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1NC - Environment

1. Plan cant solve biodiversity their framework is


influenced by fishery departments as per their
EcoAdapt 13 evidence this means that overfishing
as a stressor still occurs even if not in the coral
reefs.
2. MSP cant solve biodiversity.
Jentoft 14 Svien Jentoft, Norwegian College of Fishery Science, Faculty of Biosciences, Fisheries
and Economics, University of Troms, Norway, Marine spatial planning: risk or opportunity for fisheries in
the North Sea?, http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/832/art%253A10.1186%252F2212-9790-1213.pdf?auth66=1406487473_13fb536c6eb5023d5ed45e12c4c3aba8&ext=.pdf

MPAs (and MSP) are meant to be proactive mechanisms of areabased ecosystem management (Douvere and Ehler 2008). According to
the precautionary principle lack of information is no excuse for inaction. All
seven North Sea countries have ratified the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and therefore this principle governs by implication. Yet ,

things are more difficult to implement in reality than they


initially seem on the surface. MPAs cannot be easily imposed from

the top down. Its development requires interactive processes at the


regional scale. In Belgium this lesson was learned the hard way. As noted by
Bogaert et al. (2009), the initial MPA designation process was top-down and
received local resistance, and therefore failed. It had to be terminated,

and could not be resumed before a more interactive process


involving stakeholders was initiated six years later. This would

also be a lesson. There is little reason to assume that MSP would be any
different. MPAs are most needed when numerous and cumulative activities
expose risks to the environment. This is usually the situation near the coast
and in limited ocean spaces such as the North Sea. It is not the same as
when a MPA is established in the middle of the Atlantic where human
presence is considerably limited. The rule seems to be that the
easier their implementation due to minimal local resistance, the less
is the need for them (Gilliland and Laffoley 2008). Marine ecosystems do
not need MPAs if humans do not tamper with them, but that seems to be the
case to a diminishing extent. User-conflicts are likely to magnify and
intensify as more and more MPAs are created. Uses for the same space
are often incompatible and, if ways for different uses to co-exist cannot be
found, it remains logical they must be kept apart. No wonder therefore

that MPAs have received mixed support by fishers who find


them as an intrusion into their freedom of access and
movement (Jentoft et al. 2007). Fishers have their own precautionary

principle in place (Degnbol and Wilson2008). In the face of uncertainty,


they do not easily put their livelihood or community at risk. That is also
one reason why MPAs globally have received less support in the
fishing population than many would have expected , and why they
have been much slower in their implementation than originally anticipated

(Chuenpagdee et al. 2013). When fishers talk about MPAs and MSP,
issues of exclusion are of primary concern.

3. Their Gles evidence only says that various companies


clustered in small areas of the ocean could increase
pressure on the environment. It says nothing about
biodiversity, nothing about actual collapse, and it
actually advocates that more industrial activity take
place across a larger areathat means the aff turns
itself.
4. Ocean acidification means marine biodiversity collapse
is inevitable in the short term.
Rogers 14 [Alex Rogers, Scientific Director of IPSO and Professor of Conservation Biology at the
Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, 2014, The Oceans Death March,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/02/17/the-oceans-death-march/]

This problem is unquestionably serious, and heres why: The rate of change
of ocean pH (measure of acidity) is 10 times faster than 55 million
years ago. That period of geologic history was directly linked to

a mass extinction event as levels of CO2 mysteriously went off


the charts. Ten times larger is big, very big, when a
measurement of 0.1 in change of pH is consistent with
significant change! According to C.L.Dybas, On a Collision Course:

Oceans Plankton and Climate Change, BioScience, 2006: This acidification


is occurring at a rate [10-to-100] times faster [depending upon the
area] than ever recorded. In other words, as far as science is concerned,
the rate of change of pH in the ocean is off the charts. Therefore, and as a
result, nobody knows how this will play out because there is no known
example in geologic history of such a rapid change in pH. This begs the
biggest question of modern times, which is: Will ocean acidification cause an
extinction event this century, within current lifetimes? The Extinction Event
Already Appears to be Underway According to the State of the Ocean Report,
d/d October 3, 2013,International Programme on the State of the Ocean
(IPSO): This [acidification] of the ocean is unprecedented in the
Earths known history. We are entering an unknown territory of marine
ecosystem change The next mass extinction may have already
begun. According to Jane Lubchenco, PhD, who is the former director (200913) of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the effects of
acidification are already present in some oyster fisheries, like the West Coast
of the U.S. According to Lubchenco: You can actually see this happening
Its not something a long way into the future. It is a very big problem, Fiona
Harvey, Ocean Acidification due to Carbon Emissions is at
Highest for 300M Years, The Guardian October 2, 2013. And, according
to Richard Feely, PhD, (Dep. Of Oceanography, University of Washington) and
Christopher Sabine, PhD, (Senior Fellow, University of Washington,

Joint Institute for the Study of the Atmosphere and Ocean): If


the current carbon dioxide emission trends continue the

ocean will continue to undergo acidification, to an extent and


at rates that have not occurred for tens of millions of years
nearly all marine life forms that build calcium carbonate shells
and skeletons studied by scientists thus far have shown
deterioration due to increasing carbon dioxide levels in
seawater, Dr. Richard Feely and Dr. Christopher Sabine, Oceanographers,
Carbon Dioxide and Our Ocean Legacy, Pacific Marine Environmental
Laboratory of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, April
2006.

5. Alternate causes to coral reef stressplastic in the


ocean
The Marine Executive 12 [The Marine Executive is the leading source
of maritime news, jobs, events, and industry analysis in the United States,
NOAA Collects 50 Metric Tons of Marine Debris from Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/noaa-collects-50-metrictons-of-marine-debris-from-northwestern-hawaiian-islands, July 19th, 2012,
AR]
NOAA Ship Oscar Elton Sette arrived back in its homeport of Honolulu on
Saturday after a month in Papahnaumokukea Marine National

Monument. The team of 17 scientists collected nearly 50


metric tons of marine debris, which threatens monk seals, sea
turtles and other marine life in the coral reef ecosystem, in the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands (NWHI). But the NOAA has only
conducted annual removal missions of marine debris in the
NWHI since 1996 as part of a coral restoration effort. What
surprises us is that after many years of marine debris removal in
Papahnaumokukea and more than 700 metric tons of debris later,
we are still collecting a significant amount of derelict fishing
gear from the shallow coral reefs and shorelines, said Kyle
Koyanagi, marine debris operations manager at NOAA Fisheries Pacific
Islands Fisheries Science Center and chief scientist for the mission. The

ship was at maximum capacity and we did not have any space
for more debris. This year, marine debris was collected from waters and
shorelines around northern most islands and atolls: Kure Atoll, Midway Atoll,
Pearl and Hermes Atoll, Lisianski Island and Laysan Island. Approximately
half of the debris was comprised of derelict fishing gear and
plastics from Midway Atolls shallow coral reef environments,
where the team also completed a 27-day land-based mission prior to loading
debris on the 224-ft. NOAA Ship Oscar Elton Sette. As part of this years
mission, the NOAA team did look for debris from the 2011 tsunami in Japan,
however, no debris with an explicit connection to the tsunami was found.
Scientists monitored marine debris for radiation in partnership with the
Hawaii Department of Health out of abundance of caution and to gather
baseline data from the NWHI. While we did not find debris with an obvious
connection to last years tsunami, this mission was a great opportunity to
leverage activities that had already been planned and see what we might
find, said Carey Morishige, Pacific Islands regional coordinator for NOAAs

Marine Debris Program. Its also an important reminder that


marine debris is an everyday problem, especially here in the Pacific.
A portion of the funding for this years marine debris removal activities was
provided as part of the legal settlement collected by NOAAs Damage
Assessment, Remediation and Restoration Program from a July 2005 ship
grounding at Pearl and Hermes Atoll in the Monument. Additional support

was provided by NOAAs Marine Debris Program, NOAA


Fisheries Pacific Islands Fisheries Science Center and
Papahnaumokukea Marine National Monument, as well as other
partners including U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the State of
Hawaii, U.S. Coast Guard, Schnitzer Steel, and Covanta Energy .
Marine debris removed during this project was used to create
electricity through Hawaiis Nets to Energy Program, a public-private
partnership. Since 2002, more than 730 metric tons of derelict nets have
been used to create electricity enough to power nearly 350 Hawaii homes
for a year.

6. Even if they try to garner plan boosting resilience,


warming removes the pre-conditions for coral
survivability.
Bridle & Vines 7 John R. Bridle, Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society of London, London,
NW1 4RY, UK 2 School of Biological Sciences, Timothy H. Vines, Department of Zoology, Limits to
Evolution at Range Margins: When and Why Does Adaptation Fail?

populations
cannot become established beyond their range because they have
negative growth rates in these new habitats. However, it is clear that species can adapt to
Why do all species have spatially restricted ranges? The simple answer is that

inhospitable conditions over longer time periods, otherwise there would be no life on land, no mammals in

there is abundant
evidence for adaptation to different environments within the
range of a species, sometimes over short timescales 1 and 2. What
the ocean and only a few species on oceanic islands. Moreover,

then is happening at range edges to prevent adaptation and to stop populations from expanding into new

Populations typically become smaller and more fragmented


as species approach their ecological limits3 and 4. There are two contrasting
explanations for this failure of local adaptation: (i) if the range edge is highly
fragmented, Allee effects (see Glossary), genetic drift and the low rate of
mutational input into marginal populations might limit the
availability of locally beneficial alleles, preventing adaptation and,
therefore, range expansion 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9; and (ii) if populations at the margins remain
territories?

connected to large, well adapted central populations, the continual immigration of these locally deleterious
alleles could swamp the establishment of locally adaptive alleles, thus maintaining negative population
growth, and again preventing expansion (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, reviewed in [19]). Much
discussion of why evolution fails at range margins hinges on determining how much gene flow is necessary
to maintain adaptive potential at the margins without swamping local adaptation (see Ref. [9] for a recent
treatment). Answering this question requires a clear and detailed understanding of the genetics of
quantitative traits, as well as the nature of selection on these traits. Here, we describe theoretical models
that explore adaptation at range margins, and then examine how they have fared in the light of empirical
data. We divide these models by the type of range edge that they consider: environmental margins,
parapatric margins and hybrid zones. Although these margins differ in the number and type of factors
involved, range expansion in all three depends on locally adaptive alleles becoming established under the
ecological or genetic conditions at the range edge. Integrating range margin research into this broader
theoretical framework will generate important insights into what limits rates of adaptation in nature, a
topic that is particularly relevant given the rapid and widespread ecological changes being generated by

Climate
change represents a major immediate threat to biodiversity . Models
climate change (Box 1). Box 1. Extinction and evolution in response to climate change

that project the ecological tolerances of species on future


climatic scenarios estimate that at least 11% of species will
become extinct during the 21st century, even if one assumes

that they can disperse to track the distribution of suitable habitat


[69]. However, this figure will be an underestimate in cases where dispersal is limited or if local adaptation
already exists throughout a species range, meaning that ecological tolerance within a given population

extinctions will be reduced if


species can adapt to changing conditions, particularly at range
margins, enabling more widespread habitats to be exploited. Parmesan
will be less than the models assume [70]. Conversely,

and Yohe [71] analysed data for over 1700 species and showed that 73% have recently shifted their
ranges, mostly in the poleward or upward direction predicted by models of climate change. Detailed
studies of European butterflies also reveal similar responses 72 and 73 (Figure I), mostly in generalist, high
dispersal species. However, poleward range shifts in specialist, low dispersal species tend to be associated
with the evolution of increased dispersal abilities

[74], or with the ability to use

more widespread habitat [75]. Taken together, these studies suggest that, at least in the
poleward range shifts are more common than the local
adaptation that would enable populations to remain where they are
short term,
[42].

AT: Navy

Alt. Causes Readiness


Air power renders navy obsolete in solving sea conflict.
Dyer & McGregor 7/10 Geoff Dyer, Former Financial Times writer and author of The
Contest of the Century a survey on Chinese development in seas, and Richard McGregor, the chief
political correspondent, Japan correspondent and China correspondent for The Financial Times, Pentagon
plans new tactics to deter China in South China Sea, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83c0b88e-0732-11e481c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz38RLXm8Mu

This is a new dynamic, said a former Pentagon official familiar with the operation. The
message is, we know what you are doing, your actions will have
consequences and that we have the capacity and the will and
we are here. A spokesman for the US militarys Pacific Command said that we do
routine operations in these waters and airspace on a regular basis .
More extensive use of surveillance aircraft in the region could be coupled with a greater willingness to

US officials believe the


Chinese might be given pause for thought if images of their
vessels harassing Vietnamese or Filipino fishermen were to be
broadcast. The US militarys Hawaii-based Pacific command has also been
asked to co-ordinate the development of a regional system of
maritime information, which would allow governments in the western Pacific detailed
publicise images or videos of Chinese maritime activity. Some

information about the location of vessels in the region. Several governments say they have been caught

The US has supplied the


Philippines, Japan and other countries in the region with improved
radar equipment and other monitoring systems and is now looking for ways
unawares by the surprise appearance of Chinese ships.

to build this information into a broader regional network that


shares the data. The Pentagon has also been working on plans for
the flight of B-52s over the East China Sea last
year after China declared an exclusive air defence zone over the
area. The potential options involve sending naval vessels close to disputed areas. US officials say that
there is little appetite within the administration for some of the
more confrontational ideas that have been proposed as a means of
deterring China. These include deploying the US coast guard to the
South China Sea to counter the activities of Chinese civilian vessels and using US-led convoys to
calculated shows of force, such as

escort fisherman from the Philippines and other nations into areas where they have been expelled by the
Chinese. The Obama administration declared South China Sea a US national interest in 2010. Since then
it has watched China take effective control in 2012 of Scarborough Shoal, 120 nautical miles west of the
Philippines main island, Luzon. As well as the altercation at the Second Thomas Shoal this year, Manila has
accused Beijing of reclaiming land for a runway in a disputed area while China has also placed an oil rig in

Despite Chinese complaints, the US has


long conducted aerial surveillance in the region, although the
use of its new generation of P-8A planes in contested areas
represents an intensification of the activity. Bonnie Glaser, an Asia expert at
waters also claimed by Vietnam.

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that the surveillance flights showed that the US
has

an interest in peaceful resolution of these disputes and opposes


Chinas coercion. However, she added: Im sceptical such flights will deter
Chinese behaviour. The Philippines wants to increase its surveillance capabilities to help it
shine the spotlight on what it sees as provocative Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

Readiness is low now drastic decreases in ship building


Lehman 12

Mr. Lehman was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration and a member of the 9/11
Commission. The Seas Are Great but the Navy Is Small April 27 2012
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702304811304577365570199853412
The more troubling problem is that the administration is counting ships that won't be built at all. Last year,

the president's budget called for cuts of $487 billion over the
next decade. Mr. Obama also supports the additional cuts growing out of the sequester that went
into effect after last year's super committee failed to agree on savings in the overall budget. Unless the
law is changed, this means an additional half-trillion dollars in mandatory defense reductions over the next

Naval
readiness is already highly fragile. In order to meet current
operational requirements, the shrunken fleet stays deployed
longer and gets repaired less. There is now a serious shortage
of Navy combat aircraft, and for the first time since World War
II there are essentially no combat attrition reserves. But the
biggest effect of budget cuts will be on naval shipbuilding.
Currently the Navy has 286 ships. In order to pay for current
operations, Mr. Obama is retiring 11 modern combat ships (seven
decadecuts that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has said would be "devastating."

cruisers and four amphibious vessels) well before their useful life. In order to reach a 350-ship fleet in our

we will need to increase shipbuilding to an average of 15


ships every year. The latest budget the administration has
advanced proposes buying just 41 ships over five years. It is
anything but certain that the administration's budgets will
sustain even that rate of only eight ships per year, but even if
they do, the United States is headed for a Navy of 240-250
ships at best.
lifetime,

Alt CauseLack of funding is crushing carrier


deployments
Dyer 14
Jennifer Dyer is a retired US Naval intelligence officer who served around the world, afloat and ashore, from
1983 to 2004. My last operations in the Navy were Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in 2003. About
that new Navy readiness policy, Jan 27, 2014,
http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2014/01/27/about-that-new-navy-readiness-policy/

The bottom line for the new Optimized Fleet Response Plan is
that the Navy will maintain fewer aircraft carriers ready to
surge in response to national security requirements. Instead
of trying to maintain 3-4 carriers in that status of operational
availability (slide 10), the Navy will maintain two (slide 13). The
operationally available carriers will not be in addition to the deployed carrier in the Persian Gulf region;
they will include the deployed carrier. In other words, there will be a carrier in the Gulf region, and one
additional carrier that is operationally available. At any given time, that second carrier will have to be the
one dedicated to the Far East. It may be the carrier homeported in Japan or, when that carrier is in a
pierside maintenance period in Japan, it will be another Pacific Fleet carrier. (This isnt explicitly reflected in
the slide presentation, but its implied by national policy, which requires immediate response to a Korean

There wont be additional


carriers to deploy for front-line operations. The reason is
money. Its nothing more complicated than that. The Navy
doesnt have enough money to maintain more carriers
operationally available at the same time. If you go through the slide
crisis with at least one carrier strike group.) That will be it.

presentation, youll see two hints at that reality. Most of the presentation is devoted to explaining how the
fleet will revise scheduling, maintenance, training, etc to adjust to the new fleet response plan. But the
plans most basic numbers 2 carrier groups at a time; a 36-month cycle; one 8-month deployment per
cycle (slide 13) are ultimately driven by the constraints of money.

Alt CauseFleet draw-down is crushing readiness, largest


proximate cause
Dyer 14
Jennifer Dyer is a retired US Naval intelligence officer who served around the world, afloat and ashore, from
1983 to 2004. My last operations in the Navy were Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in 2003. About
that new Navy readiness policy, Jan 27, 2014,
http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2014/01/27/about-that-new-navy-readiness-policy/

we
have reached a readiness low-point at which DOD will have to go to Congress for
more money if it is ordered to plus up its deployed force level for a contingency. There is zero
slack in the level of ready forces, to allow us to surge:
deploy more than we already have operating forward. This means
that if we need to do something that requires more than the
already-deployed forces such as conduct an attack on Irans
nuclear facilities we literally cannot be ready to do it in the
short time it would take to merely deploy the additional forces .
This terse expression means what Ive been saying for a year (see here, here, here, and here): that

The time it will take will have to include making the additional forces operationally ready first. (A potential
alternative is leaving the Far East without a carrier, but thats only a potential alternative: even if were

two carriers and their air wings may


not be enough for the job we need to do. Under todays
warfighting and technological conditions, if we cant bring
more than two carriers to a fight on short notice, we have
simply written off the kind of national security readiness we
have maintained for the last 60 years.) The time to surge
additional carriers will probably be months, depending on where the nonwilling to short our posture in the Far East,

ready carriers are in their 36-month cycle, and how much money Congress allocates to preparing them.
The most important aspect of this reality is that the president no longer has the discretion to deploy forces
without going to Congress for money, and thus making the political process, both at home and abroad, a
very extended one.

AT: Pakistan
No nuclear escalation for India-Pak War.
Ahmed 09 Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New
Delhi, India-Pakistan Conflict Outcome Probability, IDSA, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses

In a situation involving limited Indian war aims, Pakistan would respond with
its defensive formations and use its strategic reserves in an offensive mode
wherever possible.7 A Pakistani offensive, though in keeping with
Pakistans doctrine of offensive defence8, may not eventuate in the
event of an early war. Following the imposition of costs through air action,

India expects to see hostilities terminated through


international pressure. Air operations and pivot corps
operations by India would reduce the windows available for
launching Pakistani offensives inside Indian territory, which
may prove very costly for Pakistan. Besides, there would be little

scope for launching forces into Indian territory in the face of Indias broad
front attacks. As demonstrated at Kargil, India would wrap up any
gains it may make eventually. Pakistan may employ only a small
proportion of its forces in defensive operations, seeking instead to preserve
most of its forces for post-conflict internal political purposes, allowing its
Army to stay at the apex of Pakistans political pyramid.9 In any post-conflict
scenario military losses would compromise the Pakistan Armys grip
on power. Termination of Indias limited offensives would enable

Pakistan to declare victory of sorts by claiming that it held up


Indias conventional might with only a partial use of its forces .
In such a circumstance, both states would be satisfied in having met
respective conflict aims. India would have inflicted punishment on
Pakistan and Pakistan would claim to have withstood it. Such a
juncture of positive perceptions would be useful to begin strategic
engagement for peace making and long term conflict resolution.10
The foregoing indicates that Pakistans conflict strategy is likely to comprise
the following elements: war avoidance; conventional defence;

counter offensive with strategic reserves;11 a resort to


asymmetric war; and preservation of military assets. For Pakistan
the nuclear dimension of the conflict would include a high nuclear
threshold;12 nuclear signaling for deterrence; catalyzing external pressures;
and, preservation of nuclear assets from attrition. Pakistan has mooted the
Samson Option only as a last resort.13

Pakistan is secure from collapse no risk of loose nukes.


IE 13 The Indian Express, Magazine and Political Newspaper, Pakistans Security Weapons
to Protected by a Special Security Force, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/pakistansnuclear-weapons-to-be-protected-by-a-special-security-force/1132477/

Pakistan has raised a 25,000-strong special force and put in place


extensive measures to protect and manage its strategic assets,
including its nuclear arsenal, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar said today. "A
special security force of 25,000 personnel, who have been specially trained
and provided sophisticated weapons , has been deployed to protect

(the nuclear assets)," Dar said, while winding up the debate on the 2013-

14 budget in the National Assembly or lower house of Parliament. Pakistan


has raised a special response force, a special escort force and a
marine force to protect and guard its strategic assets, he said without
giving details. Besides, there are also counter-intelligence teams and a
"personnel reliability programme" to oversee the strategic
programme, he said. The 25,000-strong security force has been equipped
with the latest equipment and the personnel are fully prepared for "mobility
on the ground or in the air", he said. The Strategic Plans Division,
which manages the nuclear arsenal, has set up a training academy for
the security force, Dar said. The security force was always prepared and
it trained for all conditions and eventualities on the basis of past experiences
and potential scenarios involving the strategic assets, he said. The system

for identifying dangers is always at high alert and is constantly


being reviewed, Dar said. Pakistan's strategic assets programme is
based on strong foundations and meets international
standards for security and management of nuclear assets as
laid down by organisations like the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and Missile Technology Control Regime, he said. Over the past year,

the military too has provided details of the special security force raised by the
Strategic Plans Division. Several batches of this force have passed out of
training academies across the country.

AT: US/China
No US-China war
Bisley, 14
(Nick Bisley, Professor of IR @ La Trobe University in Australia and Executive Director of La Trobe Asia, Its
not 1914 all over again: Asia is preparing to avoid war, http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-all-overagain-asia-is-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875)
Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle poque. Analogies are an
understandable way of trying to make sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this case, however, the historical parallel is
deeply misleading. Asia is experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China
reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister

there are very good reasons,


why Asia is not about to tumble into a great
power war. China is Americas second most important trading
partner. Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with
which China trades. Trade and investments golden straitjacket is a
Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But
notwithstanding these issues,

basic reason to be optimistic.

Why should this be seen as being more effective than the high levels

Beijing and
Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely
aware of how much they have at stake. Diplomatic infrastructure for peace The
two powers have established a wide range of institutional links
to manage their relations. These are designed to improve the level and
quality of their communication, to lower the risks of
misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to manage the trajectory of their
of interdependence between Britain and Germany before World War One? Because

relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet

The dialogue has demonstrably


improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a wide range of
under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

areas. These range from disaster relief to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of Afghan diplomats to marine
conservation efforts, in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime

Unlike the near total absence of diplomatic engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to
1914, todays two would-be combatants have a deep level of
interaction and practical co-operation. Just as the extensive array of common interests has led
Beijing and Washington to do a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15 years. These
nations have created a broad range of multilateral institutions and
legal regimes.

mechanisms intended to improve trust, generate a sense of common cause and promote regional prosperity. Some

APEC

organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (


), have a high profile with its annual leaders meeting
involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment of heads of government dressing up in national garb. Others like

ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But
there are more than 15 separate multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these
organisations are trying to build what might be described as an infrastructure
for peace in the region. While these mechanisms are not flawless, and many have rightly been
the

they have been crucial in managing


crises and allowing countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.

criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action,


specific

Economic incentives and fear of it going nuclear stops the


war
Cranston, 13
(Belinda, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific News,cites Paul Dibb, former Australian Defence deputy
secretary and Professor at Australian National University in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
US and China unlikely to go to war, says expert, 4-23-13, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/news-events/allstories/us-and-china-unlikely-go-war-says-expert#.UfPgjW3JLwJ)

the iPhone and fear of nuclear war are keeping China


and the United States from exchanging fire, an ANU defence expert says. But a dispute over
Gadgets like

four little uninhabitable rocky islands in the East China Sea needs attention. Speaking ahead of an ANU public lecture on
the risks of war between China and the United States, Professor Paul Dibb pointed out that

historically,

whenever a new superpower had emerged , such as Hitler's Germany or imperial


Japan, full-scale war had occurred . But according to Dibb, China's rise to power
was unlikely to result in the same outcome; for a start, it could result in nuclear war
something neither China nor the United States wanted. "Everybody knows that if major powers go to war and nuclear
weapons are used, its the end game," he said. "Its the end of those countries as major functional societies."

Economic interdependence was another deterrent , said Dibb, a former


Defence deputy secretary now based in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. The iPhone, for example was invented in
the United States, but its parts were made in Japan. Where is it assembled? China," he said. In the unlikely event of the
US and China going to war, Australia would find itself in a very difficult position, given it had both historic ties with the US
and a fledging relationship with China. Weve been in every war the Americans have been in, since the beginning of the
last century, Dibb said. That includes both world wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the first Gulf War, and recent
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are the ally who cant say no, he said. Earlier this year, former Foreign Affairs Minister
Kevin Rudd warned nationalism and conflicting claims in the East China and South China seas were bringing six countries
three of them close strategic partners of the US into dispute with China. Particularly worrying was a territorial row
between China and Japan over islands in the East China Sea, known as Senkaku in Japan, and Diaoyu in China. Tensions
escalated in September, when China stepped up its claim over the islands, by sending three Chinese ships into waters
near the islands. While Rudd stopped short of saying a pan-Asian war was on the cards, he did refer to Austrian Duke
Ferdinand being assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914, setting off a chain of events which lead to the start of the First World

dismisses any suggestion tension in the region could


spark a full-scale war. I dont discount the possibility of a miscalculation, over something like the
War. Dibb

Senkaku islands, or somewhere in the South China Sea, he said. But the fact is, when we have a conflict over four little
uninhabitable rocky islands,

would it make sense to go to full scale war? No.

Geography solves
Keck, 13
(Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat. He has previously served as a Deputy Editor for E-IR and as an
Editorial Assistant for The Diplomat, "Why China and the US (Probably) Wont Go to War", July 12,
thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/ NL)

Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances
of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons.
Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a
U.S.-China war in a couple of ways. First, both the United States and China are immensely large
countriesaccording to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest
countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They also have difficult topographical

unconquerable by another
power. This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where
features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually

power transitions led to war. For example, in Europe where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely
had to worry that the other side could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten

Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically


entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they
operate within. Besides being immensely large countries, China and the U.S. are also
separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also weaken their
sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the
the other sides national survival.

violent power transitions of the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival

when great power conflict has


been avoided, the states have often had considerable distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and
states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast,

British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: the
difficulty of projecting power across large distancesparticularly bodies of waters reduces each sides concern that the
other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests. True, the U.S. operates extensively in
Chinas backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijings neighbors. This undeniably heightens
the risk of conflict. At the same time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada,
and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Even with the U.S.
presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in
the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least. Thus,

while

every effort should be made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is


nearly unthinkable one will occur.

Methane
Offshore drilling is safe in the status quo regulations
and partnership vision.
Steffy 13 Loren Steffy, an award-winning business columnist for the Houston Chronicle, and before
that, as a senior writer at Bloomberg News and author of Drowning in Oil: BP and the Reckless Pursuit of
Profit, and The Man Who Thought Like a Ship, A Long Overdue Change Could Make Offshore Drilling
Safer, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorensteffy/2013/10/29/a-long-overdue-change-could-make-offshoredrilling-safer/

Even before cleanup in the Gulf of Mexico was complete, the oil and

natural gas industry started working with federal regulators on


a comprehensive review of offshore operations. We in the industry
clearly understand that the future of offshore drilling depends on our ability
to conduct operations safely. Federal regulators and the public should
rest assured. Despite claims to the contrary, the oil and natural gas

industry and the federal government have together taken


great strides to enhance the safety of offshore operations.
Four joint industry task forces have now reexamined every
aspect of offshore drilling, from equipment and operating
procedures to subsea well control and oil spill response. Working
with experienced regulators from the Department of Interior, industry
experts developed new recommendations and standards for
operations in both deep and shallow water exploration . One of
the most urgent needs was clearly to boost the rapid response capability for
containment in case of a leak. New collaborative containment companies
established after the 2010 spill now stand ready to deploy state-of-the-art
containment technology at the first indication of a spill at the wellhead. Our
task forces found room for improvement in numerous other areas. The
industry is now following newly established or revised standards in
areas ranging from well design and cementing to blowout
prevention, subsea equipment for capping wells, and protections for
workers responding to a spill. The American Petroleum Institute maintains
more than 600 industry standards covering all aspects related to production,
and more than 100 have been incorporated into federal regulations. Even
before the Deepwater Horizon accident, spills were rare. Over the past
decade, 99.999% of oil shipped to the United States reached its destination
without incident. More than 40,000 total wells have been drilled in the Gulf of
Mexico, and at the time of the spill, 699 wells were operating at depths of
5,000 feet or greater, while more than 3,900 were in production at 1,000 feet
or more. Its a common and understandable misconception that deep water
operations are inherently more risky. While deep water wells present
greater technical challenges in some cases, safety standards also
change to reflect the difference. As a result, working in deeper water
does not equate to greater risk. Obviously, even one incident is too
many, let alone one on the scale of the 2010 crisis. Thats why the industry
has also created the Center for Offshore Safety (COS). Its mission is to

work with independent third-party auditors and government

regulators to create an industry-wide culture of continuous


safety improvement. The federal Bureau of Safety and Environmental

Enforcement (BSEE) has already incorporated a number of guidelines


COS devised into its own regulations. BSEE is one of three new agencies
formed from the reorganization of the former Minerals Management Service
in response to the Gulf spill. In recent congressional testimony, Director Brian
Salerno noted that 25 of the 33 BP Deepwater Horizon Commission
recommendations have been acted upon or are in the process of being
addressed. COS is also working on a major initiative on prevention.
The Center collects and analyzes data to better detect potential problems
before they occur. The prevention protocol includes a blind source reporting
system, which allows companies to provide data without incurring punitive
action, enabling us to learn more and faster.

Methane leaks are gradual and can be stopped.


Oppenheimer 14 Michael Oppenheimer, is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Geosciences
and International Affairs at Princeton University and a consultant on scientific matters to the Environmental
Defense Fund, Plug Methane Leaks in the Booming Natural Gas Industry,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/plug-methane-leaks-in-the-booming-natural-gas-industry/

In 2012 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimated the

total methane emissions from natural gas supply chain and


petroleum sources to be 1.5 percent of U.S. natural gas
produced. But that may understate the problem. A 2013 study led by
Harvard University scientists found that total U.S. anthropogenic methane
emissions in 2008, including industrial and agricultural sources, could be 50
percent higher than EPA estimates. A series of peer-reviewed studies will be
published in the coming year, deepening our understanding of methane
emissions from various geographies and supply chain segments. We already
know enough to start cutting methane leakage, however. A study released
this year by the consulting firm ICF International analyzed 11 methanereduction techniques for 19 sources of industrial emissions. Some
measures, such as shifting to lower-emitting pneumatic valves and
requiring routine leak detection and repair, would save the industry
money; others would impose manageable costs. Overall, ICF found that
using currently available technologies, 40 percent of methane emissions
from the natural gas supply chain could be eliminated within five
years for less than a penny per thousand cubic feet of gas produced. Others
have found similarly low costs. At both state and federal levels, political
support for regulatory controls is building. In February Colorado
adopted the first rules in the U.S. that directly control methane emissions.
After Gov. John Hickenlooper declared zero tolerance for methane
emissions, the Environmental Defense Fund and three of Colorados largest
oil and gas producersAnadarko Petroleum, Encana and Noble Energy
developed a proposal that shaped the regulations. Under the new rules

companies must find and fix leaks and use stronger emission
controls for storage tanks, dehydrators and gas vents from
wells. The Colorado rule-making is a model for other states and the nation.
Last June Pres. Obama included methane controls in his Climate Action Plan,
and in the months since an interagency task force has been examining

regulatory options. The Administration announced a "methane


strategy" on March 28, a first step toward comprehensive regulation.
Whereas local water pollution issues resulting from the use of hydraulic
fracturing technologies still remain to be resolved, moving ahead with this
federal rule-making on methane leakage is in the interests of both the nation
and the global climate system.

Catastrophic methane release extremely unlikely no


impact to current trends
Ruppel and Noserale 12 (Carolyn and Diane, U.S. Geological Survey Woods Hole Field
Center AND USGS communications worker, Gas Hydrates and Climate WarmingWhy a Methane
Catastrophe Is Unlikely, May/June 2012, http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2012/06/)//WL
News stories and Web postings have raised concerns that climate warming will release large volumes of
methane from gas hydrates, kicking off a chain reaction of warming and methane releases. But

recent

research indicates that most of the worlds gas hydrate


deposits should remain stable for the next few thousand years .
Of the gas hydrates likely to become unstable, few are likely to
release methane that could reach the atmosphere and
intensify climate warming. Gas Hydrates Primer Gas hydrates are an ice-like combination
of natural gas and water that can form in deep-water ocean sediments near the continents and within or
beneath continuous permafrost. Specific temperatures and pressures and an ample supply of natural gas
are required for gas hydrates to form and remain stable. An estimated 99 percent of gas hydrates are in
ocean sediment and the remaining 1 percent in permafrost areas (see map). Methane hydrate or methane
ice, which is the most common type of gas hydrate, represents a highly concentrated form of methane:
one cubic foot of methane hydrate traps about 164 cubic feet of methane gas. The amount of methane
trapped in the Earths gas hydrate deposits is uncertain, but even the most conservative estimates
conclude that about 1,000 times more methane is trapped in hydrates than is consumed annually
worldwide to meet energy needs. The most active area of gas-hydrate research focuses on gas hydrates
potential as an alternative source of natural gas (for example, see
http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/documents/natural-gas2011/Supplementary_Paper_SP_2_4_Hydrates.pdf [842 KB PDF]); the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Gas
Hydrates Project has several programs addressing this topic (see
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/GasHydrates.aspx). Gas Hydrates and Climate Change

researchers are examining the link between climate


change and the stability of methane-hydrate deposits. Warming
Gas hydrate

climate could cause gas hydrates to break down (dissociate), releasing the methane that they now trap.
Methane is a potent greenhouse gas. For a given volume, methane causes 15 to 20 times more
greenhouse-gas warming than carbon dioxide, and so the release of large volumes of methane to the
atmosphere could, in theory, exacerbate climate warming and cause more gas hydrates to destabilize.
Some research suggests that such large-scale, climate-driven dissociation events have occurred in the
past. For example, extreme warming during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum about 55 million
years ago may have been related to a large-scale release of methane from global methane hydrates. Some
scientists have also advanced the clathrate-gun hypothesis to explain observations that may be consistent
with repeated, catastrophic dissociation of gas hydrates and triggering of submarine landslides during the
late Quaternary (400,000 to 10,000 years ago). Methane As a Greenhouse Gas The atmospheric
concentration of methane, like that of carbon dioxide, has increased since the onset of the Industrial
Revolution. Methane in the atmosphere comes from many sources, including wetlands, rice cultivation,
termites, cows and other ruminants, forest fires, and fossil-fuel production. Some researchers have
estimated that as much as 2 percent of atmospheric methane may originate with dissociation of global gas
hydrates. Currently, scientists do not have a tool to say with certainty how much, if any, atmospheric

Although methane is a potent greenhouse


gas, it does not remain in the atmosphere for long; within
about 10 years, it reacts with other compounds in the
atmosphere to form carbon dioxide and water. Thus, methane
that is released to the atmosphere ultimately adds to the
amount of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. Climate-Driven
Gas Hydrate Dissociation For the most part, warming at rates documented by the
methane comes from hydrates.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the 20th century should not lead to
catastrophic breakdown of methane hydrates or major leakage
of methane to the ocean-atmosphere system from gas
hydrates that dissociate. Although most methane hydrates would have to experience
sustained warming over thousands of years before dissociation was triggered, gas hydrates in some places
are dissociating now in response to short- and long-term climatic processes. The following discussion refers
to the numbered type locales or sectors shown in the diagram of gas-hydrate deposits below. Sector 1,

Gas hydrates that occur within or beneath


thick terrestrial permafrost will remain largely stable even if
climate warming lasts hundreds of years. Over thousands of years, warming
Thick Onshore Permafrost:

could cause gas hydrates at the top of the stability zone, about 625 feet (190 meters) below the Earths
surface, to begin to dissociate. Sector 2, Shallow Arctic Shelf: The shallow-water continental shelves that
circle parts of the Arctic Ocean were formed when sea-level rise during the past 10,000 years inundated
permafrost that was at the coastline. Subsea permafrost is thawing beneath these continental shelves, and
associated methane hydrates are likely dissociating now. (For example, see related Sound Waves article
"Degradation of Subsea Permafrost and Associated Gas Hydrates Offshore of Alaska in Response to Climate
Change.") If methane from these gas hydrates reaches the seafloor, much of it will likely be emitted to the
atmosphere. Less than 1 percent of the worlds gas hydrates probably occur in this setting, but this
estimate could be revised as scientists learn more. Sector 3, Upper Edge of Stability: Gas hydrates on
upper continental slopes, beneath 1,000 to 1,600 feet (300 to 500 meters) of water, lie at the shallowest
water depth for which methane hydrates are stable. The upper continental slopes, which ring all of the
worlds continents, could host gas hydrate in zones that are roughly 30 feet (10 meters) thick. Warming

Methane
emitted at these water depths will probably dissolve or be
oxidized in the water column and is unlikely to reach the
atmosphere. About 3.5 percent of the Earths gas hydrates occur in this climate-sensitive setting.
ocean waters could completely dissociate these gas hydrates in less than 100 years.

Sector 4, Deepwater: Most of the Earths gas hydrates, about 95 percent, occur in water depths greater
than 3,000 feet (1,000 meters). They are likely to remain stable even with a sustained increase in bottom
temperatures over thousands of years. Most of the gas hydrates in these settings occur deep within the
sediments. If the gas hydrates do dissociate, the released methane should remain trapped in the
sediments, migrate upward to form new gas hydrates, or be consumed by oxidation in near-seafloor
sediments. Most methane released at the seafloor would likely dissolve or be oxidized in the water column.
A recent article, Methane Hydrates and Contemporary Climate Change, provides more detail.

Methane Hydrate detection and mitigation in atmosphere


solves in the status quo.
Hunt et al. 13 Andrew G. Hunt, Carolyn Ruppel, Laura Stern, and John Pohlman,
members of surveyors in the US Geological Survey Committee, Using Noble Gas Signatures to
Fingerprint Gas Streams Derived from Dissociating Methane Hydrate,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Research/Oil-Gas/methane
%20hydrates/MHNews_2013_October.pdf

Based on the knowledge that noble gas molecules partition into the gas
hydrate lattice in the order of their molecular weight, the USGS Gas

Hydrates Project, in collaboration with the USGS Noble Gas


Laboratory in Denver, is investigating the potential of noble
gas signatures for fingerprinting gas streams derived from
dissociating gas hydrates. Many natural processes can lead to the
emission of methane gas. A critical challenge is determining which gas
streams originate from dissociating gas hydrates versus other sources. The
challenge is particularly acute in permafrost settings, where an ardent
scientific debate rages over whether methane leaking into the
atmosphere is sourced from dissociating gas hydrates or from nonhydrate sources, which may include shallow microbial gas, microbial gas
produced from degradation of newly thawed organic carbon, deep

thermogenic reservoirs, and coalbeds. Carbon isotopic signatures are of


limited use in distinguishing between hydrate- and non-hydrate sources of
gas streams, because gas hydrates often sequester methane with

13C signatures similar to those of local thermogenic and/or


microbial methane sources. Noble gas signatures, on the other

hand, may provide a useful alternative tool for distinguishing


methane gas sources. Previous Work Noble gas signatures of gas hydrates
were previously studied by Dickens and Kennedy (2000) and Winckler et al.
(2002), but not for the purposes of fingerprinting gas streams emitted from
dissociating methane hydrates. These studies provide important background,
but the samples experienced significant air contamination. Conflicting results
also led to questions about the true nature of noble gas storage in the
methane hydrate lattice. Experimental Approach Taking advantage of the
special capabilities of the USGS Noble Gas Laboratory, which is equipped with
a state-of-the-art gas extraction line, coupled with a noble gas mass
spectrometer, we performed an initial investigation of the

fractionation of noble gas compositions during the formation


and dissociation of methane hydrate under controlled
laboratory conditions. The full paper on this project was published as

Hunt et al. (2013). Methane hydrate was synthesized using a modified


version of the ice seed method (Stern et al., 1996). The synthesis gas was a
mixture of methane plus pressurized air with uniform noble gas content (airlike isotopic composition of Ne, Ar, Kr, and Xe). Two samples were synthesized
concurrently: a control sample that was dissociated immediately,

and a 24 companion sample that was stored in liquid nitrogen


and used for later testing. Our protocol was to collect gas from
(1) the source mixture (initial gas); (2) excess gas in the
sample chambers prior to hydrate formation; (3) excess gas
after complete conversion to hydrate (final gas); and (4) gas
released during step-wise dissociation. Following methane
hydrate synthesis, the control sample was quickly vented (while
ensuring no air contamination) to release all unreacted gas. The
synthesized hydrate was then heated and dissociated over multiple steps.
Aliquots of the released gas were collected after each step. The companion
sample was vented and quenched in liquid nitrogen, wrapped in aluminum
foil and stored for 9 months in liquid nitrogen, and then dissociated in a
similar step-wise manner. Additional samples were later synthesized to
verify the reproducibility of our results and to analyze the bulk
composition of the hydrate.

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