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Tackling Security Challenges An overview of ISAFs Mission

Tackling Security Challenges


an overview on ISAFs Mission
January 20th 2010
Brigadier General BERGER (FRANCE)
NATO International Security Assistance Force
Overall Classification of Briefing: UNCLASSIFIED

72

ISAF Campaign
p g Plan

Brigadier General BERGER (FRANCE)


NATO International Security Assistance Force
Overall Classification of Briefing: UNCLASSIFIED

73

Purpose & Agenda


Purpose: Provide information on ISAFs Campaign Plan.
Agenda:
Assessment
Situation
Mission and Intent
Campaign Design
Concept of Operations
Risks
Key Takeaways
Pakistan
Way Ahead
Discussion

74

Strategic Assessment
Situation is serious and the conflict is complex
Resilient and growing insurgency
Lack of confidence by population stemming from weak Government of
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of
economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.

Mission can succeed but requires a fundamentally new approach


Operational culture of ISAF: focus Counter-insurgency (COIN) on winning
support of the people.
Stronger security partnership: accelerate Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) and partner at all levels.
Responsive and accountable governance: an equal priority with security.
Internal ISAF organizational changes: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort.

Time is critical. ISAF must be properly resourced to gain and


maintain the initiative while ANSF capacity and capability is built.
75

PathwaytoCampaignPlan&Requirements
NATO
Objectives1

The GIRoA is able to


exercise effectively its
security responsibilities
across the country
ANSF have become
self sufficient and are
t ki th
taking
the lead
l d in
i
security operations

Defeat:Talibanledinsurgencynolonger
Defeat
Taliban led insurgency no longer
posesanexistentialthreattoGIRoA
Insurgencyreducedtoalevelwithin
GIRoAcapacity
GIRoA/ANSFcapableofprotecting
sovereigntyfrominsurgentthreat
i
f
i
h
NATO SecGen
tasking to
Conduct Assessment3

Opposing militant
forces no longer
g pose
p
a threat to stability

COMISAF
Initial
Assessment

Overall
Assessment
Of Situation
Situation is serious
Resilient Insurgency

Notes:
p
Strategic
g Political
NATO,, Comprehensive
Military Plan for Afghanistan, 20 April 2009
Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum,
Operational Plan for ISAF (OPLAN 30302
Revision 4), 9 April 2009
SACEUR, Memorandum to JFC-B, 1 July 2009

NATO
Mi i 2
Mission

Conduct military operations to


assist GIRoA in maintaining
security in order to support the
security,
extension of government
authority and the facilitation of
reconstruction and development

Plan to Implement
NATO Strategy
Population-centric
counterinsurgency
campaign

Crisis of Confidence
among Afghans and
International Community

Grow and Develop ANSF

Mission still achievable

Improve Unity of Effort


and Command

Resource
Requirement
Analysis

Prioritize Governance

76

MilitaryAssessmentofSituation
KineticEvents

1000
Poppy
900 Winter Harvest

Ramadan

Poppy
Harvest

Winter

Ramadan Winter

Poppy
Harvest

Ramadan

800
700
600
500

01Jan05 30Sep05

400
300
200

IDF

DF

Sep 09

Jul 09

Aug 09

Jun 09

Apr 09

May 09

Mar 09

Jan 09

Feb 09

Dec 08

Oct 08

Nov 08

Sep 08

Jul 08

IED

Aug 08

Jun 08

Apr 08

May 08

Mar 08

Jan 08

Feb 08

Dec 07

Oct 07

Nov 07

Sep 07

Jul 07

Aug 07

Jun 07

Apr 07

May 07

Mar 07

Jan 07

Feb 07

100

01 Jan 07 30Sep07
01Jan07
30 Sep 07

SAFIRE

Kineticeventsareincreasingatasharprate;up300%since2007and60%since2008.
Talibaninfluenceexpanding;contestingandcontrollingadditionalareas.
TalibanProvincialShadowGovernors:2005 11of34;2007 28of34;2009 33of34.
01Jan09 30Sep09
2006

2005

11 Total

2007

20 Total

2008

28 Total

2009

31 Total

33 Total

77

ISAF Command Arrangements


COMISAF / USFOR
USFOR-A
A

COMNTM-A
/ CSTC-A

RC(N)
209 Corps

RC(W)
207 Corps

IJC

RC(C)
Capital
Division

ANS
NMCC

RC(E)
201 Corps
203 Corps

RC(S)
205 Corps

Strength
ISAF / Coalition: ~107,000
ANA: ~100.131 Operational: 63.724
ANP: ~96.377 Operational: 89.030

Composition
RC(N): 1 CO, 5 PRTs; 2 ANA BDEs
RC(W): 2 BNs, 4 PRTs; 2 ANA BDEs
RC(S): 4 BDEs(+), 4 PRTs; 4 ANA BDEs
RC(E): 5 BDEs(-), 12 PRTs; 6 ANA BDEs
RC(C): 3 BNs; 2 ANA BNs
RCs are NATO OPCON to IJC

78

Mission Statement
ISAF, in partnership with GIRoA, conducts
population-centric counterinsurgency operations,
enables an expanded and effective ANSF and
supports improved governance and development in
order to protect the Afghan people and provide a
secure environment for sustainable stability.

79

COMISAFIntent
Purpose
AssistGIRoAindefeatingtheinsurgency
ProtecttheAfghanpopulationandseparateinsurgentinfluence
Gainpopularsupportforthegovernment
Allowsustainableprogressandpromotelegitimacy
Preventthereturnoftransnationalterroristsandeliminatepotentialsafehavens
Method
Conducttheoperationinthreestages:A)GaintheInitiative;B)AchieveStrategic
Consolidation;andC)SustainSecurity.
Gaintheinitiativeandstopinsurgentmomentuminthenext1218months
EstablishclosercooperationwiththeInternationalCommunity
AchieveimprovedintegrationandCIVMILoperationalcohesion
Endstate
InsurgencydefeatedtowithinGIRoAscapacity
Legitimategovernanceextendstolocallevels
SocioeconomicprogramsbenefitthemajorityofAfghanpeople
GIRoA,withISAFsupport,iscapableofassumingtheleadforsecurity
80

Campaign Design
Lines of Operation

SECURITY
S

Partner with ANSF to secure population centers


Tailor force packages with mentor teams
Isolate INS from population
Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces


Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability

NEUTRALIZE Malign Influence


Identify corruption; assist GIRoA with detainee system
Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
Enhance Regional Cooperation
STA
ABILITY

Strategic C
Communicationss / CIV-MIL Operrational Cohesion
n

WAYS
W

PROTECT the Population

SUPPORT Extension of Governance


Increase GIRoA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Support formal and informal sub-national structures
Support provision of essential services

SUPPORT Socio-economic Development


Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
Establish education programs
Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives
Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley,
K i
Kapisa,
W d k Logar,
Wardak,
L
Z b l Uruzgan;
Zabul,
U
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and
Kunduz.
Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT
raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT
raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase
mentors, trainers, partners, funding and GIRoA
participation.
Malign actors are marginalized, illegitimate
governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced,
foreign fighter networks disrupted, development
project extortion reduced and majority of
population views GIRoA as legitimate.
Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with
civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy
established; local governance mechanisms allow for
g
RoL and legitimate,
g
responsive,
p
and
reintegration;
accountable governance extended to the population.
GIRoA revenue collection and resource distribution
mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road
networks bolster licit economy and increase
employment; incentive structures increase
stability in local communities.

Ends

Phase 3 ends
when the
insurgency is
defeated and
no longer able
to threaten the
survival of
GIRoA,
Afghanistan is
stabilized,
legitimate
governance
extends to
local levels,
socioeconomic
programs
benefit the
majority of
Afghan
people, and
GIRoA, with
ISAF in
support, is
capable of
assuming the
lead for the
provision of
security
security.

MEANS
GIRoA and ANSF
NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU

81
81

CampaignStrategy

NATO
OTAN

ProtectthePopulation.
Prioritizeeffortinhighdensitypopulationareaswhereinsurgentgroupsoperateprimarilywith
disaffectedPashtunpopulations.Reduceciviliancasualties.

EnableAfghanNationalSecurityForces.
Accelerateandexpandindigenoussecurityforcecapacityandcapability.Partnerateveryechelon.

Neutralizemaligninfluence.
Identifyandreportcorruption;forgeresponsibleandaccountablegovernance.

Supportextensionofgovernance.
Gainactivesupportofthepopulationbyempoweringlegitimatesubnationalleaderswith
effectivepopulationsecuritymeasures.

Supportsocioeconomicdevelopment.
Gainactivesupportofthepopulationbycreatingsecurityconditionsthatprovidespacefor
communitybased
community
baseddevelopmentopportunities.Connecteconomiccorridors.
development opportunities Connect economic corridors

82

NATO

OPLAN38302Rev4OperationalDesign
Gain the Initiative

Achieve Strategic
C
Consolidation
lid ti

Sustain Security
y

Stage A

Stage B

Stage C

Security

PROTECT
the Population

3
ENABLE
the ANSF

NEUTRALIZE
Malign Influence

Sta
ability

OTAN

SUPPORT
Extension of Governance

SUPPORT
Socio-Economic Development

12

11

13

10

14

15

1 PROTECT the Population

2 ENABLE the ANSF

3 NEUTRALIZE Malign
Influence

4 SUPPORT Governance

5 SUPPORT Development

Partnered population
security measures stabilize
designated areas

Accelerated ANSF growth


plan complete; sustainment
ongoing

Malign actors are


marginalized, population
views GIRoA as legitimate

Legitimate, responsive, and


accountable governance is
extended to the population

Focused community
development bolsters
popular support for GIRoA

7. Effective IO campaign
implemented
8 Corruption reduced to a
8.
culturally acceptable level
9. Effective border control
established
10. Narco-INS-Criminal nexus
and confluence of Narco-GIRoA
corruption suppressed

11. Afghan population


recognizes GIRoA as a
culturally ideologically
culturally,
acceptable government
12. Effective rule of law in place

13. Essential services provided


to key areas
14 Basic infrastructure
14.
requirements met
15. Sustainable, functioning
economy established

1. Support for ISAF mission


5. ANSF demonstrates basic
solidified
capability
2 Partnered security measures 6.
2.
6 ANSF is self
self-sustaining
sustaining
effective in key areas
3. Key areas stabilized
4. INS suppressed to an
acceptable level

83
83

ConceptofOperations

NATO
OTAN

Operations impact the highest percentage of population affected by the insurgency.


insurgency
Economyofforce. Containthe
insurgencyincontestedareas;
expandgovernanceand
d l
developmentefforts.
t ff t

SupportingEffort. Generate
politicalacceptancefor
governanceanddevelopment
commensuratewithsecurity.
ShapingEffort. Denyinsurgent
freedomofmovement;improve
bordersecurityandpreparefor
decisiveoperations.
Key Population Centers
Main Effort
Supporting Effort
Shaping Effort
Economy of Force

Main Effort. Clearhigh


MainEffort.
Clear highpopulation
populationareasdirectly
areas directly
threatenedbytheinsurgency;separateinsurgentsfrom
populationincontestedareas;establishcampaign
credibilityandresolve.
84

ComprehensiveApproach

Regiona
al Strateg
gy

Central
Asia

Increase Regional Stability

India

Russia

B ild Trust
Build
T t

Reduce threats to stability


Reduce Safehavens

Pakistan

D f t Al Qaeda
Defeat
Q d

Defeat Insurgency
Increase ability
to govern and
develop
capacity
i
al
tion cal
a
N liti
Po ffort
E

l
na
o
i
t
rna unity o
e
t
In mm rs t y
co rtne curit
pa d se nce
a
il
bu vern d nt
o
g
an me
op y
vel pacit
e
d ca

Security Zones

OTAN
Expanding Stability

Enhance Cooperation

China

Iran

NATO

hip
s
r
e
ad
e
al L
s
n
o
trie
ti
s
a
i
N
Min
nce
A
a
o
n
ver
GI R
o
al G
n
atio
n
ety
i
c
b
o
Su
il S
v
i
C

le
ta b
n
u
co an
Ac Afgh ers e
d
v
lea onsi
p
e
res to th les
op
pe eeds
n

2014

Afghan population
gains trust and
confidence leading
to suppo
supportt for
o
GIRoA

2009
85

StruggleforthePopulation
MostThreatenedPopulationAreas
p
(Present)

EssentialSecurityInfluence
Essential
Security Influence
(2014)

PreventGIRoAdevelopmentandinfluence
Limitpopulationabilitytochoose

Createtimeandspace
Enablepopulationopportunitytochoose

ElementsofInsurgentInfluence
El
t fI
t I fl
Shadowgovernance
Populationintimidatedand/orcoerced
InsurgentshaveFreedomofMovement
FriendlyFreedomofMovementlimited
F i dl F d
fM
t li it d
Infrastructuredevelopmentdisrupted
Economiccapacitytruncated

ElementsofSecurityInfluence
Elements
of Security Influence
Nationalthrulocalgovernanceimproved
Securityinkeypopulationcenters
Securityconnectedbetweenregions
FriendlyFreedomofMovementassured
Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
Majorinfrastructureprojectsongoing
Economiccorridorsustainable
86
86

ISAF Focus District Overview


Limited capacity requires focused prioritization of resources

Summary
Total: 80
Annual Growth Projections:
2009 25
2010 45 (20 more)
2011 70 (25 more)
2012 80 (10 more)
2013 80
2014 80

The districts in the area outside of the identified focus districts have varying
degrees of threat and security. It is possible that security, governance and
development activities take place. However, weight of effort and prioritzation
should orient on the focus districts.

Selection Criteria:
Density of population
Threatened Population
Nature of threat
Impact to stability
Infrastructure
Governance capacity
Economic potential
Relationship to adjacent
population centers
Relationship to national /
regional economic corridors
87

Risks
GIRoA:
Failure to provide accountable, legitimate and responsive governance.

ANSF:
Lack of capacity due to poor recruiting, retention and high attrition.
Failure to develop operationally effective COIN forces.

International Community:
Failure to effectively unify governance and development efforts.
Lack of flexibility to reconfigure and create strategic effects.

NATO and Troop Contributing Nations:


Inability / unwillingness to conduct effective ISAF COIN campaign.
Reluctance to sustain long
long-term
term commitment and resources.
resources
88

Key Takeaways
Analysis indicates:
indicates:
The insurgency presently has the initiative and the population perceives it.
it
Expansion of the insurgency is outpacing GIRoAs capacity to contain it.
Success requires that we control a significant percentage of the population and
regain the initiative.
Feasible ANSF growth alone cannot contain the insurgency before 2012/2013.
Risk increases over time if force levels are insufficient
Insufficient force levels dont accomplish the mission slower....
they don
dontt accomplish the mission at all.
Additional Coalition Forces are required between 2009-2011 to gain momentum,
buy time for ANSF generation, and overmatch the insurgency.

89

Why does Pakistan matter?


RESTRICTED RUSSIAN AIRSPACE
KIR

UZB

CHINA

HIG
ALQ

HQN

1100km

TLB

760km

Seaport of debarkation S
Airport of debarkation

ISAF supplies

30%

90

Pakistan Social divides

91

Relationship with Afghanistan

2009
HIG
HQN

ALQ

2009

TLB

92

Importance of Pakistan
Triple crisis:
Political instability
Economic crisis
Indigenous Taliban movement

Pakistan = key terrain to sustain fight vs. AQ


TLB sanctuaries
sanct aries
Ambivalent attitude
P ki t long
Pakistan
l
term
t
interest
i t
t in
i Afghanistan?
Af h i t ?

93

Conclusion 1/2

NATO
OTAN

Major issues to consider:


1) Potential for nations to withdraw on a time line (18 months)
before the conditions are suitable;
2) Constrained timeline (18 months to demonstrate
momentum).
momentum)

Important challenges still remain:


1)
2))
3)
4)

30 000 US force flow plus 7 000 from other NATO Nations;


Growing
g the ANSF ((instruction and training);
g);
Intensification of cooperating with Pakistan;
International Community (IC) commitment (44 Nations ).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

94

Conclusion 2/2

NATO
OTAN

Sense of the commitment of the IC in Afghanistan:


1) Support the Afghan people (ISAF);
g
the Insurgents;
g
2)) War against
3) Prevent Afghanistan becoming a safe heaven and
a support base for Al-Qaeda.

W are also
We
l iin AFG to
t gain
i our own security
it

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

95

Discussion

96

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

ISAF

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SUMMIT


An overview of ISAF Mission
I t b l TUR
Istanbul
20 January 2010
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

Col. ITA97A Mario LUPPA

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

ISAF Mission

ISAF, in partnership with Government of


Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan (GIRoA),
enables an expands an effective Afghan
y Forces and supports
pp
National Security
improved governance and development in
order to protect the Afghan people and
provide
id a secure environment
i
t ffor sustainable
t i bl
stability.
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

98

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

ComprehensiveApproach

Regiona
al Strateg
gy

Central
Asia

Increase Regional Stability

India

Enhance Cooperation

China

Iran

Russia

B ild Trust
Build
T t

Reduce threats to stability


Reduce Safehavens

Pakistan

D f t Al Qaeda
Defeat
Q d

Defeat Insurgency
Increase ability
to govern and
develop
capacity
i
al
tion cal
a
N liti
Po ffort
E

l
na
o
i
t
rna unity o
e
t
In mm rs t y
co rtne curit
pa d se nce
a
il
bu vern d nt
o
g
an me
op y
vel pacit
e
d ca

Expanding Stability

hip
s
r
e
ad
e
al L
s
n
o
trie
ti
s
a
i
N
Min
nce
A
a
o
n
ver
GI R
o
al G
n
atio
n
ety
i
c
b
o
Su
il S
v
i
C

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

le
ta b
n
u
co an
Ac Afgh ers e
d
v
lea onsi
p
e
res to th les
op
pe eeds
n

Afghan population
gains trust and
confidence leading
to support for
G
GIRoA

99

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

Where Stability Fits


CIVILIAN

MILITARY

Engaging partners & influencing


their stability decisions supporting
th ISAF C
the
Campaign
i Pl
Plan

COMISAF

Integrated with HQ Staff to


synchronize stability into
security
it planning
l
i

GIRoA
DCOS STAB

UNAMA & UN

Dep DCOS Stab

HQ ISAF Staff
St ff
International
Community:
Embassies
Embassies,
Aid Agencies

Dir Dev

Dir Gov

Plans and Policy

OPERATIONAL COMMANDS
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

100

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

Essential Elements of Progress

DEVELOPMENT

SECURITY

ENDSTATE

GOALS

OBJECTIVES

GOVERNANCE

LONG TERM

MID TERM
MID

Partnership
with
responsive &
responsive&
accountable
GIRoAleaders

Improvement
inGIRoA
competence
andcapacity

GIRoA
responsive
and
accountable
to
population

Strategic
prioritization
prioritization
ofobjectives

International
International
unityofeffort

Afghan
Afghan
Ministries
planand
allocate
donor
funding

Quickimpact
community
focus

Momentum
ofinsurgency
is reversed
isreversed

Denationalize
donor
contributions

ANSF
capacityand
capability
expanded
through
through
partnership

GIRoAhas
sufficient
security
capacity

Afghan
population
p
p
supports
GIRoA

Significant
iincreasein
i
privatesector
investment
Increasein
GDP

GIRoAhas
effective
controlof
Afghan
Afghan
territory

Afghanistan
recognizedas
credible
credible
regional
partner

Sustainable
economic
growthand
development

Afghanistan
isnotasafe
haven to AQ
haventoAQ

Capacityy

Taliban

2009

2011

2013

2015

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

2017

2019

101

Saf
afeandSStableAffghanisttan

NEAR TERM

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

Natural Resources
Mines/Resources
Gas
Coal
Asbestos
Barite

Lithium
Salt
Lapis lazuli

ruby

Chilkonsar,
Samti Gold

Natural Gas
Emerald
Plaster
Peat

Resources

Copper- East, West & Southern Provinces est.240 M metricSary-Sang,


tons
Lapiz
lazuli
mine
Gold- Badakshan & Panj River Valley ca 25 metric tons
Iron
Iron Ore-Hajigak
Ore Hajigak Bamyan Province est.60 billon metric tons
P
Panshir
hi valley,
ll
Jangalikan-Gas
Emerald mines
w/coal
JumarGas nearby
Kashkari-oil
Gemstones- Emerald, Ruby, Sapphire, Lapis Lazuli
Hajigak
(80%illegalexport India/Pak)
I
Iron
Ore
O
Petroleum- Afghan-Tajik Basin 1.5 B Barrels of crude
& Coal
Natural Gas- Amu Darya Basin 400 B Cubic meters of NG
Jegdalek,
560 Mbbl Liquid Natural Gas
Aynak
Ruby Mine
Oil
Iron
Copper

Gold
Mercury
Pewter

Zarkashan,
Gold

Copper
C
Mine

Industrial Sites
Cotton
Textile
Food
Sugar

Chemical Sites
Steel

Power station
Power station
Pi li (G
Pipeline
(Gas))

Construction material

Cement

Gold
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

102

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

Afghan Border Crossing Points


Towraghundi

Aquina

Ai
Khanem

Sher Khan

Heyratan

Nusay

X
ABP Zone 5

Shegnan

X
ABP Zone 4

Eshkeshem

MeS Intl Airport

ABP HQ

Islam Qalah

Zone 5

ABP Zone 1

Kabul Intl Airport

Herat Intl Airport

Zone 4

Torkham
Gate/Torkham
BCC

Zone 1

Zone 3

Zone 2

Mile 78

Gulam Khan
X
ABP Zone 2

Qandahar Intl Airport

Zaranj

Weesh-Chaman

ABP Zone 3

Border Coordination Center (BCC)

Bahram Chah

Inland Customs Depot


Spin Boldak BCC

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

103

103

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

Stability Relationships with UNAMA, IC & UN


COM

ISAF

SRSG

UNAMA

Human Rights
Norah Niland

COS

DCOS STAB

DIR GOV

DSRSG Pillar I
Political Affairs
[Vacant]

DSRSG Pillar II
Relief, Humanit.
Robert Watkins

Pol. Affairs Div.


T. Masadykov

Special Adv.
on DEV
Mark Ward
Donor/Aid Eff.
Anja De Beer

DIR DEV
Plans&
Policy

DEV Chiefs

Coord Officer
Cris Stephen

Governance
Hassan Elhaq
Rule of Law
Stephanie Mcphail

GOV Chiefs

Election Spt
Knut Kristie
UNOCHA

UNICEF

UNDP

UNHCR

WFP

UNOPS

HABITAT

UNDSS

UNODC

UNFPA

WHO

UN

FAO

Military Adv.
Brig Gen Tim Lai
Police Adv.
Khuda Chowdry
Dr. Karp

Weekly average of 10 engagements with UNAMA & UN Organizations


104
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED

ISAF

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SUMMIT


An overview of ISAF Mission
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

105

International Security Assistance Force


Headquarters ISAF
ISAF, Kabul
ISAF Director of Development
Stability Division

P t S
Peter
S. Argo
A
Office: IVSN 686-1130
Cell: +93 (0) 797 777 356
Email: peter.argo@hq.isaf.nato.int
106