K. N.

Upadhyaya The Bhagavad

GIG

on war and peace

With the world precariously poised between war and peace, the question is
often raised in India whether the Bhagavad Gitd advocates war or peace.
Posed in such a form, however, the question tends to create some misleading
impressions, namely that the Gita is primarily interested in teaching either
war or peace and that a teaching of war and of peace must be incompatible.
None of these suppositions turn out to be true in the light of what the Gitd
primarily stands for. The central message of the Gitii is something more
fundamental, something having a universal range, in the total perspective of
which the question of war and peace is just one problem among many others.
Moreover, as envisaged by the Gitii, war is not incompatible with a life of
peace and righteousness.
It should be made clear at the very outset that the "peace" spoken of here
as an alternative to war is not to be confused with that which is frequently
referred to in the Gitd as the ultimate end of life.' There can be hardly any
doubt or controversy about the fact that peace (&ti), in this sense, is almost universally recognized by the different religio-philosophical systems of
India to be the supreme end of life, with different means suggested to attain
it. So the problem posed here is not in relation to the supreme end but only
with reference to the means adopted to achieve it. In other words, the problem is whether the Gitii enjoins violent or nonviolent means.
There are, indeed, some factors which naturally give rise to the impression
that the primary teaching of the Gitii consists in prescribing either war or
peace, violent or nonviolent means. Evidently, the G ~ t dis taught on the warfront at the crucial time when Arjuna, just before the commencement of the
war, is terribly upset with the problem whether to fight or not to fight. In the
course of the exhortation, he is explicitly and repeatedly told : "get up, 0
Arjuna, with a resolve to fight," "get ready for the battle," "fight, 0 Arjuna,"
"remember me at all times and fight," "fight dispassionately," etc. But, on
the other hand, virtues like nonviolence (ahiuizsd), non-anger (akrodhah),
peace (Sdntih), forgiveness ( k s a w ), amity (adrohah) and compassion to
beings (dayd bhfitesu) are enumerated as essential possessions of a righteous
man (XVI. 2 , 3 ) . Being free from enmity to all creatures (XI. 53) and doing
good to all beings (V. 25 ; XII. 4) are considered the sine qua non of attaining the highest goal. I n view of these facts, some people, stressing one or the
other side, are led to think that the Gita stands primarily for either war or
peace.
Even some eminent scholars and admirers of the Gitd seem to be deluded
by this paradoxical situation and try to resolve the difficulty by suggesting
that war is not intended here to be taken literally but only allegorically. For
K. N. Ubadhyaya is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Indian Institute of Technology,

Kanpur, India.

1 GitU 11. 70, 71; IV. 39; XVIII. 6 2 ; Sdntim nirvdpaparamdm (VI. 1 5 ) .

example, Gandhi, the well-known champion of nonviolence and a noted admirer and devoted follower of the Gitti, comments as follows: "I felt that it
[the Gitd] was not a historical work but that under the guise of physical warfare it described the duel that perpetually went on in the hearts of mankind,
and that physical warfare was brought in merely to make the description of
the internal duel more a l l ~ r i n g . " ~
S. Radhakrishnan, attempting a further amplification of the same view, observes: "The life of the soul is symbolised by the battlefield of Kuruksetra,
and the Kauravas are the enemies who impede the progress of the soul. Arjuna attempts to recapture the kingdom of man by resisting the temptations
and controlling the passion^."^ According to him "the chariot stands for the
psychophysical vehicle. The steeds are the senses, the reins their controls, but
the charioteer, the guide is the spirit or real self, Htman. Kysna, the charioteer,
is the Spirit in us."4
Such attempts at allegorical explanation may be quite ingenious, but they
are not convincing since it is almost impossible to provide similar explanations for all the different warriors of the two parties mentioned by name, for
the elaborate paraphernalia of war referred to in a realistic manner, and for
the entire sequence of events described in the course of the narrative. In fact,
if the allegorical or metaphorical interpretation is accepted, the Gita will lose
all its relevance to the context of the Mahiibhiirata in which it is fitted, and
which it itself presupposes and relates throughout the text.
Another effort to extricate the Gitd from the aforesaid difficulty is made
by Nataraja Guru who, though accepting the fact of actual war, makes the
plea that the background of war should not be taken to impair "the wisdom
teaching" of the Grtn. H e urges "that in the study of the Grtcz the blemish of
the canvas should not be attributed to the picture in the mind of the painter.
The canvas here was the historical setting of the Mahfibhnrata as described
in the epic poem, and the painting was the wisdom teaching that VyHsa
wanted to transmit to future generations through this medium."This observation of Nataraja Guru amounts to saying that VyBsa, the author of
"wisdom teaching" (the Grtd is perhaps regarded by him mainly as a gospel
of knowledge and renunciation to be practiced adequately by saints and yogins) has not displayed his wisdom in selecting the appropriate background
for this teaching. We are, however, inclined to think that its author was really
anxious to bring out as prominently as possible his commendation for the
relentless discharge of one's duty (svadharma) at all costs and in all situaM. K. Gandhi, Gitd: The Mother, ed. Jag Parvesh Chander (4th ed. ; Lahore: Indian

Publishing Works, 1946-47)) p. 14.

3 Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), I, 520.

4 The Bhagavadgitd (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 85.

6 The Bhagavadgita (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. ix.

tions, and that the background for this teaching was well-chosen, since by
weaving it with the central theme of the Epic-the war itself-the author
secures for it the desired prominence. W e are, therefore, inclined to treat the
description of war in the Grta in its literal and not allegorical sense.
Should we then say that the Grta preaches war and violence without compunction and shows no respect or regard for life? Scholars such as Professor
Karl H. Potter and Professor K. N. Jayatilleke, who take the Gita teaching
of war in its literal sense, seem to support this position. In an open disregard
to the explicit statements of Arjuna, uttered with utmost pity or compassion
(kypayd paraya'vi;to; I. 28; 11. I), that he would not incur the sin of killing
even for the sake of the kingdom of the three worlds (I. 35-36,45), would
prefer begging to killing (11. 5), would not inflict injury with his arrows on
worthy people ( I I . 4 ) , and would prefer to be killed rather than to live to
enjoy the pleasures tainted with blood (I. 35), Professor Potter notices a
"singular lack of pityw6on the part of Arjuna and observes that
he (Arjuna) worries about everything else but the pain he may inflict upon
those he wounds or kills. It is therefore not appropriate for Krishna to give
him an extended answer intended to alleviate worries about the pain he might
produce. For other people, it is extremely important to do so; it is the pain
one causes others that most worries a Christian, or indeed a Buddhist or a
Jain, when he considers what to do in Arjuna's case.7
Thus, according to him there is "the feeling that this is a callous philosophy."*
Professor Jayatilleke also thinks that the G w ~ in
, contradistinction to Buddhism, exhorts "to fight at any cost in a war in which the state is engaged."O
Such an interpretation of the Gita prescribing reckless war in an unreserved
manner seems to be another extreme view held by scholars. The true significance of the Gitd teaching, however, as I understand it, is something
deeper, and the problem deserves a more careful consideration.
The despondency of Arjuna is looked upon by K n n a not merely as the
accidental passing mood of a disheartened man, but as a deep-rooted and
widespread belief of people, symptomatic of the age, that the true goal of life
can be realized only by shaking off the burden of active worldly life. This
doctrine of renunciation (nivytti) was so dominant in India that renouncing
worldly life was considered the very first step to pursue a higher life. The
Gltd takes up the challenge of the age and puts forward a predominantly activistic philosophy while preserving at the same time the essence of renunciation. Thus, it attempts to solve the very fundamental issue of the norm of
~Presugposifionsof India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc.,

1963), p. 20.

pp. 20-21.

8 Ibid., p. 21.

0 "Some Aspects of Gita and Buddhist Ethics,"

nos. 2 & 3 (1955), 146.

7 Ibid.,

University of Ceylon Review, XIII,

human conduct and offers a general guiding principle which is equally applicable to all particular problems of life, including the one of war and peace
with which Arjuna was confronted.
The keynote of this principle is activism (pravytti)1 which seeks to incorporate in itself the essence of renunciation (nivytti). Thus, renunciation is
no longer a renunciation of action but a "renunciation in action," as Professor
Hiriyanna calls it.ll It is this "renunciation in action," or disinterested discharge of one's duty, which is reinforced by the Gfta from its different standpoints of knowledge ( j s ~ n a ) devotion
,
(bhakti) , and action (karma) regardless of the fruit, and which is said to lead ultimately to the highest goal.
From the standpoint of knowledge, Arjuna is reminded of the imperishable and immortal nature of the Self and is exhorted to remain firm and unperturbed in the discharge of his duty (11. 13-30). The knower of the truth
is said to rise above the vicissitudes of life and is no longer to be moved by
the rise or fall (birth or death) of perishable things, no longer to be swayed
by emotional weaknesses, desires, and passions. Thus, by pointing out the
inevitability of the destruction of the physical body, on the one hand, and
the impossibility of the destruction of the eternal self, on the other, Arjuna
is asked to perform his duties with equanimity (samatva) or detachment
(sahnydsa). It is said: "The wise man, 0 Arjuna, who remains equal in
pain and pleasure (samaduhkhasukham) and who is not troubled by these
(pairs of opposites), he, indeed, is fit for attaining immortality" (11. 15).
By means of devotion also the same teaching is imparted. Devotion consists not in escaping from worldly duties but in dedicating all activities to
God. It does not require abandonment of work but only the abandonment
of selfish desires. This is the crux of the teaching of complete surrender to
God. Accordingly, Arjuna is told: "Dedicating all actions to Me by your
spiritualised mind and being free from desire and egotism, fight without the
fever (of emotion)" (111.30). "With your mind and intellect given to Me,
you will undoubtedly come to Me" (VIII. 7). Work is worship, the best
homage to God. "Man attains perfection by worshipping Him through his
own duty" (XVIII. 46). Thus, the true import of devotion is taught as follows : "Doing continually all actions whatsoever, resigning unto Me, one
reaches by My grace the eternal and imperishable goal" (XVIII. 56).
The same is reiterated through the teaching of karmayoga. Yoga in this
context is defined as "equanimity" (samatvam; 11.48) or skillfulness in action" (karmmu kaus'alam; 11. 50). Action performed in the state of absolute
equanimity or with utter detachment to the fruit is considered "skillful,"
since in so doing a man goes unsullied even while engaged in action. Action,
thus, is veritably converted into inaction. I t is clearly stated: "Having aban10

Cf. Pravyttilak,capaJ caiva dharmo ndrdyapdtmakah. Mahdbhdrata (Sdnti, 347), 80-81.

of Indian Philosojhy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 121.

11Outlines

doned attachment to the fruit of action, ever content and free from dependence, one, even though engaged in action, does nothing at all" ( I V . 20).
"He is not contaminated even though he works" (V. 7 ) . So the famous teaching
of karmayoga runs as follows: "Action alone is thy concern and never its
fruits" (11. 4 7 ) , and it is added : "Man attains to the highest by performing
action without attachment" (111. 19).
Thus the precept of distinterested performance of one's own duty (svadharma) is offered by the Gzta as the central guiding principle which is woven
in the very fibers of all the paths advocated by it. From this general principle
it automatically follows that the royal prince, Arjuna, should stick unflinchingly to his pious duty of fighting against the evildoers.
There is, however, one very important point regarding this precept of "duty
for duty's sake" which must not be lost sight of, namely that the duty to be
performed must be in keeping with the codes of morality as embodied in the
scripture. A man cannot take recourse to a profession which is mean and forbidden and vindicate it by saying that it is his duty. The Gata clearly says:
"Therefore let the scripture be your authority for determining what should
be done and what should not be done" ( X V I . 24). It is also added: "He
who discards the scriptural law and acts according to the promptings of his
desire does not attain either perfection, or happiness or the supreme goal"
( X V I . 23).
From these considerations it is clear that the war is prescribed by the Gita
for Arjuna only because it happens to be one of the sacred duties of a k~atriya
in a special circumstance.12 In keeping with its ideal of duty for duty's sake,
the Grtd quite naturally upholds the view that a warrior following his royal
duty (rdjadharma) and a contemplative sage following the duty of a recluse
(yatidharmu) reach the same goal (nihireyasakariiv ubhau; V . 2 ) . The same
is explicitly declared by the Mahdbhnrata : "0 thou best of men, there are only
these two who pierce the constellation of the sun [reach the sphere of
Brahman] : the one is the recluse who is endowed with yoga and the other is
the warrior who falls fighting in the battle field."13 Thus anyone, whether he
be a recluse or a warrior, if he falls from his enjoined sacred duty, would
incur sin (11. 33). One must, therefore, unflinchingly stick to one's righteously
enjoined duty and one should be ready to sacrifice even one's life in its fulfillment (111. 35). This is the central teaching of the Gttd.
Moreover, in connection with the duty of fighting, it is important to note
that (1) the war which Arjuna is exhorted to plunge into is not a reckless
aggression but a righteous war (dharmya yuddha, 11.31 ; dharmya sangrdma,

laof

the various duties of a k~atriya,a s enumerated by the Gitd (XVIII. 43), one is

"not to run away from the battle" (yuddhe cd'py apaldyanam).

1s dvdv imau purufavydghra siiryamapdala bhedinau, parivraf yogayuktaS ca rave cd

bhimukho hatab. Mahdbhdrata, Udyoga 32. 65.

164 Upadbyaya

11.33) aimed at fighting against evildoers (dtatdyinah ; I. 36) ; (2) that it is

to be fought not with the fury of anger and passion or with the feeling of
vengeance, hatred, or greed, but with a pure sense of duty and with utter
detachment, and (3) that war is to be looked upon more as an exception
than the rule.
One cannot correctly understand and appreciate the position of the Gitd in
relation to war unless one has a due awareness of the concept of "righteous
war," since it is only the righteous war (dharmya yuddha or dharmya sangrdma) and not just any war that is sanctioned by the Gitd.14 I n fact, righteousness (dharma) is the focal point of the Gita, even of the Mahiibharata
itself, of which the Gitd is only a part. All worldly activities are to be performed in keeping with this righteousness. In one of its concluding verses
the Mahiibharata fervently appeals to one to follow the righteous mode of
living in these words: "With uplifted hand I proclaim and no one pays heed
to me. Even wealth and enjoyment are to be procured by means of righteousness. Why not uphold that righteousness."15 The Gitn itself begins by mentioning the battlefield as dharmak~etra (the field of righteousness). The
despondency of Arjuna is clearly on moral grounds. H e is not afraid of anything but moral sins. He is ready to sacrifice even his life (I. 32,35,46) but
not to commit moral sins. Repeatedly he exclaims: "Alas, what a great sin
(mahat piipaun) are we resolved to commit" (1.45) ; "why should we not
have the wisdom to turn away from this sin (papiit)" (I. 39) ; "Only sin
(papaun eva) shall we incur by killing these evildoers" (I. 36). Thus, expressing his concern for the moral sin, he entreatingly says to Kysr;la: "Being bewildered about righteousness (dharnzasapmiidha-cet*), I ask Thee. Tell
me for certain wherein lies the good (Sreyah)." Kysga naturally instructs
him about his righteous duty and points out how he will be saved from sins
and attain the supreme good (Sreyah param avdpsyatha; 111.11). He clearly
says: "He who works having given up attachment . . . is not touched by sinJJ
(lipyate na sa papena; V. 10) ; "You shall not thus incur sin" (nai'vam
papam avapsyasi; 11.38) ; "you shall cross over all sins by the boat of wisdom alone" (IV. 36). But on the other hand, "if you do not fight this righteous war (dharmyam sangrdmam), then having fallen from your duty and
glory, you shall incur sin (pdpaun avc?psyasi)" (11.33). It is explicitly declared that when there is a decline of righteousness the supreme divinity
reincarnates himself to establish righteousness (IV. 8).
But what type of war is to be called a righteous war? Samkara, in his com14 While

reminding Arjuna of his svadharma, Kyvna refers only to the righteous war:

dharmydd dhi yuddhdc chreyo' nyat kqotriyasya na vidyate (11. 31. 31) ; atha cet tvam

imam dharmyam saligrdmav na karigjlan' (11. 33).

16nrdhvabdhur viraumy egah nu ca kaicicchy~otimdm, dharmdd arthai ca kdmaS ca sa

dharmah k i m na sevyate.

mentary on the Gitd, sheds but little light and passes on with the remark that
it is a war fought in defense of people (prajdrak;a?zdrtham).16 Rlmlnuja
takes it in the sense of a war which is in keeping with justice (nydyatah
pravyttdt y u d d k t ) .I7 Though the Grtd does not elaborate this concept of righteous war, it does contain a clue whereby its view may be ascertained with
reasonable plausibility. W e have stated that Arjuna was despondent out of his
sheer regard for righteousness, and he takes the stand that the killing even
of evildoers (dtatdyinah) is sinful. Kysna dissuades him from this thought
and reminds him of the righteous duty of a ksatriya to fight against such
offenders. The word 'dtatdyiyi' is a significant one. It is said: "One who sets
fire, gives poison, attacks with weapon in hand, plunders the property, dispossesses of the territory as well as of women-these six are evil-doers
(dtatdyinah)" (VaSi;thasmyti 111. 16). With regard to such a heinous criminal, the Manusmyti says: "Whether he be a teacher, an infant, an old man or
a much learned brahmin, if he comes as a criminal (dtatdyi), one should kill
him without any consideration. There is no sin in killing a criminal (dtatdyi) ."18
He is said to be killed by his own outrageous conduct. Now, in the light of the
story of the M a h b h r a t a (which the Gitd presupposes), it is not difficult to
see that the Kauravas, against whom Arjuna is asked to fight, had committed
not one but all the six heinous crimes.lg They had further thwarted all attempts
made by Kysna for a peaceful settlement of the dispute by refusing to accept
the request of giving even five villages, the bare minimum for the five Pgndavas.
They have, therefore, rightly been called criminals (dtatdyinah) by the Gita.
But even then Arjuna feels that he would be committing sin by killing these
criminals. It is against this attitude of Arjuna that K y s ~ aimparts the teaching of righteous war and explicitly proclaims: "There is no good higher than
righteois war for a Ksatriya" (11.31). The attitude of the Grtd in this respect
is amply illustrated from the ideal set by Klsna (the incarnate God) Himself
who is said to "assume birth for the protection of the righteous ones, the destruction of the evil-doers and the establishment of righteousness" (IV. 8).
It is in the light of this very ideal that war is considered con~patiblewith the
life of righteousness, virtue, or peace.
The second important consideration of the Gitd in relation to this duty of
fighting is that, like all other duties, it also has to be performed with a detached and dispassionate mind. I t is only on this condition that Arjuna is said
to remain uncontaminated by the sin of killing, since in so performing an act,
16 Samkara

on Gita 11. 31.

on Gitd 11. 31.

18 Manusmlti VIII. 350-351.

1 9 W e are told by the epic narrative that the Kauravas had set fire to the house of the

PSndavas, given poison to Bhima, deprived them of their property and kingdom, insulted

their wife in open royal court, and were ultimately planning to launch an armed attack

on them.

17 RPm5nuja

he would be veritably converting action into inaction. Thus Kysva says:

"Treat alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat and then
get ready for the battle. Thus you shall not incur sin" (11.38). "He who is
not self-conceited, whose mind is not attached, even though he slays these
worlds, he neither slays nor is he bound" (XVIII. 17). Thus, according to
the Gita, the fighter has to exhibit the most difficult feat of indulging in outward fighting and remaining inwardly at peace at the same time. This is the
core of the teaching of "renunciation in action."
It may not, however, be quite possible for a beginner to reach this ideal of
absolute detachment. Should he, then, not stick to his righteous duty and try
to defend himself against heinous criminals? The Gita, in such a situation,
seems to moderate its strict standard and adds: "Even a little of this dharma
[discipline of detachment] saves one from great fear" (11.40). Nevertheless,
one is enjoined to make constant efforts to attain the ideal of perfect detachment (VI. 35,36).
Lastly it may be noted that war or violence as sanctioned by the Grtd is
not a normal code of conduct. As indicated above, it is to be used only in
an exceptional situation when one has to deal with incorrigible criminals, and
where all peaceful means are found unavailing. Barring this exception, the
GTta stands for peace or nonviolence as much as does any other religio-philosophical text of the world, and delivers the message of love and compassion
with perfect purity of purpose. Its teaching about war, thus, can neither be
ignored as an exercise in allegory nor looked upon as an exhortation for reckless war.
What is important to note here is that the Grta considers it morally right
to take recourse to arms against incorrigible criminals for the sake of selfdefense and protection of the righteous people. One has, however, to see that
this measure is adopted as a last resort, and the fight is fought with a sense
of pious duty and utter equanimity. Now, no one can deny that to protect
oneself and other innocent people is a noble end. It is also agreed that one
should try one's best to adopt all possible peaceful means to achieve this end.
But in case all possible peaceful means are found unavailing, and one is facing
disaster at the hands of incorrigible criminals, the question arises whether or
not in such an exceptional situation, one is morally justified in taking recourse
to violence.
It is not difficult to see that the absolute abandonment of violence in every
shape and form is an impracticability. The remark of the Bhdgavat that "the
life lives on life" (jivo j5varya jT~anarn)*~is not without truth. Even the
avowed champions of nonviolence, like the Buddha in the ancient past and
2oSrimad Bhagwafam, Vol. 111, ed. A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami (Vrindaban: The
League of Devotees, 1965), I. 13, 47; cf. Manr4~nrytiV. 28.

Gandhi in recent times, have to acknowledge directly or indirectly the limitations of nonviolence.
That absolute adherence to nonviolence and other virtues in a household
society--comprised of average people leading a normal day-to-day life-is
nearly an impossibility is acknowledged by the Buddha. While exhorting
people to renounce worldly life, he is frequently found to remark: "A holy
life in all its purity and perfection is not easy to practise while leading the life
of a h~useholder."~~
Should every householder then renounce the world and
be a recluse? Obviously it is not possible to convert the whole world into a
society of monks, for, as the Gita rightly points out, monks have to depend
for their subsistence on householders (111.8). Thus, the strict observance
of nonviolence is not possible in the larger society of active householders. It
is interesting to note that the Buddha, after attaining his enlightenment, is
found to ponder the question, "whether it is possible to reign with dhamma,
without killing or causing to kill, without conquering or causing to conquer,
without grieving or causing to grieve."22 On being told by Mgra that it is
possible, and on being prompted by him to take up the life of a king, the
Buddha rebukes him and declines to accept it.
Gandhi also had to approve violence in exceptional situations. It is wellknown that he advised the shooting of a miserably ailing cow. On another
occasion, when some people reported to him that they, owing to his instruction of nonviolence, did not retaliate against the ravaging soldiers who were
plundering their properties and misbehaving with their womenfolk, Gandhi
rebuked them for misunderstanding his teaching. I n such situations he recommends violence in preference to cowardice. H e clearly asserts : "Better far
than cowardice is killing and being killed in battle."*
It is no doubt true that nonviolent means are ordinarily the most efficacious
in bringing about change of heart and effecting enduring peace. But the big
question remains: Is it possible to change the heart of every individual, including the most reckless and unscrupulous criminals? And even if it is possible, is it also possible to effect this change before harm is done to innocent
people? Had all this been possible, we could then consistently argue that the
entire legal code of punishment is morally reprehensible. Nay, we could even
zlnuyidam sukaratp agdram ajjhdvasatd ekdntaparipunnam ekdntaparisuddha?p sarikhalikhitam brahmacariyam cars'tum. Digha Nikdya, ed. T. W . Rhys Davids and J. E.
Carpenter, 3 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1890-1911), I, 63; Majjhima Nikdya,
ed. V . Trenkner and R Chalmers, 3 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1948-Sl), I,
179, 240, 267; 11, 56.
22sakkd nu kho rajjam kdretutp ahanam aghdtayam ajinam ajdpayam atocam asocdjayam
dhammend, ti? Satpyutta Nikdya, ed. L. Fleer, 6 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1884-

1904), I, 116.
M. K. Gandhi, Grta: M y Mother, ed. Anand T . Hingorani (Bombay: Pearl Publications Private Ltd., 1965), p. 66.
2s

have found fault with the justice of the Almighty or with the law of karma,
which ordains that sinful men suffer for their sins. Thus, whether we consider the problem in social, theological, or ethical terms it is clear that there
is ample justification for inflicting punishment on criminals, and there is a
limit beyond which nonviolence and forgiveness should not be practiced.
It is precisely in the light of these considerations that the ancient scriptures
recommend the avoidance of extremes even in relation to the observance of
cardinal virtues24 and refer to situations when exceptions have to be made.
We have already noticed the exceptions made in relation to nonviolence.
Similar exceptional situations may be envisaged in relation to the observance
of other virtues like truth, etc. For example, when you have seen some innocent people running away and hiding themselves in a thick forest in order
to escape plunderers and murderers following them, and you subsequently
are approached by the latter who inquire about those people, should you or
should you not tell them the truth? The Mahabharata first advises to avoid
telling a lie but permits it if no other course is left to save the lives of innocent people. Its advice is as follows: "Do not speak unless you are asked, and
even if asked unjustly, you should not speak. The wise man, though knowing
the truth, should (alternately) behave like a dumb or ignorant man."2G But
if there is no escape from speaking, the Mahabhdrata adds, one may tell a lie.
It says: "If you can escape without speaking, then you should not speak in
any way. But if speaking is necessary or your not speaking is likely to arouse
suspicion, then it has been considered better to tell a lie rather than to tell the
Thus, it has been shown that deviating from acknowledged virtues
like nonviolence, forgiveness, truth, etc., in exceptional situations is not morally unwarranted or unjustified.
An objection, however, may be raised that such exceptional provisions are
likely to be misused by common people. They may regard even an ordinary
situation to be an exceptional one and try to justify their obvious acts of violence. To avoid such pitfalls, the GTta suggests certain measures which must
be clearly borne in mind. It points out that the pure discriminative intellect
(vyavasliyatmika buddhih) of men is uniformly of one nature (11.41) and
that those who have developed this state of intellect cannot fail to discern
whether a situation does or does not warrant a deviation from the acknowledged virtue. The diversity of opinion is expressed and controversy raised in
24na treyah satatam tejo nu nityam ireyas? kqama, Tasmdn nityam kqamd tdta papdi-

fair apavdditd. The Mahdbhdrata, ed. Visnu S . Sukthankar and others, 19 vols. (Poona:

Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1933-1959), Aranyaka Parva, 29. 6, 8.

25ndpyqfah kasyacid brziydn nu cdnydyena pycchatah., jiidnavdn api medhavi jadavallo-

kam dcaret. Zbid., Sdnti Parva 276.34.

2eaktijanena cen mokqo ndtrg ktijet kathamcana, Avaiyam k a j i t a v y a ~VC? sankeran v d

fiyaktijandt; Sreyas tatrdnrtavp vaktum satydd iti vicdritav. Zbid., Sdnti Parva 110.

14, 15.

a given situation only when ordinary people judge the issue with agitated or
passioned intellect (vcisandtmikyd buddhih) , which the Gita characterizes as
indiscriminative intellect (avyavatayydtmikd buddhih) . Such people, according
to the Gitii (XVI.24), are to be guided by the authority of the scriptures
(which are supposed to embody the rules laid down by people of discriminative
intellect). It is only the people of discriminative intellect who are said to be
competent to assess a situation directly and decide the right course of action
in a given situation. Lest everybody claim to be a man of discriminative intellect, the Gita lays down some important tests, such as the ability to remain
unmoved amidst pleasure and pain and amidst other pairs of opposites, etc.
(11.54-72), whereby it is easy to determine whether or not one is a man of
discriminative intellect. It is important to remember that Arjuna is asked to
qualify himself through these tests while he is being exhorted to get ready
for the battle (11. 38).
All this clearly shows that the Gita, in sanctioning the righteous war, fought
with equanimity and in an exceptional situation, is guided by a careful consideration of the problems of an average society.