Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
of
2008
in
the
EU
Behind
every
human
act
there
are
three
factors
:
origin,
environment
and
the
moment
(Hyppolyte
Taine)
The
financial
and
economics
crisis
of
2008
and
its
effect
on
the
European
integration
The
American
financial
crisis
spread
to
the
European
core
instantaneously.
All
countries
of
the
EU
were
infected.
Lack
of
credit,
loss
of
stock
value,
confidence
and
trust
slowed
down
the
European
economy
In
February
2009,
the
euro
zones
GDP
dropped
by
1,5%
the
industrial
output
declined
by
3,5%
in
a
year
Europe
declined
into
a
major
economic
recession
in
2008-09.
The
previous
super
performer
Baltic
countries
suffered
a
dramatic
decline
The
recession
did
not
last
for
years
and
the
Baltic
countries
returned
to
the
pre-crisis
growth
pattern
Selling
the
government
bonds
became
increasingly
difficult.
Increasing
interest
rates
extremely
expensive
loans
for
the
debtor
countries.
The
possibility
of
default
in
two
or
three
euro-zone
countries
endangered
the
euro.
Indebtedness
became
dangerously
high
in
Italy
and
Portugal,
as
well
as
in
some
CEE
countries
(Hungary,
Latvia)
Household
debts!
Crisis
hit
countries
were
located
on
the
eastern
and
southern
peripheries
of
Europe
PIIGS
(Portugal,
Italy,
Ireland,
Greece,
Spain)
Sick
men
of
the
European
Union
The
PIIGS
countries
as
peripheral
countries
were
latecomers
to
industrialization
and
economic
modernization
They
maintained
a
dual
economy
and
institutional
weaknesses
Backwardness
means
clientalism
and
corruption
The
state
is
an
enemy
tax
avoidance
is
a
virtue
Tax
collection
has
virtually
collapsed
in
Greece
in
2011
In
Italy
0,17%
(76000
people)
declare
income
over
200
000
and
210
000
luxury
cars
are
sold
a
year
Social
networking
is
a
strong
substitute
for
efficient
institutions
Black
economy:
25-28%
of
the
Greek
and
22-26%
of
the
Italian
GDP
About
30%
and
20%
of
VAT
is
not
paid
in
Greece
and
Italy
Thrift
and
the
central
value
of
work
are
not
characteristic
Hidalgo-noble
attitude
careless
spending
on
borrowed
money
As
it
turned
out,
in
2008
the
budget
deficit
was
12,7%,
300
billion
public
debt,
100%
of
GDP
Severe
austerity
measures
were
forced
on
the
country
as
a
prerequisite
for
assistance
and
bailout
Violent
public
demonstrations
flooded
Athens
The
government
became
paralyzed
and
a
deep
political
crisis
emerged
The
small
and
relatively
far
away
Greece
shocked
the
entire
European
Union
and
the
common
currency
The
EU
and
the
IMF
put
together
a
1,4
trillion
$
bailout
fund
Greece
has
a
bad
record
regarding
indebtedness
and
repayment
In
January
2012
the
countrys
debt
totaled
roughly
160%
of
GDP
Greece
was
unable
to
repay
the
matured
securities
Since
then
the
sword
of
Damocles
has
been
hanging
above
the
country
with
the
prospect
of
dropping
out
from
the
euro-zone
and
the
EU
Crisis
caused
by
overextented
and
hazardous
bank
activities:
reckless
international
borrowing
and
extensive
lending
Ballooning
and
then
bursting
of
an
oversized
real
estate
bubble
Ireland:
Ireland
was
the
most
successful
economic
performer
in
the
European
Union
Since
the
mid
1990s
the
economy
has
grown
by
a
robust
6%-12%
per
annum
FDI
rushed
to
Ireland
Huge
capital
inflow,
low
interest
rates
and
a
50%
tax
cut
pumped
investment
into
the
economy
Ireland
became
one
of
the
richest
European
countries
Between
1996
and
2006
the
real
disposal
income
was
more
than
twice
the
average
of
the
EU15
level
First,
export-led
growth
was
the
engine
of
growth
Later
the
domestic
demand
of
the
enriched
population
took
over
and
pushed
the
economy
ahead
Historic
euphoria:
the
population
wanted
to
enjoy
and
exploit
the
great
historical
luck
of
development
They
started
consuming
and
buying
in
never-seen
ways
They
moved
into
their
own
houses,
huge
building
boom
The
government
eliminitated
(texte
manquant)
Residental
mortgage
lending
grew
by
an
annual
25%
in
the
early
2000s
The
enriched
population
started
spending
recklessly
Household
indebtedness
jumped
from
60%
to
160%
of
GDP
with
80%
of
personal
credits
secured
by
property
The
housing
boom
elevated
Ireland
The
share
of
housing
in
employing
the
population
doubled
and
increased
to
20%
-
30%
of
the
work
force
In
1996
the
construction
sector
represented
5%
of
the
GDP,
in
2006
it
was
10%
After
a
point
there
was
not
sufficient
demand
for
the
extremely
expensive
houses
The
house
prices
started
decreasing
significantly
After
the
American
financial
crisis,
new
credits
were
no
longer
available
The
house
priced
dropped
by
half
and
bank
shares
by
90%
The
Irish
banks
were
overextended;
their
liabilities
were
equal
to
304%
of
the
GDP
In
2009
national
income
declined
by
7,1%
and
unemployment
reached
13%
and
GDP
per
head
dropped.
People
were
traumatized
The
top
six
banks
lost
more
than
90
billion
in
deposits
after
the
crisis
erupted
Ireland
had
to
bail
out
its
banks
with
64
billion
and
a
European
and
IMF
rescue
package
of
85
billion
With
drastic
austerity
measures
the
budget
deficit
was
strongly
cut
and
a
modest
recovery
started
in
2012
Hungary
The
market
transformation
started
the
earliest
in
Eastern
Europe
Hungary
has
attracted
a
lot
of
FDI
since
the
1990s
Rapid
development
between
2001
and
2006
with
an
annual
GDP
growth
rate
of
4,2%
The
country
progressed
impressively
and
its
per
capita
GDP
reached
the
63%
Behind
the
remarkable
growth,,
imbalances
and
negative
economic
trends
also
gained
ground
The
economy
became
overheated
Anders
Aslund
maintained
that
for
ten
CEE
countries
economic
problems
were
looming
Multiple
preconditions
of
crisis
Excessive
current
account
deficit
Large
foreign
debts
Small
currency
reserves
Huge
credit
expansion
Sharp
real
estate
price
rises
and
rising
inflation
More
devastating
mistakes
than
many
of
the
other
CEE
countries
In
a
heated
political
campaign
the
parties
tried
to
outbid
each
others
promises
Hungary
never
cut
its
budgetary
deficit
back
to
the
Maastricht
requirement
of
3%
of
GDP
In
the
1990s,
export-led
growth,
fueled
my
by
foreign
investments
and
demands
was
the
engine
of
economy
development
in
Hungary
From
the
turn
of
the
century,
domestic
demand
became
the
prime
mover
Population
income
increased
much
faster
and
higher
than
productivity
and
national
income
did.
The
Hungarian
governments
turned
to
demand-stimulating
measures
of
wage
and
pension
increases
Monetary
policy
one-sidedly
concentrated
on
anti-inflationary
measures
by
raising
interest
rates
and
overvaluing
the
currency
Hungarys
indebtedness
had
increased
sharply
to
78,7%
by
2009
Before
the
crisis
became
manifest
in
2008,
Hungary
had
already
declined
into
a
severe
economic
and
political
crisis
Hungary
turned
to
the
IMF
for
a
huge
loan
The
stabilization
program
and
the
lack
of
counter-cyclical
resources
let
to
a
recession
Foreign
currency
borrowing,
95%
of
it
in
Swiss
francs,
accounts
for
two-thirds
of
total
lending.
The
public
debts
increased
to
81%
of
the
GDP
and
two-thirds
of
debts
are
in
foreign
currencies
Because
of
the
devalued
Hungarian
currency,
paying
back
the
household
loans
has
more
than
doubled
the
repayment
burden
on
the
population
The
government
turned
to
the
IMF
again
and
the
credit
rating
of
the
country
dropped
below
junk
level
The
country
had
to
pay
nearly
10%
interest
in
their
bonds
Since
than
the
country
has
been
experiencing
a
sluggish
and
fragile
recovery
Spain
The
state
was
in
good
order,
public
debts
were
less
than
40%
of
GDP
in
2007
The
banks
were
better
regulated
and
solvent
However,
regional
budgets
are
significant
and
produced
huge
deficit
In
September
2010
regional
debts
totaled
140
billion
$
and
in
one
year
increased
by
22%
to
176$
billion
The
real
story
was
the
rise
and
demise
of
the
housing
bubble
The
construction
of
houses
reached
and
unheard
level
In
2004
and
2005
1,370
000
units
were
built
Between
1996
and
2006
prices
in
some
years
increased
by
17-18%
annually
People
felt
enriched
by
the
dynamic
development
Per
capita
GDP
trebled
between
1973
and
2005
The
income
level
rose
from
roughly
half
to
81%
of
the
average
level
of
the
euro-zone
countries
80%
of
the
population
became
homeowners
Banks
offered
40
and
50
years
loans
Construction
loans
almost
doubled
between
2005
and
2009
Families
bought
houses
with
loans
Mortgage
debts
jumped
by
25%
per
year
between
2001
and
2005
and
reached
the
heights
of
651,168,000,000
by
2005
Family
indebtedness
increased
by
115%
in
a
decade
around
the
turn
of
the
century
The
real
estate
boom
transformed
the
construction
industry
into
one
of
the
leading
sectors
of
the
economy.
Its
share
increased
from
8%
at
the
end
of
the
1990s
to
12,3%
by
2007
Nearly
20%
of
GDP
was
related
to
real
estate
and
construction
The
sector
employed
one-sixth
of
the
work
force
Overbuilding
was
evident,
as
every
fourth
newly
built
unit
remained
vacant
between
2001
and
2007
When
the
bubble
burst,
1,5
million
unfinished
and
unsold
units
remained
behind
and
1,4
million
units
were
on
sale
Prices
declined
sharply
The
construction
industry
collapsed
In
one
year
(2007-2008)
unemployment
increased
by
37%
and
reached
17,4%
of
the
labor
force
The
GDP
declined
by
4%
in
2009,
savings
halved
Gross
capital
formation
declined
by
4,8%,
16,0%
and
7,6%
in
2008,
2009
and
2010
respectively
Spain
and
Italy
accumulated
a
3,3
Trillion
$
debt
burden
by
the
end
or
2011
In
the
summer
of
2012,
the
EU
had
to
bail
out
the
Spanish
banks
PORTUGAL
The
Portuguese
economy
was
genuinely
weak
In
1986,
its
per
capital
GDP
level
was
only
57%
of
the
West
European
average
By
2000,
it
increased
to
65%,
but
the
economic
growth
slowed
down
to
an
average
of
0,7%
Unemployment
rose
to
10%
in
2009
The
country
had
weak
competitiveness
In
the
growth
period,
people
bought
on
credit
and
the
government
spent
from
loans
As
a
consequence,
private
and
public
debts
accumulated
in
Portugal
to
finance
its
western
life
style
In
Portugal
they
claimed:..
We
are
not
Greece
Meanwhile,
debt
level
totaled
76%
of
GDP
in
2009,
by
2010-11
surpassed
100%
of
GDP
By
2012
it
amounted
to
112%
of
GDP
The
economy
spiraled
out
of
control
and
declined
by
2,7%
in
2009
In
November,
the
public
and
private
debt
reached
360%
of
GDP
Bond
yield
increased
from
5,8%
to
8,54%
in
a
few
months
The
government
bonds
were
rated
at
a
junk
bond
level
As
a
consequence,
for
new
loans,
13%
and
even
17%
interest
had
to
be
paid,
the
second
highest
in
Europe
In
early
2011,
the
country
was
on
the
verge
of
bankruptcy
Portugal
became
the
third
euro-zone
country
to
be
bailed
out
by
the
IMF
and
the
EU
(80
bn)
ITALY
The
countrys
previously
rapid
growth
slowed
down
by
almost
half
during
the
13
years
around
the
turn
of
the
century
Stagnation
between
1992
and
2005
The
north
grew
by
3%,
the
south
declined
by
2%
Meanwhile,
private
consumption
and
the
net
capital
formation
increased
faster,
by
1,3%
and
1,5%
per
annum.
Public
debt
successively
accumulated
and
accompanied
Italys
development
In
the
mid-1990s,
it
already
120%
of
GDP
Italy
had
the
worlds
third
largest
public
debt
level
The
debt
situation
was
a
ticking
time
bomb
and
the
country
was
pushed
to
the
brink
of
a
sovereign
debt
crisis.
In
November
2011,
the
debt
level
increased
to
121,5%
of
GDP
It
reached
an
extraordinary
amount
of
$2.758
trillion
Half
of
it
was
held
by
Italians
within
the
country
The
gap
between
the
German
and
Italian
bond
increased
from
38
base
points
to
144
bas
points
by
December
2008
The
towering
Italian
debt
overshadowed
the
euro-zone
Its
amount
was
more
than
five
times
bigger
than
the
Greek
After
a
time,
banks
refused
to
lend
which
pushed
the
yields
or
Italian
government
bonds
up
to
6,20%
Paying
higher
interest
for
the
bonds
added
$4,1
billion
in
interest
payments
annually
The
more
than
6%
interests
rate
was
already
high
and
rising
This
development
generated
a
political
crisis
and
led
to
resignations
The
austerity
measures
implemented
made
the
economic
revival
difficult
and
from
the
last
quarter
of
2011
on,
Italy
declined
into
recession
again
and
the
government
initiated
a
new
stimulus
program
The
financialized
capitalist
system
According
to
Joan
Robinson:
..
Where
enterprise
leads,
finance
follows.
Unfortunately,
the
financial
sector
stepped
out
of
its
role
serving
the
real
economy
Features
of
economy
changed
a
lot
before
and
after
the
crisis
The
financialization
of
the
Western
capitalism
emerged
in
the
framework
of
globalization
The
flow
of
foreign
exchange
transactions
skyrocketed
and
became
many
times
bigger
than
the
output
of
the
real
economy
and
hugely
surpassed
the
financial
strength
of
the
nation
stated
The
Structural
tribulations
of
the
European
Union
and
the
euro-zone
Global
capitalism
transformed
the
European
market
system
However,
integrated
Europe
has
its
own
special
features
The
structural
weaknesses
have
an
outstanding
role
and
responsibility
in
the
sovereign
debt
crisis
of
the
euro-zone
The
structural
tribulations
of
the
EU
and
the
euro-zone
Borders
have
been
shifted
from
their
national
borders
to
the
external
borders
of
the
Union
The
Europes
integration
was
the
significant
broadening
of
the
Union
The
aggregate
advertisement
has
a
huge
impact
on
the
aggregate
consumption
Balzac
The
most
successful
business
built
on
vanity,
egoism
and
narcissism
attitude.
These
feelings
never
die
Credit
consumerism
Consumption
as
a
way
of
life
and
source
of
prestige,
inspired
by
ever-newer
consumer
goods
easily
let
to
overspending
People
became
able
and
were
attracted
to
spend
more
than
they
earned
Credit
consumerism
was
the
most
extreme
in
the
USA
Lessons
learned
and
the
long-term
impact
of
the
crisis
on
the
EU
member
countries
Future
alternatives
for
the
EU
and
the
euro-zone
- Mistaken
policy
might
lead
to
the
collapse
of
the
entire
European
Union
and
the
euro
- After
the
crisis,
the
Union
has
created
safety
nets
for
the
member
countries
- European
Financial
Stability
Facility
- European
Financial
Stabilization
Mechanism
- Movement
toward
fiscal
unification
cautiously
progresses
The
return
to
a
regulated
market
system:
Europe
had
do
dig
deep
into
the
roots
of
the
crisis
and
eliminate
them
The
EU
cannot
introduce
regulations
alone
Regulation
and
supervision
belong
together,
the
creation
of
new
institutional
framework
signals
further
institutional
and
structural
changes.