Political Law San Beda

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERA
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FUNDAMENTA

L POWERS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER POLICE POWER; THE STATE UNDER ITS POLICE POWE
R, MAY ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND MININ G EXPLORATION PERMITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
DEMANDS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE. SOU THEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE
PORTAL MINING COOP., et al. [G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
: FACTS: On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marc opper) was grante
d Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which inc
lu ded the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 70
76, or the People's SmallScale Mining Act. The law established a People's SmallSca le Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct
sup ervision and control. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP N
o. 13 3 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) pro
posal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docke
ted as RED Mines Case. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pendin
g, Mar copper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mini
ng Corp oration (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the lan
d covere d by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional
Office N o. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MP
SA applica tion of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed. On M
arch 3, 199 5, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pu
rsuant to th is statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbi
trators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. Th
e RPA subsequ ently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidate
d with the MAC cases. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Ord
er No. 97-03 w hich provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustive
ly the option o f direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwal
wal Gold-Rush Ar ea. On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action f
or certiorari, pr ohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMR
B-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC
). It prayed for t he nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 9703 on the ground th at the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would eff
ectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum orde
r arbitrarily impose d the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conduct
ed before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR. ISSUE: Whether
or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested peti
tioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133. HELD: NO.
MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy i n
resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate t h
at what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing e
lse. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operat
ing or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies
to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by peti
t ioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, who
se validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading o
f the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 19
POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, J
e nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman,
Et
hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit
o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Ai
m ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glori
os a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! is one of
the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting th at Marcop
per cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other wor
ds, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP
No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a posit ive pron
ouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases , EP No
. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be i mpaire
d by the issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no cir
cumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total a nd ab
solute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No. 133 merely evidenc es a
privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded whe
n the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the explor ati
on, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources ar e
matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining expl o
ration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right wi
thin the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of th
e Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may a
l ter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general w
el fare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere st
udy of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undert
ake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Cons
tit ution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus,
the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision o
f th e exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral
reso urces, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreeme
nts wi th qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when
he ord ered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently i
n accord ance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the St
ate may n ot be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it
is the on ly plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by
the gold r ush. EMINENT DOMAIN EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION IS DETERMINED
AT THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT WHEN THE COURT FIXES THE VALUE
OF THE PROPERTY AT THE DATE IT WAS TAKEN CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and
BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C .J: FACTS: On 17 Sept
ember 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged th erein
that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction o f a p
ublic road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to exten
d to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hote l Ro
ads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P 20,
826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amoun t
of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on
the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the exprop r
iation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower courts decision in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensati
on should be determined as of the date of t he filing of the complaint. HELD: NO
. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning fo r the
determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which express

ly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. C
o urt of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensat
io n should be determined as of the 20 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Al
exander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cri
stina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio,
Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji
Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Ger
ald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tamba
go, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! filing of
the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in de
termining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the prop erty as o
f the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an excep tion: wh
ere this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was tak en and
not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings." BILL OF R
IGHTS DUE PROCESS DUE PROCESS; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NOT PART OF THE DUE
PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: On December 27, 1991
, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Bened icto and Rivera were indicted for violati
on of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Sectio n 34 of the Central
Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informat ions filed with th
e Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases N os. 91-101879 to
91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to su bmit reports of
their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to reg ister with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Ci
rcular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical pe rsons from mai
ntaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorizat ion from the
Central Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all th e Informatio
ns filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 t
o 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jur
isdiction, forum shopping, absence of a preliminary investigation an d extinctio
n of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960. On Septe mber 6, 19
94, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23
, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases agai nst her d
ue to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the tri al court
in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for re conside
ration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 19 94. IS
SUES: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion to Qua
sh for absence of a valid preliminary investigation. (2) Whether or not the repe
al of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 135
3 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of p
etitio ners. HELD: (1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due proc
ess guaranteed by t he Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there
is sufficient groun d to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been co
mmitted and the respo ndent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a
preliminary investigat ion is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute
, and can be waived, ei ther expressly or by implication. When the records of th
e case were disclosed to them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the
charges, and filed vario us motions and pleadings, they are deemed to have made
an express waiver of thei r right to have a preliminary investigation. (2) NO. I
n the instant case, it mus t be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 96
0, Circular No. 1353 retain ed the same reportorial requirement for residents re
ceiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Even t
he most cursory glance at th e repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353
shows that both contain a sav ing clause, expressly providing that the repeal of
Circular No. 960 shall have n o effect on pending actions for 21
POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je

nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, E
t hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juan
it o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso,
Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glo
rios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! violation
of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the ef fect of t
he repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present
case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clea rly mani
fest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punis h offen
ses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either
pending or under investigation. DUE PROCESS; THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGAT
ION IS A COMPONENT PART OF DUE P ROCESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE. SALES vs. SANDIGANB
AYAN [G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Petitioner,
the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilo cos Norte, fatally shot the former ma
yor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged sho otout af
ter a heated altercation between them. After the shooting incident, peti tioner
surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police. The ne
xt day, a criminal complaint for Murder against petitioner was filed. Mun icipal
Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary investigation as under the old rules,
with two stages: (1) the determination of whether there is reasonable gro und t
o believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably gu ilty
thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for tri
al; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or info rma
tion is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substa nc
e of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present ev i
dence in his favor if he so desires. Municipal Judge then forwarded the case re
cords to the Provincial Prosecutor who, instead of conducting a preliminary inve
stigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for th
e latter to conduct the same. The Ombudsman then directed the petitioner to file
his counter-affidavit, which the latter found superfluous as he previously subm
i tted such to the Provincial Prosecutor. An Information for Murder was filed ag
ai nst petitioner. This Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether or not t
he proper procedure was followed and whether petitioner's constitutional rights
wer e safeguarded during the preliminary investigation conducted before the fili
ng o f an Information for Murder against him and the issuance of a warrant for h
is ar rest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that the Information
was ha stily filed and the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an inc
omplete preliminary investigation. Respondents say otherwise. ISSUES: (1) Whethe
r or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judg e was pro
per. (2) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman
was proper. HELD: (1) NO. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, R.A
. 5180, as amended by P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the
preliminary examin ation stage and integrated it into the preliminary investiga
tion proper. Now the proceedings consists of only one stage. Respondent Judge di
d not conduct the re quisite investigation prior to issuance of the arrest warra
nt. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of search
ing questions and ans wers. The statements of witnesses were not sworn before hi
m but before the Provi ncial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of stenographi
c notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer. Moreover, he did not comp
lete the preliminary in vestigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnes
ses of the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the
Provincial Prosecutor wi thout giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to
submit counter-affidavit
s and supporting documents. While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregul
ar preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary investigation, suc
h normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arr
e st which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecution
h as no power to recall the warrant of arrest. 22 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy
Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig,
Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Dellor
o, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangu
ndayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sob
remonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Jo
eshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (2) NO. As
this Court pointed out in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, "the purpose of a prelimina
ry investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is
placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious a nd oppres
sive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crim
e, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended
to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive tria ls. Whil
e the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a co
mponent part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a pre liminar
y investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offens
e and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is n ot a m
ere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accu sed's
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full m easu
re of his right to due process." Although a preliminary investigation is not a t
rial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a c
asual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the
facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determi nin
g whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, pre
liminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the mer it
s of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so t
hat when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of la w
to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial i
nquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when t
here is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of ev
idence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or inv
estigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary invest
i gation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge.
W hile the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a "judge" by the na
tur e of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial offi
cer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A p
reli minary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
cons titutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from a
ny mat erial damage. Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to sc
reen ca ses for trial, only evidence may be considered. While even raw informati
on may j ustify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary inv
estigatio n can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and eva
luated war ranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court. In other words
, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense
of making s ure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminar
y investigat ion serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it i
s a part of t he guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the birthrights of
all who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through
a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a p
rima facie cas e or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as
to the guilt o f the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rul
e for the determ ination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the
light of the con ditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depend
s to a large degre e upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the exa
mination, such a fi nding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor ru
n counter to the cle ar dictates of reason. Measured vis-a-vis the foregoing leg
al yardsticks, we hol d that the proper procedure in the conduct of the prelimin
ary investigation was not followed, for the following reasons: First, the record
s show that the suppos ed preliminary investigation was conducted in installment
s by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed
the preliminary invest igation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rat
her a case of passing th e buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman h
urriedly throwing the buc
k to the Sandiganbayan. Second, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder,

a non-bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fac
t that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during th
e pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected muni
c ipal executive, should have merited a deeper; and more thorough preliminary in
ve stigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallo
wed hook, line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigati
on Officer. Third, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied pure
ly on the Ombudsman's certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts
of this case much more so in the face of the latter's flawed report and one-sid
ed factual findings. In the order of procedure for criminal cases, the task of d
ete rmining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a resp
onsi bility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges. People
v. In ting clearly delineated the features of this constitutional mandate, viz:
1.] Th e determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not f
or the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to 23 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachu
ra, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., M
a. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joy
ce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao
, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremont
e, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias
Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ascertain.
Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; 2.] The preliminar
y inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assi sts him i
n making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the aff idavits,
the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documen
ts behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the jud
ge in his determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges and prosecutor s alike
should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cau se for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation pr oper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be releas ed.
Even if the two inquiries be made in one and the same proceeding, there shou ld
be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause f or
purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The prelimina r
y investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe tha
t the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the fu
nction of the prosecutor. Stated differently, while the task of conducting a pr
e liminary investigation is assigned either to an inferior court magistrate or t
o a prosecutor, only a judge may issue a warrant of arrest. When the preliminary
i nvestigation is conducted by an investigating prosecutor, in this case the Om
bud sman, the determination of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor ca
nnot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the court of a warrant of arres
t. T his is because the court with whom the information is filed is tasked to ma
ke it s own independent determination of probable cause for the issuance of the
warran t of arrest. Indeed the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 C
onstitu tion which requires probable cause to be personally determined by the ju
dge, not by any other officer or person. DUE PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAIN
T WAS FILED BY THE CSC ITSELF DOES NOT ME AN THAT IT COULD NOT BE AN IMPARTIAL J
UDGE. CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE CO MMISSION [G.R. No. 144464, November 2
2, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil
Service C ommission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-pro
fessional examination for Cruz af ter the latter had previously failed in the sa
id examination three times. The CS C found after a fact finding investigation th
at a prima facie case exists agains t you for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and C
ONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTER EST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed t
heir Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of
the "Formal Charge." They also decla red that they were electing a formal inves
tigation on the matter. The petitioner s subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their
right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant,
the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at th e same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce
J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Repo rt and Recommendation" finding the Peti
tioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and orderi ng their dismissal from the government
service Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section
47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Boo k V, Administrative Code of 1987, the
CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases wher
e the penalty imposed is removal or dismiss al from the office and where the com
plaint was filed by a private citizen agains t the government employee. ISSUE: W
hether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. HELD: NO.
The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it co
uld not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based
on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being consi
dere d experts in their field, are 24 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Ale
xander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cris
tina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio,
Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gera
ld Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambag
o, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! binding on
the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly
investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, t he Commis
sion finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over th e name G
ilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service
Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the nam
e of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signa ture of
Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by
the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge,
all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correc tly ex
plained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case in stitu
ted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions o f it
s officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subt itl
e A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987. It
can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding tha
t a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly inf or
med of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to d
efend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denia l
of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to ta
ke cognizance of the case. DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THAT EVERY L
ITIGANT MUST BE GIVEN AN OP PORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. C
ONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FA
CTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids a
nd Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (P
C-I NP). The PCINP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire truck
s. T he Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co.,
Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between
PC-I NP and Tahei Co. The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepa
ncy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order.
Conse quently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against
the res pondents. After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On revie
w, the O ffice of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the compla
ints agai nst Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal charges were file
d with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Es
pea and San tos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information. Flore
s and Tanch anco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the
Office of t he Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges agai
nst Flores an d Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecut
or made a sudd en turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered the
ir inclusion as accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners
as accused violated their right to due process. HELD: YES. It appears that the c
harge against respondents was previously dismiss ed. For this reason, there bein
g no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased
to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by
those previously indicted, without questioning the dismis sal of the charge agai
nst the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for implead
ing them as accused in this case without violating their r
ight to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of d

ue process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them wi
t hout their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be
gi ven an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend him
sel f in person at every stage of the proceedings. 25 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: A
ndy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahi
g, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Del
loro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Ma
ngundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer
Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal,
Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SEARCHES A
ND SEIZURES SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRES THAT FACTS AND CIRCUM
STANCES WARR ANT A BELIEF THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME JUST COMMITTED
. SALES vs. S ANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J: FACTS: see page 22 ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arre st issued by th
e Sandiganbayan was properly issued. HELD: NO. What the Sandiganbayan should hav
e done, faced with such a slew of con flicting evidence from the contending part
ies, was to take careful note of the contradict ions in the testimonies of the c
omplainant's witnesses as well as the improbabil ities in the prosecution eviden
ce. Certainly probable cause may not be establish ed simply by showing that a tr
ial judge subjectively believes that he has good g rounds for his action. Good f
aith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constituti
onal protection would be demeaned and the people wo uld be "secure in their pers
ons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallibl e discretion of the judge.
On the contrary, the probable cause test is an object ive one, for in order that
there be probable cause the facts and circumstances m ust be such as would warr
ant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man t hat the accused is guilt
y of the crime which has just been committed. This, as w e said is the standard.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PERSONAL DETERMINATION MERELY EMPHASIZES THE EXCLUSIVE AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ISSUING JUDGE TO SATISFY HIMSELF OF THE EXISTENC
E OF PROBALBE CAUSE. ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE [A.M
. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 5, 2001] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Complainant alleged th
at sometime in April 2000 elements o f the PNP stormed into his residence to arr
est him and his client, Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12
April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 of t
he RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of li bel. Surprised that
such a case existed against him and his client as they had n ot been previously
charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/ or Set Aside Warr
ant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutor's Office to Conduct Prelimi nary Investigati
on dated 5 May 2000 asking that the Warrant of Arrest be set asi de for being pr
emature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them a
nd no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutor's of
fice yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was no t specified th
erein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Responde nt Judge gran
ted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000
admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary i
nvestigation had already been conducted and an information already filed in cour
t. Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case. ISSUE: Whether or not
the judge failed to follow the required procedure and was negligent in the issu
ance of the warrant of arrest. 26 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexand
er Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina
Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Chri
stopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit
o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim
ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorio
s a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: YES.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o . . . warrant of arrest sh
all issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge af
ter examin ation under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may prod uce, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seize
d." Interpre ting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not th
ereby mean th at judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the c
omplainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thIs would be to unduly lade
n them with pr eliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints
instead of conc entrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rathe
r what is emphas ized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this
end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents sub
mitted by the pro secutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, iss ue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he fin
ds no probable caus e, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submiss
ion of supporting af fidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existen
ce. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certi
fication as to the ex istence of probable cause. Much more is required by the co
nstitutional provision . Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenograp hic notes if any, and other documents supporting the pro
secutor's certification. In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed t
o follow the required pr ocedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have not
iced that there was not e ven a prosecutor's certification to rely upon since no
information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-13
73 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint filed by the
private complainant Leonci o Dalin Sr. himself. Respondent Judge admitted that h
e signed the Warrant of Arr est against complainant and the latter's client simp
ly because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. T
here was thus a total and un warranted abdication of a judicial function. Respon
dent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that t
he mistake was entirely attri butable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to
faithfully comply with her "d uty" of going over the records of criminal cases
and ensuring first that an info rmation had already been filed in court before p
reparing the warrant of arrest. A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies m
erely on the certification of th e investigating officer as to the existence of
probable cause making him adminis tratively liable. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ISSUA
NCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE. CRUZ a
nd MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002] PUNO, J: FACT
S: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigati on Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an I
nform ation for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transpor
tation Office, based on the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office o
f the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the re
soluti on of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set fo
r trial . Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judg
e and hi s Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take is
sue of th e fact that although respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arre
st, he sti ll deferred its implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of th
e case on m otion of the accused. They believe that there is no longer any reaso
n why the re spondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest
considering t hat the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that
there exists p
robable cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge ma
nifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function
o f a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause befor
e issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims
t hat it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resol
uti ons and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch. ISSUE: Whether or no
t the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementation s of the warrant of
arrest. 27 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel A
barentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo
de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre
Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Ch
aro Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan
Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villa
flor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: NO.
The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue e xcept upo
n probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination unde
r oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Preli
mi nary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigati
on for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the informatio
n o r it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the i
ssua nce of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is
execu tive in nature. It is part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of prel
iminar y investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In ma
king th e required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying
on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of relianc
e depend s on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judges sound d
iscretion . It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigati
ng judge t o issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having pe
rsonally ex amined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching qu
estions and answers. For the determination of whether a probable cause exists an
d whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the en
ds of justic e, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the
records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at a
ll baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not i
mmediately is suing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings
pending reinve stigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Co
urt cannot be f aulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing
Orders duly sig ned by the respondent Judge. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PARTICULARI
TY OF DESCRIPTION DOES NOT REQUIRE PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAILS. YOUSEF AL-GHOUL,
et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001] QUISUMB
ING, J: FACTS: Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warran
ts for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obinian
a Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in
the same compound and found one (1) . 45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No.
2 were 2 M-16 rifl es with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, among other
s. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court informations accusin
g them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant
to Presidential De cree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and det
ained. At the hearin g for bail, the RTC denied petitioners motion for bail earl
ier filed for the ac cused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both o
ffenses under Preside ntial Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the
penalty of Reclusion T emporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Unde
r Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Admini
strative Circular No. 1 2-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged
with a capital offense o r an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life i
mprisonment, when evidenc e of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardl
ess of the stage of the cr iminal prosecution. Petitioners contend that the sear
ch and seizure orders viola ted Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well a
s Section 3 of Rule 126 of t he Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the
place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. ISSUE
: Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discreti on w
hen it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the o
bjects seized admissible in evidence.
HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed,

enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursu
ing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitution
al and le gal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evi
dence is t he only practical means of enforcing the constitutional 28 POLITICAL
LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Ba
lboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Dego
llado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim,
Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sab
ilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze
, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declar
e that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 calib er pistol
taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in contrast
, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulte d. The s
earch warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The s earch w
as done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordan ce wit
h Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack o f par
ticularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warra nts.
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the sa me
kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be be
yond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifi ty
in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did n
ot require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that th e
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leav
e no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it woul
d be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial si
m ilarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice. The c
as e of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed ou
t t hat one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of ob
ject s to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limi
ted t o those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were
worde d in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a di
rect re lation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential De
cree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
s and ex plosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles pros
cribed by that decree, and no other. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES WHEN VALID. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL [G.R.
NO. 123137, October 17, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Appellants PO2 Albert Abrio
l of the Philippine National Po lice (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos,
and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were char ged with and convicted, of
murder for having shot one Alejandro Flores, and of I llegal Possession of Firea
rms for the handguns that they were armed with. On app eal, one of their content
ions against their conviction for murder is that the PN P cannot be presumed to
have done their work regularly due to the errors and blu nders they committed in
transferring the possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having
failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They fur ther contend, as again
st their conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms, th at the handguns and a
mmunition taken from them by the police officers were illeg ally seized in the a
bsence of a warrant. ISSUES: Whether or not the handguns and ammunitions used in
the killing were ill egally seized from appellants in the absence of a warrant.
HELD: NO. There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure
i s valid. They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arre
st; (3) sea rches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs,
and drug la ws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at
borders or c onstructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "pla
in view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regul
ations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations. In this case, the warrantless sear
c h and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons.
I t was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shoot
ing , and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police offi
cers , and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that
the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity.
The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in the light of the fore
going exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests unde
r the Rules of Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms a
nd 29 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarent
os, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guz
man, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob
, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Re
juso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lit
a, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ammunition
which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually vio lating P.
D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules. SEARCHES AND SEIZU
RES; THERE MUST BE A PRIOR JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INTRUSION IN A PPLYING THE PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE; SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE DURING A VALID ARREST. PEOP LE OF THE PHILIP
PINES vs. CUBCUBIN [G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: At about
3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite C
ity police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near t
he cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this
reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr.
, PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamont
e slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road A tricycle dri
v er, who refused to divulge his name, told him them accused-appellant and the v
ic tim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Anto
nio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half aw
ay from the crime scene. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told Rosal and
Mal inao, Jr. that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun
Dulc e and led the policemen where accusedappellant lived. Upon arriving the poli
ce as ked permission if they could enter the house. After entering they found a
bloodi ed shirt and two spent .38 caliber shells. Accused appellant was then ask
ed to r eturn to the cafe for identification. He was positively identified by th
e waitre ss to be the person with whom the victim drank with. The police then we
nt back t o his house and there found a .38 paltik pistol. An information for mu
rder was t hen filed against accused-appellant. The trial court found him guilty
and senten ced him with the capital punishment. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the
arrest of the accused appellant was valid. (2) Whether or not there was a valid
search and seizure. HELD: (1) NO. On the first issue, the arrest of accused-appe
llant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore,
is whether there was "pro bable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the
arresting officers, to bel ieve that accused-appellant committed the crime. We
hold that there was none. Th e two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" in
dicating that accused-appella nt had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was pro
bably guilty was based entirel y on what they had been told by others, to wit: b
y someone who called the PNP st ation in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30
in the morning of August 26, 199 7 and reported that a man had been killed along
Julian Felipe Boulevard of the s aid city; by an alleged witness who saw accuse
d-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, wa
itress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was le
an, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of
brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that
the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias "Ju
n Dulce" and who said he knew wher e accusedappellant lived and accompanied them
to accused-appellant's house. Thus , PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely rel
ied on information given to them by others. (2) NO. On the second issue, accused
-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the arresting
police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the tw
o spent slugs, and the .38 caliber r evolver allegedly found in his house are in
admissible in evidence. The prosecuti
on, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of
his house. 30 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Marice
l Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricar
do de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, An
dre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes,
Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ry
an Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Vi
llaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! To be sure
, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal r ight whic
h may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication can not be p
resumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to rel inquish
the right. As in this cases, a mere failure on the part of the accused t o obje
ct to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. Nor can the wa
rrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine . As
this Court held in People v. Musa: The "plain view" doctrine is usually app lied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, b ut
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the "pla in
view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a p r
ior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to su
pplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits
the warrantless seizure. Finally, the prosecution says the search can be justif
ied as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be
valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allo
w s only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of th
e one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for su
ch search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying e
vi dence or from using the weapon against his captor. It is clear that the warra
ntl ess search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither the
t-sh irt nor the gun was within the area of accusedappellant's immediate control
. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after goi
ng ba ck to the house of accused-appellant. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ELEMENTS NECE
SSARY TO APPLY THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. PEOP LE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION
[G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Acting on a confidential ti
p supplied by a police informant t hat accused-appellant was growing and cultiva
ting marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th
Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM ) of the Bacolod C
ity Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of ac cused-appellant w
ho was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carl os City, Negros
Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they s aw two (2) tall
plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspe cted to be mar
ijuana plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proce eded to baran
gay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in t he early mor
ning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the
accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflictin g accounts.
The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitt
ed them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about t he suspect
ed marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for
the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine The operatives the n uproote
d the suspected marijuana plants. Accused-appellants version of what tra nspired
is that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his
family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went dow
n bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) per sons wh
o he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside
the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house a
s the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit
in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went a round
the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and t
he premises. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backy
ard of the ac cused was valid. 31 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexand
stopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mend
oza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald S
otto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, M
ae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: NO.
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in t
he house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does n
ot appear either that the situation falls under any of he exceptions. Consequent
ly, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clear
l y violated. It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not conse
nt to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure
f rom unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either e
xpr essly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntar
ily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing t
he m embers of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence dur
ing t he unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary sub
missio n or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially
so whe n members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily a
rmed. As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the r
ight to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a wa
rrant. I t is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for eviden
ce agains t the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incrimina
ting objec t. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine m
ay be appli ed: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arres
t in which t he police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duti
es; (b) the e vidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the ri
ght to be wher e they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d
) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here,
there was no va lid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accusedappell
ant's premises w ithout the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM a
gents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9,
1995 on the suspi cion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they a
llegedly came in " plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered
his premises on Jul y 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence agains
t him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not s
imply wait for one t o be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come acr
oss the marijuana pla nts inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and b
arged into accusedappe llant's residence. RIGHT TO INFORMATION RIGHT TO INFORMAT
ION; COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF THE PLUNDER CASES SHALL BE LIMITE D TO AUDIOVISUAL
RECORDING FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES. RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIOTV COVERAGE OF TH
E TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORME R PRESIDENT JOSE
PH E. ESTRADA vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PH ILIPPINES [A.M.
No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: This is a motion for r
econsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to te
levise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandi
ganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as o ne of the petit
ioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the r ight of the pe
ople to public information and the freedom of the press, on the on e hand, and,
on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if the re is a clas
h between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or of the right of the peop
le and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignt y, are enti
tled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard agai nst attemp
ts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of se lfish int
erests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterate s his ob
jection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground tha
t its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experien
ce with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave 32 POLITICAL
LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Ba
lboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Dego
llado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim,
Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sab
ilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze
, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! the way fo
r so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstratio ns aimed
at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the oth er. Mr.
Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be serv ed thro
ugh other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and ra
dio coverage. ISSUE: Whether or not the cases of a former President pending befo
re the Sandiga nbayan can be covered by live television and radio broadcast with
out impairing the right of the accused to a just and fair trial. HELD: NO. The C
ourt finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision p rohibiting liv
e or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former presi
de nt. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court has resolve
d t o order the audiovisual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Con
side ring the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former Presi
dent Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court bel
ieves that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The rec
ordin gs will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purpose
s. Onl y later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbaya
n shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording perta
ins. Th e master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Manageme nt and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursu
ant to la w. There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the
hearings a re historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment t
o the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Qu
od Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege). Second, the Estrada case
s involve m atters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right t
o know how t heir government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-v
isual present ation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the educa
tion and civic training of the people. They will be primarily for the use of app
ellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of
the Sandiganb ayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcri
pts of stenogra phic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to
the tapes. On t he other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadca
st, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the ca
meras and will th us be distracted from the proper performance of their roles whether as counsel , witnesses, court personnel, or judges - will be allayed. Th
e possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of publ
ic opinion may jeop ardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases
can be minimized. T he possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popula
r tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided. At th
e same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it
may be assumed, is t he concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in fav
or of, televised trial s will be addressed since the tapes will not be released
for public showing unti l after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan.
By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV
and radio broadcast will be avoided. Thus, many important purposes for preservin
g the record of the tria ls can be served by audio-visual recordings without imp
airing the right of the a ccused to a fair trial. Nor is the right of privacy of
the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pt
y. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's priva
cy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure an
d the information sought t o be elicited from him or to be published about him c
onstitute matters of a publ ic character."
SEPARATE OPINION: VITUG, J: In addressing the present motion for reconsideration

, colleagues on the Court op ine that there should be an audio-visual recording
of the proceedings for docume ntary purposes because, first, the hearings are of
historic significance; second , the Estrada cases involve matters of vital conc
ern to our people who have a fu ndamental right to know how their government wor
ks; third, the audio-visual pres entation is essential for education and civic t
raining of the people; and fourth , such recording can be used by appellate cour
ts in the event that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the
Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. 33 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy N
achura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr
., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro,
Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangund
ayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobre
monte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joes
hias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! The propos
ition has novel features; regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the
presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on
the court proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest ot herwise.
To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of camer as and e
lectronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In addit
ion, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerba
ted by placing them on camera in contravention of normal experience. The demeano
r of the witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of th e judge
to accurately assess the credibility of such witnesses. The presence of cameras
, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the dangers mentioned i n the
Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many imponderables. M ost i
mportantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of th e ca
ses against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in eve
ry human being, and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to t he
slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern mor e
than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast. RIGHTS UNDER THE MIRANDA
DOCTRINE MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL CANNOT BE CLAIMED DURING INDENTI
FICATION IN POLICE LINE-UP. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMESTUZO, et al. [G.R.
No. 104383, July 12, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On February 26, 1991, four days a
fter a reported robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with a
ccused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, wen t to the handicrafts factor
y in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell
cutter. They were looking for a certain "Mario" and "searched the first and sec
ond floors of the building. Failing to find said Mari o, the police hit Ampatin
at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Nilol oko lang yata tayo ng tao
ng ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at t his juncture that Ampati
n pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced
to look upon. Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and made to board the police vehicl
e together with accused Ampatin. They were brought to th e Urduja Police Station
in Kalookan City and placed under detention together wit h the other two accuse
d, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accuse d-appellant was broug
ht out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the righ t and he was asked t
o talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused A mestuzo and Vias. Ac
cused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants th
at accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited co mplainants to an e
motional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped wh en one of the pol
icemen intervened. Accused-appellant alleges that the trial cou rt committed a s
erious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented
by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complaina
nts for identification without the benefit of counsel, accusedap pellant avers,
is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be a ssisted by cou
nsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by t he police and
placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a cr itical stage
of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of couns el as durin
g the trial proper. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not appellants right to counsel was vi
olated. (2) Whether or not t here was a valid out-of-court identification of app
ellant to the complainants. HELD: (1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet
invoke his right to counsel when
he was presented for Identification by the complainants because the same was not
yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that duri
ng this identification by the 34 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexand
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! complainan
ts, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confess ion from
accusedappellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to a
ccused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The all eged inf
ringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custod ial inv
estigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudici al adm
ission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his c onvic
tion. In the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial adm issi
on. (2) YES. The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by comp
lainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. E ven
before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-fa ce
when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them for ide n
tification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in t
he crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culpri
ts. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHES ONLY UPON THE START OF CRIMI
NAL CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. ESTELITO REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [G.R
. No. 137473, August 2, 2001] PUNO, J: FACTS: Estelito Remolona is the Postmaste
r of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa Elementary Sch
ool. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, th e District Supervisor of Infanta
inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility w ho purportedly got a rating of 8
1.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he receiv ed information that Nery was ca
mpaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee f or a passing mark in the board
examination for teachers. It was eventually revea led that Nery Remolonas name d
id not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285
as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got
a rating of 65%. Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that
he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offe red to help his wife obtain
eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America ho wever, informed Nery that t
here was no vacancy when she presented her rating rep ort, so Estelito went to L
ucena to complain that America asked for money in exch ange for the appointment
of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,
600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona ad mitted that he was respo
nsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On r
ecommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civi l Service, the CSC foun
d the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all it
s accessory penalties. On Motion For Reconsideration, onl y Nery was exonerated
and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for revie
w and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial. ISSUE: Whether or not
there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission allegedly
signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counse l. HELD:
NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case unde r cus
todial investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers af
ter a p erson has been taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon
the sta rt of such investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Sect
ion 12 ap plies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not thos
e made in an administrative investigation. MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION ON CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DOES N
OT APPLY TO A SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT NOT ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING BY THE AUTH

ORITIES. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALOLOY [G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002
] 35 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarento
s, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzm
an, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob,
Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rej
uso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita
, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PER CURIAM
: FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on t
he evening of August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camac
ho was foun d. Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped before she was drown
ed. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himse
lf, who clai med that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a
nearby creek . While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay
Captain that h e only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and throwi
ng her body in the ravine. While in the custody of the authorities, he was asked
incriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Ju
anito was not y et in custodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicia
l confession, co upled with circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juani
to guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. On appeal, Juanito m
aintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of the Const
itution when it a dmitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Ba
rangay Captain Cen iza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to info
rm him of his const itutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elic
it from him the incr iminatory information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and D
icon are not police i nvestigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upo
n them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. While these rights ma
y be waived, the prose cution failed to show that he effectively waived his righ
ts through a written wa iver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes t
hat his extrajudicial co nfession is inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: (1) Whethe
r or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captain was admiss
ible. (2) Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the j udge was
admissible. HELD: (1) YES. As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza,
it has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation d
oes not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by th
e authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed t he crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions m
ade by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investig
ation. What the Con stitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confession s. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Cen
iza that he raped GEN ELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This n
arration was a spontan eous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary
manner. It was given be fore he was arrested or placed under custody for investi
gation in connection wit h the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did
not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, whi
ch could have compelled h er to testify falsely against him. (2) NO. However, th
ere is merit in Juanitos cl aim that his constitutional rights during custodial i
nvestigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incr
iminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is se
ttled that at the moment th e accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested
by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started.
So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense withou
t the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon s claim that no complaint has yet been
filed and that neither was h e conducting a preliminary investigation deserves s
cant consideration. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under
the custody of the police au thorities, who had already taken the statement of
the witnesses who were then be fore Judge Dicon for the administration of their
oaths on their statements.
MIRANDA DOCTRINE; TWO KINDS OF INVOLUNTARY OR COERCED CONFESSIONS TREATED IN SEC

TION 12 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALLEJO [G.R. N
o. 144656, May 9, 2002] PER CURIAM: 36 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Al
exander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cri
stina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio,
Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Ger
ald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tamba
go, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FACTS: The
accused appellant, Gerrico Vallejo, was sentenced to death by the RTC of Cavite
City for the rape slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cav
i te on July 10, 1999. Accused-appellant now questions the validity of the metho
d by which his bloodstained clothes were recovered. According to accused-appella
nt , the policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before. Ther
eaf ter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to th
e ba ck of the house where dirty clothes were kept. Accused-appellant challenges
the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as evidence against
him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for bein
g hea rsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and
intimi dation. Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor
Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmi
ssible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were made by on
e alrea dy under custodial investigation to persons in authority without the pre
sence of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the oral and written confessions used ag
ainst the accused is inad missible. HELD: NO. Section 12 of Art. III of the Cons
titution provides in pertinent parts : "(1) Any person under investigation for t
he commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his o
wn choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provi
ded with one. These rights cannot be wa ived except in writing and in the presen
ce of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, v iolence, threat, intimidation or any ot
her means which vitiate the free will sha ll be used against him. Secret detenti
on places, solitary, incommunicado, or oth er similar forms of detention are pro
hibited. "(3) Any confession or admission o btained in violation of this or Sect
ion 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence aga inst him." There are two kinds of i
nvoluntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1)
coerced confessions, the product of third deg ree methods such as torture, force
, violence, threat, and intimidation, which ar e dealt with in paragraph 2 of Se
ction 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, give n without the benefit of Miranda
warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section. Clearly, ac
cused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of
the statements he was to make as well as the wr itten confessions he was to exe
cute, for he was properly informed by Atty. Leyva that it may be used against hi
m and there was no attendance of force or any for m of coercion. Neither can he
question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva wh o acted as his counsel during
the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a l awyer need not challenge all
the questions being propounded to his client. The p resence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying anything whic h might incriminate him bu
t, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to precl ude the slightest coercio
n as would lead the accused to admit something false. I ndeed, counsel should no
t prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. MIRANDA DOCT
RINE; CONFESSION TO A RADIO REPORTER IS ADMISSIBLE WHERE SAID REPORT ER WAS NOT
ACTING FOR THE POLICE OR CONFESSION WAS NOT MADE OUT OF FEAR. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL
IPPINES vs. ABULENCIA [G.R. No. 138403, August 22, 2001]
PER CURIAM: FACTS: The accused Rolly Abulencia was charged of having raped and k
illed a 10 year old girl named Rebelyn Garcia. The body of Rebelyn was found li
feless and naked whil e floating in a creek in Pangasinan. The examination of th
e body found signs tha t she was raped and that she died of drowning. According
to eye witness accounts , the accused was last person who was seen to have been
with the victim before s he died. While in detention, the accused was interviewe
d by a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio and admitted of having raped 37 POL
ITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nn
ifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et h
el Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Rebelyn an
d that she fell off the bridge which caused her death. The interview w as tapere
corded and was submitted as evidence in court. The trial court sentence the accu
sed to a penalty of death hence this petition by the accused arguing th at there
is no direct evidence linking him to the commission of the crime. ISSUE: Whethe
r or not the accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evide nce and his
admission in a radio interview. HELD: YES. Normally, the crime of rape whether s
imple, qualified or complexed wi th other crimes is committed in seclusion, ther
eby rendering its prosecution difficult ow ing to the absence of witnesses to it
s commission. The prosecution of such crime becomes even more intricate and comp
lex if homicide is committed since the vict im herself would no longer be able t
o testify against the perpetrator. In most c ases, only circumstantial evidence
is available to prove its commission. The abs ence of direct evidence, however,
does not preclude the conviction of a person a ccused of the complex crime of ra
pe with homicide. Circumstantial evidence can b e as potent as direct evidence t
o sustain a conviction provided that there is a concurrence of all the requisite
s prescribed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revis ed Rules on Evidence. Likewise,
the Court held that an accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evidenc
e if the circumstances proven constitute an unbro ken chain which leads to a fai
r and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accuse d, to the exclusion of all ot
hers, as the guilty person. The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, tak
en together with the condition of Rebelyn's body wh en found, eloquently indicat
e that the appellant sexually assaulted her before d rowning her to death. It be
ars stressing that appellant admitted having raped Re belyn when he was intervie
wed by Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Ra dio. Mojares' testimony l
ends support to the courts conclusion. We have held that "a confession to a radio
reporter is admissible where it was not shown that sai d reporter was acting fo
r the police or that the interview was conducted under c ircumstances where it i
s apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear." MIRANDA DOCTR
INE; ADMISSIBLE. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS, WHEN PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. P
RINCIPE [G.R. No. 135862, May 2, 2002] PER CURIAM: FACTS: Rafael Principe was ac
cused of the rape slaying of one Arlene Ipurong who was then 6 years of age. An
investigation was conducted by the police in the evening of A ugust 9, 1998. Sev
eral witnesses pointed to accused-appellant as the person who was last seen with
the victim Arlene. Accused-appellant was subsequently taken i nto custody by th
e police. On August 17, 1998, accused-appellant was interrogate d by the police,
to whom, after reading his rights in Tagalog and in the presenc e of accused-ap
pellant s father and of his counsel Atty. Cesar Villar, he admitt ed hitting Arl
ene with a large rock until she was unconscious and subsequently r aping her. Ac
cused-appellant contends that the trial court failed to ascertain w hether accus
edappellant was fully apprised of the legal consequences of his plea
, considering that he finished only up to the sixth grade of the elementary scho
ol. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the trial court complied with the requirement of
inquiring on the voluntariness of the plea. (2) Whether or not the extrajudicia
l confession of the accused is admissible. HELD: (1) NO. When an accused enters
a plea of guilt to a capital offense, Section 3 o f Rule 116 of the Rules of Cri
minal Procedure provides that it is the duty of th e trial court to observe the
following rules: (1) it must conduct a searching in quiry into the voluntariness
and full 38 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel
Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo
de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andr
e Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, C
haro Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan
Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Vill
aflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! comprehens
ion of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecuti on to pre
sent evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his cu
lpability; and (3) it must ask the accused if he desires to present evi dence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This is because a plea of guil
t must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the inquiry must focus on
the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequ ences o
f the plea. In this case, the trial court failed to comply fully with the requir
ement to conduct a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appella nt's p
lea was voluntary and done with full comprehension of the consequences the reof.
Thus, in determining whether accused-appellant was aware of the full conse quen
ces of his plea of guilt, the trial court simply asked him whether he knew t hat
he "may" be sentenced to death, implying that it was possible that the death pe
nalty might not be imposed on him. A mere warning that the accused faces the sup
reme penalty of death is insufficient. (2) YES. With respect to accused-appel la
nt's extrajudicial confession, the Constitution, R.A. No. 7438, and case law l a
y down four fundamental requirements for the admissibility of extrajudicial con
fessions in general, to wit: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) it must b
e made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confes
s ion must be express; and (d) it must be in writing. In this case, after accuse
dappellant was read his rights in Tagalog, he signified his intention to confess
his participation in the rape and killing of Arlene. Accused-appellant's confes
s ion was placed in writing and it was signed by him, his counsel, and the admin
is tering officer. Hence, the said confession is admissible it being in accordan
ce with the above requisites. RIGHT TO BAIL RIGHT TO BAIL; PRIOR TO CONVICTION B
Y THE TRIAL COURT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES
, BAIL SHALL BE A MATTER OF RIGHT. YOUSEF AL -GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
, et al. [G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: see page 28
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bail. HELD: YES. The iss
ue on bail has been resolved in our resolution dated November 24, 1998, where th
is Court ruled: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty pres cribed
in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammun itions
and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to pr
ision mayor in its minimum period and prision mayor in its maximum period to rec
lusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail a
s a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Sec
tion 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94. RIGHT TO BAIL; WHEN BAIL SHALL B
E DENIED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALARCA [G. R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: Accused Palarca was convicted of the crime of rape by
the RTC sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 39 POLITICA
L LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer
Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel De
gollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim
, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee S
abilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a S
ze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On appeal,
appellant points out that the accusatory portion of the information f ailed to
specifically allege that the rape was committed through force or intimi dation.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of accused
-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to deny the accused his right to ba
il. HELD: NO. Accused-appellant makes much of the finding of the investigating j
udge during the bail hearing that the evidence against accused-appellant was not
strong. It must be stressed, however, that the assessment of the evidence prese
nted during a ba il hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or deny
ing an applicatio n for the provisional release of the accused. Not being a fina
l assessment, and merely for the purpose of determining the necessity of confine
ment to avoid esca pe, courts tend to be fair and liberal in their appreciation
of evidence. Thus i n People v. Baldoz, et al., the Court made the following pro
nouncements: The asse ssment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is i
ntended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provi
sional release of the accused. It is not a final assessment. Before conviction,
every one accused is entitled to bail, except when the offense charged is punish
able by reclusion per petua, life imprisonment or death; and the evidence of gui
lt is strong. The denia l of this fundamental right is justified only if there is
a great probability of escape. Confinement prior to conviction is warranted, in
order to assure the pr esence of the accused at the trial. Thus, the natural te
ndency of the courts has always been towards a fair and liberal appreciation of
the evidence in the dete rmination of the degree of proof and in the presumption
of guilt necessary to wa rrant a deprivation of that right. Such appreciation i
s at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final
assessment of the evidenc e before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon
occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course. RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RATIONALE BEHIND THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED
TO BE INFORMED O F THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONTERON [G.R. No. 130709, March 6, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J: FACTS: Accused-appellant was formally charged with rape, he entered a plea of
not guilty at his arraignment. After trial, the lower court convicted him of th
e crime of rape . Accused-appellant contends that the RTC of Davao has committed
an error in not acquitting him of the crime charged in the Information. He argu
es that his nega tive plea to the information filed against him, his filing of t
he notice of appe al, and his denial of the rape charges against him during tria
l, indicate his in nocence. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the accusedappellant is correct. HELD: NO. Constitutional due process demands that the accu
sed in a criminal case shoul d be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa
tion against him. The rationale be hind this constitutional guarantee are: First
, to furnish the accused with the d escription of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; sec ond, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal, for protection against a f urther prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the fac ts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had. The purpose of arraignment is to apprise the

accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nat
ure of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him why the pro
s ecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. Consequently, when the accu
se dappellant entered a negative plea during his arraignment, the same was not b
ind ing on the court 40 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonja
n, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constanti
no, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Go
dinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeann
e Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemi
na Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura
, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! as an indi
cation of his innocence. Rather, it is a general denial of the charges impugned
against him and an exercise of his right to be heard of his plea. Neit her is th
e accused-appellants filing of a notice of appeal indicative of his inno cence. O
n the contrary, accused-appellants appeal was necessitated by the judgmen t of co
nviction rendered against him by the trial court. While the accused-appel lant i
s guilty of rape, the same was committed only in its attempted stage. This and t
he fact that the accused-appellant was still a minor when the crime was co mmitt
ed warrant the modification of the decision of the RTC of Davao. RIGHTS OF THE A
CCUSED; THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED CARRIES WITH IT THE OBLIGATION T O EFFECTIVELY
CONVEY TO THE ACCUSED INFORMATION TO ENABLE HIM TO PREPARE HIS DEF ENSE. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALCALDE [G.R. Nos. 139225-28, May 29, 2002] DAVIDE, JR.,
C.J: FACTS: On 24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Pros ecutor of La
guna filed before the trial court two informations for parricide and two informa
tions for frustrat ed parricide. Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997, ARNEL,
who was assisted b y a counsel de parte, refused to speak. Pursuant to Section
1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him a plea o
f not guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pretrial. The cases wer e then consolidated and jointly tried. After the prosecutio
n rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed a motion
for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. On 27 Apri
l 1998, the defense, through counsel de parte, filed a demurrer to evidence base
d on the following gr ounds: (a) The accused has not been adequately informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment; (b) Not
an iota of incriminato ry evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced a
nd presented by the pro secution during the trial; and (c) The constitutional pr
esumption of innocence o f the accused has not been overcome by any evidence or
contrary presumption. In support thereof, the defense alleged that ARNEL was aff
licted with psychosis and could not comprehend, and that despite his strange beh
avior characterized by hi s deafening silence, motionless appearance, and single
direction blank stare the trial court insisted on his arraignment. Thus, accuse
d was not adequately appri sed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Moreover, no concrete evidence pointing to ARNEL as the culprit was presen
ted by the prosecution. Hen ce, the constitutional presumption of innocence of a
n accused prevails. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has been adequately inform
ed of the nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment. HEL
D: NO. The physical and outward manifestations of ARNEL at the time of his ar ra
ignment, which were brought to the attention of the trial court, indicated subst
antial de monstration of a mental disorder that rendered ARNEL unfit to be arrai
gned or tr ied in the four criminal cases at bar. The trial court failed to exer
cise utmost circumspection in assuming that ARNEL was in full possession of his
mental facu lties and understood the proceedings against him. The constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him unde
r the Bill o f Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively
convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for h
is defense. A t the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberratio
n of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is s
ufficient to j ustify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be ful
ly satisfied th at the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the l
aw secures or gi
ves. Under the circumstances in these cases, the trial court gravely failed in t
his regard. Solemn and inflexible is the constitutional behest that no person s
h all be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Absol
ut e heedfulness of this constitutional 41 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura
, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma.
Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce
Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao,
Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte,
Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias T
ambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! injunction
is most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the grav est jeopa
rdy of losing his life. It constantly behooves every court to proceed w ith utmo
st care in each of such cases before it, and nothing can be more demandi ng of j
udges in that respect than when the possible punishment would be in its s everes
t form like death a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and ir repar
able. In light of the foregoing fatal infirmities committed by the trial co urt,
as well as by the defense counsel, we have no other alternative except to s et
aside the joint decision in question and remand the cases to the trial court for
further proceedings to allow the defense to present evidence to prove that A RN
EL was either unfit for arraignment and trial or was insane at the time the cr i
mes charged were committed. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; THE RECITAL OF THE ESSENTIALS
OF A CRIME DELINEATES THE N ATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST AN ACCUSED. P
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAS [G.R. Nos. 133583-85, February 20, 2002] PAN
GANIBAN, J: FACTS: For automatic review are decisions promulgated by the Regi on
al Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas
y Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her two min
or daughters. When first arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistanc
e of his counsel, pleade d not guilty. When the case was submitted for decision,
the prosecution moved to reopen the case to present the Birth Certificate of th
e victims as well as the Marriage contract of the parents. This motion was grant
ed over the objection of the defense counsel. Before the prosecution presented i
ts evidence, appellant, t hrough his counsel, moved for the change of his former
plea of not guilty to tha t of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted. Appellan
t was thus rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived its
right to present evidence and submitted them for decision based on the evidence
presented by the prosecuti on. The RTC then rendered the assailed decisions. IS
SUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper. HELD: NO. The Co n
stitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Th is right f
inds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of t he Rules
of Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an Informati
on. The facts stated in the body of the Information determine the crime that the
accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. This recital of the esse
ntials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of accusation against an accus
ed. Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape as d
efined by law is alleged in the Information. Since the Information fail s to all
ege the essential elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have been con
victed of that crime. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him would be violated. RIGHTS OF THE ACCU
SED; R.A. NO. 7080 WAS CRAFTED TO AVOID THE FOLLY OF FILING MU LTIPLE INFORMATIO
NS. JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [GR No. 148965, February 26,
2002] PUNO, J: FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot against Joseph E. Estrad
a, then President of the Philippines, five former President and members of his f
amily, his ators were filed with the Office of 42 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy
Nachura, Alexander of the impeachment proceedings criminal complaints against th
e associates, friends and conspir Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je
nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et
hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juani
t o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, A
im ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glor
ios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! the Ombuds
man. On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable
cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal informati
on against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the in
formation was for the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 and among the res pondents
was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558. On April 24, 2001, petition er filed
a Motion to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the ground that t he Anti
-Plunder Law, RA 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one off
ense. On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying peti tioners
Motion to Quash and Suspend. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the
Anti-Plunder Law, RA 7080, is constitutional. (2) Whether or not Jinggoy Estrad
a can be prosecuted for plunder under RA 7080 even if he h as been charged only
on one count with what would constitute acts of plunder und er paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information. HELD: (1) YES. Petitioners contention that RA 7080 is un
constitutional as applied to hi m is principally perched on the premise that the
Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot c
onstitute plunder. Petitioners pr emise is patently false. A careful examination
of the Amended Information will s how that it is divided into three parts: (1) t
he first paragraph charges former President Estrada with the crime of plunder to
gether with petitioner Jinggoy Est rada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yoland
a Ricaforte and others; (2) the sec ond paragraph spells out in general terms ho
w the accused conspired in committin g the crime of plunder; and (3) the followi
ng four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) des cribe in detail the predicate acts constit
utive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items 1-6 of RA 7080. Pertinent to the
case at bar is the predicate act alle ged in sub paragraph (a) of the Amended I
nformation which is of receiving or coll ecting, directly or indirectly, on sever
al instances, money in the aggregate amo unt of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gamb
ling in the form of gift, share, percenta ge, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit xxx In this sub paragraph (a), peti tioner, in conspiracy with former Pre
sident Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from il
legal gambling. Contrary to petitioners post ure, the allegation is that he recei
ved or collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on se
veral instances means the petitioner committe d the predicate acts in a series. T
o insist that the amended Information charged the petitioner with only one act o
r offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pre
tzel interpretation. Respondent Ombudsman cann ot be faulted for including the pr
edicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in
one, and not in four separate Informations. A study of the history of RA 7080 wi
ll show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multi
ple informations. The said law was precisely e nacted to address this procedural
problem. (2) YES. There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nat
ion resulting in material damage to the nationa l economy is made up of a complex
and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different p
arties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accu
sed and their different criminal acts have a com monality to help the former pre
sident amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten we alth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d
) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused
in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge therefore, is not that
each accused agreed to receive protection money f rom illegal gambling, that ea
ch misappropriated a certain portion of the tobacco excise tax, that ach accused
ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Bel le Corporation and receive c
ommissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly en
riched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate directly or indirectly, i
n the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of illgotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE SUFFI
CIENCY OF THE INFORMATION C ONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO B
E INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. 43 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE
: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito C
ahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder
Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan
Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennif
er Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Ta
al, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALARCA [G. R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
FACTS: see page 39 ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant m ay be validly conv
icted under the information charging him with rape. HELD: YES. While generally a
n accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the c
omplaint or information, this rule is not without exception. The right to assail
the sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence may be waived b
y the accusedappellant. In People v. Lopez, we held that an info rmation which l
acks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accus
ed fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the d eficiency was
cured by competent evidence presented therein. Thus, [F]ailure to o bject was thu
s a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right guar anteed by th
e Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if t aken agains
t his will. This Court has, on more than one occasion, recognized waiv ers of con
stitutional rights, e.g., the right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
the right to counsel and to remain silent; the right to be heard; and the right
to bail. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; A COUNSEL DE OFFICIO MUST BE GIVEN A REASONABLE
TIME TO C ONSULT WITH THE ACCUSED AS TO HIS PLEA BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRA
IGNMENT. P EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASCUGUIN [G.R. No. 144404, September 24
, 2001] BUENA, J: FACTS: Bascuguin, herein accused-appellant, was charged with t
he crime of rape with homicide before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas. At his arrai
gnment, he appeared wi thout the assistance of counsel. The trial court assigned
a counsel de officio. He pleaded guilty to the crime charged. A series of quest
ions were propounded by the trial court to test accusedappellant's voluntariness
and comprehension of t he consequences of his plea. Trial on the merits was con
ducted thereafter to all ow the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise d
egree of culpability. Tri al court rendered its decision finding Leodegario Basc
uguin guilty beyond reason able doubt. The procedure observed by the trial court
at the arraignment of accu sed-appellant is graphically illustrated in the Tran
script of Stenographic Notes [TSN] herein quoted as follows "COURT: Ready for ar
raignment? You asked the acc used if he has a counsel? "CLERK OF COURT: (Note: A
sking the accused) "ACCUSED: None, sir. "COURT: Atty. Macasaet, I will appoint y
ou as counsel de officio for the accused. "ATTY. MACASAET: Yes, Your Honor. "ATT
Y. MACASAET: May I confer wit h the accused, Your Honor. The accused is ready fo
r arraignment, your Honor. "CO URT: Arraigned (sic) the accused. (Note: the Cler
k of Court is reading the Infor mation to the accused) "CLERK OF COURT: The accu
sed pleaded (sic) guilty, your H onor, for the crime charged. "COURT: You ask th
e accused if he knows the consequ ences of his plea. "COURT: Do you know that th
e penalty impossible (sic) in case s of this nature is death? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir
. "COURT: Do you know that in your plea of guilt you can be sentenced by the Cou
rt? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir. 44 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Rago
njan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Consta
ntino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher
Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Je
anne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, J
emina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Vent
ura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! "COURT: Do
you admit having raped Marissa Moral? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir. "COURT: Do you admit
that after raping Marissa Moral you stabbed and killed her? "ACCUSED: Yes, sir."
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional guarantees of due process of an accuse
d were violated in the case at hand. HELD: YES. Basic is the precept that every
person accused of a crime must know t he nature and cause of accusation against
him. This is effected, among others, by the read ing of the information in a lan
guage understood by the person accused. Reading t he TSN, we are left to specula
te on whether the information was actually read in the dialect known to accuseda
ppellant, or whether it was translated to him or e xplained in a manner he can c
omprehend. What is visible to us is the cryptic rec ording of the proceedings in
the court a quo. Nevertheless, the trial court's de cision declared that the in
formation was read in Tagalog, a language known to ac cused-appellant. Granting,
on presumption of correctness, that the information w as read in Tagalog as dec
lared by the trial court, still, we cannot admit accuse d-appellant's conviction
on the basis of his improvident plea of guilt. One of t he constitutional guara
ntees of due process is the right of an accused to be hea rd by himself and coun
sel. The trial court gave accused-appellant a counsel de o fficio to represent h
im. However, accused-appellant impugns such assignment cont ending that he was n
ot given the opportunity to choose his own counsel. What is visible from the TSN
is the fact that when the court asked accused-appellant if he has a lawyer, and
upon responding that he has none, the trial court appointed a counsel de offici
o, as follows - COURT: Ready for arraignment? You ask(ed) th e accused if he has
a counsel?; CLERK OF COURT: (Note: Asking the accused); ACCU SED: None, sir.; C
OURT: Atty. Macasaet, I will appoint you as counsel de officio for the accused."
It appears from the records that after the appointment of a c ounsel de officio
, the arraignment immediately followed. As glaringly reflected in the records, t
he appointed counsel de officio conferred with the accused only for a few minute
s, thus - COURT: Atty. Macasaet, I will appoint you as counsel de officio for th
e accused; ATTY. MACASAET: Yes, Your Honor; ATTY. MACASAET: May I confer with th
e accused, Your Honor. The accused is ready for arraignment, yo ur Honor. " A cr
iminal case is a serious matter that deserves serious attention especially in ca
ses involving capital punishment. Under the present Revised Rule s of Criminal P
rocedure, whenever a counsel de officio is appointed by the court to defend the
accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time t o consult with
the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment . Counsel de
officio's haste in proceeding with the arraignment falls short of t he standard
mandated by the rules for an effective and adequate counseling. The limited time
allotted for consultation with accused-appellant seriously casts do ubt on whet
her counsel de officio has indeed sufficiently explained to the accus ed-appella
nt the crime charged, the meaning of his plea, and its consequences. V erily, a
judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. In the interest
of substantial justice then, this Court has no recourse but to remand the case
to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSE
D; A SEARCHING INQUIRY MUST FOCUS ON THE VOLUNTARINESS AND T HE FULL COMPREHENSI
ON OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARANZADO [G.R.
Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001] DAVIDE, C.J: FACTS: ZENY was born on 19 Nov
ember 1984 in Sto. Nino, South Cotaba to. Her parents
were BERNARDINO and Lourdes Gerongani. At about midnight of 7 March 1997, she wa
s sleeping with her sisters and younger brother in their house at Poblacion, Es
p eranza, Sultan Kudarat, when the knocking at the door of their room awakened h
er . When she opened the door, her father immediately slapped her and demanded t
o k now why she locked the door. Then, 45 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura,
Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma.
Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce
Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, R
aji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte,
Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Ta
mbago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! BERNARDINO
asked her daughter: "Can I touch your vagina?" Repulsed by the sugges tion, ZEN
Y refused, only to find just as quickly that her father had poked a kni fe at he
r neck. BERNARDINO thereafter pulled ZENY's hair, forcibly held her down the flo
or and boxed her stomach. Recognizing the weakness of his daughter, he u ndresse
d her; and while choking her he imposed his lechery. He was obstinate to her dau
ghter's pleas for mercy and compassion. He warned her not to tell anyone of the
deed or he would kill her. He then stood up, dressed up and left the daug hter t
o her weeping. Unsatisfied with that single act of carnality, BERNARDINO r epeat
ed the assault, twice on the honor and chastity of ZENY about midnight of 1 0 Ma
rch 1997. Upon arraignment on 19 May 1997, BERNARDINO, assisted by his couns el
Atty. Balo, entered a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 October 1997, BE RN
ARDINO, through his counsel Atty. Balo, moved to withdraw his previous plea of n
ot guilty in each of the three cases and to substitute the same upon re-arraig n
ment with pleas of guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was accorded with d
ue process. HELD: NO. The C ourt found that the trial court failed, albeit regre
ttably, to observe the rigid and severe constitutional mandate on due process, m
ore particularly the demands of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which
reads: SECTION 3. Plea of gu ilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a s
earching inquiry into the volu ntariness and full comprehension of the consequen
ces of his plea and shall requi re the prosecution to prove his guilt and the pr
ecise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. As
pointed by the OSG, the Supreme Court had already outlined how compliance with s
aid rule, where an accused plead s guilty to a capital offense, should be attain
ed by the trial court, thus: 1. T he court must conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full compre hension [by the accused] of the consequences
of his plea; 2. The court must requ ire the prosecution to present evidence to p
rove the guilt of the accused and pr ecise degree of his culpability, and 3. The
court must ask the accused if he des ires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires. The re is no debate that the trial court had
persuasively observed the second comman d of the rule by directing the prosecuti
on to adduce evidence to determine the e xact culpability of the accused, taking
into account the presence of other possi ble aggravating or mitigating circumst
ances. On the first requirement, it bears to note that a searching inquiry must
focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequ
ences of the plea so that the plea of guil ty can be truly said to be based on a
free and informed judgment. While there ca n be no hard and fast rule as to how
a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," it would be well for the court to do
the following: 1. Ascertain from the accuse d himself a.) how he was brought in
to the custody of the law; b.) whether he had the assistance of a competent coun
sel during the custodial and preliminary inve stigations; and c.) under what con
ditions he was detained and interrogated durin g the investigations. These the c
ourt shall do in order to rule out the possibil ity that the accused has been co
erced or placed under a state of duress either b y actual threats of physical ha
rm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. 2 . Ask the defense counsel a se
ries of questions as to whether he had conferred w ith, and completely explained
to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. 3. Elicit inf
ormation about the personality profile of the accus ed, such as his age, socioec
onomic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy inde
x of his capacity to give a free and informed plea o f guilty. 4. Inform the acc
used the exact length of imprisonment or nature of th e penalty under the law an
d the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an acc
used pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or beca
use of promises of the authorities or parties of a lig hter penalty should he ad
mit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the jud
ge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
. 46 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarent
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! 5. Require
the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges ag ainst him
or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or c ause him
to supply missing details of significance. First, the questions were fr amed in
English. The record of such inquiry is bereft of any indication that the trial
court attempted to ascertain whether BERNARDINO was well-versed in the En glish
language; neither does it reveal any information about his personality pro file
which could "provide contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case ." N
or does the record of the searching inquiry shed light on matters concerning his
apprehension, detention and prior investigation. An examination of the reco rds
, however, disclosed that BERNARDINO signed a "Waiver" whereby he waived his rig
ht to a preliminary investigation. Such waiver was attested to by the Municip al
Jail Warden, but there was nothing that would indicate that he was assisted b y
a competent counsel at the time. Second, while Atty. Balo manifested that afte
r he conferred with BERNARDINO the latter intimated that he was ready to withdra
w his former plea of guilty, it is not clear whether the former explained to th
e latter the implications of a plea of guilty. Third, during the searching inqui
r y, the trial judge and BERNARDINO kept mentioning about the "three cases filed
" or "crimes charged" against the latter. BERNARDINO even hoisted, as one of the
r easons why he committed the crimes, the fact that he had a very big problem b
eca use his house was burned. To ensure that he fully understood the nature of t
he c rimes filed against him to which he pleaded guilty, the court should have a
t lea st asked him to recount what he exactly did. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION O
F CASES RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; THE RIGHT IS DEEMED VIOLATED ONLY
WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS IS ATTENDED BY VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS, AND OPPRESSIVE DELAYS
. JOSE P . LOPEZ vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al. [G.R. No. 140529, September
6, 2001] GONZAGA-REYES, J: FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman narrates that the
verified audit report of the COA special audit team was received on December 22
, 1993, and finding the same suffi cient in form and substance was docketed as O
MB Case No. 34-93-2791. On the basi s thereof, a preliminary investigation was c
onducted. On March 1, 1994, the resp ondents were ordered to file their counteraffidavits. On May 10, 1994, the Offi ce of the Ombudsman received the counteraf
fidavits of respondents. On February 2 9, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman rece
ived the reply-affidavit of COA. In a R esolution dated July 17, 1998, graft inv
estigation officer Ladrera recommended t he filing of thirty (30) informations a
gainst petitioner. The said recommendatio n was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Gervacio on February 27, 1999, a nd by Ombudsman Desierto on April 30,
1999. The informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999. In thi
s case, the preliminary investigation was r esolved close to four (4) years from
the time all the counter and reply affidavi ts were submitted to the Office of
the Ombudsman. After the last reply-affidavit was filed on February 28, 1995, it
was only on July 17, 1998 that a resolution was issued recommending the filing
of the corresponding criminal informations ag ainst the petitioner and the other
s. It took eight months or on February 27, 199 9 for Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve the same and close to another year or on April 30, 1
999 for Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to approve th e recommendation ISSUE: Whether
or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in r
esolving the complaint filed against the petitioner, which violated his cons tit
utional right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him.
47 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos,

Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman
, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, J
uanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejus
o, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita,
Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: YES.
Article III of the Constitution provides that: SECTION 16. All person s shall h
ave the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasij
udic ial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a "speedy dispos
ition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extend
s to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in
all p roceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings." Hence, under
the Co nstitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all offi
cials w ho are tasked with the administration of justice. However, the right to
a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violat
ed only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressiv
e delays ; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secu
red, or e ven without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allow
ed to elap se without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which t
he conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factor
s as the le ngth of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or fail
ure to asser t such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible conc ept. We find that the cases are not sufficiently complex to justif
y the length o f time for their resolution. Neither can the long delay in resolv
ing the case un der preliminary investigation be justified on the basis of the n
umber of informa tions filed before the Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions in
volved. Verily, t he delay in this case disregarded the Ombudsman's duty, as man
dated by the Const itution and Republic Act No. 6770, to enforce the criminal li
ability of governme nt officers or employees in every case where the evidence wa
rrants in order to p romote efficient service to the people. The failure of said
office to resolve th e complaints that have been pending for almost four years
is clearly violative o f this mandate and the rights of petitioner as a public o
fficial. In such event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the cases fil
ed against him. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOUBLE JEOPARDY; ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR DOUBLY J
EOPARDY TO ATTACH LETICIA R. MER CIALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 1
24171, March 18, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On August 12, 1993, criminal c
ases for rape with homi cide were filed against the private respondents for the
death of Maritess Ricafort Merciales. During the tri al, after presenting seven
witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for t he discharge of accused Jo
selito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a st ate witness. However, the
prosecution contended that it was not required to pres ent evidence to warrant
the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had alr eady been admitted into
the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Just ice. Consequently, the
respondent judge denied the motion for discharge, for fai lure of the prosecuti
on to present evidence as provided for by Section 9, Rule 1 19 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. On July 13, 1994, private respondent s filed a motion to
set the case for hearing, invoking their constitutional righ t to speedy trial.
The respondent Judge granted the motion. On the said date, th e prosecution fil
ed a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting further evidence. The res
pondent Judge postponed the hearing and reset the same for Augu st 9, 1994. On A
ugust 9, 1994, the respondent Judge called for a recess so as to let the prosecu
tion decide whether or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to pro
ve the due execution of the accused Nuada's extrajudicial confes sion. However,
after the recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the N
BI agent, and instead manifested that he was not presenting any further evidence
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On October
21, 1994, the trial court issued the assailed Order which acquitted a ll of the
accused. Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the s
aid criminal cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a peti tion to
annul the Order of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismis sed the
petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Order of the trial court is valid. HELD: NO
. The trial court, notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the prose
cution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public prosecutor tenac
iously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state witness, the trial court passively w
atched as the public prosecutor bungled the case. The trial court was well aware
of the nature of the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that have s
o far b een presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu proprio, s
hould ha ve called additional witnesses for the purpose of questioning them hims
elf in or der to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues i
nvolved in the case. It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in co
urt. Indee d, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is
entitled to due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accu
sed by the court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same i
s null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot
constitute a claim for double jeopardy. By contending that the challenged decisi
on is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to la
ck or exces s of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of the ac
cused agains t double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches o
nly when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a comp
laint or info rmation sufficient in form and substance to sustain their convicti
on; (2) the co urt has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and hav
e pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed wit
hout their cons ent. Thus, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy be
cause, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdictio
n. Any ruling is sued without jurisdiction is in legal contemplation, necessaril
y null and void a nd does not exist. The dismissal of the case below was invalid
for lack of a fun damental prerequisite, that is, due process. DOUBLE JEOPARDY;
WHEN DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES EVEN IF MOTION TO DISMISS IS MADE BY ACCUSED HIMS
ELF. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERRA [G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002] PUNO, J
: FACTS: On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra was charged with th e crim
e of murder for killing a certain Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued
by th e Regional Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988. He remained at-la
rge un til May 24, 1996 when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdictio
n of th e court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately, arraignment proceeded d
uring wh ich he entered a plea of "Not Guilty." On the same day, the prosecution
called t o the witness stand the wife of the victim, private complainant Damian
a Cortezo. She testified that: (1) she has executed an affidavit of desistance;
(2) she is no longer interested in prosecuting the case; and (3) other witnesses
of the sh ooting incident have turned hostile and have similarly lost concern i
n pursuing the same. T hereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the
accused, m oved for the dismissal of the case. Thus, the court dismissed the ca
se and the w arrant of arrest was cancelled. Subsequently, two other witnesses a
ppeared after learning of the dismissal of the case and manifested their willing
ness to testi fy. On August 21, 1996, the trial court set aside the Order of Dis
missal dated M ay 24, 1996. Respondent moved for its reconsideration but his mot
ion was denied on September 26, 1996. He then instituted before the Court of App
eals a Petition
for Certiorari challenging the August 21 Order. The appellate court rendered a D
ecision on April 6, 1998 granting the petition. It ruled that the dismissal of t
he case against petitioner has attained finality, and that its revival requires
the filing of a new case or information. 49 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachur
a, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma
. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyc
e Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao,
Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte
, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ISSUE: Whe
ther or not the revival of the case is violative of the constitutional right of
the accused against double jeopardy. HELD: YES. Under Article III, Section 21 of
the Constitution, "No person shall b e twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to ano ther prosecution for the s
ame act." In a long line of decisions, we have enumera ted the following requisi
tes for double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid ind ictment; (2) before a co
mpetent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid p lea has been entered; a
nd (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or t he case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. There are ho
wever two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismi
ss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is w hen the ground is ins
ufficiency of evidence of the prosecution, and the second i s when the proceedin
gs have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the righ t to a speedy trial
. In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited requisites present. First, the
re was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a convic
tion, filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal.
Second, the Regional Trial Court clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the m
urder charge against the respondent. Third, he was arraigned in open court on Ma
y 24, 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de officio. Fourt h, during the arra
ignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Finally, there was a valid termination
of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to Dismi ss the case. Whil
e it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in pray ing for its dism
issal, double jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was the
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. In view of private complainant's d
esistance and her testimony that other witnesses have turned hos tile and are al
so no longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner clea rly lacks the
evidence to support the charge. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT JUDICIAL SUPERVISION JUDICIA
L SUPERVISION; ONLY THE SUPREME COURT CAN OVERSEE THE JUDGES' AND COURT P ERSONN
EL'S COMPLIANCE WITH ALL LAWS, AND TAKE THE PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION A GAINS
T THEM IF THEY COMMIT ANY VIOLATION THEREOF. CAOIBES vs. OMBUDSMAN, et al. [G.R.
No. 132177, July 19, 2001] BUENA, J: FACTS: On May 23, 1997, respondent Florent
ino M. Alumbres, Presiding J udge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of L
as Pias City, filed before the Office of the Ombu dsman, a Criminal Complaint for
physical injuries, malicious mischief for the de struction of complainant's eye
glasses, and assault upon a person in authority. R espondent alleged therein tha
t on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floo r of the Hall of Justice, La
s Pias City, he requested petitioner to return the ex ecutive table he borrowed f
rom respondent; that petitioner did not answer so res pondent reiterated his req
uest but before he could finish talking, petitioner bl urted "Tarantado ito ah,"
and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of
his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglass es unserviceable; and th
at respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pia s Police Station. He pr
ayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganba yan against the petiti
oner. On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Co mplaint against petit
ioner, this time an administrative case with the Supreme Co urt, docketed as Adm
. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petition er from the judicia
ry on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. S
aid complaint is based on the same facts as those in the comp
laint filed earlier with the Office of the Ombudsman. 50 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE
Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennif
er Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Ta
al, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In the Ord
er 3 dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitio ner to fi
le a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Inste ad of fi
ling a counteraffidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 an "Ex-Parte M otion f
or Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of t he Omb
udsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and r efer
the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office of the Court Admini stra
tor, is already investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Invoking Sect ion
15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cog
nizance of Case No. MB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, a ll
egedly, the accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal ch
arges falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to in v
estigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee wh
ich appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. ISSUE: Whether or no
t the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on Case No . OMB-097-0903 pend
ing resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ. HELD: YES. It appears that the prese
nt case involves two members of the judiciar y who were entangled in a fight wit
hin court premises over a piece of office furniture. Und er Section 6, Article V
III of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its person nel. Prescinding from
this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself an d by itself whether a
criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, inv olves an administrat
ive matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases ag ainst judges and co
urt personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination a
s to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. Th is rule should hol
d true regardless of whether an administrative case based on t he act subject of
the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, asid
e from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matte r unless he is i
nformed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrat
ive authority of the Court, because in determining whether an ad ministrative ma
tter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative l iabilities but
also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maced
a vs. Vasquez. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION; THE OMBUDSMAN MAY NOT INITIATE OR INVESTIGA
TE A CRIMINAL O R ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT BEFORE HIS OFFICE AGAINST A JUDGE, PU
RSUANT TO HIS PO WER TO INVESTIGATE PUBLIC OFFICERS. JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES vs.
OFFICE OF THE OM BUDSMANMINDANAO, et al. [G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001] PA
RDO, J: FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an ex
propriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project be
fore the trial co urt presided by petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes. DPWH won t
he expropriation c ase and as of 19 May 1994, it still owed the lot owners the f
ollowing amounts: R eynaldo Lao P489,000; Tessie Amadeo P1,094,200; and Alfonso
Galo P13,927,215. On 5 April 1994, the trial court granted Amadeos motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. T
he writ was served b y Sheriff Paralisan to the DPWH-Region IX. On 3 May 1994, P
aralisan issued a Not ice of Levy addressed to the Regional Director describing
the properties subject of the levy. The auction sale pushed through on 18 May 19
94 with Alex Bacquial as the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of
sale was issued by Pa ralisan. On 19 May 1994, Bacquial and Paralisan attempted
to withdraw the auctio ned properties but were prevented from doing so by the c
ustodian of the subject
DPWH properties. On 20 May 1994, Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for th
e issuance of a break through order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the
auctioned properties. The motion was granted by petitioner on the same date. Ar
m ed with the court order, Bacqiual succeeded in hauling off the properties for
5 successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily suspend
in g the writ of execution earlier issued. However, on 21 June 1994, the lower c
our t issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of execution. 51 P
OLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On the bas
is of letters from Cong. Manuel Garcia of the 2 nd District of Davao C ity and t
he DPWH custodian, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed peti tioner a
nd Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an admi nistrat
ive case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomal ous im
plementation of the writ of execution. By virtue of an administrative comp laint
filed by the DPWH, Paralisan was dismissed from the service by the Supreme Cour
t on 23 August 1995. The Court further directed the Court Administrator to condu
ct an investigation on petitioner and to charge him if the investigation so warr
ants. On 15 January 1996, Dir. Antonio Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombu dsma
n-Mindanao recommended that petitioner be charged before the Sandiganbayan w ith
violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and likewise be administratively charged b ef
ore the Supreme Court for acts unbecoming of a judge. On 22 January 1996, Vale n
zuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal com
plaint charging petitioner with violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e). On 22 Februar
y 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to
d ismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Co
ur t. The motion was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation of acts of a ju dge in the exercise of his official functions alle
ged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absen
ce of an administrative charge for the sa me acts before the Supreme Court. HELD
: NO. R.A. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: Sec. 15.
Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the follow
ing powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its ow n or o
n complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or em ploye
e, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjus t, i
mproper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may tak e o
ver, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the Government, the inves ti
gation of such cases. Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority, Exce p
tions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all e
lective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrum
entalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, go
v ernment-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over o
ff icials who may be removed only be impeachment, or over Members of Congress, a
nd the Judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal
or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant
to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the cas
e t o the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the
Cons titution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Judge of the Court of Ap
peals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court
that is tasked to oversee the judges and the court personnel and take the proper
admi nistrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the l and. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without r
unning afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation
of pow ers. Petitioners questioned orders directing the attachment of government
propert y and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office,
well with in his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack
or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was
valid unde r the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
judicial a ction only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the cour
ts. No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investi
gation servi
ce of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a
judicial order or decision whether final and executory or notand pronounce it erro
neous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for ren
d ering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alon
e. 52 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarento
s, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzm
an, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob,
Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rej
uso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita
, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! PERIODS FO
R DECISION PERIODS FOR DECISION; THE LOWER COURTS HAVE THREE MONTHS WITHIN WHICH
TO DECIDE CASES OR MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THEM. ELIEZER A. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN vs.
JUDGE ROBER TO S. JAVELLANA [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, November 13, 2001] VITUG, J:
FACTS: In a complaint-affidavit, dated 17 September 1999, Eliezer A. S ibayan-Jo
aquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the p
erform ance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The compla
int was an offshoot of a case for estafa, docketed Criminal Case No. RTC 1150, e
ntitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Tan y Salazar," filed by Sibayan-Jo
aquin f or and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the
San Carl os City RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the r
endition of judgment in the aforenumbered criminal case, the decision, dated 16
July 1999 , that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered only
on the ten th month after the case was submitted for decision. The matter was re
ferred to t he Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation. The Inves
tigating Jus tice ended his report to the Court by recommending respondent judge
be held admi nistratively liable for failure to render judgment in Criminal Cas
e No. RTC-1150 within the period prescribed by law (in violation of 15, ARTICLE V
III OF THE PHI LIPPINE CONSTITUTION, CANON 1, RULE 1.02, and CANON 3, RULE 3.05
OF THE Code of Judicial Conduct). ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may be held admi
nistratively liable for failure to render judgment within the period prescribe b
y law. HELD: YES. Section 15, Article XVIII, of the Constitution provides that l
ower co urts have three months within which to decide cases or matters pending b
efore them from the date of submission of such cases or matters for decision or
resolution. Canon 3 of t he Code of Judicial Conduct holds similarly by mandatin
g that the disposition of cases must be done promptly and seasonably. Admittedly
, respondent judge has ta ken ten months to finally decide Criminal Case No. RTC
1150 from its submission f or decision, a period clearly beyond the ninety-day r
eglementary period. He coul d have asked for an extension of time to decide the
case and explain why, but he did not. Any undue delay in the resolution of cases
often amounts to a denial o f justice and can easily undermine the people's fai
th and confidence in the judi ciary. Aware of the heavy caseload of judges, the
Court has continued to act wit h great understanding on requests for extension o
f time to decide cases. PERIODS FOR DECISION; ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 10-94 WHIC
H DIRECTS ALL TRIAL JUDG ES TO MAKE A PHYSICAL INVENTORY OF THE CASES IN THEIR D
OCKETS APPLIES TO THE SAN DIGANBAYAN. PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SAND
IGANBAYAN [A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 28, 2001] PARDO J: FACTS: On September
27, 2000, complying with the order, Presiding Justi ce Francis E. Garchitorena s
ubmitted a report admitting a number of cases submitted for decisi on and motion
for reconsideration pending resolution before its divisions. We qu ote: "Cases
Submitted W/ Motions For "For Decision Reconsideration "1st Division 341 None 53
e
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! "2nd Divis
ion "3rd Division "4th Division "5th Division "Total 5 None 12 None 5 None 52 1
-----------------------------------------------415" On July 31, 2000, the IBP, t
hrough its National President, Arthur D. Lim, transm itted to the Court a Resolu
tion 1 addressing the problem of delays in cases pend ing before the Sandiganbay
an. On November 21, 2000, the Court resolved to direct then Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA) "to conduct a judicial audit of the San
diganbayan, especially on the cases subject of this ad ministrative matter, and
to submit a report thereon not later than 31 December 2 000." On December 4, 200
0, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garc
hitorena admitted that the First Division of the Sandiga nbayan has a backlog of
cases; that one case alone made the backlog of the First Division so large, inv
olving 156 cases but the same has been set for promulgati on of decision on Dece
mber 8, 2000, which would reduce the backlog by at least f ifty percent (50%). I
SSUES: Whether or not Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094 is applica
ble to the Sandiganbayan. HELD: YES. Administrative Circular 10-94 directs all t
rial judges to make a phys ical inventory of the cases in their dockets. Given t
he rationale behind the Administrative Cir cular, we hold that it is applicable
to the Sandiganbayan with respect to cases within its original and appellate jur
isdiction. We reiterate the admonition we i ssued in our resolution of October 1
0, 2000: "This Court has consistently impres sed upon judges (which includes jus
tices) to decide cases promptly and expeditio usly on the principle that justice
delayed is justice denied. Decision-making is the primordial and most important
duty of the member of the bench. Hence, judge s are enjoined to decide cases wi
th dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants
disciplinary sanction including fine suspensio n and even dismissal. The rule p
articularly applies to justices of the Sandiganb ayan. Delays in the disposition
of cases erode the faith and confidence of our p eople in the judiciary, lower
its standards, and bring it into disrepute. Delays cannot be sanctioned or toler
ated especially in the anti-graft court, the showc ase of the nation's determina
tion to succeed in its war against graft. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT JURI
SDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COU RT
OVER DECISIONS OR FINAL ORDERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS LIMITED TO QUESTIONS O F
LAW. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. No. 135789. Jan
uary 31, 2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: On May 5, 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. , Cesar C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos organized HMHMI to serve a
s a holding company for the shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi, Jose Y. Campos, C
esar C. Zalamea and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in Bulletin Publishing Corporation
and the shares of stocks o f Hans M. Menzi in other companies, including Liwayw
ay Publishing Incorporated. On June 27, 1984, Hans M. Menzi died. On July 6, 198
4, the court appointed Manue l G. Montecillo executor of the Estate of Hans M. M
enzi and later the president of HMHMI. With the lone exception of Montecillo, Ed
uardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesa r C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos, constitute the pr
incipal stockholders and incor porators of HMHMI. 54 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: An
dy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On Februar
y 12, 1987, the PCGG issued Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against all shares of
stocks, assets, properties, records and documents of HMHMI. Forthwith , on Febr
uary 13, 1987, upon the request of PCGG, Central Bank Governor Fernande z instru
cted commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to withhold th e withd
rawal of funds and assets by Liwayway Publishing Corporation and HMHMI. O n July
29, 1987, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconve yance
, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against the following defe ndan
ts: Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Ferdi nan
d E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. On October 17, 1990, the PCGG filed a Secon d
Amended Complaint naming specifically the estate of Hans M. Menzi as one of th e
defendants. On November 27, 1992, the estate of Hans M. Menzi, in behalf of HM
HMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a "Motion to Lift Freeze Order" dated February
12, 1987, alleging that: (1) The stocks, assets, properties, records and docume
nts of HMHMI were sequestered without any judicial action having been filed aga
i nst it, or without impleading it as a defendant in Civil Case No. 0022; and (2
) Such issuance of a writ of sequestration without filing a corresponding judici
al action against HMHMI within the reglementary period established by Section 26
, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution resulted in the automatic lifting of th
e sequestration order on August 12, 1987. On April 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan gr
an ted the motion. On October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's mot
ion for reconsideration. On January 15, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines fi
led with the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the resolution of the
Sa ndiganbayan lifting the freeze order. On July 16, 1996, the Court set aside
the Sandiganbayan's resolution lifting the freeze order and remanded the case ba
ck t o the Sandiganbayan for resolution. Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of seques
trati on dated February 12, 1987, reasoning that there was no prima facie factua
l basi s for its issuance. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which t
he Sand iganbayan denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in lifit
ng the writ of sequestrati on over the assets, shares of stock, property records
and bank deposits of HMHMI. HELD: NO. It is well settled that the appellate jur
isdiction of the Supreme Cour t over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganba
yan is limited to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or c
ontroversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probati
ve value of the evidence presented, the truth o r falsehood of facts being admit
ted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the tru
th or falsehood of facts or when the query invit es calibration of the whole evi
dence considering mainly the credibility of the w itnesses, the existence and re
levancy of specific surrounding circumstances as w ell as their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court's fun ction to examine and weigh a
ll over again the evidence presented in the proceedi ngs below. At any rate, the
Court agrees with respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full authority to deci
de on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs
of sequestration that the PCGG initially issued. Bas ed on the evidence the PCG
G submitted so far to the Sandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the Bullet
in Publishing Corporation almost one hundred (100%) pe r cent since 1957, except
those Bulletin shares sold to U. S. Automotive Corpora tion in 1985, those conv
erted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to the general public at public
offerings. In the absence of competent evidence showing thus far that President
Ferdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired Bullet in shares of the late H
ans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to sequestrat
ion, the Court may not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question. 55
e nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman,
Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Jua
nit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso,
Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Gl
orios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! JUDICIAL R
EVIEW JUDICIAL REVIEW; STATUTE WHEN VAGUE ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. 14
8560, November 19, 2001] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrad
a, the highest-ranking of ficial to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashione d that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the c onstitutionally infirm
. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to su bject the Plunder Law
to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, accor ding to him, it suff
ers from the vice of vagueness. ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is vague a
nd is therefore unconstitutional ? HELD: NO. Preliminarily, the whole gamut of l
egal concepts pertaining to the v alidity of legislation is predicated on the ba
sic principle that a legislative measure is p resumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution. Courts invariably train their si ghts on this fundamental rule whe
never a legislative act is under a constitution al attack, for it is the postula
te of constitutional adjudication. This strong p redilection for constitutionali
ty takes its bearings on the idea that it is forb idden for one branch of the go
vernment to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been sai
d that the presumption is based on the deference t he judicial branch accords to
its coordinate branch the legislature. Hence in de termining whether the acts o
f the legislature are in tune with the fundamental l aw, courts should proceed w
ith judicial restraint and act with caution and forbe arance. Every intendment o
f the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of i ts constitutionality, inv
alidity being a measure of last resort. In construing t herefore the provisions
of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an int erpretation is fairly p
ossible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. In La Union Credit Cooper
ative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as long as there is s ome basis for the deci
sion of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touch
ed and the case will be decided on other available grounds . Yet the force of th
e presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into t
he safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palp
ably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, i t must be struck dow
n on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded. A
s long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform th
ose who are subject to it what conduct would render them lia ble to its penaltie
s, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its a
pplication; the counsel, in defending one charged with its vi olation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the pros cribed conduct. I
ndeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what th e assailed statu
te punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumu lating ill-gott
en wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combinat ion of acts en
umerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. Petitioner, howe ver, bewails
the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of t he terms "co
mbination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series o f overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "p attern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law uncons
titutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him th e right t
o be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, he nce, vio
lative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seem s to us
to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merel y beca
use general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms withou
t defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides
, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legisla

ture to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted
i n the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
e mployed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness 56 POLITICA
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! or ambigui
ty of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, c an be gat
hered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. More
over, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words o f a stat
ute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and sig
nification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technic al or s
pecial legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who a re, or
dinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phras eolog
y in such a manner is always presumed. Under the circumstances, petitioner' s re
liance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doc tri
ne has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the ef fe
ct that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with s
ufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand wh a
t conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that spe
cie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be
said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common inte
lligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. I
n such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respect
s it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
t argeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforc
er s unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrar
y f lexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against
legi slations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheles
s spe cify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparentl
y ambi guous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may
be "sa ved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as agains
t the se cond whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the d
octrine c annot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from amb
iguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is v
oid for un certainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite war
ning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and prac
tice. It mu st be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requir
es a reasona ble degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute p
recision or m athematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibilit
y, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and b
ounds of the s tatute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid me
rely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, es pecially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be im
possible to prov ide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. The vo
id-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or require
s the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must nec
essarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the fir
st essential of d ue process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other han
d, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily bro adly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'' The
overbreadth and va gueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have n
ot recognized an 'ov erbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the Firs
t Amendment." In Broa drick v Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial o
verbreadth have been e ntertained in cases involving statutes which, by their te
rms, seek to regulate o nly spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, h ave been curtailed when invoked against ordinary crimin
al laws that are sought t o be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, i
t has been held that "a fa cial challenge to a legislative act is the most diffi
cult challenge to mount suc cessfully, since the challenger must establish that
no set of circumstances exis
ts under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is sai
d that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in al
l its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is cl
e arly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
co nduct of others.'' In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
va gueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes
in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment ca
ses. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statu
te. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom appl
icat ion of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on th e ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other person
s or o ther situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As h
as been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbre adth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while 57 POLITICA
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! statutes f
ound vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as appli
ed' to a particular defendant.'' Consequently, there is no basis for p etitioner
's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its enti
rety. In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the pu rported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at lengt h by pe
titioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, canno t be c
reated by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critic
s who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provisio n of
the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other p art.
To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrench ed
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, pe
titioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being o ne
of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the la
w was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committee s
by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge
of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. JUDICIAL REVIEW; T
HE SUPREME COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECTIFYING ERRORS OF JU DGMENT. DE LEON v
s. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACT
S: In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled t hat private respondent'
s appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Min
is try of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Maca
rai g, we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service
(CES ) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not po
ssess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointe
d. He nce, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to se
curity of tenure. It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al.,
decide d on September 26, 1990, where the nature of private respondent's appoint
ment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, w
as firs t contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992,
holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private resp
ondent. There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitut
ion or a t the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstitute
d by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. Th
ere was n o CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the D
epartment, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on A
ugust 5 an d 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of
the appoin tment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a firs
t grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the
requirement s for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed
in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due proce
ss. Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his ap
pointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case cons
idering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolut
ion of the Co urt. ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata applies. HELD: NO. Concede
dly, if we follow t he conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conc
lusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of th e R
ules of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private responden t'
s appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final jud g
ment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be f
inally laid to rest. Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own
ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res
judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stre
ssed that this is not the first time in Philippine and American 58 POLITICAL LA
W COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balb
oa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degoll
ado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr
., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabil
ala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze,
Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! jurisprude
nce that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantia
l justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisp rudence.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CIVIL SERVICE; THE CSC HAS J
URISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING ANOMALIES CONNECTED TO CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIO
NS. CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [G.R. No. 144464, November 22,
2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: see page 24 ISSUES: Whether or not the CSC had jurisdic
tion t o hear and decide the complaint against petitioners. HELD: YES. Petitione
rs' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is app licable to instance
s where administrative cases are filed against erring employees in conne ction w
ith their duties and functions of the office. This is, however, not the s cenari
o contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the acts complain ed of
arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Subp rofe
ssional) examination. The examinations were under the direct control and sup erv
ision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government employees ove
r whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the
petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed gui
lty of dishonesty, the penalty meted was dismissal from the office. Section 2 8,
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provid e
s that the CSC can rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomal
ies connected to the examinations, as it reads: SECTION 28. The Commission shall
have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and employees and
over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities.
It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding
that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly in
formed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity
t o defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a de
ni al of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC t
o t ake cognizance of the case. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMELEC; THE COMELEC EXE
RCISES SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER BOARDS OF ELECTION I NSPECTORS AND BOARDS OF
CANVASSERS. O'HARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. Nos. 148941-42, Ma
rch 12, 2002] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Jovita Rodriguez were
candidates fo r the position of vicegovernor, province of Rizal during the May
14, 2001 electi ons. 59 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonja
dinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeann
e Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemi
na Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura
, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On May 19,
2001, upon conclusion of the canvassing of the certificates of canvas s coming
from the thirteen municipalities and one component city of Rizal, the P rovincia
l Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected vi ce-gove
rnor with 216,798 votes over respondent Rodriguez's 215,443 votes. On May 23, 20
01, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Binangonan, Rizal filed wi th the
COMELEC, a petition to correct entries in the certificate of canvass of v otes.
It was alleged that there were typographical errors in the number of votes garn
ered by petitioner and respondent resulting in the addition of 7,000 votes to pe
titioner. The MBC of Binangonan submitted the affidavit of Evelyn Ramirez, the M
unicipal Accountant of Binangonan, Rizal, admitting that she committed the mathe
matical error. On May 25, 2001, respondent Rodriguez filed with the COMELEC a pe
tition to annul the proclamation of the winning candidate for vice-governor of t
he province of Rizal, and to correct alleged manifest mathematical errors. Respo
ndent Rodriguez asserted that after the mathematical error would have been corre
cted, she would obtain a plurality of 215,422 votes as against petitioner's 209,
798. Petitioner filed his answer to the petition, arguing that there was no mani
fest error apparent in the certificate of canvass which respondent Rodrigue z an
d the MBC of Binangonan sought to correct. On July 25, 2001, the COMELEC iss ued
a resolution in the cases, wherein it ordered that petitioners proclamation i s
annulled, the PBC of Rizal to reconvene and correct the manifest mathmatical e r
ror in the votes, and to proclaim respondent as the duly elected Vice-Governor o
f Rizal. Accordingly, on July 27, 2001, the PBC of Rizal reconvened. However, p
etitioner was not notified of the proceedings of the PBC of Rizal. On the same d
ay, the PBC of Rizal issued another certificate of canvass of votes and proclam
a tion of the winning candidates for provincial officers, and on the basis there
of proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected vice-governor of Rizal. Imm
ed iately, respondent Rodriguez took her oath of office before Judge Leila Suare
z A cebo, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City. ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gr
avely abused its discretion when it annulled the pr oclamation of petitioner as
vice-governor of Rizal and by ordering the PBC of Ri zal to reconvene and correc
t the alleged manifest mathematical error supposedly committed by the MBC of Riz
al. HELD: YES. The COMELEC should have conducted further investigation or at lea
st a technical inspection or examination of election returns to verify the exist
ence of the all eged error before it gave credence to the statements of the MBC
of Binangonan an d concluding outright that the Statement of Votes submitted by
respondents were accurate. The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these Statement of
Votes because the y were prepared by the same members of the MBC who claimed to
have made a mistak e due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion."
It would have been more prudent to make a determination whether these same indi
viduals committed a ny other mistake in the tabulation or statement of votes. Ev
en based on the stat ements/affidavits of the MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent
that the errors sough t to be corrected do not appear on the face of the certifi
cate of canvass. As ab ove-stated, the alleged error which the COMELEC perceived
to be manifest does no t fall under the definition of "manifest error" which wa
s laid down in Chavez vs . COMELEC . . . To be manifest, the errors must appear o
n the face of the certifi cates of canvass or election returns sought to be corr
ected and/or objections th ereto must have been made before the board of canvass
ers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. The Co
nstitution gives the Commis sion on Elections the broad power "to enforce and ad
minister all laws and regula tions to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, in
itiative, referendum and reca
ll." The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervision and control
over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The Commission must
do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cas
t in the elections. The Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the st
a tutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad a
nd more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, or
de rly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of
th e people s sacred right of suffrage. 60 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachur
a, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma
. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyc
e Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao,
Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte
, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In the abs
ence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected,
the Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election ret urns or t
he re-counting of the ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in orde r to val
idate the claim of its MBC. If after the re-canvass of the election retu rns or
the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or mathematic al mis
take in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission sho uld h
ave annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificat e of
canvass. If the records had borne out that petitioner's proclamation was th e r
esult of a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of v ot
es and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate, there c o
uld have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a prepr
oclamation controversy. COMMISSION ON AUDIT COA; THE FACT THAT PRIVATE AUDITORS
MAY AUDIT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOES NOT DIVES T COA THE POWER TO AUDIT AND EXAMIN
E THE SAME GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. DEVELOPMENT B ANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISS
ION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002] CARPIO, J: FACTS: In 1986, the P
hilippine Government, under the administration o f then President Corazon C. Aqu
ino, obtained from the World Bank (WB) an Economic Recovery Loan ( ERL) in the a
mount of 310 Million US Dollars. The ERL was intended to support th e recovery o
f the Philippine economy, at the time suffering severely from the fi nancial cri
sis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos regime. As a condi
tion for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine go vernment t
o rehabilitate the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which was then sadd
led with huge non-performing loans. The governments commitment was embo died in t
he Policy Statement of the DBP which, among others, provided that the m entioned
bank will now be required to have a private external auditor. On Novemb er 28,
1986, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Banks M
anual of Regulation for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries. Thus, o n Dece
mber 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1 124 w
hich substantially provides that the requirements for an annual financial au dit
by an external independent auditor shall extend to specialized and unique ba nks
such as the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DBP. On December 12, 1986, p ur
suant to CB Circular No. 1124 and the governments commitment to the WB, DBP Cha i
rman Jesus Estanislao wrote the Commission on Audit (COA) seeking the approval o
f the DBPs engagement of a private external auditor in addition to the COA. On J
anuary 20, 1987, the COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. replied to the December
12, 1986 letter of the DBP Chairman with a statement that the COA will interpose
no objection to your engagement of a private external auditor as required by th
e Economic Recovery Program Loan Agrrement of 1987 provided that the terms for
s aid audit are first reviewed and approved by the Commission. Cosequently, the B
oa rd of Directors of the DBP approve the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as the
DB Ps private external auditor for calendar year 1986. However, a change in the
lead ership of the COA reversed the course of events. On April 27, 1987, the new
COA Chairman, Eufemio Doningo, wrote the CB Governor protesting the issuance of
Circ ular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the COAs constitutional and s
tatuto ry power to audit government agencies. On May 13, 1987, after learning th
at DBP had signed a contract with above-mentioned auditing firm, the new COA Cha
irman w rote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instruct
ion to d isallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were unconsti
tutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the
COA Chai rman a copy of the DBPs contract with Joaquin Cunanan & Co., signed fou
r months e arlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairmans covering hand-written note
sought the
COAs concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of COAs concurrence to the c
ontract, DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the 61 POLITICAL LAW C
OMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa,
Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado
, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr.,
Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala
, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Mar
ia Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! total amou
nt of Php 487,321.14 despite the formers objection to the same. Thereaf ter, the
COA chairman issued a memorandum disallowing the payments. On January 1 9, 1988,
the DBP Chairman moved for a reconsideration of the memorandum issued b y the C
OA which the latter also denied ratiocinating that the said Commission ha s the p
ower, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertain ing t
o the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures of uses of funds and proper typer
taining to the government. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-D, 1987 Philippine Constitution) ISSU
ES: (1) Whether or not the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit
the DBP is exclusive and precludes the concurrent audit of the DBP by a private
exte rnal auditor. (2) Whether or not there is a necessity of hiring a private a
udito r and the reasonableness of their fees. HELD: (1) NO. The resolution of th
e issue herein requires an interpretation of Section 2, Article IXD of the 1987
Constituition, which provides: Sec. 2 (1) The Commiss ion on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and se ttle all accounts pertaini
ng to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and propert
y, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, the G overnment, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or contr
olled corporations with original charters. (2) The Commi ssion shall have the exc
lusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Art icle, to define the sco
pe of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required t
herefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules an d regulations, includi
ng those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessiv
e, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties. The bare language of Section 2 shows that the C OAs power under the fi
rst paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authorit y under the second p
aragraph is declared exclusive. The framers of the Constitutio n, in deleting the
word exclusive in the first paragraph, deemed that the inclusio n of such word wou
ld constitute a disincentive or obstacle to private investment . There are gover
nment institutions with private investments in them, and some o f these investor
s Filipinos, as well as in some cases, foreignersrequire the prese nce of private
auditing firms, not exclusively but concurrently. The qualifying word exclusive in
the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph whic
h is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is inten ded to refer o
nly to the phrase to which it is immediately associated. Thus, the first paragra
ph of Section 2 must be read the way it appears, without the word e xclusive, sign
ifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Bes
ides, the framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the wor d exclusive in
the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audi t by privat
e external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from the r eading of
the entire Section 2 is that the COAs power to examine and audit is non -exclusiv
e. On the other hand, the COAs authority to define the scope of its audi t, promu
lgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditu res is
exclusive. Further, the mere fact that private auditors may audit governm ent ag
encies does not divest COA of its power to examine and audit the same gove rnmen
t agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a priv ate
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its fi ndi
ngs and conclusions will still bind the government agencies and its officials .
A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or asset s
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. (2) YES. The hiring of a private a
uditor being an express condition for the grant of the US $ 310 Million Economic
Recovery Loan, a major objective of which was DBPs rehabilitation, the same was
a necessary corporate act on the part of the DBP. The national government, repre
sented by the Central Bank Governor, as well as the Ministers of Finance, Trade,
and Economic Planning, had already committed to the hiring by all government ba
nks for private auditors in addition to the COA. For the DBP to refuse to hire
a private auditor would have aborted the vital loan and derailed the national ec
o nomic recovery, resulting in grave consequences to the entire nation. The hiri
ng of a private auditor was not only necessary based 62 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE:
Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Ca
hig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder D
elloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan
Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennife
r Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taa
l, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! on the gov
ernments loan covenant with the World Bank, it was also necessary becau se it was
mandated by Central Bank No. 1124 under pain administrative and penal sanctions
. The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being a condition of the l oan, the
fees of such private auditors are in reality part of the governments cos t of bo
rrowing from the World Bank. An annual private audit fee of about half a million
pesos added to the interest on a US $310 Million loan would hardly make the cos
t of borrowing excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. Besides, the con dition
imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk, requiring the borrower to su bmit
to audit by an independent public accountant, is a reasonable and normal bu sine
ss practice. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS SANDIGANBAYAN SANDIGANBAYAN; THE
LIFTING OF THE WRITS OF SEQUESTRATION DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SEQUESTERED PROPERT
Y ARE NOT ILLGOTTEN. PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. Nos. 119609-10, Septem
ber 21, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS: On August 28, 1990, PCGG sent Corporate Secretary
Victor A. Afr ica of Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated Augu
st 3, 1990, directing him to s end notices to all stockholders of record of OWNI
for special stockholders meet ing. On September 17, 1990, during the special st
ockholders meeting of OWNI, PC GG voted all the Class "A" shares in the election
of directors and elected to th e board of directors Commissioners Maceren, Parl
ade and Gutierrez representing t he Class "A" shares and Brooker and Miller repr
esenting Class "B" and "C" shares . None of the registered Class "A" shareholder
s of OWNI was present in that, spe cial stockholders meeting. PCGG sequestered t
he Class "A" shareholding about 60% of the outstanding capital stock, and PCGG v
oted all the Class "A" shares. On O ctober 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa w
rote the SEC questioning the electio n of PCGG nominees as directors of the OWNI
board on the ground that they were n ot stockholders of OWNI. On January 27, 19
91, the special stockholders meeting of OWNI took place. Stockholders owning 63,
573 Class "A" shares were represented . An election of directors for Class "A" s
hares was held. Nieto, Jr., J. Africa and A. Africa were elected as directors fo
r Class "A" shares for 1991 until thei r successors are elected and qualified. C
lass "B" and "C" shareholders did not a ttend the meeting. No new directors for
them were elected. On July 29, 1991, PCG G, acting for itself and in behalf of O
WNI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a compl aint for injunction with damages again
st V. Africa, J. Africa, Nieto, Jr. and Oc ampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the defen
dants from interfering with PCGG s manageme nt of OWNI and/or representing thems
elves as director. ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG s takeover of OWNI is legal. H
ELD: NO. In PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr., the Court ruled that who should vote the sequ
estered shares requires the determination of the ill-gotten character of those s
hares an d consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The issue was still pend
ing in th e main case in the Sandiganbayan. This is only an incident of the main
case and is limited to the stockholders meeting held on September 17, 1990. Thi
s is with out prejudice to the final disposition of the merits of the main suit.
The owner ship of the shares is still under litigation. It is not known whether
the shares are part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his
"cronies." We find the writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid beca
use the sui t in Civil Case No. 0009 against Nieto, Jr. and J. Africa as shareho
lders in OWN I is not a suit against 63 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, A
lexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cr
istina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio
, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raj
i Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim
ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios
a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! OWNI. This
Court has held that "failure to implead these corporations as defenda nts and m
erely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a viola tion of
their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct
and separate personality without a hearing.'' Furthermore, PCGG issued the writ
s of sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the period set by the Con
stitution. Article XVIII, Section 26, of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 2
6.The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamati on No.
3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth s hall r
emain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification o f thi
s Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the Pres iden
t, the Congress may extend said period. "A sequestration or freeze order sha ll
be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the prop er
court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the co r
responding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from i
ts ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action o
r proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. "T
he sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial a
ction or proceeding is commenced as herein provided." The sequestration orders
i ssued against respondents shall be deemed automatically lifted due to the fail
ur e of PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the respondent
s t herein within the period prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987
Con stitution. The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not necessarily b
e fat al to the main case since the lifting of the subject orders does not ipso
facto mean that the sequestered property are not illgotten. The effect of the li
fting of the sequestration against OWNI will merely be the termination of the ro
le of the government as conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no lon
ger ex ercise administrative or housekeeping powers and its nominees may no long
er vote the sequestered shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of t
he subj ect firm. SANDIGANBAYAN; WHEN FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN NOT
CONCLUSIVE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT; THE ACQUISITION COST OF THE PROPERTY SHALL
BE THE BASIS FOR ASCERTAINING THE VALUE THEREOF. REPUBLIC OF THE PHLILPPINES vs
. SANDIGANBAYAN, e t al. [G.R. No. 102508, January 30, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C.J: F
ACTS: Private respondent Jolly R. Bugarin, a government offic ial during the Mar
cos regime, is now being pursued by the petitioner to recover the alleged unexpl
ained wealth amassed by the former. In a petition filed by the Republic, represe
nted by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), with the Sandigan
bayan on Aug ust 3, 1987, it averred that respondent Bugarin acquired during his
incumbency a s Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), real and
personal prop erties whose aggregate fair market value at the time of their acq
uisition was P6 ,313,632.56. Allegedly, those properties were manifestly in exce
ss or out of pro portion to his salaries, allowances, and other emoluments from
July 1, 1967 to m arch 15, 1986 totaling P743,243.65 only. In the respondents ans
wer, he claimed th at some of the properties enumerated were acquired by him and
his wife before he became the Director of NBI. The acquisition cost of the prop
erties he acquired during his incumbency was P2,793,141.26 only. He likewise all
eged that apart fro m his salary as NBI Director for the entire period of his se
rvice, he also recei ved allowances from the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), the Na
tional Police Commiss ion, the Central Bank, and the Law Firm of San Juan, Afric
a, Gonzales, and San A gustin. He also derived substantial income from the inves
tment and properties he and his wife acquired before he became the Director of N
BI. Based on the findin
gs of the Sandiganbayan, the said Tribunal dismissed the petition for forfeiture
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 64 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Na
chura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr.
, Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro,
Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangunda
yao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobrem
onte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joesh
ias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ISSUES: (1
) Whether or not respondents professional fees outside NBI should form part of hi
s lawful income. (2) Whether or not respondents properties are manifestly out o f
proportion to his lawful income. HELD: (1) YES. The respondents professional fee
s outside the NBI should form part of hi s lawful income. Before resolving the i
ssues herein involved, it must be kept in mind that the Supreme Court is not a t
rier of facts. It is not the Courts functi on to examine and weigh all over again
the evidence presented in the proceedings . While the petitioner concedes that
the Sandiganbayans findings of facts are con clusive upon this Court, it invokes
the exception laid down in Dischoso vs. Cour t of Appeals, to wit: 1.) when the
conclusion is a finding entirely grounded spe cultion, surmise, and conjecture;
2.) when the inference made is manifestly absu rd, mistaken, or impossible; 3.) .
; 4.) when the judgment is premised on a misapp rehension of facts. A plain read
ing of the Sandiganbayans ruling exposed manifest errors prompting the Court to d
elve upon the factual matters of the case. Respo ndent was engaged as a consulta
nt on handwriting, document evaluation, ballistics , fingerprinting and other spe
cialized projects. He claimed that he rendered his services as such outside of of
fice hours. He was given permission by his superio r to act as consultant, but h
e could not find among his files written permission allegedly given to him in 19
67. At any rate, he did not conceal his consultancy services and the correspondi
ng fees he received: in fact, he stated them in the Statement of Assets and Liab
ilities he submitted to the office of the Secretary of Justice, as well as in hi
s ITR. Even assuming that he had no prior written a uthority to act as a consult
ant of private entity, respondents violation of the r ule lack of prior permissio
n was a technical one. At most, it would subject him to administrative penalty p
rovided in the Civil Service rules had the proper cha rge been filed against him
. Such violation did not amount to a crime or graft an d corrupt practice as def
ined by law. Hence, we are of the opinion that his prof essional fees should be
included in the computation of his lawful income. In asc ertaining the value of
respondents properties and shareholdings, it is not the fa ir market value, as cl
aimed by the petitioner that should be made the basis ther eof, rather, as corre
ctly held by the Sandiganbayan, it is the acquisition cost thereof, since it is
the actual amount of money shelled out by respondent in acq uiring them. It is t
he acquisition cost that must be charged against respondents lawful income and fu
nds. Neither can we sustain petitioners bare allegation that the cost or consider
ation of the subject properties stated in the contracts were understated for tax
evasion purposes. Absent any evidence to support it, such c laim deserves a sho
rt shrift for being merely speculative or conjectural. (2) YE S. In resolving th
e second issue, it would be noteworthy to have a reference on Section 2 of R. A.
No. 1379 which provides that whenever any public officer or e mployee has acqui
red during his incumbency property which is manifestly out of p roportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawf ul income and i
ncome from legitimately acquired property, the said property shal l be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. From the summary of Bugarins assets
, it can readily be seen that all of his real properties were purc hased or cons
tructed as the case may be from 1968 to 1980. The total acquisition cost thereof
was P1,705,583. With the exception of those that had been liquidat ed, those ac
quired from 1981 onward, and those whose year of acquisition could n ot be deter
mined, his shareholdings in various corporations and other investment s amounted
to P464,580. Hence, for the period from 1968 to 1980, he amassed weal th in the
amount of P2,170,163. On the other hand, his total income from 1967 to 1980 amo
unted only to P766,548. Premises considered, respondents properties acqu ired fro
m 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his lawful income for the said pe
riod should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the r
espondent to show to the Courts satisfaction that the same were lawfully acquired
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SANDIGANBA
YAN; THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL E XCEPT WHE
N HE IS CHARGED AS COPRINCIPAL, ACCOMPLICE OR ACCESSORY OF A PUBLIC OFF ICER. MA
CALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. Nos. 140199-200, February 6,2002] PARDO, J: FACTS
: Petitioner Felicito S. Macalino was the Assistant Manager of th e Treasury Div
ision and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philip
pines National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporat
ion. O n September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, wi
th the approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations
against the petitioner and his spouse Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa
through falsification of official documents and frustrated estafa through falsif
ication of mercantile documents. During the initial presentation of evidence for
the de fense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the gro
und that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public
officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), former
ly Const ruction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
governme nt-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. The Sandigan
bayan deni ed petitioners motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganba
yan has jurisdiction over the petitioner. HE LD: NO. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no
original charter as it was incorporated unde r the general law on corporations,
it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a publ ic officer within the cover
age of RA 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan h as no jurisdiction over hi
m. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisd iction over a private ind
ividual is when the complaint charges him either as a c o-principal, accomplice,
or accessory of a public officer who has been charged w ith a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The cases cited by res pondent People of the
Philippines are inapplicable because they were decided und er the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution which included as public officers, of ficials and employee
s of corporations owned and controlled by the government thr ough organized and
existing under the general corporation law. The 1987 Constitu tion excluded such
corporations. The crime charged against petitioner was commit ted in 1989 and 1
990. The criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-s ettled that the j
urisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by t he law in force
at the institution of the action. OMBUDSMAN OMBUDSMAN; THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE
AND TO PROSECUTE GRANTED BY LAW TO THE OMBUD SMAN IS PLENARY AND UNQUALIFIED. OF
FICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. RUBEN ENOC, et al. [G.R. Nos. 145957-68, January 25, 2
002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: Respondents herein were employed at the Office of the So
uther n Cultural Comminities (OSCC), Davao Del Sur, Provincial Office, Digos, Da
vao del Sur with below grade 27. They were charged with 11 counts of malversatio
n through falsifi cation, based on the alleged purchases of medicine and food as
sistance for cultu ral community members, and 1 count of violation of R.A. 3019
in connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without bidding/canvas
s. As none of the r espondents has the rank required under R.A. 8249 to be tried
66 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos
, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzma
n, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob,
Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Reju
so, Aim
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! for the sa
id crimes in the Sandiganbayan, the informations were filed by the Omb udsman in
RTC of Digos (Branch 19). Thereafter, the respondents moved to for the quashal
of the case before the RTC averring , as in the case of Uy vs. Sandigan bayan, t
hat the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling with in the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The said motion was granted by the lo wer co
urt. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to prosecute and investig
ate c ases cognizable by the regular courts. HELD: YES. The power to investigate
and prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsma n is plenary and unqualified. It p
ertains to any act or omission of any public office r or employee when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The law doe
s not make any distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and tho
se cognizable by regular courts. It has been held th at the clause any illegal ac
t or omission of any public official is broad enough t o embrace any crime commit
ted by a public officer or employee. The reference mad e by R.A. 6770 to cases c
ognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsm
an primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sa ndiganbayan, and Section
11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to cond uct preliminary investi
gation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdicti on of the Sandiganbaya
n, should not be construed as confining the scope of the i nvestigatory and pros
ecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Section 15 of R.A. 6770 give the O
mbudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The la
w defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombu dsman to take over, a
t any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government , the investigation
of such cases. The grant of this authority does not necessari ly imply the exclu
sion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cogn
izable by other courts. The exercise of the Ombudsman of his p rimary jurisdicti
on over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatib le with the disc
harge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses co mmitted by publ
ic officers and employees. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Offi ce of the Ombu
dsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Spec ial Prosecuto
r under Section 11 of R.A. 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecut or is merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under t he supervis
ion and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to con duct preli
minary investigation and to prosecute criminal cases is within the jur isdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all c omplaint
s against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administ
rative, civil, and criminal liability in every case where the evidence w arrants
. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the perosonnel of his of
fice and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the gover nment
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in investig ation
and prosecution of certain cases. The law likewise allows him to direct th e Sp
eciall Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in a
ccordance with Section 11(4c) of R.A. 6770. OMBUDSMAN; THE OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBJ
ECT AN ACCUSED TO THE EXPENSE, RIGORS AND EM BARRASSMENT OF TRIAL ARBITRARILY. C
ABAHUG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. [G.R. NO. 132816, February 5, 2002]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: A negotiated contract was entered into by the Depart
m ent of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), represented by petitioner Susana
B. Cabahug, by virtue of her pos
ition as Department of Education, Culture and Sports Director for Region XI, for
the purchase of 46,000 units of topaz Monobloc Armchairs from Rubber worth Indu
stries Corporation (RWIC), at P495 per unit. The negotiated contract was approv
e d by Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of the DECS. Before the consummation of
t he contract, another DECS supplier, Jesusa T. dela Cruz wrote to Secretary Gl
ori a objecting to the said contract for the reason that the chairs were 67 POLI
TICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nni
fer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et he
l Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o
Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! patently o
verpriced. The letter was referred to Antonio E.B. Nachura, DECS Under secretary
for Legal Affairs, who after requiring petitioner Cabahug to comment o n said l
etter, resolved to give due course to the transaction. Consequently, a c omplain
t was filed by dela Cruz before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, aga inst p
etitioner Cabahug, Secretary Gloria, and Undersecretary Nachura. The Offic e of
the Ombudsman through Jovito Coresis, Jr., issued a Resolution finding prob able
cause and recommending the filing of Information with the Sandiganbayan by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor and the dismissal of the case against Secre tar
y Gloria and Undersecretary Nachura. Unaware of the Information filed before the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Offi ce
of the Special Prosecutor. After learning of the filing of the Information wi t
h the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. Petitioner p
rayed that the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Office of the Specia
l Prosecutor be admitted by the graft court as her Motion for Reinvestigation. T
he Third Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion for Reconsideration.
A ccordingly, the case was evaluated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Ci
ce ro D. Jurado, Jr., Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II assigned to review th
e c ase, recommended dismissal of the case, there being no showing that petition
er a cted in bad faith or with gross negligence. While Special Prosecutor Leonar
do P. Tamayo and his Deputy Robert E. Kallos, concurred in the findings, Ombudsm
an An iano Disierto did not agree. Noting that bad faith and/or gross inexcusabl
e negl igence is deducible from the acts of the accused, Ombudsman Disierto orde
red pro secution to proceed. To this petitioner filed a Motion for Re-determinat
ion of E xistence of Probable Cause. This motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan
and trea ted the same as a second Motion for Reconsideration which is not allow
ed by the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsiderat
ion arguin g therein that the said motion cannot be considered a second motion f
or reconsid eration since it was addressed to the court, and not anymore to the
Office of th e Special Prosecutor or the Ombudsman. The motion was denied and so
was the subs equent Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or n
ot the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. HEL D: YES. While it i
s the function of the Ombudsman to determine whether or not th e petitioner shou
ld be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial , he cannot do
so arbitrarily. When at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie ca
se or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient be lief as to th
e guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from i
nflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial. There is nothing in
the records that show Cabahug acted in bad faith or even with gros s inexcusabl
e negligence. In the absence of bad faith, she cannot be held liable for violati
on of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. Judicial power of review includes the
determination of whether there was grave abuse of discretion amount ing to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentali ty of the
government [Section 1(2) Article VIII 1987 Constitution]. Under this d efinition
, the Sandiganbayan should have, considering the divergent positions in the Offi
ce of the Ombudsman, granted the motion for redetermination of probable cause af
ter reviewing the evidence thus far submitted, and dismissed the case a gainst p
etitioner. Thus, respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowin
g the case to proceed. OMBUDSMAN; THE OMBUDSMAN CAN ONLY RECOMMEND REMOVAL OF A
PUBLIC OFFICIAL FOUND T O BE AT FAULT. RENATO A. TAPIADOR vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBU
DSMAN, et al. [G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002] THE

Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman
, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, J
uanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejus
o, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita,
Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! DE LEON, J
R., J: FACTS: On 4 July 1994, Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen, lodged a complaint
-affidavit with the Resident Ombudsman at the main office in Manila of the Burea
u of Immigration and Deportation against petitioner Renato A. Tapiador, BID Spec
ial Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then A
ssociate Commissione r Bayani M. Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance
that petitioner Tapia dor demanded and received from Walter Beck the amount of T
en Thousand Pesos (P10 ,000.00) in exchange for the issuance of an alien certifi
cate of registration (A CR) which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the
petitioner despite repea ted demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additiona
l amount of Seven Thousan d Pesos (P7,000.00). Accompanying the complaint was th
e affidavit executed by a certain Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks t
o corroborate the alleged payment of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.0
0) by Walter Beck and his wife to the petitioner in consideration for the issuan
ce of the subject ACR. Aft er investigation, BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. L
edesma found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service rules an
d regulations as well as pe nal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and adm
inistrative charges be filed against the petitioner. Upon review of the case, th
e criminal charge was dismis sed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence; however,
the Ombudsman found the peti tioner liable for grave misconduct in the administ
rative aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the governme
nt service. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for grave misconduct
in the admin istrative case against him. HELD: NO. A thorough review of the reco
rds, however, showed that the subject aff idavits of Beck and Terencio were not
even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation
conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID o ffice in Manila. Neither d
id they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective
sworn statements despite prior notice before the inve stigating officer who sub
sequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upo n finding that the charg
e against the petitioner "was not supported by any evide nce". Hence, Beck's aff
idavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this b asis alone, the Admini
strative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsma n should have dismiss
ed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in t he first instance. N
onetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Be ck does not categor
ically state that it was petitioner Tapiador who personally d emanded from Beck
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in consideration for the issuance
of the latter's ACR. On the other hand, it appears that Walter Beck and his wife
sought the assistance of Purisima Terencio sometime in the la ter part of 1992
in facilitating the issuance of his ACR and in the process, Ter encio allegedly
informed the couple that Beck could be granted the same and woul d be allowed to
stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of the petitio ner and a cert
ain Mr. Angeles who was also with the BID, for a fee of Ten Thousa nd Pesos (P10
,000.00). Hence, Beck and his wife did not appear to have any direc t or persona
l knowledge of the alleged demand of the petitioner except through t he informat
ion allegedly relayed to them by Terencio. Likewise, although Beck cl aimed to h
ave subsequently paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), his affidavit i s silent
as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of provi ng, by s
ubstantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evide nce doe
s not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an o rdinar
y civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind mi ght a
ccept as adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant clearly failed t
o present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the charge in the subject admi
nistrative case, that is, with substantial evidence. Besides, assuming arguendo
, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority t
o directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly
from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the
public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concer
n ed. 69 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abar
entos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de
Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Ja
cob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo
Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy
Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflo
r.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! OMBUDSMAN;
APPEALS FROM THE ORDERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN ARE COGNIZABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
. SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN [G.R. No. 149148, April 5, 2002
] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was originally the administ
ra tor of the estate of his mother Remedios Bermejo Villaruz. However, in an ord
er issued by the trial court , he was removed as such for patent neglect of his
legal duties and failure to c omply with the court orders. In his place, respond
ent's eldest brother, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., was appointed regular administra
tor and was required to file a bond. Thereafter, Nicolas filed a motion for the
approval of his bond. Santiago and his brother, Jose Ma. Villaruz, opposed Nicol
as' motion and prayed that Jos e Maria be instead appointed regular administrato
r. Attached to their opposition was a certification executed by their mother Rem
edios before she passed away. S ubsequently, Judge Patricio denied the oppositor
s' opposition, while recognizing the validity of the certification executed by R
emedios BermejoVillaruz. On Octo ber 12, 1998, Judge Sergio Pestao, to whom the c
ase was in the meantime reassigne d, approved the administrator's bond of respon
dent Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. Afte r receiving a copy of Judge Pestao's order, re
spondent Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of Ro
xas City, prepared a Letter of Admi nistration (LOA). On December 7, 1998, admin
istrator Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., a ccompanied by three armed security guards a
nd respondent's Deputy Sheriff Charle s Aguiling, took possession of the entire
estate of the decedent. This gave rise to the present action. In a letter-compla
int to the Ombudsman, respondent Santi ago B. Villaruz alleged that petitioner c
ommitted two crimes in issuing the LOA, to wit: 1) falsification by a public off
icer under Article 171 of the Revised P enal Code and 2) Corrupt practice in vio
lation of 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corr upt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). Resp
ondent accused petitioner of acting "with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and gross inexcusable negligence" by fal sely attributing to Judge Pestao the ap
pointment of Nicolas B. Villaruz as new ad ministrator and investing him with "f
ull authority to take possession of all pro perty/ies" of the decedent, because
the fact was that it was Judge Patricio who had appointed Nicolas administrator
of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari in this case sh
ould have been filed in the Court of Appeals. HELD: NO. In Tirol, Jr. v. del Ros
ario, it is held that although as a consequenc e of the decision in Fabian v. De
sierto, appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in ad
ministrative cases are now cognizable by the Court of Appeals, ne vertheless in
cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with gra ve abuse of d
iscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special ci vil action o
f certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed in the Court to set aside th e Ombudsman
's order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto it is again held that t he Court h
as jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. In Posadas v. Ombuds man, "the
rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. Bu t as has
been held, infinitely more important than conventional adherence to gen eral ru
les of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free n ot onl
y from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexat ious
prosecution." Indeed, while the Court's policy is one of non-interference i n th
e conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers with
a latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, nonetheles s e
xceptions to the general rule have been recognized, to wit: 1. When necessary
to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2. W

hen necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression o
r multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub
judice; 70 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel A
flor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! 4. When th
e acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosec
ution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy
is clearly apparent; 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the o ffense; 8
. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9. Where t he charg
es are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. 10. Whe n there
is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash o n that
ground has been denied. OMBUDSMAN; THE COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE DISCR
ETION OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE EXCEPT WHEN THE CONSTITUTION
AL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED ARE IMPAIRED. MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VA
SQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: see pag
e 25 ISSUE: Whether or not the case warrants t he intervention of the court. HEL
D: YES. It appears that the charge against resp ondents was previously dismissed
. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complai
nant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of mo
tions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the
dismis sal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not
be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating
their r ight to due process. Ordinarily, the courts will not interfere with the
discreti on of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground
to belie ve that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably gu
ilty there of and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the ap
propriate c ourts. However, the case at bar falls under one of the recognized ex
ceptions to this rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accus
ed are impai red and the charges are manifestly false. In cases where the Ombuds
man and the S pecial Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not probable
cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and conclusions. The power to i
nvestigate off enses of this nature belongs to the Ombudsman and the Special Pro
secutor. While the Ombudsman may have erred in disregarding the recommendations
of the Special Prosecution Officers which appear to be substantiated by the reco
rd, he should b e allowed an opportunity to review his decision and, where neces
sary, correct it . Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due
process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them witho
ut their knowledg e. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be giv
en an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself
in person at ever y stage of the proceedings. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 71 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Rago
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! EXHAUSTION
OF REMEDIES; WHERE THE CASE INVOLVES ONLY LEGAL QUESTIONS, THE LITIGA NT NEED N
OT EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SUCH JUDICIAL RELIEF CAN BE SOUGHT
. CASTRO vs. SECRETARY RICARDO T. GLORIA [G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001] SAND
OVAL-GUTIEREZ, J: FACTS: Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of E duc
ation, Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct
against petitioner Gualbe rto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School, B
arili, Cebu. It was alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutang's wife, pe
titioner's co-teacher at th e same school. After hearing or on August 28, 1984,
the DECS Regional Office VII , through Assistant Superintendent Francisco B. Con
cillo, rendered a decision de claring petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
He was meted the penalty of di smissal from the service. 3 The DECS Central Offi
ce affirmed Concillo's decision in an Indorsement dated March 25, 1986. After hi
s motion for reconsideration an d subsequent appeal to the Central DECS office w
ere denied, petitioner filed a p etition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Co
urt, imploring that judgment be r endered ordering respondent Secretary or anyon
e who may have assumed the duties and functions of his office (1) to reduce his
penalty from dismissal to one (1) year suspension; 2) to consider the one (1) ye
ar suspension as already served co nsidering that he has been out of the service
for more than ten (10) years; 3) t o reinstate him to his former position; and
4) to pay his back salaries. On Nove mber 20, 1997, the trial court rendered the
herein assailed decision dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustio
n of administrative remedies. It rule d that petitioner should have appealed to
the Civil Service Commission before co ming to court. Petitioner insists that, "
when the question to be settled is pure ly a question of law, he may go directly
to the proper court so that he can have proper redress." For its part, the Offi
ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) conten ds that petitioner's adequate remedy wa
s to appeal the decision of respondent Se cretary to the Civil Service Commissio
n. ISSUE: Whether or not the following is a question of law Is dismissal from th
e s ervice the proper penalty for the 1st offense of disgraceful and immoral con
duct? HELD: YES. In the case at bench, petitioner no longer disputes the adminis
trativ e finding of his guilt for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct
. It is settled and final insofar as he is concerned. What petitioner only impug
ns is the correctnes s of the penalty of "dismissal from the service." He is con
vinced that the prope r penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct is only suspe nsion from the service. Undoubtedly, the issue here is a
pure question of law. W e need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we
will be able to determi ne whether the penalty of dismissal is in order. As cor
rectly pointed out by pet itioner, the proper penalty for the 1st offense of dis
graceful and immoral condu ct is only suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. In fac t, this has been the consistent ruling of this Court
. In Aquino v. Navarro, a se condary guidance counselor in a public high school,
was merely suspended for dis graceful and immoral conduct. In Burgos v. Aquino,
the Court suspended a court s tenographer for six months for maintaining illici
t relations with the complainan t's husband and for perjury in not disclosing in
her personal information sheet she has a daughter as a result of that relations
hip. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES; THE PURPOSE OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS TO
GIVE THE COMELEC AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THE ERROR IMPUTED TO IT. BERNARDO vs
. ABA LOS
[G.R. No. 137266, December 5. 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: 72 POLITICAL LAW COMM

ITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Av
ito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, A
lder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jon
athan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, J
ennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria
Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FACTS: On
April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, J r. and Je
sus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents Be n
jamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta a
nd Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a),
(b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Re
public Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case
No. 98-110, alleged that: Respondents sponsored, arranged and conducted an all-ex
pense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City publ
i c school teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Re
so rt, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wh
ere in he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City public school teachers and e
mplo yees a hazard pay of P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from P1,500.0
0 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the
end of the month. The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who ar
e mem bers of the Board of Election Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registere
d vote rs thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to induce or unduly
influe nce the said teachers and the public in general (the other guests) to vo
te for t he candidacy of Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr. On December 1, 1998, the COMEL
EC En Ban c issued the assailed Resolution No. 983208 dismissing the complaint "
for insuff iciency of evidence to establish prima facie case." On February 09, 1
999, petiti oners, without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed
the instant petition with this Court. ISSUES: Whether petitioners failure to subm
it a motion for reconsideration was fa tal to his cause of action. HELD: YES. Pe
titioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC leve
l. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En
Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of P
rocedure, Petitioners failure to file the required motion for reconsiderati on u
tterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expe
ditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and pr oce
eding brought before the Commission." Contrary to petitioners statement that a r
esort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the
purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the
error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a moti on
for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse .
But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commit s
a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a p
etition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rul
es of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if "there is no appea
l, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Ha
ving failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Re
solution, petitioners instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, t
hey have not raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Cour
t . JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS JUDICIAL REVIEW; FINDINGS OF FAC
T OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY MUST BE RESPECTED BUT THE SAME SHOULD BE SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. OFELIA D. ARTUZ vs. CO URT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No
. 142444, September 13, 2001]
BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Private respondent Rene A. Bornales, Legal Aide, Regional

Health Office No. VI (RHO VI),0 filed against petitioner Ofelia D. Artuz, then L
egal Officer IV, RHO VI, DOH, for Estafa or Swindling through Falsification of P
ublic Documents and/o r Falsification of Public Documents. 73 POLITICAL LAW COMM
ITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Av
ito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, A
lder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jon
athan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, J
ennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria
Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In view pe
rhaps of the delay, private respondent Bornales went to the Merit Syst em Protec
tion Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which took cogn izance o
f the Letter-Complaint and directed Regional Office to conduct the neces sary in
vestigation, and to submit its report and recommendation. Thereafter, on 28 May
1993 the MSPB formally charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Falsificati on of
Public Documents. In her answer dated 20 July 1993 petitioner Artuz veheme ntly
denied the charges against her, contending that they were "malicious, fabri cate
d and pure harassment." She maintained that the charges had no factual and l ega
l basis as she had regularly reported to office and performed her duties as L eg
al Officer IV during the period in question, as shown by her Daily Time Record s
(DTRs) for July and August 1991, which were duly verified by the Personnel Sec
tion and finally approved by the Director of RHO VI. Moreover, she asserted that
her Punch Cards for those months would tally with her DTRs and further confirm
the regularity of her office attendance. According to her, their office was impl
ementing the Bundy clock system, and there was no office memorandum or circular
requiring the use of the Logbook. Subsequently, petitioner received copy of CSC
Resolution No. 981650 finding her guilty of dishonesty and falsification of pub
l ic documents and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service in
cl uding all its accessory penalties. According to the CSC substantial evidence e
sta blishes the fact that respondent falsified entries in her DTRs for the month
s of July and August 1991 to enable her to claim her salaries in full. It is, th
eref ore, clear that she benefited from said deliberate acts of falsification. "
In fa lsification or forgery, the person or persons who are or were in possessio
n of, or made use of, or benefited from the forged or falsified documents are le
gally presumed to be forgers." ISSUE: Whether or not the Logbook is the best evi
dence to prove the attendance o f any employee as against the DTRs. HELD: NO. Th
e CSC and the CA proceeded in disposing of this case on a wrong prem ise. Both a
ssumed that the Logbook alone would be the best evidence of an employee's attend
ance in his office. This assumption is erroneous and baseless. Ordinarily, the L
ogbook is used as a mere locator for those employees who now and then are requir
ed to render service or sent on official business outside the office premi ses,
or to record events or unusual happenings in the office, unless otherwise s peci
fied or required in an office memorandum or circular. Just to illustrate the fal
lacy of this assumption and the unreliability of the Logbook as piece of evi den
ce: RHO VI sits in Iloilo City. It comprises the Provinces of Aklan, Antique, Ca
piz, Guimaras, Negros Occidental and the Cities of Iloilo, Bacolod, Roxas, Si la
y, etc. If an employee of RHO VI is sent on an official business to Bacolod Ci t
y and takes the regular trip by boat that leaves Iloilo City at 6:00 o'clock in
the morning, arriving at the pier of Bacolod City at 8:00 o'clock, he does not h
ave to go to the regional office before departure time to sign the Logbook. Sim
ilarly, when he leaves Bacolod City after office hours at 6:00 o'clock in the af
ternoon and arrives in Iloilo at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he does not have
t o pass the office to sign the Logbook, as it would be impractical, unreasonabl
e and absurd! In such case, the office can only rely on his DTR which is not onl
y certified correct by him but also by his chief of office. Findings of fact of
an administrative agency must be respected and this Court should not be tasked t
o weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body. However
, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial
ev idence. We are not convinced that the non-signing in the Logbook by petitione
r A rtuz alone is substantial evidence considering that we have clearly shown in
the above discussion that it is not "the best evidence to prove attendance of a
n em
ployee," unlike the questioned DTRs that were duly certified by the employee con
cerned, verified by his immediate supervisor, and authenticated by the head of
t he regional office. JUDICIAL REVIEW; WHERE THE LAW PROVIDES FOR AN APPEAL FROM
THE ADMINISTRATIVE BO DIES TO THE SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS, SUCH BODIE
S ARE CO-EQUAL WITH THE RTCS. PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION, et al. vs. CAGAYAN
ELECTRIC POWER and LIGH T CO., INC. [G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002] 74 POLITIC
AL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer
Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel D
egollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Li
m, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee
Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a
Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! SANDOVAL-G
UTIERREZ, J: FACTS: Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum issued by Preside nt Aquino
, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legis
lative franch ise to distribute electric power to the municipalities of Villanue
va, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of
Misamis Orient al, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entit
led "In Re: Pet ition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power
Sector". The pet ition sought the "discontinuation of all existing direct supply
of power by the National Power Corporation (NPC) within CEPALCO's franchise are
a." After hearing , the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition, and decla
ring that the peti tioner has been proven to be capable of distributing power to
its industrial con sumers and having passed the secondary considerations with a
passing mark of 85 and that all direct connection of industries to NPC within t
he franchise area of CEPALCO is no longer necessary. Therefore, all existing NPC
direct supply of po wer to industrial consumers within the franchise area of CE
PALCO is hereby order ed to be discontinued. The decision became final and execu
tory. To implement the decision, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PS
C), petitioner, and ad vised the latter of its desire "to have the power supply
of PSC, directly taken from NPC, disconnected, cut and transferred" to CEPALCO.
PSC refused CEPALCO's r equest, citing its contract for power supply with NPC ef
fective until July 26, 1 996. To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC
and PIA filed a complain t for injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Tri
al Court of Cagayan de Oro City. On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered jud
gment in favor of PSC and PIA. CEPALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but wa
s denied by the trial cour t in its order dated December 13, 1994. Aggrieved, CE
PALCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petition
and dissolved the injuncti on. ISSUE: Whether or not an injunction ordered by t
he trial court can lie against t he final judgment of the ERB. HELD: NO. "The ru
le indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judg ment has gained
finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execu tion.
No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrai n suc
h execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, whe n fa
cts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitabl e o
r unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its executio n
or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties c
an warrant an injunctive relief." Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and e x
ecutory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circu
mstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a cha
nge in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as
shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decisio
n of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality
of judgments. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated shou
l d not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes t
ha t what had already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of th
is principle does not commend itself to sound public policy. Corollarily, Sectio
n 1 0 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a revi
ew o f its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the ru
le th at where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrati
ve bod ies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodi
es are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and
logica lly, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being coequal wi
th the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing
that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administra
tive bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of j
u stice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be ope
ne d, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. LAW OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS 75 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel
Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo
de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andr
e Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, C
haro Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan
Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Vill
aflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! DE FACTO O
FFICERS DE FACTO OFFICERS; A DE FACTO OFFICER TAKES THE SALARIES AT HIS RISK. TH
E GENERA L MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) and RAMON ANINO vs. JULIETA
MONSERAT E [G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: Juli
eta Monserate, respondent, started her governm ent service in 1977 as Bookkeeper
II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year lat er, she w
as promoted to the position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer ( SG-16) i
n 1980. In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganizati on, res
pondent applied for the permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the R esourc
e Management Division, same office. The Comparative Data Sheet 4 accomplis hed b
y the PPA Reorganization Task Force showed that respondent was ranked #1 in the
eligibility. On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of th
e PPA, appointed respondent to the position of Manager II (Resource Managem ent
Division). On even date, respondent assumed office and discharged the functi ons
thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Dir ec
tor of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved her appointment. Meanwhile ,
on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per
the Comparative Data filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, prote
sting against respondent's appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution d
ated August 11, 1988, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondent
' s appointment based on "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2) CSC MC NO. 10,
s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service Eligibility." These groun
ds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution. Aggrieved, respondent file
d with the PPA General Manager an appeal/request for clarification dated Novembe
r 2, 1988. She questioned her replacement claiming that the proceedings before t
he PPA Appeals Board were irregular because (1) she was not notified of the hear
in g before it; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the August 11, 1988 PPA Appe
als Board Resolution or a copy of the protest filed by petitioner Anino; (3) she
wa s not informed of the reasons behind her replacement; and (4) their Port Man
ager (in Iloilo City), who was then an official member of the Board, was not inc
lude d in the said proceedings. On November 8, 1988, pending resolution of her a
ppeal /request for clarification, respondent received a copy of PPA Special Orde
r No. 492-88 dated October 21, 1988, also issued by General Manager Dayan. This
PPA Or der officially reassigned her to the position of Administrative Officer (
SG-15) which was petitioner Anino's former position and was lower than her previ
ous pos ition as Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division Ma
nager On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally prot
esting a gainst petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time questioning
the propr iety of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. The C
SC dismiss ed respondent's appeal. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court null
ified the r esolutions of the Board and the Civil Service due to lack of notice
and hearing and that the appointment of respondent to the position of Administra
tive officer constitutes a demotion which violates her rights to security of ten
ure. The CA ordered also ordered the reinstatement of Monserate to the position
of Resource Management Division Manager. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not there was du
e process when respondent was replaced by petitio ner Anino. (2) Whether or not
the appointment of petitioner Anino was valid. HELD: (1) NO. The grounds mention
ed against respondents appointment were not supported by the evidence and were in
themselves ambiguous. Respondent never had any pendi
ng criminal or administrative case at the time of her appointment as manager. Sh

e was not given the chance to 76 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexand
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! defend her
self or air her side of the story as she was never notified of the res olution o
f the PPA Appeals Board and was not furnished a copy of the resolution. What she
received was the order already ordering her demotion. Therefore the re solution
of the PPA Appeals Board is irregular if not null and void. (2) NO. Non etheles
s, he is considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbenc y. A d
e facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly ex ercis
es its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though suc h ap
pointment or election may be irregular. In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, this Cou
rt ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de fact
o officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenu
re, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and
under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the sal
aries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for wh ate
ver salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. The rule is tha
t where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful i nc
umbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he oc
cupied the office in good faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied squarel y
on the present case in view of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assu
med under protest the position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter
part of 1988, which position she currently holds. Since then, she has been recei
ving the emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such office. Whi
l e her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the correspondin
g emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful
o ffice (Division Manager), she cannot recover full back wages for the period w
hen she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to back pay differ
ent ials for the period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer u
p to the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division M
anag er. Such back pay differentials pertain to the difference between the salar
y rat es for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same mu
st be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed
the c ontested position up to the time of his retirement on November 30, 1997.
COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS COMMENCEMENT; A CES ELIGIBILITY IS A REQUIREM
ENT FOR A POSITION EMBRACED IN THE CES. DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 1
27182, December 5, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: In the Decision sought to be
reconsidered, we ruled t hat private respondent's appointment on August 28, 198
6, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Minis try of Local Government, was
temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macarai g, we held that since priva
te respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES ) eligible, his appointmen
t did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibil
ity for the CES position to which he was appointed. He nce, he can be transferre
d or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. It appears, h
owever, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decide d on September 26, 1990,
where the nature of private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel
- CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was firs t contested, this Court
issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macar
aig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. There was no Career Exe
cutive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or a t the time of appointm
ent of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Boa
rd of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. There was n o CESO eligibility ex
amination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO
board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 an d 12, 1990. The CESO
eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appoin
tment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and
petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirement
s for the position to 77 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragon
jan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constan
tino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher
Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jea
nne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Je
mina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventu
ra, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! which he w
as appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee
on security of tenure and due process. Invoking res judicata, private respondent
contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed u pon and c
ontroverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been set
tled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not resp
ondents possessed eligibility for a permanent appointm ent which entitles him to
security of tenure. HELD: NO. A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganizat
ion Plan which was ad opted and declared part of the law of the land by Presiden
tial Decree No. 1, dated Septemb er 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibili
ty is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. It bears stressin
g that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, t he questioned appointment was made on October
16, 1987, before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the first C
ESO examination was given in 1990, as in the present case. Nevertheless, the Cou
rt, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility is required for a CES position, su
ch that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility shall be tem
porary. Evidently, a CES eligibili ty has always been one of the requirements fo
r a position embraced in the CES. T he Court finds no reason to make an exceptio
n in the instant controversy. The fo regoing law and circular were never amended
nor repealed by the Freedom Constitu tion. A CES eligibility was an existing an
d operative requirement at the time of private respondent's appointment as Minis
try Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither w ere the said law and circular inconsisten
t with the Freedom Constitution as to r ender them modified or superseded. In fa
ct, the Integrated Reorganization Plan a llows the appointment of non-CES eligib
les, like private respondent, provided th ey subsequently acquire the needed eli
gibility. COMMENCEMENT; APPOINTMENT VS. REASSIGNMENT DR. ELEANOR A. OSEA vs. DR.
CORAZON E . MALAYA [G.R. No. 139821, January 30, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACT
S: On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed Protest Case N o. 91120-004 with the C
ivil Service Commission. She averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge
, Ass istant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary
Ricar do T. Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the
endors ement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that despite the
recommen dation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed responde
nt to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur; that res
pondent's appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial Sc
hool Boar d, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991. He
nce, petit ioner prayed that respondent's appointment be recalled and set aside
for being n ull and void. In dismissing petitioner's protest, the Civil Service
Commission h eld that Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplat
es a situatio n where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the
appointments, whereas respondent's appointment was made by no less than the Pre
sident, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of re
spondent as Sc hools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner
as Schools Divi sion Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassign
ments, in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. T
hus, petitioner filed a petition for review of both the Resolutions of the Civil
Service Commiss ion before the Court of Appeals, which however dismissed the pe
tition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the
respondent was merely reassigned to Camarines Sur and did not require the mandat
ory prior c onsultation with the local school board under Section 99 of RA 7160.
HELD: NO. Clearly, Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to a
ppointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is be
cause at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools divisio
n superintendents were 78 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Rago
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! appointed
by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to specific divisio n or loca
tion. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Cir cular No
. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superint endent
and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive servic
e. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positi
ons was transferred from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the
President. Under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Scho ols Di
vision Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her design
ation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she p revio
usly exercised her functions as Officerin-Charge-Schools Division Superinte nden
t, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of th e L
ocal Government Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the local school boar d,
does not apply. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Educ a
tion, Culture and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law. Appointmen
t should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as th
e selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its conf
i rmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen u
nl ess he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. On the
ot her hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organi
zati onal unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involv
e a r eduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an
appoi ntment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of
additi onal duties on an incumbent official. COMMENCEMENT; AN AD INTERIM APPOIN
TMENT IS A PERMANENT APPOINTMENT; DISAPPROVED AD INTERIM VS. BY-PASSSED AD INTER
IM. MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, et al. [G.R. No. 149036,
April 2, 2002] CARPIO, J: FACTS: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC appointed pet
itioner as "Acti ng Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairper
son Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of
EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On F ebruary 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S. B.
Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a "T
emporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001 , President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appoin
ted, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC C hairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 20
08. Benipayo took his oath of office an d assumed the position of COMELEC Chairm
an; and Borra and Tuason likewise took t heir oaths of office and assumed their
positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The O ffice of the President submitted to th
e Commission on Appointments on May 22, 20 01 the ad interim appointments of Ben
ipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmations. However, the Commission on Appointmen
ts did not act on said appointments. This p rocess was repeated twice. On April
11, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo issued a Memorandum whereby he reaasigned pe
titioner to the Law Department. Petitioner r equested Benipayo to reconsider her
reassignment to the Law Department but to no avail. Upon denial, petitioner fil
ed an administrative and criminal complaint w ith the Law Department against Ben
ipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Re
solution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Ci rcular No. 07 and other pertinent
administratve and civil service laws, rules an d regulations. During the penden
cy of her complaint before the Law Department, p etitioner filed the instant pet
ition questioning the appointment and the right t o remain in office of Benipayo
, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
ISSUES: 79 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Ab

arentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo d
e Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre
Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Cha
ro Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan S
y Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaf
lor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (1) Whethe
r or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a tempo rary appo
intment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2) Wheth
er or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent a ssumptio
n of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointme nt unde
r Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (3) Whether or not Ben ipayo'
s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and he r rea
ssignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having be en d
one without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body. HELD: (1) NO. An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes ef fect immedia
tely and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appoin tee has qua
lified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by th e Commissi
on on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constit ution its
elf makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effectiv
e until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournm
ent of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitu
tion provides as follows: "The President shall have the power to make a ppointme
nts during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commissio n on Ap
pointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." Thus, the ad i nterim
appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signi
fying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear t
hat the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad in
terim appointment is utterly without basis. Hence the ad interim appointme nts e
xtended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointm ents
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2) NO. Ther e i
s no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Ap po
intments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a fin a
l decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking po
wer on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision
on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its con
sent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Const
i tution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is
fi nal and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this
ins tance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the
cons titutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by
the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An a
d int erim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of t
he Com mission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appoin
tment i s one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commissi
on on Ap pointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final d
ecision b y the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to th
e appointm ent as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the Presid
ent is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. (3) NO
. The Chair man, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered o
n his own au thority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance wit
h the Civil S ervice Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not req
uired by law t o secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's appoin
tment papers da ted February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001, i
ndisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID only in an ac
ting or temporar y capacity. Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES)
officer, and neit her does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which
are necessary qual ifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescri
bed in the Qualific
ations Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission. Obviousl
y, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. 80 POLITICAL LA
W COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balb
oa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degoll
ado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr
., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabil
ala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze,
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! POWERS AND
DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICER POWERS AND DUTIES; MANDAMUS WILL LIE ONLY TO COMPEL
THE PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTE RIAL DUTY BUT NOT TO FULFILL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
S. G & S TRANSPORT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 120287, May 28,
2002] BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Petitioner G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), with
the n ame and style Avis Rent-ACar, was the exclusive operator of coupon taxi s
ervices at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) under a five (5)-year c
ontract of concession with respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MI
AA). Th e concession contract expired but was renewed by the parties on a monthl
y basis "until such time when a new concessionaire (shall have been) chosen." Un
der the arrangement, G & S was able to operate the coupon taxi service uninterru
ptedly b eyond the period of five (5) years originally awarded by MIAA. On 12 Ju
ly 1994 M IAA initiated proceedings for public bidding to choose two (2) concess
ionaires o f the coupon taxi services at the NAIA. Five (5) firms pre-qualified
to join. Co nsequently, MIAA selected 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN as the winning b
idders and i ssued in their favor the respective notice of awards of the coupon
taxi service concession. Petitioner G & S filed a complaint for injunction and m
andamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against MIAA
and its Gene ral Manager, 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN. The complaint sought to di
squalify 2000 TRANSPORT from the award of the concession contract the bidding in
cluding petiti oner G & S and respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN and it also
asserted that t he concession contract should have been executed in favor of G &
S. The trial co urt dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action against herein respondents and that mandamus was una
vailable to compe l the award of the concession contract in favor of G & S since
such decision was discretionary upon the MIAA. The Court of Appeals granted the
petitions for cer tiorari of 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN, set aside the order of
the trial court iss uing the writ of preliminary injunction, and prohibited the
trial court from "he aring and taking further cognizance of the case except to d
ismiss the same. The appellate court held that the trial court gravely abused it
s discretion when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction since under PD 18
18 no court would hav e jurisdiction to restrain the operation of a public utili
ty and since the selec tion of winning bidders was solely the discretion of the
sponsoring government a gency. ISSUE: Whether or not a mandamus was available to
compel the award of the conces sion contract in favor of the petitioner. HELD:
NO. It is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the perform ance
of a ministerial duty but does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual
oblig ations. Only such duties as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law o
r by r eason of official station are to be enforced by the writ. Whether MIAA wi
ll ente r into a contract for the provision of a coupon taxi service at the inte
rnationa l airport is entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion.
It does n ot involve a duty the performance of which is enjoined by law and thus
this Cour t cannot direct the exercise of this prerogative. Indeed the determin
ation of th e winning bidders should be left to the sound judgment of the MIAA w
hich is the agency in the best position to evaluate the proposals and to decide
which bid wo uld most complement the NAIA's services. The exercise of such discr
etion is a po licy decision that necessitates such procedures as prior inquiry,
investigation, comparison, evaluation and deliberation. This process would neces
sarily entail the technical expertise of MIAA which the courts do not possess in
order to eval
uate the standards affecting this matter -- courts, as a rule, refuse to interfe
re with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exe
r cise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally
b etter 81 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel A
flor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! equipped t
echnically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal facto rs, such
as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisio ns. LIAB
ILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC SERVICE REQUIRES U
TMOST INTEGRITY AND STRIC TEST DISCIPLINE POSSIBLE OF EVERY PUBLIC SERVANT. BALT
AZAR LL. FIRMALO vs. MELIN DA C. QUIRREZ [A.M. No. P-00-1401, January 29, 2002]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: On May 20, 1996, then Presiding Judge, Cezar R. Marav
illa, of RTC-Branch 82 of Odiongan, issued an order reprimanding and censuring
the respondent for insubord ination and gross inefficiency. The reprimand arose
from the respondents failure to submit an inventory of cases and to schedule cert
ain criminal cases in the co urt calendar. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court required
the respondent to submit a wr itten explanation why no administrative sanction s
hould be rendered against her. Several months thereafter, respondent was re-assi
gned to the typing of orders, decisions clearances, etc. However, she failed to
perform these tasks efficientl y as shown by her works marred by omissions, spel
ling syntax and error. Responde nt filed her comment stating that the matter of
her failure to calendar the crim inal cases was deemed closed and terminated fol
lowing the submission of her expl anation. She further pointed out that the erro
rs she committed were already corr ected and remedied. Upon submission of this c
ase to the Office of the Court Admi nistrator (OCA) for evaluation and recommend
ation, the said office recommended t hat respondent be ordered to pay a fine of
Php 1,000.00 with a stern warning tha t that a commission of similar offense sha
ll be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty a
s found by the OCA. HELD: YES. I ndeed, the respondent has all but admitted the
wrongdoing complained of when she stated, among others, that the exhibits submitt
ed to your Office are Orders o f the then judges (retired and returned to regula
r station) typewritten by me sh owing an error in the margin. These, however, ha
ve been accordingly corrected. Whi le indeed respondent may have corrected and remedi
ed her mistakes and shortcomings, it must be stressed that requisite competence a
nd efficiency is not confined to those isolated instances pointed out by complai
nant but is a continuous obligati on demanded of her for so long as she serves i
n the judiciary. Sine the administ ration of justice is a sacred task, the perso
n involved in it ought to live up t o the strictest standard of honesty, integri
ty and uprightness. It bears stressi ng once again that public service requires
utmost integrity and the strictest di scipline possible of every public servant.
A public office is a public trust tha t enjoins all public officers and employe
es, particularly those serving in the j udiciary to respond to the highest degre
e of dedication often even beyond person al interest. As held in the case Mendoz
a vs. Mabutas, the Court condemns and wou ld never countenance such conduct, act
or omission on the part of all those invo lved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public acc ountability and diminish and even ju
st tend to diminish the faith if the people in the Judiciary. LIABILITY OF PUBLI
C OFFICERS; THOSE INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE CA RRY A HEAVY BURDE
N OF RESPONSIBILITY. 82 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonja
dinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! TERESITA H
. ZIPAGAN vs. JOVENCIO N. TATTAO [A.M. No. P-01-1512, September 24, 2001] PANGAN
IBAN, J: FACTS: Complainant claims that on 26 February 1998 she went to th e Off
ice of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela to dis
cuss an important of ficial matter with the presiding judge of said Court. There
after she talked with a certain Mrs. Albano, the officer-incharge of the Regiona
l Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela regarding her consultation with the j
udge. It was at that juncture that respondent berated her saying [G]et out of thi
s place, we don't rec eive orders from the Department of Justice because we are
under the Supreme Cour t, you [have been] a sucker ever since the time of Judge
Vera Cruz. Afterwards, r espondent slapped her right cheek and hit her right eye
with a glass with water causing her to become wet. As a result of the incident s
he suffered injury in he r right eye. In his COMMENT dated 02 June 1998, respond
ent avers that on 26 Febr uary 1998, complainant entered their office and therei
n shouted so many utterance s which disturbed the people who [were] attending the
trial of cases set for sai d date.' He told her not to shout since their office
[was] not a market place bu t complainant went near him and threw the 'glass of
Sprite' he was drinking (res pondent was taking his merienda that time). Therea
fter, Zipagan hit him with a b allpen, wounding his right elbow in the process s
o he slapped her with his left hand. Still, complainant kept on attacking him an
d was only pacified when Utilit y Worker Gerard Vinasoy brought her out of the o
ffice. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to measure up to that behavior ex
pected of a court employee. HELD: YES. Time and time again, this Court has empha
sized that "the conduct of e very employee of the judiciary must be at all times
characterized [by] propriety 'and decorum and above all else, it must be above
and beyond suspicion." We have rei terated in several cases that "the conduct an
d behavior of every official and em ployee of an agency involved in the administ
ration of justice, from the presidin g judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at al
l times be characterized by, among ot hers, strict propriety and decorum so as t
o earn and keep the respect of the pub lic for the judiciary.'' Moreover, the Co
de of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (RA 6713)
implements the State policy of promotin g a high standard of ethical responsibil
ity in the public service. Specifically, Section 4 of the Code requires "[p]ubli
c officials and employees . . . [to] res pect the rights of others, and . . . re
frain from doing acts contrary to law, go od morals, good customs, public policy
, public order, public safety and public i nterest." Clearly, the brash and call
ow behavior of respondent is unbecoming a c ourt employee. Assuming that complai
nant was disturbing the orderly administrati on of justice with her noisy chatte
r, respondent should have exercised more pati ence and adopted a more prudent ma
nner in asking her to leave the office. His ab rupt interruption of the conversa
tion, followed by his slapping her face and hit ting her right eye has shamed no
t only the court he was serving, but the entire judiciary as well. Clearly, resp
ondent has degraded the dignity of the judiciary and undermined the people's fai
th and confidence in it. Indeed, the Court looks with great disfavor [upon] any
display of animosity by any court employee. Cour t personnel must, at all times,
act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn the public's regard
for the judiciary. Improper behavior, particularl y during office hours, exhibit
s not only a paucity of professionalism at the wor kplace but also a great disre
spect to the court itself. Such a demeanor is a fai
lure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. LIABILITY

OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THE GROUND FOR REMOVAL OF A JUDICIAL OFFICER SHOUL D BE EST
ABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. ANG vs. JUDGE ASIS [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1590, Janu
ary 15, 2002] 83 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Mari
cel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ric
ardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez,
Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Monte
s, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy,
Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa
Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! YNARES-SAN
TIAGO, J: FACTS: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated April 7, 2000 filed wi th the Of
fice of the Court Administrator, Gina B. Ang charged Judge Enrique C. Asis, Pres
iding Judge of Bra nch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, with Br
ibery, Extortion an d Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act rela
tive to Election Cas e No. 98-01. Sometime in October 1998, while her election p
rotest was pending, r espondent allegedly intimated to complainant's lawyers tha
t he will decide the c ase in complainant's favor in exchange for monetary consi
deration. Without her k nowledge, complainant's father delivered to respondent t
he total amount of P140, 000.00 on three occasions in October 1998, January 1999
, and April 1999. Sometim e in December 1998, complainant was told by her lawyer
s that respondent had requ ested assistance in the promotion of his brother, the
n Examiner II at the Bureau of Customs, through complainant's cousin, Atty. Ramo
n Salazar, Jr., who was the Chief of Staff of the Customs Commissioner. Complain
ant refused but, unbeknown to her, her family immediately contacted her cousin a
nd respondent's brother was soon promoted. Subsequently, complainant learned tha
t respondent had requested that his son be admitted for training at the Philippi
ne Heart Center. Complainan t refused as she might be misinterpreted as extendin
g any assistance to responde nt in order to obtain a favorable decision. Neverth
eless, she acceded to her law yer's request to bring respondent's son to Manila
and even paid for the latter's plane fare and accommodation until his applicatio
n was granted by the Philippin e Heart Center. In January 2000, complainant alle
gedly received a call from resp ondent telling her that his son needed P4,000.00
for his training. Thinking that this was a request for a loan, she agreed. Sinc
e she did not have cash at the t ime, she asked her friend to give a check to re
spondent's son. On March 14, 2000 , respondent rendered his decision in the elec
tion protest declaring Caridad Ato k winner in the mayoralty race. Respondent fi
led his Comment. He vehemently deni ed the charges of complainant and instead, h
e cited various citations he receive d as a member of the Judiciary of Biliran b
ecause of his integrity. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of Bri
bery, Extortion and Viola tion of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. HELD:
NO. From the affidavit-complaint of the complainant, it will be noted that all
the charges of complainant are based on informations (sic) allegedly given or pa
ssed on to h er by her lawyers. Complainant's lawyers in her electoral protest f
iled in the s ala of respondent Judge Asis were Attorneys Lee and Matriano. Howe
ver, complaina nt did not present any of these lawyers, Attys. Lee or Matriano,
to corroborate her allegations that they, Attys. Lee and Matriano, were approach
ed by responden t "intimating" that for a consideration he will render a favorab
le decision for complainant in the electoral protest. The ground for the removal
of a judicial o fficer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is t
he rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office
, willful neglect , corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rule in regard to
admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply. In short, this Court can no
t give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. While this Co
urt will never tol erate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would viol
ate the norm of pub lic accountability or diminish the people's faith in the jud
iciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded
suits that only ser ve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administratio
n of justice For admi nistrative liability to attach it must be established that
respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishones
t purpose or some mora l obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through som e motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the natur
e of fraud. It contempla
tes a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive o
f self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause dama
g e. 84 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abare
ntos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de G
uzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jac
ob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo
Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy L
ita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor
.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In the cas
e at bar, the record does not show that respondent judge was moved by ill-will o
r bad faith in rendering the adverse judgment, or that his ruling was manifestly
unjust. Complainant has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriet
y attended the issuance of the subject decision. To reiterate, bad fai th is not
presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. LIABILITY OF P
UBLIC OFFICERS; JUDGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE ADMINISTRATIVELY RES PONSIBLE FOR
EVERY ERROR OR MISTAKE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. GERRY JA UCIAN vs. SA
LVACION B. ESPINAS [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1641, May 9, 2002] PANGANIBAN, J: FACTS: Com
plainant, as losing mayoral candidate for the Municipal ity of Daraga, Albay, in
the May 11, 1998 local elections, filed a petition, dated May 22, 1998, denomin
ated as an 'election protest and/or revision/recounting of votes,' on the ground
that fraud and anomalies were allegedly committed during the aforesaid local el
ectio ns, both in the course of voting and during the counting and tabulation of
the b allots, to his prejudice. He prayed for the issuance of an order directin
g the r evision or recounting of the ballots in the contested 114 precincts as e
numerate d in his petition, the nullification and setting aside of the proclamat
ion of Wi lson Andes as mayor, and his own proclamation as mayor. Later, respond
ent judge issued the assailed Order, dated March 8, 1999 which contained a findi
ng that 'o nly thirteen (13) ballot boxes were found well supported to warrant t
he approval of the relief being sought by the protestant. Complainant asserts th
at responde nt judge should have ordered a revision of the ballots in all the pr
ecincts alle ged in the Complaint, pursuant to Section 255 of the Omnibus Electi
on Code. To j ustify her March 8, 1999 Order directing a partial revision of the
ballots, resp ondent cites The Updated Election Code of the Philippines as modi
fied/amended. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge can be held administrat
ively liable f or gross ignorance of the law. HELD: YES. Judges may be held admi
nistratively liable for gross ignorance of the law when it is shown that motivat
ed by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption they ignor ed, contradicted or
failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence. In this case, respondent's Order
on a very basic subject was patently erroneous. 16 Her failu re to observe the r
equirements prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code for an el ection protest is
inexcusable. First, the said Code took effect on December 3, 1 985, long before
the 1998 elections. Second, the evidence shows that she acted i n bad faith. Jud
ges may not be held liable administratively responsible for ever y error or mist
ake in the performance of their duties; otherwise, that would mak e their positi
on unbearable. To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistak e must be gro
ss or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith. In the absenc e of proof t
o the contrary, a defective or erroneous decision or order is presum ed to have
been issued in good faith. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; GOOD FAITH IS ALWAYS PR
ESUMED UNLESS CONVINCING EV IDENCE TO THE CONTRARY IS ADDUCED. ANDRADE vs. COURT
OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 127932, December 7, 2001] DE LEON JR, J: FACTS: On July 6,
1971, petitioner was appointed as permanent tea cher in the Division of City Sc
hools, Manila. She was initially assigned as English teacher at the Araullo Hi g
h School, Manila. On June 14, 1985, two (2) days before the opening of classes
for the school year 1985-1986, petitioner was not given any teaching load. 85 PO
LITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je n
nifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In an indo
rsement dated July 30, 1985, addressed to Superintendent Coronel, priv ate respo
ndent Wingsing cited three (3) reasons why petitioner Andrade was not g iven any
teaching load: (1) drastic drop of enrollment; (2) she was declared an excess t
eacher; and (3) she ranked lowest in her performance rating. Hence, on A ugust 2
2, 1985, Superintendent Coronel informed the petitioner, through private respond
ent Wingsing, that the petitioner would be designated to a non-teaching p ositio
n in the meantime that arrangements were being made for her eventual reass ignme
nt to other schools where her services may be needed. Feeling aggrieved, pe titi
oner filed an action for damages with mandatory injunction against private r esp
ondent Dominador S. Wingsing, English Department Head Virginia E. Fermin and Ass
istant Schools Division Superintendent Arturo F. Coronel before the Regional Tri
al Court (RTC), Quezon City. Petitioner contends that public respondent Court of
Appeals erred in applying the Orcino Doctrine and that Sec. 31 of P.D. No. 8 07
, otherwise known as the Civil Service Commission, Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 4670, ot h
erwise known as The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers and R.A. No. 2260, a
s amended should be the applicable laws. Petitioner asserts that private respond
ent Wingsing failed to comply with the said laws considering that no performanc
e evaluation plan which can be the basis for personal action was ever presented
i n evidence to justify the latter's actions. What was shown were performance ra
ti ng sheets and the Certification on the Audit of Teachers, allegedly prepared
by petitioner's coteachers and personnel from the Office of the Research and Eva
lua tion Services, which petitioner Andrade did not conform to nor sign. Petitio
ner also doubts the veracity of private respondent Wingsing's claim that there w
as a reduction of classes for the school year 1985-1986 as reason for her being
decl ared as an excess teacher since Araullo High School even hired three (3) mo
re ne w teachers that school year. To underscore her claim that she had been sin
gled o ut, petitioner asserts that, contrary to the declaration of respondent Wi
ngsing, there was no other person declared as an excess teacher in Araullo High
School for that school year. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is liable
for damages. HELD: NO. "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and obse
rve honesty and good fa ith." The elements of abuse of one's rights under the sa
id Article 19 (New Civil Code) are the following: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exerc ised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudici
ng or injuring another. I n this regard, it appeared that the complaint of petit
ioner Andrade failed to me et the second and third requirements. Wingsing was no
t at all dictated by whim o r fancy, nor of spite against the petitioner but was
rather guided by the follow ing factors: qualification to teach, seniority, tea
ching performance and attitud e towards the school community. For two (2) consec
utive years petitioner receive d an unsatisfactory rating, the lowest, from two
(2) English Department Heads, n amely: Herminia Valdez and Virginia Fermin. Peti
tioner knew about her poor ratin g, but she refused to acknowledge it. She did n
ot question nor contest the same. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, there wer
e no new teachers hired that scho ol year in Araullo High School; rather, existi
ng substitute teachers were merely given permanent designation or assigned new s
ubjects, significantly, prior to t he teachers' audit or to the declaration of e
xcess teachers on July 27, 1985. En trenched is the rule that bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or negl igence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or s
ome moral obliquity and conscious doi ng of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty thro
ugh some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. In th
e case at bar, we find that there was no "dishonest purpose," or "some moral obl
iquity," or "conscious doing of a wron g," or "breach of a known duty," or "some
motive or interest or ill will" that c an be attributed to the private responde
nt. It appeared that efforts to accommod ate petitioner were made as she was off
ered to handle two (2) non-teaching jobs,
that is, to handle Developmental Reading lessons and be an assistant Librarian,

pending her reassignment or transfer to another work station, but she refused. T
he same would not have been proposed if the intention of private respondent wer
e to cause undue hardship on the petitioner. Good faith is always presumed unles
s convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the part
y alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation. Absent enough proof
t hereof, the presumption of good faith prevails. In the case at bar, the burden
o f proving alleged bad faith therefore was with petitioner but she failed to d
isc harge such onus probandi. 86 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexande
r Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina
Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Chris
topher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendo
za, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald So
tto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Ma
e Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Without a
clear and persuasive evidence of bad faith, the presumption of good fa ith in fa
vor of private respondent stands. As explained by payroll clerk Aida So liman, p
etitioner's name was not deleted from the regular monthly payroll but me rely tr
ansferred to the last page of the roll since she failed to submit her For m 48 o
r Daily Time Record (DTR) sheet on time. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; WITHDRAWA
L OF A COMPLAINT OR SUBSEQUENT DESISTANCE BY THE COMPLAINANT IN AN ADMINISTRATIV
E CASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY WARRANT ITS D ISMISSAL. ISAGANI RIZON vs. JUDGE OSCA
R E. ZERNA [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1575, September 17, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: Complai
nant Rizon filed an election protest before the RTC pr esided by respondent Judg
e Zerna. Complainant contested the election of protestee Ong for the positio n o
f Mayor of the Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, the latter having been pr
oclaimed as winner in the May 11, 1998 elections. On November 22, 1998, the p ar
ties submitted the case for decision but the case had remained undecided withi n
three (3) months after its submission. On February 26, 1998 complainant filed a
"Motion to Render Early Decision," which according to complainant, fell on "de
af ears." Complainant thus filed an affidavit-complaint before this Court chargi
ng respondent with "willful, deliberate, and malicious delay in rendering the d
e cision." Upon evaluation of the complaint and respondent Judge's comment there
to , the OCA submitted a report to this Court finding the judge guilty of gross
ine fficiency, the delay in the disposition of the case being inexcusable. The r
epor t stated, among other things, that: Judge Zerna has a history of delay in de
cidin g cases, he failed to render decision within the ninety (90) day period an
d to a ccordingly render decision in twenty two (22) criminal cases, seventeen (
17) civ il cases, five (5) criminal and nine (9) civil cases appealed from the l
ower cou rts, and other pending matters in four (4) cases; to take appropriate a
ction for the early resolution of twenty eight (28) other cases; to take further
action o n thirty two (32) others which he failed to act on or set in the court
calendar after the lapse of considerable length of time; and to act on twenty t
hree (23) other cases that could already be archived. Pending resolution of this
case, comp lainant filed before the Supreme Court an Affidavit of Desistance, st
ating that "after careful deliberation," he found that the case "does not merit
further pro secution." Complainant informed the Court that he is "no longer inte
rested in pu rsuing the complaint." ISSUE: Whether or not the Affidavit of Desis
tance filed by the complainant can a bsolve the respondent from liability. HELD:
NO. Complainant's desistance cannot absolve respondent from liability. In Enoja
s, Jr. vs. Gacott, Jr., we said: To begin with, withdrawal of a complaint or subs
equent desistance by the complainant in an administrative case does not necessar
ily war rant its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or
pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be
detesta ble. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the compla
inant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court does not dismiss
administ rative cases against members of the Bench merely on the basis of withd
rawal of t he charges. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
investigat e and decide the complaint against the respondent. To be sure, publi
c interest i s at stake in the conduct and actuation of officials and employees
of the judici ary. And the program and efforts of this Court in improving the de
livery of just ice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by p
rivate arrangem
ents between the parties. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; IN THE ABSENCE OF SUBSTAN
TIAL EVIDENCE, ANDMINISTR ATIVE LIABILITY COULD NOT BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. 87 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Rag
onjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Const
antino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christophe
r Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, J
eanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto,
Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ven
tura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ANTONIO G.
PRINCIPE vs. FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF T HE OMBUDS
MAN [G.R. No. 145973, January 23, 2002] PARDO, J: FACTS: On February 19, 1991, t
hen City Mayor of Antipolo City, Daniel S. Garcia, endorsed the Philjas Corporat
ion to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for the creation, devel
opment and sale of lots of the Cherry Hills Subdivision (CHS ) located in the ab
ovementioned city. Thereafter, Philjas was issued different p ermits and documen
ts for purposes of proceeding with the project. Eventually, a Small Scale Mining
Permit (SSMP) was issued to Philjas to extract and remove 10, 000 cu. Meters of
filling materials from the area where the proposed subdivision is to be constru
cted. However, another respondent (in the CA case) informed Phi ljas that CHS is
within the EIS System and as such must secure ECC from the DENR . Subsequently,
Philjas applied for an ECC permit. Upon the recommendation of on e of the subor
dinates of herein petitioner, the latter approved Philjass applicat ion for an EC
C permit. The petitioner approved the same based from the Inspectio n Report con
ducted by petitioners subordinates. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding the
petitioner Principe administratively liable for Gross Neglect of Du ty and impo
sed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office. The CA affirmed th e Ombudsma
ns decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman may dismis
s petitioner from the service on an admin istrative charge for gross neglect of
duty, initiated, investigated and decided by the Ombudsman himself without subst
antial evidence to support his findings of gross neglect of duty because the dut
y to monitor and inspect the project was n ot vested in the petitioner. HELD: NO
. DAO 38-1990 specifically points out the functions of the office attach ed to t
he petitioner and nowhere in it can be found the latters responsibility of monito
rin g housing and land development projects. The Ombudsman, without taking into
cons ideration the lawfully mandated duties and functions attached to petitioners
posi tion, immediately concluded that as the signing and approving authority of
the E CC issued to Philjas, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to conduct act
ual mon itoring and enforce strict compliance with the terms of the ECC. Hence,
how coul d petitioner be guilty of neglecting a duty, which is not even his to b
egin with ? Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that petitio
ner was th e person who signed and approved the ECC, without proof of actual act
or omissio n constituting neglect of duty. In the absence of substantial eviden
ce of gross neglect of petitioner, administrative liability could not be based o
n the princi ple of command responsibility. The negligence of the petitioners sub
ordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence. It was not within the mandate
d responsibil ities of petitioner to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The
principles gov erning public officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1
987 clearly pro vide that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not
be civilly liab le for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or mis
feasance of his s ubordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written orde
r the specific act or misconduct complained of. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; AD
MINISTRATIVE OFFENSES DO NOT PRESCRIBE. FLORIA v s. SUNGA [A.M. NO. CA-01-10-P 1
, November 14, 2001]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration for an admini

strative case filed against Alda Floria by her fellow employees in the Court of
Appeals, which was previously dismissed by this Court. Said Floria was complain
ed for immorality for having an illicit r elationship with a married man, for fa
lsification for tampering her childrens bir th certificates with a legitimate sta
tus, and for misrepresentation by claiming that she earned a Masterals Degree. Th
e prior case was 88 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, M
aricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino,
Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godine
z, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Mo
ntes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina S
y, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, El
sa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! dismissed
on the ground that the illicit relationship was ongoing and the presen ce of ill
motive on the part of the complainants. ISSUE: Does the fact that the offense w
as no longer existing exculpate a person from an administrative complaint? HELD:
NO. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. It bears stressing that it i s no
t in accordance with the norms of morality for a woman, even if single, to maint
ain a n illicit relationship with a married man. Even if such relationship had e
nded, the stigma of immorality still attaches to the parties, especially the wom
an. Th is is specially so when the persons concerned are public employees who ar
e suppo sed to maintain a high standard of morality in order to live up to their
role as models in society. The fact that the illicit relationship has ceased wi
ll only mitigate her culpability. This Court demands that every employee of the
judiciar y must adhere to the exacting standards of honesty, integrity, morality
, and dec ency in his professional and personal conduct, thus: "Every employee o
f the judi ciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Lik
e any publi c servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrit
y not only i n the performance of his official duties but in his personal and pr
ivate dealing s with other people, to preserve the court's good name and standin
g. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct, o fficial and otherwise, of the personnel who worked thereat, from
the judge to th e lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the e xacting standards of morality and decency in their professional
and private cond uct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the co
urts of justice. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; NO ONE CAN
BE SAID TO HAVE ANY VESTED RIGHT IN AN OFF ICE OR ITS SALARY; EXCEPTION. BUKLOD
NG KAWANING EIIB vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001] S
ANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: On 30 June 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquin
o issued Executive Order (EO) No. 1273 establishing the Economic Intelligence an
d Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Depa
rtment of Finance. It was made as the agency of primary responsibility for anti
smuggling operations in all la nd areas and inland waters and waterways outside
the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On 7 January 2000, moti
vated by the fact that the desig nated functions of the EIIB are also being perfo
rmed by the other existing agenc ies of the government and that there is a need to
constantly monitor the overlappi ng functions among these agencies, former Presi
dent Joseph Estrada issued EO No.1 911 ordering the deactivation of EIIB and the
transfer of its functions to the B ureau of Customs and the National Bureau of
Investigation. On 29 March 2000, for mer President Estrada issued EO No. 2232 pr
oviding that all EIIB personnel occup ying positions specified therein shall be
deemed separated from the service effe ctive 30 April 2000, pursuant to a bona f
ide reorganization resulting to aboliti on, redundancy, merger, division or cons
olidation of positions. Petitioners, who for themselves and in behalf of others
with whom they share a common or general interest, filed the instant petition se
eking the nullification of EO Nos. 1911 and 2232 based on the grounds presented
as issues below. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed EOs violate the right to sec
urity of tenure. HELD: NO. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the ab
olition of an off ice within the
competence of a legitimate body done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Va

lid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. 8
Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman,
Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Ju
anit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso
, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, G
lorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! In Dario v
. Mison, it was ruled that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have be en regard
ed as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorga
nization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to ma
ke bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal
) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to e xist. An
d in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it ma
y, if the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done fo
r the political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, other wise no
t in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition do ne is
void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a c hange
of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the exist
ence of ample funds. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as rega
rds salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an of fice
or its salary. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; DISTINCTION AMONG EMPLOYEES MUST BE B
ASED ON SUBSTANT IAL DISTINCTIONS. CRUZ, et, al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. N
o. 134740, October 23, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS: Since 1963, the Sugar Regulatory A
dministration (SRA), a govern ment owned corporation, adopted various resolution
s granting the payment of social ameliora tion benefits (SAB) to all its employe
es, sourced from corporate funds. In May 1 994, the Resident Auditor of the Comm
ission on Audit (COA) in the SRA, Juanita V illarosa examined the accounts of th
e SRA. Pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. 6758, which provides that such other additi
onal compensation, whether in cash or in kin d, being received by the incumbents
only as of 1 July 1989, not integrated into the standardized rates shall contin
ue to be authorized, Villarosa questioned the legality of the payment of the SAB
to all employees of the SRA. In a letter date d 26 September 1994, the Departmen
t of Budget and Management (DBM) ruled that th e grant of the SAB had no legal b
asis and was in violation of R.A. 6758. Accordi ngly, the auditor suspended the
payment of SAB to SRA employees. The SRA Adminis trator filed a letter with the
COA requesting the lifting of the suspension. In the meantime, the affected SRA
employees appealed to the Office of the President for the continued grant of SAB
. The COA denied the request for the lifting of s uspension of payment of SAB, c
laiming that upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758 (on 1 July 1989), the grant of th
e SAB was no longer allowed unless there was a pri or authority from the DBM or
Office of the President or a legislative issuance. On 11 May 1996, the Office of
the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben T orres, issued a 1st Indorsem
ent, granting post facto approval/ratification of th e SAB to SRA employees. On
the basis thereof, SRA filed a motion for reconsidera tion with the COA for the
lifting of the suspension of payment of SAB to its emp loyees. COA allowed the p
ayment of SAB to SRA employees but only to those hired before 31 October 1989. O
ther employees remained not entitled to said benefits. ISSUE: Whether or not COA
gravely abused its discretion in denying SAB to SRA em ployees hired before 31
October 1989. HELD: YES. The classification of COA as to who were entitled to th
e SAB and excl uding therefrom those employees hired after 31 October 1989, has
no legal basis. The d ate of hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a sub
stantial distinction. The employees, based on the title or position they were ho
lding, were exposed to the same type of work, regardless of the date they were h
ired. The date of hiri
ng is not among the factors that shall be taken into consideration in fixing com
pensation or granting of benefits. R.A. 6758, Section 2 provides, thus: Sec. 2.
S tatement of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide e
qu al pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon subst
ant ive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requiremen
ts o f the positions. xxx Evidently, any distinction among employees must be base
d on substantial differences, that is, level or rank, degree of 90 POLITICAL LAW
COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balbo
a, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degolla
do, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr.
, Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabila
la, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, M
aria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! difficulty
and amount of work. To discriminate against some employees on the bas is solely
of the date of hiring is to run against the progressive and social pol icy of t
he law. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THOSE WHO SIT AS ALTERNATES FOR DEPARTMENT SE
CRETARIE S ARE LIKEWISE PROHIBITED FROM RECEIVING ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. DELA
CRUZ, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001] SANDOV
AL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum N o. 97
-038 directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government a
gencies and government-o wned and controlled corporations which have effected pa
yment of any form of addi tional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secreta
ries, their deputies and a ssistants, or their representatives, in violation of
the rule on multiple positi ons, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of su
ch additional compensation o r remuneration given to and received by the concern
ed officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finalit
y of the Supreme Court En Ban c Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Libe
rties Union vs. Executive Secr etary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, I
nc, et al. vs. Secretary of Agr arian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22
, 1991. The COA Memorandum furth er stated that the said Supreme Court Decision,
which became final and executory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order N
o. 284 unconstitutional insofar a s it allows Cabinet members, their deputies an
d assistants to hold other offices , in addition to their primary offices, and t
o receive compensation therefor. Pe titioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C.
Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Dire ctors, appealed from the Notice of Disallow
ance to the Commission on Audit based on the following grounds: 1. The Decision
of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberti es Union and Anti-Graft League of the Phil
ippines, Inc. was clarified in the Res olution of the Court En Banc on August 1,
1991, in that the constitutional ban a gainst dual or multiple positions applie
s only to the members of the Cabinet, th eir deputies or assistants. It does not
cover other appointive officials with eq uivalent rank or those lower than the
position of Assistant Secretary; and 2. Th e NHA Directors are not Secretaries,
Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries a nd that they occupy positions lower
than the position of Assistant Secretary. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, as
mere alternates are entitled to their repr esentation allowances. HELD: NO. Pres
idential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and
dissolving the existing housing agencies, defining its powers and functions, pro
viding funds therefor, and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides: SECT
ION 7. Board of Directors. The Authority shall be governed by a Board of Dir ect
ors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of the Sec re
tary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Director-General o f
the National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of Finance, the
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Industry, the Executive Secretary and the G
eneral Manager of the Authority. From among the members, the President will app
oint a chairman. The members of the Board may have their respective alternates w
ho shall be the officials next in rank to them and whose acts shall be consider
e d the acts of their principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provid
ed , that in the absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary pres
idi ng officer. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or empl
oyme nt under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
const
rued as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein

without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is t
hat these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of th
e constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials. 91 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alex
ander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Crist
ina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, C
hristopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji M
endoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Geral
d Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago
, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! It may be
conceded that the directors concerned occupy positions lower than Assi stant Sec
retary which may exempt them from the prohibition (under) the doctrine enunciate
d in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, supra. However, the ir posit
ions are merely derivative; they derive their authority as agents of the authori
ty they are representing; their power and authority is sourced from the power an
d authority of the cabinet members they are sitting for. Sans the cabine t membe
rs, they are non-entities, without power and without personality to act i n any
manner with respect to the official transactions of the NHA. The agent or repres
entative can only validly act and receive benefits for such action if the princi
pal authority he is representing can legally do so for the agent can only do so
much as his principal can do. The agent can never be larger than the princ ipal.
If the principal is absolutely barred from holding any position in and abs olut
ely prohibited from receiving any remuneration from the NHA or any governmen t a
gency, for that matter, so must the agent be. Indeed, the water cannot rise a bo
ve its source. Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-officio membe r
s of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensat
ion, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, o
r some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alte
r nates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rul
e would give petitioners a better right than their principals. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS; SECURITY OF TENURE DEPENDS UPON THE NATURE OF THE APP OINTMENT WHICH I
N TURN DEPENDS UPON THE POSSESSION OF THE REQUISITE ELIGIBILITY. MA. CHONA M. DI
MAYUGA vs. MARIANO E. BENEDICTO II [G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002] DE LEON,
JR., J: FACTS: On October 26, 1992, then Secretary of Public Works and Highways
Jose P. Dimayuga issued a permanent appointment in favor of petitioner Chona M.
Dimayuga as Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board (Board, for brevi
ty). As its highest-ranking working official, the petitioner exercised supervisi
on and c ontrol over the boards three divisions. She also oversaw the Boards Build
-OperateTransfer (BOT) projects. At the time, the position of Executive Director
II was not deemed part of the Career Executive Service (CES), that is until Jun
e 4, 199 3, when it was included therein. On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Com
mission i ssued Memorandum Circular No. 21, providing among others, that incumben
ts of posi tions which are declared to be CES positions are for the first time p
ursuant to this resolution who hold permanent appointment thereto shall remain u
nder perman ent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or
transfer to other CES positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary stat
us in said p ositions until they qualify. Petitioner alleges that she had been a
subject of se veral administrative and criminal complaints which were all design
ed to coerce h er removal. As a consequence of such complaints, DPWH Secretary V
igilar issued a first 90-day suspension order which was followed by another 90-d
ay suspension i ssued this time by Executive Secretary Alexander Aguirre. After
the expiration o f the last suspension order, petitioner was directed by DPWH Se
cretary Vigilar t o the Legal Service Department to assist in the implementation
of P.D. 1096 (Nat ional Building Code of the Philippines). As a gesture of prot
est to such order o f the Secretary, the petitioner filed a leave of absence rat
her than assume a po sition which she considered as a demotion. On September 28,
1998, while she was on leave, petitioner received a letter from Secretary Vigil
ar informing her that President Estrada had appointed Mariano Benedicto II as th
e new Executive Direc tor II of the Board. As a consequence thereof, petitioner
filed a petition for q uo warranto before the Court of Appeals which the latter
tribunal dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent inclusion of the petiti
oners position under
the CES would automatically qualify the latter for the said position even in the
absence of the required eligibility. HELD: NO. The mere fact that a position be
longs to a Career Service does not aut omatically confer security of tenure o it
s occupant even if he does not possess the require d qualifications. 92 POLITICA
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Such right
will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn d epend on
his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualific
ations for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or , only a
s an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting c apacity
in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot
be so regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. In the doct rinal
case of Cuevas vs. Bacal, the Court emphasized two (2) salient points, to wit: F
irst, in order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must posses
s the rank appropriate to the position. Failure in this respect will rende r the
appointment merely temporary. Second, security of tenure in the Career Exe cuti
ve Service (CES) is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The
guaranty of security of tenure to the members of the CES does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointeda concept which is applica ble
only to first and second level employees in the civil servicebut to the rank to
which they are appointed by the President. The Court reiterates the above poi nt
s if only to serve as a contradistinction to petitioners arguments. If a career e
xecutive officers security of tenure pertains only to his rank and not to his p o
sition, with greater reason then that petitioner herein, who is not even a CESO
eligible, has no security of tenure with regard to the position of Executive Di
rector II of the Toll Regulatory Board which was earlier classified on June 4, 1
993 as part of the CES or prior to the issuance of the CSC Memo. Circ. No. 21 d
a ted May 31, 1994. Lastly, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor-Genera
l, non-eligibles holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never mean
t to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would
b e a premium vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege ev
en their eligible counterpart do not enjoy. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; THE EXERC
ISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE BY THE GOVERNM ENT CORPORATIONS IS LIMITED BY THE
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF LAW. BAYBAY WATER DI STRICT vs. COMMISSSION ON AUDIT [G
.R. No. 147248-49, January 23, 2002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: In 1996, the Resident Au
ditor of the BWD conducted an audit o f its 1994 accounts. In the course of the
audit, the auditor disallowed payments of per diems in excess of those authorize
d by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and P.D. 198, RATA (represe
ntation and transportation allowance, etc. Respondents were se rved with notices
of such disallowance. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not members of the Board of Direct
ors of water districts are enti tled to receive benefits in addition to those au
thorized to be paid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of the LWUA. (2
) Whether or not the disallowanc e of duplication of claims of transportation al
lowance of various BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, rice allowance,
and excessive per diems to member s of the board of directors of BWD, would impa
ir vested rights, violate any rule against diminution of benefits, and undermine
the management prerogatives of wa ter districts. (3) Whether or not the BWD off
icers and employees are entitled to receive benefits in excess of that authorize
d by the law. HELD: (1) NO. Petitioners invoke the ruling of this Court in the c
ases of Kneebone vs. NLRC, Vengco vs. Trajano and Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v
s. NLRC, to support their contention that the prohibition against the payment of
compensation other than per diems does not include the payment of allowances an
d other benefits. Th ese cases are, however, not applicable. They refer to exclu
sion made by this Cou
rt of allowances and other benefits from the salaries of employees in the privat
e sector, not to the compensation of members of the board of directors of water
districts, whose rights to compensation, as already stated, are governed by P.D
. No. 198. Under 93 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, M
aricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino,
Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godine
z, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Mo
ntes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina S
y, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, El
sa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Section 13
of this decree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of the me
mbers of the board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in
a statute must be given their natural, ordinary and commonly-accepted meaning,
due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases a re used.
By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by li
miting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same para
graph, providing No director shall receive other compensation than the am ount pro
vided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of w ater di
stricts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no oth
er compensation or allowance in whatever form. R.A. 6758, Section 4, spec ifical
ly provides that the Salary Standardization Law applies to positions, appoi ntive
or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in t
he government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and go vern
ment financial institutions. The positions in this category are assigned Sal ary
Grade 1 to Salary Grade 10. It is obvious that the Salary Standardization La w
does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are in fact l
imited to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the district s
. (2) NO. Petitioners contend that even before this Court declared in Davao Cit
y Water District vs. Civil Service Commission that water districts are governmen
t-owned and controlled corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the COA, wat
e r districts had already been granting additional benefits to members of the bo
ar d of directors with the approval of the LWUA, and to their officers and emplo
yee s and that they continued doing so after the promulgation of the decision in
tha t case. This contention cannot be warranted. The erroneous application and
enfor cement of the law by public officers does not estop the government from ma
king t he subsequent correction of such errors. More specifically, where there i
s an ex press provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the la
w must b e enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error commit
ted by pu blic officials in granting the benefits. As already stated, P.D. no. 1
98 express ly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per
diems as de termined by the LWUA pursuant to P. D. no. 198, to directors of wate
r districts. Practice without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give ri
se to any ve sted right if it is contrary to law. The same rule applies to the o
fficers and e mployees of the BWD. R.A. no. 6686, which then applied, provides t
hat all govern ment personnel are entitled to a Christmas Bonus of one month bas
ic salary and a dditional cash gift of one thousand pesos. The cash gift granted
to the BWD mana ger for the year 1994 amounted to P1,500. The resident auditor,
therefore, prope rly disallowed the 500 thereof as this amount was in excess of
the authorized by law. (3) NO. With respect to the officers and employees of BW
D, it has been hel d that the terms and conditions of employment of government e
mployees are govern ed by law. Thus, the exercise of management prerogative by g
overnment corporatio ns are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to
them. The cash gift g ranted to the general manager as part of his Christmas bon
us was in excess of th at authorized by R. A. no. 6686. It cannot be justified b
y the exercise of manag ement prerogative as it is contrary to law. RIGHTS OF PU
BLIC OFFICERS; TRANSFERS OF OFFICERS AGAINST THEIR WILL AMOUNT TO RE MOVAL ONLY
IF THEY ARE APPOINTED TO PARTICULAR STATIONS. CRISTINA JENNY CARIO vs. EXEC. DIR.
DAVID DAOAS [G.R. No. 144493, April 9, 2002] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: On 16 August 19
95, Cristina Jenny Cario was appointed Accounta nt III in the Office of the North
ern Cultural Communities (ONCC), now known as the National Commissio n for Indig
enous People. On 05 November 1996, Cario was reassigned by Atty. David Daoas, ONC
C Executive Director, to the position of Technical Assistant of the S
ocio-Economic Division of the ONCC. Cario alleged that her reassignment was an of
fshoot of her refusal to sign a Disbursement Voucher for the travel expenses to
Indonesia of ONCC Regional Director Rosalina Bistoyong. She further alleged tha
t the position was non-existent. 94 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexa
nder Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristi
na Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Ch
ristopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Me
ndoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald
Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago,
Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On 14 Marc
h 1997, Cario received a faxed memorandum from Bistoyong directing her to report
to the ONCC Region II office. Thereafter, Cario filed an administrative complaint
for Grave Misconduct, Oppression and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest o
f the Service against Bistoyong. Bistoyong allegedly asked Cario a numb er of tim
es to withdraw the case in exchange for reinstatement to her former pos ition. C
ario refused whereupon Bistoyong threatened to reassign her to the ONCC R egion I
I in Cagayan or in Manila. On 14 April 1997, Atty. Daoas issued a memoran dum to
petitioner, reprimanding her for her failure to report at the Region II o ffice
, and stating that she was considered Absent Without Leave (AWOL) since 17 March
1997. Still, Cario continued to report for work in Region I everyday despit e th
e fact that she was not given any assignment. On 11 September 1997, the Civi l S
ervice Commission issued Resolution No. 97-3754 dismissing the appeal of Atty .
Daoas and Bistoyong and ordering them to return Cario to Region I. Cario reporte d
back to work only to be informed, through a memorandum, that the CSC resolutio
n was rendered moot and academic by her having been dropped from the rolls. On 1
1 March 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 98-0488 dismissing Cario's appeal an
d affirming her dropping from the rolls. From this Carino appealed to the Court
o f Appeals, which denied her petition for lack of merit. ISSUES: (1) Whether or
not the termination was valid. (2) Whether or not the reassignmen t order of th
e petitioner that is null and void, being violative of the Constitu tional right
to security of tenure, imposes upon her the obligation to comply wi th it befor
e it is declared illegal? HELD: (1) NO. As correctly stated by the Court of Appe
als, the validity of the reassig nment of petitioner was already settled by the
pronouncement of the Civil Servic e Commission that such reassignment was not va
lid and that she could not be tran sferred to another region without her consent
. It is true that the transfer or d etail of a public officer or employee is a p
rerogative of the appointing authori ty and that it can be done as the exigencie
s of the public service may require. As such, this Court in a number of cases al
lowed the reassignment of personnel b ut in such instances, they were not appoin
ted to a specific station or particula r unit or agency. The rule proscribes tra
nsfers without consent of officers appo inted not merely assigned to a particula
r station, such as in the case of herein petitioner who was appointed as Account
ant III in Region I. Hence, she could no t be reassigned to another station or r
egion without her consent. Otherwise, the unconsented transfer would amount to a
removal. (2) NO. Petitioner is thus just ified in not heeding her reassignment
order because her basis was not her "firm belief" that her transfer was illegal,
but the legal opinion of a regional offic e of the Civil Service Commission. Pe
titioner could not therefore be considered AWOL because she was in fact reportin
g for work in Region I until 29 April 1997 when Bistoyong issued a memorandum or
dering her to refrain from reporting for wo rk therein. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICER
S; A PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED TO OTHE R DUTIES FOR THE GOOD O
F THE PUBLIC SERVICE EVEN OVER HIS OBJECTION. REMEDIOS PA STOR vs. CITY OF PASIG
, et al. [G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002] MENDOZA, J: FACTS: Petitioner Remedios P
astor is ity (now City) of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of t
he investigation of reports against her concerning ments by her. In 1995, after
three years with no Budget Officer of the Municipal Municipal Administrator pend
ing the issuance of Advice of Allot case filed against her, she ask
ed for reinstatement to her former position but she was instead reassigned to an
other unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Co
m mission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. Howe
ve r, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decis
ion of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). 95 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nach
ura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr.,
Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Jo
yce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundaya
o, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremon
te, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshia
s Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! ISSUE: Whe
ther or not petitioner may be reinstated to her original position as B udget Off
icer. HELD: YES. We agree with the CSC that petitioner should now be re turned t
o her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amoun
t to her remova l without cause from the position to which she has been permanen
tly appointed. T he CSC held that, while petitioner's reassignment was originall
y made in the exi gency of the service without reduction in her rank, status, or
salary, responden t City Mayor failed to advance "sufficient reason" to warrant
petitioner's conti nuous reassignment for more than three years which "appears
too long for one to conduct the study assigned to her." There is no question tha
t we recognize the v alidity and indispensable necessity of the well established
rule that for the go od of public service and whenever public interest demands,
a public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even
over his objection wit hout necessarily violating his fundamental and legal righ
ts to security of tenur e in the civil service. But as we have already stated, "
such cannot be undertake n when the transfer of the employee is with a view to h
is removal" and "if the t ransfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employe
e away from his permanent position" because "such attitude is improper as it wou
ld in effect result in a c ircumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the
tenure of office of those w ho are in the civil service." TERMINATION OF OFFICIA
L RELATIONS TERMINATION; EXCEPT WHERE THE OFFICE WAS CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION
ITSELF, IT MAY BE ABOLISHED BY THE SAME LEGISLATURE THAT BROUGHT IT INTO EXISTE
NCE; EXCEPTI ON. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 14280
1-802, July 1 0, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: see page 89 ISSUE: Whether
or not the Pre sident has the authority to abolish EIIB. HELD: YES. The general
rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with th
e legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create inc
luded the power to destroy. A public office is either created by t he Constituti
on, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the offi ce was creat
ed by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legis lature that
brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, a
gencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Pre sidents pow
er of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particu lar offic
e or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry our reorga nization
measures. Under Section 31, Book III, of EO No. 292 (Administrative Cod e of 19
87), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office an in or der to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing aut horit
y to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President . For
this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencie s t
o the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, it was ruled that re or
ganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or ab o
lition thereof by reason economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.
The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the O
ffice of the President. Hence it is subject to the Presidents continuing authori
ty to reorganize. TERMINATION; NATURE OF ABANDONMENT. 96 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE
Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! LACSASA M.
ADIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001] PARDO, J: FACTS
: On December 6, 1994, Mayor Sultan Serad A. Batua issued a perma nent appointme
nt to Nasiba A. Nuska to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registra r. The s
ame appointment was duly approved by the Civil Service Commission Office , Maraw
i City on December 9, 1994. The new mayor, Lacsasa M. Adiong issued a mem orandu
m informing all municipal employees of the termination of their appointmen t and
directing them to clear themselves from money and property accountabilitie s. O
n July 1, 1995, another memorandum clarified this by specifying that the mas s t
ermination of services applied only to temporary or casual workers and requir in
g those holding approved permanent appointments to submit copies of their appo i
ntments. Due to respondent Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her appointment c
oupled with her failure to make a courtesy call on the petitioner as the new ma
yor, he terminated her services and appointed a certain Nanayaon Samporna in her
stead. On August 27, 1995, respondent Nuska wrote Mayor Adiong requesting for h
er reinstatement and payment of salaries covering the period July 1,1995 to Aug
u st 31, 1995. Mayor Adiong failed to act on the request. Hence, on March 11, 19
96 , respondent Nuska appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The latter
is sued a resolution declaring the termination of Nuskas employment to be invali
d an d ordering her immediate reinstatement. On March 17, 1997, petitioner Mayor
Adio ng filed a motion for reconsideration. On December 11, 1997, the CSC denie
d the motion. Mayor Adiong filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The CA dismissed t
he pet ition and affirmed the resolution of CSC. ISSUE: Whether or not responden
t Nuskas termination of employment was valid. HELD : NO. The Constitution provide
s that: "No person shall be deprived of life, libe rty or property without due p
rocess of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal pr otection of the laws.
" It further mandates that: "No officer or employee of the civil service shall b
e removed are suspended except for cause provided by law." In this case, respond
ent Nuska had a permanent appointment to the position of mu nicipal civil regist
rar of Ditsaan Ramain, Lanao del Sur. She thus enjoyed secur ity of tenure as gu
aranteed by law. As an employee in the civil service and as a civil service elig
ible, respondent Nuska entitled to the benefits, rights and p rivileges extended
to those belonging to the classified service. She could not b e removed or dism
issed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements
of due process. The reasons advanced by petitioner why respond ent Nuska s empl
oyment was terminated were the following: failure to make a cour tesy call, fail
ure to submit her appointment papers, and failure to report to wo rk which was t
antamount to abandonment. The failure to make a courtesy call to o ne s superior
is not an offense, much less a ground to terminate a person s empl oyment. Resp
ondent Nuska s failure to submit her appointment papers is not a cau se for her
outright dismissal. It was not shown that respondent Nuska was inform ed of the
July 1, 1995 memorandum requiring those with permanent appointments to submit th
eir papers. At the very least, petitioner could have reminded her to s ubmit the
documents without terminating her employment immediately. On the alleg ed aband
onment by respondent Nuska of her position, the same is without any basi s. It i
s significant to note that Nuska, in her letter dated 27 August 1995, inf ormed
Mayor Adiong that she did not resign and that the termination of her servi ces w
as not in accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations. She requ
ested that she be reinstated to her lawful position and her back salaries b e pa
id accordingly. The foregoing explains that although Nuska was physically ab sen
t in the office premises, all the while, she had the intention to return to w
ork. Hence, she could not be deemed to have abandoned or relinquished her right
to the position under an appointment with permanent employment status. A person
holding a public office may abandon such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non
-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office.
However, nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonm
e nt where such nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involun
ta ry failure perform. 97 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragon
ra, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Abandonmen
t may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or
discharge, for instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable del ay by an
officer illegally removed in taking steps to vindicate his rights may c onstitut
e an abandonment of the office. If a person was still willing to return to work
despite his physical absence, it would not constitute as abandonment. ELECTION L
AW PROCEDURE IN ELECTION CASES FILING FEES; ERRORS IN THE PAYMENT OF FILING FEES
IS NO LONGER EXCUSABLE. VILLOT A vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 146724,
August 10, 2001] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: In the May 12, 1997 barangay electio
ns, petitioner wa s proclaimed as the Punong Barangay of Barangay 752, Zone 81,
District V, over his opponent, herein private respondent. Consequently, the latt
er filed an election protest against petition er with the Metropolitan Trial Cou
rt of Manila, Branch 24. On December 29, 1999, the court, after due hearing rend
ered decision declaring private respondent as the duly elected Punong Barangay.
On March 2, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously paid wi
th the cashier of Metropolitan Trial Court the amount of P150.00 as appeal fee a
nd another P20.00 as legal research fee, or a total of P170.00. On March 9, 2000
, or nine (9) days after petitioner's receipt of the decision of the trial court
, he again paid with the Cash Division of the COMELEC the sum of P520.00 as appe
al fee and legal research fee. Private respond ent filed a motion to dismiss pet
itioner's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary perio
d. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lac k or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's appeal and in denying
his moti on for reconsideration. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, although petitio
ner filed his notice of appeal within th e reglementary period, however, he erro
neously paid the required appeal fees wit h the cashier of the Metropolitan Tria
l Court and not with the Cash Division of the COMELEC, as required in Sections 3
and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of P rocedure. After he realized his mista
ke, petitioner paid again with the Cash Div ision of the COMELEC the total amoun
t of P520.00 only on March 9, 2000 or four ( 4) days beyond the five (5) day reg
lementary period to appeal. Verily, the prese nt controversy is no different fro
m the case of Rodillas v. COMELEC, et al., whe re the necessary appeal fees were
likewise paid out of time. The Court held ther ein that: The mere filing of the
notice of appeal was not enough. It should be a ccompanied by the payment of th
e correct amount of appeal fee. The payment of th e full amount of the docket fe
e is an indispensable step for the perfection of a n appeal (Dorego v. Perez; Be
llo v. Fernandez). In both original and appellate c ase, the court acquires juri
sdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees as he
ld in Acda v. Minister of Labor. The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means
a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an e ssential requirement withou
t which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no app
eal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and ma
y be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the pro
vision of the law. In Soller v. COMELEC, et al., reit erating the cases of Loyol
a v. COMELEC, et al., and Miranda v. Castillo, et al., the Court stressed the ca
veat that errors in the payment of filing fees in elec tion cases is no longer e
xcusable. Thus, on the matter of non-payment or incompl
ete 98 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abaren
tos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Gu
zman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jaco
b, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo R
ejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Li
ta, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! payment of
filing fees we opined that: "the Court would no longer tolerate any m istake in
the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after th
e promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997." DISPOSITION OF CASES;
THE PERIOD PROVIDED BY ELECTION LAWS IN THE DISPOSITION OF CASES MUST BE OBSERVE
D FAITHFULLY BECAUSE AN ELECTION CASE, UNLIKE ORDINARY ACT IONS, INVOLVES PUBLIC
INTEREST. ISAGANI RIZON vs. JUDGE OSCAR E. ZERNA [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1575, Septemb
er 17, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: see page 86 ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in t
he dispositio n of cases, in the case at hand is inexcusable. HELD: YES. Section
258 of the Om nibus Election Code provides: SECTION 258. Preferential dispositi
on of contests in courts. - The courts, in th eir respective cases, shall give p
reference to election contests over all other cases, except those of habeas corp
us, and shall without delay, hear and, within thirty days from the date of their
submission for decision, but in every case wi thin six months after filing, dec
ide the same. Judge Zerna did not contest the a llegation of delay. He however a
scribed it to the process of going over each of the questioned ballot. This is a
flimsy excuse considering that the thirty-day p eriod provided him under Sec. 2
58 of the Omnibus Election Code is more than suff icient to examine a little ove
r a hundred questioned ballots, and that he could have asked the Court for an ex
tension of time to render decision if he was havin g problems with the "examinat
ion" of the contested ballots such that he could no t be able to decide the case
on time. As the Court have held in Espaola vs. Panay (248 SCRA 684) asking for a
n extension of time to dispose a case is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that s
omething sinister or corrupt is going on. In Bolalin vs. Occiano, it was held th
at: The period provided by [election] law[s] [in the disposition of cases] must b
e observed faithfully because an election case, unli ke ordinary actions, involv
es public interest. Time is of the essence in its dis position since the uncerta
inty as to who is the real choice of the people for th e position must soonest b
e dispelled. It is neither fair nor just that one whose right to the office is i
n doubt should remain in that office for an uncertain p eriod Moreover, records of
the OCA disclose that respondent had a "propensity [for ] delay in the disposit
ion of his cases." The Court also concurs with this ratio nalization, and metes
upon respondent a fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that s imilar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES DISQUALIFICATION; VIOLA
TION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 CONSTITUTES MORAL TURPITUD E AND CONVICTION THERE
FOR DISQUALIFIES A PERSON FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. VILLABER vs. COMMISSIO
N ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS
: Villaber was a candidate for the congressional sea t in the First District of
Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. His rival filed a petition to d
isqualify him and to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that Vill
aber had b een previously convicted for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the
crime invo lves moral turpitude; hence under Section 12 of the 99 POLITICAL LAW
COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balbo
a, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degolla
do, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr.
, Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabila
la, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, M
aria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Omnibus El
ection Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. Villaber was subse
quently disqualified by the COMELEC resting its decision on the case o f People
vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Hence this petition by Villaber, contending that v iolation
of B.P. 22 does not involve moral turpitude and that People vs. Tuanda is not a
pplicable since he is not a lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be d
isqualified on the ground that viola tion of BP 22 constitutes moral turpitude.
HELD: YES. As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted
the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or de
prav ity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
gene ral, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man a nd woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good moral
s.'' In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "
everyth ing which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals." We, how
ever, cl arified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that "not every crimi
nal act i nvolves moral turpitude," and that "as to what crime involves moral tu
rpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine." We further pronounced therein th
at: "in Int ernational Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), th
e Court adm itted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude d
oes or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum p
rohibitum. T here are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve mor
al turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala pr
ohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpi
tude is ultim ately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circums
tances surroun ding the violation of the statute." We reiterate here our ruling
in Dela Torre t hat the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitud
e is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surround
ing the violatio n of the statute. At any rate, the question of whether or not t
he crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alon
e. The elements o f the offense against BP 22 are: 1) The accused makes, draws o
r issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2) The accused knows at the
time of the issua nce that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or cred
it with, drawee ban k for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and 3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficienc
y of funds or credit , or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, witho ut any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The
presence of the secon d element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty.
Fe Tuanda we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 "imports decei
t" and "certainly relat es to and affects the good moral character of a person" T
he case did not make a d istinction, hence it applies to petitioner. DISQUALIFIC
ATION; THE TERM LIMIT FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS REFERS TO THE RIGHT TO B E ELECTED
AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE IN THE SAME ELECTIVE POSITION. ADORMEO vs. COMM ISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: Pet
itioner and private respondent, who was then the incumb ent mayor, were the only
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City i
n the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor i
n May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In t
h e election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of M
ay
12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2
001. On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Elect
ion Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certifica
te of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground
t hat the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecut
iv e terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992; (2) in the election of M
ay 1995; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only t
he unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election.
Pet itioner contended 100 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragon
ra, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! that Talag
a's candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 19
87 Constitution which provides. On March 9, 2001, private respondent r esponded
that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for
two (2) consecutive terms. Because of his defeat in the 1998 election b y Tagara
o, the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus h is mayo
rship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. On April 2 0, 200
1, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private respondent Ramon Y. Ta
laga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that h e had
already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candida cy w
as ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled. On April 27, 2001, private respondent fil
ed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that "three (3) consecutive term s"
means continuous service for nine (9) years and that the two (2) years servic e
from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao prevented him from having three consecutive years o
f service. He further alleged that the recall election was not a regular elect i
on, but a separate special election specifically to remove incompetent local of
ficials. On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private responden
t Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. It reversed the First Division's ruling and held that he
did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11
, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service
a s Mayor of Lucena City. On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent
wa s proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: Whether or not
public respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discre tion amounting to lac
k or excess of jurisdiction when it declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga,
Jr. qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14, 2 001 elections.
HELD: NO. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective posit
ion. Consequentl y, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecu
tive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the sa
me position for t he same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The Court held th at the two conditions for the application of the disqualifica
tion must concur: a ) that the official concerned has been elected for three con
secutive terms in th e same local government post and 2) that he has fully serve
d three consecutive t erms. Accordingly, COMELEC's ruling that private responden
t was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly t
wo years he was a priv ate citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupte
d by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither can respondent's victory in the r
ecall election be deeme d a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitutio
n as "voluntary renuncia tion" for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC,
the Court held that the s econd sentence of the constitutional provision under s
crutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall n
ot be considered as an int erruption in the continuity of service for the full t
erm for which he was electe d." The clear intent of the framers of the constitut
ion to bar any attempt to ci rcumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunc
iation of office and at the s ame time respect the people's choice and grant the
ir elected official full servi ce of a term is evident in this provision. Volunt
ary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation
of the three term limit; conve rsely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the ful l term provided by law amounts to an interrupti
on of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance wit
h the legal process of writ of ex ecution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from of
fice is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did no

t fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. DISQUALIFICATION; BEFORE A COMELEC RE
SOLUTION OF A DISQUALIFICATION CASE BECOMES FINAL AND EXECUTORY, THE BEI HAS THE
MINISTERIAL DUTY TO COUNT AND TALLY THE VO TES IN FAVOR OF THE CANDIDATE UNDER
INVESTIGATION. PAPANDAYAN, JR. vs. COMMISSIO N ON ELECTIONS [G.R. No. 147909, Ap
ril 16, 2002] 101 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Mar
icel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ri
cardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez,
Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Mont
es, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy,
Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa
Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! MENDOZA, J
: FACTS: In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the p osition o
f Mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr.,
respondent Fahida P. Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and
Maiko Hassa n Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner
in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC, alleging that petitioner was not a resid
ent of Baran gay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of B
ayang, Lanao del Sur. In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joi
nt affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga
and two membe rs of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal, Tubaran, Hadji Taher Ba
tawe and Saado ri Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in Barangay Tangca
l, Tubaran. Res pondent also submitted a similar affidavit, dated February 17, 2
001, of Samorana o Sarip, a member of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal. She a
verred that petit ioner did not state in his Voter Registration Record, accompli
shed on May 8, 199 9, the number of years and months he had been a resident of t
he Municipality of Tubaran. Hadji Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip later filed their A
ffidavits of Desist ance retracting their earlier statements. In its resolution,
dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared pet
itioner to be disqua lified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of
candidates and all vo tes cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as
stray votes. On May 14 , 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was am
ong those voted by the electorate for the position of municipal mayor. Meanwhile
, on May 19, 2001, peti tioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division
) in SPC No. 01-039 seek ing the issuance of an order directing the Board of Ele
ction Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his fav
or during the May 14, 200 1 elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116. T
he said resolution provide s that if the disqualification case has not become fi
nal and executory on the da y of the election, the BEI shall tally and count the
votes of the candidate decl ared disqualified On the other hand, respondent fil
ed a pre-proclamation case (S PC No. 01-259) in the COMELEC. On May 29, 2001, th
e First Division of the COMELE C (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order suspending
the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the
resolution of this present peti tion. However, despite the said order (in SPC No
. 01-039), the Municipal Board o f Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded with the proc
lamation of petitioner on June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent, therefore, th
e COMELEC (First Division), in an order, dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proc
lamation of petitioner, without p rejudice to the filing of the appropriate char
ges against the members of the Boa rd responsible for the proclamation. Thereaft
er, the COMELEC en banc issued a re solution, dated January 30, 2002, sustaining
the annulment of the proclamation o f petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039
for being moot and academic. It appea rs that, as a consequence thereof, the inc
umbent Vice-Mayor of Tubaran assumed t he position of mayor pursuant to the COME
LEC en banc resolution dated June 30, 2 002. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Boar
d of Election Inspectors is precluded from counting a nd tallying the votes cast
in petitioners favor. (2) Whether or not the factual f indings of the COMELEC de
claring petitioner as disqualified should be upheld. HELD: (1) NO. The resolutio
n, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc was not yet f inal and executory w
hen the elections were held on May 14, 2001. Consequently, t he Board of Electio
n Inspectors of Tubaran, in the exercise of its ministerial d uty, had to count
the votes cast in his favor. At the time the elections were he ld in May 14, 200
1, the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, had not yet bec ome final and ex
ecutory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was duty
bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of petitioner. (2) NO, even tho
ugh if the question of whether or not petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is a
f actual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and determined by the and t
ha t the COMELECs findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
fin ality, the evidence is insufficient to sustain its resolution. The Supreme C
ourt agreed with the Solicitor General that petitioner has duly proven that, alt
houg h he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, 102 POLITICAL L
AW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Bal
boa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degol
lado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, J
r., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabi
lala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze,
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! he later t
ransferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as show n by his
actual and physical presence therein for ten years prior to the May 14, 2001 ele
ctions. The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo
got married in 1990, they resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, th ere was
manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deem
ed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his
wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was rel
inquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran
to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private sec retary
of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. Furt her, t
he evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was regist ered
as a voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidac y al
though he later withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters , h
e was again registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tu
baran. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; THE FACT THAT
A CANDIDATE PROCLAIMED HAS ASSUMED O FFICE DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE COMELEC OF ITS A
UTHORITY TO ANNUL ANY CANVASS AND ILL EGAL PROCLAMATION. AMPATUAN, et al. vs. CO
MMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 149803, January 31, 2002] PARDO, J: FACT
S: Petitioners and respondents were candidates for the provincial elective posit
ions in the province of Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner Amp
atuan an d respondent Candao contended for the position of governor. The slate o
f Ampatua n emerged as winners as per election returns. On May 23, 2001, respond
ents filed a petition with the Comelec for the annulment of election results and
/or declar ation of failure of elections in several municipalities in the provin
ce of Magui ndanao. They claimed that the ballots were filled-up en masse by a f
ew persons t he night before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot box
es, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all.
On May 25, 2 001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the proclamation of th
e winning cand idates for congressman of the second district, governor, vice-gov
ernor and board members of Maguindanao. It was however lifted by Comelec on June
14, 2001 in re sponse to the petition filed by the petitioners on May 30, 2001.
Consequently, th e Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioners winners
. On June 16, 200 1, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition to set
aside the Comelec order dated June 14, 2001, and preliminary injunction to suspe
nd the effects of the proclamation of the petitioners. Meantime, petitioners ass
umed their respect ive offices on June 30, 2001. On July 17, 2001, the Court res
olved to deny respo ndents' petition. Petitioners' assumption into office notwit
hstanding, on July 2 6, 2001, the Comelec ordered the consolidation of responden
ts' petition for decl aration of failure of elections with SPA Nos. 01-244, 01-3
32, 01-360, 01-388 and 01-390. The COMELEC further ordered a random technical ex
amination on four to s even precincts per municipality on the thumb-marks and si
gnatures of the voters who voted and affixed in their voter's registration recor
ds, and forthwith direc ted the production of relevant election documents in the
se municipalities. On Au gust 28, 2001, the Comelec issued another order directi
ng the continuation of th e hearing and disposition of the consolidated SPAs on
the failure of elections a nd other incidents related thereto. It likewise order
ed the continuation of the technical examination of election documents as author
ized in the July 26, 2001 o rder. On September 26, 2001, petitioners filed the p
resent petition. They claime d that by virtue of their proclamation pursuant to
the June 14, 2001 order issue d by the Comelec, the proper remedy available to r
espondents was not a petition for declaration of failure of elections but an ele
ction protest. The former is h
eard summarily while the latter involves a full-blown trial. 103 POLITICAL LAW C
OMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa,
Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado
, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr.,
Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala
, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Mar
ia Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Petitioner
s argued that the manner by which the technical examination is to be c onducted
would defeat the summary nature of a petition for declaration of failur e of ele
ctions. On October 22, 2001, the Comelec issued an order suspending the implemen
tation of the two (2) assailed orders. However, on November 13, 2001, th e Comel
ec issued another order lifting the suspension. On November 20, 2001, the Suprem
e Court issued a temporary restraining order. ISSUE: Whether the Commission on E
lections was divested of its jurisdiction to h ear and decide respondents' petit
ion for declaration of failure of elections after petit ioners had been proclaim
ed. HELD: NO. Petitioners submit that by virtue of their proclamation as winners
, th e only remedy left for private respondents is to file an election protest,
in which cas e, original jurisdiction lies with the regular courts. In Loong v.
Commission on Elections, the court ruled that "a preproclamation controversy is
not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elect
ions." These two remedies were more specifically distinguished in this wise: "Wh
ile, however, the Comelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examin
ation of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go be
yond or behin d them and investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is dut
y bound to inv estigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other ana
logous causes i n actions for annulment of election results or for declaration o
f failure of ele ctions, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus
, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or decla
ration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election do
cuments and compa re and analyze voters' signatures and thumbprints in order to
determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean."
The fact that a ca ndidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Co
melec of its author ity to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. Responden
ts' allegation of ma ssive fraud and terrorism that attended the May 14, 2001 el
ection in the affecte d municipalities cannot be taken lightly as to warrant the
dismissal of their pe tition by the Comelec on the simple pretext that petition
ers had been proclaimed winners. Elucidating on the concept of failure of electi
on, the Court held that : " . . . before Comelec can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a fai lure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first
, no voting has taken pla ce in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law
or, even if there was vot ing, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure
to elect; and second, the v otes cast would affect the result of the election. I
n Loong vs. Commission on El ections, this Court added that the cause of such fa
ilure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence
, terrorism, fraud or other a nalogous cases." PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; AN
INCOMPLETE CANVASS IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT BE MAD E THE BASIS OF A PROCLAMATION. U
TTO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. No. 150111, January 31, 2002] PARD
O, J: FACTS: Petitioner Abdulkarim D. Utto and respondent Datu Almansa B. An gas
were candidates for the position of the mayor of the municipality of Sultan sa
Barong is, Maguindanao in the May 14, 2001 election. The original municipal boar
d of ca nvassers was composed of Nena Alid as chairman, and Maceda Lidasan Abo a
nd Noron Gonina, as members. During the canvassing on May 16, 2001, election ret
urns in Precinct Nos. 15A, 25A/26A, 66A, and 68A/69A were presented. On May 18,
2001, re spondent filed a petition to inhibit Alid and Abo, which resulted in th
e suspens
ion of the canvassing. Alid and Abo inhibited themselves from the proceedings. O
n May 24, 2001, Bai Haidy D. Mamalinta took over as chairperson, with Roihaida
K halid and Noron Gonina, as members of the municipal board of canvassers. The c
an vassing was again suspended when both Khalid and Gonina also inhibited themse
lve s from participating in the proceedings. 104 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy N
achura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr
., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro,
Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangund
ayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobre
monte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joes
hias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! On May 27,
2001, the provincial election supervisor designated Rufden Mangelen a nd Tamano
Diolanen as members of the municipal board of canvassers. In the morni ng of Ma
y 31, 2001, the municipal board of canvassers convened with chairperson Mamalint
a and member Asuncion Corazon Reneido present. The other member, Mowakir am Samu
ang was absent. Before the start of the canvass, chairperson Mamalinta di stribu
ted to the parties present a report on the status of canvassing. Out of th e 98
precincts, the municipal board of canvassers issued four (4) separate rulin gs e
xcluding the above-cited five (5) election returns. At this point, responden t o
rally manifested his intention to appeal the ruling, and simultaneously filed a
verified notice of appeal, which Bai Haidy D. Mamalinta (chairperson of the m un
icipal board of canvassers) refused to accept. Meanwhile, despite respondent's m
anifestation, the municipal board of canvassers proceeded with the proclamatio n
of the candidates for municipal offices. The board proclaimed petitioner as th
e duly elected mayor of the municipality. On June 1, 2001, Corazon Reniedo sent
a letter to Atty. Wynne Asdala, acting provincial election supervisor of Maguind
anao irrevocably resigning as member of the municipal board of canvassers of Su
l tan sa Barongis, Maguindanao in connection with the canvass of the election re
tu rns because she was being pressured to proclaim mayoralty candidate Abdulkari
m U tto in gross violation of Section 20, Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 38 (
9), Comelec Resolution No. 3848. Based on the canvass of 93 election returns, pe
titi oner obtained a margin of 149 votes over respondent. The total number of re
giste red voters from the five excluded election returns is 944. On June 7, 2001
, resp ondent filed with Comelec a motion to annul pendente lite petitioner's pr
oclamat ion contending that such proclamation violated Section 20 (i), Republic
Act No. 7166. 15. In spite of the law's mandate to suspend the canvassing and aw
ait the decision of the Comelec on the appeal, the municipal board of canvassers
proceed ed with the proclamation. On June 14, 2001, petitioner, with vice-mayor
alty cand idate and Sangguniang Bayan candidates who were proclaimed by the muni
cipal boar d of canvassers on May 31, 2001 filed with Comelec motions for interv
ention cont ending that their proclamation would not be affected by the five (5)
election re turns. On June 23, 2001, Comelec sent petitioner via telegram summo
ns with notic e of hearing attaching thereto a copy of respondent's verified app
eal. When the case was called for hearing on June 29, 2001, before the Comelec,
First Division , only counsel for respondent and intervenor vice-mayor appeared.
Petitioner was notified via telegram of the resetting of the hearing. On June 3
0, 2001, Comele c (First Division) promulgated a resolution ordering the inclusi
on of the uncanv assed election returns, and setting aside petitioner's proclama
tion. The Comelec (First Division) found petitioner's proclamation to be illegal
. Meanwhile, peti tioner took his oath at noon of the same day and immediately a
ssumed office as m ayor of the municipality of Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao.
On July 5, 2001, pe titioner filed with Comelec, First Division, a motion to rec
onsider the resoluti on of June 30, 2001, assailing it as contrary to law and th
e evidence and issued without affording him notice and opportunity to be heard a
s he was not impleade d as a party to the petition. Petitioner prayed that the i
nclusion of the uncanv assed return be set aside and the case remanded to the Co
melec (First Division) for the amendment of the petition to include all indispen
sable parties. Petition er claims that respondent by "skillful strategy" made it
appear that he (petitio ner) was a party in the appeal proceedings by filing a
motion to annul proclamat ion in the same proceedings and naming him party respo
ndent without obtaining pr ior leave of the Comelec. ISSUE: Whether or not the p
roclamation of petitioner was legal. HELD: NO. Assumi ng arguendo that petitione
r was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard, the petition would still b
e denied. The twin-requirement of notice and he aring in annulment of proclamati
on is not applicable because of the illegality o f petitioner's proclamation. Se
ction 38 (9), Comelec Resolution No. 3848 45 prov
ided the procedure in the disposition of contested election returns and certific
ate of canvass. The Comelec precludes the board of canvassers from proclaiming
a ny candidate as winner, except upon its authorization after it has ruled on th
e appeal of the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation thereof 105 POL
ITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nn
ifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et h
el Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! shall be v
oid ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the result
s of the election. This provision is mandatory and requires strict obs ervance.
Within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, respondent went to the Come
lec. Pursuant to Section 20 (i), Republic Act No. 7166, the municipal b oard of
canvassers may not proclaim any candidate without waiting for the author ization
of the Comelec. Considering that petitioner had a very small margin of 1 49 vot
es over respondent, and there were 944 registered voters from the five exc luded
election returns, the results of the municipal election would be undoubted ly a
dversely affected by the contested returns. The proclamation thus made is vo id
ab initio. It is now settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal a nd
cannot be the basis of a proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the tr
ue vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitte d
. When the municipal board of canvassers disregarded the five (5) election retu
rns, it in effect disenfranchised the voters of the excluded precincts. Time and
again, the Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. The fact that a
candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise
of such power. It is also true that after proclamation, the remedy of a party ag
grieved in an election is an election protest. This is on the assumption, howev
e r, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and
vo id, the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive Comelec of
th e power to declare such proclamation a nullity. PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
; IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MANIFEST ERROR IN THE CERTIF ICATE OF CANVASS SOUGHT TO
BE CORRECTED, THE COMELEC SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE REC ANVASS OR RE-COUNTING. O'H
ARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002] KA
PUNAN, J: FACTS: see page 59 ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused it
s discretion when it annulled the pr oclamation of petitioner as vice-governor o
f Rizal and by ordering the PBC of Ri zal to reconvene and correct the alleged m
anifest mathematical error supposedly committed by the MBC of Rizal. HELD: YES.
The COMELEC should have conducted further investigation or at least a technical
inspection or examination of election returns to verify the existence of the all
eged error before it gave credence to the statements of the MBC of Binangonan a
n d concluding outright that the Statement of Votes submitted by respondents wer
e accurate. The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these Statement of Votes because t
he y were prepared by the same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a mis
tak e due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical exhaustion." It would have
been more prudent to make a determination whether these same individuals committ
ed a ny other mistake in the tabulation or statement of votes. Even based on the
stat ements/affidavits of the MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors
sough t to be corrected do not appear on the face of the certificate of canvass
. As ab ove-stated, the alleged error which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest
does no t fall under the definition of "manifest error" which was laid down in
Chavez vs . COMELEC . . . To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of t
he certifi cates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or ob
jections th ereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifi
cally noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. The Constitution give
s the Commis sion on Elections the broad power "to enforce and administer all la
ws and regula tions to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, refer
endum and reca ll." The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervisi
on and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The
Commission must
do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cas
t in the elections. The Constitution 106 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura,
Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. C
ristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce D
io, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Ra
ji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, G
erald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tam
bago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! upgraded t
o a constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
to grant the Commission broad and more flexible powers to effectively perform it
s duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible el ections,
and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage. In the ab
sence of any manifest error in the certificate of canvass sought to be corrected
, the Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the election ret urns or
the re-counting of the ballots in the municipality of Binangonan in orde r to va
lidate the claim of its MBC. If after the re-canvass of the election retu rns or
the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or mathematic al mi
stake in the addition of the votes had been established, the Commission sho uld
have annulled the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous certificat e o
f canvass. If the records had borne out that petitioner's proclamation was th e
result of a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of v o
tes and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the electorate, there c
ould have been no valid proclamation to speak of. The issue would involve a prep
roclamation controversy. ELECTION CONTESTS ELECTION CONTESTS; PRE-CONDITIONS FOR
DECLARING A FAILURE OF ELECTION. CAWASA vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. [G
.R. No. 150469, May 30, 2002] CARPIO, J: FACTS: Petitioner Jun Cawasa and privat
e respondent Adbulmalik Manamp aran were among the candidates for mayor in the M
unicipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. Out o f the 40 precincts in Nunungan,
only 36 functioned, as there was a failure of el ection in the remaining 4 preci
ncts. Special elections were set considering that that the number of registered
voters in the remaining 4 precincts would affect the election results. Comelec,
en banc, however took cognizance of the petition of private respondent for the a
nnulment of election results for the following re asons: a) The case pending bef
ore the second division of the Comelec is a pre-pr oclamation controversy, while
the case pending before the Comelec en banc is a c ase for annulment of electio
n results. b) Comelec found that the special electio ns were not held in the des
ignated polling places in Nunungan but were transferr ed to the different munici
palities without any authority from the Comelec, in vi olation of the due proces
s requisites. Moreover, nothing in the records could sh ow that notice was given
to the political candidates and to the registered voter s affected by the speci
al elections of the said transfer of polling places. c) T he Comelec found that
members of the Philippine Army 26th Infantry Battalion ser ved as election inspe
ctors without authority from Comelec. ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec en banc
resolution was issued without jurisdic tion and/or with grave abuse of discretio
n amounting to lack of jurisdiction. HELD: NO. The transfer was made not only in
blatant disregard of the Comelec res olution specifying the polling places but
also provisions of the Election Code (Sections 153 and 154). As clearly provided
by the law, the location of polling places sh all be the same as that of the pr
eceding regular election. However, charges may be initiated by written petition
of the majority of the voters of the precinct o r agreement of all the political
parties or by resolution of the Comelec after n otice and hearing. But ultimate
ly, it is the Comelec which determines whether a change is necessary after notic
e and hearing. The Comelec has unequivocally stat ed that nothing in the records
showed that notice was given to the political can didates and registered voters
affected by the transfer. There is no cogent reaso
n for us to disturb the findings of the Comelec on this matter. Indeed, the fact
ual findings of the Comelec supported by the substantial, evidence shall be fin
a l and non-reviewable. 107 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Rag
onjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Const
antino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christophe
r Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, J
eanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto,
Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ven
tura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! Next, the
appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI is another gra ve irregu
larity that attended the special elections. There was absolutely no leg al basis
for the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. (Sec O EC Sect
ions 164, 165, 166, 170, and Sec. 13 of RA No. 6646). Prayers to annul el ection
results, as in the instant case, and a prayer to declare failure of elect ions
based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous cases, are actua
lly of the same nature and the Election Code denominates them similarly. Th e Co
melec may exercise the power to annul election results or declare a failure of e
lection motu propio, or upon a verified petition. The hearing of the case sh all
be summary in nature. A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in al
l instances essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a f
air and reassurable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the cont ro
versy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. In fine, a
trial is not at all indispensable to satisfy the demands of due process. The p r
e-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: 1) That no voting has bee
n held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terroris
m, fraud or other analogous cases; and 2) That the votes not cast therein are s
u fficient to affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these two
ci rcumstances justifies the calling of special elections. Here, the Comelec fou
nd that the special elections were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer
of the polling places and the appointment of military personnel as members of t
he BEI. Inevitably, the Comelec could not ascertain who voted during the special
el ections. The circumstances were such that the entire electoral process was n
ot w orthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect, no election was held
. LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS LOCAL AUTONOMY LOCAL AUTONOMY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNI
TS CANNOT ENACT ORDINANCES THAT GO AGAINST T HE LAWS DULY ENACTED BY CONGRESS. L
INA vs. PAO [G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001] QUISUMBING, J: FACTS: On December
29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appoint ed agent by the Philippine Charit
y Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the o peration of lott
o. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's pe
rmit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dat
ed February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinanc e passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 which declared
its policy against the operation of lotto within the province. A s a result of
this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint f or declarator
y relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restr aining order
. On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, pr omulgated h
is decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508. Petitioners contend that the assailed resolu tion is a
valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement
objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is l ikewise a
valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the G eneral W
elfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Governm ent Cod
e of 1991. They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illega l beca
use no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sough t bef
ore it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and
27 of R.A. 7160. ISSUES: 108 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ra
gonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Cons
tantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (1) Whethe
r Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lag una and t
he denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid. (2) Whether prio r consul
tations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lot to syst
em can be operated in a given local government unit. HELD: (1) YES. The entire c
ontroversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to is sue a mayor's permit
for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private res pondent. According
to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the ope
ration of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, how ever, merely state
s the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy state
ment on the part of the local council, which is not selfexecut ing. As a policy
statement expressing the local government's objection to the lo tto, such resolu
tion is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy t o air its views
which may be contrary to that of the national government's. Howe ver, this free
dom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local government s may actuall
y enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. G iven this pr
emise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpre
ted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. Th e game of l
otto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government t hrough an
Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the
law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries
. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Lo cal counc
ils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by C ongress
as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the p rincipa
l or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to s uggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the ma
ndate of the statute. (2) NO. As for the second issue, we hold that petiti oners
erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherw ise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up
of lotto outlets around the country. From a careful reading of said provisio ns,
we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to
be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program n or
a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PC S
O. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that l
otto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Gover
nment Code. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
S; THE CREATION OF A NEW LGU THROUGH A DIVISION OR MERGER OF EXISTING LGUs IS RE
COGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. CAWALING vs. C OMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [G.R. NO.
146319, October 26, 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: By virtue of Republic A
ct 8806, the City of Sorsog on was created by merging the Municipalities of Baco
n and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon. A plebiscite w as conducted which wa
s approved by the majority of the votes cast, and ratified the Act. Petitioner a
s a taxpayer, now assails the validity of the said Act on t he ground that it vi
olates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 i n relation with Sec
tion 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which requires th at only a municipal
ity or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city. He is thus as
sailing its mode of creation and that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a compon
ent city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of baran
gays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 880
6 has done. Petitioner further assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted
by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City asserting t
hat the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 109 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy
Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, J
r., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro
, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangun
dayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobr
emonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joe
shias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! should be
conducted within 120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express provision
of its Section 54. The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former P resident
Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebi scite wa
s conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period a fter th
e approval of the Act; as the 120-day period expired without a plebiscite conduc
ted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the
plebiscite held on December 16, 2000. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that i
t scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effecti
vity of the Act as under its Section 65, the Act shall take effect upon i ts pub
lication in at least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation. ISSUES
: (1) Whether or not the law is constitutional. (2) Whether or not the said law
vi olates the provisions of the Local Government Code and Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution. (3) Whether or not the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC
is valid. HELD: (1) YES. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of const
itutionality. Th is presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of power
s which enjoins u pon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becom
ing courtesy for e ach other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joi
nt act of the Legis lature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ens
ure that it is in ac cord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may dec
lare a law, or portio ns thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown
a clear and unequivoca l breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or ar
gumentative one. In oth er words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonab
le doubt, for to doubt i s to sustain. (2) NO. Petitioner's constricted reading
of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a clus
ter of barangays may be c onverted into a component city" is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes b y which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay i n accordance with the criteria established by the Co
de. Thus, Section 8 of the C ode distinctly provides: "SECTION 8. Division and M
erger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with
the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, T
hat such division shall not r educe the income, population, or land area of the
local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements p
rescribed in this Code: Provid ed, further, That the income classification of th
e original local government uni t or units shall not fall below its current inco
me classification prior to such division. . . . ." Verily, the creation of an en
tirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing loca
l government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merg
er or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. (3) YE
S. The law was first published i n the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspape
r of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a news
paper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of
the law was completed on Septemb er 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMEL
EC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which
to conduct the plebiscite, not fr om the date of its approval (August 16, 2000)
when the law had not yet been publ ished. Since publication is indispensable fo
r the effectivity of a law, citing t he landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera, it cou
ld only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the December 16
, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the
law on September 1, 2000.
POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS POWERS OF LGUs; THE ALLOCATION OF THE SPECIAL E
DUCATION FUND FOR THE ESTABLISHME NT AND MAINTENANCE OF EXTENSION CLASSES LOGICA
LLY IMPLIES THE HIRING AND COMPENS ATION OF TEACHERS BUT NOT THE GRANTING OF SCH
OLARSHIPS. 110 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Marice
l Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricar
do de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, An
dre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes,
Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ry
an Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Vi
llaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! COA of the
PROVINCE of CEBU vs. PROVINCE of CEBU [G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001] YNAR
ES-SANTIAGO, J: FACTS: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as c hai
rman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, a
ppointed classroom teache rs who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle e
xtension classes that woul d accommodate students in the public schools. In the
audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of
Cebu, for the period Januar y to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and pe
rsonnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the exten
sion classes were charged ag ainst the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF).
Likewise charged to the SEF w ere the college scholarship grants of the province
. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, sa
ying that disbursements for th e salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are
not chargeable to the provinci al SEF. Faced with the Notices of Suspension iss
ued by the COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petit
ion for declaratory relief with the trial court. Invoking the legal maxim "expre
ssio unius est exclusio alterius ," petitioner alleges that since salaries, pers
onnel-related benefits and schola rship grants are not among those authorized as
lawful expenditures of the SEF un der the Local Government Code, they should be
deemed excluded therefrom. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the salaries and personne
l-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives
in connection with the establishmen t and maintenance of extension classes may
be charged to the Special Education F und (SEF) of the local government unit con
cerned. (2) Whether or not the expense s for college scholarship grants may be c
harged to the Special Education Fund (S EF) of the local government unit concern
ed. HELD: (1) YES. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the inte
nt of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statu
te. In thi s connection, the following portions of the deliberations of the Sena
te on the s econd reading of the Local Government Code on July 30, 1990 are sign
ificant: Sena tor Pimentel: Mr. President, pursuant to the wording of the propose
d transfer of this elementary school system to local government units, what are
specifically covered here are merely the construction, repair, and maintenance o
f elementary school buildings and other structures connected with public element
ary school ed ucation, payment of salaries, emoluments, allowances et cetera, pr
ocurement of b ooks, other teaching materials and equipment needed for the prope
r implementatio n of the program. There is nothing here that will indicate that
the local govern ment will have any right to alter the curriculum. Undoubtedly, t
he aforecited exc hange of views clearly demonstrates that the legislature inten
ded the SEF to ans wer for the compensation of teachers handling extension class
es Even under the d octrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF
for the establishmen t and maintenance of extension classes logically implies th
e hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their
services. Every statu te is understood, by implication, to contain all such prov
isions as may be neces sary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make eff
ective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and su bsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inf
erred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresp
onding compensation of t hese teachers are necessary and indispensable to the es
tablishment and maintenan ce of extension classes. (2) NO. With respect, however
, to college scholarship g rants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local G
overnment Code reveals that
said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be
appropriated. It should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Gov
ernment Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike p
ayment of salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of "establishment a
n d maintenance of extension classes" and "operation and maintenance of public s
ch ools," the "granting of 111 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander
Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Co
nstantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christo
pher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza
, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sott
o, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae
Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! government
scholarship to poor but deserving students" was omitted in Sections 1 00 (c) an
d 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus e st. A pe
rson, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant o
f scholarship where the legislature has omitted it. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW TRE
ATIES TREATIES; THE PARIS CONVENTION RESPECTS THE RIGHTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES TO
ADOPT LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT ABUSES WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM THE EXERCIS
E OF E XCLUSIVE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE PATENT. SMITH KLINE & FRENCH LABORATORIE
S vs. C OURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 121267, October 23, 2001] KAPUNAN, J: FACTS: P
etitioner is the assignee of Letters Patent No. 12207 coveri ng the pharmaceutic
al product Cimetidine, which relates to derivatives of heterocyclicthio or lower
al koxy or amino lower alkyl thiourea, ureas or guanadines issued by the Bureau
of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). Private respondent file
d wi th the BPTTT a petition for compulsory license to manufacture and produce i
ts ow n brand of medicines using Cimetidine. Petitioner opposed the petition for
compu lsory license, arguing that the private respondent had no cause of action
and fa iled to allege how it intended to work the patented product. After both
parties were heard, the BPTTT rendered a decision directing the issuance of a co
mpulsory license to private respondent to use, manufacture and sell in the Phili
ppines i ts own brand of pharmaceutical products containing. Petitioner thereaft
er filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the decision of the
BPTTT, ar guing that said decision is an invalid exercise of police power and is
violative of international law. Petitioner states that the grant of a compulsor
y license to private respondent is an invalid exercise of police power since it
was not sh own that there is an overwhelming public necessity for such grant, co
nsidering t hat petitioner is able to provide an adequate supply of Cimetidine t
o satisfy th e needs of the Philippine market. It argues further that the provis
ions of the P atent Law on compulsory licensing contravene the Convention of Par
is for the Pro tection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), which allegedl
y permits the g ranting of a compulsory license over a patented product only to
prevent abuses w hich might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights con
ferred by the pat ent, or on the ground of failure to work or insufficient worki
ng of the patented product, within four years from the date of filing of the pat
ent application or three years from the date of grant of the patent, whichever e
xpires last. Petit ioner opines that the inclusion of grounds for the grant of a
compulsory license in Section 34 of the Patent Law other than those provided un
der the Paris Conve ntion constitutes a violation of the Philippines' obligation
to adhere to the pr ovisions of said treaty. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the sai
d grant of compulsory license was an invalid exercise of police power. (2) Wheth
er or not the grant violated the international law, pa rticularly the Paris Conv
ention. HELD: (1) NO. The grant of the compulsory license satisfies the requirem
ents of the pr ovisions of Section 34 of the Patent Law. More than ten years hav
e passed since the patent for Cimetidine was issued to petitioner and its predec
essors-in-inter est, and the compulsory license applied for by private responden
t is for the use , manufacture and sale of a medicinal product. Furthermore, bot
h the appellate c ourt and the BPTTT found that private respondent had the capab
ility to work Cime
tidine or to make use thereof in the manufacture of a useful product. 112 POLITI
CAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je nnife
r Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de Guzman, Et hel
Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Dio, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanit o L
im, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, Raji Mendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aim ee
Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Glorios a
Sze, Maria Fe Taal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! (2) NO. Pe
titioner's contention that Section 34 of the Patent Law contravenes th e Paris C
onvention because the former provides for grounds for the grant of a co mpulsory
license in addition to those found in the latter, is likewise incorrect . Artic
le 5, Section A(2) of the Paris Convention states: Each country of the un ion sh
all have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compu
lsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work. S ectio
n A(2) of Article 5 of the Paris Conventional unequivocally and explicitly respe
cts the right of member countries to adopt legislative measures to provide for t
he grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result from t he e
xercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent. An example provided of
possible abuses is "failure to work;" however, as such, is merely supplied b y w
ay of an example, it is plain that the treaty does not preclude the inclusion of
other forms of categories of abuses. TREATIES; THE VFA GIVES LEGITIMACY TO THE
BALIKATAN EXERCISES; THERE IS NO TREAT Y ALLOWING US TROOPS TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT
IN THE PHILIPPINES. LIM vs. HONORABLE E XECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 151445, Apr
il 11, 2002] DE LEON, JR., J: FACTS: Beginning January of this year 2002, person
nel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mi
ndanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan
02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exerc ises are the largest combined training
operations involving Filipino and America n troops. In theory, they are a simula
tion of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilate
ral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1
951. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arth ur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando file
d this petition for certiorari and prohibit ion, attacking the constitutionality
of the joint exercise and seeking the issua nce of a writ of prohibition/injunc
tion to prevent US troops from participating in areas of armed conflict on the g
round that such is in gross violation of the Constitution. They argue that: I. T
he Philippines and the United States signed t he Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in
1951 to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the Constitutional
Processes of each country only in the case of a n armed attack by an external agg
ressor, meaning a third country against one of them. By no stretch of the imagin
ation can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf bandit s in Basilan constitute an exter
nal armed force that has subjected the Philippin es to an armed external attack
to warrant US military assistance under the MDT o f 1951. II. Neither does the V
FA of 1999 authorize American soldiers to engage i n combat operations in Philip
pine territory, not even to fire beck if fired upon. They were joined subsequently
by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both partylist organizations, who filed
a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. L im and Ersando filed suit in
their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers . SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on t
he other hand, aver that certain members of their or ganization are residents of
Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affec ted by the operations bein
g conducted in Mindanao. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Balikatan activities are c
overed under the Visiting Forces Agreement and are therefore valid. (2) Whether
or not the American soldiers are authorized to engage in combat in the Philippin
es. 113 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abare
ntos, Je nnifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino, Ricardo de G
uzman, Et
TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! HELD: (1)
YES. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent ba sis
, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The express io
n is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the ap p
roval of the Philippine government. After studied reflection, it appeared farfe
tched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "activities" arose
from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parti
es a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojo
u rn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the
j oint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveilla
nce to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations t
o a ssist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects
suc h as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and
the l ike. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikat
an exe rcises. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan 02-1," a "mutual ant
iterror ism advising, assisting and training exercise," falls under the umbrella
of sanc tioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both th
e history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclu
sion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one
subject o f the instant petition, are indeed authorized. (2) NO. There is no tre
aty or agr eement allowing US troops to engage in combat in the Philippines. Par
agraph 8 of section I of the VFA stipulates that US exercise participants may no
t engage in combat "except in self-defense. Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow fo
reign troop s to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Both the Mu
tual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties
and internat ional agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read
in the contex t of the 1987 Constitution. The present Constitution contains key
provisions use ful in determining the extent to which foreign military troops ar
e allowed in Ph ilippine territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and S
tate Policies, i t is provided that: xxx xxx xxx SEC. 2. The Philippines renounc
es war as an inst rument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted princ
iples of internati onal law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the po
licy of peace, equa lity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nati
ons. xxx xxx xxx SEC . 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territo rial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-d
etermination. SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, ad
opts and pursues a pol icy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country. xxx x
xx xxx The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign mili
tary presence in the co untry, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreig
n troops are allowed ent ry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception

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CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERA

TIONS Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!! FUNDAMENTA

determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which express

POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Je

k to the Sandiganbayan. Second, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder,

ight to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of d

HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed,

SEPARATE OPINION: VITUG, J: In addressing the present motion for reconsideration

OT APPLY TO A SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT NOT ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING BY THE AUTH

MIRANDA DOCTRINE; TWO KINDS OF INVOLUNTARY OR COERCED CONFESSIONS TREATED IN SEC

a conviction, if one should be had. The purpose of arraignment is to apprise the

47 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos,

, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legisla

68 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos,

to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2. W

[G.R. No. 137266, December 5. 2001] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: 72 POLITICAL LAW COMM

BELLOSILLO, J: FACTS: Private respondent Rene A. Bornales, Legal Aide, Regional

ng criminal or administrative case at the time of her appointment as manager. Sh

ISSUES: 79 POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Ab

lure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. LIABILITY

that is, to handle Developmental Reading lessons and be an assistant Librarian,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J: FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration for an admini

competence of a legitimate body done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Va

rued as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein

fice is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did no

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