(10) Unson vs.

Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980

Petitioner, Miguel Unson, and private respondent, Edita Araneta, were
married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that marriage the child in question,
Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. On July 13, 1974 they executed an
agreement for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as
they have in fact been living separately since June 1972.
During early part of 1978, Unson found out that Araneta has been living
with her brother in law Agustin F. Reyes and later had two kids. Araneta
and Reyes had also embraced a protestant sect. Petitioner contends that
Maria Teresa was born and reared under the Roman Catholic faith and
should not be exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life
which is the upbringing and training her father is committed to.
Editha admitted that her present circumstances at first impression might
seem socially if not morally unacceptable; but she has reared and brought
up Maria Teresa in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honest.
Respondent is seeking the custody of their child.
Issue: WON the child custody should be given to the mother?
Held: No. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to
be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence,
that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as
admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who
is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life.
The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her
mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between
right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the
unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law,
the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that
she has reached a perilous stage in her life.

No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being of his

child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than
petitioner's in this case.
B. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234, 217
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or
transferred except in the cases authorized by law.
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity
or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of
the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary
measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary
hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be
heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault,
irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so
warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental
authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper.
(318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the
commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or
institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by
the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of
the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon
proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the
commitment of the child whenever just and proper.
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years.
Emancipation also takes place:

(1) By the marriage of the minor; or

(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public
instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the
minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be
irrevocable.
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and
other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in
summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and
similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
(11) Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao
were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent
Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. Out of their marriage, two children
were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao.
Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother while
Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house. Reynaldo Eslao
died. Petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the
respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her,
respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief
therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for
the loss of her late son.
Subsequently, petitioner married Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a JapaneseAmerican and the petitioner migrated in the US. Petitioner returned to the
Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United
States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to
take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye,
expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for
their support and education;

Respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of
having abandoned Angelica.
The lower court rendered its decision ordering respondent to cause the
immediate transfer of the custody of the Angelica to her natural mother.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not custody of the daughter should be given to the
mother.
RATIO: Yes. The trial courts disquisition, in consonance with the provision
that the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody is enough to convince the Court
to decide in favor of private respondent.
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For
the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not
appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance also, is the rule long accepted by the courts that
the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
C. Who exercises PA, FC 211-213 cf. FC 49, 102(6), 43(2), 63(2), 176. 49, 102
(6), 129 (9)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents
and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental
authority. (311a) chan robles virtual law library
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving
parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the
court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property
of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their
common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.

the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited

in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved
and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of
Article 43(2)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial
guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence
required under the particular circumstances.

Art. 102 (6)Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall
be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the

preceding Article shall produce the following effects:

A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse.
Gardin was left in the care of her father and grandparents.

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the

case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of

Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court
granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.

(12) Tonog vs. CA, 376 SCRA 642

Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with
Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's
parents and sister.

Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set aside the
original judgement and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's
petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the
court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their
previous decision and granted Edgar custody over Gardin.
Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the
guardianship proceeding?
Held: custody should remain with her father. In custody disputes, it is
axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the
child.
The general rule child should stay with their mother. However, even a
mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven
years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable illness.
If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference,
but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its
discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen
be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other
parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of
the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor.

Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor;
we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain
in the meantime parental custody over her. The child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment.
Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori,
her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which
parent should have the custody over her person.