A.C. No.

5305

March 17, 2003

MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the
respondent, Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of
this Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco
F. Brillantes, Jr.1 The decretal portion of our resolution in Atienza reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was found guilty
of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon him from assuming any post in government service,
including any posts in government-owned and controlled corporations, when he
accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as
6th member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District.
Upon expiration of the legal consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed
as a Special Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a proviso to
the effect that nothing therein should be construed as establishing an employeremployee relationship between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso
was only a ploy to circumvent our order barring respondent from appointment to a
government agency. Petitioner points out in reality, respondent enjoys the same
rights and privileges as a regular employee, to wit:3
1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories, as
evidenced by the covering Property Issue Slips with respondent signing as
"Accountable Employee";4
2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of Authorized
Travel kept by LWUAs General Services Division5 and Report of Travel accomplished
by respondent himself;6
3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as brought to light
by written instructions personally signed by respondent;7

4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various

provinces;8
5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as the Prequalification,
Bids, and Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Committee,
among others, with receipt of corresponding honoraria as borne out by various
Disbursement Vouchers;9
6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the minutes of
such meetings;10 and
7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct, gross
misconduct, and willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and show that
respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar.
In his comment,11 respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy
Contract as well as the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the
affirmative defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy
contract shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are not
covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular issued by
the Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be submitted to the
Commission for approval. With respect to his designation as the 6th Member of the
Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water District, respondent reasons out that the
same is not a "reappointment", which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said
designation is not an organic appointment to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence,
according to respondent, the CSC need not pass approval upon his temporary
designation.
Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water District Board,
especially the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA, assumed such functions
merely by virtue of a designation and only in addition to their regular duties. In any
event, says respondent, his designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000
and the Special Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on April 30, 2000. It has
never been renewed since then. With respect to his use of LWUA properties,
respondent admits receiving the cellular phone unit but insists that he merely
borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA Board of Trustees Member.
In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent willfully violated a lawful order
of this Court and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year and fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.

There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled

corporation, created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198.12 As such, our ruling
in the Atienza case, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically prohibits respondents
appointment to any position in any government-owned and controlled corporation,
clearly encompasses and extends to LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioners allegations.13
Instead, he offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993 (MC
No. 27, s. 1993) to exculpate himself from the charge against him. However, it does
not escape our attention that the very Memorandum Circular that respondent cites
before this Court provides that the duties enumerated in the consultancy contract
are mainly advisory in nature.14
Without belaboring the definition of "advisory,"15 it appears obvious to us that the
tasks and duties that respondent performed pursuant to the consultancy contract
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed merely advisory in nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor does he
issue written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a seat in such vital
LWUA committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondents continuous
receipt of honoraria for sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees,
particularly the BOT Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere consultant for the
LWUA. The evidence on record clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order
implementing National Compensation Circular No. 75-9516 refers to payments of
honoraria to officials/employees in consideration of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondents acceptance of his 1998 Productivity
Incentive Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, of
the LWUA,17 which governed the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said
bonus only to "officials" and "employees" (permanent, temporary, casual, or
contractual) of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and
functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of
LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply,18 there is a difference between a
consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s.
1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed, among others,
by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By
performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee,
albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both
letter and spirit of this Courts decree in Atienza.
The lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes.19 That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondents disobedience to this Courts order prohibiting his
reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including
government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal
consultancy or a special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of
a contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving

compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance of the

Courts authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. It
is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should prevail between Bench
and Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such
defiance not only erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence in
the rule of law.
What aggravates respondents offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary
lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very well aware of
the standards of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. His
propensity to try to "get away" with an indiscretion becomes apparent and
inexcusable when he entered into a legal "consultancy" contract with the LWUA.
Perhaps realizing its own mistake, LWUA terminated said contract with respondent,
but then proceeded to give him a "special consultancy." This travesty could not be
long hidden from public awareness, hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed
by petitioner. Given the factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar
Discipline, we have no hesitance in accepting the recommendation of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that respondent be fined and
suspended from the practice of law. The Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule
1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For violating the Code as well as transgressing his oath as an
officer of the court, his suspension for one (1) year and a fine of ten thousand
(P10,000) pesos are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for having
willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in our decision of March 29, 1995
rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco
F. Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
and ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent
as well as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo
Castillo guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of
Indefinite Suspension.1 Respondent, who was already married with three children,
had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he was reviewing for
the bar until before the release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant and
respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit
acknowledging the child as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth
of the child, however, respondent started to refuse recognizing the child and from
giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking
compassion and forgiveness from this Court. He submitted certificates from
government and civic organizations appreciating his services as a lawyer,
certificates of attendance from religious groups, and certificates of good moral
character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro.2
On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment
thereon.3
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No.
01-2003) recommending the exoneration of respondent from administrative liability.
It stated that the suspension of respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public
Attorney and 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the
community; that respondent has shown integrity and moral uprightness in the
performance of his official functions; that the acts imputed to him may be attributed
to his "youthful indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways after
taking his oath as member of the bar.4
The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment
dated August 15, 2003, stating that the motion for reconsideration should be denied
until respondent admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.5
On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondents
motion for reconsideration should be denied since respondent has not truly
repented as he is still not supporting his child.6
On August 25, 2003, respondents wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten
letter stating that respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that
respondent had an affair with complainant, such was only

because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present
case after respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to
compel respondent to sign the affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn
further avers that respondent is the sole breadwinner of the family and that their
family will be gravely affected by his suspension.7
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating
that if the acts acknowledging and giving support to the child of the complainant
are the proofs of his remorse, then he shall comply unconditionally.8
On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on
Livelyns letter.9
On January 13, 2004, complainants counsel said that while he sympathizes with
Livelyn and her children, respondent has not taken any move to support
complainant and her child to repair the damage done to them.10
On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainants Comment, reiterated
his willingness to support the child if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant
for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of P2,000.00 each.11
On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that
it is unfair for her and her three children that respondent had to support
complainants daughter when it is not clear who the childs father is. Livelyn argues
that complainant should have filed a case for support where the paternity of the
child could be determined and not use the present administrative case to get
support from respondent.12
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still
connected with said office despite having been indefinitely suspended by this Court.
It replied on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still connected with their office; that
he has been regularly receiving his salary and benefits; and that this was the first
time that they received communication concerning respondents administrative
case.13
Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to
discharge his duties and received salary and benefits in connection therewith since
he filed a timely motion for reconsideration thus the case has not yet attained
finality.14
In view of respondents show of repentance and active service to the community,
the Court deems it just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite
suspension to a definite period of two years suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite
suspension imposed on him by the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is

REDUCED to TWO YEARS suspension effective from date of receipt of herein

Resolution.
Complainants further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the
proper court in a proper case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillos record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the
country and the Department of Justice including the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.
SO ORDERED.

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful
attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did
not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in
June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo.
Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent
even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1
It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised
he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship
continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in
him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent
married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of
witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take
aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and
that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974,
the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground
of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondent's third
motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3
In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in
civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of
time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a
lawyer. 4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.
On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the
charge of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore
an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community. 7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither
so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been
forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's
girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those
years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced
to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily
and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who
could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the
partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman

scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent
suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very
hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of
age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
fees.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7940

April 24, 2012

RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF
THE RULES OF COURT,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a
crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts and the Case
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team,
wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for
his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City
Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city
council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas letter
and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of
P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what
he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not
Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a
complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.1 On November
12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article
172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years
and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction.2
Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as
well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during
the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on
October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632,
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and

Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be
disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.
The Courts Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated
the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification
case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral
to the IBP was "factually infirmed"3 and contained "factual exaggerations and
patently erroneous observation,"4 and was "too adventurous."5
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of
Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given
the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of
the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the
settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession
of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of
falsification.6
This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory.
In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,7 the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is
no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become final.
The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or
suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer
for a party to a case without authority so to do.
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to
justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.8 Moral
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution.1wphi1 Being
the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and

moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.10
Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.11
Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed
that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he
has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and
shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard
of the legal profession.12
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions,
are most sacredly bound to uphold the law.13 The privilege to practice law is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.14
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED
from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal
records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. L-363

July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ,

respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it
on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced
to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to
reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted
a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion
of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the
murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be
removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent
presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the
case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty
or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it
means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v.
Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended
to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited.
Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was
convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a
subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to
strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground
for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction
and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon
has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making
it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent

Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in
the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the
court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the
felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for
in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional
pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of
any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was
taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the
judicial construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v.
Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the
Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out
the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if
he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of
the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if
granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him
to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit
and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself,
unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense
by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the
United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time)
and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree
of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain
rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the
bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to
them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men

in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the
crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

A.M. No. 1048

July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former
Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an
attorney.
I
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by
respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for
estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given
respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other
occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in
respondent's office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for
marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI
and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment.
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not
return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at
around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent,
complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to
see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant
answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo,
kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for
examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent
powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to
the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was
photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a
sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against selfincrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of
administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending
investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases
were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave
Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was
found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was
pending resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that
complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his
knowledge and consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI
at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the
City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that
he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and
attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of
Manila.
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against
respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the
investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by
respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the
disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that
respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by
the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of
administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely
denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by
complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative

testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him
(Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him
(Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176
SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official,
which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal
records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28546

July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court
for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money.
Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066,
affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a
writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but
his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in
Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961.
Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago
appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his
family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and
lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson.
Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of
sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court
of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his
co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case
Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago
upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential
house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be
reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered
and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife
Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which
failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the
respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from
carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila
court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November
1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously
issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement
of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued
a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3,
1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order
was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116,
praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a
minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the
petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary
injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary
delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1.
We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders
of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its
co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the
restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila
court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the
enforcement of the writ.
2.
Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one
case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal

properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound
by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties
would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In
Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common
interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal
partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3.
Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a
writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in
the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that
Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption
is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does
not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got
embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until
the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession
being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the
latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the
judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to
the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in
the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the
properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued
up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4.
We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego)
that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question
that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago,
considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy
was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the
very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5)
the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted
to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when
Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his
efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his
wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the
wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not
a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago
had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5.
The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal
infirmities.

(a)
It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from
the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This halfshare is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy,
constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only
upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The
decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect
a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4
(b)
The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which
is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted
from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of
Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part
would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision
would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and
in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution
of the conjugal union.
6.
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of
the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now
enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The
respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to
doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as
an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to

litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
7.
In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes
other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of
the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in
the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the
mother case of the present case). We find that
(a)
the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on
the merits has not even started;
(b)
after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim,
the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new
parties-defendants;
(c)
after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to
admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new
party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d)
the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental
complaint; and
(e)
the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an
extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental
complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons
hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal
properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was
personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which
resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the
conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as
barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted.
This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails
to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid
or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal
properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the
Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which

they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was
annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of
the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750
despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of
P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require
payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is
the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the
amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule
39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is
of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount
of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the
Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the
fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as
shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was
unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the
services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a
preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the
properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually
of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their
feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the
plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause
more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of
land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the
defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels

bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad
faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused
by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold
the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired
them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith
sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who
acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of
a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of
the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the
original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of
ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements
subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy
and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid
on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that
the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches,
and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in
the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil
case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent
action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this
decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the
Clerk of Court.

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the
provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he
made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as
follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase
of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your
animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to
him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help
and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a
lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in
translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for
your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to
submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence
here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back
home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will
exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations
of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are
in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I
would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in
any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my
desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If
the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers
in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle
the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal
provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related
to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine
Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the
end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character
and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being
a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not
per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange
for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the
traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare

cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It
is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out
those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action
in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes,
or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing
of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured,
the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end
that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between
individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense
when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the
same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of
the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of
this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of
solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It
lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation
and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and
those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the
action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined
the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case,
suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should
go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of
which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this
nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating,
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that
he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience
at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it
should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the
considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this

particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future
convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the
respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an
attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having
published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as
follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not
to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the
strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the
said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice
of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work
from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious
than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more
elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the
Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby
is, reprimanded.

A.C. No. 3056

August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which
complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes
Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to
the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale
with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the
respondent with the following offenses:
1.
Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient
justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested
therein.
2.

Conduct unbecoming of public official.

3.

Dishonesty.

4.

Extortion.

5.
Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with
pending official transaction before him.
6.
Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7.

Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of
Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of
lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the
respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny
registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action
except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify
certain details about the transactions.

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron

suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a
certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide
him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as
pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City
house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act
favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute
clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to
respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare,
respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the
respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20,
1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G
within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163
certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale
with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26,
1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly
fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents
which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only
during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator,
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No.
1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless
of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale
with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on
June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against
respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed
respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be
taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case
on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of
directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the
official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear
Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a
formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges
of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the
law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite
repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some
pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of
conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some
pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro
G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be
reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration;
and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence
supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave
misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him
for registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for
expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration
of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the
registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally
denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the
registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the
Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof
but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that
he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains
uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him
the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original
denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample
opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5
September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to
mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of
applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best
in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron
be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective
immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by
Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the
government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA,
Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint
against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of
deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a
public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also
constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground
for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E.
Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair,
speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is
subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion
he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession
its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor,
full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the

highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a
fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the
Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule
103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable"
may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every
lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a
public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling
of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs.
Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred
from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7430

February 15, 2012

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,

vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion
(complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
(respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment2 to the complaint.
In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation4 dated
September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International
School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and
raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents
are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00
in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants
herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a
comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs
the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants
herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
xxxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was
immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the
International School Manila.

The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not
resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said
illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss
the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007
requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the
morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim of moral and exemplary
damages.
xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006
was issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents
that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the
herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the
person of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for
respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of
fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated
September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being
premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the
Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the
instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in
resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the
Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.5
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the
grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order
lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the
authority to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and
(3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed
against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the
status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED

for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII2008-6447 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors
had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law
for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v.
Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,8 but it was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26,
2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of
Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed
or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation
of the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.9 Gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of
a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind
this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.10
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction
against the respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by
the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the respondent
are intrinsically connected with the discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial
functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a
public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the
Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client

relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of
personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence.11
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts
committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this
Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers
in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a
lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined
as a member of the bar on such grounds.12
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests
before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical
and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of
the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a

high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.14 (emphasis
supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer
for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative
cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan16 where the
respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in
his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government,
performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present
controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose
decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of
administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always
constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may
not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with
a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.17
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle
involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary
action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is
not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives.18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply
apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.19
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been
resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed,
the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is
already in effect.

Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in
proper cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant
to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended,
when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the
acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the
Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the
approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by
the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled
thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an
incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the
parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving
strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no
longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant
to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended,
when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the
acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the
Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party. (emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of
evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the
application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its
Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine
to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his
report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such
delegation. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the
respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority
to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this
point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis
of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
xxxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the
2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
first, states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary
injunction or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may]
conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order
only in a delegated capacity.20
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The
unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the
delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show
that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the
illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze
will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006
and August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as
superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the formers
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International
School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the
respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof

would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted
prejudice to International School Manila.
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal
case before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the
attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep
status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes Employment Contract with
International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal
dismissal case moot and academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of
[the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the
circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between
David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondents lackadaisical
attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five (5)
months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondents
disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1wphi1 Failure to decide a case or
resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x
x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a
case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases
undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x. 21
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance
with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the
2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes".
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his
acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably
resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed.

Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law is a serious charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal
from the service.24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Additionally, in parallel cases,25 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law was meted the penalty of suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing
recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the
respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314,
entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is
still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct
demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are
subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also
bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the
interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge
of their official functions.26
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of
the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic
rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic
laws and rules will render them administratively liable.1wphi1 Where the law
involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of
his court, respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority."28 (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law

for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.