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ROUNDUP
In This Issue T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s
The current state of The reformed Indian The multi-tiered nature of
preparedness is very low defence procurement terrorism and its roots in
for AAD and it would regime has singularly failed Pakistan would have to
require strong leadership to deliver. Last seven years be tackled by Islamabad
at the decision-making makes a dismal reading. through some proactive
level to steer the ship Not a single contract has measures on all fronts.
of modernisation to its been signed in an open Piecemeal solutions will
logical end competition. not suffice.

LT GENERAL (RETD) MAJOR GENERAL BRIGADIER (RETD)

8 NARESH CHAND 10 (RETD) MRINAL SUMAN 7 RAHUL BHONSLE

E d i torial Messages
Messages
The Parliamentary
standing committee
on defence, in its
report tabled in Lok
Sabha on December DI
RE
CTOR GENER
AL

16, has found fault

with the government

SE

NT
OR DA

NI
MINISTER OF DEFENCE CO AN
LO NEL COMM
for not implementing INDIA

I
the recommendation

regarding the creation
of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), among
other issues. “The committee fails to
understand the lack of political consen-
sus on such an important issue concern-
ing the nation’s security,” it observed.
In their February 2001 recommen-
dations on “Reforming the National
Security System”, the Group of Ministers
had stated: “The COSC (Chiefs of Staff
Committee) has not been effective in
fulfilling its mandate. It needs to be
strengthened by the addition of a CDS
and a VCDS.” With greater emphasis on
joint and integrated operations in the
future, the system had to be reorganised
with a CDS and a VCDS, together with
an integrated staff, to render “Single
Point Military Advice” to the government
to administer the Strategic Forces, to
enhance the efficiency and effective-
ness of the planning process through
intra- and inter-service prioritisation, and
to ensure the required “jointness” in the
armed forces.
Prioritisation of funds, lack of “joint-
I
am happy to learn that you are publishing the SP’s Land Forces-Indian Army Special.
have been a regular reader of your publication titled ‘SP Land Forces’. I have
Indian Army has done commendable work during warlike situations and during peace.
The pressure on our land borders has always been immense. The Army has stood up to the found the contents of your magazine very professional, informative and well researched,
as also, the opinions, where expressed, are unbiased and impartial. Yet another strength
occasion each time in warding off various challenges.
of your magazine are the interviews of distinguished personalities. These are invariably
Modernisation and indigenisation of the Army is a top priority. At the same time, there well documented and provide a fair share of the author’s views.
is an urgent need to take more measures for the welfare of the Jawans, including their living
I find the publication a ‘must read’ for all professionals in the field.
and working conditions.
Wishing you every success in the future.
I hope the publication will be read and appreciated by one and all.
Please accept my best wishes for your future endeavours.
(Ram Pratap)
Lieutenant General
(A.K. Antony) Director General
Excl u s i v e I n t e r v i ew

‘Work
ness”, and lack of tri-service network
centricity are even today adversely
affecting the operational efficiency of
the armed forces and can embarrass the
nation in the future as indeed it did in
the 1962 conflict wherein the Indian Air
Force (IAF) stayed out. During the Kargil

on Defence
conflict, the need for government clear-
ance for participation of the IAF, and
the spat between the army and the IAF,
inordinately delayed the use of air power.
Considering the fact that it was to be

Communication
used in own territory and in own air-
space, the delay was inexcusable. Later,
the then IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal
A.Y. Tipnis, acceded in an article that
“there was total lack of army-air force
Photographs: Ratan Sonal

Network by 2011’
joint staff work”.
Are these two instances not enough
to spur the political leadership to adopt
the CDS system? Or do we still feel that
wars are better fought by committees
such as the pusillanimous COSC, which
even in peacetime dithers and delays
important issues due to turf tending? Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor, PVSM, AVSM,
SM, VSM, ADC, in a conversation with SP’s Editor-in-Chief Jayant
Baranwal and SP’s Land Forces Editor Lieutenant General (Retd)
V.K. Kapoor, flags the modernisation efforts and other significant
Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor developments in the Indian Army
6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 1

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): The global
and regional security environment
is evolving dynamically, giving rise
to new forms of security challenges.
Considering the specific threats and
challenges that exist in our region, the
Indian Army will have to be prepared to
face these, covering the entire spectrum
of warfare. That said, the army’s pace of
modernisation and restructuring/trans-
formation in relation to likely adver-
saries and future challenges seems to be
way too sluggish. Your views.
Chief of the Army Staff (COAS):
Modernisation or transformation of any
army is a complex and dynamic process
influenced by national security objectives
and strategy, appreciated future threats,
changing nature of conflict and emerg-
ing technologies. It is also impacted by
the defence procurement process as well
as budgetary concerns. Military capabil-
ity development process is a long drawn
exercise, wherein existing force structure,
maintenance of right mix of latest and
legacy equipment and gestation periods
of assimilation of new equipment are
assessed against the capabilities desired.
Accordingly, the formulation of long term
perspective plans (covering a 15-year peri-
od), service capital acquisition plans (five-
year period) and annual acquisition plans
are progressed. We are on course to ensure
we have the desired capabilities to counter
potential threats. Any perception that the
Indian Army’s modernisation and restruc-
turing is sluggish would be inappropriate.
A number of measures have been
instituted to ensure optimal fruition of
our modernisation plans. Streamlining
of the procurement process has been a
major achievement. The revised Defence
Procurement Procedure now lays down
definite timelines for various activities
involved in the procurement process. Let
me assure you that we have evolved a
transparent, accountable and responsive
framework to provide the desired impetus
to modernisation of the army in the long
term perspective.
SP’s: Over the past one-and-half
years, you have as the COAS visited
Bangladesh, France, UK and the US,
among other countries. What are the
major areas of defence cooperation with
each of these nations?
COAS: Defence Cooperation and engage-
ment with friendly foreign countries is a
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
vital tool of attaining our overall foreign
policy objectives. Our defence cooperation
with friendly foreign countries has grown
exponentially in the past few years and
is being implemented based on the poli-
cies of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and
Ministry of External Affairs. These defence
cooperation activities include joint train-
ing/exercises, subject matter expertise and
faculty exchanges of training institutes,
high/functional level visits and sports/
adventure activities. Many of these activi-
2 SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09
ties are carried out within
institutionalised defence
mechanisms specific to a
friendly foreign country.
Bangladesh is our friendly
neighbour and shares
maritime and land frontiers
and has historic, cultural,
religious and civilisational
links. Army-to-army contacts
between the two nations are
bound to give fillip to people-
to-people contact between
the two nations. Defence
cooperation with Bangladesh
is essential in maintaining
peace, stability and security in
South Asia. Extensive defence
cooperation activities have
now been institutionalised,
with the inaugural army-to-
army staff talks having been
conducted recently.
France, UK, the US and India have
convergence of interests on various mul-
tifaceted issues of mutual interest and
concerns. Institutionalised mechanisms
are in place for a wide spectrum of engage-
ments with these nations to enhance our
military capabilities. The ongoing bilateral
joint exercises among the armies of India
and UK, India and the US, and the partici-
pation of our marching contingent at the
last National Day Celebrations in France is
indicative of our growing defence activities
which are mutually beneficial.
SP’s: The horizontal and the vertical envel-
op of the army’s operations is increasing
and exploitation of space for military pur-
pose is a trend which the Indian Army can-
not afford to ignore. How are various space
vectors being developed to optimise the
army’s operational capabilities? What are
your views on a Military Space Command
and why has this command not been sanc-
tioned till date?
COAS: Space is emerging as a vital fron-
tier of warfare and its exploitation will
be crucial in future military operations.
Space based applications include satellite
imagery, navigation, signal intelligence,
telecommunications, early warning and
meteorology applications. Satellite based
sensors will provide real time situational
awareness across the spectrum of conflict.
The Indian Army is the largest user of such
space based applications and adequate
measures are being taken to gradually
enhance our capabilities to exploit space
for military applications.
The Indian Army already has a
dedicated Space Cell to implement vari-
ous space related initiatives. As future
operations will be prosecuted in a single
battle space, exploitation of space will
need to be jointly coordinated and con-
trolled. Towards that end, Headquarters
Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) already
has a Joint Space Cell, coordinating the
requirements of all three services. As our
capabilities and requirements increase,
there will be a need to upgrade to a Tri-
Service Military Space Command.
SP’s: Employment of unmanned ground
and aerial vehicles (UGVs and UAVs,
respectively) has added a new dimension
to combat. What measures have been
taken to acquire this capability for the
Indian Army?
COAS: Airborne surveillance capabilities
by means of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
have been acquired for the command the-
atres of the army. Certain voids are being
addressed with additional procurement of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The Defence
Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) has developed a short range
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Nishant) which
is being evaluated for induction into the
army. There are certain shortcomings at
present which are being addressed by the
DRDO. In the current plan, the DRDO is in
the process of developing an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle system capable of operating
in High Altitude area. This is likely to fruc-
tify in the 12th Army Plan.
SP’s: Since October 2001, when Operation
Enduring Freedom was launched by
the US in Afghanistan in response to
September 11 attacks, till date, the
Afghanistan–Pakistan region has gained
considerable notoriety. Resurgence of
the Taliban and al-Qaeda, despite the
US and NATO military operations in
this region, has remained politically
unstable. At present, India is helping
Afghanistan in infrastructural develop-
ment. Considering India’s national inter-
est, what role do you see for India and the
Indian Army in the future?
COAS: India and Afghanistan share a
strategic partnership based on histori-
cal and cultural ties. We have an abiding
interest in the security and stability of
Afghanistan. The focus of Indian assis-
tance to Afghanistan has been on infra-
structure development, humanitarian aid
and strengthening of political, social and
economic institutions of Afghanistan. The
principal objective is to build indigenous
Afghan capacities and institutions for
effective governance. Our assistance pro-
gramme of $1.2 billion (Rs 5,625 crore),
modest from the standpoint of Afghan
needs, is the sixth largest. Our socio-eco-
nomic assistance programmes are being
implemented in close coordination with
the Afghan government, and are spread
across Afghanistan.
The Indian Army has been rendering
assistance in training officers and men
of the Afghan National Army (ANA) on
various courses and disciplines, including
media, information technology and English
language. We have also offered our train-
ing establishments for training of ANA
units/sub-units. Our military assistance
to the ANA in terms of military hardware
consisting of vehicles, bullet proof vests
and head gears, uniforms and medicine
has been significant. In the future, we look
forward to closer cooperation with the
ANA to provide the necessary assistance to
create a strong Afghan army that can inde-
pendently secure the country.
SP’s: How is the Indian Army balanc-
ing the dual demand for futuristic force
development, with investment in current
technology that ensures operational pre-
paredness, and a mix of old, contempo-
rary and futuristic technologies?
COAS: Futuristic force development and
modernisation of the army is based on the
military capabilities development strategy
in line with the national aims and objec-
tives. The Army Long Term Perspective
Plan aims at keeping the force in the right
shape and size while seeking to transform
it into an optimally equipped and respon-
sive force capable of operating across the
spectrum of conflict. The modernisation
programme envisages a 30:40:30 ratio of
a generational mix of weapons and equip-
ment. This comprises 30 per cent state-
of-the-art, 40 per cent contemporary and
30 per cent equipment of old version. The
focus is on the development of balanced
force capability to include a right mix of
key technologies and force multipliers.
SP’s: As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee (COSC), are there any areas
in which you would like to see a greater
inter-services synergy?
COAS: ‘Synergy’ is aimed at obtaining
optimal “operational” and “administra-
tive cost effectiveness” in the current and
envisaged future geopolitical environment.
As the current Chairman COSC, one of my
primary objectives has been to promote
‘Functional Jointness’ within the services.
There has been impetus given to ‘Jointness’
among the services in various operational
and non-operational spheres of the armed
forces by integrating policy, doctrine, war
fighting and procurement by employing a
joint and synergetic approach. It has been
my effort to change the thought process of
safeguarding respective service interests to
a holistic approach in enhancing overall
defence capability.
SP’s: India’s failure to evolve responses to
Pakistan’s asymmetric provocations has
seriously eroded the nation’s deterrence
and credibility. Do you feel that there is a
need to change this policy and, if so, what
additional capability would the Indian
Army require for a more assertive and
offensive response?
COAS: It is wrong to presume that the
Indian Army has not worked out any
response options to counter Pakistan’s
asymmetric threats. However, a decision
to exercise military option in a democracy
has to be based on the overall strategy
of the nation to meet such challenges,
which include synergy between other
instruments of the state. Necessary capa-
bility and plans are very much in place to
respond to these challenges as and when
the Indian Army is asked to execute a
military option.
SP’s: For effective jointmanship, officers
of the three services and certain other
government agencies must be trained
in the art of formulating national
and military strategy, and in apply-
ing operational art to achieve political
objectives of war with least cost to your
own side. For this and for higher educa-
tion in defence and security studies, the
armed forces require an Indian National
Defence University (INDU) and a National
Wargaming Centre (NWC). What is the
delay in raising the INDU and what are
your views on the NWC?
COAS: There is no disputing that establish-
ment of the INDU is of vital importance to
inculcate a much needed strategic thought
culture among all practitioners of national
security in our country. The Committee
on National Defence University has delib-
erated this need in great detail, wherein
establishment of the INDU, to include
institutions such as a National War gam-
ing Centre and Centre for Strategic Studies,
amongst a host of other affiliated institu-
tions, has been spelt out.
There has been a considerable delay in
the establishment of the INDU due to vari-
ous reasons. However, both the MoD and
HQ IDS are undertaking concerted action
to bring the project to fructification at the
earliest. Besides identifying the location at
Binola in Gurgaon district, Haryana, the
concerned authorities are engaged with
finalisation of the draft to be presented to
the Cabinet for “in principle” approval.
SP’s: Does the Indian Army have any plans
to push indigenous development of weap-
ons and other systems on the pattern of the
Indian Navy? What are your views in this
regard and has the army created any news
organisation to oversee this vital issue?
COAS: The requirements of the army and
naval weapon systems cannot be compared.
Naval platforms are large and involve inte-
gration of large systems from diverse sources,
while the army needs numerous diverse and
independent systems. Impetus is being given
to indigenous development of army weapons
and equipment, whenever feasible. However,
the effort is limited by lack of adequate
expertise in defence production in the local
market. It is envisaged that with continued
effort, there will be improvement in defence
technology in private sector. Existing organi-
sations and functional fora are adequate to
guide the indigenisation process.
SP’s: In the absence of the Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS), it is felt that the HQ
IDS is nothing but an enlarged Defence
Planning Staff, which was its forerunner.
Your comments.
Continued on page 4
G R E AT P E R F O R MANCES.

SMALL “ITEMS”.

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS.

 ‘Work on Defence Communication Network by 2011’ continued from page 2

COAS: Based on the report of the
Kargil Review Committee, the Group of
Ministers in their February 2001 report
had recommended the creation of a CDS.
In the interim, HQ IDS was established
on October 1, 2001 to function as the
advisory staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of
Staff Committee. This HQ has achieved
immense success in its experiment with
vertical as well as horizontal integration in
all its branches. HQ IDS and the Services
HQ have been jointly developing various
joint war fighting doctrines and concepts,
evident from the number of joint doc-
trines that have recently been published,
namely, the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious
Operations and Joint Special Forces
Operations Doctrine. In addition, a num-
ber of other doctrines are currently under
formulation. The HQ is today responsible
for the integration that is now being
achieved in the formulation of the ‘Long
Term Integrated Perspective Plan (2012-
2027)’ encompassing the 12th, 13th and
14th Plans for capability development of
the armed forces as a whole.
Besides this, the establishment of the
Defence Intelligence Agency and creation
of the tri-service Strategic Forces Command
and Andaman and Nicobar Command have
demonstrated the capability and efficacy for
integrated operational planning and execu-
tion. However, these are only a few steps,
albeit important ones, in the right direction
and a good evolutionary base has now been
created to further move towards achieving
true tri-service synergy.
SP’s: How long will it take for the armed
forces to become network centric? What is
the delay in establishing the much talked
about Defence Communication Network?
COAS: The Indian armed forces have
initiated processes to transform from a
conventional warfare centric to a network
enabled force. Our ultimate aim is, of
Warm Gestures: Greeting the COAS during the interview
course, to be a complete network centric
force. This is an ongoing process which will
involve adopting niche technologies within
the organisation that need time. The
Request for Proposal for Project Defence
Communication Network has recently
been issued to the shortlisted vendors. The
contract is likely to be signed by December
2010. The project is very much on track
and we hope to commence executing this
project by January 2011.
SP’s: Have plans to make the army’s Special
Forces more potent and effective fructified?
COAS: The requirement of Special Forces
and their concept of employment are peri-
odically reviewed and changes made to
meet our operational requirements. Keeping
in view future operations, our Special Forces
are being modernised to include consolida-
tion of existing assets and procurement
of state-of-the-art equipment and train-
ing facilities. Decision has been taken to
enhance the strength of Special Forces
keeping in view our future requirements.
Equipping of existing units is also under
progress as per our modernisation plan.
SP’s: What are the long term plans for the
Rashtriya Rifles (RR) which has proved
its mettle in counter insurgency (CI) oper-
ations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)?
COAS: The RR was primarily raised to
undertake CI operations and augment
the field force during warlike situations.
At present, the RR constitutes the bed-
rock of counter terrorism operations in
J&K. While the security forces through
relentless operations have substantially
controlled the violence level in the state,
the terror infrastructure is active and the
terrorist threat remains real. The RR will
continue to be employed in its primary
role in J&K till there is asymmetric threat
to our national security and simultane-
ously remain prepared for its assigned role
in conventional operations.
SP’s: The defence procurement process is
still far from satisfactory and is one of
the major reasons for the delay in capa-
bility building of the armed forces. What
is being done to refine the process?
COAS: Capital acquisition for moderni-
sation of defence forces is a continu-
ous process, with an endeavour being
made to expedite acquisition process of
military hardware to maintain a tech-
nologically updated army. As per the
Defence Procurement Procedure 2008
(Amendment 2009), normal laid down
period for acquisition of any new military
hardware involving trials is 36 months.
However, at times there are delays due to
technical and procedural processes, lead-
ing to time overruns.
With a view to further streamline/
accelerate the defence procurement
process, the defence procurement pro-
cedure is revised from time to time and
adequate monitoring mechanism has
been instituted to expedite procurement.
The last updated version of the Defence
Procurement Procedure came into effect
on November 1.
SP’s: Is there a likelihood of the army get-
ting drawn into India’s internal security
problems, such as the Naxal militancy
described by Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh as the “the single biggest internal
security challenge ever faced by our coun-
try”? Do you feel that the paramilitary
and the state police of concerned states
will be able to manage on their own?
What sort of assistance are the armed
forces providing at present?
COAS: The Naxal menace and the chal-
lenge it poses to the nation’s internal secu-
rity is well known. However, it is felt that the
Central Paramilitary Forces and state police,
suitably trained, equipped and re-oriented,
will be able to meet this challenge. Towards
this, all assistance is being provided to the
state police and paramilitary forces in terms
of advice, training and guidance. I am confi-
dent that they are quite capable of counter-
ing the challenge at hand. SP

I n dustr y Spea k

‘India safer than most countries

of the emerging world’
Robert R. Amsterdam’s crusade centres around homeland security and its role in maintaining secure
borders in a terrorism-hit world. In his 25 years of practice, Amsterdam, a Canadian International lawyer
and founding partner of the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff, has handled numerous international business
disputes in a variety of emerging markets. With an active trade and subsidy practice, Amsterdam has
both defended and prosecuted cases for and against governments and corporations. One of the few
lawyers in the world good at taking on the state “when the state starts acting like a criminal”,
Amsterdam has worked in countries as diverse as Hungary, Nigeria, Venezuela and Guatemala, and
is deeply experienced with politically sensitive cases.
SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What do you lem in most parts of the world. And India port combat operations. way we think but from an organisational
mean by the state going rogue? is no exception. perspective how we are to function in the
Robert R. Amsterdam (Amsterdam): SP’s: How could the role of security agen- future. This is for the government to decide.
No, it is not the state going rogue, but the SP’s: What is the role of private security in cies be extended to help police in main- But I feel an advanced training in bomb
state becoming a criminal. In challenging maintaining efficient homeland security? taining law and order? disposal, and so on, could be undertaken.
cases, which often involve the conduct of Amsterdam: The idea behind private secu- Amsterdam: A private security agency is an Tie-ups with defence forces for such pro-
the sovereign state, clients across the world rity agencies is quite old. Managing global organisation that provides security services grammes could be made.
need to be represented. These cases involve risk is a very important task and today, the to other corporations and the public at large.
complex issues and include corporate com- rules of the game are changing. It is impor- Security services generally employ guards to SP’s: How can the security of high-profile
mercial litigation, corporate restructuring tant to have security educated citizens and protect buildings or installations from unau- risk zones, like airports, residences of state
to human rights advocacy and in emerging understand the role of private security in a thorised access, deterring criminal activity heads or government offices, be protected
markets. We take a local perspective and country’s security. India’s growth, both as through armed or unarmed patrol and sur- by private security?
integrate it into an international strategy, a regional and international power, with a veillance, carrying out safety measures such Amsterdam: Many countries are doing
working with counsel or as counsel to pro- disturbed environment in its vicinity makes as assisting in evacuations and providing it and have been happy with the services.
vide logical, clear and multi-dimensional it more important for creation of this close protection services to VIPs. One-to-one More should try.
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

advice anywhere in the world.
SP’s: Does India exist in your list of rogue
states?
Amsterdam: Not at all. India is safer
than most of the countries of the emerg-
ing world. I work in many countries
where the rule of law is a caricature. In
India, it is not so. But the country does
not seem to be aware of these advantages.
The common man must assert in the fight
against corruption, which is a state prob-
awareness in the common man.
SP’s: How would this force help in intel-
ligence gathering?
Amsterdam: In terms of their inter-
national role and their role in helping
governments meet basic security respon-
sibilities, private security agencies are
contracted to assist in intelligence gath-
ering operations, to provide security for
government officials travelling in combat
zones and, in some cases, to directly sup-
interactions with the beat constable would
help in conveying information with security
repercussions. There are more private secu-
rity guards than police in most cities. It is
almost impossible for the police force to be
everywhere all the time. They could keep a
watch on the movement of people and in case
they notice something fishy, they could report
to the police so that action can be initiated.
SP’s: How can security guards fight terror?
Amsterdam: 9/11 not only changed the
SP’s: Which are these countries?
Amsterdam: The US, Iraq, Afghanistan,
many African and South American countries.
SP’s: When will the concept of private
military come up?
Amsterdam: It is a much debated topic
worldwide. It will probably become an
important futuristic development.
—By Our Special Correspondent

4 SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

 Milit ar y-Histor y
Indian Army Through The Ages
Defence of a nation and development are complementary. If India
aspires to be a regional and global economic power, its military power
must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests.
L T G ENERAL (R ETD ) V.K. K APOOR
E
arly military history of India is a
chronicle of the nation’s princely
kingdoms constantly at war with
each other and this motivated their
thinking, with the resultant lack of unity
against foreign invaders. Thus, the Indian
saga of battles against all invaders, including
the British, is replete with tales of tactical
level battles showcasing the personal bravery
of kings and princes which lacked strategic
level thinking and planning. From the lesson
of these wars it also becomes clear that the
military leaders of India’s princely kingdoms
did not understand the importance of battle-
field mobility and the need to evolve new
concepts and to have new weapons synchro-
nised into a new art of warfare to confront
more skillful opponents.
The British era of the Indian Army
lasted for nearly 200 years. Major Stringer
Lawrence was the first army officer appoint-
ed Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of all the
East India Company’s forces in 1752. He
can, thus, be deemed as the “Father of the
Indian Army”. The forces then comprised
Europeans recruited from England or locally
and Indian auxiliaries. These Indians were
armed with their own weapons, wore their
own uniform and were commanded by their
own officers. The events of 1857 are too
well known to be recounted in any detail in
this brief focus on the Indian Army. A Royal
Commission appointed in July 1858 sug-
gested that the army in India be composed
mainly of Indian troops with a proportion
of Indian to British being 2:1. By 1863,
the actual numbers were 3,15,500 Indian
and 38,000 British troops. Step by step, the
three Presidency Armies were amalgamated
and the process was completed by 1895.
With the overall control of the Indian
Empire being vested in the Crown, the impe-
rial strategy for the defence of India envis-
aged a wide cordon sanitaire to give depth
to this jewel in the crown. Afghanistan,
Tibet and Burma were the immediate buf-
fers, while the global dominance of the
British Navy of the time allowed it even
further outposts like Hong Kong, Singapore,
Aden and Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea.
Pax Britannica was at its zenith and the
core was India.
Era of the World Wars
The final shape and professional restruc-
turing of the Indian Army was carried out
prior to World War I (WW I) under General
Kitchener, the C-in-C in India between
1902 and 1909. During this period, due to
a clash between him and Viceroy Curzon
over the perceived organisational duality of
control of the military in India, the latter
resigned. This issue has had a significantly
adverse effect on the higher defence control
mechanism that evolved post-Independence
which, to this day, denies the service chiefs
any say in the government decision-mak-
ing forums. In World War I, more than one
million Indian soldiers served overseas. The
army expanded from 2,39,511 in 1914
to 14,40, 428 personnel by 1919. While
there were no commissioned Indian officers
in the army, the Indian Army fought in all
major theatres, including France Gallipoli,
Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine.
Britain declared war against Germany
on September 3, 1939, two days after the
latter attacked Poland. The Viceroy declared
India at war on the same day. World War II
(WW II) had started. Congress governments
in power in eight provinces resigned as they
had not been consulted at all and declared
they would not cooperate with the govern-
ment. This was not due to any love for Nazi
Germany but as a matter of principle. At
the start of WW II, the Indian Army had
a strength of 1,94,373 personnel, a little
more than that available at the start of
WW I. The modernisation planned in 1938
had yet to start. The Indian Army was not
intended to fight overseas but only protect
India’s borders and neighbouring areas.
However, before the war ended, the
Indian Army had expanded to a strength of
over 20,00,000 men and engaged in opera-
tions stretching from Hong Kong to Italy. In
the re-conquest of Burma, it provided the
bulk of forces and played important roles
in the campaigns in North Africa and Italy.
Nearly 63,000 awards were earned by the
Indian Army in WW II. Awards for gal-
lantry alone notched approximately 4,800.
These included 31 Victoria Crosses, four
George Crosses, 252 Distinguished Service
Orders, 347 Indian Orders of Merit and
1,311 Military Crosses.
Independence & Partition
While the Indian Army did not fight
a war of Independence, it contrib-
uted to it. Among the factors that led to
Independence, a major dimension was
the formation of the India National Army
(INA) by the Indian prisoners of war. Nearly
20,000 officers and men joined the INA.
The British were stunned at the defection of
officers. They realised they could not rely on
the Indian Army to put down a movement
for Independence. This was reinforced by
the mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force
in January 1946 and an even more wide-
spread one in February 1946, in the Royal
India Navy. It was acknowledged that India
could not be held by force of arms and this
was a major factor in the British decision to
grant Independence.
It was agreed that by August 15, 1947,
India and Pakistan should have effective
forces, mainly non-Muslims and Muslims,
under their respective control. A large
part of the army had mixed classes and
involved a major reorganisation of practi-
cally all units. The navy and the air force
did not pose a serious problem due to their
small size. An Armed Forces Reconstitution
Committee under Field Marshal Auchinleck
was set to divide the units and stores in the
ratio of 2:1 between India and Pakistan,
respectively. Muslims from
India and non-Muslims from
Pakistan could elect the
dominion they would serve.
The tragedy of partition
is a story which deserves
separate coverage. The mis-
ery of partition and Punjab
migration could have been lessened had
Mountbatten been a wiser man and not
rushed Independence, and delayed the
announcement of the boundary award.
Out of about 14 million people involved in
migration, it is estimated that more than
half a million died in the violence that
erupted on both sides. The strain on the
troops of the old Indian Army, together
with the emotional stress of communal dif-
ferences, personal tragedies and daily expo-
sure to heartrending scenes of murders,
rapes and other brutalities, brought their
discipline to a breaking point, but it sur-
vived because of its leadership. It was the
greatest test of the old Indian Army which
it passed with flying colours under the most
adverse circumstances.
Operation Gulmarg: ‘Operation Gulmarg’,
a deliberately planned offensive by Pakistan,
was aimed at the annexation of Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K). According to its leader,
Colonel Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army,
its planning was done in August 1947. The
Indian Army’s operations in J&K and the
achievement of the Indian Army under its
own officers despite logistics constraints,
daunting terrain and severe climate is a
proud tribute to its leadership, fighting spirit
and patriotic fervor of all ranks. They under-
took a task allotted to them as a sacred mis-
sion to be fulfilled whatever the cost.
The Indian Army, Post
Independence
Strength of the Indian Army in August
1947 was 4,00,000, but the political lead-
ership was keen to reduce the strength to
save defence expenditure. Hence, it was
decided to bring down the strength of the
army to 2,00,000 after the J&K operations,
which would involve the disbandment of
many units. A new Territorial Army Act
was passed in 1948 and infantry and artil-
lery units, with a nucleus of regular offi-
cers, were raised in 1949.
Several other changes occurred dur-
ing the period from 1948 to 1960. The
designation of C-in-C ceased to be in use
from 1955 and the three chiefs (army, navy
and the air force) were made equal and
independently responsible for their respec-
tive service. Every function of the Defence
Services was duplicated in the Ministry of
Defence where civilian bureaucrats not
only ensured financial and administrative
control but also gradually took over the
decision making powers of the defence ser-
vices. The standing of the military reached
an all time low during the time of Krishna
Menon’s tenure as Defence Minister when
Photographs: SP Guide Pubns
Soldiers in action
decisions concerning matters of major
military importance were taken without
consultation of the concerned service.
Jawaharlal Nehru’s bias against the mili-
tary was well known in the services. The
clearest indication of this emerged when
General K.M. Cariappa, the first C-in-C of the
Indian Army, outlined his plan for the securi-
ty of North-East Frontier Agency after China
had occupied Tibet. Nehru flared up and
thumping the table, said: “It is not the busi-
ness of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister
who is going to attack us where. You mind
only Kashmir and Pakistan.” Nehru contin-
ued to appease the Chinese and the untimely
death of Sardar Patel took away all opposi-
tion to Nehru’s views. The Sino-Indian War
of 1962 and the national humiliation was
the result of this policy and the bias against
the military. The military also failed by
acquiescing to a policy they knew to be mili-
tarily and politically unsound.
1961 to 1971: Traumatic Times
The defeat in 1962 shook the foundation of
the nation and the armed forces. The army
began to introspect to overcome its weak-
nesses. The 1965 war helped the army to
redeem its image, but revealed embarrassing
weaknesses in its equipment and training,
and even leadership at various levels. These
two wars spurred the political leadership
to modernise and expand the services. As
1970 came to a close, the Indian Army was
now ready to face new challenges emerging
on the horizon.
Subsequently, the 1971 War resulted in
creation of a new nation, Bangladesh, and
a decisive military victory in which 93,000
prisoners of war were taken. While many
books have been written to describe each
battle in detail, it is the spirit of the soldiery
during this campaign that deserves mention.
In the words of Sydney Schanberg of New
York Times, who accompanied Indian troops
in two sectors: “I don’t like sitting around
praising armies. I don’t like armies because
armies mean wars—and I don’t like wars.
But this (the Indian) army was something...
They were great all the way. There was never
a black mark... I lived with the officers and
I walked, rode with the jawans—and they
were all great... And they were the most per-
fect gentlemen—I have never seen them do
a wrong thing, not even when they just saw
how bestial the ‘enemy’ had been.”
1971 to 1998: Steady
Modernisation
The period after 1971 War saw the
induction of new equipment for modern
6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 5
 Kargil War (1999) - Bofors FH-77B
Indian Army in WWI Indian Troops in formation in WWI ALH (Dhruv) Helicopters of IA T-90 Tanks on display guns in action

wars. The Experts Committee under the What the Indian Army achieved is best India was facing an attempt by the Pakistan macy by India. However, it led to some posi-
Photographs: militaryphotos.net, vayu-sena.tripod.com and SP Guide Pubns

Chairmanship of Lieutenant General
K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in
1976. Some of its major recommendations
started getting implemented in the 1980s.
The expansion of mechanised forces was
achieved as a result of this report.
On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the
Indian Army were landed by 17 sorties of
helicopters at a point 3 km short of Bilafond
La, a pass on the Soltaro ridge, West of
Siachen glacier. The soldiers occupied the
pass. This was the opening move in what is
referred to as the Siachen conflict between
India and Pakistan which continues till
date. This period also saw the army assault
on the Golden Temple on the night of June
5, 1984 at Amritsar to clear the complex
of militants who had taken up base in the
temple precincts. The operation was code
named ‘Blue Star’. By the first light of June
7, the Golden Temple complex had been
cleared of militants but it left, in its after-
math, a wave of anguish and anger among
the Sikh community, culminating with the
assassination of the then Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi by her Sikh guards.
The period July 1987 to March 1990 saw
the Indian Army fight Tamil militants in Sri
Lanka with one hand tied behind their back.
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) moved to
Sri Lanka to carry out peacekeeping duties
as generally assigned during UN opera-
tions and to separate the warring factions,
namely, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) and the Sri Lankan armed forces,
but ended up enforcing peace and conduct-
ing military operations against the Tigers.
described in the words of Rajan Wijeratrie,
at one time the State Minister of Defence in
the Sri Lankan government. “The IPKF had
virtually finished them off. They were gasp-
ing for breath in the jungles. It was we who
provided that oxygen to them,” Wijeratrie
reportedly said. This summed up what IPKF
had achieved before de-induction.
During the 1980s, the Indian Army
also conducted the operation in Maldives
to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing
the government and while it did not involve
much fighting, it demonstrated to the world
the speed and efficiency with which the
Indian armed forces could react. This period
(1989 onwards) also saw the start of the
terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and
deployment of additional troops in J&K.
Kargil War (May-July 1999)
Kargil Sector is 168 km along the line of
control (LoC), stretching from Kaobal Gali
in the west to Chorbat La in the east. The
sector was vast with the line of control runs
along the watershed along heights 4,000
to 5,000 metres high. The frontage and
the nature of terrain ensured large gaps
between defended areas. The deployment
included one infantry battalion at Dras;
two infantry battalions and a BSF battalion
covering Kargil and Chorbat La was held by
Ladakh Scouts.
As news of Pakistani intrusion began
trickling in from May 3, 1999, it became
clear that armed intruders had occupied
heights in the gaps between all defended
areas in the sector. It became apparent that
to change the LoC using its regular troops.
The complacency of the local army forma-
tions in not conducting even routine surveil-
lance in the winter months stood out. Taken
by surprise, the initial reactions were unsat-
isfactory, leading to poorly planned patrols
and attacks. While these loopholes were
eventually plugged, success came only when
the whole act was put together. Air and
artillery (155 mm Howitzers) was employed
with devastating effect to allow the Indian
soldier, the infantryman to live up to his
reputation of fortitude under adversity and
courage and determination in the attack.
Operation Parakram
Operation Parakram (“valour” in Hindi)
was a momentous event which could have
unleashed a major war on the sub-conti-
nent. It involved a massive build-up Indian
Army ordered in the wake of the December
13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament
House. This 10-month mobilisation from
January to October 2002 along the border
with Pakistan generated high levels of ten-
sion in the relations between the two South
Asian neighbours, and raised the prospects
of a major war.
The operation was a major effort in coer-
cive diplomacy by Delhi in the wake of the
terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament
on December 13, 2001 and while the gov-
ernment claims that their strategic objec-
tives were met by mere posturing which
avoided a war, military analysts are of the
view that gains were not commensurate to
the mammoth exercise in coercive diplo-
tive changes in India’s military doctrine and
hastened military modernisation together
with organisational changes.
Way Ahead
The Indian Army, as it moves through the
first quarter of the 21st century, is likely to
face four types of challenges and threats—
traditional threats, contemporary threats in
the form of terrorism, internal challenges
and contingency threats. In essence, India
faces a far greater threat than any other
country in the world because of a highly
volatile strategic neighbourhood. Moreover,
taking into account the country’s vibrant
economic growth, it would naturally have
to assume additional responsibility as a
stabilising force in the region. It is encour-
aging to note that India’s security concerns
have, for the first time, converged with
international security concerns which
makes the global community appreciate the
need to develop and modernise the nation’s
military capabilities.
Defence of a nation and development
are complementary. If India aspires to be
a regional and global economic power,
its military power must reflect that desire
through its ability to protect its interests.
In this context, the transformation of the
Indian military for the future, through
technological improvements coupled with
innovative operational art, would afford
India a distinct advantage over its potential
adversaries, which is vital for preserving
the country’s sovereignty and furthering its
national interests. SP

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6 SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

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 C ount er-t er ro rism
Pak Offensive against Taliban
The multi-tiered nature of terrorism and its roots in Pakistan would have to be tackled by Islamabad
through some proactive measures on all fronts rather than addressing piecemeal terrorism emanating
from South Waziristan
BRIGADIER (RETD) RAHUL BHONSLE
O
f late, the Pakistan Army’s
operations in South Waziristan
have triggered much debate. On
December 12, Prime Minister
Yousaf Raza Gilani declared that opera-
tions in South Waziristan had been suc-
cessfully culminated and would be
extended to Orakzai agency. The comment
invited sharp criticism from influential
national newspaper Daily Times, which
in an editorial on December 14 stated:
“Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani may
be forgiven for what appeared to be a
Freudian slip or wishful thinking when he
said that the military offensive in South
Waziristan was almost over.” So what
is the truth behind these assertions and
Photograph: novinite.com
what are the lessons for India?
The saga of South Waziristan started on
October 10 at the Pakistan Army General
Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, the
twin city of capital Islamabad. Security
guards at the fortress like complex hardly
imagined that by the end of the day they
would be facing one of the biggest challeng-
es to the army’s seat of power. A complex
terrorist attack launched by a group affiliat-
ed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
shattered the perception of invincibility of
the GHQ and, in turn, the Pakistan Army.
Dressed in army fatigues, the ter-
rorists charged though the GHQ main
entrance in a white Toyota, simultane-
ously unleashing suicide bombs and grab-
bing hostages. Tehreek-e-Taliban (Amjad
Farooqi group) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,
ironically bred by Pakistan’s Inter Services
Intelligence Agency and both based in
Southern Punjab, claimed responsibil-
ity for the attack. Considered as one of
the most audacious strikes given that the
GHQ is heavily fortified, it highlighted
the complacency of the army which had
ignored intelligence warnings received of
just such a possibility.
Years of militancy and terrorism had
left the army unaffected and in a mode of
denial, rising out of its slumber only when
international pressure mounted with the
Taliban in Buner, within striking distance
of Islamabad in May this year. The GHQ
attack was perhaps the last straw as the
Pakistan army launched a three-pronged
attack on October 17 against Taliban
strongholds in South Waziristan supported
by jet fighters and helicopter gun ships.
Their target: the Mehsuds, the fiercest
opponents of the state.
Conduct of the Offensive
As many as 30,000 troops in three prongs
advanced on the tribe’s heartland at Makin
in an Operation codenamed Rah-e-Nijat.
Major General Athar Abbas, the chief of
the Inter-Services Public Relations, told
the media, “The army has launched an
operation after receiving orders from the
government. Both air and ground troops
are taking part.” By October-end, Rah-e-
Nijat had reached Sararogha on Jandola-
Sararogha axis. On Shakai-Kaniguram
axis, Karama was encircled and clearance
of Kaniguram had commenced. On the
Razmak-Makeen axis, troops were on the
outskirts of Makeen.
A month later, the army claimed to have
captured most of the key Taliban bases in
South Waziristan and was planning to fan
Pakistan Army Faces Fierce Taliban
out into the rugged countryside to hunt for
militants. “After taking complete control of
the roads and the tracks, we are going to
chase them in the forested areas, wherever
they are hiding in the countryside,” Abbas
said, claiming that the army had destroyed
all training centres of Baitullah Mehsud’s
network in South Waziristan.
By November-end, approximately 600
terrorists are reported to have been killed
and 22 arrested even as 70 army officers
and soldiers lost their lives. The terrorists
to security forces killed ratio of 8.7:1 indi-
cates stiff resistance offered by the rebels
even though a large number seem to have
melted into the hills with estimates of the
Mehsuds having almost 10,000 fight-
ers, including almost all the key leaders
who remain untraced. Thus, the Prime
Minister’s premature declaration of vic-
tory invited an immediate retort from
close observers.
Pak Military Strategy: 3Ds
The tenor of the offensive is not surprising
considering the overall strategy pursued
by the Pakistani military of 3Ds—denial,
deals and destruction—in tackling the
existential challenge of terrorism and mili-
tancy faced by the country.
Firstly, it has been denying the exis-
tence of an indigenously driven threat
arising from fundamentalism and extrem-
ism, instead passing the blame on to
neighbours Afghanistan and India with-
out sufficient evidence. This was amply
highlighted when the Pakistan Foreign
Minister had to concede that India’s role
in fanning militancy in Balochistan could
not be established. The spread of funda-
mentalism and extremism from tribal
areas to Punjab also remains unacknowl-
edged, giving rise to fears of increase
in terrorist attacks in other parts of the
country which have already manifested in
cities such as Lahore and Multan. A recent
attack killed senior generals of the army
again in the high security zone near the
GHQ in Rawalpindi.
Secondly, it has been making deals
selectively with rebel leaders, the current
favourites being Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. For this,
it is using tribal networks to advantage. For
instance, the Ahmedzai Wazirs succeeded
in convincing Taliban leader Maulvi Nazir
to stay neutral and not side with TTP’s new
leader Hakimullah Mehsud. The al-Qaeda
and Haqqani network which operate in
Afghanistan are also not impacted but for
sporadic American drone attacks despite
many “certificates” given by US military
commanders keen to egg on the Pakistan
Army to take a more proactive role.
The third D is destruction, using kinetic
operations air, helicopter gun ships and
artillery to target terrorist bunkers and
compounds without any restraint. As
rebels operate in dispersed groups not
exceeding eight to 10 fighters, these strikes
have succeeded in destroying mainly civil-
ian infrastructure in the main townships
of South Waziristan, such as Makeen
and Sararogha. This has also led to more
demands being made for arms and arma-
ment from the US with a steady supply of
spares and ammunition beefing up the air
force and army kitty.
On the other hand, the terrorist attacks
from Peshawar extending to Punjab are
continuing. The large number of sleeper
cells, trained and equipped, can be acti-
vated by a phone call by the TTP. Moreover,
the Lashkar-e-Taiba network continues to
spread with recent revelations following
investigations of the involvement of David
Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana by
the Federal Bureau of Investigations in the
US raising alarms across the world.
Thorny Road Ahead
Conventional wisdom on counter militancy
indicates that a 3D strategy to counter mili-
tancy is doomed to fail. Denial only provides
space for propaganda by terrorists who jus-
tify suicide attacks as targeted against anti-
Islamic forces and the army for its support
to the West. Deals where society is divided
into tribal and Taliban layers strengthen
one group against the other, with the state
ultimately having to take on those that are
supposed to be supporting it. Destruction
of so called terrorist compounds without
any external checks is likely to create more
martyrs for the Taliban, boosting their
ranks in the long run with no record of
civilians killed in the operations violating
all norms of human rights.
Despite these pitfalls, the South
Waziristan operations, if sustained and
followed up by a non-kinetic counter-mili-
tancy campaign, will be able to achieve
the desired aim of stabilising the region
and denying it as a base for terrorists
who are now attacking both Afghanistan
and Pakistan at will. Consolidating con-
trol over secured territory and spreading
development is necessary. For this, the
Pakistan Army would have to establish a
counter-militancy grid, something that
it is loathe to do and is culturally averse.
Success can also be sustained if military
action to deal with radical elements is
supplemented by efforts to engage the
people of Waziristan, and to find accept-
able ways to implement peace, develop-
ment and progress delivered through
infrastructure, health and education.
Thus, the multi-tiered nature of terror-
ism and its roots in Pakistan would have to
be tackled by the state through some pro-
active measures on all fronts rather than
addressing piecemeal terrorism emanating
from South Waziristan. The overall growth
of fundamentalism through the madrassa
culture needs to be curbed across the coun-
try with Southern Punjab now coming
into the limelight.
In the larger context, for the Pakistani
campaign to succeed in bringing stabil-
ity to the Af-Pak region, the Pakistan
army would have to do what the Kerry
Lugar Bill has called for, cease support to
extremist and terrorist groups operating
in the region and neutralise the al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and associated terrorist
groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish-e-Mohammed and their infrastruc-
ture in the country, including in areas as
Quetta and Muridke.
No Easy Options for India
Whether the Pakistan Army has the
patience and fortitude to prevail in the long
term will depend on the policy it adopts
vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. President
Barack Obama’s declaration that American
troops would commence pull out from
Afghanistan mid-2011 would tempt the
Pakistan Army to wait for an opportunity
of return of the Taliban in Kabul while tol-
erating instability at home.
For India, the scenario looks grim as
ever. The Pakistan Army’s commitment to
restore stability by neutralising terrorist
groups in the country remains suspect to
say the least. On the other hand, boosting
conventional armoury with American aid
and assistance would create additional
challenges for the Indian military.
Thus, there are no easy options ahead.
The clearest one would be continued
capacity building of the armed forces, the
paramilitary and the police to counter the
challenge of terror and proxy war from
across the western borders. Procurement
cycles to acquire surveillance assets, anti-
terror and conventional armament would
have to be shortened so that the opera-
tional gaps are made up by the middle of
2011. This may also envisage an increase
in the defence and security budget for
2010-11 due in a few weeks. After all,
past experience proves that economic
development will only be possible with
a strong defence and security establish-
ment to complement and support national
development strategy. SP
6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 7
 A r my Air Defence

Back to the Basics

The current state of preparedness is very low for AAD and
it would require strong leadership at the decision-making
level to steer the ship of modernisation to its logical end
LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND

S
ecurity environment in South Asia is
bleak, with Afghanistan and Pakistan
struggling to establish the rule of law
amidst a sea of terrorist violence.
The present regime in Bangladesh is moder-
ate and in favour of India but one cannot
predict when the tables are turned. Nepal is
also struggling to achieve internal stability.
China has recently become quite aggressive,
probably telling India not to forget 1962. The
internal environment is also dominated by
Naxalite violence which was allowed to fester
for long to reach such a level of intensity. The
events of 26/11 have shaken the country and
achieving coastal security has become the
holy grill. For all you may know that the next
terrorist attack may be from the air. After all,
the threat perception during January 26 and
August 15 celebrations in Delhi were based
on suicide missions with microlite aircraft
which was much before 9/11.
In such an environment, it is essential
the armed forces remain prepared for all
eventualities and modernisation is one key
ingredient of preparation. However, army
modernisation, and in particular Army Air
Defence (AAD) modernisation, remains
grounded, caught in a web of indigenisation,
and Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) projects, and proce-
dures. A brief review will justify the forego-
ing statement.
Guns Systems
L70 Gun System: AAD inherited L60 gun
of Second World War vintage in 1947,
which was replaced by L70 gun system.
During the early 1960s, this was a fairly
modern system with its own fire control
radar for night firing and it took almost
two decades to transform the complete L60
inventory into L70. Meanwhile, the DRDO
started the development of an AD gun
which was to replace L70 however after
many twists and turns lasting over two
decades the project failed and was shelved.
AAD now started looking at the global
market for replacement but it appeared that
guns were going out of flavour and pos-
sible choice narrowed down to Skyshield of
Rheinmetall Defence which has an effec-
tive range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000
rounds per minute. It can be matched
with any fire control radar and the most
redeeming feature is the Ahead (advance
hit efficiency and destruction technology)
ammunition. It contains 152 heavy tung-
sten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles
and ejected by a time fuse. Since it led to a
single vendor situation thus it is likely that
the process will be repeated and a fresh
Request for Proposal is issued causing a
delay of a couple of years. Meanwhile, the
L70 gun will shortly celebrate its 50th anni-
versary much to glee of some of our hos-
tile neighbours. Suppose the future gun’s
induction starts in 2015 then to change the
whole inventory may take another 20 years
and notionally if the gun remains current
for another 20 years, which brings us to
2055. This is a mind boggling and unimagi-
nable time frame. Unless some drastic action
is taken, L70 may die of old age without
leaving a successor.
23mm Twin Gun: This is a highly mobile
light gun with a high rate of fire of 2,000
rounds/min and eminently suited for the
field army but it is purely a mechanical gun
thus has become obsolete to meet the cur-
rent and future threat specially with respect
to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which
are going to proliferate at battalion and bri-
gade level. Adding a fire control radar will
only make it heavier, but giving it a power
drive and a modern optronic sight will more
than foot the bill at reasonable cost. Such an
upgradation project has been going on for
the last decade or so with BEL and hope that
it succeeds soon. Finally, it will be most cost
effective to have a common successor to L70
and 23mm Twin Gun.
Schilka: This is a self-propelled gun system,
having a fire control radar and a very high
rate of fire of 3,400 rounds/min with its
four barrels. It is ideally suited for supporting
mechanised forces and, after 35 years of ser-
vice, it has become obsolete. Its successor was
Tanguska and one regiment worth equip-
ment was imported but for some unexplained
reason no further procurement was carried
out. There is a requirement for finding a suit-
able replacement which ideally could be the
latest version of Tanguska or try to mount
L70’s successor on a suitable platform.
Missile Systems
Quick Reaction Surface-To-Air Missile:
OSA-AK system was imported from erstwhile
Russia to fill the void of threat against armed
attack helicopters. Meanwhile, Trishul was
being developed to succeed OSA-AK by the
DRDO. However, the project did not succeed
and was foreclosed. OSA-AK is fast becoming
obsolescent and the options to succeed are
the Surface Launched Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) and
Hawk-21, both Raytheon’s, Spyder of Israeli
(already selected for the Indian Air Force),
Russia’s Tor M-1 and so on.
Medium Range Surface-To-Air
Missile: The current system is Kvadrat of
Russian origin with a range of 25 km and
has been in service for more than three
decades. It is now obsolete and needs
replacement immediately. The DRDO was
developing the Akash system for more
than two decades but without success
and perforce AAD has to look for global
options of which there are many. Russia’s
BUK-M1, Aster30, MICA, Patriot missile
and its variants like PAC-2 GEM, GEM/C,
GEM/T (or GEM+) (made by Raytheon)
and most advance Patriot Advance
Capability -3(PAC-3) made by Lockheed
Martin. Israel has offered a joint venture
with the DRDO calling it the MRSAM
(earlier named Barak ‘Next Generation’)
with a possible range of 70 km. This actu-
ally is meant for the Indian Air Force but
AAD and the Indian Navy should join the
project to make it a more viable option.
As seen from the above review it is crystal
clear that the state of preparedness is very
low for AAD and it would require strong
leadership at the decision-making level to
steer the ship of modernisation to its logical
end instead of sacrificing it at the altar of
procedures and red tape. SP

‘Majority of AAD equipment

cum acquisition in accordance with approved perspective
plans. These include guns, missiles, radars, and so on.

today is obsolete’
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAM PRATAP,
AVSM, VSM, Director General of Army Air Defence
SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What is the current and future
pattern of air threat globally?
Director General of Army Air Defence (DGAAD):
Traditional air threat from fixed and rotary wing aircraft will
continue to evolve as an expensive but highly capable multi-
role weapon system with improved night capabilities, longer
stand-off ranges, greater accuracy and lethality. While these
threats will continue to remain formidable, it is appreci-
ated that the proliferation trend would be more towards
unmanned systems like Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs),
cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, UAVs and rockets.
Factors of cost, training, operational needs and strategies
to counter enemy capabilities would further fuel this trend.
A significant number of TBMs or UAVs can be acquired for
the price of one or two highly sophisticated aircraft, without
the attendant costs of training, maintenance, basing and
sustaining a manned aircraft fleet. UAVs will increasingly be
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
national AD plan?
DGAAD: The AAD is envisaged to play a crucial role in
the national active AD plan along with the Indian Air
Force (IAF). The AAD is responsible to provide AD protec-
tion to critical assets, both in the tactical battle area as
well as the rear areas. In addition, the AAD has tradition-
ally been responsible for ground-based AD to all strategic
assets of national importance. The AAD does this by
deploying a mix of ground-based AD weapon systems of
complementing ranges and altitudes to provide a layered
and tiered AD environment.
SP’s: Majority of the weapon systems in the inventory
are either obsolete or obsolescent. Take the example of
L/70 gun which is the mainstay of AAD and still car-
rying on after more than four decades. Are there plans
to replace it with a more modern system?
SP’s: With the current and future air threat, are the gun
systems still relevant?
DGAAD: The gun systems retain their relevance in the
current as well as future air threat scenario. Though
their effective range and kill probability is much less than
that of contemporary missiles, these adequately make up
for it with a very high rate of fire and low cost. The gun
systems are the only means of terminal AD. All missile
systems have a dead zone which needs to be covered by
a gun system. In case of suddenly appearing targets, like
helicopters, aircraft, missiles and rockets, which may have
either escaped detection or may not have been destroyed
by the missiles due to very limited reaction time, the gun
systems are the only available means of engaging such
targets. Hence, countries such as the US, which had ear-
lier discarded the guns, are once again planning to revert
to AD guns for the terminal AD of their field formations.
SP’s: What are the plans for identifying a successor to
Quick Reaction and Medium Range Surface-To-Air Missile?
DGAAD: The modernisation plan of the AAD has been
formulated and procurement of successor systems is
being processed as envisaged in the plan as per Defence
Procurement Procedures 2008.

used for attack, decoy, electronic warfare and suppression
of enemy air defence missions, while retaining the tradi-
tional reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition
reconnaissance missions. Large calibre rockets and multiple
launch rockets with multiple war head options, long range
and high rates of fire will pose a deadly threat to the field
force. Electronic warfare would also be used concurrently as
a decisive element of combat power duly integrated with the
fire support plan as a soft kill option. All these require AAD
to be modernised to meet these diverse threats.
SP’s: What role does the AAD play in executing the
DGAAD: While it is true that the majority of AAD equip-
ment today has become obsolete/obsolescent, but at the
same time we should not overlook the fact that military
capability development and enhancement is an ongo-
ing process which seldom keeps pace with the emerging
threat and technologies. This is also true for the AAD. We
have embarked on a two-pronged strategy to achieve and
maintain optimal desired AD capability. The first involves
sustaining effectiveness of existing assets through tech-
nological upgrades and extension of service life of such
equipment. The other involves time bound induction of
platforms and systems through in-house development
SP’s: Are there any plans to improve the AD for the
combat zone?
DGAAD: Yes, the AD of combat zone is a major respon-
sibility of the AAD today. New weapon employment phi-
losophy based on Theatre AD concept is being validated to
provide a gap free multilayered and multi-tiered AD envi-
ronment to the Tactical Battle Area, which would permit
maximum freedom of manoeuvre to the field force com-
manders, without getting tied down to integral terminal
AD weapon systems. Induction of necessary equipment for
this may take some time. •
...Extracts from SP’s LandForces 4 of 2009

8 SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09

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 D efence P roc urement
Caught in a
QUAGAMIRE
The reformed Indian defence procurement regime has
singularly failed to deliver
MAJOR GENERAL (RETD) MRINAL SUMAN
M
ajor reforms in India’s
defence procurement regime
were initiated in 2001 as a
follow up of the recommen-
dations of the Group of Ministers consti-
tuted in the wake of the Kargil conflict.
The services were euphoric and expected
speedy induction of new defence equip-
ment to plug critical gaps. Unfortunately,
all hopes have been belied as the reformed
Indian defence procurement regime has
singularly failed to deliver.
Last seven years’ record makes a dis-
mal reading. Not a single major contract
has been signed in an open competition.
Every proposal continues to flounder in the
labyrinth of bureaucratic inertia while the
services continue to wait for procurements
to materialise. Consequently, India has been
forced to resort to single-vendor govern-
ment-to-government deals for critical sys-
tems, in total contravention to the spirit and
provisions of the procurement procedure.
Allegations of irregularities continue
to hog the limelight. Every deal is getting
embroiled in controversy due to alleged
infirmities of the selection process. Worse,
even the vendors find the system highly
intimidating and dissuasive. Indian pri-
vate sector continues to wait for level
playing field while the foreign vendors are
becoming wary of dealing with India.
Seven years is a long period for any sys-
tem to prove itself. The Defence Minister
has also been publicly expressing his exas-
peration with the current dispensation
and wants corrective steps initiated. It is
time for candid introspection and assidu-
ous review. Some of the major infirmities
that impede expeditious procurements are
discussed below.
Structural Infirmities
The whole procurement regime is caught
in a bureaucratic quagmire. Reference
has to be made to the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) at every stage causing infructu-
ous delays. MoD controls the issuance of
Request For Proposal (RFP), opening of
technical/commercial proposals, selection
of vendors for trials, acceptance of Staff
Evaluation Report and conduct of com-
mercial negotiations to sign contract. In
other words, bureaucrats of MoD have
made the whole system totally captive to
their dictates.
Worse, the entire procurement regime
is characterised by a total lack of joint-
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
ness between MoD and the Services
Headquarters (SHQ). MoD initiates pro-
curement process on the basis of Services
Qualitative Requirements (SQR) evolved
by SHQ. Thereafter, there is no dialogue
between the two. No market survey is ever
carried out to provide feedback to SHQ
as regards cost-performance relation-
ship of equipment in the world market.
Incongruously, after field trials and staff
appraisal, SHQ cannot prioritise its selec-
tion. It is for MoD to select the cheapest
10 SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09
technically acceptable system. In the
process, the country suffers as it misses
an opportunity to buy the more advanced
equipment available in the market with
minimal cost accretion.
Policy & Procedural
Inadequacies
SQR are evolved to define minimum per-
formance attributes, corresponding to the
task/tasks to be performed by the system.
Non-compliance of any of the SQR ren-
ders equipment unfit for procurement, as
no deviations are allowed. An excellent
system surpassing all vital performance
parameters can get eliminated because of
its non-compliance with some inconse-
quential SQR. This is a most bizarre way
of carrying out procurement.
Under the current policy, all equipment
that meet laid down SQR have to be con-
sidered at par and the lowest bidder is to
be awarded the contract. Vendors find it
strange that the Indian government takes
no cognisance of cutting-edge technology
and accords no weightage to it. Expecting
a superior defence system to be available
at a cost less than a mediocre system is
juvenile. It is one of the most unfair provi-
sions and deters leading manufacturers
from participating in bids.
Inadequate time is given to vendors to
submit their technical and commercial
proposals, resulting in repeated requests
for extensions and acrimony. Preparation
of proposals is a highly time-consuming
process especially for complex systems.
Most major arms producers are systems
integrators and need essential inputs from
their sub-vendors. Transfer of technol-
ogy cases necessitate detailed interaction
with Indian technology recipient. In cases
entailing offset obligations, vendors have
to do exhaustive preparatory work to fac-
tor it in their commercial quote, which
remains firm and fixed.
The Indian offset policy also needs
fine tuning. It will not be incorrect to
state that the policy is totally devoid of
any well considered purpose and has suc-
ceeded only in creating more confusion
and delays. India does not accept either
indirect offsets or transfer of technol-
ogy against offsets. Additionally, Foreign
Direct Investment cap at 26 per cent
makes it highly unattractive. Thus, offset
fulfillment is totally dependant on export
of defence goods and services, with ben-
efits accruing being of temporary and
doubtful value.
Functional Weaknesses
As pointed out by the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India, defence acqui-
sition is “a cross-disciplinary activity
requiring expertise in technology, mili-
tary, finance, quality assurance, market
research, contract management, project
management, administration and policy
making”. It thereafter observed that the
existing system of defence acquisitions
being handled by unspecialised personnel
posted for three-year tenures was simply
not adequate.
Unfortunately, no acquisition staff is
selected for any special flair or expertise.
For most of them it is just another routine
assignment. Worse, no training in acqui-
sition functions is ever provided to them
and their short tenures preclude acqui-
sition of on-the-job expertise. Lacking
required competence, many officials con-
sider it judicious to let matters drift rather
than take risky decisions. Indifferent qual-
ity of acquisition staff is the single most
important reason for the failure of the
procurement regime.
Maximum delay takes place at the con-
tract negotiation stage. There is no stan-
dard procedure in place to determine fair
price of the equipment being purchased.
Every one gropes in the dark and goes
more by gut feeling than by any scientific
calculation. Though mandated, no data
bank is being maintained of all acquisi-
tion related activities. The three services
do not share details of their procurements
with each other. Such a state of affairs
results in ludicrous situations where they
buy the same equipment from the same
vendor at different rates, totally oblivious
of each other.
Indian officials are notorious for their
supercilious and condescending attitude.
As awarders of high value contracts,
they assume the role of dispensers of
favours. Communications remain unac-
knowledged. Whereas Indian business
community has got used to such an equa-
tion, foreign vendors find the overbearing
behaviour of Indian officials to be highly
gratuitous, exasperating and dissuasive.
The Way Forward
Slow and tardy modernisation of the
Indian armed forces has been causing dis-
quiet amongst all who are concerned with
national security. Defence procurement
procedure is due for review shortly. The
opportunity should be utilised to carry
out a holistic and transparent revision.
Cosmetic changes mean little. The govern-
ment would do well to invite suggestions
from the industry, both indigenous and
foreign, to obtain constructive inputs.
Acquisition process consists of two dis-
tinct functions—technical evaluation and
commercial evaluation. As bureaucrats
have no role to play in technical evalua-
tion of competing systems, all activities
from selection of vendors to ascertaining
their technical suitability should be car-
ried out under a duly structured organisa-
tion under the Chief of Integrated Defence
Staff. Evaluation of commercial proposals
and award of contract should continue to
be overseen by the ministry, as at present.
This single step would reduce procure-
ment time by months. Approval of acqui-
sition plans, categorisation of proposals
Illustration: Ratan Sonal
and budgetary allocations should contin-
ue to be under the direct control of MoD.
Some of the other suggestions are as
follows:
• A fine balance should be maintained
between need for generating com-
petition and security imperatives.
Excessive secrecy gives rise to propaga-
tion of half-truths and subjective dis-
information.
• Sanctions to proposals must be accord-
ed in one go rather than in a piecemeal
manner.
• Matrix system should be adopted for
technical evaluation wherein equip-
ment with better performance param-
eters (albeit within the specified range)
gets credit in inter se evaluation. It will
also help India in getting latest equip-
ment with best value for money.
• Adequate time should be given to ven-
dors to submit their proposals. Prior to
the issuance of RFP, recommendations
can be sought from major vendors as
regards the time they would need to
prepare their proposals.
• As mandated in DPP 2008, price
negotiations should be banned in cases
where the lowest bid falls within the
previously calculated fair price.
• Application of life cycle cost analysis
(sum of acquisition costs and sustain-
ing costs) should be made mandatory
for ascertaining the most cost-effective
commercial proposal.
• Offset provisions should be liberalised
by way of allowing indirect offsets and
transfer of technology.
• Functionaries must be held respon-
sible for delays caused in the procure-
ment of defence equipment due to
non-performance.
• An exhaustive data bank should be cre-
ated in the Acquisition Wing.
Most importantly, even perfect structures
and procedures are of no consequence
unless the functionaries who operate the
mechanism are capable of delivering. The
quality of the acquisition staff must be
improved by meticulous selection, proper
training and longer tenures.
Special attention needs to be paid to
the quality of financial advice. The cur-
rent practice of defence finance function-
aries masquerading as financial experts
is the primary cause of most infirmities
of the present system. A separate cadre
of defence economists and defence finan-
cial advisors should be raised for expert
advice. Finally, it has generally been
accepted the world over that an efficient
acquisition workforce can not only expe-
dite procurements but also affect a sav-
ing of up to 15 per cent of the capital
expenditure in initial purchase price and
associated lifecycle costs. With India’s pro-
jected imports of close to $100 billion (Rs
4,66,890 crore) over the next 10 years,
the amount saved could be a whopping
$15 billion (Rs 70,030 crore). SP
 Tec hnolog y
Micro & Mini
SATELLITES
Small satellites have a tremendous potential in the civilian,
scientific as well as military arenas having applications in
diverse fields like communications, remote-sensing,
meteorology, cartography, disaster management, and
search and rescue
BRIGADIER (RETD) VINOD ANAND
M
icrosatellites—or miniaturised
satellites or small satellites, as
these are sometimes referred
to—represent a revolutionary
breakthrough in satellite development. This
‘generation-next’ of satellites offers many
advantages over conventional satellites.
Small in size, these are cheap and have a
rapid development cycle, allowing microsat-
ellite projects to be completed in schedules
as tight as one to three years. Their lighter
weight and small size also permits these to be
launched from smaller launch vehicles and,
as demonstrated lately, multiple microsatel-
lites can be inserted into orbit simultaneously
using a single launch vehicle.
The credit for having launched maxi-
mum microsatellites in orbit goes to the
Russians who successfully launched 13 sat-
ellites aloft one rocket in April 2007. India
joined this elite club a year later on April 28,
when a PSLV-C9 launch vehicle successfully
introduced 10 satellites into space simul-
taneously. Where the Indians scored over
the Russians was that while the payload of
the Indian mission was 829 kg, the Russian
mission had a payload of only 300 kg.
On one hand, the low manufacturing
and launch cost of small satellites make
them ideal for testing advanced technologies
for future satellite applications. Even failure
of an experimental technology does not
impose as much cost/time penalty as a full-
fledged conventional satellite. On the other
hand, their small size makes them quite
complex with highly miniaturised rugged
components. Nevertheless, small satellites
have a tremendous potential in the civilian,
scientific as well as military arenas having
applications in diverse fields like communi-
cations, remote-sensing, meteorology, car-
tography, disaster management, and search
and rescue.
Classification of satellites
Being a relatively new field, no standard
classification of this class of satellites has
been universally accepted as yet. They are
variously called small satellites (SmallSat),
cheap satellites (CheapSat), microsatellites
(MicroSat), mini-satellites (MiniSat) and
nano-satellites (NanoSat). The US Defence
Advanced Research Projects Agency refers
to these as light satellites (LightSats) and
the US Naval Space Command as SPINSats
(Single Purpose Inexpensive Satellite
Systems). Nevertheless, in recent years,
a generic method of classifying satellites,
including small satellites, has been generally
accepted. This is as follows:
• Large satellites: greater than 1,000 kg
• Medium satellites: 500 to 1,000 kg
• Small Satellites
- Mini satellites – 100 to 500 kg
- Micro satellites – 10 to 100 kg
- Nano satellites – 1 to 10 kg
- Pico satellites – 0.1 to 1 kg
- Femto satellites – less than 0.1 kg
Nano-satellites and Pico-satellites are
also sometimes referred to as cube satellites
(CubeSats) due to their little-bigger-than-
matchbox size with one side of the satellite
being approximately 10 cm. This category
of small satellites has generated probably
the greatest interest out of the category of
small satellites.
Military perspective
Militarily, small satellites, especially micro
and nano-satellites, hold tremendous poten-
tial. Conceptually it is feasible to launch
hundreds of small satellites almost simul-
taneously by small size solid-fuel rockets.
These are thus ideal for launch-on-demand
applications which may be critical for future
military space operations. Micro and nano-
satellites can also be used effectively in
anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Microsatellites
carrying hard-kill or soft-kill payloads can
be manoeuvred close to the target satellite
and activated at the desired time. China is
said to be developing ASAT systems using
India has not
demonstrated any
military oriented small
satellite capability
as yet. China, on the
other hand, seems to
be well on the way to
developing militarily
capable microsatellites.
‘parasitic’ satellites capable of attaching
themselves to target satellites without detec-
tion and lying dormant till the need arises.
Microsatellites are best deployed in net-
worked local satellite groups or distributed
constellations which offer many advantag-
es. Firstly, such networks/constellations are
highly survivable. Even if one or more com-
ponents satellites of such a constellation
are damaged, unserviceable or ‘taken-out’,
the constellation can continue functioning
effectively using other satellites. Secondly,
the combined processing power of satellite
constellations may equal or even surpass
bigger satellites. Thirdly, the target handling
capability of a satellite constellation will be
much more than a single satellite and they
can cover more area. Last, but not the least,
is the flexibility inherent to a network for
carrying out multiple tasks simultaneously.
Consequently, microsatellite constella-
tions can be designed to support the entire
spectrum of space-based C4ISR operations,
such as surveillance, navigation, commu-
nications, remote-sensing, electromagnetic
intelligence (ELINT), and so on.
Trend worldwide
Due to their launch-on-demand capabil-
ity, small satellites offer a few more tactical
advantages. Microsatellites swarms can
be launched over the area of interest at
short notice, lending these an edge over
Demeter micro-satellite of France
conventional satellites that have to be pre-
positioned after detailed planning as their
orbital manoeuvre capability is restricted.
Such satellites are more ‘military friendly’
as these can be placed over the target area
in the correct time, space and duration
like any other military weapon or sensor.
Besides, these can provide highly flexible
and survivable communication, naviga-
tion and surveillance networks with build
in redundancy over the tactical battle area.
Perhaps due to this very reason several
countries are pursuing military oriented
microsatellite programmes.
In the US, interest in small satellites
for military applications was kindled with
the launch of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA)-sponsored 52
kg Global Low Orbiting Message Relay
experimental satellite by the Space Shuttle
in 1985. Thereafter, a large number of
DARPA, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, US Navy and Air Force
sponsored microsatellites have been
launched by the US. Most of these were for
communications, ELINT, Earth observation
and experimental purposes. The former
Soviet Union was known to have used con-
stellations of small satellites of the COSMOS
series for tactical communications. France,
too, is said to be developing experimental
electronic ELINT microsatellites called
ESSAIM. Four of them, each weighing 120
kg, will be in LEO at 680 km and monitor
radio communications. In 2004, France
launched its first micro-satellite DEMETER
(Detection of Electromagnetic Emission
from Earthquake Regions) designed to
record disturbances in the ionosphere due to
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsuna-
mis. Most members of the EU, UK, Canada,
Brazil and India, too, are engaged in small
satellite research and development.
India & China
India made a start in small satellite develop-
ment with the launch of 360 kg experimen-
tal Aryabhata satellite as far back as 1975.
Other experimental small satellites, like the
35 kg RTP (1979) and RS-1 (1980), soon
followed. Recent efforts include the Space
Capsule Recovery Experiment SRE-1 (2007)
and the 60 kg ANUSAT developed by the
students of Anna University. Launched in
2009, ANUSAT is an experimental solar-
powered satellite with a data-store and for-
ward payload. Similarly, HAMSAT (40 kg)
launched with Cartosat-1 in 2005 is said to
be one of the smallest satellites built by the
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).
The satellite is designed to provide satellite-
based Ham radio services to amateur radio
operators across the globe. Despite these
developments, India has not demonstrated
any military oriented small satellite capabil-
ity as yet.
On the other hand, China seems to be
well on the way to developing militarily
capable microsatellite networks for remote
sensing and optical/radar satellites. First
indication of the Chinese microsatellite
Photograph: www.cnes.fr
capability came on May 10, 1999 when
the experimental 100 kg SJ-5 satellite was
launched successfully. In June 2000, a 50
kg microsatellite Tsinghua-1 (TS-1) was
launched aboard a Russian rocket. A joint
project between the Tsinghua University
and the University of Surrey in UK, it has
a primarily earth observation role. A con-
stellation of seven satellites with remote-
sensing payloads is on the anvil. The Hy-1
(Ocean-1) microsatellite was launched
in 2002. This was followed by the 2004
launch of the experimental Shiyan-1
remote-sensing satellite and the Nuoxing-1
nano-satellite. The satellites were reported
to be developed by the Harbin University
and Tsinghua University, respectively.
China is expected to use microsatellites
for data transmission, environment moni-
toring, space environment observations,
positioning and navigation, and scientific
experimentation. More importantly, China
is also likely to use microsatellites constel-
lations for supporting ground operations.
People’s Liberation Army theorists have
lately suggested that China could deploy
a network of microsatellites launched by
micro-launchers to form a ‘skynet’ for
global reconnaissance, surveillance and
communications. China is also said to be
developing a network of microsatellites in
ASAT role and seems to have achieved a
fair amount of progress in manoeuvring
small satellites.
During the 2007 Shenzhou-7 manned
spacecraft mission, the spacecraft
passed unusually close (45 km) to the
International Space Station. About four
hours before Shenzhou’s point of closest
approach to the space station, it launched
a 40 kg manoeuvrable microsatellite called
BanXing-1 which contained two cameras
and communication gear. This microsatel-
lite came quite close to the space station
causing consternation in the international
community due to the small margin for
error. Nevertheless, the successful execution
of the complex mission is perhaps indicative
of the progress made by China in orbital
manoeuvre techniques.
Therefore, while ISRO is developing
applications of micro and nano-satellites in
the civil arena there is also a need to look at
the military uses of such satellites. Indian
armed forces are working on a 15-year
Long Term Perspective Plans and looking for
developing applications for national space
assets to provide force multiplication to
own forces. A Space Cell in HQ Integrated
Defence Staff has been formed with a view
to co-ordinate space issues. The Defence
Space Vision 2020 document is expected to
include developing application for such sat-
ellites. Further, the evolving space doctrine
needs to include concepts and precepts of
military uses of micro and nano-satellites.
The intentions of India’s neighbours would
never be clear, but China has demonstrated
its space capabilities and Beijing would
not hesitate to offer its all-weather friend
Pakistan high-end space technologies. SP
6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 11

2009:
The Year that Was
Photographs: PRO Indian Army, PIB and SP Guide Pubns
China Showcases Trans-Regional Mobility
The two-month long manoeuvres witnessed approximately four divisions, or 50,000 troops, of the
People’s Liberation Army criss-crossing the country
GURMEET KANWAL AND MONICA CHANSORIA
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
PLAs Rapid Reaction Force on the move
12
A nnual Round up
5 6
15 January: The Indian Army cel- ventional warhead of up to 300 kg,
ebrates its 61st Foundation Day to is successfully test-fired by the Indian
commemorate the appointment in Army at Pokharan missile test range in
1949 of General K.M. Cariappa as its Rajasthan.
Commander-in-Chief—the first Indian 20 April: The bi-annual Army
officer to hold the post. Chief of the Commanders Conference begins with
Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor focus on macro level issues like mili-
confers Sena Medals for gallantry and tary strategy, operational logistics and
unit citations. factors impacting the welfare and
9 February: Indian armed forces enhancement of satisfaction among all
demonstrate their joint doctrine on ranks.
amphibious warfare in the military 1 May: Armour Day commemorates
exercise, TROPEX-09, held just 80 nau- the commencement of mechanisa-
tical miles from Karachi. tion of the Indian cavalry regiments.
22 February: India and Bangladesh On this day in 1938, the Scinde Horse
conduct their first joint military exer- became the first regiment to shed their
cise in West Bengal’s Jalpaiguri district. horses and convert to tanks.
2-21 March: Singapore Armed Forces 3 May: The Indian Army concludes a
and the Indian Army conduct a bilat- 72-hour long major training exercise,
eral armour exercise, codenamed Bold Hind Shakti, in the Punjab plains. The
Kurukshetra, in central India. exercise focused on practising its pre-
29 March: The land-attack version of mier corps, the Kharga Corps, in con-
BrahMos-II cruise missile, with a range duct of offensive tasks.
of 290 km and capability to carry con- 3 June: Lieutenant General K.R. Rao
E xercise St ride 2009
O
n the eve of its 60th anniversary
on October 1, 2009 the People’s
Republic of China opted yet again
to showcase its military prowess
to the world. China’s largest ever military
exercise Stride 2009 (Kuayue) was employed
as a means to issue a clear message that the
Chinese armed forces have come a long way
from being a rustic and bucolic ‘Red Army’
that waged a ‘People’s War’ six decades ago.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) put
on display its most modern equipment. Its
units flaunted innovative methods to deploy,
operate and sustain the mix of old and new
equipment that is now held by operational
formations.
Photograph: china-defense-mashup.com
In what could be described as a belliger-
ent showcasing of military capabilities and
consequent willingness to use them, the
PLA tested its prowess by undertaking the
Stride 2009 exercises, which commenced
on August 12, 2009 and continued for two
months. The Chinese press reported these
exercises as the PLA’s “largest-ever tactical
SP’S LAND FORCE S 6 / 2 0 09
11
7
assumes the office of DG Artillery.
He has the rare distinction of having
served in all the Strike Corps of the
Indian Army.
3 June: Lieutenant General Arvinder
Singh Lamba, General Officer
Commanding, Sudarshan Chakra
Corps takes over as Chief of Staff, HQ
Army Training Command. A recipient
of the coveted Ati Vishisht Seva Medal,
he has a vast experience of conven-
tional as well as counter insurgency
operations.
4 June: Soldiers from the Indian Army
individually win the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and
6th position in Everest Marathon 2009
in Nepal.
12 June: The 5 BIHAR Infantry
Battalion Group, earmarked to rep-
resent the country in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Africa, as part of
the United Peace Keeping Mission,
sets off.
12 June: “Shakti” The Artillery
event, in which they will be mobilised and
transported vast distances across the nation”.
The two-month long manoeuvres witnessed
approximately four PLA divisions (50,000
troops) criss-crossing the country represent-
ing as many as four Chinese Military Regions
(MRs), including Lanzhou, Shenyang, Jinan
and Guangzhou. The exercises principally
were ground operations although the PLA
Air Force provided the necessary support in
moving troops and providing air cover.
Multiple mission scenarios
The aim of these manoeuvres was to test
and practice ‘trans-regional mobility’ that
focuses on moving field formations within
China from one of its seven MRs to another.
The exercise focused on implementing the
2007 Training Outline for informationised
training and included multiple mission sce-
narios—amphibious landing, air assault,
close air support—under complex electro-
magnetic environments. The Chinese press
extensively reported PLA’s multi-mode move-
Combat Command and Control System
(ACCCS) is dedicated to the Indian
Army. Lieutenant General P.C. Katoch,
Director General of Information
Systems, and Ashwani Kumar Datt,
Chairman & Managing Director,
BEL hand over the ACCCS to Army
Chief General Deepak Kapoor and
Lieutenant General K.R. Rao, Director
General of Artillery.
15 June: General Deepak Kapoor
reviews the overall security situa-
tion in Jammu and Kashmir and the
arrangements for smooth conduct of
Amarnath Yatra.
June 24: The Army Chief, accompa-
nied by Lieutenant General V.K. Singh,
GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and
Lieutenant General R.K. Loomba, GOC
3 Corps, visits Kohima. In a brief inter-
action with the Governor of Nagaland,
the Army Chief assures continued sup-
port and full cooperation from security
forces to the civil administration in
ments by ground, rail (including high speed
trains), water and/or air. China’s neighbours
watched carefully as the trans-regional
mobility experience could well be used out-
side China’s borders, especially if neighbour-
ing countries permit movement of PLA units
through or over their territory.
For the past two decades, it has been well
known that the Chinese held substantial
drills every year in what was projected as
experiments in capacity-building in the
event that it became necessary to use force
to settle the Taiwan dispute. However, the
Kuayue exercises indicate a major transfor-
mation in the pattern. For the first time,
these were not directed at rehearsing an
amphibious assault on Taiwan, but instead
centre on the South China Sea. It may be
recalled that a perpetual source of inter-
state tensions between the Southeast Asian
nations and China have been territorial dis-
putes over islands in the South China Sea.
The Stride 2009 exercises are in line with
what was proclaimed in the Chinese 2006
2 3 4

8 9 1. Director General of Military Training Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia

Presenting Expedition Flag to Team Leaders of Joint Indo-German
Mountaineering Expedition 2. Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor
presenting project Shakti equipment to DGIS 3. Army Chief General
Deepak Kapoor exchanging menento with Nepalese Army Chief
General Chhatra Man Gurung 4. Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor
with Gen David H Petraeus, Commander, US Central Comd 5. Lt
Gen NK Singh DG(SD) Addressing the Contingent of 5 BIHAR INf Bn
Group, earmarked for CONGO 6. Chinese delegation 7. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh on his three day Russia visit 8. Lt Gen
D Bhardwaj Director General Mechanised Force and other Senior
retired officer paying homage at Teen Murti War Memorial 9. Yudh
Abhyas 2009

maintaining peace in the state.
6 July: Chief of General Staff of
Afghan National Army General
Bismillah Khan Mohammadi arrives
in Delhi on a four-day official visit
to India.
20 July: General Deepak Kapoor, dur-
ing his five-day visit to the US, meets
General David H. Petraeus, Commander,
US Central Command and is given a
guard of honour at Whipple Field.
19 August: India and Maldives
undertake a series of measures to
strengthen bilateral defence coopera-
tion during Indian Defence Minister
A.K. Antony’s two-day official visit to
the Maldives.
21 August: Lieutenant General V.K.
Ahluwalia, Director General Military
Training, flags off a joint Indo-German
mountaineering expedition to Mount
Shivling (6,543 m) in Garhwal
Himalayan Region.
24 August: The Indian Army receives
the first batch of 10 locally manufac-
tured T-90 main battle tanks, under
license from Russia.
27 August: The Army Chief par-
ticipates in Pacific Armies Chiefs
Conference VI and the Pacific Armies
Management Seminar XXXIII in Tokyo,
Japan and holds bilateral meetings with
the Chiefs of countries of the Indian
Ocean Region.
31 August: General Deepak Kapoor
takes over as Chairman of the Chief Of
Staff Committee. He is handed over the
baton by outgoing Navy Chief Admiral
Sureesh Mehta.
1 October: Lieutenant General P.C.
Bhardwaj takes over as Vice Chief.
Commissioned into First Battalion the
Parachute Regiment on June 14, 1970,
the General is a specialist in Special
Operations and was the first person
from the Indian Army to undergo the
rigorous Commando Divers Course at
Naval Diving School.
5 October: Lieutenant General
K.J. Gillespie, Chief of the Royal
Australian Army, arrives in Delhi on
an official visit.
12 October: India successfully test-
fires an interceptor missile from the
Integrated Test Range at the Wheeler
Island in Orissa.
12 October: As part of the ongoing
Indo-US Defence Cooperation, Indo-US
joint exercise Yudh Abhyas 2009 is
conducted at Babina under the aegis of
HQ Southern Command.
21 October: The four-day Army
Commanders Conference at Delhi
reviews the operational preparedness
of the army along with the operational
plans and modernisation of weapons.
2 December: 2nd Lancers (Gardner’s
Horse), raised by Lieutenant Colonel
William Linneaus Gardner in 1809,
celebrates its Bicentenary Anniversary
of Raising.
2 December: Defence Minister A.K.
Antony meets visiting Vice Chief of
General Staff of the People’s Liberation
Army of China Major General Ge
Zhenfeng and his military delegation.
6 December: On a three-day Russia
visit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
inks six major defence and nuclear deals,
including a crucial agreement on the
use and cooperation of atomic energy.
11 December: Chief of Nepal Army
General Chhatra Man Singh Gurung is
conferred the rank of an Indian Army
General by President Pratibha Patil.
The General was the visiting dignitary
and reviewed the Passing Out Parade
of Indian Military Academy, Dehradun,
his Alma Mater.
17 December: The Chief of the Army
Staff presents 25 specialised scooters to
the army’s disabled soldiers and financial
assistance/education scholarship cheques
to 15 Veer Naris and their wards.
—Compiled by SP’s Team

White Paper on National Defence. It expressed
clear Chinese aspirations to seek world power
status. Towards this end, the first target to
be achieved was the creation of a modern
force capable of defeating a moderate-sized
adversary—namely Taiwan, Vietnam or India
by 2010. Therefore, overt deployments and
large-scale military manoeuvres are, in fact,
a pointer to the Chinese resolve to back diplo-
macy with the use of military force to solve
outstanding disputes.
Training for integrated
operations
China’s latest 2008 White Paper on
National Defence foreshadowed the renewed
emphasis on ground force training observed
in Stride 2009. There were clear indications
that the Chinese armed forces were training
for “integrated joint operations” on future
battlefields, in line with the strategic require-
ments of high mobility operations and
three-dimensional assault. There has been
a perceptible shift in the PLA’s posture from
regional defence to trans-regional mobility.
It is gradually making its units small, modu-
lar and multi-functional in organisation
through appropriate downsizing and struc-
tural reform. While accelerating the devel-
opment of aviation, light mechanised and
information counter-measure forces, it is
giving priority to the development of tactical
missiles, surface-to-air missiles and special
operations forces, so as to increase its capa-
bilities for land-air integrated operations,
long-distance manoeuvres, rapid assault and
special operations.
Soon after Stride 2009 was completed,
the PLA Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps
conducted a similar 20-day, large-scale,
multi-modal transportation, trans-regional
exercise called Airborne Movement 2009
(Kongjiang Jidong), beginning mid-October
2009. The Airborne Movement 2009
paralleled the tasks that army divisions
performed during Stride 2009. More than
13,000 troops were airlifted and began
marching through Hubei, Henan, Anhui,
and Jiangsu provinces. Heavy equipment,
including ZBD-03 Airborne Fighting
Vehicles, which were seen in the October 1
parade, was transported by rail while other
personnel moved by road convoys to the
exercise area in central China. The official
Chinese Xinhua news agency reported the
event as the “largest-ever Chinese airborne
force trans-regional campaign mobility (sic)
comprehensive training exercise”.
Considering that Stride and Airborne
Movement 2009 were touted to be success-
ful by higher headquarters, the relatively
rapid movement of large units across the
borders of MRs could indicate the need
for fewer units—thus setting the stage for
more personnel cuts and force reductions.
As part of the PLA’s long-term modernisa-
tion programme, considerable quantities
of new equipment have entered the PLA
inventory over the past decade. However, the
subsequent training of personnel to main-
tain and operate the new gear will remain a
Herculean task.
Foreign military observers
Beginning October 21, 2009, a joint exer-
cise named Vanguard 2009 (Qianfeng) got
underway at the Queshan Combined Arms
Training Base. According to the People’s
Daily, the main participants were the
armoured brigade of the 20th Group Army,
the 1st Army Aviation Regiment, an element
of the 15th Airborne Corps and aircrafts
from units from the air force of Guangzhou
and Jinan MRs. Deputy Commander of the
Jinan MR Lieutenant General Feng Zhaoju
claimed: “This exercise is the PLA’s first
joint operation and joint training activity
for basic campaign army groups in the true
sense”—an apt illustration of the period of
transforming doctrinal guidance to actual
implementation of tactical and operational
concepts. The PLA invited over 200 foreign
military observers to witness Vanguard
2009, in which a division of the 14th Group
Army and a PLA Air Force aviation division
in the Chengdu MR experimented with air
support to ground operations whilst con-
ducting independent joint operations.
Major General Xu Jingnian, Commander
of the 20th Group Army, pointed out that
while they were able to resolve issues per-
taining to voice command and digital com-
munications, communication weaknesses
continued to remain the biggest challenge
for the exercise. “How to achieve mutual
connections, real-time intelligence gathering
and sharing among various service branches
is the biggest issue... We are still unable to
achieve seamless (communications) connec-
tivity,” he stressed.
Such exercises showcasing China’s
rapid military modernisation and grow-
ing professionalism, combined with
its increasing economic clout, reflect
Beijing’s enhanced comprehensive
national power. With its growing power
and influence in Asia, China’s poses a
long-term strategic challenge to nations
in the region including India, with which
Beijing has a long-standing territorial
dispute. It also demonstrates the trans-
formation underway in the PLA today
and its efforts to further improve its capa-
bilities. The diverse missions and multi-
farious demands of winning “local wars
under conditions informationisation”
are challenges the PLA confronts vis-à-
vis realising its strategic goal of build-
ing Revolution in Military Affairs-ready
armed forces by the mid-21st century.
Clearly, the PLA is receiving enhanced
political guidance regarding its responsi-
bilities and missions. SP
Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in
Delhi and Dr Monika Chansoria is Research Fellow, CLAWS.

6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 13

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DEFEXPO INDIA 2010

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Date: February 15-18, 2010
Venue: Pragati Maidan

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KEY MEDIA PARTNER

for Defexpo India 2010:
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News i n B r i e f
Stratfor report - India to train
Afghan troops
Stratfor, the US news intelligence service
has stated that the Indian Army will train
Afghanistan’s army in counterinsurgency
operations, in its latest report. It described the
move as a sign of growing alliance between
India and Afghanistan about which Pakistan
has always been sensitive. It also said that
Afghanistan might also be considering send-
ing its air force pilots for training to India.
According to Stratfor India and Afghanistan
were pushing the idea that the faster India
trains the Afghan Army, the quicker NATO
can withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
According to them India’s goal was to gain a
toehold in the Afghan military establishment,
creating goodwill that it could use when the
time comes. The report states - “This prospect
is worrisome to Pakistan. New Delhi’s key
interest in Afghanistan has to do with its secu-
rity vis-a-vis Pakistan, and the trans-national
Islamist militant groups believed to be based
there. Long before the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan during the 1980s, Islamabad
viewed Kabul as aligned with New Delhi”.
Stratfor further points out that “Pakistan felt
sandwiched between its archrival to the east
and a hostile regime to the west. Another issue
was secular left-leaning Pakistani Pashtun
forces were pushing for a separate homeland
for their ethnic group — a demand backed by
Afghanistan in those days. To deal with these
threats, the Pakistanis decided to employ the
Islamist card to counter Pashtun nationalism
on both sides of the Durand Line”.
■ information flow are imperative.
Army Honours its Brave
Chief of the Army Staff, General Deepak
Kapoor, presented 25 Specialized Scooters
to Army’s disabled soldiers and financial
assistance/education scholarship cheques to
15 Veer Naris and their wards. Keeping up
with the tradition of emphasis on the welfare
and rehabilitation of its soldiers and their
families, and the army has instituted many
schemes. Rs One lakh each has been paid by
the Army to 12,084 NOKs of martyrs who
laid down their lives between 15 Aug 1947
to 30 Apr 1999 as a one time grant since not
much of ex-gratia was given to this category
earlier. An assistance of Rs One Lakh each
has also been given to all those war disabled
soldiers who have been invalided out from
the service due to their disability sustained
in various operations since 15 Aug 1947.
Under this scheme, Rs 43.85 crores has been
distributed to 4,385 beneficiaries till date.
■ vehicle has been developed to be applied
Oshkosh SandCat Multirole
Vehicle, International
The Oshkosh SandCat is a protected multi-
role vehicle built to offer high performance
and payload capacities for challenging mis-
sions. Manufactured by Oshkosh Defense, a
division of Oshkosh Corporation, the vehicle
was demonstrated at the Defence Vehicle
Dynamics (DVD) event on 25-26 June
2008. The vehicle is designed to serve as a
versatile, highly protected, manoeuvrable
and affordable solution for a variety of mis-
sions, including military, special operations,
peacekeeping, law enforcement and security,
homeland defence and disaster aid.
Plasan of Israel initially designed SandCat
as a composite armoured vehicle as a
replacement to the AIL storm jeeps of the
Israel Defence Force (IDF). In October 2005,
this vehicle was first demonstrated at the
Association of US Army (AUSA) show. Plasan
named the vehicle SandCat and displayed it
at the Eurosatory show during 2006. At the
Eurosatory show in 2008, the SandCat was
relaunched as a brand of Oshkosh Defense.
■ not obstruct driver’s vision. In water it can
VBM Freccia 8×8 Infantry
Fighting Vehicle, Italy
Veicolo blindato medio (VBM) Freccia 8×8
infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) is a medium
armoured vehicle developed by the consor-
tium Iveco-Oto Melara. It is the first digitised
vehicle to enter into service with the Italian
Army. The VBM Freccia IFV is based on the
chassis of the 105mm-armed Centauro
tank destroyers developed by the consortium
during 1992-96. The first prototype of the
vehicle was ready by 1996. The vehicle has
been modified to provide greater anti-tank
blast protection for the crew. The interior
layout of the Freccia has been optimised to
carry a crew of eight soldiers, with two men
in the turret and a driver.
The first VBM Freccia IFV was delivered
to the Italian Army in February 2009, at
Cepolispe in Montelibretti, Rome. On 26 May
2009, Oto Melera, the designer and manu-
facturer of the Hitfist Plus turret, and Rafael,
the designer and manufacturer of Spike
missiles, performed the launching trials on
the weapon system. This trial campaign was
completed in June 2009 with approval of
the anti-tank system following soon after.
The VBM Freccia IFV has a longer and
narrower hull than the Centauro tank
destroyer and weighs 26t. It is an 8×8-drive
vehicle with disc brakes on all eight wheels
and is equipped with the Hitfist Plus turret.
The vehicle’s hull and turret are aluminium
with a layer of ballistic steel fitted to provide
higher protection.
■ etc as a backbone to synergise and facilitate
Bronco All-Terrain Tracked
Carrier, Warthog Variant, UK
The Warthog all-terrain vehicle (ATV) is an
amphibious armoured vehicle and a vari-
ant of the Bronco all-terrain tracked carrier
(ATTC). The vehicle has been designed to
give high protection, huge payload capac-
ity and all terrain mobility. It has a capacity
to carry a crew of 12. The Bronco ATTC is
jointly developed by Singapore Technologies
Kinetics (ST Kinetics) and the Defence
Science & Technology Agency (DSTA) ini-
tially for the use of Singapore Army. This
for numerous operations including rapid
deployment, peace keeping and humani-
tarian aid missions, combat support and
logistics and maintenance. In May 2001,
the first Bronco ATTC was delivered to the
Singapore Armed Forces. More than 600
Bronco ATTCs are on order.
Bronco ATTC is a twin-chassis vehicle
developed to traverse difficult terrains creat-
ing low ground pressure, flexibility, high
payload capacity, spacious interiors, easy
transportability, higher mine protection, self-
recovery and stretch potential. The rubber
tracks and the running gear system fitted
to the vehicle provide soft and quiet ground
conditions creating low ground pressure
and thermal signature. These tracks enable
the vehicle traverse any terrain including
water, mud, swamp, soft sand and snow. The
hydraulic, articulated steering system of the
vehicle ensures better mobility, stability and
comfort in climbing up and getting down
tough terrains. It can reach a maximum
speed of 65km/h on roads. The vehicle has
the capacity to carry a payload of over 5t.
its swimming features require it to be less
prepared and the compact trim vane does
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief
Jayant Baranwal
Editor
Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor
travel at a speed of 5km/h. Compared to the Assistant Editor
Bronco ATTC, the Warthog will have a few Arundhati Das
additional features including the Platt MR50 Senior Technical Group Editor
shielded ring mount and external fuel tanks. Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand
Contributing Editor
■ Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia
Assistant Photo Editor
Abhishek Singh
Network Centricity : An
answer to security threats Sub-Editor
Bipasha Roy
Intelligence agencies operating at national
Contributors
and state level should be strengthened
India
with coordination mechanism, intelligence General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd)
analysis and dissemination of inputs in real Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra,
time to the end user said M M Pallam Raju, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal
Minister of State for Defence, Government (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd)
of India. He was speaking at a Seminar on Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K.
Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal,
Network Centricity and National Security Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma
organised jointly by Directorate General Europe
of Information Systems, The United Andrew Brookes (UK)
Service Institution of India (USI) and the USA & Canada
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). Lon Nordeen (USA)
Adding a private sector’s dimension to the Anil R. Pustam (West Indies)
theme, he stated that there are significant South Africa
opportunities for the private industry to Helmoed R. Heitman
partner in the homeland security and sub- Chairman & Managing Director
Jayant Baranwal
conventional warfare space. The equipment
and training must be upgraded and modern- Admin & Coordination
Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey
ized in order to have an effective counter-
insurgency internal security force. Design
Associate Art Director: Ratan Sonal
General Deepak Kapoor, Chief of Army Layout Designs: Rajkumar Sharma,
Staff stated, advancement in technology Vimlesh Kumar Yadav
has increased threats to national security. Sales & Marketing
Advanced technology is harnessed in terrorist Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia
attacks, asymmetric warfare, 4th Generation Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh
warfare etc. Therefore timely actions like Sales Manager: Rajiv Ranjan
starting unique IT projects, information grids SP’s Website
Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish
Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma
Arvind Thakur, Chairman CII Core Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal
on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt
Group on Information Systems & Chief Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this
Executive officer, NIIT Ltd said that a publication may be reproduced, stored in a
National Task Force on Policy Advocacy retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
has been established post 26/11 attacks. It or by any means, photocopying, recording,
aims at strengthening a nationwide security electronic, or otherwise without the prior
written permission of the publishers.
architecture with a focus on policy advocacy,
spreading awareness of technology among Printed in India
by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd
the security forces and sensitise the industry
© SP Guide Publications, 2009
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Ap p o i n t m e n t
• Lt Gen S.R. Ghosh, AVSM, SM has taken
over as the GOC-IN-C HQ Western
Command wef 01 Dec 2009.
6/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 15
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