ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES

Vol. 67, No. 2, August, pp. 111126, 1996

ARTICLE NO. 0068

Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric,

Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explaining Harvesting
Behavior and the Role of Communication
KIMBERLY A. WADE-BENZONI
Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University

ANN E. TENBRUNSEL
College of Business Administration, University of Notre Dame
AND

MAX H. BAZERMAN
Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University

This research explores the effects of egocentric interpretations of fairness, expectations about other
actors harvesting decisions, and communication on
the focal actors harvesting decisions in asymmetric
social dilemmas. We found support for the predictions
that egocentrism exists in perceptions of fairness in
asymmetric dilemmas, overharvesting is positively related to the amount of egocentrism, and egocentrism
is stronger before discussion than after discussion.
Furthermore, in a comparison between asymmetric
and symmetric dilemmas, we found that egocentrism
and overharvesting were greater in asymmetric dilemmas than in symmetric dilemmas. Finally, the results
indicate that among certain actors, overharvesting in
asymmetric dilemmas is positively related to the
amount of harvesting expected from the other parties.
This study contributes to the social dilemma literature
by (1) introducing the idea of egocentric interpretations of fairness as an explanation for overharvesting
behavior, (2) demonstrating that egocentrism is more
pronounced in asymmetric versus symmetric dilemmas, (3) suggesting that the reduction of egocentric
interpretations of fairness is another reason why communication enhances cooperative behavior, and (4)
demonstrating that beliefs about what others will do
is related to harvesting decisions in asymmetric as
well as symmetric dilemmas. q 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

This research was supported by the Dispute Resolution Research

Center and the Kellogg Environmental Research Center of Northwestern University. We thank George Loewenstein, Dave Messick,
and Leigh Thompson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper, and Dawn Iacobucci for her statistical advice. Address
reprint requests to Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni, Kellogg Graduate
School of Management, Evanston, IL 60208-2001.

Stocks of fish in many fisheries around the world are

at the brink of collapse with considerable uncertainty
as to when and how they will be brought back to a
sustainable level (National Marine Fisheries Service,
1992). Should fishers reduce their individual harvest
levels? The individual fishers may correctly conclude
that each consumes such a small amount of the total
resource that what is done individually without the
cooperation of other fishers makes essentially no difference to collective outcome. Yet, in the aggregate, this
line of thinking eventually results in a collective harvest that is too high to enable the various species to
maintain their existence over time.
A variety of critical issues associated with environmental degradation human overpopulation, resource
depletion, and pollution can be characterized as situations in which individual interests are at odds with
collective interests. In these social dilemmas each decision maker is best off acting in his/her own selfinterest, regardless of what others do; yet, each selfinterested decision creates a negative outcome for all
involved. When a large number of people make the selfinterested choice, the costs accumulate. As a result,
everyone is worse off than if they had decided not to
act in their own self-interest.
An important aspect of the fish consumption situation described above, as well as many other real-life
social dilemmas, is the asymmetry in the distribution
of the associated benefits and burdens. For example,
large commercial fishers with sizable harvesting capacities, relative to smaller fishers, reap the majority of
the benefit from harvesting beyond a sustainable level
while experiencing a minimal economic burden of a
collapsed stock because of their greater ability to switch

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Copyright q 1996 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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their harvest to a different species of fish. Such asymmetries in problem cause and outcome dependency
have an impact on the dynamics of potential dilemma
resolution processes.
This paper investigates the role of egocentric interpretations of fairness, expectations about the decisions
of others, and communication with respect to harvesting behavior in asymmetric social dilemmas. In addition, the study compares egocentrism and overharvesting in asymmetric dilemmas to such behavior in
symmetric dilemmas. Egocentric interpretations of
fairness refer to judgments that are biased in a manner
favoring the individuals making the judgments. This
study contributes to the existing literature on social
dilemmas by introducing the idea of egocentric interpretations of fairness as an explanation for overharvesting behavior, demonstrating that egocentrism is
more pronounced in asymmetric versus symmetric dilemmas, suggesting that reduction of egocentric interpretations of fairness is another reason why
communication enhances cooperative behavior, and
demonstrating that expectations about what others
will do is related to harvesting decisions in asymmetric
dilemmas.
Social dilemmas are formally defined by three properties (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Yamagishi, 1986): (1) a noncooperative choice is always more
profitable to the actor than a cooperative choice, regardless of the choices made by others; (2) a noncooperative choice is always harmful to others compared to a
cooperative choice; and (3) the aggregate amount of
harm done to others by a noncooperative choice is
greater than the profit to the actor himself. Such dilemmas are social in nature because people have an influence on each others welfare, and the underlying dilemma is attributable to the conflict between individual
and collective rationality (Kahan, 1974).
A resource dilemma is a specific type of social dilemma. In a resource dilemma, collective noncooperation leads to a serious threat of depletion of future resources (Hardin, 1968; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). The resource dilemma refers to a
situation in which a group shares a common resource
(for example, fish, water, forests, or energy) from which
the individual members can harvest. If members take
too much from the common source, the resource is exhausted. The group interest requires moderate harvest,
but personal interests may induce the individual members to harvest excessively.
The majority of social dilemma research has focused
on symmetric dilemmas where all group members occupy symmetric or interchangeable positions (see Murnighan, King, & Schoumaker, 1990, and Van Dijk,
1993, for exceptions). In symmetric dilemmas, each

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participant has the same personal resources, and the

consequences of their choices are identical to the
choices of the other participants. However, in many
real life situations, participants differ with respect to
personal resources or consequences of choices, and receive different levels of benefit from mutual cooperation. In asymmetric resource dilemmas, some parties
have more interest in maintaining the resource than
others and some parties are in a position where they
are able to harvest more than others. We agree with
Murnighan et al. (1990) and Van Dijk (1993) in the
assertion that situations of asymmetry are more prevalent than situations of symmetry and, therefore, a focus
on asymmetric dilemmas enhances the ecological validity of social dilemma research. We also argue that
asymmetry highlights a set of new research questions
not addressed by the symmetric social dilemma literature.
In asymmetric social dilemmas, the incentive structure of the problem varies from one party to another,
introducing additional complications in the dilemma
resolution process. We argue that a central complication is that this asymmetry promotes egocentric assessments of fairness in the allocation of resources. In symmetric dilemmas, where all parties occupy identical positions, an easily evoked normative rule is the equal
division rule which prescribes that whatever is being
allocated or contributed should be divided equally
among participants (Allison & Messick, 1990). In contrast, when there is asymmetry in interests and outcomes it is not clear what should be considered a fair
solution, since all parties do not benefit equally from
the equality rule as they do in symmetric situations.
For example, in an asymmetric resource dilemma, parties who currently harvest less of the resource benefit
more from a solution based on an equal percentage
reduction of current harvest, while those who currently
harvest more of the resource benefit more from a solution based on an equal unit reduction of current harvest. Both solutions can be considered fair, but neither
is the obvious fairest solution. In the symmetric case,
equal-percentage reduction and equal-unit reduction
are the same solution, whereas in the asymmetric case
they are not. Thus, in the asymmetric case there is
ambiguity concerning appropriate contributions and
entitlements of parties. We therefore predict that there
will be more ambiguity (variation) about what should
be considered a fair allocation of resources in asymmetric than in symmetric social dilemmas (Hypothesis 1).
We suggest that the ambiguity described above enables individuals to make egocentric or self-serving
interpretations of the situation and to judge as fair
distributions of resources that favor themselves. Substantial research evidence suggests that people make

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egocentric judgments in a variety of situations (Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Messick & Sentis, 1983; Neale &
Bazerman, 1983) including judgments of fairness (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). People tend to justify their assessment of fairness by
changing the importance of attributes affecting what is
fair (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, and Bazerman, 1996).
Walster, Walster, and Berscheid (1978) introduced
the notion of egocentric interpretations of fairness by
noting that when people are personally involved in a
situation, judgments of fairness are likely to be biased
in a manner that benefits themselves. Early research
on egocentric biases included a study by Ross and Sicoly (1979) who found that people tend to overestimate
their own input, such as family members overestimating their contribution to household tasks and seminar
participants overestimating their own participation
relative to others estimates of their participation. The
egocentric bias in judgments of fairness was also studied by Messick and Sentis (1979; 1983), who suggested
that people initially determine their preference for a
certain outcome on the basis of self-interest and then
justify this preference on the basis of fairness.
Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) argue that egocentric interpretations of fairness are an important
cause of unnecessary and costly settlement delays in
bargaining. They found that negotiators judgments of
fair outcomes were biased in an egocentric direction
and that asymmetries in negotiators costs increased
egocentric interpretations of fairness. In addition, they
found that even when people were presented with identical information, their perceptions of the situation differed dramatically depending on their role in the situation. They concluded that egocentric interpretations of
fairness hinder conflict resolution because people are
reluctant to agree to what they perceive to be an inequitable settlement. Consistent with the finding that egocentric assessments of fairness may be an important
cause of ineffective conflict resolution, we argue that
egocentric interpretations of fairness in asymmetric resource dilemmas are an important cause of overharvesting.
Van Dijks (1993) research, which examined the relationship between fairness considerations and choice behavior, is indirectly related to our interest in the relationship between egocentrism and overharvesting in
asymmetric social dilemmas. Using an asymmetric social dilemma, Van Dijk (1993) examined the relationship between fairness considerations and choice behavior. In one study involving a public good dilemma, he
predicted that subjects would exhibit an egocentric bias
in their preference for contribution rules (equal versus
proportional) such that rule preference would be
shaped by self-interest. However, no egocentric bias

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was observed in the preference for the contribution

rules. Van Dijk points out that in his experimental
design, preference for the contribution rule did not influence the actual outcomes. Thus, a bias in the preference for contribution rules was not instrumental for
furthering ones own interests. In addition, Van Dijk
only examined the egocentric bias indirectly by looking
at preference for contribution rules. In our study, we
measure the egocentric bias directly, and we relate the
bias to harvesting decisions which represent individuals actual outcomes.
We thus propose that egocentrism may be one causal
mechanism contributing to the exploitation of a resource in asymmetric social dilemmas. We believe that
asymmetry in interests and outcomes in social dilemmas creates a situation whereby individuals may differ
in their interpretations of fairness. When there are
multiple ways to decide what is fair, people differentially focus on solutions favorable to themselves. In
resource dilemmas where all interested parties must
decrease their use of a resource in order to preserve it,
the egocentric bias results in individuals believing that
it is fair for them to have more of the resource than an
independent advisor would judge. The collective result
is excessive resource depletion which does not necessarily result from greed alone, but from biased perceptions of fairness as well. Thus, the problem is not necessarily in individuals desire to be unfair, but perhaps in
their inability to interpret information in an unbiased
manner (Messick & Sentis, 1983, Diekmann et al.,
1996). Consequently, we predict that in asymmetric social dilemmas, egocentrism will exist in perceptions of
fairness (Hypothesis 2). Since we argue that asymmetry
exacerbates the tendency for individuals to hold egocentric interpretations of fairness, we predict that there
will be greater evidence of egocentrism in asymmetric
than in symmetric social dilemmas (Hypothesis 3). The
prevalence of egocentrism in asymmetric social dilemmas results in individuals believing that they deserve
more of a resource than others think they deserve. This,
in turn, leads the interested parties to take too much
resulting in overharvesting. We therefore predict that
harvesting will be positively related to the amount of
egocentrism in asymmetric dilemmas (Hypothesis 4).
Since we have argued that there is more evidence of
egocentrism in asymmetric than symmetric dilemmas,
and that egocentrism is related to harvesting, we would
expect to find greater overharvesting in asymmetric
than in symmetric dilemmas (Hypothesis 5).
We have argued that the additional complexity in
asymmetric relative to symmetric social dilemmas enables more opportunity for egocentric interpretations
of fairness. As a result, the dilemma is harder to resolve
because it is more difficult to reach agreement about

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what is fair. We also argue that it is difficult for individuals to accurately predict how other parties will behave
in asymmetric dilemmas since everyone does not occupy identical positions. The result is, once again, that
the asymmetric dilemma is difficult to resolve.
It has been well established across a variety of social
dilemmas that expectations of others cooperation
and ones own cooperation are strongly interrelated
(Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Messick, Wilke,
Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983; Van Lange &
Liebrand, 1989). The literature on this topic suggests
that the relationship between expectations and choice
behavior is bidirectional (Abric & Kahan, 1972; Van
Lange & Liebrand, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1992). One
explanation for the relationship is conditional cooperationpeople are more likely to cooperate if they expect
others to cooperate than if they expect others not to
cooperate. Alternatively, an individual who decides to
cooperate or to defect may have a rational basis for
believing others will do likewise. In other words, people
use their own behavior as information about what
other people will do (Orbell & Dawes, 1991). This may
be particularly difficult in the asymmetric situation, as
it is harder to use oneself as a source of information
about others behavior. The correlation between choice
and expectations may also be explained by post-hoc
justification rationalizing ones own cooperative or
noncooperative choice by expressing cooperative or
noncooperative expectations of others (Messe & Sivacek, 1979). Such justification enables defectors to assuage guilt and cooperators to avoid feeling unwise,
thereby permitting individuals to maintain an image
of being rational and moral people.
Although the relationship between expectations of
others and cooperative decision making has been well
documented in symmetric dilemma situations, we believe that it is important to study in asymmetric situations. Asymmetric temptation (differing temptation for
self and opponent), as compared to symmetric temptation, was found to increase the amount of misrepresentation that occurs in a negotiation situation and to increase the expectation that ones opponent will engage
in misrepresentation (Tenbrunsel, 1995). These results
indicate a relationship between ones own behavior and
the expected behavior of others in asymmetric situations similar to the relationship observed in symmetric
situations. Based on this observation, we expect the
choice-expectations relationship found previously in
symmetric social dilemmas to also be present in asymmetric social dilemmas. Thus, we predict that harvesting will be positively related to the amount of harvesting
expected from the other parties (Hypothesis 6).
One way that individuals may share their notions of

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fairness and gain information about the behavior of

others is by communicating with the other parties. Past
research provides evidence that communication enhances cooperation in social dilemmas (Deutsch, 1960;
Jerdee & Rosen, 1974; Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Liebrand, 1984; Radlow & Weidner, 1966). However,
Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) showed that
communication promotes cooperation only when the
discussion itself is relevant for the decisions that have
to be made. This finding raises the question of how
discussion increases cooperativeness. Two of the most
plausible explanations for the effect of communication
are (1) the development of a commitment norm and (2)
enhanced feelings of we-ness or group identity (Van
Lange et al., 1992). Another source of communication
effects could be that group members statements of
their own intended decisions could assure other members of their good intentions, leading to higher rates of
cooperation (Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee, 1977).
We argue that communication may also enhance cooperation by reducing the amount of egocentrism in
the interpretation of fairness. Discussion allows parties
to share their interests and beliefs, including perceptions of fairness. Once individuals learn what others
believe to be fair, they may adjust their perceptions of
fairness to a less biased position. Thus, we predict that
egocentrism will be stronger before discussion than after
discussion (Hypothesis 7).
METHOD

Subjects
One-hundred eighty students from the J. L. Kellogg
Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University participated in a simulated resource dilemma
as part of a negotiations class exercise. One-hundred
twenty-four subjects participated in an asymmetric dilemma simulation, which was the central piece in our
experiment. Fifty-six subjects participated in a symmetric dilemma simulation, which served as a comparison case for the asymmetric dilemma.1
Procedures
The procedures and materials used for the symmetric
and the asymmetric simulation were the same except
where specifically noted.
Students participated in an exercise based on the
real-life crisis in the northeastern fishery where currently stocks of principal groundfish species have col1
All subjects came from the same general population. However,
the data on the subjects for the symmetric condition were collected at
a later point in time in response to the suggestions of two anonymous
reviewers.

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EGOCENTRIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FAIRNESS

lapsed and there is considerable uncertainty as to when

and how they will be brought back to a sustainable
level. The two most critical issues for fisheries management in the future are (1) who will pay the cost of
correcting problems and (2) who will receive the benefits. Thus, the northeastern fishery exemplifies the issues inherent in managing any commonly held resource. Since the substantive features as well as the
payoff structure of the exercise (in the asymmetric simulation) were grounded in, and consistent with, this
real world situation, the ecological validity of the experimental situation was enhanced.
In this multi-party exercise, each person represented
an organization which relied on shark fishing for income. The representatives participated in a conference
to discuss the common concern of the exploitation of
large coastal shark. The resource on which they all
depended (shark) was in danger because they were collectively overfishing the resource. In addition to the
common goal of solving the exploitation problem, they
all had the individual goal of protecting the economic
health of their organizations.
The conference consisted of four representatives from
various commercial and recreational fishing groups:
Large Commercial Fishers Association, Small Commercial Fishers Association, Recreational Fishers Association, and Recreational Tours Association. In the
asymmetric simulation, the commercial fishers used
relatively larger numbers of sharks and had less of an
interest in the future health of the resource. In contrast, the recreational fishers used smaller numbers of
shark, but had a greater interest in the future of the
resource. In the symmetric simulation, the fishers in
all four roles were currently harvesting the same
amount of shark and had the same level of interest in
the future health of the resource.
All subjects were given two sets of materials during
the exercise, one before the discussion period (conference) and one after the discussion period. The first set
of materials included the subjects role assignment, the
general case information (explaining the general situation and the structure of the simulation), and role instructions. The general information provided all subjects with the payoff structure for all four parties in
the simulation.
All participants were told that (1) they would like to
maximize current profit without depleting the harvest
pool to a level that is too low to provide future harvests,
and (2) their goal was to maximize the net present
value of the profit that their associations would receive.
This profit was broken up into two components: the
profit that was received from the current harvest and
the expected profit that would be received from future
harvests. Consequently, each associations net present

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value was a function of their harvest level, the value

the association placed on shark harvesting in the future, and the total harvest level of all four associations.
The payoff structure (profitability for each association) was described by the following profit functions
in the asymmetric simulation:
Large commercial (LC)
$10,000(Harvest Level / .10(Future))
Small commercial (SC)
$10,000(Harvest Level / .25(Future))
Recreational competition (RC)
$10,000(Harvest Level / .70(Future))
Recreational tours (RT)
$10,000(Harvest Level / .85(Future))
Harvest Level was the harvest level of that particular association in metric tons. The total harvest level
of all four associations was currently at 5000 metric
tons. The 5000 metric ton total was the sum of the
following current harvesting levels for each individual
association: large commercial, 2000 metric tons; small
commercial, 1500 metric tons; recreational competition, 1000 metric tons; recreational tours, 500 metric
tons. The associations had harvesting options indicated
by the following ranges: Large commercial: 4002000
metric tons, Small commercial: 3001500 metric tons,
Recreational competition: 2001000 metric tons, Recreational tours: 100500 metric tons.
In contrast to the asymmetric simulation, the payoff
structure for the symmetric simulation was described
by the following profit function:
$10,000(Harvest Level / .475(Future))
The profit function for the symmetric dilemma was
the same for all four associations. Harvest Level was
the harvest level of that particular association in metric
tons. The total harvest level of all four associations
was currently at 5000 metric tons, with each individual
association harvesting 1250 metric tons regardless of
role. All four associations in the symmetric version had
harvesting options indicated by the following range:
2501250 metric tons.
The harvesting ranges in both the symmetric and
asymmetric versions reflected real world restrictions
by (1) requiring that harvest levels fall between 20 and
100% of the current harvest level so as not to allow the
associations to go out of business and (2) requiring that
associations not harvest more than that which was in-

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dicated by their current harvesting level since current

harvests reflected maximum capacity.
Subjects were told that the sustainable level was a
harvest of 2500; if the total harvest level was 2500 or
less, the species would be able to reproduce itself at
their current population level; if the total harvest level
was above 2500, the species would not be maintained at
their current levels. Harvesting above the sustainable
level decreased the opportunity for future harvesting,
resulting in a net decrease in the total profit. Future
represented the future shark level that was available
for reproduction; when the harvesting level was greater
than 2500, the value of Future decreased, which in turn
decreased overall profit. Future was calculated as the
smaller of {(2500) or (5000 the total harvest level of
all four associations)}. This formula captured the future
negative implications of utilizing the resource above
the sustainable level.
In the asymmetric simulation, associations placed
different weights on the importance that they attached
to future shark harvests as indicated by the coefficient
preceding Future. As is evident, recreational fishing
groups were more concerned with future harvests than
the commercial groups. Consistent with the real world
situation, subjects were told that the commercial
groups had better capabilities than recreational groups
to switch to a different kind of fish should the shark
resource be depleted, explaining their lower dependency on the future condition of the resource. Large
commercial fishing groups depended the least on future
harvests due to the small percentage of livelihood that
was earned from shark fishing (coefficient .10). Small
commercial fishing groups depended slightly more on
shark harvesting for their livelihood and, therefore,
had a stronger desire to see that shark levels were
maintained for future use (coefficient .25). The recreational competition fishing groups depended on sharks
for a significant portion of the tournaments that were
conducted (coefficient .70). Recreational tours were
exclusively designed around sharks and thus the recreational tour fishing groups placed the highest value
on future shark harvests (coefficient .85). Thus, the
asymmetry was reflected in the current harvesting levels and the future interest coefficients. In the symmetric version, profit coefficients were the same for all four
fishing groups (coefficient .475). Note that the total
future concern of the four parties was the same for the
symmetric and asymmetric cases (4 1 .475 .1 / .25
/ .7 / .85).
The profit formulas set up a classic social dilemma
in both the symmetric and asymmetric versions. The
dominant individual strategy to overharvest (defect)
is reflected in the fact that all parties have a future
coefficient which is less than 1, indicating that for every

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metric ton sacrificed, they receive less than a metric ton

in return. However, in the symmetric and asymmetric
versions the sum of the coefficients is greater than 1,
indicating that the dominant collective strategy is to
curtail harvesting (cooperate). The dominant collective
strategy to cooperate is illustrated in the negative, linear relationship between total harvesting level and total profit. In the asymmetric simulation, if the four
parties all harvested at their maximums, the total
profit would be $50,000,000, with the large commercial
group receiving $20,000,000, the small commercial
group receiving $15,000,000, the recreational competition group receiving $10,000,000, and recreational
tours group receiving $5,000,000. In contrast to maximum harvesting behavior, a total harvest of only 2500
metric tons would create a total profit of $72,500,000,
with the distribution of that profit depending on the
allocation of the 2500 metric tons. In the symmetric
simulation, if the four parties all harvested at their
maximums, the total profit would be $50,000,000, with
each association receiving $12,500,000. Similar to the
asymmetric version, a total harvest of 2500 metric tons
in the symmetric version would create a total profit of
$72,500,000, with the distribution of that profit depending on the allocation of the 2500 metric tons. Any
substantive information indicating asymmetries in dependency on the future state of the resource was edited
out of the symmetric case. All other substantive information was common between the symmetric and asymmetric cases.2
The profit numbers obtained from these formulas
provided subjects with a way of thinking about the net
benefit of harvesting relatively more or less shark while
holding all other factors constant. The subjects were
told that all other factors, such as the harvesting of
other types of fish, were accounted for in the equation.
In addition, all future interests were embedded in the
coefficients. Thus, no factors other than those represented by the formulas were considered valid. Finally,
groups were informed that they could not exchange
profits or actual fish. (For example, one group could not
capture the shark and redistribute it or the profit to
another group.)
In the asymmetric simulation, there were 31 fourparty groups. Asymmetric groups were divided into two
conditions with 15 groups in one condition and 16
groups in the other. The two conditions were created
to allow for the investigation of communication on egocentrism. The only difference between the two conditions concerned whether or not subjects made a variety
of assessments (as explained below) before the discussion with the other parties at the simulated conference.
2

Actual materials are available from the authors.

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EGOCENTRIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FAIRNESS

Subjects received the first set of materials which included all of the information described above before
the simulated conference. After reading the first set of
materials but before the conference, subjects in the first
asymmetric condition, but not in the second asymmetric condition, received forms on which they recorded
what they believed to be a fair solution to the problem,
their projected harvest levels, and their predictions
about the behavior of others. Collecting these measures
was the only difference between the two conditions.
Next, all subjects participated in a 30-min discussion,
representing the simulated conference, with the other
three members of their group.3 During this time, they
discussed the issues and potential solutions. However,
they were not allowed to make any binding commitments.
The second set of materials, received after the simulated conference, consisted of final role instructions
from their respective associations, forms for harvesting
level decisions, forms for estimated fair solutions, and
forms for expectations of others behavior. All subjects
individually read and completed the materials in the
order in which they are listed above.
In the symmetric simulation, there were fourteen
four-party groups. All subjects in the symmetric simulation followed the same procedures as the subjects in
the first condition in the asymmetric simulation (recording decisions prior to discussion as well as after
discussion) as described above.
Measures
Ambiguity. Each of the four actors recorded what
he or she considered to be a fair harvest for each of the
four parties involved (including him or herself), for a
total of 16 measures per group. We then calculated 16
averages each of the four actors fairness judgments
of harvesting levels for each of the four parties. The 16
averages were calculated separately for subjects in the
symmetric and asymmetric groups. The two sets of
means were computed both before and after discussion.
The standard deviations of these means served as measures of ambiguity with respect to fairness judgments.
Larger standard deviations of the mean fairness judgments indicated more variance in interpretations of
fairness.
3

The four-party groups, although run simultaneously (with the

exception of the symmetric dilemma groups which were run at a
later point in time) were not in the presence of one another. Each
group was either in its own small breakout room with the door closed,
or in its own part of a large auditorium where the discussions of
other groups could not be heard. Subjects only found out about the
discussion of other groups during the debriefing session which occurred after all data was collected. Thus, the assumption of independence of observations was preserved.

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To test for a significant difference in the standard

deviation of fairness judgments between the symmetric
and asymmetric groups, we used a method recommended by Hogg and Tanis (1977). Using this method,
we calculated,
F [(n1 )(s21)/(n1 0 1)]/[(n2)(s22)/(n2 0 1)],
on (n1 0 1) and (n2 0 1) degrees of freedom,
where n1 sample size of population 1 (asymmetric
groups), n2 sample size of population 2 (symmetric
groups), s21 sample variance for population 1 (asymmetric groups), and s22 sample variance for population
2 (symmetric groups).
Egocentrism. Two measures of egocentrism were
designed: an individual measure for each actor and a
group measure. Group and individual egocentrism
were determined both before and after the discussion
for the symmetric case and condition one of the asymmetric case and only after discussion for condition two
of the asymmetric case.
Group egocentrism. For each actor, a ratio was
computed which represented what the actor thought
was fair for her in relation to what she thought was
fair for the total of the four parties. The four ratios
were then added together. A total of one indicated
that no egocentrism existed at the group level. A
total in excess of one indicated that there was evidence of egocentrism at the group level. For example,
if the large commercial representative believed that
his association deserved 40% of the total harvest, the
small commercial representative believed that her
association deserved 30% of the total harvest, the
recreational competition representative believed
that his association deserved 20% of the total harvest, and the recreational tours representative believed that her association deserved 10% of the total
harvest, group egocentrism would be equal to 1.0 (or
100% if represented in terms of percentages). However, if the large commercial representative believed
that his association deserved 50% of the total harvest, the small commercial representative believed
that her association deserved 40% of the total harvest, the recreational competition representative believed that his association deserved 30% of the total
harvest, and the recreational tours representative
believed that her association deserved 20% of the
total harvest, group egocentrism would be equal to
1.4 (or 140% if represented in terms of percentages).
This measure can be summarized in equation form
as follows:

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WADE-BENZONI, TENBRUNSEL, AND BAZERMAN

Group Egocentrism
[LClc /(LClc / LCsc / LCrc / LCrt)]
/ [SCsc /(SClc / SCsc / SCrc / SCrt)]
/ [RC rc /(RClc / RCsc / RCrc / RCrt)]
/ [RT rt /(RTlc / RTsc / RTrc / RTrt)],
where Ij what actor I thinks is fair for actor j; LC
Large Commercial; SC Small Commercial; RC
Recreational Competition; RT Recreational Tours.
Individual egocentrism. For each actor, a ratio was
computed which represented what each actor thought
was fair for her in relation to what she thought was
fair for others compared to what each other actor
thought was fair for the focal actor, correcting for the
egocentrism for each other actor. This correction was
created by comparing the focal actors assessment of
her fair share with that of one of the other parties,
while eliminating the other party from the comparison
set. This procedure was then repeated using each of
the three other parties for comparison. A ratio of zero
indicated that no egocentrism existed at the individual
level. A total in excess of zero indicated that there was
evidence of egocentrism at the individual level. This
measure is computed as follows:
Egocentrism for LC
[{[LClc /(LClc / LCsc / LCrc)]
FIGURE 1

0 [RTlc /(RTlc / RTsc / RTrc)]}

/ {[LClc /(LClc / LCsc / LCrt)]
0 [RC lc /(RClc / RCsc / RCrt)]}
/ {[LClc /(LClc / LCrc / LCrt)]
0 [SClc /(SC lc / SCrc / SCrt)]}]/3,
where Ij what actor I thinks is fair for actor j. Individual egocentrism for the other three actors was calculated in a parallel manner.
Figure 1 further clarifies the logic for this measure
by pictorially describing the measure conceptually. As
indicated by Fig. 1, we compare the focal actors assessment of the percentage of the total harvest that they
think they deserve among a set of trios in which the
fourth member is excluded. We then use the assessment of the fourth member as a control to assess the
egocentrism of the focal actor. We repeat this process
three times for each actor. Thus, in step (1), we first
calculate what A considers to be fair for herself in relation to B and C. Next, we calculate what D considers
fair for A in relation to B and C. D is left out of the
trio because Ds judgment is being used as a point of

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reference, and leaving out D eliminates the possible

influence of Ds egocentrism. If A and D agree on the
relative allocation of resources that A should receive
among A, B, and C, then the result of step (1) will be
zero, suggesting no egocentrism by A. Steps (2) and (3)
follow the same logic, comparing As judgment of the
allocation of resources between herself and two other
actors with another actors judgment of a fair allocation
between the three actors. In each step, the actor being
used as a point of comparison is left out of the trio. If
the other three actors agree with As judgments, then
the sum of (1), (2), and (3) will be zero indicating no
evidence of egocentrism in actor A.
Expectations of others behavior. There were two
measures of expectations of others behavior, an individual measure for each actor and a group measure.
Both measures were determined separately both before
and after the discussion for the symmetric case and
condition one of the asymmetric case and only after
discussion for condition two of the asymmetric case.

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EGOCENTRIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FAIRNESS

TABLE 1a
Ambiguity in Fairness JudgmentsSymmetric versus Asymmetric (after Discussion)
Target
Respondent

LC

SC

RC

RT

LC

SD (asy) 323
SD (sym) 127
p .001

SD (asy) 291
SD (sym) 113
p .001

SD (asy) 193
SD (sym) 113
p .001

SD (asy) 99
SD (sym) 113
ns

SC

SD (asy) 346
SD (sym) 79
p .001

SD (asy) 233
SD (sym) 71
p .001

SD (asy) 200
SD (sym) 80
p .001

SD (asy) 96
SD (sym) 73
p .01

RC

SD (asy) 425
SD (sym) 75
p .001

SD (asy) 208
SD (sym) 64
p .001

SD (asy) 241
SD (sym) 68
p .001

SD (asy) 135
SD (sym) 63
p .001

RT

SD (asy) 397
SD (sym) 64
p .001

SD (asy) 248
SD (sym) 64
p .001

SD (asy) 182
SD (sym) 63
p .001

SD (asy) 110
SD (sym) 66
p .001

Note. SD (asy) indicates the standard deviation in asymmetric groups and SD (sym) indicates the standard deviation in symmetric
groups.

Group expectations. The group measure consisted

of the sum of the twelve assessments that the four
parties provided of their expectations of the behavior
of the other three parties, and then the total sum was
divided by three. This calculation provides a measure
of the expectations of group behavior for each party
while ignoring the focal partys own behavior. This
measure can be summarized in equation form as follows:
Group measure of expectations of others behavior
(LC:SC / LC:RC / LC:RT / SC:LC
/ SC:RC / SC:RT / RC:LC / RC:SC
/ RC:RT / RT:LC / RT:SC / RT:RC)/3,
where K:L what actor K thinks actor L will do.
Individual expectations. The individual measure
consisted of the sum of the three assessments that each
actor provided of their expectations of the behavior of
the other three parties. There was a separate measure
for each actor. This measure is summarized in equation
form below:
LCs expectations of other actors behavior
(LC:SC / LC:RC / LC:RT),
where K:L what actor K thinks actor L will do.
Individual expectations of others behavior for the
other three actors was calculated in a parallel manner.

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Harvesting. There were two measures of harvesting

behavior, an individual measure for each actor and a
group measure. The individual measure was simply
what each actor recorded as her harvesting level (in
metric tons of shark). The group measure consisted of
the sum of the four individual harvesting levels.
RESULTS

Hypothesis 1, which stated that there will be more

ambiguity about what should be considered a fair allocation of resources in asymmetric than in symmetric
social dilemmas, was supported by the measure of ambiguity both before and after discussion. To assess ambiguity, we assessed the variation in each of the four
actors interpretations of fair harvesting distributions
among the four parties (including themselves).
After discussion, we found that 15 out of 16 standard
deviations were significantly higher in the asymmetric
than in the symmetric groups (p .001 for 14, and p
.01 for 1). Before discussion, we found that 9 out of
the 16 standard deviations were significantly higher in
the asymmetric than in the symmetric groups ( p
.001 for 6, p .01 for 1, and p .05 for 2). 4 Tables 1a
and 1b summarize these results.
Hypothesis 2, which stated that egocentrism will exist in perceptions of fairness in asymmetric social dilemmas, was supported by both the group and individual measures of egocentrism, both before and after dis4

Three of the nonsignificant items were in the predicted direction.

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TABLE 1b
Ambiguity in Fairness Judgments Symmetric versus Asymmetric (before Discussion)
Target
Respondent

LC

SC

RC

RT

LC

SD (asy) 412
SD (sym) 149
p .001

SD (asy) 251
SD (sym) 153
p .05

SD (asy) 183
SD (sym) 142
ns

SD (asy) 130
SD (sym) 196
ns

SC

SD (asy) 493
SD (sym) 197
p .001

SD (asy) 213
SD (sym) 236
ns

SD (asy) 188
SD (sym) 243
ns

SD (asy) 139
SD (sym) 296
p .01a

RC

SD (asy) 392
SD (sym) 119
p .001

SD (asy) 159
SD (sym) 94
p .01

SD (asy) 220
SD (sym) 137
p .05

SD (asy) 141
SD (sym) 106
ns

RT

SD (asy) 497
SD (sym) 68
p .001

SD (asy) 273
SD (sym) 101
p .001

SD (asy) 260
SD (sym) 77
p .001

SD (asy) 149
SD (sym) 105
ns

Note. SD (asy) indicates the standard deviation in asymmetric groups and SD (sym) indicates the standard deviation in symmetric
groups.
a
This test was significant in the opposite direction than was predicted. We have no explanation for this result.

cussion. The group measure of egocentrism before

discussion (includes condition one only) was 1.23 which
was significantly higher than one (t 5.68, df 13, p
.001). The group measure of egocentrism after discussion (includes both conditions one and two) was 1.11
which was significantly higher than one (t 4.43, df
30, p .001).
Individual measures of egocentrism indicated that
egocentrism existed in all actors in the asymmetric dilemma both before and after discussion, with the exception of the recreational tours representative. Before
discussion (includes condition one only), the large commercial representatives individual egocentrism score
was .095 which was significantly greater than zero (t
3.10, df 14, p .01); the small commercial representatives individual egocentrism score was .076
which was significantly greater than zero (t 2.47, df
13, p .05) 5; the recreational competition representatives individual egocentrism score was .077 which
was significantly greater than zero (t 2.24, df 14,
p .05); the recreational tours representatives individual egocentrism score was 0.005 which was not significantly different from zero (t 0.20, df 14, ns).
Similarly, after discussion (includes both conditions
one and two of the asymmetric groups), the large commercial representatives individual egocentrism score
5

The degree of freedom is one less than would be expected in

calculations involving fairness judgments of the small commercial
actor before discussion in asymmetric groups. This is because one
subject felt he could not judge what was fair for him before discussion.
This was the only judgment he did not make.

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was .041 which was significantly greater than zero

(t 2.31, df 30, p .05); the small commercial representatives individual egocentrism score was .031
which was significantly greater than zero (t 2.82, df
30, p .01); the recreational competition representatives individual egocentrism score was .054 which
was significantly greater than zero (t 2.86, df 30,
p .01); the recreational tours representatives individual egocentrism score was .002 which was not significantly different from zero (t .19, df 30, ns).
Table 2 summarizes the results from the test for Hypothesis 2. It includes all egocentrism scores and significance levels.
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that there will be
greater evidence of egocentrism in asymmetric than in
symmetric social dilemmas, was supported by the
group measures of egocentrism after discussion. In the
symmetric dilemma, the group measure of egocentrism
TABLE 2
Existence of Egocentrism in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

Group
LC
SC
RC
RT

Before
discussion
1.23
.095
.076
.077
0.005

After
discussion
(cond. 1 & 2)

.001
.01
.05
.05
ns

1.11
.041
.031
.054
.002

.001
.05
.01
.01
ns

Note. Group: no egocentrism 1, Individual: no egocentrism 0.

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EGOCENTRIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FAIRNESS

TABLE 3

(2) LC harvest
B0 / B1 (LC egocentrism)

Symmetric versus Asymmetric Egocentrism

Before discussion
After discussion

121

Symmetric

Asymmetric

1.14
1.03

1.23
1.11

/ B2(LC expectations of others) / e

(3) SC harvest
B 0 / B1(SC egocentrism)

Note. No egocentrism 1.

/ B2(SC expectations of others) / e

(4) RC harvest

after discussion was 1.03 which was not significantly

different from one (t 1.75, df 13, ns), indicating no
evidence for egocentrism according to our measure. In
addition, a one-way analysis of variance indicated a
significant difference in group egocentrism after discussion between symmetric and asymmetric groups (F
4.76, df 44, p .05). The group measure of egocentrism before discussion in the symmetric dilemma was
1.14, in contrast to group egocentrism of 1.23 (reported
earlier) found in the asymmetric dilemma. Although
this result was in the predicted direction (egocentrism
was lower in the symmetric dilemma than in the asymmetric dilemma), it was non-significant (F 2.51, df
27, ns). Table 3 summarizes the comparison between
symmetric and asymmetric groups, clearly illustrating
lower egocentrism for the symmetric case.6
Moderate support was found for Hypotheses 4 and 6
which predicted that harvesting would be positively
related to the amount of egocentrism (Hypothesis 4)
and to the amount of harvesting expected from the
other parties (Hypothesis 6). To test Hypotheses 4 and
6, regressions were run treating harvesting levels as
the dependent variable and measures of egocentrism
and expectations of others behavior as the two independent variables. Six regressions were run, one for
the group measure, one for each of the four individual
measures, and one overall regression which combines
the data from the four individuals regressions by including role as an independent (categorical) variable.7
Regression equations were as follows:

(1) Group harvest

B0 / B 1(Group egocentrism)
/ B2 (Group expectations of others) / e

Comparisons of egocentrism between the symmetric and asymmetric groups are not made at the level of individual egocentrism.
The individual roles are not comparable since in one case they are
symmetric, and in the other case they are asymmetric. Thus, such
a comparison at the individual level would be inappropriate.
7
The overall regression was based on the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer.

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B0 / B1 (RC egocentrism)
/ B2(RC expectations of others) / e
(5) RT harvest B0 / B 1(RT egocentrism)
/ B 2(RT expectations of others) / e
(6) Harvest
B 0 / B1(roledummy1) / B 2(roledummy2)
/ B3(roledummy3) / B4 (egocentrism)
/ B5(expectations of others) / e,
where LC Large commercial; SC Small commercial; RC Recreational competition; RT Recreational
tours.
These regressions provided moderate support for our
predictions. Three of the individual regressions as well
as the overall regression showed a significant relationship between egocentrism and harvesting behavior.
The group regression, the overall regression, and two
of the individual regressions showed significant relationships between expectations of others behavior and
harvesting behavior.
In the group regression (R2 .61, df 2,23),8 expectations of others behavior was significantly related to
harvesting behavior (T 5.531, p .001) and egocentrism was in the predicted direction, but nonsignificant
(T .473, ns). For large commercial (R2 .23, df
2,25), expectations of others behavior was significantly, positively related to harvesting behavior (T
2.22, p .05) as predicted, and egocentrism was in the
predicted direction, but nonsignificant (T 1.11, ns).
For small commercial (R2 .22, df 2,27), egocentrism
was significantly, positively related to harvesting behavior (T 2.56, p .05) and expectations of others
behavior was in the predicted direction, but nonsignificant (T 1.67, ns). For recreational competition
8

One large commercial subject felt that he could not judge the
harvesting levels of the other three actors after discussion. Another
large commercial actor made no final harvesting decision for himself.
One small commercial actor felt that she could not judge the harvesting level of the large commercial actor. These omissions account for
the slight variation in the degrees of freedom of the regressions. All
three of these actors made all other decisions as instructed.

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WADE-BENZONI, TENBRUNSEL, AND BAZERMAN

TABLE 4

Egocentrism
Group
LC
SC
RC
RT
Overall

p
p
p
p

ns
ns
.05
.01
.01
.001

Expectations
of others

Role

p .001
p .05
ns
ns
p .06
p .01

p .001

(R2 .30, df 2,28), egocentrism was significantly,

positively related to harvesting behavior (T 3.00, p
.01) and expectations of others behavior was in the
predicted direction, but nonsignificant (T 1.68, ns).
For recreational tours (R2 .30, df 2,27), egocentrism
was significantly, positively related to harvesting behavior (T 2.89, p .01) and expectations of others
behavior was marginally significant (T 1.97, p .06)
and in the predicted direction.
Finally, for the overall regression (R 2 .85, df
5,112), role was significantly related to harvesting behavior (T 06.75, 016.27, 018.62, p .001). Egocentrism was significantly, positively related to harvesting
behavior (T 4.72, p .001) and expectations of others behavior was also significantly, positively related
to harvesting behavior (T 3.23, p .01). Table 4
summarizes the results from the six regressions.
Hypothesis 5 predicted greater harvesting in asymmetric than in symmetric groups. The data strongly
support this prediction. On average, symmetric groups
harvested 2614 metric tons, while asymmetric groups
following the exact same procedure harvested an average of 3228 metric tons (F 10.10, df 27, p .01).
Including both conditions one and two for the asymmetric groups, subjects harvested an average of 3436 metric tons (F 18.46, df 41, p .001).9 Table 5 summarizes the individual and group harvesting levels (after
discussion) for the two asymmetric conditions and the
symmetric condition. In addition, 64% of the symmetric
groups reached the sustainable 2500 metric ton level,
while only about 10% of the asymmetric groups were
able to do so. A x2 test revealed a significant difference
between symmetric and asymmetric cases in the number of groups that reached the 2500 metric tons level
(p .001).
Hypothesis 7, egocentrism will be stronger before
discussion than after discussion in asymmetric social
dilemmas, was tested using both between- and within9

Three individuals in the asymmetric case did not report a final

harvesting level for themselves. Thus, the group harvest could not
be calculated for three groups resulting in less degrees of freedom
than would be expected.

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subjects tests. Group and individual measures of egocentrism before discussion in condition one of the asymmetric groups (where subjects recorded what they
thought was fair before discussion) were compared to
group and individual measures of egocentrism after
discussion in condition two of the asymmetric groups
(where subjects did not record what they thought was
fair before discussion). This procedure was used since
subjects decisions in condition two of the asymmetric
groups were not biased by previous exposure to data
forms. A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare the group egocentrism before (mean 1.23) and
after discussion (mean 1.09) and a significant difference was found (F 6.56, df 29, p .05). Similarly,
a one-way analysis of variance was used to compare
individual egocentrism in the asymmetric groups before and after discussion for each of the four roles. The
results for each role were as follows: Large commercial
egocentrism before discussion (mean .095) was marginally greater than egocentrism after discussion
(mean .017); (F 3.92, df 30, p .06). Small
commercial egocentrism before discussion (mean
.076) was nonsignificantly greater than egocentrism
after discussion (mean .034) (F 1.56, df 29, ns).
Recreational competition egocentrism before discussion (mean .077) was nonsignificantly greater than
egocentrism after discussion (mean .063) (F .128,
df 30, ns). Recreational tours egocentrism before discussion (mean 0.005) was very similar to egocentrism after discussion (mean 0.008) (F .007, df
30, ns). Although nonsignificant, differences in individual egocentrism before and after discussion were in the

TABLE 5
Harvesting Levels (Metric Tons)

Group
LC
SC
RC
RT

Sym

Asym (1)

Asym (2)

Asym (1 & 2)

2614
746
686
591
591

3228
1548
1145
420
180

3645
1691
1253
524
195

3436
1622
1200
474
188

Note. Although group harvesting levels are comparable between

symmetric and asymmetric groups, individual harvesting levels
are not. Recall the harvesting options:
Harvesting options: (in metric tons)

Group
LC
SC
RC
RT

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Symmetric

Asymmetric

2500 5000
2501250
2501250
2501250
2501250

2500 5000
400 2000
300 1500
200 1000
100 500

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TABLE 6a

DISCUSSION

Effect of Discussion on Egocentrism (Between Subjects)

Group
LC
SC
RC
RT

Before discussion

After discussion

1.23
.095
.076
.077
0.005

1.09
.017
.034
.063
0.008

Note. Group: no egocentrism 1, Individual: no egocentrism 0.

predicted direction for all roles. Table 6a summarizes

the egocentrism scores before and after discussion for
this between-subjects test of Hypothesis 7 with the
asymmetric groups.
The above test for Hypothesis 7 has the advantage
of statistical independence between pre- and post-discussion measures. We also conducted three similar
within-subjects tests. For the first within-subjects test,
measures of egocentrism before discussion were compared to measures of egocentrism after discussion using subjects from condition one of the asymmetric
groups only (thereby examining the effect of discussion
within the same group of individuals). Although preand post-discussion measures of egocentrism were not
significantly different, they were in the predicted direction (egocentrism was lower after discussion) for the
group measure and three of the individual measures.10
Table 6b summarizes the egocentrism scores before and
after discussion for this within-subjects test. A second
within-subjects test compared measures of egocentrism
at the group level before and after discussion including
only the symmetric groups. A t test revealed that egocentrism after discussion (1.03) was significantly lower
than egocentrism before discussion (1.14) (t 3.41, df
13, p .01). A third within-subjects test combined
the symmetric groups and condition one of the asymmetric groups (all groups that made decisions both before and after discussion) and compared group egocentrism before and after discussion. Before discussion,
group egocentrism was 1.19 and after discussion group
egocentrism was 1.09. A t test revealed that egocentrism after discussion was significantly lower than before discussion (t 3.70, df 27, p .001). The results
for the second and third within-subjects tests are also
summarized in Table 6b.

The results of this study advance our knowledge of

resource dilemmas in several ways. First, we find support for the notion that egocentrism, which is particularly pronounced in asymmetric dilemmas, may be a
causal mechanism that increases exploitation of resources. Second, we propose that an additional benefit
of communication in social dilemmas may be the reduction of egocentrism. Third, we extend the finding that
expectations of others behavior is related to harvesting
in an asymmetric dilemma situation.
The results of this experiment provide evidence of
egocentric biases in the interpretation of fairness at
both the group and individual levels in asymmetric social dilemma situations. Evidence of the bias was found
at the group level and at the individual level in actors
in three out of the four roles. Egocentric interpretations
of fairness was absent only in actors in the recreational
tours role. We attribute its absence to the fact that this
role represented the weakest actor (unable to harvest
much in the present and very dependent on the future)
which minimized ambiguity with respect to this actor.
It was obvious to all actors that recreational tours was
very dependent on the cooperation of others for their
survival. Thus, they felt fairly treated even with small
concessions from the other parties and their assessments of what was fair for them tended to be congruous
with the assessments of other parties.
In addition, the results of this experiment suggest
that harvesting behavior is affected by egocentric interpretations of fairness. The relationship was found
among actors for three out of the four roles at the individual level and in the overall regression test. In a

TABLE 6b
Effect of Discussion on Egocentrism (Within-Subjects)
Before discussion

After discussion

Asymmetric groups
Group
LC
SC
RC
RT

1.23
.095
.076
.077
0.005

1.15
.066
.024
.043
.012
Symmetric groups

1.14

10

The egocentrism measures for the recreational tours role did not
support hypothesis 7 according to this within-subjects test. However,
the individual egocentrism measures both before and after discussion
for this role indicated no evidence for egocentrism. Thus, it is not
surprising that discussion had no effect since our prediction assumed
the presence of egocentrism.

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1.03

Asymmetric & symmetric groups

1.19

1.09

Note. Group: no egocentrism 1, Individual: no egocentrism 0.

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resource dilemma, egocentrism results in parties believing that it is honestly fair for them to have more of
a resource than independent advisors would judge as
fair, causing them to overharvest, which in turn results
in resource depletion. One explanation for why this
relationship might not exist for large commercial actors
is that it is probable that the large commercial actors
incentive to defect was so strong that fairness, whether
egocentrically-based or not, was overridden by self-interest. During the debriefing, several students in this
role indicated that although they thought it was fair
for them to show self-restraint in their harvesting decisions, the incentive to not cooperate was stronger. In
addition, they felt that they would have trouble justifying almost any cooperative behavior to their constituency in light of the payoff structure.
Our results suggested that egocentrism was more
pronounced in asymmetric than in symmetric dilemmas. We argue that the reason for this lies in the additional ambiguity in fairness judgments introduced in
the asymmetric social dilemmas. Suggestive of this reasoning are our results which demonstrate more ambiguity in fairness judgments in the asymmetric dilemma
than in the symmetric one. In general, social dilemmas
are characterized by a significant amount of uncertainty, including uncertainty about the behavior of
other people, and, in resource dilemmas, about the nature of the environment (Biel & Garling, 1993). Much
real world ecological debate concerns the definition of
safe levels of resource use. It is rarely clear what
levels of resource exploitation will not endanger future
access to it (Messick, 1991). The presence of so much
ambiguity enables judgments to be biased in a selfserving manner. In asymmetric dilemmas, which we
believe more closely parallel real world social dilemmas
than symmetric dilemmas, the problem is only compounded by the added ambiguity of what constitutes a
fair solution. The association between the asymmetry
in the dilemma and the ambiguity concerning fairness
was clear to us in comparison to the symmetric dilemma not only through our measures of ambiguity,
but also through our discussion with the subjects after
the data collection. When debriefing subjects who participated in the asymmetric dilemma, there was consistently significant disagreement within the groups as
to what they believed to be a fair solution. Fairness
arguments included splitting the profits equally, reducing harvests by equal numbers of metric tons, reducing
harvests by equal percentages of current harvests, reducing harvests in accord with the extent to which each
association cared about the future of the resource, and
several permutations of these four solutions.11 Subjects
11
Note that each of these four solutions represented different levels of relative harvest reduction for the groups.

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argued earnestly and fervently with one another

throughout the debrief, and remained in disagreement
concerning issues of fairness at the conclusion of the
exercise. In striking contrast, when debriefing subjects
who participated in the symmetric dilemma, the majority of subjects agreed on the equal division rule as the
singular truly defendable fair solution.12 The only display of emotion was directed at defectors who had difficulty defending their behavior, especially on the basis
of fairness.
Another important result of this experiment is that
communication in social dilemmas may serve as a
means of reducing egocentric interpretations of fairness which contribute to non-cooperative behavior.
This result points to an additional benefit of communication in social dilemmas: the reduction of egocentrism
which was shown to be associated with harvesting.
Hearing the other parties articulate the logic for distribution patterns that are different than ones own egocentrically determined patterns may lead parties to reevaluate their own assessment of what would be fair,
thereby decreasing harvesting levels. Future research
may be useful in explaining the contextual factors that
determine the importance of communication in asymmetric dilemmas.
The results of this study also indicate that expectations of others behavior is related to choice behavior
in asymmetric social dilemmas. This result parallels
early symmetric dilemmas research by Dawes et al.
(1977) and others. However, since this relationship was
not found among all individual actors, perhaps in
asymmetric social dilemmas this relationship holds for
some, but not all, parties and this relationship depends
on the payoff structure. This suggests another area
where future research might lend some insight.
In interpreting these results, it is important to recognize the potential lack of generalizability to real world
settings. While we made every effort to use a realistic
dilemma scenario, and drew on many facts related to
this scenario, we realize that our replication is not perfect nor are our participants real fishers. If anything,
the self-interested motivation of our subjects may be
substantially less than that of real-world fishing groups
whose livelihood depends on shark harvests, and as
such the magnitude of our results may be conservative.
Despite its limitations, this study points to a set of
12
Fifty-seven percent of the symmetric groups reported the equal
division rule (everyone harvests 625 metric tons) as the fairest solution, and those groups actually harvested according to that rule. In
contrast, none of the asymmetric groups (0%) reported the equal
division rule as the fairest solution, nor harvested according to that
rule. A x2 test comparing symmetric to asymmetric groups indicated
a significant difference in the number of groups who reported the
equal division rule as the fairest solution (p .001).

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EGOCENTRIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FAIRNESS

factors which may be important to understanding behavior considered undesirable in light of the current
environmental crisis. Consistent with research on ambiguity and self-interested behavior (Hsee, 1993; Tenbrunsel, 1995), the pervasive real-world resource dilemma represents a critical area where ambiguity enables individuals to justify behavior characterizing
what they want to do (take a larger share of a limited
resource) instead of what they should do (practice
self-restraint in the use of the resource). Thus, the selfserving bias allows individuals the illusion of consistency between an attitude of concern for the environment and behavior that contradicts this concern (Bazerman, Wade-Benzoni, & Benzoni, 1996). Self-serving
biases may lead to behaviors which damage the health
and hinder the sustainability of the natural environment in so far as ambiguity provides individuals with
the leeway to do what they want instead of what they
should do. For example, since there is a lot of uncertainty about which behaviors are most important to
solving environmental problems, egocentric biases may
cause individuals to believe that their positive contributions to environmental issues are more important
than the contributions of others. Similarly, equivocal
connections between environmental problems and
their causes can lead to self-serving assignment of
blame for environmental problems. Ambiguity enables
individuals to perceive their own negative contributions to environmental problems as less important,
thus allowing them to avoid blame and point to others
as the primary cause. In sum, ambiguity coupled with
self-serving biases lets individuals off the hook in
terms of taking responsibility for contributing to environmental problems and modifying behavior to help
solve them.
The identification of egocentrism as a possible causal
mechanism for overharvesting may have important implications for the management of social dilemmas. A
management process should not rely on parties to automatically agree on what is fair or expect everyone to
consider a given solution fair. When it is more difficult
to agree on a fair solution, the conflict is more difficult
to resolve. This is especially true in social dilemmas
where there is no formal solution enforcement mechanism and implementation of the solution is dependent
on voluntary restraint of the parties. If they have not
accepted the solution as fair, they are unlikely to implement it. In addition, knowing about the bias is unlikely
to have an impact on the magnitude of the bias. Research by Babcock et al. (1995) indicated that telling
individuals about the self-serving bias did not mitigate
the bias. They found that despite being told of the existence and impact of the bias, subjects were unable to
correct it. Subjects informed about the bias seemed to

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125

believe that the other party would be biased, but that

they were immune. However, the results of our study
suggest that communication among parties may be an
effective method to reduce egocentric interpretations
of fairness which may, in turn, decrease the likelihood
of overharvesting and increase the probability that parties come to a consensus on a solution.
As a final note, we add that delayed consequences
is an important characteristic of the typical resource
dilemma where group members share a common replenishable resource over time. Over-consumption of
the common resource is rewarding to group members
in the short run but can have deleterious consequences,
such as loss of future access to commons due to depletion, for the group in the long run (Samuelson & Messick, 1986). While fish consumers today enjoy most of
the benefit, experience minimal burden, and contribute
significantly to the problem, future generations of people experience minimal or no benefit, endure the majority of the burden, and contribute little (or not at all) to
the creation of the problem. This temporal component
contributes to the asymmetry in outcomes in many resource dilemmas as the present generation gains the
benefits of consumption, leaving the burdens to future
generations. This suggests an area ripe for the future
study of egocentric interpretations of fairness, as they
might be expected to influence intergenerational allocation decisions.
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Received: February 1, 1995

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