TANADA v.

ANGARA 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via
signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction
of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for
the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are
the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was
taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.
Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because
it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations
(UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What
Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it
should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is
isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

Facts: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel
Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per
share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the
winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino
First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In
turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of
principle and policy (not self-executing);
Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer
of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino
First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations
as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference
shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
2

certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

FACTS: Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine
Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?

RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did
not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. xxx
xxx
xxx
The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic
seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the
4

freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all
WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.xxx
xxx
xxx
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while
serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of
a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty
in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty
and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal
hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may
even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate
Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty.
Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected
policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy
makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 402 3 February 1997
FACTS: The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner
matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a managers check worth Php 33
million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the managers check.
The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution Filipino first policy and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is self
executing or non self executing
If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino
First policy (Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is therefore null and void.
HELD: As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity
must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The
Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51%
shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing
rather than non self executing. Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution which states that in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of
the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a
positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce
it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the
provision in question.
Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains to heritage . the
constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
constitution could have very well used the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the
6

Filipinos and therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall
on the hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the
Philippines being a democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the
provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because
it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of
qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong
Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their
business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the
workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate ,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers
of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial
Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57)

Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she
could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready
for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier
company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He
reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI
agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed
against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in
the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired
from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to
be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the
box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the
constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
was AFFIRMED.

People vs Marti G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

Facts: The proprietors of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, following standard operating procedure,
opened four gift wrapped boxes from which emerged a peculiar odor. They reported this to the NBI on the same
day, and in the presence of said agents, opened the boxes which contained marijuana. The NBI filed an
information against appellant for violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act, but appellant contended that the
evidence had been obtained in violation of consti rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
Issue: May an act of a private individual without the intervention and participation of the State, and allegedly
in violation of appellants constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
Held: No. It was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made search/inspection of the packages, not the
NBI, as appellant would have the Court believe. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of the proprietor as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau
of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search the proprietor effected into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Outlawed is any unwarranted intrusion by the government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. However, in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As held in Bernas vs.
US, the Fourth Amendment and the law applying to it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen; rather the amendment only proscribes government action. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.

10

Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price
is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico
as a refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of
Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by
virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government
and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held:

Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this,
the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

11

Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan263 SCRA 222 (1996) G.R. No. 79543

Facts: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District inMetro Manila, an
old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of variousawards and commendations attesting to his
competence and performance as a policeofficer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be
sitting on the other sideof the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of apostal
delivery van.Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely,Eddie
Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be adischarged soldier), as his confederates.
At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt.
Arsenio C. Carlos andSgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible
evidence, saying that the law should favour him as an accused.
Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect and
petitioners extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence
Held: No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony who is not
a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.
NOTES xxx xxx xxxx1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; DECISION AND FINAL ORDERS OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN; APPEALABLE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI ON PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT; EXCEPTIONAL CASES. - As amended by Republic Act No.
7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall
be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance
of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave misapprehension
of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan
deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply because
the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all
criminal cases, a person's life and liberty are at stake. As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available
remedy, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable only
where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED DURING INVESTIGATION FOR THE
COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE; ENUMERATED. - The relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows: "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families." (italics supplied.)
Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel
which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above underscored)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF COUNSEL; WHEN ADMISSIBLE. - By
parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
12

retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be a dimissible. Although a number of
cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have
been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this
Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, 554, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers
during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel."
4. ID.; JUDICIAL DECISIONS; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF "JUDGE-MADE" LAW UPHELD BY THE COURT. - The
prospective application of "judge-made" laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444, 448449, October 28, 1993, where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with
Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and Article 4 of the same Code which states
that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of
statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.
5. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DISTINGUISHED FROM PENAL LAWS. - A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of
the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the
government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the State. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing
punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the State has the power to
pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the State for a crime or
offense against its law.
6. ID.; ID.; ARREST; IRREGULARITY THERETO IS DEEMED WAIVED BY VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTING TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. - It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by
appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover,
the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT; BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT.
- Weighing heavily against the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts - in this
case, the Sandiganbayan itself - particularly in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this
Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; BRIGANDAGE; CONSTRUED. - 'The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of Art.
306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by Art. 306.
On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the
purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.
Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it
was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of Art. 306, it is required that the band 'sala a los
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campos para dedicarse a robar.' A finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the
crime or the fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were
purposely organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the
present case, there had been no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the
purpose of "depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another." What was duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van.
There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the
"indiscriminate" commission thereof.

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YRASUEGUI VS. PAL G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his
failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal
weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until
November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred.
He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such
time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks
for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check
would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated
were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of
almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight
did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly
failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES. A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee
would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight
given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight
which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.

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Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from
the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external
force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether
they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is
considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the
job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness
of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent
quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight
deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms
of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or
based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.

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