G.R. No.

91745 March 4, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JULIO MANLIGUEZ, SHIRLEY IGNACIO y AGATIA and LUCIA
GUIRAL, Accused-Appellant.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The information dated April 25, 1988 in Criminal Case No. 16207-88 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, charged the accusedappellant, Julio Manliguez, and his two co-accused, Shirley A. Ignacio and
Lucia Guiral, with the crime of kidnapping, committed as follows:
... That on or about April 16, 1988, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the
above-mentioned
accused,
conspiring,
confederating and cooperating together and helping one
another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped one
Diana Grace Ali, a minor, seven (7) years of age while the
latter was sleeping in her room, accused brought and carried
away the herein minor at 171 Fatima Boulevard, Davao City
and detained her in a house of one accused Jose Manliguez
from April 16, 1988 up to April 22, 1988, but until now the
victim child has not been recovered. (p. 21, Rollo.)
When arraigned, the three defendants entered pleas of not guilty.
As summarized in the Solicitor General's "Manifestation (In Lieu of Appellee's
Brief)," the facts of the case are the following;
Diana Grace Ali, the "kidnap victim," is an adopted child and
was 7 years old when the incident at issue occurred on April
16. 1988.
At about noontime on April 16, 1988, Priscilla, the widowed
adoptive mother of Diana Grace, was about to sleep in the
sala of their house located in Bangkal, Davao City. Diana
Grace was in her room accompanied by a certain Susan and
Lucia Guiral (one of the accused),the latter being the Ali's
househelper. Priscilla woke up at about 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and found that Diana Grace was missing. She
then instructed Lucia Guiral and Susan to look for the girl in
the neighborhood. Diana Grace was nowhere to be found
(pp. 54-67, tsn, October 4, 1988)

Earlier, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same

date, Lori Jean Ali, the 16-year-old daughter of Priscilla Ali,
left their residence and proceeded to Santa Cruz to get her
report card. On her way out, she saw a maroon colored
Minica cab parked in front of their house (p. 8, tsn, June 28,
1988). She saw two persons seated inside the back, one
male and a female. She later pointed to the accusedappellant Julio Manliguez, as the man standing near their
gate beside the parked Minica cab, and to the accused,
Shirley Ignacio, as the female occupant of the Minica cab
(pp. 13-14, Ibid.).
Susan Caberte, Lucia Guiral and Priscilla Ali searched for
Diana Grace around the neighborhood. Failing to find her,
Priscilla Ali left her house with daughter Lori Jean. Accused
Guiral also left and went home to her place at Guihing,
Davao del Sur. She was fetched on April 21, 1988 by Lori
Jean Ali. Susan Caberte and Shirley Albarico who told her
that Mrs. Ali wanted her back. She obliged and went back
with them to Davao City. Upon arrival in Davao City, accused
Lucia Guiral was immediately brought to the Ulas Police
Station where she was accused of hiding Diana Grace Ali
(pp. 80-83, tsn, Nov. 14, 1988).
The police conducted a thorough investigation, but the police
investigators comported themselves in a manner beyond the
constitutional prohibition. Accused Lucia Guiral was
subjected to torture to extract a confession. Guiral was
undressed. her body was soaked wet and then she was
subjected to electric shocks. The agony prompted her to
concoct a story. She pointed at a house in Juna Subdivision
as the place where Diana Grace was supposedly being kept.
It turned out to be the house of a certain Major Payo. She
was tortured some more and brought to a garbage dump
where a police officer fired shots near her ear (pp. 83-86,
tsn, Nov. 14, 1988).
As the policemen kept hitting her head with their pistols and
fired shots near her head when she was brought again to the
garbage dump, Guiral told another lie so the police would
stop torturing her. She told them that the kidnappers were in
the Fatima Village. She was shoved into a Ford Fiera vehicle
and brought to Fatima Village where she mentioned the
accused Julio Manliguez because he is the only person she
knows who was staying at Fatima Village. Manliguez was
roused from his sleep at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of. April

22, 1988 and boarded into the Ford Fiera (pp. 88-91, Ibid; p.
145, tsn. Nov. 28, 1988). Inside the Fiera, a police officer
pushed the barrel of his armalite rifle on Manliquez's chest.
He asked the police officer not to do that because it hurt. The
policeman was irked and fired shots near his ear (pp. 147148, tsn, Nov. 28, 1988).
Afterwards, Manliguez was brought to the Talomo Police
Station where he was detained. He was not given any food
to eat nor water to drink. At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
the same day, the police brought him out of his cell and
interrogated him on the whereabouts of the child. After
repeated denials, Manliguez was also tortured. A cellophane
bag was put over his head and tightened around his neck.
He lost consciousness. Manliguez refused to admit any
complicity in the alleged kidnapping. In the evening of that
day, Manliguez was brought out of his cell and taken to the
office of the police investigator. There, he was hit on the
head with a rattan chair (pp. 152-154, Ibid.).
Reports were lodged against the abusive policeman in the
office of Colonel Miguel Abaya. An investigator, Lt.
Camorongan. was sent together with a doctor. Manliguez
was brought to the Regional Hospital where he was treated.
After treatment, Lt. Camorongan brought Manliguez to the
headquarters of the 431st Metrodiscom (Metropolitan District
Command) and investigated regarding his complaint of
police brutality. He executed a statement (Exh. "4"
Manliguez) and was transferred to the Ma-a City Jail to
identify his tormentors. He pointed to policemen Plaza and
Mirando as among those who tortured and beat him (pp.
155-161, ibid.).
Meanwhile, Shirley Ignacio was arrested in her house at
Piapi Boulevard in connection with the disappearance of
Diana Grace Ali. Before going with the policemen, she asked
for permission to call up her brother but the policemen
refused to let her. She was brought to the Talomo Police
Station and was placed in the cell occupied by accused
Lucia Guiral. A Lt. Obrero asked Guiral if "this is Shirley," and
Guiral said "she is the one" Shirley Ignacio vehemently
denied knowing Guiral (pp. 114-117, TSN, Nov. 15, 1988; p.
118, ibid).

She was tortured and brought to places she falsely pointed

to as the hiding place of the child, to avoid further torture (pp.
120-131, ibid).
On their return to Davao City, Shirley Ignacio tried to kill
herself by jumping from the jeep in which they were riding.
She was brought to a hospital for treatment of the injuries
she sustained (pp. 131-132,ibid).
About two (2) months later, on June 12, 1988, Diana Grace
Ali was reunited with her family. It turned out that the Solon
family took Diana Grace into their custody after she was
found roaming the street that rainy afternoon of April 16,
1989 when she was first missed by her family (pp. 215-254,
tsn, July 31, 1989 and August 28, 1989, pp. 76-81, Rollo):
After trial on the merits. the lower court rendered a decision on May 2, 1988,
finding Manliguez guilty as charged, but it exonerated his co-accused, Shirley
A. Ignacio and Lucia Guiral, because their extra-judicial confessions were
found to have been obtained through "third-degree" methods in violation of
their constitutional right against self-incrimination, The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, Julio Manliguez is
hereby sentenced to be imprisoned to (sic) reclusion
perpetua.
Lucia Guiral and Shirley Ignacio are hereby acquitted since
the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (P. 51, Rollo.)
On June 13, 1989, Manliguez filed a motion for new trial on the ground of
newly-discovered evidence.
The trial court, after granting a new trial and hearing the testimonies of
Esmeraldo Solon, Sr., Anastacia Solon and Esmeraldo Solon, Jr., still
maintained his conviction (p. 61, Rollo). He appealed to this Court.
The only issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that Manliguez kidnapped the seven-year old child,
Diana Grace Ali, on April 16, 1988.
The Solicitor General, in his "Manifestation (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief),"
opined that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to prove that the child

was kidnapped, much less that the accused-appellant was the kidnapper.
The Solicitor General noted that the lone witness to the kidnapping, the 7year-old victim, admitted that she had been coached by her mother to point
to Manliguez as her kidnapper.
The Solicitor General further noted that the only other prosecution witness,
Lori Jean Ali, the victim's adoptive sister, linked Manliguez to the "kidnapping"
by testifying that on April 16, 1988 she saw Manliguez near the gate of a
house across the street from their house (p. 90. Rollo). That lone
circumstance, even if it were true, proves nothing. The constitutional
presumption of innocence that the accused enjoys is not shaken by it
(People vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597). Before there can be conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, there should be more than one circumstance
present. The facts from which the inferences are derived must be proven,
and the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the author of the crime (Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court;
People vs.Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Colinares, 163 SCRA 313).
The testimonies of the defense witnesses Esmeraldo Solon, Sr. and
Esmeraldo Solon, Jr., disprove the alleged kidnapping of Diana Grace. True,
she disappeared from her residence in the afternoon of April 16, 1988, but
Esmeraldo Solon, Jr. testified that he found her in front of his parents' house
at about 4:00 o'clock, of that rainy afternoon roaming on the highway to Toril.
Because it was raining, he called her and brought her inside the house. He
asked her why she was roaming the street but she did not answer. His
mother changed her wet clothes with those of his sister's (p. 234, tsn, August
28, 1989). Esmeraldo, Jr. reported to the police how he found the child (p.
236, ibid.). Not knowing whose child she was, the police advised the Solons
to keep her with them until they could locate her parents, Esmeraldo Solon,
corroborated his son's testimony on how the child, Diana Grace Ali, came to
live with them since April 16, 1988 and up to June 12, 1988, a Sunday, when
after hearing mass with Diana Grace, he brought her around the
neighborhood of the church and Diana recognized the Ali residence and
pointed it out to him (p. 249, tsn, Ibid. p. 93. Rollo).
In rushing to convict Manliguez, the trial court carelessly overlooked the
following significant facts which would have normally engendered doubts as
to the credibility of the prosecution's evidence:
1. The conflicting "confessions" of Lucia Guiral and Shirley Ignacio were
forced out of them by torture inflicted on them by the Talomo police led by a
Lt. Obrero. As a result of torture, Guiral was forced to falsely implicate
Manliguez, her brother-in-law, as the kidnapper. Shirley Ignacio was likewise
forced to falsely admit that she herself kidnapped the child and hid her in her

sister's (Chillita Rallos) house in Ma-a. Midland Village. Surely, the conflicting
confessions could not both be true.
2 Those "confessions" were disproved by Solon's admission that the child
had been in his house since April 16, 1988 after she had been picked up
from the street at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon by his 14-year old son,
Esmeraldo, Jr.
3. Manliguez never admitted the, kidnapping despite the torture which he
suffered in the hands of the Talamo police. Instead, he reported to a CLAO
lawyer, Attorney Caete his ordeal in the police station. Upon complaint
lodged with the PC's Col. Abaya, a PC doctor was sent to examine his
injuries. Only after he was brought to the Regional Hospital for treatment of
his injuries and transferred, first to the 431st PC company headquarters, and
later, to the Ma-a City Jail, did the torture of Manliguez stop.
4. Neither in Manliguez's house at the Fatima Village, nor in Chillita Rallos'
house at Ma-a, did the police find tht missing minor.
5. During the more than two (2) months that Mary Grace Ali was missing, her
family did not receive any ransom note from her supposed kidnappers.
6. The child herself led Esmeraldo Solon. Sr. to her house after they had
attended a mass in Bangkal. While they were walking around looking at the
house, she recognized her home.
7. During her two-months' stay with the Solon family. Mary Grace never
mentioned that she had been kidnapped.
Under this state of the evidence, it can not be said with moral conviction that
it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the child, Mary Grace Ali, had
been kidnapped and that the appellant did it. On the contrary, it is extremely
doubtful that she was kidnapped at all. It appears that, being somewhat
intellectually deficient, she had wandered away from home in the afternoon
of April 16, 1988, got lost and could not find her way back. She also could not
tell the Solons (who found her) her correct address.
The Court is inclined to reject the kidnapping charge for there is not the
slightest hint of a motive for the crime. There is no evidence of any demand
for ransom, nor proof that the child's widowed mother was in a position to
satisfy the demand if it were made. The kidnapping theory appears to be the
hobgoblin of the distraught mind of the child's mother. who wildly unleashed
her arrows of suspicion at everyone who bad been seen anywhere near her
child, or her house, on the day the child disappeared, mindless of the pain

and misery her reckless charge would cause the innocent victims of her
wrath.
The Court sympathizes with the appellant, Julio Manliguez and his coaccused, Shirley Ignacio y Agatia and Lucia Guiral, who suffered horrible
torture in the hands of some members of the Talomo Police Force on account
of false accusations levelled against them by the child's mother, Priscilla Ali,
and sister, Lori Jean Ali. We cannot conclude this decision without
recommending to the Commission on Human Rights and the Philippine
National Police that they undertake a thorough and speedy investigation of,
and impose proper disciplinary sanctions on, Police Lieutenant Obrero and
Patrolmen Plaza and Miranda members of the Police Force of Talomo,
Davao City in April 1988, for the alleged torture of the three (3) accused, Julio
Manliguez, Shirley Ignacio and Lucia Guiral, to extort confessions from them
during the investigation of the alleged kidnapping of the child, Mary Grace Ali.
Inhuman physical torture is the easiest means of obtaining "evidence" from
helpless civilians when police investigators are neither sufficiently trained for
detective work, nor adequately equipped, with the scientific tools of criminal
investigation. An end should be put to such police brutality.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The
appellant, Julio Manliquez, is acquitted of the crime charged and his
immediate release from custody is ordered.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Commission of Human Rights
and the Philippine National Police.
SO ORDERED.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the
government in the last quarter of 1995, which delved into the alleged
participation of national and local officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal
gambling. Although the Court of Appeals upheld the admission into the
Witness Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed personal
knowledge of such gambling activities, the secretary of justice nonetheless
challenges the side opinion of the appellate court that the testimony of the
witness must, as a condition precedent to his admission into said Program,
be shown to be capable of substantial corroboration in its material
points. The justice secretary claims that such corroboration need not be
demonstrated prior to or simultaneous with the witness admission into the
Program, as long as such requirement can be demonstrated when he
actually testifies in court. However, inasmuch as Roque has already been
admitted into the Program and has actually finished testifying, the issue
presented by petitioners has become moot. Thus, any judgment that this
Court may render on the instant petition would be merely an academic
disquisition on a hypothetical problem. Until it can be shown that
an actualcontroversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a binding
decision.

The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to partially set aside the June
28, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] which disposed as follows:[2]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
want of merit, and the injunction issued against respondent judges from
hearing the criminal actions against petitioner is hereby LIFTED.

[G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998]

SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE

ROMANO, LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS,
JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION;
and
POTENCIANO
ROQUE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO
PINEDA, respondents.
DECISION

SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals upheld the justice secretarys denial on January
11, 1996 of private respondents Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance
of Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program.
Although Respondent Court ruled in favor of the government, herein
petitioners nonetheless assail the following portion of the said Decision:
x x x From the explicit terms of the statute, it is at once apparent that the
presence of such corroborative evidence is sine qua non to a witness
admission into the Program. Being in the nature of a condition precedent [to]

his admission into the Program, the existence of such corroborative evidence
must be shown at the time his application for admission is being evaluated.

the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommending the filing of the following

charges against Pineda and other persons x x x.
xxx

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as follows: [3]
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and
involvement of national and local government officials in jueteng and other
forms of illegal gambling.
The case was also the subject of a legislative inquiry/investigation by both
the Senate and the House of Representatives.

xxx

xxx

The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of the petitionerprosecutors), created by petitioner Secretary Teofisto Guingona on
November 24, 1995 (Annex F), conducted a preliminary investigation of the
case and subpoenaed all the respondents in I.S. No. 95-774, therein
requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits by December 22, 1995.
On December 21, 1995, Roque executed a supplemental sworn statement
relative to I.S. No. 95-774, clarifying some of his statements in his first
affidavit (Annex G). Consequently, the December 22, 1995 setting was
cancelled and reset to January 8, 1996 to give Pineda and other respondents
time to refute the charges contained in the supplemental sworn statement.

In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to

the networking of xxx national and local politicians and gambling lords,
sought admission into the Governments Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Program. Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity
as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the term of
former President Corazon C. Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also
revealed that he and members of his family were in danger of being
liquidated, facing as he did the formidable world of corruption with a wellentrenched hold on Philippine social, political and economic systems.

On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of

Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program,
which was denied by petitioner Secretary in a letter-reply dated January 11,
1996 (Annexes H and I). On January 23, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of
Appeals.

After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance

with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, the Department of Justice
admitted Roque to the program, providing him a monthly allowance,
temporary shelter and personal and security protection during witness duty.

In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded with their preliminary

investigation, and on February 2, 1996, they issued a resolution finding
probable cause to charge private respondent Pineda with several offenses
(Annex K). On February 5, 1996, three (3) Informations for corruption of
public officials were filed against him in the Manila and Pasig City Trial
Courts (Annexes L, M and N). He was subsequently arraigned on
February 28, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the City of Manila
presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes, and on March 14, 1996 in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 168, of Pasig City, presided by Judge Benjamin Pelayo.

On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI

Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. and Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his
stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG), several gambling
lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians
offered him money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted,
upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective gambling
operations (Annex B).
On the basis of Roques sworn statement, the sworn statement and
supplemental affidavit of one Angelito H. Sanchez, and the sworn statement
of Gen. Lorenzo Mateo (Annexes C, D and E), then NBI Director Mariano
M. Mison forwarded the result of their investigation on the jueteng scam to

xxx

xxx

xxx

On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up with a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining both trial courts from hearing the criminal actions in the
meantime.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of

whether the secretary of justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a) in
admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program and (b) in excluding him from
the Informations filed against private respondent. Private respondent
contended that Roques admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his
testimony could not be substantially corroborated in its material points;
and second, he appeared to be the most guilty or at least more guilty than
private respondent, insofar as the crimes charged in the Informations were
concerned.

As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in

their favor, Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining that
admission to the Program requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of the
material points in the witness testimony.

Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of

witnesses: (a) a witness who has perceived or has knowledge of, or
information on, the commission of a crime under Section 3; and (b)
a particeps criminis or a participant in the crime under Section 10.

Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission
of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if
qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted
into the Program whenever the following are present:

Based on his sworn statements, Roque participated in the commission

of the crimes imputed to private respondent (corruption of public officials) by
accepting bribe money. Necessarily, his admission to the Program fell under
Section 10, which requires that he should not appear to be the most guilty of
the imputed crimes. Respondent Court found that private respondent sought
to bribe him several times to prevent him from conducting raids on private
respondents gambling operations. Such passive participation in the crimes
did not make him more guilty than private respondent.
On the first issue, Respondent Court initially ruled that, by express
provision of Sections 3 and 10, the requirement of corroboration is a
condition precedent to admission into the Program. A contrary interpretation
would only sanction the squandering of the various benefits of the Program
on one who might later be adjudged disqualified from admission for lack of
evidence to corroborate his testimony.
However, in the same breath, Respondent Court upheld herein
petitioners alternative position that substantial corroboration was
nevertheless actually provided by Angelito Sanchez and retired Gen.
Lorenzo M. Mateos testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of the
government.

Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that

Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that corroboration must
already exist at the time of the witness application as a prerequisite to
admission into the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides:

xxx
(d)

xxx

xxx

his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

xxx

xxx

x x x.

On the other hand, petitioners contend that said provisions merely

require that the testimony of the state witness seeking admission into the
Program can be substantially corroborated or is capable of
corroboration. So long as corroboration can be obtained when he testifies in
court, he satisfies the requirement that his testimony can be substantially
corroborated on its material points.

The Courts Ruling

The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by
petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power.

Subsequently, this petition was filed.[4]

No Actual Controversy
The Issue
The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows:
Whether or not a witness testimony requires prior or simultaneous
corroboration at the time he is admitted into the witness protection, security
and benefit program.[5]

Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition
fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [6] According
to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist, courts are mandated to settle
disputes between real conflicting parties through the application of the law.
[7]
Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the

following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; [8] and (3) the person
challenging must have standing; that is, he has personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.[9]
The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass
upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems[10] or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real
adverse interests.[11] Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. [12] As a
condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy
between litigants must first exist.[13]
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the
former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character,
whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.[14]
Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs. Commission on
Elections[15] regarding the provision in the Organic Act, which mandates that
should there be any conflict between national law and Islamic Law,
the Shariah courts should apply the former. In that case, the petitioner
maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shariah) was derived from the Koran,
which makes it part of divine law, the Shariahmay not be subjected to any
man-made national law. This Court dismissed petitioners argument
because, as enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. No actual controversy between real litigants existed, because
no conflicting claims involving the application of national law were
presented. This being so, the Supreme Court refused to rule on a merely
perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and
those of the national law.
In contrast, the Court held in Sabello vs. Department of Education,
Culture and Sports[16] that there was a justiciable controversy where the issue
involved was whether petitioner -- after he was given an absolute pardon -merited reappointment to the position he had held prior to his conviction, that
of Elementary Principal I. The Court said that such dispute was
not hypothetical or abstract, for there was a definite and concrete
controversy touching on the legal relations of parties and admitting of specific
relief through a court decree that was conclusive in character. That case did
not call for mere opinion or advice, but for affirmative relief.

Closely related to the requirement of an actual case, Bernas

continues, is the second requirement that the question is ripe for
adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. Thus, in PACU vs. Secretary of Education,[17] the Court declined to pass
judgment on the question of the validity of Section 3 of Act No. 2706, which
provided that before a private school may be opened to the public, it must
first obtain a permit from the secretary of education, because all the
petitioning schools had permits to operate and were actually operating, and
none of them claimed that the secretary had threatened to revoke their
permit.
In Tan vs. Macapagal,[18] the Court said that Petitioner Gonzales had
the good sense to wait until after the enactment of the statute [Rep. Act No.
4913 (1967)] requiring the submission to the electorate of certain proposed
amendments to the Constitution [Resolution Nos. 1 and 3 of Congress as a
constituent body (1967)] before he could file his suit. It was only when this
condition was met that the matter became ripe for adjudication; prior to that
stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one
such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel asserted, will neither direct nor
restrain executive [or legislative action] x x x. [19] The legislative and the
executive branches are not allowed to seek its advice on what to do or not to
do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meantime. Before a
court may enter the picture, a prerequisite is that something has been
accomplished or performed by either branch. Then may it pass on the
validity of what has been done but, then again, only when x x x properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.[20]
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not
requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and
disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roques testimony,
inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any
of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed
Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage
witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified
nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give
rise to a justiciable controversy.
After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government
prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the
Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private
respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roques admission into the Program is
already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial
review.

Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor
any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being sought in this
case. The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel for private respondent
that this action is a purely academic exercise, which has no relevance to
the criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. After the assailed Decision
had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque
testified in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his
academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses who
are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are discharged to testify against their
co-accused.[21]

granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support
the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the
power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is
part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent
judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted
to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of
our justice system. [Emphasis ours]

Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to

show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court
might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can
only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.[22]

Simply stated, the decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict

is executive in character. Only when an information, charging two or more
persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court, come into play, viz.:

An Executive Function
In the present petition, the government is in effect asking this Court to
render an advisory opinion on what the government prosecutors should do
when, how and whom to grant or to deny admission into the Program. To
accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into the functions of the executive
department. From their arguments stated above, both sides have obviously
missed this crucial point, which is succinctly stated in Webb vs. De Leon:[23]
It is urged that they [the provisions of RA 6918] constitute xxx an intrusion
into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the
Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state
witness. The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 which gives the
court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness. Petitioners argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the
sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power
to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to
prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretionthe
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power
to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be

SEC. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the

prosecution.When two or more persons are charged with the commission
of a certain offense, the competent court, at any time before they have
entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to be discharged
with the latters consent that he or they may be witnesses for the government
when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d)

Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;

(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
In the present case, Roque was not one of those accused in the Informations
filed by the government prosecutors. Rule 119, Section 9, is therefore clearly
not applicable.
A resort to the progenitors of RA 6981 will yield the same result.
Although Presidential Decree 1731 and National Emergency Memorandum
Order No. 26 state only when immunity from suit attaches to a witness, they
do not specify who are qualified for admission into the Program. PD 1731,

otherwise known as a law Providing for Rewards and Incentives to

Government Witnesses and Informants and for Other Purposes provides:
SEC. 4. Any such informants or witnesses who shall testify, or provide vital
information, regarding the existence or activity of a group involved in the
commission of crimes against national security or public order, or of an
organized/syndicated crime or crime group, and/or the culpability of individual
members thereof in accordance with this Decree shall, upon
recommendation of the state prosecutor, fiscal or military lawyer, as
approved by the Secretary of National Defense or the Secretary of Justice,
as the case may be, be immune from criminal prosecution for his
participation or involvement in any such criminal activity which is the subject
of the investigation or prosecution, in addition to the benefits under Sec. 2
hereof: Provided, that, immunity from criminal prosecution shall, in the case
of a witness offering to testify, attach only upon his actually testifying in court
in accordance with his undertaking as accepted by the state prosecutor,
fiscal, or military lawyer: Provided, further, that the following conditions are
complied with:
xxx

xxx

xxx

c. That such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated in its

material points;
xxx

xxx

x x x.

The same tenor was adopted in National Emergency Memorandum

Order No. 26 signed by former President Corazon C. Aquino, Section 5(c) of
which provides:
c. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution.This applies to the witness
participation or involvement in the criminal case in which his testimony is
necessary and may be availed of only upon his actually testifying in court in
accordance with his undertaking, and provided that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated in its

material points;
xxx

xxx

x x x.

One may validly infer from the foregoing that the government prosecutor
is afforded much leeway in choosing whom to admit into the Program. Such

inference is in harmony with the basic principle that this is an executive

function.
RA 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could help the
government in curbing crime by providing an antidote, as it were, to the usual
reluctance of witnesses to testify. The Department of Justice has clearly
explained the rationale for said law: [24]
Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to
appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal
complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have
been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more
effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a
law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to
ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts.
This Court should then leave to the executive branch the decision on
how best to administer the Witness Protection Program. Unless an actual
controversy arises, we should not jump the gun and unnecessarily intervene
in this executive function.

Closer Scrutiny of the Assailed Decision

Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further
enlighten petitioners as to its true message. Respondent Court did sustain
Roques admission into the Program -- even as it held that the first contention
of petitioners was untenable -- based on the latters alternative argument that
Roques testimony was sufficiently corroborated by that of General
Mateo. While Respondent Court insisted that corroboration must exist prior
to or simultaneous with Roques admission into the Program, it sanctioned
subsequent compliance to cure this defect. The reason for this is found in
the penultimate paragraph of the Decision, in which Respondent Court
categorically stated that it found no manifest abuse of discretion in the
petitioners action. There is no quarrel with this point. Until a more
opportune occasion involving a concrete violation of RA 6981 arises, the
Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 197291

April 3, 2013

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP
CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution
Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO
MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus
cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and
discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may
be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to
include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of
mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or
motion.
The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the
final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 1 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila, dismissing petitioners
petition for mandamus.2
Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009,
when 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of
Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was
petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao
Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on
November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before
he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what
became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes
Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the
preliminary investigation.

On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the
corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue
subpoenae to several persons.4 On December 1, 2009, 25 informations for
murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th
Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.5
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her
letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of
the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in
Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 6 On December
8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of venue. 7 However,
on December 9, 2009, but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to
Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15
additional informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the
Cotabato City RTC.8 Later on, additional informations for murder were filed
against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of
the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. 9
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41
informations for murder when he was arraigned on January 5,
2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre.13 It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010
the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny
Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009.14
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ.15 On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its
amended pre-trial order,16 wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the
Prosecution witnesses.17
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent
Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for
murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in
the massacre through his two sworn declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the
request twice more on October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.20
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied
petitioners request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for
mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777), 22 seeking to

compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various

murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on
January 24, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial,
the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18,
2011,25 respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a
proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.

2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN

THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN
ACCUSED AND HIS NON-INDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSIONS MADE
THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.35
The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of
mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation
to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.

On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of

documents,26 which the RTC in Manila granted on March 21, 2011 after
respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.

Ruling

Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the

Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests
the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion the discretion of what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. 36

On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag,

care of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear
and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. 28 Petitioner
opposed the motion to quash the subpoena on April 15, 2011. 29 The parties
filed other papers, specifically, respondents their reply dated April 26,
2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011;31 and respondents another
reply dated May 20, 2011.32
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil
Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus. 34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS
AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE
MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS ADMITTED
PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS
FILED WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC RTC; and,

The appeal lacks merit.

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the
amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing
of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be
filed in court.37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department,
through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of
supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors
committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be
indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that
petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of

individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have

Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based
because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his
exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure
in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory
provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a
participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the
approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to
encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its
commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or
before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and
shielding him from economic dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each
other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial
court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can
be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before
resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing
in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following
conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a)
there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e)
said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the
commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply

and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be

admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are
present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the
court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10
of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted
to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing
in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used
as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the
requisites under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that
an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to
Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a
state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in
the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged
accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense,
unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with
his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. 40 The discharge
is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the
exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules
for that purpose exist.41

While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a coaccused from the information in order that he may be utilized as a
Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, 42 such
discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due
regard to the proper administration of justice.43Anent the requisite that there
must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the
information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious the
public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for
that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged
in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed
to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish
his case,44 as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the most guilty one, and the
like.45
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for
the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in
order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program.
The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates
as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the
criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity
for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should
such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public
prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the
Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of
the witness.46 The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said
accused from the information.47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the
Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the
absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the
criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act
No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the
commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his
admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that
was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he
could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao
massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he
later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that
became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the
crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when

the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be
used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be
exercised,48or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken
in the exercise of judgment or discretion.49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the
letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way,
i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent
Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no
longer available as petitioner's recourse.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
AFFIRMS the final order issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner
VS.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque, Branch 258,HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
259,PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JOVENCITO
ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the
crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June
30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed
by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.

4.

HELD:

1.
2.
3.
4.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail
the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to
the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn
statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it
did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion
in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape and homicide
2.
Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3.

Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right
to due process during their preliminary investigation

Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial

prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as
an accused.

NO.
NO.
NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were
given all the opportunities to be heard.
NO.

REASONS:
1.

The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
2.
The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed
it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners
that respondent judges should have conducted searching examination
of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3.

The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more

evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully.

4.

Petitioners argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption

that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the

executive department of government whose principal power and

responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators
(See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro,
the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no
showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners complaint about the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity
on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown
and beyond knowing.