THE PATTON REPORT
©1972 Pet. Proottion L Lamm& IL.
A Fire Protection Publication
Consulting
WHY SMOKE KILLS
In building fires most deaths result from inhaling
toxic and/or superheated gases rather than direct
contact with the flames. Thus, smoke is the chief
killer in building fires. Why is this so? In order to
set the stage for the discussion of smoke as the
prime killer of people in structural fires we must
first go back and again define the basic fire safety
plan for buildings.
I have pointed out in previous Patton Reports that
our fire safety technology has been primarily
structured to protect the building — not the people
within the building. Structural fire protection is
directed toward limiting the dollar loss due to fire
through the following techniques.
A.Fire Proofing: Structural collapse which might
result in total loss of the facility is prevented
through fire proofing the structural members.
B. Sub-division of Risk: A limitation is placed on the
maximum fire size and extent of fire loss by
subdividing the property into fire resistive com-
partments. For example, usually each floor of a
multi-story building is a separate fire zone. Often,
each floor is further compartmented with fire
rated walls or partitions.
These measures, although primarily intended to
prevent property loss, are also considered to serve
the need of protecting life within the structure.
Additional fire safety features have been incorporated
in the building design specific to the life problem.
They are:
A. Exits. (Presumably safe routes to flee the fire)
B. Control of the flammability of interior sheathing
to reduce the possibility of a very rapid spreading
fire that would quickly cut off the exits.
These are not the sole fire safety features of a build-
ing, but they are the fundamental concepts of build-
ing fire protection.
Now recapping to this point we have pointed out
that the primary killer of people in buildings is
smoke. And then we have pointed out that the
primary fire controls applied to buildings are:
Surveys Research
No.24
A. Fire proofing structural components.
B. Subdivision to risk (compartmentation).
C. Exits.
D. Regulation of the combustibility of interior
sheathing.
Now let us examine these basic fire control measures
in their relationship to the control of smoke.
SMOKE, THE UNPLANNED FOR HAZARD
Do the basic fire control measures applied to
buildings have validity from a smoke control view-
point? Let us see.
Fireproofing the steel is no solution to the smoke
problem. There is no need to say more on this item.
There are many who consider the division of risk
(compartmentation) to be an important means of
protecting life as well as property. In fact, the
NFPA Life Safety Code relies rather heavily on corn-
partmentation as a supplement to exits. The idea is
"trap" the fire to prevent it from blocking exit ways
and/or directly exposing people; and, as a last resort
a fire resistive compartment can act as a protected
sanctuary for the people to "hole up" in to "ride
out" the fire in safety.
At this point we are not questioning the capability
of the compartment to contain the fire (although
even this is debatable — see Patton Report No. 18).
The question at hand now is . . . DO THE FIRE
ENCLOSURES ALSO SERVE AS SMOKE EN-
CLOSURES? The answer to this question, un-
fortunately, is no. Fire enclosures in buildings do
not serve as smoke enclosures.
The reason why this is so can be readily seen from
an examination of Illustration 1. This illustration
shows a typical approved method of protecting
vertical air vents to multi-story buildings. Note that
this standard and routine solution to vertical fire
spread represents no barrier whatsoever to the
passage of smoke. No fire dampers are required. No
physical barrier of any sort is included to prevent
smoke spread to upper floors through this approved
ducting system. Smoke can enter the vertical shaft
and back up through the sub ducts.
Now please examine Illustration 2. This shows a
typical air handling system for a multi-story building.
There are some who claim that requirements calling
for a fire damper where a duct pierces a fire wall
or floor also will act as a smoke barrier. In truth, it
won't. The fusible links holding the dampers open
react only to heat, not smoke. Because of the
dilution factor and heat loss along the duct it is pos-
sible to pass great quantities of toxic gasses without
operating the fire dampers. And, contrary to popular
opinion, automatic dampers are not required in duct
work piercing the ceiling of a fire resistive floor and
ceiling assembly. In short, the traditional air hand-
ling system is definitely not a smoke control system.
Let us now look at the fire compartment itself —
the walls and floors that act as an enclosure for the
space. How valid are four walls and two floors as a
smoke enclosure? Well, perhaps— and I emphasize the
"perhaps" — the structural fire compartment is
reasonably tight the day the building is completed,
assuming the doors are closed. But as anyone can
attest who has ever made a building inspection,
the day after the grand opening the workmen
immediately start chopping holes in the walls and
floors to run additional pipe and wiring through,
and if they ever seal the holes again I am sure it is
only by accident. Those who think holes become
sealed because the fire regulations say they should
are not in close contact with reality.
ROOf
Floor J—
Ceiling/ 77
iGr ille
LI
Floop T DOOR
LI
tri
ceiling t ro
Branch-i -C Fire Resistive
X Enclosure
Fire
Illus. 1. Typical arrangement of sub-ducts.
Note: Dampers are not required.
In summary, the structural compartment that pre-
sumably is a fire enclosure is an absolute sieve as far
as smoke is concerned. This has been proven over
and over again by innumerable major fires that have
occurred in compartmented buildings. And it's
not just because the workmen don't patch their
holes either, it's also because vertical and horizontal
shafts are not required to be smoke tight to begin
with.
SMOKE AND THE EXIT PLAN
To this point we have seen that the fire protection
features of buildings that are primarily property
oriented; i.e., the fireproofing and the com part-
mentation, are not effective solutions to the smoke
problem from a life safety view point. Now, how
about those safety features provided in buildings in
specific recognition of the human life problem. These
are the exit ways and the control of the flammability
of interior sheathing.
It is not uncommon for smoke to block corridors
leading to the enclosed exit ways. In recognition of
this problem many codes require one hour corridor
partitions in certain types of buildings. But this is
no real solution because there is no practical way
to guarantee that corridor doors will be closed when
a fire occurs.
I say that there is no practical way to be certain
that corridor doors will be shut in event of fire
for these reasons:
a) If the doors are equipped with self closing devices
so as to keep the doors closed at all times they
will be propped open because constantly closed
doors often will interfere with daily operations.
PRESSURE RELIEF DAMPER
HEAT SENSITIVE ELEMENT TO
STOP FAN IN CASE OF FIRE
BLOWER
FIRE
BRANCH
DAMPERS DAMPERS
BRANCH
NONCOMBUSTIBLE.
MIN. I HR. RATING
llus. 2, Typical installation of air conditioning system in building
of rue resistive, protected noncombustible, or heavy timber
construction.
b) If the doors are held open with inexpensive
fusible links excessive quantities of smoke can
pass through the openings prior to the fusing of
the links by heat.
c) All doors could be equipped with magnetic hold
open devices to be operated by fast acting product
of combustion . smoke detectors. But, to be really
effective, a P.C. detector would be needed in each
room as well as in. the corridors. An elaborate
detection system of This nature would be very
costly to install and maintain, and from a cost --
effectiveness viewpoint it will not be justified for
most occupancies.
d) Even if the door is closed when fire occurs,
those who first respond to a fire report more often
than not open the door to determine the size of
the fire.
e) Finally, it should also be noted that even if all
corridor doors are completely closed during the
entire course of a fire, smoke can still spread from
a room to a corridor (or the reverse) through air
handling systems, openings around doors, etc. The
truth is that fire zones simply are not fully smoke
tight.
So, to this point, we have determined that the
problem of smoke is not satisfactorily solved by
fireproofing the steel or by dividing the building
into fire resistive compartments, and now we see that
the building exit plan, which is the primary plan
for life safety in buildings, can be voided by smoke.
FLAME SPREAD REGULATIONS
There have been many instances in the past where
fire has spread rapidly over highly combustible
interior trim or decorations. As a consequence,
highly combustible interior trim, sheathing, and
decorations are generally prohibited in buildings
having a high occupancy count. This is all well and
good — but does it fully solve the smoke problem?
I think not for two reasons.
The first reason is that reduction in flame spread
does not necessarily mean a reduction in smoke
production. As a matter of fact some of the treat-
ments that reduce the flame spread ratings of
materials actually increase the generation of, and
toxicity of, smoke.
The second reason is that interior trim and decora-
tions do not necessarily represent the prime fire haz-
ard of an occupancy. Usually it is the contents that
represent the prime fire problem. And there is no
practical way to regulate all contents to be noncom-
bustible or to produce nontoxic smoke.
So, flame spread ratings represent an increment of
fire safety — but they do not solve the smoke
problem.
DWELLINGS
The single family dwelling is the number one problem
from a loss of life by fire viewpoint. If there is
anything in fire protection that cries out for attention
it is the constant -- day after day — week in and week
out killing of children in homes by fire. Again,
most are killed by smoke rather than the fire itself.
WHAT IS BEING DONE ABOUT THE PRO-
BLEM? Let's look at the four typical building fire
protection solutions named above; fireproofing,
compartmentation, enclosed exits and control of
flammability of interior sheathing in relation to home
construction:
a) Homes are not required to be of fireproof or of
noncom bustible construction.
b) No real attempt made to compartment a dwelling
into fire resistive compartments.
c) There are no requirements for secondary exits.
Stairways usually are open.
d) The use of highly combusitble interior sheathing
is common in dwellings.
In short, the fire protection solutions that are applied
in other types of buildings (which solutions I con-
sider inadequate) are not even applied to dwellings.
Further, content fires in homes are more likely to be
of a smokey variety (Example — bedding or sofa
fires). When this is coupled with the fact that the
occupants are asleep approximately 1/3 the time,
the results are obvious.
So, in the dwelling where the smoke and fire death
problem is most acute, the least fire safety is applied.
WHY PEOPLE DIE FROM SMOKE
We are now in a position to explain why it is that
smoke rather than fire itself is the prime killer of
people.
The most obvious answer, of course, is that the com-
bustion products travel over a wider area more quick-
ly than the flames.
But there are also other reasons equally important.
One is that the traditional fire protection features
incorporated in structures produce some reason-
able control of the fire — but they do not effectively
control the propagation of or spread of smoke.
The third is that the occupancy (the home) where the
threat of smoke to human life is the greatest,
the controls applied are the least.
In summary, smoke is the prime killer of people
because our present fire requirements do not deal
with the smoke problem in a meaningful way.
In the next Patton Report I will discuss further
aspects of the smoke problem.
Dated: August, 1972