Archaeological Inference and Inductive Confirmation

Author(s): Bruce D. Smith

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 598-617
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/675394 .
Accessed: 04/11/2014 13:17
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and American Anthropological Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to American Anthropologist.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ArchaeologicalInference
and Inductive Confirmation
BRUCED. SMITH
University of Georgia

The limitations of the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method of inductive confirmation are described, and an alternate method, the hypothetico-analog (H-A) method
is described in detail. The H-A method can be characterized as a modified and
supplemented form of the simple H-D method, and is proposed as being more
appropriate for archaeological inference. Aspects of the H-A method that are given
particular attention include the establishment of boundary conditions for reference
classes, plausibility considerations, multiple working hypotheses, bridging arguments, and criteria for selecting alternative hypotheses. [scientific method,

archaeologicalinference,hypothetico-analogmethod, inductiveconfirmation]
INTRODUCTION

PREHISTORICARCHAEOLOGYover the last fifteen years has been suffering through

many of the symptoms of paradigmcrisis described by Thomas Kuhn. Such periods of
theoretical retooling are characterized not only by the borrowing of theoretical and
methodological models from other fields in the search for a new paradigm,but also by a
recourseto philosophy (Kuhn 1970:88).
It is specifically to the philosophy of science that a growingnumber of archaeologists
have turned in an attempt to make their research and their results more valid. Most
archaeologists would now acknowledge the value and necessity of employing scientific
methodology in their reasoning.There is still no agreement,however, as to which variation
of the "scientificmethod" should be employed in archaeologicalreasoning.
There are a number of reasons for the present state of confusion concerning the
integration of scientific methodology into archaeologicalreasoning.The most obvious of
these reasons is that until recently formal trainingin either the philosophy of science or the
different variationsof the scientific method was not an integralpart of graduateprogramsin
anthropology.As a result, most archaeologistshave minimalexposureto or understandingof
scientific methodology, even though they may use such terms as hypothesis, confirmation,
etc., in their working vocabularies. It is not surprising, therefore, that relatively few
archaeologists have felt confident enough of their own understanding of scientific
methodology to attempt to alleviate the state of ignoranceof their colleaguesby providing
insight into how any one of the numerous variationsof the scientific method could be
employed in archaeological reasoning. It is also not surprisingthat of the attempts at
interpretationof scientific methodology that have been made by archaeologists,many have
tended to confuse the issue further ratherthan providingneeded clarificationof the role of
scientific methodology in archaeologicalreasoning(Morgan1973:259-260).
Lewis Binford is generally associated with the first attempts at making archaeological
reasoningmore scientific, although one could trace the beginningsof this trend back through
Taylor (1948) to the late 1800s. Binford'sconcern with explanationin archaeologyis clearly
598

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

599

evident in many of his articles of the 1960s (see the collected essays in Binford 1972), as is
his selection of the covering law (CL) model of explanation proposed by Carl Hempel:
"After surveying most of the argumentativedebate in the literatureon the philosophy of
science, I concluded that from a practical-sciencepoint of view, the argumentsof Karl [sic]
Hempel (see particularlyHempel, 1965) were the most useful" (Binford 1972:18). In a
number of his articles Binford also discusses the need for implementation of a
"logicodeductive" (1972:70) or "rigorous hypotheticodeductive" (1972:96) method of
confirmation in archaeology.Finally, Binfordalso presentsa numberof specific examplesof
the way in which such a hypothetico-deductive(H-D) method of confirmation could be
applied to an archaeologicalsituation. The most detailed of the specific examples given by
Binford is his discussionof smudgepits and hide smoking(see Binford 1972:33-58). Binford
has recently been criticized by Sabloff, Beale, and Kurlandfor (1) advocatingthe CL model
of explanation (1973:108); (2) organizinghis argumentsin terms of a simple hypotheticodeductive structurewhile paying "polemicallip serviceto Hempel'sCL model" (1973:110);
and (3) presenting specific archaeologicalexamples that do not conform either to the CL
model of explanation or to the hypothetico-deductivemethod of confirmation(1973:111).
While these criticismsappearto be justified, and will be discussedin more detail later in this
article, I would at this time like to pursue an interestingquestion that may at first seem
rather unimportant:Why were these criticismsso long (six years) in coming?The answerto
this question in large measure has to do with the fact that Binford was apparentlynot so
much concerned with either stressing the importance of employing the CL model or
explainingin detail the structureof the HD method as he was with analyzingthe structureof
archaeologicalreasoning: "However, it is noteworthy that Lewis R. Binford, the guiding
light of the new archaeology, has strongly supported a deductive approach without
polemically belaboringthe role of the Hempeliandeductive-nomologicalmodel" (Sabloff,
Beale, and Kurland 1973:108). Binford was primarily interested, then, in presenting a
rigorouslogical method of confirmationthat archaeologistscould employ in their reasoning.
Labeling the method he outlined (see especially Binford, 1972:47-48) as hypotheticodeductiveand demonstratingin detail its relationshipto Hempel'sCL model were apparently
of secondary concern, judging from the very limited coveragegiven to these topics in his
articles. This has interesting implications, because while Binford's logical method of
inference, as well as another complementarymethod appliedto archaeologicalsituationsby
Longacre (1970) and Hill (1968), do not, in fact, conform to the hypothetico-deductive
framework,they are still recognizedby philosophersas reasonable,if incomplete, methods
of scientific inference(Morgan1973:271-272; M. Salmon 1976:379).
Philosophersand other interested individualshave as a result not focused their criticism
so much at the method of scientific inference proposed by Binford, Longacre, Hill, and
others. Rather they have directed their comments toward the numerous more recent
attempts to claim that this method of inference must in fact be viewed as part of the CL
model of explanation: "The new archaeologistswould have their colleaguesbelievethat the
new trends in theory and methodology, which they have helped to develop in the past
decade, are inextricably linked to positivist philosophy and the deductive-nomological(CL)
model of explanation, which they espouse" (Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland1973:108). Two
publications in particular (Fritz and Plog 1970; Watson, LeBlanc, and Redman 1971)
attempted both to describeHempel'sCL model of explanation and to demonstratethe need
for its acceptance and employment by archaeologists.The responseby philosophersto these
two publicationswas both rapid and devastating.Levin (1973) respondedto the article by
Fritz and Plog, and Morgan (1973) replied in detail to the discussion of the CL model
presented in the book of Watson,LeBlanc, and Redman. While these detailed criticismsby
Levin and Morganhave apparently done severe damage to the image of the CL model of
explanation within archaeology,they do not appearto have eliminated all support for the

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

600

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

positivist philosophy of Carl Hempel (see Watson 1974; Watson, LeBlanc, and Redman
1974).
This debate within archaeology in the early 1970s over the relative merits of the CL
model of explanation unfortunatelytended to divertattention from an articleby JamesHill
(1972) which presenteda comprehensivedescriptionof the hypothetico-deductivemethod
of confirmation as well as providing a discussion of how it could be employed in
archaeologicalreasoning.It is important to stress that Hill's article, ratherthan addressing
the issue of explanation in archaeology, was focused on the more important and more
pressing problem of successful articulation of the H-D method of confirmation to
archaeologicalsituations. For a few years after the appearanceof Hill's 1972 article it
appeared that even if the issue of the identity of an appropriatemodel of explanation in
archaeology remained unresolved, archaeologistscould at least employ the hypotheticodeductive method of confirmationin their reasoning.
This situation changed abruptly with the publication of two short articles in 1975 and
1976 by Merrilee Salmon, a philosopher with a research interest in archaeological
confirmation. Although ratherbrief, Salmon's articles contain a number of very important
points, includingthe following:
(1) The hypothetico-deductivemethod is an inductiveratherthan a deductivemethod
of confirmation(1976: 377).
(2) Archaeologistsdo not employ the H-D method in their reasoning,even if they
believe and state that they do (1975:464, 1976:378).
(3) The fact that archaeologistsdo not employ the H-D method in their reasoning,
even if they think that they do, is good, not bad. This is because the H-D method is an
oversimplified and incomplete account of scientific reasoning, and is inadequate for
employment in archaeologicalinference.
(4) The inductive method of logical confirmationemployed by many archaeologistsis
far more sophisticatedthan the H-D method, with which it is often confused.
(5) The method of logical confirmationemployed by many archaeologistsis, in fact,
roughly comparable to a method of inductive inference described in a number of
publicationsby WesleySalmon (1963, 1967).
Thus in 1976 many archaeologists find themselves in a situation that is puzzling,
surprising,and at the same time encouraging.Although they have thought of themselvesas
employing an impressivelydeductive method of logical confirmation(H-D), they find that
the H-D method is not only inductive rather than deductive, but further that they were
neveractually employing the H-D method in their reasoning.Ratherthey were employing,in
an admittedlyincomplete way, a more sophisticatedmethod of inductiveinference.
MerrileeSalmon begins the final paragraphof her 1975 articlewith this statement: "It is
my hope in presentingsome of these issues and suggestingalternativemodels, that fruitful
discussionsof confirmation and explanationin archaeologywill ensue" (1975:464). She has
indeed presenteda numberof pertinentobservationsand suggestionsconcerningarchaeological confirmationthat deserveserious considerationby all interested archaeologists.Whileit
is understandablethat many archaeologistsare perhaps not concerned with the issue of
archaeologicalreasoning, or do not feel knowledgeableenough on the subject to offer an
opinion, or perhaps are not too excited about sticking their heads up out of the trench, I
strongly agree with Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland(1973:118) that: "It cannot be ignoredby a
thinking member of the profession; the argument revolves around the place of scientific
models in archaeologicalresearch.The true issues need a clearand vigorousairingin print."
In the present article, which is concerned specifically with confirmationin archaeology,a
number of logical points raised by M. Salmon will be pursued.These points are elaborated
upon in a short initial section of this article. The following much longer section will be

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

601

concerned with the method of inductive confirmation presented by W. C. Salmon and

suggested to archaeologistsby M. Salmon as an alternativeto the H-D method. To facilitate
discussion of this generalmethod as it specificallyapplies to archaeologicalinference,it will
be referredto as the Hypothetico-Analog(H-A) method of inductiveconfirmation.
THE HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE
METHODOF INDUCTIVECONFIRMATION
The H-D method of confirmation will be briefly described prior to presentinga more
detailed discussionof some of its inherent limitations. A more comprehensivetreatmentof
the H-D method can be found in W. Salmon (1963:76-88) and Copi (1972:422-468). The
hypothetico-deductivemethod begins with the formulationof a hypothesis, which can be
defined as a statement that "is taken as a premise,in orderthat its logical consequencescan
be examined and comparedwith facts that can be ascertainedby observation"(W.Salmon
1963:77). Once the hypothesis has been formulated,and any necessaryinitial conditions are
stated, the next step in the H-D method involves deducinglogical consequencesfrom the
hypothesis. Such consequences, which are often termed test implicationsor observational
predictions,when combinedwith the hypothesis and any stated initial conditions, constitute
a logical argument. This argument, consisting of a hypothesis and initial conditions as
premises and a test implicationas conclusion must, in the hypothetico-deductivemethod, be
a deductive rather than an inductive type of argument.By definition, a deductive type of
argumentis one in which the conclusion must logically follow from the premises:"If all of
the premisesare true, the conclusion must be true" (W. Salmon 1963:14; see also M. Salmon
1976:377). Many of the people who believe the H-D method to be thoroughlydeductivein
characterwould be correctif the method consisted only of deducingtest implicationsfrom a
hypothesis. But the H-D method includes a final step of confirmation. This involves
comparingthe deduced observationalpredictionswith reality to see if in fact they are true.
If the observationalpredictionsare true, the hypothesis is confirmedto some extent. In this
final step of the hypothetico-deductive method, observational predictions and the
hypothesis once again comprise an argument,but the hypothesis is now the conclusion and
the observationalpredictionsare the premises.This argumentof confirmationcan be seen to
be inductive rather than deductive for the simple reason that even if all of the premises
(observational predictions) of the argument are demonstratedto be true, the conclusion
(hypothesis) might still be false: "To arguethat true implicationsconfirm a hypothesis is to
argue inductively, for it is logically possible for the implications to be true while the
hypothesis is false" (M. Salmon 1976:377; see also W. Salmon 1967:18-20, 108-110). This
point will be discussedin greaterdetail later in this article.Thus, althoughthe H-Dmethod
employs deductive logic in one step, it must be viewed in total as an inductive method of
confirmation,because it also includesan inductiveargument.The fact that the hypotheticodeductive method is not a deductive form of confirmation may be disconcertingto any
archaeologistswho hope to prove once and for all the absolute truth of their hypotheses. At
the same time it will, however, make it easier for many archaeologists to accept the
otherwise disturbing fact that they have not been employing the hypothetico-deductive
method of confirmation. The loss will not seem so serious if the hypothetico-deductive
method is only inductiveafter all (assumingit is possible to lose somethingyou only thought
you had).
The type of inference that many archaeologists,as well as most of the membersof the
larger scientific community, employ resembles the H-D method, but differs from it in a
number of important ways: "It seems undeniable that science uses a type of inference at
least loosely akin to the hypothetico-deductivemethod" (W.Salmon 1967:18).
The most obvious, but not the most important, differencebetween the H-D method and
the method of confirmationemployed in archaeologicalinferencehas to do with the way in

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

602

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

which observationalpredictions are shown to follow logically from hypotheses. Rarely if

ever are such arguments deductive in form. The truth of an observational prediction
(conclusion) is often arguedto be highly probableif an archaeologicalhypothesis (premise)
is true, but rarely if ever could it be demonstratedthat such an observationalprediction
must be true if the hypothesis is true. This is in large part due to the inherent nature of
archaeologicalinference. Hypotheses formulatedin archaeologicalinference invariablyhave
to do with various aspects of prehistorichuman behavior (Hill 1972:101) and as a result
cannot be tested directly. They can, however, be tested indirectly. The observational
predictions of such hypotheses about human behavior take the form of statements
concerning predicted patterning of cultural debris in archaeologicalsites. It is logically
impossible to deduce such observationalpredictionsbecause of the problemsof disturbance,
poor preservation,or poor recovery of cultural debris. Few archaeologistswould arguethat
if their hypothesis concerningprehistorichumanbehavioris correct,the predictedpatternof
cultural debris must be observedduringexcavation.But one cannot argueotherwiseand still
be employing the hypothetico-deductive method of confirmation. In discussing an
archaeologicalhypothesis concerninghumanbehaviorM. Salmonstates:
... the point here is a logical one-that there is no deductiverelation of the sort required
by the H-D method between the hypotheses and the "implication."We can say, however,
that if the hypotheses are true then it is highly probable that the "implication" is
true.... The "implication"was not deduced from the hypotheses, but was inferredwith
high probabilityon the basisof a correct inductiveargument[1976:378].
Similarly:"Whilethey [test implications] are presumedto be likely consequencesof a given
hypothesis, they do not follow of necessity from it. They are not deducedfrom a hypothesis
in the sense that there is a strict formal logical connection between the hypothesis and its
test implication" (Hill 1972:83-84). This statement by Hill is especially interestingbecause
throughouthis paper he refers to the method being presentedas being deductive,and more
specifically being the hypothetico-deductivemethod of confirmation.It is apparentthat not
only is the H-D method incorrectly characterizedas being a deductive form of logical
inference, but that the method Hill presents is not, in fact, the hypothetico-deductive
method. Probablythe most important point to be made concerningthese inconsistenciesin
Hill's paper is that they can to a greatextent be remediedby changinga few terms, and that
they in no way detract from the substance of his presentation.Whilethe method presented
is incorrectly identified as the H-D method, it is none the less a solid method of inductive
confirmation.
Having demonstrated that archaeologistsare not in fact employing the H-D method
because their observational predictions are not deduced from hypotheses, we can now
consider a number of other, more important differencesbetween the H-D method and the
method of inductive confirmation actually employed by many archaeologists. These
differences can most accurately be viewed as representingserious limitations of the H-D
method.
The first seriouslimitation of the H-D method has to do with the relationshipbetween an
observationalprediction and the variety of alternativehypotheses that could account for it.
W. Salmon poses this problem of unlimited alternativehypotheses in the following way:
"Whatare the chances that the deduced prediction would be true if the hypothesis we are
testing is false and some other hypothesis is true? The same question may be reformulated:
Are there other hypotheses which would be strongly confirmed by the same outcome?"
(1963:82). When this question is rephrasedin terms of archaeologicalinference, it will be
recognized as a familiar problem by many archaeologists:"Whatare the chances that a
specific pattern of cultural debrisis the result of the specific causativehumanactivity I have
hypothesized, or is it the result of any one of a numberof other humanactivity patterns?"
If one were to employ the H-D method strictly, all of the logically possiblehypotheses that

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

603

could have been used to deduce the observationalprediction would have to be considered
because the H-D method providesno guidelinesfor reducingthe class of all logical possible
hypotheses to a smallergroupof more likely hypotheses:
The basic trouble with the hypothetico-deductiveinference in that it always leaves us
with an embarrassingsuperabundanceof hypotheses. All of these hypotheses are equally
adequate to the availabledata from the standpoint of the pure hypothetico-deductive
framework. Each is confirmed in precisely the same manner by the same evidence.... The hypothetico-deductive method is therefore, hopelessly inconclusive for
determining the acceptability of scientific hypotheses on the basis of empirical data.
Somethingmust be done to improveit [W. Salmon 1967:115-116 ].
Obviously archaeologistsdo, in fact, initially reduce the number of alternativehypotheses
they are going to consider, and therefore are filling this logical gap in the H-D method, or it
could be said that they are extending or supplementingthe H-D method. The ways in which
archaeologists narrow the range of hypotheses to be considered for any observational
prediction or set of observationalpredictions will be discussedin the next section of this
article.
The second shortcomingor limitation of the H-D method is that it does not provideany
clear set of universallyapplicableguidelinesor proceduresfor choosing between alternative
hypotheses, either in terms of those hypotheses considered as possible candidatesfor the
same specific observationalpredictions, or in terms of alternativehypothesis for different
sets of observationalpredictions being tested at a later point in the confirmationprocess.
This problemtoo will be discussedin the next section of this article.
Whileit is clear that those archaeologistswho do employ scientific methodologyin their
reasoningdo not employ the hypothetico-deductivemethod, it is also clearthat the method
that they do employ is in fact logically superiorto the H-D method, and avoidsmany of its
shortcomings.
THE HYPOTHETICO-ANALOG
METHODOF INDUCTIVECONFIRMATION
It should initially be emphasized that the method of confirmation referredto in this
article as the hypothetico-analog (H-A) method is best characterized as a variety of
supplemented H-D method that is similar in form to the generalmethod of confirmation
presentedby W.Salmon (1967, 1973) and which has recently been brieflydescribedas being
applicableto archaeologicalsituations by M. Salmon (1976). Whilethe H-A method can be
viewed as an expansion and refinement of the more generalmodel describedby W.Salmon
in an attempt to make it specifically applicable to archaeologicalproblems, this neither
entails the endorsementof the attempt by either W.Salmon or M. Salmonnor does it ensure
by association the logical correctnessof the H-A model. It is possiblethat this attempt will
do as much damageto the generalmethod describedby W. Salmon as other archaeologists
have managedto do to the work of CarlHempel,althoughit is to be hoped that this will not
be the case. The term hypothetico-analoghas been applied to the method to be discussed
simply to facilitate reference to the method and to indicate that it is inductivein form, with
argumentby analogy playingan importantrole.
One of the most obvious differences between the H-D and the H-A method is that in the
latter method observationalpredictionsdo not have to be deduced from a hypothesis and
initial conditions. An observationalprediction in the H-A method is "inferred with high
probability" (M. Salmon 1976:378). Salmon further suggests calling such observational
predictionsor test implications"inductiveimplications"(1976: 378).
More importantly, the H-A model addresses the problem of unlimited alternative
hypotheses. The whole question of how it might be logically possible to limit the numberof
possible hypotheses to be considered as being responsiblefor a specific single observational

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

604

[79, 1977

prediction or set of observationalpredictionshas been an issue of much debate within the

philosophy of science for a number of years. Whilesome scientists and philosopherswould
argue that there is no mechanismfor thinkingup hypotheses-that hypothesis formulationis
a psychologicalratherthan a logical process-others think it may be possibleto develop such
methods (Simon 1973). It is at the same time clear, however, that scientists, including
archaeologists, do not consider all logically possible hypotheses, but initially distinguish
between those that are reasonableand those that are not. W. Salmon arguesthat there is a
step in the logical sequence of confirminghypotheses that comes after discovery, or first
thinking of a hypothesis, and prior to the decision of whether the hypothesis should be
seriously entertained and tested: "At this stage we are trying to determine whether the
hypothesis deservesto be seriously entertainedand tested or whetherir should be cast aside
without further ceremony" (1967:113). Salmon describesthis step as involving"plausibility
considerations"(1967:114). Such plausibilityconsiderationsare: "not only admissableinto
the logic of justification;they are an indispensablepart of it" (W. Salmon 1967:118). This
step of plausibilityconsiderationof alternativehypotheses is, then, not only an essentialpart
of the logic of confirmation, but it is also the most crucialstep involvedin the H-A method
of archaeologicalinference,and clearlynecessitatescarefulconsideration.
Plausibility Considerations

Perhaps the first point that should be made clear in consideringthe process by which
scientists in general and archaeologists in particular assess the relative plausibility of
alternative hypotheses is that it is not an area of logically solid ground. Not only are a
number of the theoretical issues concerning plausibility considerations being actively
debated, there are also practicaldifficulties that must be dealt with, as will be seen shortly.
In light of these inherent theoretical and practical difficulties, it is not surprisingthat M.
Salmon does not attempt any detailed discussionof plausibilityconsiderationsas they apply
to archaeological inference. In discussing the now well known case study by William
Longacre (1963, 1968, 1970) involving the proposed causal link between a hypothesized
pattern of matrilocal residence and an inductively inferred observational prediction of
nonrandom (aggregated) distribution of ceramic style elements, M. Salmon states the
following:
An important feature of Longacre'sexample is that his hypothesis was a plausibleone,
that is, it had significant prior probability.The priorprobabilityof a hypothesismay be
taken as a measureof its likelihood, independentof any testing of it throughcheckingits
deductive or inductive implications. Variouskinds of backgroundinformation,including
ethnographic analogies, are used to determine the prior probability of an hypothesis . .. Why weren't any other hypotheses with the same implications considered
here?... The alternativehypotheses which could account for the observedphenomena
were so initially implausiblethat they were not even mentioned. [Longacredoes in fact
mention alternativehypotheses; see 1970:34] No other hypothesis which fits the data
uncovered by Longacre has as high prior probability as his hypothesis, so no other
hypothesis is so strongly confirmedby the data [1976:378-379; emphasisin original].
Although M. Salmon goes on to say that plausibilityconsiderationsare not alwaysso easily
resolved as in the Longacreexample, and providesan additionalexampleto makeher point,
she does not provide any detailed discussion of how plausibility considerationsshould be
carriedout.
The detailed discussion of plausibility considerations that will be presented below is
clearly necessary for a number of reasons.The most obvious reason will be recognized by
many, if not all, archaeologists,and has to do with the basis on which archaeologistsevaluate
propositions concerningprehistorichuman behaviorthat are put forth by other membersof
the profession. It has alreadybeen noted that for any specific observationalpredictionor set

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

605

of related observationalpredictions there is an abundanceof logically possible alternative

hypotheses. In terms of archaeologicalinference this could be rephrased:There is an
abundance of logically possible (not necessarily probable) human activity patterns that
would result in archaeologicallyidentical patterns of cultural debris. The observational
predictions, if subsequently shown to be true, would serve to confirm any one of the
alternativehypotheses. The decision as to which of these equally confirmablealternative
hypotheses concerninga causalhuman behaviorpatternwill actually be formallystated (and
perhaps confirmed) is reached through plausibility considerations. It has already been
established that such plausibility considerationsare an integral part of the confirmation
process. If an archaeologist simply states a formal hypothesis rather than presenting
alternativehypotheses and explicitly stating the procedureby which they were rejected as
being less plausible,how does one judge the relative plausibilityof the hypothesis that was,
in fact, selected for formal statement and testing? If the procedure by which an
archaeologistdeterminesthe prior probability of a hypothesis is not explicitly stated, how
can other archaeologistsassess the reasonablenessor correctnessof the determination?How
could one know if the archaeologist, either by design or through ignorance, selected a
hypothesis for subsequent testing that was not in fact the most plausiblechoice? The only
criteria that could be employed in such a situation would be those of competence and
intellectual honesty of the author. Consider the following statement by Lewis Binford:
"... The main point of our argumentis that independent means of testing propositions
about the past must be developed. Such means must be considerablymore rigorousthan
evaluating an author's propositions by judging his professionalcompetence or intellectual
honesty" (1972:90). It is clear, I think, that this demand for explicit objectivityshould be
extended to include plausibility considerations.Hypotheses must not only be subjected to
testing once formally stated, but the plausibilityconsiderationsthat resultedin the selection
of the hypothesis (or hypotheses) to be tested must be explicitly stated. Unlessthis is done,
archaeologicalinference will not be a logically complete method of inductiveconfirmation.
In describingthe plausibilityconsiderationprocessI outline the generalmethod described
by W. Salmon (1967:113-131), and at the same time refer to the specific application of
plausibility considerationto archaeologicalsituationsby severalarchaeologists.I think it will
become clear as the discussion progressesthat some archaeologistsemploy a method of
plausibility considerationthat is very comparableto the abstractdescriptionprovidedby W.
Salmon. The procedure outlined and described in detail by Lewis Binford in the article
"SmudgePits and Hide Smoking: The Use of Analogy in ArchaeologicalReasoning"(1967;
reprinted1972:33-51; see also, Binford 1972:52-58), will in particularbe seen to be in very
close agreementwith the more generallogical model. Although Binforddoes not employ the
same terminology as W. Salmon, and does not provide any discussion of the inherent
theoretical problems involved, he does, in fact, providea logically sophisticatedexample of
plausibilityconsiderationin archaeologicalinference. Binford'smethod would riot, however,
be the most appropriateto employ in all archaeologicalsituations, and different variationsof
plausibilityconsiderationsin archaeologicalinferencewill thereforealso be discussed.
Before going further with a discussionof plausibilityconsiderations,a numberof points
need to be reiterated. First, plausibilityconsiderationsare logically separatefrom and prior
to the actual testing of a hypothesis: "Plausibilityargumentsembody considerationsrelevant
to the evaluation of prior probabilities.They are logically prior to the confirmatorydata
emerging from the H-D schema, and they involve direct consideration of whether the
hypothesis is of a type likely to be successful" (W. Salmon 1967:118). Similarly: "This
particular situation demonstrates the necessity of examining the validity of arguments
presentedbefore consideringthem seriously and proceedingto the testing of their accuracy.
Invalid arguments may be dismissed; valid argumentsmust be tested to determine their
accuracy"(Binford 1972:57).

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

606

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

Secondly, plausibility considerations involve analysis of prior documented situations

where either or both the observational prediction(s) (patterns of cultural debris) and
alternative causative hypotheses (patterns of human behavior)might have occurred.In an
archaeologicalcontext this assessmentof the priorprobabilityof hypothesizedrelationships
of human activity to cultural debris usually involves consideration of documented
ethnographic and ethnohistoric situations where the behavior pattern and/or pattern of
cultural debris is described.Archaeologistsare not, however,restrictedto a considerationof
ethnographicsituations in determiningthe prior probabilityof hypotheses, as will be seen
later in this article.
The first step in plausibility consideration involves defining the attribute class to be
considered.This is a simple matter (W.Salmon 1967:90-91) and in an archaeologicalcontext
consists of explicitly defining the alternativebehaviorpatternsand the pattern of cultural
debristhat are under consideration(Binford1972:37-38, 45).
The second, and much more difficult step involves the choice of a reference class. In an
archaeologicalcontext choosing a referenceclass would involve decidingwhich ethnographic
situations are going to be consideredin assessingpriorprobabilityof alternativehypotheses,
and which are not going to be considered. Choosing a reference class is referredto as
establishing boundary conditions by Ascher: "In effect, the new analogy consists of
boundary conditions for the choice of suitable analogs" (1961:319), while M. Salmon
employs the term "domain of applicability"(1975:461) to refer to a referenceclass. W.
Salmon clearly expresses the problems confronting archaeologistswho are attempting to
establishan appropriatereferenceclass:
... In order to ascertain the probability we must have enough instances to be able to
make an inductive generalization.Thus we do not want to try to refer single cases to
classes that are too narrow, for if we do we will not have enough evidenceupon which to
base our inference. At the same time, we want our reference class to contain other
relevantcases, not irrelevantones [1967:91].
In attempting to define a suitable reference class, archaeologistsare almost invariably
confronted with the twin problems of insufficient data and possibly biaseddata. This often
forces archaeologiststo define a reference class that is larger than appropriatein that it
contains irrelevantcases.
There is, however, no clear-cut set of rules for defining the boundariesof a reference
class: "The choice of a reference class is an extremely practicalaffair, in which we must
balance a number of factors such as the size of the class, the amount of statisticalevidence
available, the cost involved in getting more data, the difficulty in effecting a relevant
subdivision.. ." (W. Salmon 1967:92). As a general rule archaeologistshave tended to
employ the suggested criteria of similarity of environmentand similarity of subsistence
adaptationin defining the boundariesof a referenceclass: "In summary,then, the canon is:
seek analogies in cultures which manipulatesimilar environmentsin similarways" (Ascher
1961:319). While this is certainly good advice, it does not provide an answer to the
question: Should all ethnographic descriptions of human populations that have a similar
subsistence pattern and are located within a similar environmental situation as the
prehistoricpopulationin question be includedin the referenceclass, or only some?
One possible way to approachthis problemis to include all such similarethnographically
documented populations within the reference class, and then partition the reference class
into subgroupson the basis of geographical,subsistence, cultural, or environmentalcriteria
(see W. Salmon 1967:91-92; M, Salmon 1975:460-461). The way in which the reference
class is partitioned would vary, of course, depending upon the type of human behaviorcultural debris relationship being considered. Once partitioning of the reference class has
been accomplished,the subgroupthat is most similarto the prehistorichumanpopulationin
question could be surveyed to assess the prior probability (relative plausibility) that

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

607

alternative behavior patterns would have resulted in the pattern of cultural debris under
consideration.If considerationof this initial highly similarsubgroupdid not yield sufficient
data to ascertainthe priorprobabilityof alternativehypotheses, then subgroupswith a lesser
degree of similarity could be considered.The numberof subgroupsthat would be eventually
considered would depend both upon the quality of the ethnographicdescriptionsavailable
within each subgroup,and the relativedifficulty encounteredin decidingbetween alternative
hypotheses. If in the initial subgroup there were accurate, detailed descriptions of the
cultural debris and the causal behaviorpattern was always the same, it would not appearto
be necessaryto consider any other subgroups.If, on the other hand, data were lacking, or
there was more than one hypothesis with nonnegligiblepriorprobability,furthersubgroups
would have to be considered. Thus Longacre was able to restrict his plausibility
consideration to a small subgroup, the WesternPueblos (Longacre 1970:28), of the total
possible referenceclass becauseof the excellent quality of the ethnographicinformation,the
historical-culturalcontinuity in the area,and the apparentlack of more than one hypothesis
with nonnegligibleprior probability. Binford, on the other hand, considereda much larger
percentage of the cases in the total possible reference class, including ethnographic
descriptions from the Great Lakes region, the Plains, and the southeast United States
(Binford 1972:42-44, 53-55).
Before turning to a consideration of how the relative prior probability of alternative
hypotheses is actually determined, two final points should be made concerningreference
classes. First, archaeologistsshould explicitly define the referenceclassesthey are employing
in plausibility considerations.Secondly, archaeologistsshould considerall of the available
ethnographiccases included within those referenceclasses ratherthan selecting only some
cases for comparison(requirementof total evidence, W. Salmon 1967:76). Thirdly,there is
an increasingeffort by archaeologiststo recognizeand employ reference classes other than
ethnographicones. Geographicreference classes (G. Johnson 1972, Pearson1976) as well as
reference classes concerning plant and animal populations (Asch, Ford, and Asch 1972;
Smith 1975) are being successfully employed in determining the prior probability of
alternative hypotheses. Similar guidelines to the ones just put forth for ethnographic
referenceclassesalso apply to such nonethnographicreferenceclasses(Smith 1976a).
Although W. Salmon outlines an all-inclusiveclassification of considerations that can
serve as a basis for plausibilityjudgments(1967:125-130), such plausibilityconsiderationsin
archaeologicalinference invariablytake the form of argumentby analogy (Binford 1967).
Since arguments by analogy play such an important role in plausibility judgments, it is
obviously important to understand their general structure, and to know the criteria
establishedfor determiningthe strengthof such arguments.Throughsuch an understanding,
archaeological arguments by analogy can be improved, and the overall archaeological
reasoningprocesscan be strengthened.
Argument by analogy is familiar to most people because it plays an important role in
most everyday reasoning.It can be briefly defined as: "A form of inference in which it is
reasonedthat if two or more things agreewith one anotherin one or more respects,they will
probably agree in yet other respects" (Neilson 1956:94). In archaeological plausibility
considerations the situations to be comparedconsist of the archaeologicalsituation on the
one hand, and on the other hand all of the ethnographicsituationsincludedin the reference
class. The archaeologicalobservationalpredictions (specific statements concerningpatterns
of cultural debris) are the shared attributes that will be compared with reference class
situations, and the alternative hypotheses (causal patterns of human behavior) are the
unknown but inferredattribute.
The archaeologist,in attemptingto determinethe prior probabilityof alternativeinferred
behavior patterns should employ the seven nonquantitativecriterialisted below, which are
describedin greaterdetail in Copi (1972:358-362; see also Binford1972:34-36).

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

608

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

(1) The numberof situationsshown to sharethe attributesin question.

(2) The dissimilarityof the situations shown to share the attributes.This is what M.
Salmon is referringto when she discussesemploying ethnographiccases from dissimilar
subgroupsof the referenceclass (1975:461).
(3) The numberof sharedattributes.
(4) The numberof inferredattributes.
(5) The significanceof the sharedattributes.
(6) The specificity of inferredattributes. Binford'sargumentconcerningsmudgepits
and hide smoking (1967), for example, would be a strongerargumentif it were not so
specific as to the exact function of the pit (Munson1969).
(7) The numberof points of differencebetween situations.
The extent to which these criteria have to be employed will, of course, depend upon the
relative prior probabilitiesof variousalternativehypotheses that emerge duringplausibility
consideration.If only one of the hypothesizedcausalbehaviorpatternsis even mentionedin
the reference class situations, there is obviously no need to apply all of the seven criteria
listed above.
The situation becomes more difficult, however, if more than one hypothesisis shown to
have nonnegligible prior probability. If in such a situation the competing hypothesized
human behaviorpatterns with nonnegligibleprior probabilityare similar,one solution is to
incorporateboth into a single,less specific hypothesis priorto testing:
... one may then be forced, as I previously suggested(Binford, 1967 p. 8), to offer a
more generaland inclusiveproposition.In this case the more generalinclusiveproposition
would be that the observed archaeologicalfeatures were smudge pits as distinct from
lightingfires, roastingpits, etc. [Binford 1972:57.]
If, on the other hand, alternativehypothesized causal behaviorpatterns with nonnegligible
prior probability are not similar,they should be formally stated and subjectedto testing. It
is important to rememberthat the function of plausibilityconsiderationsis not necessarily
to select the single hypothesis with the highest prior probabilityfor formal statement and
testing, but ratherto reject those hypotheses with low prior probability.If more than one
alternativehypothesis is formally stated for testing, it is important to attempt to ascertain,
through consideration of the reference class situations, if there are differencesamong the
patterns of cultural debris caused by each humanactivity. If observed,such differencesmay
allow a selection of one of the alternativehypotheses duringtesting.
Archaeologistswould, in many cases, be pleased to be confronted with the problem of
more than one hypothesis with nonnegligibleprior probability.It is a much more common
situation for an ethnographic reference class to yield very little, if any, information
concerning human behavior-culturaldebris relationships.Archaeologistsare attemptingto
deal with this problemin a numberof ways.
The patterning of material remains in archaeologicalcontexts is being observed and
analyzed with much greater accuracy and in much greater detail now than formerly.
Improved recovery techniques such as flotation (Struever1968) have greatly increasedthe
amount and the variety of data being recovered from archaeologicalcontexts, allowing
longer and more detailed observationalprediction sets to be developed for archaeological
situations. There has also been a correspondingincreasein the accuracyof the recordingand
describing of the context of material remains. This increased accuracy in recovery and
recording, combined with the development of sophisticated analytical techniques, has
resulted in a much greater ability on the part of archaeologiststo recognize and describe
accurately the existing patterning of cultural debris in archaeologicalsituations. This has
allowed longer and more detailed observationalprediction sets to be developed. There has
also been increased interest in attempting to extract more information from the material
remainsthemselves(Semenov 1964; Wilmsen1970).

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

609

All of these efforts have been directed toward providing more accurate and more
complete detailed descriptions of patterned material remains observed in archaeological
contexts. This concern with accuracy and detailed descriptionsstems from the realization
that the ability to identify and to differentiate between the cultural debris patterns
produced by alternativehypothesized behaviorpatterns depends to a greatextent upon the
length and quality of sharedattributelists for archaeologicalsituations.
Archaeologists are at the same time working on strengthening the other side of
plausibility considerations,the analog situations. Numerousindividualshave oriented their
researchtoward detailed study and analysis of the cause and effect relationshipsexisting
between human behavior and patterned material remains in a great variety of specific,
contemporary ethnographic analog situations (Bonnichsen 1973; Cranstone 1971; David
1971; Friedrich 1970; Gould 1968, 1971; Heider 1967; Longacreand Ayres 1968; White
and Thomas 1972). All of these efforts are oriented toward providingmore detailed and
more accurate attribute lists for specific humanbehavior-culturaldebrisanalogsituations,as
well as critically analyzing the numerous ways in which archaeologists are prone to
misinterpretpatternedmaterialremains.
Cross-culturalsurveys employing published ethnographicreports are also being carried
out to determinewhat kinds of relationshipsof human behaviorto materialremainscan be
observed in a large number of diverseethnographicanalog situations (Naroll 1962; Ember
1973). A recent article by Murdock and Provost (1973), incidentally, gives an excellent
example of partitioningof an ethnographicreferenceclass into subgroups.
Investigations of analog situations have not, however, been restricted to the study of
present day human populations or to the analysis of published ethnographic reports.
Archaeologistshave also been literally taking things into their own hands and carryingout
imitative experiments with material objects in a manner designedto simulate past human
activity patterns(Ascher 1961; Million1975; North 1975; Spears1975).
Once plausibility considerationsare completed, and the prior probabilityof alternative
hypothesized causal behavior patterns for a specific observational prediction or set of
observationalpredictionshas been determined,the next step in the H-A method is to state
explicitly those hypotheses with nonnegligiblepriorprobability.Alternativehypotheses that
were considered but rejected due to low priorprobabilityshould also be listed at this point.
Formulation of Alternative Hypotheses

Once hypotheses with high prior probability are explicitly stated, the H-A method
follows, with a few exceptions, the format of the H-Dmethod.
At this point in the employmentof the hypothetico-analogmethod, it is to be hoped that
at least one (and perhaps more) hypothesized causal human activity pattern(s) has been
found to have high prior probabilityof causing a specific set of observationalpredictions,
and has been explicitly stated prior to being tested. If the archaeologist is primarily
interestedin pursuingthe strengthor reliabilityof the hypothesizedhumanbehavior-cultural
debris relationship(s), subsequent testing of the hypothesis (hypotheses) would involve
either consideringa different set of relevantattributeswithin the originalreferenceclass, or
consulting either a previously unconsidered subset of the original reference class or an
entirely new referenceclass, employing the originalattribute class (Binford 1972:46).
If, on the other hand, the archaeologistis consideringhuman behavior-culturaldebris
relationships within the context of an archaeological research project, the H-A method
should be carried out within a largerproblem oriented framework.The familiarstatement
that archaeologymust be problem oriented simply means that any researchproject should
be oriented toward providinganswersto a number of explicitly stated generalproblemsor
researchquestions.

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

610

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

Priorto the excavation of a small Middle Mississippisite duringthe summerof 1974, for
example, I delimited a series of five general problem areas, with one of these being
seasonality of occupation of the site (Smith 1976b). Three alternative,tentative solutions to
this problem were developedas a result of separateplausibilityconsiderationsand were then
explicitly stated:
H1: The site was occupied throughoutthe annualcycle,
H2: The site was occupied seasonally,duringthe springand summer,
H3: The site was occupied seasonally,duringthe fall and winter.
It is important to note that each of the hypotheses would result in quite different sets of
observationalpredictions (these three sets of conflicting observationalpredictions will be
outlined below). Each hypothesis was explicitly stated after separateplausibilityconsiderations showed each to have the highest prior probabilityof resultingin the three conflicting
sets of observational predictions. Actually, each of these three hypotheses representsa
generalized,more inclusivestatement that incorporatesa varietyof more specific hypotheses
concerningthe seasonalityof occupationof the site.
For any defined problem area it is advisable, for a number of reasons,to formulatea
series of such alternativehypotheses (having different sets of observationalpredictions).By
formulatinga seriesof alternative"multipleworkinghypotheses"ratherthan workingwith a
single hypothesis, the researcheris much less likely to form bonds of intellectual affection
that would compromise his or her ability to measure the relative value of the tentative
solutions objectively (Chamberlain1965). Workingwith a number of conflicting alternate
hypotheses is also clearly necessarybecause in archaeologicalreasoningthe issue is not and
can not be one of establishingor confirmingthe strength of a single hypothesis,but rather
attempting to demonstratewhich of a numberof alternative,tentative solutions seems most
correct (Hill 1972:83). There is no single, totally accurate solution to any archaeological
problem area, but only a choice as to which of a numberof tentativesolutions is supported
by the data availableat any one time:
This observed reality can be describedby models which are neither more or less "true"
nor more or less "real," but are simply abstractionswhich account for the observed
phenomena more or less satisfactorily in the minds of one or more observers[Bayard
1969:382].
Formulatingmultiple working hypotheses does not, however, guaranteeinsulation against
intellectual paternalismnor is it a substitute for intellectualhonesty. It is clearlypossibleto
formulate a series of multiple working hypotheses in such a way that a favored tentative
solution is found to provide the best fit with the availabledata. Nor does formulationof
multiple working hypotheses assure a reasonable solution to the problem area being
considered. It is always possible that the availabledata will be so limited or so equivocalthat
a clear choice between alternativesolutions is not possible.
Once general problem areasand relevanthypotheses are formulated,they are of course
subject to continual change and review throughout the total researchprocess. Additional
problem areas may be identified as the researchprogresses,and some initial problem areas
may be droppeddue to lack of data.
Observational Predictions and Bridging Arguments

Once a series of alternativehypotheses for a designatedproblemareahas been explicitly

stated, the next step in the H-A method involvesexplicit statement of a set of observational
predictions for each hypothesis. These sets of observationalpredictionswould consist of the
attribute classes defined at the beginningof each plausibilityconsideration,as well as any
relevant additional observational predictions that were uncovered during subsequent
considerationof the referenceclass.

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

611

The most obvious test implications that could be inductively inferred for each of the
seasonality hypotheses outlined above would involvethe predictionof the occurrenceat the
site in question of various plant and animal remainsthat could potentially yield seasonality
information. A number of such observationalpredictions(p's), both positive and negative,
are outlined below.
H1 Yearround occupation
p's All the positive p's listed below underH2 and H3.
H2 Fall-Winteroccupation
Fish scales recoveredwill indicate a fall-winterperiod of death (Yerkes1973;
pl
Casteel 1975).
p2 Fish scales recoveredwill not indicate a spring-summerperiodof death.
p3 Mandiblesof deer and other mammalsrecovered will indicate a fall-winter
period of death (Smith 1975).
p4 Mandiblesof deer and other mammals recoveredwill not indicate a springsummerperiod of death.
p5 Remains of wild species of plants recoveredwill indicate a fall-winterperiod
of availability/collection(Asch, Ford, and Asch 1972).
p6 Remains of wild species of plantsrecoveredwill not indicate a spring-summer
period of availability/collection.
p7 Remains of domestic crops recovered will indicate a fall-winterharvestand
storage.
p8 Remains of domestic crops recoveredwill not indicate a spring-summerutilization.
H3 Spring-Summeroccupation
p's The same observationalpredictionsas listed under H2, with the positive p's
becomingnegativeand the negativep's becomingpositive.
A number of other less obvious test implications having to do with seasonal subsistence
activities might also be inductively inferred. The presence of large chert hoes and/or hoe
flakes at the site, for example, could be suggested as a positive observationalpredictionfor
H1 and H3 and as a negative prediction for H2, because such hoes are viewed as being
strongly associated with both the springpreparationand the summermaintenanceof garden
plots.
As has already been discussed, such observational predictions would be inductively
inferred ratherthan deduced from each hypothesis. Inferringsuch observationalpredictions
involves two interrelated tasks: actually identifying and stating them, and the more
frustrating task of attempting to demonstrate the existence of a strong cause and effect
relationship between the hypothesis and each observationalprediction. There is no set of
procedures or guidelines for identifying or discovering any or all of the observational
predictions of a specific hypothesis. Discovering test implications, like discovering
hypotheses, is a creative process: "Finding implications, like finding hypotheses, is a
problem located in the context of discovery rather than the context of justification" (M.
Salmon 1975:462). Thus the relative creative ability of an archaeologistas a problemsolver
can be measured not only in his or her ability to recognize worthwhile problemsand to
formulate alternativehypotheses that are relevantto the problems,but also in terms of his
or her ability to inductively infer observational predictions from hypotheses. The more
frustrating task of establishing a logical link or "bridge" between a hypothesis and an
observationalprediction is often referredto as establishinga bridgingargumentor argument
of relevance. Such bridging arguments in the H-A method, which have already been
discussed, take the logical form of argument by analogy, and are established during
plausibility considerations.It is often more appropriate,however, to present such bridging

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

612

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

argumentsat the same time as the observationalpredictionsare stated, ratherthan in the

discussionof plausibilityconsiderations.
Establishingbridgingargumentsalso invariablyinvolves stating one or more additional
premises(Copi 1972:451-452) or auxiliaryhypotheses (M. Salrhin 1975:460).
In the seasonality example presented above, for example, the bridging argument
establishinga cause and effect relationshipbetween a fall-winter occupation (hypothesis)
and fish scales indicatinga fall-winterseason of death (observationalprediction)involvesnot
only an argumentby analogy, but also necessitatesan auxiliaryhypothesis. The argumentby
analogy would involve comparing the archaeological situation with a ref'rence class
consisting of studies done on seasonal growth characteristicsof fish scales. In temperate
of wide
climatic situations the annual growth cycle of fish results in the
depositih
spring-summergrowth bands interspersed with narrow winter bands. As a r?sult of this
annual deposition of growth bands, it is possible to determinethe approximatoseason of
death of a fish by examiningthe outside edge of its scales (Casteel1975, Yerkes1i73). Even
if a high prior probability was established for the cause and effect relationship between
seasonality of death and fish scale characteristics,the argument would link fish scale
characteristicsand the season of death of the fish, which was not necessarilythe same as the
season of occupation of the site. It is logically possible, for instance, that the site was
occupied duringthe spring and summer(H3), and that fall-winterkilled fish were preserved
and broughtto the site when it was occupied in the spring.
To cover this possibility, it is necessaryto state an auxiliaryhypothesis: (Al) "Fish scales
recovered from the site in question are from fish that were killed while the site was
occupied." Such additional premises are a necessary part of many bridging arguments,
although they are often not explicitly stated, but ratherremainas "hiddetiassumptions."
the fact
Because such auxiliary hypotheses are often a necessarypart of bridgingargaUthents,
that an observationalprediction is shown to be empiricallyfalse does not necessarilymean
that the hypothesis in question is also false. If, for example, p2 under H2 was shown to be
false (scales of spring-summerkilled fish were in fact recovered),it would not necessarily
mean that H2 was false, but ratherthat either H2 or the auxiliaryhypothesis (Al) was fMlse.
Archaeologicalreasoning quite often involves not a series of single alternativehypothtses,
but rather a series of groupsof alternativehypotheses, with each groupconsistingof a single
explicitly stated hypothesis, as well as a numberof auxiliaryhypotheses, some of which may
remain hidden, unrecognized, and unstated. It is clearly necessary for such hidden
assumptions to be recognizedand explicitly stated if the overallstrength of archaeological
reasoningis to be improved.
Determiningthe RelativeStrengthof AlternativeHypotheses
The final step of the hypothetico-analogmethod simply involves the identification and
collection of all archaeological data pertinent to the problem being considered, and the
subsequent comparisonof this observeddata base with the specific observationalpredictions
inductively inferred from each alternativehypothesis. It should be stressedthat this last step
is not intended to demonstratethe absolute truth or total accuracy of any hypothesis, but
ratherto determinewhich hypothesis, if any, is best supportedby the data (Copi 1972:431;
Hill 1972:83). When one of a series of alternativehypotheses is found to provide a better
predictionof the data than the others this simply indicatesthat of the alternativehypotheses
formulated, it provides the most correct fit with reality. Thus it is possible that the
hypothesis most supported by the data may in actuality not be a very accuratedescription
of reality, althoughit is better than the other hypotheses considered.There could, in fact, be
a number of other hypotheses that would providea more accuratefit with reality that were
not identified and considered in the reasoning process. It is unfortunate that supported

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

613

hypotheses are sometimes viewed as universaltruths or totally accurate explanations of

reality rather than as temporaryaccounts of reality that appearto have advantagesover the
other tentative solutions chosen for consideration.
The actual process of determiningwhich of a number of alternativehypotheses is best
supported by the data observed involves evaluation of each hypothesis according to a
numberof criteria.
(1) The number of observationalpredictions shown to be empiricallytrue (M. Salmon
1975:459-460). IrvingCopi refers to this criterionas the relative"predictiveor explanatory
power" of alternativehypotheses: "If one of two testable hypotheses has a greaternumber
of observable facts deducible from it than from the other, then it is said to have greater
predictive or explanatory power" (Copi 1972:433-434). Thus if all of the observational
predictions of two alternativehypotheses are shown to be empiricallytrue, the hypothesis
havinga greaternumberof supportedobservationalpredictionsis preferred.
(2) The variety of independence of observationalpredictions shown to be empirically
true (Hill 1972:83; M. Salmon 1975:459-460). Thus if each of two hypotheses have the
same number of observationalpredictionsshown to be empiricallytrue, the hypothesis with
empirically true observationalpredictions that shows a greater degree of independence,a
greater variety, is preferred. The obvious problem with this criterion is, of course, the
difficulty involved in objectively identifying and quantifying the degree of independence
between observationalpredictions(M. Salmon 1975:460-461).
(3) The significanceof the observationalpredictionsshown to be empiricallytrue.
Whether a hypothesis is confirmed depends not only on the number of true I's
[observational predictions] and the variety of the confirming data, but also on the
significance of the I's, or the importance of the data represented by the true I's [M.
Salmon 1975:461].
It is clearly not only the number and variety of supported observationalpredictionsthat
should be taken into consideration, but also the relative importance of the observational
predictions. Some empirically true observational predictions may be trivial, others
significant. Once again the problem arises as to the difficulties involved in objectively
identifying and quantifying the degree of significanceof variousobservationalpredictions.
"Like the question of relevant variety, the question of significanceis a deep and difficult
one, essentialto the problemof confirmation ... ." (M. Salmon 1975:461).
(4) Simplicity. If two hypotheses are comparablein terms of the number, variety, and
significanceof observationalpredictionsshown to be empiricallytrue, the hypothesis that is
simpler or more "natural" is preferred (Copi 1972:434-435). While simplicity is very
difficult to define or measure, one way in which this criterion might be implementedin
archaeologicalreasoning is in terms of the number and strength of the additional premises
needed undereach hypothesis.
(5) Observationalpredictionsshown to be empiricallyfalse. Those hypotheses for which
test implications have been inductively inferred that are subsequently shown to be false
would be less preferable than those hypotheses that have no such false observational
predictions. This is perhapsthe single most importantcriterionin assessingthe relativemerit
of alternativehypotheses, because a single false observationalpredictioncan seriouslyaffect
the standing of a hypothesis. Two important points should be kept in mind, however,
concerningthe rejectionof a hypothesis on the basisof a false observationalprediction.
First, due to the possibility of poor preservation,poor recovery, etc., the failure of a
positive observational prediction to be observed would not mean that the observational
predictionis empiricallyfalse.
Secondly, any empirically false observationalprediction would not necessarilyindicate
that the hypothesis in question was false and should be rejected. Rather it would indicate
that either the hypothesis or an auxiliary hypothesis (or both) was probably false. The

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

614

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

decision as to which, if any, of the related hypotheses was false would depend upon the
researcher'srelativeconfidence in each of them.
The five criteriabriefly describedabove are generallyrecognizedas the most appropriate
ones to employ in determiningwhich of a series of alternativehypotheses is best supported
by the availabledata. In an ideal situation, one of a seriesof alternativehypotheses would be
determinedto be best supported by the availabledata accordingto all five criteria.Such a
hypothesis would clearly have a greaternumberand a greatervariety of empiricallytrue test
implications,as well as havinga greaternumber of significanttest implicationsthan any of
the other alternative hypotheses, no false test implications, and a minimum of additional
premises.Such an ideal situation is rarelyencounteredin the realworld, however.
It is also clearthat when the choice between alternativehypotheses is not an obvious one,
the criteria that will be employed are not amenableto statistical analysis. Rather they are
nonquantifiable criteria that are open to varying interpretations.Two archaeologists,for
example, might view the relative independence and significance of test implications
differently, resulting in the first archaeologist determining one hypothesis to be best
supported by the available data, while the second archaeologist determines another
hypothesis to be preferred.What is the solution to such an impasse?"Ultimately our last
court of appealin decidingbetween rivalhypotheses is experience"(Copi 1972:433; see also
M. Salmon 1975:461). Like the ideal situation, however, such a logical impasse is rarely
encountered in the real world. Usually the selection of one of a number of alternative
hypotheses as being best supported by the data is possiblewith a minimumof difficulty.
In conclusion, it shouldbe pointed out that to facilitate descriptionof the H-A method of
inductive confirmation, I have presented it as a structured linear sequence of logically
discrete steps. In reality, however,the H-A method, as employed in archaeologicalinference,
is a much more flexible process. Because archaeologistscannot accurately predictall of the
patterns of cultural debris that may be uncovered during excavation, there is a continual
reassessmentand adjustmentof problemareas,plausibilityconsiderations,and hypothesesas
both expected and unexpected patterns of materialremainsare observedin generaloutline
as the field season progresses.This process of continual reassessmentcontinues throughthe
laboratoryanalysis phase of research,as patterns of cultural debrisare broughtinto clearer
focus, and even into the final phase of writingan account of the researcheffort.
Archaeological inference is a lengthy, complicated, and often frustratingprocess that
holds a fascination for archaeologists, often not shared by innocent bystanders. This
fascinationis a reflection of the firm belief held by most archaeologiststhat if they are good
enough puzzle solvers and can overcome the numerousproblemsand shortcomingsof the
archaeologicaldata base, they will be able to see beyond the patternsof cultural debris to
the behaviorpatterns of prehistorichuman populations.It is hoped that furtherclarification
and refinement of some of the ideas presentedhere will enable archaeologiststo see such
patternsof prehistorichumanbehaviorwith greaterclarity.
NOTES
Acknowledgments. A number of referees providedlengthy and very detailed comments
and suggestions for improvement of the initial versions of this article, almost all of which
were incorporated in subsequent revisions.Their constructivecriticismand encouragement
are gratefullyacknowledged.
REFERENCESCITED
Asch, Nancy B., RichardI. Ford, and David L. Asch
1972 Paleoethnobotanyof the Koster Site: The ArchaicHorizons.Illinois State Museum
Reports of Investigations,No. 24. Springfield:Illinois State Museum.

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

615

Ascher, Robert
1961 Analogy in Archaeological Interpretation. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology
17:317-325.
Bayard, Donn T.
1969 Science, Theory, and Reality in the "New Archaeology." American Antiquity
34:376-384.
Binford, Lewis R.
1967 Smudge Pits and Hide Smoking: The Use of Analogy in Archaeological Reasoning.
American Antiquity 32:1-12.
1972 An Archaeological Perspective. New York: Seminar Press.
Bonnichsen, Robson
1973 Millie's Camp: An Experiment in Archaeology. World Archaeology 5:277-291.
Casteel, Richard W.
1975 Estimation of Size, Minimum Numbers of Individuals, and Seasonal Dating by
Means of Fish Scales from Archaeological Sites. In Archaeozoological Studies. A
Clason, ed. Pp. 70-86. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Chamberlain, Thomas C.
1965 The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses. Science 148:754-759.
Copi, Irving M.
1972 Introduction to Logic. Fourth ed. New York: Macmillan.
Cranstone, B. A. L.
1971 The Tifalmin: A "Neolithic" People in New Guinea. World Archaeology
3:132-142.
David, Nicholas
1971 The Fulani Compound and the Archaeologist. World Archaeology 3:111-131.
Ember, Melvin
1973 An Archaeological Indicator of Matrilocal Versus Patrilocal Residence. American
Antiquity 38:177-181.
Friedrich, Margaret H.
1970 Design Structure and Social Interaction: Archaeological Implications of an
Ethnographic Analysis. American Antiquity 35:332-343.
Fritz, John M., and Fred T. Plog
1970 The Nature of Archaeological Explanation. American Antiquity 35:405-412.
Gould, Richard A.
1968 Living Archaeology: The Ngatatjara of Western Australia. Southwestern Journal of
Anthropology 24:101-121.
1971 The Archaeologist as Ethnographer: A Case Study From the Western Desert of
Australia. World Archaeology 3:143-177.
Heider, Karl G.
1967 Archaeological Assumptions and Ethnographic Facts: A
Cautionary Tale From
New Guinea. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23:52-64.
Carl
G.
Hempel,
1965 Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science.
Glencoe: Free Press.
Hill, James N.
1968 Broken K Pueblo: Patterns of Form and Function. In New
Perspectives in
Archeology. Sally R. Binford and Lewis R. Binford, eds. Pp. 103-142. Chicago:
Aldine.
1972 The Methodological Debate in Contemporary Archaeology: A Model. In Models in
Archaeology. David Clarke, ed. Pp. 61-107. London: Methuen.
Johnson, Gregory A.
1972 A Test of the Utility of Central Place Theory in Archaeology. In
Man, Settlement,
and Urbanism. Peter Ucko, Ruth Tringham, and G. W. Dimbleby, eds. Pp.
769-786.
London: Duckworth.
Johnson, Leroy, Jr.
1972 Problems in "Avant-Garde" Archaeology. American Anthropologist 74:366-377.
Kuhn, Thomas S.
1970 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Second ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Levin, Michael E.
1973 On Explanation in Archaeology. American Antiquity 38:387-395.

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

616

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

[79, 1977

Longacre, William A.
1963 Archaeology as Anthropology: A Case Study. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Anthropology, University of Chicago.
1968 Some Aspects of Prehistoric Society in East-Central Arizona. In New Perspectives
in Archeology. Sally R. Binford and Lewis R. Binford, eds. Pp. 89-102. Chicago:
Aldine.
1970 Archaeology as Anthropology: A Case Study. Anthropological Papers of the
University of Arizona, No. 17.
Longacre, William A., and James E. Ayres
1968 Archeological Lessons From an Apache Wickiup. In New Perspectives in
Archeology. Sally R. Binford and Lewis R. Binford, eds. Pp. 151-160. Chicago:
Aldine.
Million, Michael
1975 Ceramic Technology of the Nodena Phase Peoples. Southeastern Archaeological
Conference, Bull. 18:201-208.
Morgan, Charles G.
1973 Archaeology and Explanation. World Archaeology 4:259-276.
Munson, Patrick J.
1969 Comments on Binford's "Smudge Pits and Hide Smoking: The Use of Analogy in
Archaeological Reasoning." American Antiquity 34:83-85.
Murdock, George P., and Caterina Provost
1973 Factors in the Division of Labor by Sex: A Cross-Cultural Analysis. Ethnology
12:203-225.
Naroll, Raoul
1962 Floor Area and Settlement Population. American Antiquity 27:587-589.
Neilson, W. A., ed.
1956 Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language. Second ed.
Springfield: G. C. Merriarr.
North, F. Chester
1975 Determination of Sodium and Potarsium in Nelumbo lutea. In Report of
Excavations at the Zebree Site. Dan Morse. Pp. 235-237. Arkansas Archaeological
Survey Research Report No. 4.
Pearson, Charles E.
1976 Analysis of Late Prehistoric Settlement on Ossabaw Island, Georgia. Masters thesis,
Department of Anthropology, University of Georgia.
Sabloff, Jeremy A., Thomas W. Beale, and Anthony M. Kurland
1973 Recent Developments in Archaeology. Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 408:103-118.
Salmon, Merrilee H.
1975 Confirmation and Explanation in Archaeology. American Antiquity 40:459-470.
1976 "Deductive" versus "Inductive" Archaeology. American Antiquity 41:376-380.
Salmon, Wesley C.
1963 Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
1967 The Foundations of Scientific Inference. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press.
1973 Logic. Second ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Semenov, S. A.
1964 Prehistoric Technology. M. W. Thompson, trans. Bath: Adams and Dart.
Simon, H.
1973 Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic? Philosophy of Science 40:471-480.
Smith, Bruce D.
1975 Middle Mississippi Exploitation of Animal Populations. Anthropological Papers,
Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, No. 57.
1976a Determining the Selectivity of Utilization of Animal Species by Prehistoric
Human Populations. Paper presented at the 41st Annual Meeting of the Society for
American Archaeology.
1976b Gypsy Joint: A Sm4ll Middle Mississippi Site. Southeastern Archaeological
Conference, Bull. 19:22-25.
Spears, Carol S.
1975 Hammers, Nuts and Jolts, Cobbles, Cobbles, Cobbles: Experiments in Cobble
Technologies in Search of Correlates. In Arkansas Eastman Archaeological Project. C.
Baker. Pp. 83-116. Arkansas Archaeological Survey Research Report No. 6.

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Smith ]

INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION

617

Struever, Stuart
1968 Flotation Techniques for the Recovery of Small-scale Archaeological Remains.
American Antiquity 33:353-362.
Taylor, Walter W.
1948 A Study of Archaeology. American Anthropological Association, Memoir 69.
Watson, Patty Jo
1974 Theory in Archaeology: The New Criticism. Paper presented at the 39th Annual
Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology.
Watson, Patty Jo, Steven A. LeBlanc, and Charles L. Redman
1971 Explanation in Archaeology. New York: Columbia University Press.
1974 The Covering Law Model in Archaeology: Practical Uses and Formal Interpretations. World Archaeology 6:125-132.
White, P., and David H. Thomas
1972 What Mean These Stones? Ethno-Taxonomic Models and Archaeological Interpretations in the New Guinea Highlands. In Models in Archaeology. David Clarke, ed.
Pp. 275-308. London: Methuen.
Wilmsen, Edwin N.
1970 Lithic Analysis and Cultural Inference. Anthropological Papers of the University
of Arizona, No. 16.
Yerkes, Richard
1973 Fish Scales From Two Fairmount Houses on the Merrel Tract at Cahokia.
Manuscript. Author's Files.
Submitted 5 March 1976
Revision submitted 27 August 1976
Accepted 14 December 1976
Final revisions received 17 February 1977

This content downloaded from 201.148.81.39 on Tue, 4 Nov 2014 13:17:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions