G.R. No.

L-12342

August 3, 1918

A. A. ADDISON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARCIANA FELIX and BALBINO TIOCO, defendants-appellees.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for appellees.
FISHER, J.:
By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914, the plaintiff sold to the defendant Marciana Felix, with
the consent of her husband, the defendant Balbino Tioco, four parcels of land, described in the
instrument. The defendant Felix paid, at the time of the execution of the deed, the sum of P3,000 on
account of the purchase price, and bound herself to pay the remainder in installments, the first of
P2,000 on July 15, 1914, and the second of P5,000 thirty days after the issuance to her of a
certificate of title under the Land Registration Act, and further, within ten years from the date of such
title P10, for each coconut tree in bearing and P5 for each such tree not in bearing, that might be
growing on said four parcels of land on the date of the issuance of title to her, with the condition that
the total price should not exceed P85,000. It was further stipulated that the purchaser was to deliver
to the vendor 25 per centum of the value of the products that she might obtain from the four parcels
"from the moment she takes possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her
favor."
It was also covenanted that "within one year from the date of the certificate of title in favor of
Marciana Felix, this latter may rescind the present contract of purchase and sale, in which case
Marciana Felix shall be obliged to return to me, A. A. Addison, the net value of all the products of the
four parcels sold, and I shall obliged to return to her, Marciana Felix, all the sums that she may have
paid me, together with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum."
In January, 1915, the vendor, A. A. Addison, filed suit in Court of First Instance of Manila to compel
Marciana Felix to make payment of the first installment of P2,000, demandable in accordance with
the terms of the contract of sale aforementioned, on July 15, 1914, and of the interest in arrears, at
the stipulated rate of 8 per cent per annum. The defendant, jointly with her husband, answered the
complaint and alleged by way of special defense that the plaintiff had absolutely failed to deliver to
the defendant the lands that were the subject matter of the sale, notwithstanding the demands made
upon him for this purpose. She therefore asked that she be absolved from the complaint, and that,
after a declaration of the rescission of the contract of the purchase and sale of said lands, the
plaintiff be ordered to refund the P3,000 that had been paid to him on account, together with the
interest agreed upon, and to pay an indemnity for the losses and damages which the defendant
alleged she had suffered through the plaintiff's non-fulfillment of the contract.
The evidence adduced shows that after the execution of the deed of the sale the plaintiff, at the
request of the purchaser, went to Lucena, accompanied by a representative of the latter, for the
purpose of designating and delivering the lands sold. He was able to designate only two of the four
parcels, and more than two-thirds of these two were found to be in the possession of one Juan
Villafuerte, who claimed to be the owner of the parts so occupied by him. The plaintiff admitted that
the purchaser would have to bring suit to obtain possession of the land (sten. notes, record, p. 5). In
August, 1914, the surveyor Santamaria went to Lucena, at the request of the plaintiff and
accompanied by him, in order to survey the land sold to the defendant; but he surveyed only two
parcels, which are those occupied mainly by the brothers Leon and Julio Villafuerte. He did not
survey the other parcels, as they were not designated to him by the plaintiff. In order to make this

survey it was necessary to obtain from the Land Court a writ of injunction against the occupants, and
for the purpose of the issuance of this writ the defendant, in June, 1914, filed an application with the
Land Court for the registration in her name of four parcels of land described in the deed of sale
executed in her favor by the plaintiff. The proceedings in the matter of this application were
subsequently dismissed, for failure to present the required plans within the period of the time allowed
for the purpose.
The trial court rendered judgment in behalf of the defendant, holding the contract of sale to be
rescinded and ordering the return to the plaintiff the P3,000 paid on account of the price, together
with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent per annum. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
In decreeing the rescission of the contract, the trial judge rested his conclusion solely on the
indisputable fact that up to that time the lands sold had not been registered in accordance with the
Torrens system, and on the terms of the second paragraph of clause (h) of the contract, whereby it
is stipulated that ". . . within one year from the date of the certificate of title in favor of Marciana Felix,
this latter may rescind the present contract of purchase and sale . . . ."
The appellant objects, and rightly, that the cross-complaint is not founded on the hypothesis of the
conventional rescission relied upon by the court, but on the failure to deliver the land sold. He argues
that the right to rescind the contract by virtue of the special agreement not only did not exist from the
moment of the execution of the contract up to one year after the registration of the land, but does not
accrue until the land is registered. The wording of the clause, in fact, substantiates the contention.
The one year's deliberation granted to the purchaser was to be counted "from the date of the
certificate of title ... ." Therefore the right to elect to rescind the contract was subject to a condition,
namely, the issuance of the title. The record show that up to the present time that condition has not
been fulfilled; consequently the defendant cannot be heard to invoke a right which depends on the
existence of that condition. If in the cross-complaint it had been alleged that the fulfillment of the
condition was impossible for reasons imputable to the plaintiff, and if this allegation had been
proven, perhaps the condition would have been considered as fulfilled (arts. 1117, 1118, and 1119,
Civ. Code); but this issue was not presented in the defendant's answer.
However, although we are not in agreement with the reasoning found in the decision appealed from,
we consider it to be correct in its result. The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing
sold. With respect to two of the parcels of land, he was not even able to show them to the purchaser;
and as regards the other two, more than two-thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse
possession of a third person.
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered
to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee." (Civ. Code, art.
1462.) It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery
may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over
the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not
enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and theright of possession. The thing sold must
be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing
into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the
execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument,
the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it
himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality the delivery has not been effected.

As Dalloz rightly says (Gen. Rep., vol. 43, p. 174) in his commentaries on article 1604 of the French
Civil code, "the word "delivery" expresses a complex idea . . . the abandonment of the thing by the
person who makes the delivery and the taking control of it by the person to whom the delivery is
made."
The execution of a public instrument is sufficient for the purposes of the abandonment made by the
vendor; but it is not always sufficient to permit of the apprehension of the thing by the purchaser.
The supreme court of Spain, interpreting article 1462 of the Civil Code, held in its decision of
November 10, 1903, (Civ. Rep., vol. 96, p. 560) that this article "merely declares that when the sale
is made through the means of a public instrument, the execution of this latter is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing sold: which does not and cannot mean that this fictitious tradition necessarily
implies the real tradition of the thing sold, for it is incontrovertible that, while its ownership still
pertains to the vendor (and with greater reason if it does not), a third person may be in possession of
the same thing; wherefore, though, as a general rule, he who purchases by means of a public
instrument should be deemed . . . to be the possessor in fact, yet this presumption gives way before
proof to the contrary."
It is evident, then, in the case at bar, that the mere execution of the instrument was not a fulfillment
of the vendors' obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that from such non-fulfillment arises the
purchaser's right to demand, as she has demanded, the rescission of the sale and the return of the
price. (Civ. Code, arts. 1506 and 1124.)
Of course if the sale had been made under the express agreement of imposing upon the purchaser
the obligation to take the necessary steps to obtain the material possession of the thing sold, and it
were proven that she knew that the thing was in the possession of a third person claiming to have
property rights therein, such agreement would be perfectly valid. But there is nothing in the
instrument which would indicate, even implicitly, that such was the agreement. It is true, as the
appellant argues, that the obligation was incumbent upon the defendant Marciana Felix to apply for
and obtain the registration of the land in the new

registry
of property; but from this it cannot be concluded that she had to await the final decision of the
Court of Land Registration, in order to be able to enjoy the property sold. On the contrary, it was
expressly stipulated in the contract that the purchaser should deliver to the vendor one-fourth "of
the products ... of the aforesaid four parcels from the moment when she takes possession of them
until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her favor." This obviously shows that it was not
forseen that the purchaser might be deprived of her possession during the course of the
registration proceedings, but that the transaction rested on the assumption that she was to have,
during said period, the material possession and enjoyment of the four parcels of land.
Inasmuch as the rescission is made by virtue of the provisions of law and not by contractual
agreement, it is not the conventional but the legal interest that is demandable.
It is therefore held that the contract of purchase and sale entered into by and between the plaintiff
and the defendant on June 11, 1914, is rescinded, and the plaintiff is ordered to make restitution of
the sum of P3,000 received by him on account of the price of the sale, together with interest thereon
at the legal rate of 6 per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until payment, with the
costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988

FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted by her husband, JOSE
TAGACAY,respondents.
Pedro R.
Perez
, Jr. for petitioner.
Teodoro B. Mallonga for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The subject of this dispute is the two lots owned by Domingo Melad which is claimed by both the
petitioner and the respondent. The trial court believed the petitioner but the respondent court, on
appeal, upheld the respondent. The case is now before us for a resolution of the issues once and for
all.
On January 29, 1962, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the then Court of
First Instance of Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had
purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the
defendant. 1 In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the
said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from
Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943. 2 The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was refiled in
1967. 3

At the trial, the plaintiff presented a deed of sale dated December 4, 1943, purportedly signed by
Domingo Melad and duly notarized, which conveyed the said properties to her for the sum of
P80.00. 4 She said the amount was earned by her mother as a worker at the Tabacalera factory. She
claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Domingo Melad, with whom she and her mother were living
when he died in 1945. She moved out of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and
asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would
deliver part of the harvest from the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. The deliveries having
stopped, she then consulted the municipal judge who advised her to file the complaint against Danguilan.
The plaintiff 's mother, her only other witness, corroborated this testimony. 5

For his part, the defendant testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece,
whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had no
children of their own. He and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and
helped Domingo with the cultivation of the farm. Domingo Melad signed in 1941 a private instrument
in which he gave the defendant the farm and in 1943 another private instrument in which he also
gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care of the grantor and
would bury him upon his death. 6 Danguilan presented three other witnesses 7 to corroborate his
statements and to prove that he had been living in the land since his marriage to Isidra and had remained
in possession thereof after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. Two of said witnesses declared that neither
the plaintiff nor her mother lived in the land with Domingo Melad. 8

The decision of the trial court was based mainly on the issue of possession. Weighing the evidence
presented by the parties, the judge 9 held that the defendant was more believable and that the plaintiff's
evidence was "unpersuasive and unconvincing." It was held that the plaintiff's own declaration that she
moved out of the property in 1946 and left it in the possession of the defendant was contradictory to her
claim of ownership. She was also inconsistent when she testified first that the defendant was her tenant
and later in rebuttal that he was her administrator. The decision concluded that where there was doubt as
to the ownership of the property, the presumption was in favor of the one actually occupying the same,
which in this case was the defendant. 10

The review by the respondent court 11 of this decision was manifestly less than thorough. For the most
part it merely affirmed the factual findings of the trial court except for an irrelevant modification, and it was
only toward the end that it went to and resolved what it considered the lone decisive issue.

The respondent court held that Exhibits 2-b and 3-a, by virtue of which Domingo Melad had
conveyed the two parcels of land to the petitioner, were null and void. The reason was that they
were donations of real property and as such should have been effected through a public instrument.
It then set aside the appealed decision and declared the respondents the true and lawful owners of
the disputed property.
The said exhibits read as follows:
EXHIBIT 2-b is quoted as follows: 12
I, DOMINGO MELAD, of legal age, married, do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of
my giving to Felix Danguilan, my agricultural land located at Barrio Fugu-Macusi,
Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, Philippine Islands; that this land is registered under
my name; that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to whom I will deliver
this land except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that I will die
and also for all other things needed and necessary for me, he will be responsible
because of this land I am giving to him; that it is true that I have nieces and nephews but
they are not living with us and there is no one to whom I will give my land except to Felix
Danguilan for he lives with me and this is the length175 m. and the width is 150 m.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign my name below and also those present in
the execution of this receipt this 14th day of September 1941.
Penablanca Cagayan, September 14, 1941.
(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD
WITNESSES:
1. (T.M.) ISIDRO MELAD
2. (SGD.) FELIX DANGUILAN
3. (T.M.) ILLEGIBLE
EXHIBIT 3-a is quoted as follows: 13
I, DOMINGO MELAD, a resident of Centro, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, do hereby
swear and declare the truth that I have delivered my residential lot at Centro,
Penablanca, Cagayan, to Felix Danguilan, my son-in-law because I have no child; that I
have thought of giving him my land because he will be the one to take care of
SHELTERING me or bury me when I die and this is why I have thought of executing this
document; that the boundaries of this lot ison the east, Cresencio Danguilan; on the

north, Arellano Street; on the south by Pastor Lagundi and on the west, Pablo Pelagio
and the area of this lot is 35 meters going south; width and length beginning west to east
is 40 meters.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, I hereby sign this receipt this 18th day of December 1943.
(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD
WITNESSES:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
(SGD.) DANIEL ARAO
It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to
donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think,
however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances
were onerous donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation
to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered
by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected
through a public instrument. The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo
v. De Mesa, 14 where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable
consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the
expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor Placida
Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in
his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine
whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to
demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is
valid and effective, although not recorded in a public instrument.
The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands
donated and the services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be
considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been effected
through a public instrument and not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been adduced
to support her contention that the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.
On the other hand, both the trial court and the respondent court have affirmed the factual allegation
that the petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance
with the condition imposed by the donor. It is alleged and not denied that he died when he was
almost one hundred years old, 15which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by
himself and so provided for the donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We
may assume that there was a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction
an onerous donation.

Regarding the private respondent's claim that she had purchased the properties by virtue of a deed
of sale, the respondent court had only the following to say: "Exhibit 'E' taken together with the
documentary and oral evidence shows that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the
appellants." This was, we think, a rather superficial way of resolving such a basic and important
issue.

The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only three years old and the
consideration was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker
in a factory. 16 This was itself a suspicious circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not
made to the mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made out in
favor of Apolonia Melad although she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname, before
that instrument was signed and in fact even after she got married. 17 The averment was also made that
the contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. 18 It was also alleged that
even after the supposed execution of the said contract, the respondent considered Domingo Melad the
owner of the properties and that she had never occupied the same. 19

Considering these serious challenges, the appellate court could have devoted a little more time to
examining Exhibit "E" and the circumstances surrounding its execution before pronouncing its
validity in the manner described above. While it is true that the due execution of a public instrument
is presumed, the presumption is disputable and will yield to contradictory evidence, which in this
case was not refuted.
At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private
respondent did not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file
this action for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession, she transferred
the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot
belonging to her step-brother. 20 Her claim that the petitioner was her tenant (later changed to
administrator) was disbelieved by the trial court, and properly so, for its inconsistency. In short, she failed
to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her
actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.

As was held in Garchitorena v. Almeda: 21

Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership
does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity
and Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a public document does
not constitute sufficient delivery where the property involved is in the actual and
adverse possession of third persons (Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil. 404; Masallo vs.
Cesar, 39 Phil. 134), it becomes incontestable that even if included in the contract,
the ownership of the property in dispute did not pass thereby to Mariano
Garchitorena. Not having become the owner for lack of delivery, Mariano
Garchitorena cannot presume to recover the property from its present possessors.
His action, therefore, is not one of revindicacion, but one against his vendor for
specific performance of the sale to him.
In the aforecited case of Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 22 Justice Mapa declared for the Court:
Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a fundamental principle in all matters of contracts
and a well- known doctrine of law that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia
rerum transferuntur". In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of
article 609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are acquired
and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in
consequence of certain contracts, by tradition". And as the logical application of this
disposition article 1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the rights to the fruits
of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall not
acquire a real right" (and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been
delivered to him."

In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes
a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership
of the same by virtue of a contract. As Manresa states in his Commentaries on the
Civil Code, volume 10, pages 339 and 340: "Our law does not admit the doctrine of
the transfer of property by mere consent but limits the effect of the agreement to the
due execution of the contract. ... The ownership, the property right, is only derived
from the delivery of a thing ... "
As for the argument that symbolic delivery was effected through the deed of sale, which was a public
instrument, the Court has held:
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing
is considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the
vendee." (Civil Code, art. 1462). It is true that the same article declares that the
execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect
of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing
sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is
not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession.
The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever
to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of
the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser
cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it
himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are
opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to realitythe delivery
has not been effected. 23
There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual possession
of the litigated properties. Even if the respective claims of the parties were both to be discarded as
being inherently weak, the decision should still incline in favor of the petitioner pursuant to the
doctrine announced in Santos & Espinosa v. Estejada 24 where the Court announced:
If the claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment must be for the
defendant, for the latter being in possession is presumed to be the owner, and
cannot be obliged to show or prove a better right.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court
REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21998 November 10, 1975
CALIXTO PASAGUI and FAUSTA MOSAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ESTER T. VILLABLANCA, ZOSIMO VILLABLANCA, EUSTAQUIA BOCAR and CATALINA
BOCARdefendants-appellees.
Julio Siayngco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Filomeno Arteche, Jr. for defendants-appellees. .

ANTONIO, J.:
The only issue posed by this appeal is whether or not, from the nature of the action pleaded as
appears in the allegations of the complaint, the aforesaid action is one of forcible entry, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. .
On February 4, 1963, appellants Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar filed a complaint with the Court
of First Instance at Tacloban City, alleging that onNovember 15, 1962, for and in consideration of
Two Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P2,800.00), they bought from appellees Eustaquia Bocar and
Catalina Bocar a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 2.6814 hectares, situated in
Hamindangon, Pastrana, Leyte; that the corresponding document of sale was executed, notarized
on the same date, and recorded in the
Registry
of Deeds of Tacloban, Leyte on November 16, 1962; that during the first week of February, 1963,
defendant spouses Ester T. Villablanca and Zosimo Villablanca, "illegally and without any right,
whatsoever, took possession of the above property harvesting coconuts from the coconut plantation
thereon, thus depriving plaintiffs" of its possession; that despite demands made by the plaintiffs upon
the above-mentioned defendants "to surrender to them the above-described property and its
possession" the latter failed or refused to return said parcel of land to the former, causing them
damage; and that Eustaquia and Catalina Bocar, vendors of the property, are included defendants in
the complaint by virtue of the warranty clause contained in the document of sale. Plaintiffs prayed for
a decision ordering defendants to surrender the possession of the parcel of land above-described to
them and to pay damages in the amounts specified. .
On February 21, 1963, appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Court of
First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action being one of forcible entry.
Appellants opposed the Motion to Dismiss asserting that the action is not one for forcible entry
inasmuch as in the complaint, there is no allegation that the deprivation of possession was effected
through "force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth." .
On May 13, 1963, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it
appearing from the allegations in the complaint that the case is one for forcible entry which belongs
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal Court) of Pastrana, Leyte.
The first Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 27, 1963 and the second was likewise
denied on July 5, 1963. From the aforementioned orders, appeal on a pure question of law was
interposed to this Court. .
It is well-settled that what determines the jurisdiction of the municipal court in a forcible entry case is
the nature of the action pleaded as appears from the allegations in the complaint. In ascertaining
whether or not the action is one of forcible entry within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
municipal court, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to
be consulted.. 1 .
In the case at bar, the complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs were in physical possession of the
land and have been deprived of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. It simply avers that plaintiffs-appellants bought on November 12, 1962 from defendantsappellees Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar the parcel of land in question for the amount of
P2,800.00; that a deed of sale was executed, notarized and registered;that "during this first week of
February, 1963, defendants Ester T. Villablanca and her husband, Zosimo Villablanca, illegally and

without any right whatsoever, took possession of the above described property, harvesting coconuts
from the coconut plantation therein, thus depriving of its possession herein plaintiffs, and causing
them damages for the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P800.00)"; that for the purpose of
enforcing the vendors' warranty in case of eviction, Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar were also
included as defendants; and, therefore, plaintiffs-appellants pray that a decision be rendered,
ordering (a) defendants Ester T. Villablanca and her husband, Zosimo Villablanca, "to surrender the
possession of the above described property to said plaintiffs"; (b) defendants Ester T. Villablanca
and her husband, Zosimo Villablanca, "to pay to said plaintiffs the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED
PESOS (P800.00) as damages for the usurpation by them of said property"; and (c) defendants
Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar "to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P2,800.00, plus incidental
expenses, as provided for by Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in case of eviction or loss of ownership to
said above described property on the part of plaintiffs." .
It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to
delivery of the land subject of the sale. 2 This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no
impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the
vendee. It can be negated by the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material possession of
the land subject of the sale.. 3 It appears from the records of the case at bar that plaintiffs-appellants had not acquired physical
possession of the land since its purchase on November 12, 1962. As a matter of fact, their purpose in filing the complaint in Civil Case No.
4
3285 is precisely to "get the possession of the property." In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible

entry, it is not only necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical possession of the property
but also that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. For, if the dispossession
did not take place by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have
jurisdictions.. 5 The bare allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff has been "deprived" of the land of which he is and has been the
6
legal owner for a long period has been held to be insufficient. It is true that the mere act of a trespasser in unlawfully
entering the land, planting himself on the ground and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would imply
the use of force. In the case at bar, no such inference could be made as plaintiffs-appellants had not
claimed that they were in actual physical possession of the property prior to the entry of the Villablancas.
Moreover, it is evident that plaintiffs-appellants are not only seeking to get the possession of the property,
but as an alternative cause of action, they seek the return of the price and payment of damages by the
vendors "in case of eviction or loss of ownership" of the said property. It is, therefore, not the summary
action of forcible entry within the context of the Rules. .

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is hereby set aside, and the case remanded to the court a quo
for further proceedings. Costs against defendants-appellees. .

G.R. No. 92989 July 8, 1991

PERFECTO DY, JR. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GELAC TRADING INC., and ANTONIO V. GONZALES, respondents.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioner.
Expedito P. Bugarin for respondent GELAC Trading, Inc.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the March 23, 1990 decision of the
Court of Appeals which ruled that the petitioner's purchase of a farm tractor was not validly
consummated and ordered a complaint for its recovery dismissed.
The facts as established by the records are as follows:
The petitioner, Perfecto Dy and Wilfredo Dy are brothers. Sometime in 1979, Wilfredo Dy purchased
a truck and a farm tractor through financing extended by Libra Finance and Investment Corporation
(Libra). Both truck and tractor were mortgaged to Libra as security for the loan.
The petitioner wanted to buy the tractor from his brother so on August 20, 1979, he wrote a letter to
Libra requesting that he be allowed to purchase from Wilfredo Dy the said tractor and assume the
mortgage debt of the latter.
In a letter dated August 27, 1979, Libra thru its manager, Cipriano Ares approved the petitioner's
request.
Thus, on September 4, 1979, Wilfredo Dy executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner
over the tractor in question.
At this time, the subject tractor was in the possession of Libra Finance due to Wilfredo Dy's failure to
pay the amortizations.
Despite the offer of full payment by the petitioner to Libra for the tractor, the immediate release could
not be effected because Wilfredo Dy had obtained financing not only for said tractor but also for a
truck and Libra insisted on full payment for both.
The petitioner was able to convince his sister, Carol Dy-Seno, to purchase the truck so that full
payment could be made for both. On November 22, 1979, a PNB check was issued in the amount of
P22,000.00 in favor of Libra, thus settling in full the indebtedness of Wilfredo Dy with the financing
firm. Payment having been effected through an out-of-town check, Libra insisted that it be cleared
first before Libra could release the chattels in question.
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. R-16646 entitled "Gelac Trading, Inc. v. Wilfredo Dy", a collection case to
recover the sum of P12,269.80 was pending in another court in Cebu.
On the strength of an alias writ of execution issued on December 27, 1979, the provincial sheriff was
able to seize and levy on the tractor which was in the premises of Libra in Carmen, Cebu. The
tractor was subsequently sold at public auction where Gelac Trading was the lone bidder. Later,
Gelac sold the tractor to one of its stockholders, Antonio Gonzales.
It was only when the check was cleared on January 17, 1980 that the petitioner learned about
GELAC having already taken custody of the subject tractor. Consequently, the petitioner filed an
action to recover the subject tractor against GELAC Trading with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City.
On April 8, 1988, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, pronouncing that the plaintiff is the owner of the tractor, subject matter of
this case, and directing the defendants Gelac Trading Corporation and Antonio
Gonzales to return the same to the plaintiff herein; directing the defendants jointly
and severally to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P1,541.00 as expenses for hiring a
tractor; P50,000 for moral damages; P50,000 for exemplary damages; and to pay the
cost. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint with
costs against the petitioner. The Court of Appeals held that the tractor in question still belonged to
Wilfredo Dy when it was seized and levied by the sheriff by virtue of the alias writ of execution issued
in Civil Case No. R-16646.
The petitioner now comes to the Court raising the following questions:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING THAT OWNERSHIP OF THE FARM TRACTOR HAD ALREADY
PASSED TO HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN SAID TRACTOR WAS LEVIED ON BY
THE SHERIFF PURSUANT TO AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED IN
ANOTHER CASE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GELAC TRADING INC.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS EMBARKED ON
MERE CONJECTURE AND SURMISE IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE OF THE
AFORESAID TRACTOR TO PETITIONER WAS DONE IN FRAUD OF WILFREDO
DY'S CREDITORS, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH FRAUD AS FOUND
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SALE OF THE TRACTOR BY
RESPONDENT GELAC TRADING TO ITS CO-RESPONDENT ANTONIO V.
GONZALES ON AUGUST 2, 1980 AT WHICH TIME BOTH RESPONDENTS
ALREADY KNEW OF THE FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE WAS VIOLATIVE OF
THE HUMAN RELATIONS PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE AND RENDERED
THEM LIABLE FOR THE MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES SLAPPED
AGAINST THEM BY THE TRIAL COURT. (Rollo, p. 13)
The respondents claim that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, no constructive delivery
was effected since the consummation of the sale depended upon the clearance and encashment of
the check which was issued in payment of the subject tractor.
In the case of Servicewide Specialists Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court. (174 SCRA 80 [1989]),
we stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

The rule is settled that the chattel mortgagor continues to be the owner of the
property, and therefore, has the power to alienate the same; however, he is obliged
under pain of penal liability, to secure the written consent of the mortgagee.
(Francisco, Vicente, Jr., Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, (1972), Volume
IV-B Part 1, p. 525). Thus, the instruments of mortgage are binding, while they
subsist, not only upon the parties executing them but also upon those who later, by
purchase or otherwise, acquire the properties referred to therein.
The absence of the written consent of the mortgagee to the sale of the mortgaged
property in favor of a third person, therefore, affects not the validity of the sale but
only the penal liability of the mortgagor under the Revised Penal Code and the
binding effect of such sale on the mortgagee under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.
xxx xxx xxx
The mortgagor who gave the property as security under a chattel mortgage did not part with the
ownership over the same. He had the right to sell it although he was under the obligation to secure
the written consent of the mortgagee or he lays himself open to criminal prosecution under the
provision of Article 319 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. And even if no consent was obtained from
the mortgagee, the validity of the sale would still not be affected.
Thus, we see no reason why Wilfredo Dy, as the chattel mortgagor can not sell the subject tractor.
There is no dispute that the consent of Libra Finance was obtained in the instant case. In a letter
dated August 27, 1979, Libra allowed the petitioner to purchase the tractor and assume the
mortgage debt of his brother. The sale between the brothers was therefore valid and binding as
between them and to the mortgagee, as well.
Article 1496 of the Civil Code states that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee
from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501 or in any
other manner signing an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the
vendee. We agree with the petitioner that Articles 1498 and 1499 are applicable in the case at bar.
Article 1498 states:
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if
from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1499 provides:
Article 1499. The delivery of movable property may likewise be made by the mere
consent or agreement of the contracting parties, if the thing sold cannot be
transferred to the possession of the vendee at the time of the sale, or if the latter
already had it in his possession for any other reason. (1463a)
In the instant case, actual delivery of the subject tractor could not be made. However, there was
constructive delivery already upon the execution of the public instrument pursuant to Article 1498

and upon the consent or agreement of the parties when the thing sold cannot be immediately
transferred to the possession of the vendee. (Art. 1499)
The respondent court avers that the vendor must first have control and possession of the thing
before he could transfer ownership by constructive delivery. Here, it was Libra Finance which was in
possession of the subject tractor due to Wilfredo's failure to pay the amortization as a preliminary
step to foreclosure. As mortgagee, he has the right of foreclosure upon default by the mortgagor in
the performance of the conditions mentioned in the contract of mortgage. The law implies that the
mortgagee is entitled to possess the mortgaged property because possession is necessary in order
to enable him to have the property sold.
While it is true that Wilfredo Dy was not in actual possession and control of the subject tractor, his
right of ownership was not divested from him upon his default. Neither could it be said that Libra was
the owner of the subject tractor because the mortgagee can not become the owner of or convert and
appropriate to himself the property mortgaged. (Article 2088, Civil Code) Said property continues to
belong to the mortgagor. The only remedy given to the mortgagee is to have said property sold at
public auction and the proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the obligation secured by the
mortgagee. (See Martinez v. PNB, 93 Phil. 765, 767 [1953]) There is no showing that Libra Finance
has already foreclosed the mortgage and that it was the new owner of the subject tractor.
Undeniably, Libra gave its consent to the sale of the subject tractor to the petitioner. It was aware of
the transfer of rights to the petitioner.
Where a third person purchases the mortgaged property, he automatically steps into the shoes of
the original mortgagor. (See Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521 [1989]). His right of
ownership shall be subject to the mortgage of the thing sold to him. In the case at bar, the petitioner
was fully aware of the existing mortgage of the subject tractor to Libra. In fact, when he was
obtaining Libra's consent to the sale, he volunteered to assume the remaining balance of the
mortgage debt of Wilfredo Dy which Libra undeniably agreed to.
The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the mortgage obligation so that the
tractor could be released to the petitioner. It was never intended nor could it be considered as
payment of the purchase price because the relationship between Libra and the petitioner is not one
of sale but still a mortgage. The clearing or encashment of the check which produced the effect of
payment determined the full payment of the money obligation and the release of the chattel
mortgage. It was not determinative of the consummation of the sale. The transaction between the
brothers is distinct and apart from the transaction between Libra and the petitioner. The contention,
therefore, that the consummation of the sale depended upon the encashment of the check is
untenable.
The sale of the subject tractor was consummated upon the execution of the public instrument on
September 4, 1979. At this time constructive delivery was already effected. Hence, the subject
tractor was no longer owned by Wilfredo Dy when it was levied upon by the sheriff in December,
1979. Well settled is the rule that only properties unquestionably owned by the judgment debtor and
which are not exempt by law from execution should be levied upon or sought to be levied upon. For
the power of the court in the execution of its judgment extends only over properties belonging to the
judgment debtor. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78771, January
23, 1991).
The respondents further claim that at that time the sheriff levied on the tractor and took legal custody
thereof no one ever protested or filed a third party claim.

It is inconsequential whether a third party claim has been filed or not by the petitioner during the time
the sheriff levied on the subject tractor. A person other than the judgment debtor who claims
ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded, however, from taking other legal remedies
to prosecute his claim. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra) This is
precisely what the petitioner did when he filed the action for replevin with the RTC.
Anent the second and third issues raised, the Court accords great respect and weight to the findings
of fact of the trial court. There is no sufficient evidence to show that the sale of the tractor was in
fraud of Wilfredo and creditors. While it is true that Wilfredo and Perfecto are brothers, this fact alone
does not give rise to the presumption that the sale was fraudulent. Relationship is not a badge of
fraud (Goquiolay v. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663 [1963]). Moreover, fraud can not be presumed; it must be
established by clear convincing evidence.
We agree with the trial court's findings that the actuations of GELAC Trading were indeed violative of
the provisions on human relations. As found by the trial court, GELAC knew very well of the transfer
of the property to the petitioners on July 14, 1980 when it received summons based on the complaint
for replevin filed with the RTC by the petitioner. Notwithstanding said summons, it continued to sell
the subject tractor to one of its stockholders on August 2, 1980.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on March 23, 1990 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated April 8, 1988 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119745 June 20, 1997

POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES REYNALDO and ANGELITA R. QUIAMBAO and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is the seller's failure to eject the lessees from a lot that is the subject of a contract of sale with
assumption of mortgage a ground (1) for rescission of such contract and (2) for a return by the
mortgagee of the amortization payments made by the buyer who assumed such mortgage?
Petitioner posits an affirmative answer to such question in this petition for review on certiorari of the
March 27, 1995 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, in CA-G.R. CV Case No. 32298
upholding the validity of the contract of sale with assumption of mortgage and absolving the mortgagee
from the liability of returning the mortgage payments already made. 2

The Facts
Petitioner Power Commercial & Industrial Development Corporation, an industrial asbestos
manufacturer, needed a bigger office space and warehouse for its products. For this purpose, on

January 31, 1979, it entered into a contract of sale with the spouses Reynaldo and Angelita R.
Quiambao, herein private respondents. The contract involved a 612-sq. m. parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-6686 located at the corner of Bagtican and St. Paul Streets, San
Antonio Village, Makati City. The parties agreed that petitioner would pay private respondents
P108,000.00 as down payment, and the balance of P295,000.00 upon the execution of the deed of
transfer of the title over the property. Further, petitioner assumed, as part of the purchase price, the
existing mortgage on the land. In full satisfaction thereof, he paid P79,145.77 to Respondent
Philippine National Bank ("PNB" for brevity).
On June 1, 1979, respondent spouses mortgaged again said land to PNB to guarantee a loan of
P145,000.00, P80,000.00 of which was paid to respondent spouses. Petitioner agreed to assume
payment of the loan.
On June 26, 1979, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale With Assumption of Mortgage
which contained the following terms and conditions: 3
That for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand
Pesos (P295,000.00) Philippine Currency, to us in hand paid in cash, and which we
hereby acknowledge to be payment in full and received to our entire satisfaction, by
POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
100% Filipino Corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine
Laws with offices located at 252-C Vito Cruz Extension, we hereby by these presents
SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY by way of absolute sale the above described
property with all the improvements existing thereon unto the said Power Commercial
and Industrial Development Corporation, its successors and assigns, free from all
liens and encumbrances.
We hereby certify that the aforesaid property is not subject to nor covered by the
provisions of the Land Reform Code the same having no agricultural lessee
and/or tenant.
We hereby also warrant that we are the lawful and absolute owners of the above
described property, free from any lien and/or encumbrance, and we hereby agree
and warrant to defend its title and peaceful possession thereof in favor of the said
Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation, its successors and
assigns, against any claims whatsoever of any and all third persons; subject,
however, to the provisions hereunder provided to wit:
That the above described property is mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank,
Cubao, Branch, Quezon City for the amount of one hundred forty-five thousand
pesos, Philippine, evidenced by document No. 163, found on page No. 34 of Book
No. XV, Series of 1979 of Notary Public Herita
L. Altamirano registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasig (Makati), Rizal . . . ;
That the said Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation assumes
to pay in full the entire amount of the said mortgage above described plus interest
and bank charges, to the said mortgagee bank, thus holding the herein vendor free
from all claims by the said bank;
That both parties herein agree to seek and secure the agreement and approval of the
said Philippine National Bank to the herein sale of this property, hereby agreeing to

abide by any and all requirements of the said bank, agreeing that failure to do so
shall give to the bank first lieu (sic) over the herein described property.
On the same date, Mrs. C.D. Constantino, then General Manager of petitioner-corporation,
submitted to PNB said deed with a formal application for assumption of mortgage. 4
On February 15, 1980, PNB informed respondent spouses that, for petitioner's failure to submit the
papers necessary for approval pursuant to the former's letter dated January 15, 1980, the application
for assumption of mortgage was considered withdrawn; that the outstanding balance of P145,000.00
was deemed fully due and demandable; and that said loan was to be paid in full within fifteen (15)
days from notice. 5
Petitioner paid PNB P41,880.45 on June 24, 1980 and P20,283.14 on December 23, 1980,
payments which were to be applied to the outstanding loan. On December 23, 1980, PNB received a
letter from petitioner which reads: 6
With regard to the presence of the people who are currently in physical occupancy of
the (l)ot . . . it is our desire as buyers and new owners of this lot to make use of this
lot for our own purpose, which is why it is our desire and intention that all the people
who are currently physically present and in occupation of said lot should be removed
immediately.
For this purpose we respectfully request that . . . our assumption of mortgage be
given favorable consideration, and that the mortgage and title be transferred to our
name so that we may undertake the necessary procedures to make use of this lot
ourselves.
It was our understanding that this lot was free and clear of problems of this nature,
and that the previous owner would be responsible for the removal of the people who
were there. Inasmuch as the previous owner has not been able to keep his
commitment, it will be necessary for us to take legal possession of this lot inorder
(sic) to take physical possession.
On February 19, 1982, PNB sent petitioner a letter as follows: 7
(T)his refers to the loan granted to Mr. Reynaldo Quiambao which was assumed by
you on June 4, 1979 for P101,500.00. It was last renewed on December 24, 1980 to
mature on June 4, 1981.
A review of our records show that it has been past due from last maturity with interest
arrearages amounting to P25,826.08 as of February 19, 1982. The last payment
received by us was on December 24, 1980 for P20,283. 14. In order to place your
account in current form, we request you to remit payments to cover interest, charges,
and at least part of the principal.
On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 45217 against respondent spouses for rescission
and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 159. Then, in its reply to PNB's letter
of February 19, 1982, petitioner demanded the return of the payments it made on the ground that its
assumption of mortgage was never approved. On May 31, 1983, 8 while this case was pending, the
mortgage was foreclosed. The property was subsequently bought by PNB during the public auction.
Thus, an amended complaint was filed impleading PNB as party defendant.

On July 12, 1990, the trial court 9 ruled that the failure of respondent spouses to deliver actual
possession to petitioner entitled the latter to rescind the sale, and in view of such failure and of the denial
of the latter's assumption of mortgage, PNB was obliged to return the payments made by the latter. The
dispositive portion of said decision states: 10

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against defendants:
(1) Declaring the rescission of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
executed between plaintiff and defendants Spouses Quiambao, dated June 26,
1979;
(2) Ordering defendants Spouses Quiambao to return to plaintiff the amount of
P187,144.77 (P108,000.00 plus P79,145.77) with legal interest of 12% per
annum from date of filing of herein complaint, that is, March 17, 1982 until the same
is fully paid;
(3) Ordering defendant PNB to return to plaintiff the amount of P62,163.59
(P41,880.45 and P20,283.14) with 12% interest thereon from date of herein
judgment until the same is fully paid.
No award of other damages and attorney's fees, the same not being warranted under
the facts and circumstances of the case.
The counterclaim of both defendants spouses Quiambao and PNB are dismissed for
lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by respondent-spouses and PNB, Respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
In the assailed Decision, it held that the deed of sale between respondent spouses and petitioner did
not obligate the former to eject the lessees from the land in question as a condition of the sale, nor
was the occupation thereof by said lessees a violation of the warranty against eviction. Hence, there
was no substantial breach to justify the rescission of said contract or the return of the payments
made. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads: 11
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the complaint
filed by Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation against the
spouses Reynaldo and Angelita Quiambao and the Philippine National Bank is
DISMISSED. No costs.
Hence, the recourse to this Court.
Issues
Petitioner contends that: (1) there was a substantial breach of the contract between the parties
warranting rescission; and (2) there was a "mistake in payment" made by petitioner, obligating PNB
to return such payments. In its Memorandum, it specifically assigns the following errors of law on the
part of Respondent Court: 12

A. Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to consider in its decision

that a breach of implied warranty under Article 1547 in relation to Article 1545 of the
Civil Code applies in the case-at-bar.
B. Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to consider in its decision
that a mistake in payment giving rise to a situation where the principle of solutio
indebiti applies is obtaining in the case-at-bar.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit. It fails to appreciate the difference between a condition and a
warranty and the consequences of such distinction.
Conspicuous Absence of an Imposed Condition
The alleged "failure" of respondent spouses to eject the lessees from the lot in question and to
deliver actual and physical possession thereof cannot be considered a substantial breach of a
condition for two reasons: first, such "failure" was not stipulated as a condition whether resolutory
or suspensive in the contract; and second, its effects and consequences were not specified
either. 13
The provision adverted to by petitioner does not impose a condition or an obligation to eject the
lessees from the lot. The deed of sale provides in part: 14
We hereby also warrant that we are the lawful and absolute owners of the above
described property, free from any lien and/or encumbrance, and we hereby agree
and warrant to defend its title and peaceful possession thereof in favor of the said
Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation, its successors and
assigns, against any claims whatsoever of any and all third persons; subject,
however, to the provisions hereunder provided to wit:
By his own admission, Anthony Powers, General Manager of petitioner-corporation, did not ask the
corporation's lawyers to stipulate in the contract that Respondent Reynaldo was guaranteeing the
ejectment of the occupants, because there was already a proviso in said deed of sale that the sellers
were guaranteeing the peaceful possession by the buyer of the land in question. 15 Any obscurity in a
contract, if the above-quoted provision can be so described, must be construed against the party who
caused it. 16 Petitioner itself caused the obscurity because it omitted this alleged condition when its lawyer
drafted said contract.

If the parties intended to impose on respondent spouses the obligation to eject the tenants from the
lot sold, it should have included in the contract a provision similar to that referred to in Romero
vs. Court of Appeals, 17where the ejectment of the occupants of the lot sold by private respondent was
the operative act which set into motion the period of petitioner's compliance with his own obligation, i.e.,
to pay the balance of the purchase price. Failure to remove the squatters within the stipulated period gave
the other party the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or to waive that condition of
ejectment in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code. In the case cited, the contract specifically
stipulated that the ejectment was a condition to be fulfilled; otherwise, the obligation to pay the balance
would not arise. This is not so in the case at bar.

Absent a stipulation therefor, we cannot say that the parties intended to make its nonfulfillment a
ground for rescission. If they did intend this, their contract should have expressly stipulated so.
In Ang vs. C.A., 18 rescission was sought on the ground that the petitioners had failed to fulfill their

obligation "to remove and clear" the lot sold, the performance of which would have given rise to the
payment of the consideration by private respondent. Rescission was not allowed, however, because the
breach was not substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment by the petitioners of the obligation to sell.

As stated, the provision adverted to in the contract pertains to the usual warranty against eviction,
and not to a condition that was not met.
The terms of the contract are so clear as to leave no room for any other interpretation. 19
Furthermore, petitioner was well aware of the presence of the tenants at the time it entered into the
sales transaction. As testified to by Reynaldo, 20 petitioner's counsel during the sales negotiation even
undertook the job of ejecting the squatters. In fact, petitioner actually filed suit to eject the occupants.
Finally, petitioner in its letter to PNB of December 23, 1980 admitted that it was the "buyer(s) and new
owner(s) of this lot."

Effective Symbolic Delivery

The Court disagrees with petitioner's allegation that the respondent spouses failed to deliver the lot
sold. Petitioner asserts that the legal fiction of symbolic delivery yielded to the truth that, at the
execution of the deed of sale, transfer of possession of said lot was impossible due to the presence
of occupants on the lot sold. We find this misleading.
Although most authorities consider transfer of ownership as the primary purpose of sale, delivery
remains an indispensable requisite as our law does not admit the doctrine of transfer of property by
mere consent. 21 The Civil Code provides that delivery can either be (1) actual (Article 1497) or (2)
constructive (Articles 1498-1501). Symbolic delivery (Article 1498), as a species of constructive delivery,
effects the transfer of ownership through the execution of a public document. Its efficacy can, however,
be prevented if the vendor does not possess control over the thing sold, 22 in which case this legal fiction
must yield to reality.

The key word is control, not possession, of the land as petitioner would like us to believe. The Court
has consistently held that: 23
. . . (I)n order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is
necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that . . . its
material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the
purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed
in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold
passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic
delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through
another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality the delivery has not been
effected.
Considering that the deed of sale between the parties did not stipulate or infer otherwise, delivery
was effected through the execution of said deed. The lot sold had been placed under the control of
petitioner; thus, the filing of the ejectment suit was subsequently done. It signified that its new owner
intended to obtain for itself and to terminate said occupants' actual possession thereof. Prior physical
delivery or possession is not legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is deemed

equivalent to delivery. 24 This deed operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and
authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. Nothing more is required.

Requisites of Breach of Warranty Against Eviction

Obvious to us in the ambivalent stance of petitioner is its failure to establish any breach of the
warranty against eviction. Despite its protestation that its acquisition of the lot was to enable it to set
up a warehouse for its asbestos products and that failure to deliver actual possession thereof
defeated this purpose, still no breach of warranty against eviction can be appreciated because the
facts of the case do not show that the requisites for such breach have been satisfied. A breach of
this warranty requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
(1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold;
(2) This eviction is by a final judgment;
(3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and
(4) The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance
of the vendee.25
In the absence of these requisites, a breach of the warranty against eviction under Article
1547 cannot be declared.
Petitioner argues in its memorandum that it has not yet ejected the occupants of said lot, and not
that it has been evicted therefrom. As correctly pointed out by Respondent Court, the presence of
lessees does not constitute an encumbrance of the land, 26 nor does it deprive petitioner of its control
thereof.

We note, however, that petitioner's deprivation of ownership and control finally occurred when it
failed and/or discontinued paying the amortizations on the mortgage, causing the lot to be foreclosed
and sold at public auction. But this deprivation is due to petitioner's fault, and not to any act
attributable to the vendor-spouses.
Because petitioner failed to impugn its integrity, the contract is presumed, under the law, to be valid
and subsisting.
Absence of Mistake In Payment
Contrary to the contention of petitioner that a return of the payments it made to PNB is warranted
under Article 2154 of the Code, solutio indebiti does not apply in this case. This doctrine applies
where: (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no
duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the payment is made through
mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause. 27
In this case, petitioner was under obligation to pay the amortizations on the mortgage under the
contract of sale and the deed of real estate mortgage. Under the deed of sale (Exh. "2"), 28 both
parties agreed to abide by any and all the requirements of PNB in connection with the real estate
mortgage. Petitioner was aware that the deed of mortgage (Exh. "C") made it solidarily and, therefore,
primarily 29 liable for the mortgage obligation: 30

(e) The Mortgagor shall neither lease the mortgaged property. . . nor sell or dispose
of the same in any manner, without the written consent of the Mortgagee. However, if
not withstanding this stipulation and during the existence of this mortgage, the
property herein mortgaged, or any portion thereof, is . . . sold, it shall be the
obligation of the Mortgagor to impose as a condition of the sale, alienation or
encumbrance that the vendee, or the party in whose favor the alienation or
encumbrance is to be made, should take the property subject to the obligation of this
mortgage in the same terms and condition under which it is constituted, it being
understood that the Mortgagor is not in any manner relieved of his obligation to the
Mortgagee under this mortgage by such sale, alienation or encumbrance; on the
contrary both the vendor and the vendee, or the party in whose favor the alienation
or encumbrance is made shall be jointly and severally liable for said mortgage
obligations. . . .
Therefore, it cannot be said that it did not have a duty to pay to PNB the amortization on the
mortgage.
Also, petitioner insists that its payment of the amortization was a mistake because PNB disapproved
its assumption of mortgage after it failed to submit the necessary papers for the approval of such
assumption.
But even if petitioner was a third party in regard to the mortgage of the land purchased, the payment
of the loan by petitioner was a condition clearly imposed by the contract of sale. This fact alone
disproves petitioner's insistence that there was a "mistake" in payment. On the contrary, such
payments were necessary to protect its interest as a "the buyer(s) and new owner(s) of the lot."
The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle
that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. 31 But as shown earlier, the
payment of the mortgage was an obligation petitioner assumed under the contract of sale. There is no
unjust enrichment where the transaction, as in this case, is quid pro quo, value for value.

All told, respondent Court did not commit any reversible error which would warrant the reversal of
the assailed Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-40195 May 29, 1987

VICTORIA R. VALLARTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO
LLAMAS, Pasay City Court, respondents.
Francisco G.H. Salva for petitioner.

CORTES, J.:

The petitioner seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 13, 1974 affirming
the Trial Court's judgment convicting her of estafa. We denied the petition initially but granted a
motion for reconsideration and gave the petition due course.
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and
accused Victoria Vallarta are long time friends and business acquaintances. On November 20, 1968,
Cruz entrusted to Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry. In December of the same year, Vallarta
decided to buy some items, exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated check in the
amount of P5,000 dated January 30, 1969. Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with the bank.
However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored and Cruz was informed that Vallarta's
account had been closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give
another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for more time. Still later, she started avoiding Cruz. Hence,
this criminal action was instituted.
Based on the foregoing facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Vallarta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
WE affirm.
Petitioner is charged under Art. 315 (2) (d) as amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes any person who shall defraud another "(b)y postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check."
By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds" is
deemed prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
To constitute estafa under this provision the act of post-dating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or
simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the
offended party because of the issuance of a check whether post-dated or not. That is, the latter
would not have parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the check.
likewise, the check should not be, issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation (People v. Lilius, 59
Phil. 339 [1933]).
In seeking acquittal, petitioner stresses that the transaction between her and Cruz was a "sale or
return," perfected and consummated on November 20, 1968 when the seven pieces of jewelry were
delivered. The check issued in December 1968 was therefore in payment of a pre-existing
obligation. Thus, even if it was dishonored, petitioner claims that she can only be held civilly liable,
but not criminally liable under Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. She also argues that at any rate,
what prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry was the social standing of petitioner Vallarta and not the
postdated check.
She thus assigns as errors the finding of that Court a quo that the jewelries were entrusted on
November 20, 1968, but the sale was perfected in December 1968, and the finding that there was
deceit in the issuance of the postdated check.
In order to arrive at the proper characterization of the transaction between Vallarta and Cruz, that is,
whether it was a "sale or return" or some other transaction, it is necessary to determine the intention
of the parties.

The following excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes are significant:
I. Direct Examination of Rosalinda Cruz
Q: Now, what happened with that business transaction of yours with
Mrs. Vallarta?
A: After that and after she finally agreed to buy two sets and changed
the ruby ring with another ring, she gave me postdated check; I
waited for January 30, 1969. 1 deposited the check in the Security
Bank. And after that I knew (learned) that it was closed account
(TSN, June 29, 1972, p. 9) (Emphasis supplied).
II. Cross-Examination of Rosalinda Cruz
Q: Now, you mentioned about certain jewelries in Exh. "A. Could you
tell under your oath whether all the jewelries listed here (Exh. "A")
were taken by Mrs. Vallarta at one single instance?
A: Yes, Sir. It was on one (1) day when I entrusted them to her so she
can select what she wants (Id at p. 22) (Emphasis supplied).
III. Cross-Examination of Rosalinda Cruz
COURT: But could you still recall or you cannot recall whether you
agreed to reduce the cost to Five Thousand Eight Hundred (
P5,800.00) Pesos?
A Yes, Sir. I agreed to reduce it to Five Thousand Eight Hundred
(P5,800.00) Pesos, Sir, when I went to see her in her house to
finalize what jewelries she wanted (Id. at p. 26).
Note that Vallarta changed the ruby ring because it was not acceptable to her, and chose another
ring. Likewise, the price to be paid for the jewelry was finally agreed upon only in December 1968.
Thus, there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the object of the contract and the
consideration therefore only in December 1968, the same time that the check was issued. The
delivery made on November 20, 1968 was only for the purpose of enabling Vallarta to select what
jewelry she wanted.
Properly, then, the transaction entered into by Cruz and Vallarta was not a "sale or return." Rather, it
was a "sale on approval " (also called " sale on acceptance, " "sale on trial." or "sale on satisfaction"
[CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). In a "sale or return," the ownership passes to the buyer on delivery (CIVIL
CODE, art. 1502). (The subsequent return of the goods reverts ownership in the seller [CIVIL CODE,
art. 1502]). Delivery, or tradition. as a mode of acquiring ownership must be in consequence of a
contract (CIVIL CODE, art. 712), e.g. sale.
If there was no meeting of the minds on November 20, 1968, then, as of that date, there was yet no
contract of sale which could be the basis of delivery or tradition. Thus, the delivery made on
November 20, 1968 was not a delivery for purposes of transferring ownership the prestation
incumbent on the vendor. If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date, then it
could have been transmitted only in December 1968, the date when the check was issued. In which

case, it was a "sale on approval" since ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only when she
signified her approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed upon.
Thus, when the check which later bounced was issued, it was not in payment of a pre-existing
obligation. Instead the issuance of the check was simultaneous with the transfer of ownership over
the jewelry. But was the check issued simultaneously with the fraud?
Republic Act No. 4885, amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima
facie evidence of deceit upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds.
Admittedly, (1) the check was dishonored as Vallarta's account had been earlier closed; (2) she was
notified by Cruz of the dishonor: and, (3) Vallarta failed to make it good within three days. Deceit is
therefore presumed.
Petitioner lays stress on her being an alumna of a reputable school, on her having a husband who is
a bank manager, and on the big land-holdings of her father, and argues that it was these
qualifications and not the post-dated check which prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry (Rollo, pp.
78-79: Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 10-11). Hence, there was no deceit. It is thus suggested that
a person of petitioner's social standing cannot be guilty of deceit, at least in so far as issuing
bouncing checks is concerned. This reasoning does not merit serious consideration. If accepted, it
could result in a law that falls unequally on persons depending on their social position.
Did Cruz part with the jewelry solely because she knew Vallarta to be rich, or did she do so because
of the check issued to her? As the trial court and the Court of Appeals found, petitioner was able to
obtain the jewelry because she issued the check. Her failure to deposit the necessary amount to
cover it within three days from notice of dishonor created the prima facie presumption established by
the amendatory law, Rep. Act No. 4885, which she failed to rebut.
Petitioner, however, contends that Rep. Act No. 4885 is unconstitutional. She claims that even as
the presumption of deceit established by Rep. Act No. 4885 is stated under the guise of being prima
facie. It is in effect a conclusive presumption, because after the prosecution has proved that: (1) the
check has been dishonored; (2) notice has been given to the drawer; and, (3) three days from
notice, the check is not funded or the obligation is not paid, the accused is held guilty. Thus, it is
alleged, the constitutional presumption of innocence is violated.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the presumption of deceit under Rep. Act No. 4885 is not
conclusive. It is rebuttable. For instance, We ruled in the case of People v. Villapando (56 Phil. 31
[1931]) that good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check, as when the drawer,
foreseeing his inability to pay the check at maturity, made an arrangement with his creditor as to the
manner of payment of the debt.*
Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome
such presumption of innocence" (People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing I COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact
that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the
guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between
the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the

others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common
experience" (People v. Mingoa, supra. See also US v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 [1916]).
There can be no doubt that the "postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check," is a false pretense or a fraudulent act. It is so characterized by Art. 315 (2) (d),
Revised Penal Code. Republic Act No. 4885 does nothing more than limit the period within which the
drawer/issuer must pay the creditor.
Petitioner also argues that Rep. Act No. 4885 violates the constitutional injunction against
imprisonment for non-payment of debt. Ironically, she does not question the constitutionality of Art.
315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, which defines the crime she is being accused of, and provides for
its punishment. In fact, she concedes the constitutionality of the latter statute. She further concedes
that a person may be imprisoned for "criminal fraud" covered by Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code.
In People v. Sabio (No. L-45490, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 568), this Court ruled that Rep. Act
No. 4885 has not changed the rule established in Art. 315 (2) (d) prior to the amendment; that
Republic Act No. 4885 merely established the prima facie evidence of deceit, and eliminated the
requirement that the drawer inform the payee that he had no funds in the bank or the funds
deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. Thus, even with the
amendment introduced by Rep. Act No. 4885 it is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the
debt.
Petitioner also assigns as error the denial by the trial court of her motion for reconsideration. Her
motion was directed at the finding of the trial court that no payments were made. Alleging that a
check drawn by one Sison was given by petitioner to Cruz in payment of the rubber check, petitioner
claims that had her motion for reconsideration been granted, she would have called to the witness
stand the Branch Manager of Security Bank and Trust Company, Pasay City, where the check was
allegedly deposited by Cruz, for said bank manager to Identify the owner-holder of the savings
account to which the amount in Sison's check had been credited (Brief for Petitioner, p. 46).
Granting that the bank manager's testimony would have been as alleged by petitioner, Our decision
would remain. As correctly observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals (Court of
Appeals Decision, pp. 2-3), the payments petitioner allegedly made were not shown to have any
relevance to the obligation in question.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16394

December 17, 1966

JOSE SANTA ANA, JR. and LOURDES STO. DOMINGO, petitioners,

vs.
ROSA HERNANDEZ, respondent.

Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners..

J. T. de los Santos for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case CA-G.R. No. 20582-R, in effect
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case No. 1036.
The petitioners herein, spouses Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo, owned a 115,850square meter parcel of land situated in barrio Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3598. On 28 May 1954, they sold two (2) separate portions of the
land for P11,000.00 to the herein respondent Rosa Hernandez. These portions were described in
the deed of sale as follows:
Bahaguing nasa gawing Hilagaan. Humahanga sa Hilaga, kina Maria
Perez
, at Aurelio Perez; sa Timugan, sa lupang kasanib; sa Silanganan, kay Mariano Flores at
Emilio Ignacio; sa Kanluran, kay Cornelio Ignacio; Mayroong (12,500), m.c. humigit
kumulang.
Bahaguing nasa gawing Silanganan Humahanga sa Hilagaan, sa kay Rosa Hernandez; sa
Silanganan, kay Domingo Hernandez at Antonio Hernandez; sa Timugan, sa Sta. MariaTigbi Road; at sa Kanluran, sa lupang kasanib (Jose Sta. Ana, Jr.), mayroong (26,500)
metros cuadrados, humigit kumulang.
After the sale (there were two other previous sales to different vendees of other portions of the land),
the petitioners-spouses caused the preparation of a subdivision plan, Psd-43187, was approved on
13 January 1955 by the Director of Lands. Rosa Hernandez, however, unlike the previous vendees,
did not conform to the plan and refused to execute an agreement of subdivision and partition for
registration with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan; and she, likewise, refused to vacate the areas
that she had occupied. Instead, she caused the preparation of a different subdivision plan, which
was approved by the Director of Lands on 24 February 1955. This plan, Psd-42844, tallied with the
areas that the defendant, Rosa Hernandez, had actually occupied.
On 28 February 1955, herein petitioners-spouses filed suit against respondent Rosa Hernandez in
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, claiming that said defendant was occupying an excess of
17,000 square meters in area of what she had bought from them. Defendant Rosa Hernandez, on
the other hand, claimed that the alleged excess, was part of the areas that she bought.
The trial court observed:
The only question, therefore, to be determined by the Court is whether or not the plaintiffs
had sold two portions without clear boundaries but with exact areas (12,500 sq. m. and
26,000 sq. m.) at the rate of P.29 per square meter or, as defendant Rosa Hernandez
claimed, two portions, the areas of which were not definite but which were well defined on
the land and with definite boundaries and sold for the lump sum of P11,000.00.
Finding for the plaintiffs, the said court ordered the defendant, among other things, to vacate "the
excess portions actually occupied by her and to confine her occupation only to Lots 4-a and 4-b as
shown in the plan, Exhibit E, of the plaintiffs . . .," referring to Psd-43187.

Not satisfied with the judgment, defendant Hernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint and declared Rosa Hernandez the owner of lots 4-a
and 4-b in her plan, Psd-42844, upon the following findings:
The contract between appellees and appellant (Exhibit D) provided for the sale of two
separate portions of the same land for the single consideration of P11,000.00. Appellee Jose
Santa Ana, Jr. said the transaction was by a unit of measure or per square meter, and that
although the actual total purchase price of the two parcels of land was P11,300.00 at P0.29
per square meter the parties agreed to the sale at the reduced price of P11,000.00. The
appellant denied this claim of appellees. Gonzalo V. Ignacio, the notarial officer before the
contract of sale was executed, failed to corroborate Sta. Ana upon this point. Upon the
contrary, Ignacio testified that appellant complained to him and the appellees to the effect
that the areas stated in the contract were less than the actual areas of the parcels of land
being sold and here we quote the notarial officer's own words:
"That the area stated in the document will not be the one to prevail but the one to
prevail is the boundary of the land which you already know." (p. 74, Innocencio).
Sta. Ana is the nephew of the appellant, and the former's assurance probably appeased the
latter against insisting in the correction of the areas stated in the contract of sale.
Two witnesses testified for the appellant. Jesus Policarpio divulged that the same parcels of
land involved in this case were previously offered to him by the appellees for the single
purchase price of P12,000.00. Julio Hernandez stated that his sister, the herein appellant,
had offered P10,000.00 as against the appellees' price of P12,000.00, and that he was able
to persuade the parties to meet halfway on the price. Furthermore the previous conveyances
made by the appellees for other portions of the same property (Exhibits B and C) are also for
lump sums.
The difference in area of 17,000 square meters is about one-half of the total area of the two
parcels of land stated in the document, but not for this alone may we infer gross mistake on
the part of appellees. The appellees admit the lands in question were separated from the rest
of their property by a long and continuous "pilapil" or dike, and there is convincing proof to
show that the bigger lot (Lot 4-a) was wholly tenanted for appellees by Ciriaco Nicolas and
Santiago Castillo and the smaller lot (Lot 4-b) was wholly tenanted for said appellees by
Gregorio Gatchalian. These facts support the theory that the two parcels of land sold to the
appellant were identified by the conspicuous boundaries and the extent or area each tenant
used to till for the vendors. Again, appellees should not be heard to complain about the
deficiency in the area because as registered owners and possessors of the entire land since
1949 they can rightly be presumed to have acquired a good estimate of the value and areas
of the portions they subsequently sold.
The Court of Appeals concluded by applying to the case Article 1542 of the new Civil Code:
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit
of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be
greater or less area or number than that stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price; but
if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real
estate, its area or number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to

deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in
the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is
rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated.
and declared Rosa Hernandez the owner of the whole of lots 4-a and 4-b of her own subdivision
Plan Psd-42844, notwithstanding their increased area as compared to that specified in the deed of
sale.
In turn, the Sta. Ana spouses appealed to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, by disturbing the findings of fact of the trial court, made
upon conflicting testimonies of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, now in the petitioners, and the
defendant, now the respondent, Rosa Hernandez.
The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it held that the deed of sale,
Exhibit D, was for a lump sum, despite the fact that the boundaries given therein were not
sufficiently certain and the boundaries indicated did not clearly identify the land, thereby
erroneously deciding a question of substance in a way not in accord with law and the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
On the face of the foregoing assignments of error and the petitioners' discussions thereabout, their
position can be summarized as follows: that the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its own
findings of fact for that of the trial court's, without strong and cogent reasons for the substitution,
contrary to the rule that appellate courts shall not disturb the findings of fact of trial courts in the
absence of such strong and cogent reasons; and that Article 1542 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines does not apply, allegedly because the boundaries, as shown in the deed of sale, are not
definite.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner spouses complain against the failure of the Court of
Appeals to accept the findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance. The credibility of
witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence are matters within the exclusive authority of the
Court of Appeals, and it is not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial court. Both the
Judiciary Act (R.A. 296, section 29) and the Rules of Court (Rule 45, section 2) only allow a review
of decisions of the Court of Appeals on questions of law; and numerous decisions of this Court have
invariably and repeatedly held that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not
reviewable by the Supreme Court (Galang vs. Court of Appeals, L-17248, 29 January 1962;
Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 418, 421; and cases therein cited; Onglengco vs. Ozaeta, 70
Phil. 43; Nazareno vs. Magwagi, 71 Phil. 101). Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or
required to examine and contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. As
pointed out by former Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., Vol. 2,
p. 412), the law creating the Court of Appeals was intended mainly to take away from the Supreme
Court the work of examining the evidence, and confine its task for the determination of questions
which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.
The first assignment of error must, therefore, be overruled. We now turn to the second.

Despite the incontestable fact that the deed of sale in favor of Rosa Hernandez recites a price in a
lump sum (P11,000.00) for both lots (Annex "C", Complaint, Rec. on App., p. 21), appellants insist
that the recited area should be taken as controlling. They combat the application of Article 1542 of
the Civil Code, on the ground that the boundaries given in the deed are indefinite. They point out that
the southern boundary of the small parcel is merely given as "lupang kasanib" and that the same
occurs with the western boundary of the bigger lot, which is recited as "lupang kasanib (Jose Sta.
Ana, Jr.)". The Court of Appeals, however, found as a fact that
the two parcels of land sold to appellant (i.e., appellee herein, Rosa Hernandez) were
identified by the conspicuous boundaries. (Emphasis supplied)
consisting in a long and continuous pilapil or dike that separated the lands in question from the rest
of the property. On the basis of such findings, that can not be questioned at this stage, for reasons
already shown, it is unquestionable that the sale made was of a definite and identified tract, a corpus
certum, that obligated the vendors to deliver to the buyer all the land within the boundaries,
irrespective of whether its real area should be greater or smaller than what is recited in the deed
(Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. 490; Teran vs. Villanueva, 56 Phil. 677; Azarraga vs. Gay, 52 Phil.
599; Mondragon vs. Santos, 87 Phil. 471). And this is particularly true where, as in the case now
before this Court, the area given is qualified to be approximate only ("humigit kumulang", i.e., more
or less Rec. on App., p. 22).
To hold the buyer to no more than the area recited on the deed, it must be made clear therein that
the sale was made by unit of measure at a definite price for each unit.
If the defendant intended to buy by the meter be should have so stated in the contract
(Goyena vs. Tambunting, supra).
The ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain, in construing Article 1471 of the Spanish Civil Code
(copied verbatim in our Article 1542) is highly persuasive that as between the absence of a recital of
a given price per unit of measurement, and the specification of the total area sold, the former must
prevail and determines the applicability of the norms concerning sales for a lump sum.
La venta a cuerpo cierto indudablemente se verifica cuando en el contrato no solo no es
precisado el precio singular por unidad de medida, sino que tampoco son indicadas los
dimensiones globales bales del inmueble, pero tambien se verifica cuando aun ng habiendo
sido indicado un precio singular por unidad de medida, sin embargo es especificada la
dimension total del inmueble, en cuyo ultimo caso entre los dos indices en contraste,
constituido uno por la falta de un precio singular por unidad de medida, y otro por la
concrecion de las dimensiones globales del unmueble, la Ley da prevalencia al mero y
presume que aquella individualizacion no habia tenido para las partes valor esencial, que
solo constituia una superabundancia, y no significa que las partes hayan convenido aquel
precio global solo en cuanto el inmueble tuviese efectivamente aquellas dimensiones
totales, siendo de estimar que esta es una presuncion absoluta, contra la cual ni el
comprador ni el vendedor pueden articular prueba contraria.
Por tanto, ni el comprador ni el vendedor pueden pretender una disminucicion o,
respectivamente un suplemento de precio, cuando las dimensiones globales del unmueble
resulten despues mayores o menores de las indicadas en el contrato, aunque aduzcan que
solo en tanto han convenido el aquel precio en cuanto creian que las dimensiones de la
cosa fueran las precisadas en el contrato. (Tribunal Supreme de Espaa, Sent. de 26 Junio
1956; Rep. Jurisp. Aranzadi, 2.729) (Emphasis supplied)

The Civil Code's rule as to sales "a cuerpo cierto" was not modified by Act 496, section 58,
prohibiting the issuance of a certificate of title to a grantee of part of a registered tract until a
subdivision plan and technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, and
authorizing only the entry of a memorandum on the grantor's certificate of title in default of such plan.
The latter provision is purely a procedural directive to Registers of Deeds that does not attempt to
govern the rights of vendor and vendee inter se, that remain controlled by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. It does not even bar the registration of the contract itself to bind the land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, in its case No. 20582-R, is hereby affirmed.
Costs against the appellants, Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29972 January 26, 1976

ROSARIO CARBONELL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PONCIO, EMMA INFANTE and RAMON
INFANTE, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.
Petitioner seeks a review of the resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special Division of Five) dated
October 30, 1968, reversing its decision of November 2, 1967 (Fifth Division), and its resolution of
December 6, 1968 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the challenged resolution reads:
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration filed on behalf of appellee Emma Infante,
is hereby granted and the decision of November 2, 1967, is hereby annulled and set
aside. Another judgement shall be entered affirming in toto that of the court a
quo, dated January 20, 1965, which dismisses the plaintiff's complaint and
defendant's counterclaim.
Without costs.
The facts of the case as follows:
Prior to January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio, a native of the Batanes Islands, was the owner
of the parcel of land herein involve with improvements situated at 179 V. Agan St., San Juan, Rizal,
having an area of some one hundred ninety-five (195) square meters, more or less, covered by TCT
No. 5040 and subject to mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank for the sum of P1,500.00.
Petitioner Rosario Carbonell, a cousin and adjacent neighbor of respondent Poncio, and also from
the Batanes Islands, lived in the adjoining lot at 177 V. Agan Street.

Both petitioners Rosario Carbonell and respondent Emma Infante offered to buy the said lot from
Poncio (Poncio's Answer, p. 38, rec. on appeal).
Respondent Poncio, unable to keep up with the installments due on the mortgage, approached
petitioner one day and offered to sell to the latter the said lot, excluding the house wherein
respondent lived. Petitioner accepted the offer and proposed the price of P9.50 per square meter.
Respondent Poncio, after having secured the consent of his wife and parents, accepted the price
proposed by petitioner, on the condition that from the purchase price would come the money to be
paid to the bank.
Petitioner and respondent Jose Poncio then went to the Republic Savings Bank and secured the
consent of the President thereof for her to pay the arrears on the mortgage and to continue the
payment of the installments as they fall due. The amount in arrears reached a total sum of P247.26.
But because respondent Poncio had previously told her that the money, needed was only P200.00,
only the latter amount was brought by petitioner constraining respondent Jose Poncio to withdraw
the sum of P47.00 from his bank deposit with Republic Savings Bank. But the next day, petitioner
refunded to Poncio the sum of P47.00.
On January 27, 1955, petitioner and respondent Poncio, in the presence of a witness, made and
executed a document in the Batanes dialect, which, translated into English, reads:
CONTRACT FOR ONE HALF LOT WHICH I BOUGHT FROM
JOSE PONCIO
Beginning today January 27, 1955, Jose Poncio can start living on the lot sold by him
to me, Rosario Carbonell, until after one year during which time he will not pa
anything. Then if after said one can he could not find an place where to move his
house, he could still continue occupying the site but he should pay a rent that man,
be agreed.
(Sgd)
JOSE
PONCI
O
(Sgd.)
ROSA
RIO
CARB
ONELL
(Sgd)
CONS
TANCI
O
MEON
ADA
Witnes
s
(Pp. 6-7 rec. on appeal).

Thereafter, petitioner asked Atty. Salvador Reyes, also from the Batanes Islands, to prepare the
formal deed of sale, which she brought to respondent Poncio together with the amount of some
P400.00, the balance she still had to pay in addition to her assuming the mortgaged obligation to
Republic Savings Bank.
Upon arriving at respondent Jose Poncio's house, however, the latter told petitioner that he could not
proceed any more with the sale, because he had already given the lot to respondent Emma Infants;
and that he could not withdraw from his deal with respondent Mrs. Infante, even if he were to go to
jail. Petitioner then sought to contact respondent Mrs. Infante but the latter refused to see her.
On February 5, 1955, petitioner saw Emma Infante erecting a all around the lot with a gate.
Petitioner then consulted Atty. Jose Garcia, who advised her to present an adverse claim over the
land in question with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Atty. Garcia actually sent a letter of
inquiry to the Register of Deeds and demand letters to private respondents Jose Poncio and Emma
Infante.
In his answer to the complaint Poncio admitted "that on January 30, 1955, Mrs. Infante improved her
offer and he agreed to sell the land and its improvements to her for P3,535.00" (pp. 38-40, ROA).
In a private memorandum agreement dated January 31, 1955, respondent Poncio indeed bound
himself to sell to his corespondent Emma Infante, the property for the sum of P2,357.52, with
respondent Emma Infante still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of Republic Savings
Bank in the amount of P1,177.48. Emma Infante lives just behind the houses of Poncio and Rosario
Carbonell.
On February 2, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed the formal deed of sale in favor of
respondent Mrs. Infante in the total sum of P3,554.00 and on the same date, the latter paid Republic
Savings Bank the mortgage indebtedness of P1,500.00. The mortgage on the lot was eventually
discharged.
Informed that the sale in favor of respondent Emma Infante had not yet been registered, Atty. Garcia
prepared an adverse claim for petitioner, who signed and swore to an registered the same
on February 8, 1955.
The deed of sale in favor of respondent Mrs. Infante was registered only on February 12, 1955. As a
consequence thereof, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to her but with the annotation of the
adverse claim of petitioner Rosario Carbonell.
Respondent Emma Infante took immediate possession of the lot involved, covered the same with
500 cubic meters of garden soil and built therein a wall and gate, spending the sum of P1,500.00.
She further contracted the services of an architect to build a house; but the construction of the same
started only in 1959 years after the litigation actually began and during its pendency. Respondent
Mrs. Infante spent for the house the total amount of P11,929.00.
On June 1, 1955, petitioner Rosario Carbonell, thru counsel, filed a second amended complaint
against private respondents, praying that she be declared the lawful owner of the questioned parcel
of land; that the subsequent sale to respondents Ramon R. Infante and Emma L. Infante be declared
null and void, and that respondent Jose Poncio be ordered to execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance of said land in her favor and for damages and attorney's fees (pp. 1-7, rec. on appeal in
the C.A.).

Respondents first moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that petitioner's
claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, the alleged sale in her favor not being evidenced
by a written document (pp. 7-13, rec. on appeal in the C.A.); and when said motion was denied
without prejudice to passing on the question raised therein when the case would be tried on the
merits (p. 17, ROA in the C.A.), respondents filed separate answers, reiterating the grounds of their
motion to dismiss (pp. 18-23, ROA in the C.A.).
During the trial, when petitioner started presenting evidence of the sale of the land in question to her
by respondent Poncio, part of which evidence was the agreement written in the Batanes dialect
aforementioned, respondent Infantes objected to the presentation by petitioner of parole evidence to
prove the alleged sale between her and respondent Poncio. In its order of April 26, 1966, the trial
court sustained the objection and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the memorandum
presented by petitioner to prove said sale does not satisfy the requirements of the law (pp. 31-35,
ROA in the C.A.).
From the above order of dismissal, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-11231)
which ruled in a decision dated May 12, 1958, that the Statute of Frauds, being applicable only to
executory contracts, does not apply to the alleged sale between petitioner and respondent Poncio,
which petitioner claimed to have been partially performed, so that petitioner is entitled to establish by
parole evidence "the truth of this allegation, as well as the contract itself." The order appealed from
was thus reversed, and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings (pp. 26-49,
ROA in the C.A.).
After trial in the court a quo; a decision was, rendered on December 5, 1962, declaring the second
sale by respondent Jose Poncio to his co-respondents Ramon Infante and Emma Infante of the land
in question null and void and ordering respondent Poncio to execute the proper deed of conveyance
of said land in favor of petitioner after compliance by the latter of her covenants under her
agreement with respondent Poncio (pp. 5056, ROA in the C.A.).
On January 23, 1963, respondent Infantes, through another counsel, filed a motion for re-trial to
adduce evidence for the proper implementation of the court's decision in case it would be affirmed
on appeal (pp. 56-60, ROA in the C.A.), which motion was opposed by petitioner for being premature
(pp. 61-64, ROA in the C.A.). Before their motion for re-trial could be resolved, respondent Infantes,
this time through their former counsel, filed another motion for new trial, claiming that the decision of
the trial court is contrary to the evidence and the law (pp. 64-78, ROA in the C.A.), which motion was
also opposed by petitioner (pp. 78-89, ROA in the C.A.).
The trial court granted a new trial (pp. 89-90, ROA in the C.A.), at which re-hearing only the
respondents introduced additional evidence consisting principally of the cost of improvements they
introduced on the land in question (p. 9, ROA in the C.A.).
After the re-hearing, the trial court rendered a decision, reversing its decision of December 5, 1962
on the ground that the claim of the respondents was superior to the claim of petitioner, and
dismissing the complaint (pp. 91-95, ROA in the C.A.), From this decision, petitioner Rosario
Carbonell appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals (p. 96, ROA in the C.A.).
On November 2, 1967, the Court of Appeals (Fifth Division composed of Justices Magno Gatmaitan,
Salvador V. Esguerra and Angle H. Mojica, speaking through Justice Magno Gatmaitan), rendered
judgment reversing the decision of the trial court, declaring petitioner therein, to have a superior right
to the land in question, and condemning the defendant Infantes to reconvey to petitioner after her
reimbursement to them of the sum of P3,000.00 plus legal interest, the land in question and all its
improvements (Appendix "A" of Petition).

Respondent Infantes sought reconsideration of said decision and acting on the motion for
reconsideration, the Appellate Court, three Justices (Villamor, Esguerra and Nolasco) of Special
Division of Five, granted said motion, annulled and set aside its decision of November 2, 1967, and
entered another judgment affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo, with Justices Gatmaitan
and Rodriguez dissenting (Appendix "B" of Petition).
Petitioner Rosario Carbonell moved to reconsider the Resolution of the Special Division of Five,
which motion was denied by Minute Resolution of December 6, 1968 (but with Justices Rodriguez
and Gatmaitan voting for reconsideration) [Appendix "C" of Petition].
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Article 1544, New Civil Code, which is decisive of this case, recites:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry
of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith (emphasis supplied).
It is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the
protection of the second paragraph of said Article 1544.
Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who
first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that
ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first
recorded" his right. Under the first and third paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of
anterior registration (DBP vs. Mangawang, et al., 11 SCRA 405; Soriano, et al. vs. Magale, et al., 8
SCRA 489).
If there is no inscription, what is decisive is prior possession in good faith. If there is inscription, as in
the case at bar, prior registration in good faith is a pre-condition to superior title.
When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof
and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated
thereon. Carbonell was not aware and she could not have been aware of any sale of Infante as
there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in
good faith. Her good faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded her adverse claim
four (4) days prior to the registration of Infantes's deed of sale. Carbonell's good faith did not cease
after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Because of
that information, Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire underscores Carbonell's
good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good breeding of a good Christian and good
neighbor, Infante snubbed Carbonell like a leper and refused to see her. So Carbonell did the next

best thing to protect her right she registered her adversed claim on February 8, 1955. Under the
circumstances, this recording of her adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good
faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when she registered her deed of sale four (4) days
later on February 12, 1955.
Bad faith arising from previous knowledge by Infante of the prior sale to Carbonell is shown by the
following facts, the vital significance and evidenciary effect of which the respondent Court of Appeals
either overlooked of failed to appreciate:
(1) Mrs. Infante refused to see Carbonell, who wanted to see Infante after she was informed by
Poncio that he sold the lot to Infante but several days before Infante registered her deed of sale.
This indicates that Infante knew from Poncio and from the bank of the prior sale of the lot by
Poncio to Carbonell. Ordinarily, one will not refuse to see a neighbor. Infante lives just behind the
house of Carbonell. Her refusal to talk to Carbonell could only mean that she did not want to listen to
Carbonell's story that she (Carbonell) had previously bought the lot from Poncio.
(2) Carbonell was already in possession of the mortgage passbook [not Poncio's saving deposit
passbook Exhibit "1" Infantes] and Poncio's copy of the mortgage contract, when Poncio sold
the lot Carbonell who, after paying the arrearages of Poncio, assumed the balance of his mortgaged
indebtedness to the bank, which in the normal course of business must have necessarily informed
Infante about the said assumption by Carbonell of the mortgage indebtedness of Poncio. Before or
upon paying in full the mortgage indebtedness of Poncio to the Bank. Infante naturally must have
demanded from Poncio the delivery to her of his mortgage passbook as well as Poncio's mortgage
contract so that the fact of full payment of his bank mortgage will be entered therein; and Poncio, as
well as the bank, must have inevitably informed her that said mortgage passbook could not be given
to her because it was already delivered to Carbonell.
If Poncio was still in possession of the mortgage passbook and his copy of the mortgage contract at
the time he executed a deed of sale in favor of the Infantes and when the Infantes redeemed his
mortgage indebtedness from the bank, Poncio would have surrendered his mortgage passbook and
his copy of the mortgage contract to the Infantes, who could have presented the same as exhibits
during the trial, in much the same way that the Infantes were able to present as evidence Exhibit "1"
Infantes, Poncio's savings deposit passbook, of which Poncio necessarily remained in possession
as the said deposit passbook was never involved in the contract of sale with assumption of
mortgage. Said savings deposit passbook merely proves that Poncio had to withdraw P47.26, which
amount was tided to the sum of P200.00 paid by Carbonell for Poncio's amortization arrearages in
favor of the bank on January 27, 1955; because Carbonell on that day brought with her only
P200.00, as Poncio told her that was the amount of his arrearages to the bank. But the next day
Carbonell refunded to Poncio the sum of P47.26.
(3) The fact that Poncio was no longer in possession of his mortgage passbook and that the said
mortgage passbook was already in possession of Carbonell, should have compelled Infante to
inquire from Poncio why he was no longer in possession of the mortgage passbook and from
Carbonell why she was in possession of the same (Paglago, et. al vs. Jara et al 22 SCRA 1247,
1252-1253). The only plausible and logical reason why Infante did not bother anymore to make such
injury , w because in the ordinary course of business the bank must have told her that Poncio
already sold the lot to Carbonell who thereby assumed the mortgage indebtedness of Poncio and to
whom Poncio delivered his mortgage passbook. Hoping to give a semblance of truth to her
pretended good faith, Infante snubbed Carbonell's request to talk to her about the prior sale to her b
Poncio of the lot. As aforestated, this is not the attitude expected of a good neighbor imbued with
Christian charity and good will as well as a clear conscience.

(4) Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 her adverse claim, which was accordingly annotated
on Poncio's title, four [4] days before Infante registered on February 12, 1955 her deed of sale
executed on February 2, 1955. Here she was again on notice of the prior sale to Carbonell. Such
registration of adverse claim is valid and effective (Jovellanos vs. Dimalanta, L-11736-37, Jan. 30,
1959, 105 Phil. 1250-51).
(5) In his answer to the complaint filed by Poncio, as defendant in the Court of First Instance, he
alleged that both Mrs. Infante and Mrs. Carbonell offered to buy the lot at P15.00 per square meter,
which offers he rejected as he believed that his lot is worth at least P20.00 per square meter. It is
therefore logical to presume that Infante was told by Poncio and consequently knew of the offer of
Carbonell which fact likewise should have put her on her guard and should have compelled her to
inquire from Poncio whether or not he had already sold the property to Carbonell.
As recounted by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, then Associate Justice, in the preceding case of
Rosario Carbonell vs. Jose Poncio, Ramon Infante and Emma Infante (1-11231, May 12, 1958),
Poncio alleged in his answer:
... that he had consistently turned down several offers, made by plaintiff, to buy the
land in question, at P15 a square meter, for he believes that it is worth not less than
P20 a square meter; that Mrs. Infante, likewise, tried to buy the land at P15 a square
meter; that, on or about January 27, 1955, Poncio was advised by plaintiff that
should she decide to buy the property at P20 a square meter, she would allow him to
remain in the property for one year; that plaintiff then induced Poncio to sign a
document, copy of which if probably the one appended to the second amended
complaint; that Poncio signed it 'relying upon the statement of the plaintiff that the
document was a permit for him to remain in the premises in the event defendant
decided to sell the property to the plaintiff at P20.00 a square meter'; that on January
30, 1955, Mrs. Infante improved her offer and agreed to sell the land and its
improvement to her for P3,535.00; that Poncio has not lost 'his mind,' to sell his
property, worth at least P4,000, for the paltry sum P1,177.48, the amount of his
obligation to the Republic Saving s Bank; and that plaintiff's action is barred by the
Statute of Frauds. ... (pp. 38-40, ROA, emphasis supplied).
II
EXISTENCE OF THE PRIOR SALE TO CARBONELL
DULY ESTABLISHED
(1) In his order dated April 26, 1956 dismissing the complaint on the ground that the private
document Exhibit "A" executed by Poncio and Carbonell and witnessed by Constancio Meonada
captioned "Contract for One-half Lot which I Bought from Jose Poncio," was not such a
memorandum in writing within the purview of the Statute of Frauds, the trial judge himself recognized
the fact of the prior sale to Carbonell when he stated that "the memorandum in question merely
states that Poncio is allowed to stay in the property which he had sold to the plaintiff. There is no
mention of the reconsideration, a description of the property and such other essential elements of
the contract of sale. There is nothing in the memorandum which would tend to show even in the
slightest manner that it was intended to be an evidence of contract sale. On the contrary, from the
terms of the memorandum, it tends to show that the sale of the property in favor of the plaintiff is
already an accomplished act.By the very contents of the memorandum itself, it cannot therefore, be
considered to be the memorandum which would show that a sale has been made by Poncio in favor
of the plaintiff" (p. 33, ROA, emphasis supplied). As found by the trial court, to repeat the said
memorandum states "that Poncio is allowed to stay in the property which he had sold to the plaintiff

..., it tends to show that the sale of the property in favor of the plaintiff is already an accomplished
act..."
(2) When the said order was appealed to the Supreme Court by Carbonell in the previous case of
Rosario Carbonell vs. Jose Poncio, Ramon Infante and Emma Infante
(L-11231, supra), Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, then Associate Justice, speaking for a
unanimous Court, reversed the aforesaid order of the trial court dismissing the complaint, holding
that because the complaint alleges and the plaintiff claims that the contract of sale was partly
performed, the same is removed from the application of the Statute of Frauds and Carbonell should
be allowed to establish by parol evidence the truth of her allegation of partial performance of the
contract of sale, and further stated:
Apart from the foregoing, there are in the case at bar several circumstances
indicating that plaintiff's claim might not be entirely devoid of factual basis. Thus, for
instance, Poncio admitted in his answer that plaintiff had offered several times to
purchase his land.
Again, there is Exhibit A, a document signed by the defendant. It is in the Batanes
dialect, which, according to plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence, is the one spoken by
Poncio, he being a native of said region. Exhibit A states that Poncio would stay in
the land sold by him to plaintiff for one year, from January 27, 1955, free of charge,
and that, if he cannot find a place where to transfer his house thereon, he may
remain upon. Incidentally, the allegation in Poncio's answer to the effect that he
signed Exhibit A under the belief that it "was a permit for him to remain in the
premises in the" that "he decided to sell the property" to the plaintiff at P20 a sq. m."
is, on its face, somewhat difficult to believe. Indeed, if he had not decided as yet to
sell the land to plaintiff, who had never increased her offer of P15 a square meter,
there was no reason for Poncio to get said permit from her. Upon the other hand, if
plaintiff intended to mislead Poncio, she would have caused Exhibit A to be drafted,
probably, in English , instead of taking the trouble of seeing to it that it was written
precisely in his native dialect, the Batanes. Moreover, Poncio's signature on Exhibit A
suggests that he is neither illiterate nor so ignorant as to sign document without
reading its contents, apart from the fact that Meonada had read Exhibit A to him and
given him a copy thereof, before he signed thereon, according to Meonada's
uncontradicted testimony.
Then, also, defendants say in their brief:
The only allegation in plaintiff's complaint that bears any relation to
her claim that there has been partial performance of the supposed
contract of sale, is the notation of the sum of P247.26 in the bank
book of defendant Jose Poncio. The noting or jotting down of the sum
of P247.26 in the bank book of Jose Poncio does not prove the fact
that the said amount was the purchase price of the property in
question. For all we knew, the sum of P247.26 which plaintiff claims
to have paid to the Republic Savings Bank for the account of the
defendant, assuming that the money paid to the Republic Savings
Bank came from the plaintiff, was the result of some usurious loan or
accomodation, rather than earnest money or part payment of the
land. Neither is it competent or satisfactory evidence to prove the
conveyance of the land in question the fact that the bank book

account of Jose Poncio happens to be in the possession of the

plaintiff. (Defendants-Appellees' brief, pp. 25-26).
How shall We know why Poncio's bank deposit book is in plaintiffs possession, or
whether there is any relation between the P247.26 entry therein and the partial
payment of P247.26 allegedly made by plaintiff to Poncio on account of the price of
his land, if we do not allow the plaintiff to explain it on the witness stand? Without
expressing any opinion on the merits of plaintiff's claim, it is clear, therefore, that she
is entitled , legally as well as from the viewpoint of equity, to an opportunity to
introduce parol evidence in support of the allegations of her second amended
complaint. (pp. 46-49, ROA, emphasis supplied).
(3) In his first decision of December 5, 1962 declaring null and void the sale in favor of the Infantes
and ordering Poncio to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of Carbonell, the trial judge found:
... A careful consideration of the contents of Exh. 'A' show to the satisfaction of the
court that the sale of the parcel of land in question by the defendant Poncio in favor
of the plaintiff was covered therein and that the said Exh. "a' was also executed to
allow the defendant to continue staying in the premises for the stated period. It will be
noted that Exh. 'A' refers to a lot 'sold by him to me' and having been written
originally in a dialect well understood by the defendant Poncio, he signed the said
Exh. 'A' with a full knowledge and consciousness of the terms and consequences
thereof. This therefore, corroborates the testimony of the plaintiff Carbonell that the
sale of the land was made by Poncio. It is further pointed out that there was a partial
performance of the verbal sale executed by Poncio in favor of the plaintiff, when the
latter paid P247.26 to the Republic Savings Bank on account of Poncio's mortgage
indebtedness. Finally, the possession by the plaintiff of the defendant Poncio's
passbook of the Republic Savings Bank also adds credibility to her testimony. The
defendant contends on the other hand that the testimony of the plaintiff, as well as
her witnesses, regarding the sale of the land made by Poncio in favor of the plaintiff
is inadmissible under the provision of the Statute of Fraud based on the argument
that the note Exh. "A" is not the note or memorandum referred to in the to in the
Statute of Fraud. The defendants argue that Exh. "A" fails to comply with the
requirements of the Statute of Fraud to qualify it as the note or memorandum
referred to therein and open the way for the presentation of parole evidence to prove
the fact contained in the note or memorandum. The defendant argues that there is
even no description of the lot referred to in the note, especially when the note refers
to only one half lot. With respect to the latter argument of the Exhibit 'A', the court
has arrived at the conclusion that there is a sufficient description of the lot referred to
in Exh. 'A' as none other than the parcel of land occupied by the defendant Poncio
and where he has his improvements erected. The Identity of the parcel of land
involved herein is sufficiently established by the contents of the note Exh. "A". For a
while, this court had that similar impression but after a more and thorough
consideration of the context in Exh. 'A' and for the reasons stated above, the Court
has arrived at the conclusion stated earlier (pp. 52-54, ROA, emphasis supplied).
(4) After re-trial on motion of the Infantes, the trial Judge rendered on January 20, 1965 another
decision dismissing the complaint, although he found
1. That on January 27, 1955, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant Poncio a
parcel of land with an area of 195 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No.

5040 of the Province of Rizal, located at San Juan del Monte, Rizal, for the price of
P6.50 per square meter;
2. That the purchase made by the plaintiff was not reduced to writing except for a
short note or memorandum Exh. A, which also recited that the defendant Poncio
would be allowed to continue his stay in the premises, among other things, ... (pp.
91-92, ROA, emphasis supplied).
From such factual findings, the trial Judge confirms the due execution of Exhibit "A", only that his
legal conclusion is that it is not sufficient to transfer ownership (pp. 93-94, ROA).
(5) In the first decision of November 2, 1967 of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals composed
of Justices Esguerra (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), Gatmaitan and Mojica, penned
by Justice Gatmaitan, the Court of Appeals found that:
... the testimony of Rosario Carbonell not having at all been attempted to be
disproved by defendants, particularly Jose Poncio, and corroborated as it is by the
private document in Batanes dialect, Exhibit A, the testimony being to the effect that
between herself and Jose there had been celebrated a sale of the property excluding
the house for the price of P9.50 per square meter, so much so that on faith of that,
Rosario had advanced the sum of P247.26 and binding herself to pay unto Jose the
balance of the purchase price after deducting the indebtedness to the Bank and
since the wording of Exhibit A, the private document goes so far as to describe their
transaction as one of sale, already consummated between them, note the part tense
used in the phrase, "the lot sold by him to me" and going so far even as to state that
from that day onwards, vendor would continue to live therein, for one year, 'during
which time he will not pay anything' this can only mean that between Rosario and
Jose, there had been a true contract of sale, consummated by delivery constitutum
possession, Art. 1500, New Civil Code; vendor's possession having become
converted from then on, as a mere tenant of vendee, with the special privilege of not
paying rental for one year, it is true that the sale by Jose Poncio to Rosario
Carbonell corroborated documentarily only by Exhibit A could not have been
registered at all, but it was a valid contract nonetheless, since under our law, a
contract sale is consensual, perfected by mere consent, Couto v. Cortes, 8 Phil 459,
so much so that under the New Civil Code, while a sale of an immovable is ordered
to be reduced to a public document, Art. 1358, that mandate does not render an oral
sale of realty invalid, but merely incapable of proof, where still executory and action
is brought and resisted for its performance, 1403, par. 2, 3; but where already wholly
or partly executed or where even if not yet, it is evidenced by a memorandum, in any
case where evidence to further demonstrate is presented and admitted as the case
was here, then the oral sale becomes perfectly good, and becomes a good cause of
action not only to reduce it to the form of a public document, but even to enforce the
contract in its entirety, Art. 1357; and thus it is that what we now have is a case
wherein on the one hand Rosario Carbonell has proved that she had an anterior
sale, celebrated in her favor on 27 January, 1955, Exhibit A,annotated as an adverse
claim on 8 February, 1955, and on other, a sale is due form in favor of Emma L.
Infante on 2 February, 1955, Exhibit 3-Infante, and registered in due form with title
unto her issued on 12 February, 1955; the vital question must now come on which of
these two sales should prevail; ... (pp. 74-76, rec., emphasis supplied).
(6) In the resolution dated October 30, 1968 penned by then Court of Appeals Justice Esguerra (now
a member of this Court), concurred in by Justices Villamor and Nolasco, constituting the majority of a

Special Division of Five, the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the Infantes, while reversing the
decision of November 2, 1967 and affirming the decision of the trial court of January 20, 1965
dismissing plaintiff's complaint, admitted the existence and genuineness of Exhibit "A", the private
memorandum dated January 27, 1955, although it did not consider the same as satisfying "the
essential elements of a contract of sale," because it "neither specifically describes the property and
its boundaries, nor mention its certificate of title number, nor states the price certain to be paid, or
contrary to the express mandate of Articles 1458 and 1475 of the Civil Code.
(7) In his dissent concurred in by Justice Rodriguez, Justice Gatmaitan maintains his decision of
November 2, 1967 as well as his findings of facts therein, and reiterated that the private
memorandum Exhibit "A", is a perfected sale, as a sale is consensual and consummated by mere
consent, and is binding on and effective between the parties. This statement of the principle is
correct [pp. 89-92, rec.].
III
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OR PRICE FOR THE SALE
IN FAVOR OF CARBONELL
It should be emphasized that the mortgage on the lot was about to be foreclosed by the bank for
failure on the part of Poncio to pay the amortizations thereon. To forestall the foreclosure and at the
same time to realize some money from his mortgaged lot, Poncio agreed to sell the same to
Carbonell at P9.50 per square meter, on condition that Carbonell [1] should pay (a) the amount of
P400.00 to Poncio and 9b) the arrears in the amount of P247.26 to the bank; and [2] should assume
his mortgage indebtedness. The bank president agreed to the said sale with assumption of
mortgage in favor of Carbonell an Carbonell accordingly paid the arrears of P247.26. On January 27,
1955, she paid the amount of P200.00 to the bank because that was the amount that Poncio told her
as his arrearages and Poncio advanced the sum of P47.26, which amount was refunded to him by
Carbonell the following day. This conveyance was confirmed that same day, January 27, 1955, by
the private document, Exhibit "A", which was prepared in the Batanes dialect by the witness
Constancio Meonada, who is also from Batanes like Poncio and Carbonell.
The sale did not include Poncio's house on the lot. And Poncio was given the right to continue
staying on the land without paying any rental for one year, after which he should pay rent if he could
not still find a place to transfer his house. All these terms are part of the consideration of the sale to
Carbonell.
It is evident therefore that there was ample consideration, and not merely the sum of P200.00, for
the sale of Poncio to Carbonell of the lot in question.
But Poncio, induced by the higher price offered to him by Infante, reneged on his commitment to
Carbonell and told Carbonell, who confronted him about it, that he would not withdraw from his deal
with Infante even if he is sent to jail The victim, therefore, "of injustice and outrage is the widow
Carbonell and not the Infantes, who without moral compunction exploited the greed and treacherous
nature of Poncio, who, for love of money and without remorse of conscience, dishonored his own
plighted word to Carbonell, his own cousin.
Inevitably evident therefore from the foregoing discussion, is the bad faith of Emma Infante from the
time she enticed Poncio to dishonor his contract with Carbonell, and instead to sell the lot to her
(Infante) by offering Poncio a much higher price than the price for which he sold the same to
Carbonell. Being guilty of bad faith, both in taking physical possession of the lot and in recording
their deed of sale, the Infantes cannot recover the value of the improvements they introduced in the

lot. And after the filing by Carbonell of the complaint in June, 1955, the Infantes had less justification
to erect a building thereon since their title to said lot is seriously disputed by Carbonell on the basis
of a prior sale to her.
With respect to the claim of Poncio that he signed the document Exhibit "A" under the belief that it
was a permit for him to remain in the premises in ease he decides to sell the property to Carbonell at
P20.00 per square meter, the observation of the Supreme Court through Mr. Chief Justice
Concepcion in G.R. No. L-11231, supra, bears repeating:
... Incidentally, the allegation in Poncio's answer to the effect that he signed Exhibit A
under the belief that it 'was a permit for him to remain in the premises in the event
that 'he decided to sell the property' to the plaintiff at P20.00 a sq. m is, on its face,
somewhat difficult to believe. Indeed, if he had not decided as yet to sell that land to
plaintiff, who had never increased her offer of P15 a square meter, there as no
reason for Poncio to get said permit from her. Upon the they if plaintiff intended to
mislead Poncio, she would have Exhibit A to be drafted, probably, in English, instead
of taking the trouble of seeing to it that it was written precisely in his native dialect,
the Batanes. Moreover, Poncio's signature on Exhibit A suggests that he is neither
illiterate nor so ignorant as to sign a document without reading its contents, apart
from the fact that Meonada had read Exhibit A to him-and given him a copy thereof,
before he signed thereon, according to Meonada's uncontradicted testimony. (pp. 4647, ROA).
As stressed by Justice Gatmaitan in his first decision of November 2, 1965, which he reiterated in his
dissent from the resolution of the majority of the Special Division. of Five on October 30, 1968,
Exhibit A, the private document in the Batanes dialect, is a valid contract of sale between the parties,
since sale is a consensual contract and is perfected by mere consent (Couto vs. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459).
Even an oral contract of realty is all between the parties and accords to the vendee the right to
compel the vendor to execute the proper public document As a matter of fact, Exhibit A, while merely
a private document, can be fully or partially performed, to it from the operation of the statute of
frauds. Being a all consensual contract, Exhibit A effectively transferred the possession of the lot to
the vendee Carbonell by constitutum possessorium (Article 1500, New Civil Code); because
thereunder the vendor Poncio continued to retain physical possession of the lot as tenant of the
vendee and no longer as knew thereof. More than just the signing of Exhibit A by Poncio and
Carbonell with Constancio Meonada as witness to fact the contract of sale, the transition was further
confirmed when Poncio agreed to the actual payment by at Carbonell of his mortgage arrearages to
the bank on January 27, 1955 and by his consequent delivery of his own mortgage passbook to
Carbonell. If he remained owner and mortgagor, Poncio would not have surrendered his mortgage
passbook to' Carbonell.
IV
IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DISPUTED LOT IN THE MEMORANDUM EXHIBIT
"A"
The claim that the memorandum Exhibit "A" does not sufficiently describe the disputed lot as the
subject matter of the sale, was correctly disposed of in the first decision of the trial court of
December 5, 1962, thus: "The defendant argues that there is even no description of the lot referred
to in the note (or memorandum), especially when the note refers to only one-half lot. With respect to
the latter argument of the defendant, plaintiff points out that one- half lot was mentioned in Exhibit 'A'
because the original description carried in the title states that it was formerly part of a bigger lot and
only segregated later. The explanation is tenable, in (sic) considering the time value of the contents

of Exh. 'A', the court has arrived at the conclusion that there is sufficient description of the lot
referred to in Exh. As none other than the parcel of lot occupied by the defendant Poncio and where
he has his improvements erected. The Identity of the parcel of land involved herein is sufficiently
established by the contents of the note Exh. 'A'. For a while, this court had that similar impression
but after a more and through consideration of the context in Exh. 'A' and for the reasons stated
above, the court has arrived to (sic) the conclusion stated earlier" (pp. 53-54, ROA).
Moreover, it is not shown that Poncio owns another parcel with the same area, adjacent to the lot of
his cousin Carbonell and likewise mortgaged by him to the Republic Savings Bank. The transaction
therefore between Poncio and Carbonell can only refer and does refer to the lot involved herein. If
Poncio had another lot to remove his house, Exhibit A would not have stipulated to allow him to stay
in the sold lot without paying any rent for one year and thereafter to pay rental in case he cannot find
another place to transfer his house.
While petitioner Carbonell has the superior title to the lot, she must however refund to respondents
Infantes the amount of P1,500.00, which the Infantes paid to the Republic Savings Bank to redeem
the mortgage.
It appearing that the Infantes are possessors in bad faith, their rights to the improvements they
introduced op the disputed lot are governed by Articles 546 and 547 of the New Civil Code. Their
expenses consisting of P1,500.00 for draining the property, filling it with 500 cubic meters of garden
soil, building a wall around it and installing a gate and P11,929.00 for erecting a b ' bungalow
thereon, are useful expenditures, for they add to the value of the property (Aringo vs. Arenas, 14
Phil. 263; Alburo vs. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277; Valencia vs. Ayala de Roxas, 13 Phil. 45).
Under the second paragraph of Article 546, the possessor in good faith can retain the useful
improvements unless the person who defeated him in his possession refunds him the amount of
such useful expenses or pay him the increased value the land may have acquired by reason thereof.
Under Article 547, the possessor in good faith has also the right to remove the useful improvements
if such removal can be done without damage to the land, unless the person with the superior right
elects to pay for the useful improvements or reimburse the expenses therefor under paragraph 2 of
Article 546. These provisions seem to imply that the possessor in bad faith has neither the right of
retention of useful improvements nor the right to a refund for useful expenses.
But, if the lawful possessor can retain the improvements introduced by the possessor in bad faith for
pure luxury or mere pleasure only by paying the value thereof at the time he enters into possession
(Article 549 NCC), as a matter of equity, the Infantes, although possessors in bad faith, should be
allowed to remove the aforesaid improvements, unless petitioner Carbonell chooses to pay for their
value at the time the Infantes introduced said useful improvements in 1955 and 1959. The Infantes
cannot claim reimbursement for the current value of the said useful improvements; because they
have been enjoying such improvements for about two decades without paying any rent on the land
and during which period herein petitioner Carbonell was deprived of its possession and use.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL DIVISION OF FIVE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF OCTOBER 30, 1968 IS HEREBY REVERSED; PETITIONER ROSARIO
CARBONELL IS HEREBY DECLARED TO HAVE THE SUPERIOR RIGHT TO THE LAND IN
QUESTION AND IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO REIMBURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
INFANTES THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00) WITHIN THREE
(3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO CANCEL TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 37842
ISSUED IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS INFANTES COVERING THE DISPUTED LOT,
WHICH CANCELLED TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5040 IN THE NAME OF JOSE

PONCIO, AND TO ISSUE A NEW TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN FAVOR OF

PETITIONER ROSARIO CARBONELL UPON PRESENTATION OF PROOF OF PAYMENT BY
HER TO THE INFANTES OF THE AFORESAID AMOUNT OF ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P1,500.00).
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS INFANTES MAY REMOVE THEIR AFOREMENTIONED USEFUL
IMPROVEMENTS FROM THE LOT WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS
DECISION, UNLESS THE PETITIONER ROSARIO CARBONELL ELECTS TO ACQUIRE THE
SAME AND PAYS THE INFANTES THE AMOUNT OF THIRTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY-NINE PESOS (P13,429.00) WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF
THIS DECISION. SHOULD PETITIONER CARBONELL FAIL TO PAY THE SAID AMOUNT WITHIN
THE AFORESTATED PERIOD OF THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS
DECISION, THE PERIOD OF THREE (3) MONTHS WITHIN WHICH THE RESPONDENTS
INFANTES MAY REMOVE THEIR AFOREMENTIONED USEFUL IMPROVEMENTS SHALL
COMMENCE FROM THE EXPIRATION OF THE THREE (3) MONTHS GIVEN PETITIONER
CARBONELL TO PAY FOR THE SAID USEFUL IMPROVEMENTS.
WITH COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
Castro, C.J, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2397

August 9, 1950

TOMASA QUIMSON and MARCOS SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO ROSETE, respondent.
Marcelino Lontok for petitioners.
Ignacio Mangosing for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales. The case involves s dispute over a parcel of land sold to two
different persons.
The Facts as found by the Court of Appeals are these:
Esta finca pertenecia originalmente al hoy difunto Dionisio Quimson, quien, en 7 de junio de
1932, otorgo la escritura Exhibit A de trespaso de la misma a favor de su hija Tomasa
Quimson, pero continuo en su posesion y goce. La vendio a los esposos Magno Agustin y
Paulina Manzano en 3 de Mayo de 1935, con pacto de recomprar dentro del plazo de seis
aos; y dos aos escasos despues, en 5 de abril de 1937, la volvio a vender a Francisco
Rosete, tambien con pacto de retro por el termino de cinco aos, despues de haber
verificado su recompra de Agustin y Manzano, con dinero que le habla facilitado Rosete,
otorgandose a este facto la escritura de venta Exhibit 1. Desde entoces Rosete es el que
esta en su posesion y disfrute, de una manera pacifica y quieta, aun despues de la muerte
de Dionisio Quimson, ocurrida en 6 de junio de 1939, hasta el enero de 1943, en que
Tomasa Quimson acudio al Juez de Paz de San Marcelino , Zambales, para que este

interviniera en un arreglo con Rosete sobre dicha finca, cuyo fracaso motivo una carrera
hacia Iba, la capital de Zambales, para ganar la prioridad del registro e inscripcion de las
escrituras de venta Exhibits A y 1 que Dionisio Quimson otorgara a favor de Tomasa
Quimson y Francisco Rosete, respectivamente, carreraque aquella gano por haber llegado a
la meta una hora antes, a las 9:30 a.m. del 17 de febrero de 1943, en tanto que este la
alcanzo a las 10:30 a.m. de ese mismo dia.
Two questions are raised: (1) What were the effects of the registration of plaintiff's document? and
(2) Who was prior in possession? The Court of Appeals' answer to the question is , None, and to the
second, the defendant or second purchaser.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the first issue in the light of the view we take of the last,
to which we will address ourselves presently.
Articles 1462 and 1473 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be deemed delivered, when it is placed in the control and
possession of the vendee.
When the sale is made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the said
instrument the contrary does not appear or may not be clearly inferred.
ART. 1473. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith,
if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
first recorded it in the
registry
.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall belong to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence of this, to the person who represents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In the case of Buencamino vs. Viceo (13 Phil., 97), Mr. Justice Willard, speaking for the court and
citing article 1462 says: "Upon a sale of real estate the execution of a notarial document of sale is a
sufficient delivery of the property sold.".
In the case of Florendo vs. Foz (20 Phil., 388), the court, through Mr. Chief Justice Arellano, rules
that "When the sale is made by menas of a public instrument, the execution thereof is tantamount to
conveyance of the subject matter, unless the contrary clearly follows or be deduced from such
instrument itself, and in the absence of this condition such execution by the vendor is per se a formal
or symbolical conveyance of the property sold, that is, the vedor in the instrument itself authorizes
the purchaser to used the title of ownership as proof that latter is thenceforth the owner of the
property."
More decisive of the case at the bar, being almost on all fours with it, is the case of Sanchez vs.
Ramon (40 Phil., 614). There. appeared that one Fernandez sold a piece of land to Marcelino

Gomez and Narcisa Sanchez underpacto de retro in a public instrument. The purchasers neither
recorded the deed in the registry of property nor ever took materials possession of the land. Later,
Fernandez sold the same property by means of a private document to Ramos who immediately
entered upon the possession of it. It was held that, according to article 1473 of the Civil Code,
Gomez and Sanchez were the first in possession and. consequently, that the sale in their favor was
superior. Says the court, through Mr. Justice Avancea, later chief justice:
To what kind of possession is acquired by the materials occupancy of the thing or right
possessed, or by the fact that the latter is subjected to the action of our will, or by the
appropriate acts and legal formalities established for acquiring possession (art. 438, Civil
Code). by a simple reasoning, it appears that, because the law does not mention to which of
these kinds of the possession the article refers, it must be understood that it refers to all of
these kinds. The proposition that this article, according to its letter, refers to the materials
possession and excludes the symbolic does not seem to be founded upon a solid ground. It
is said that the law, in the first possession and then the date of the date of the title and as a
public instruments is a title, it is claimed that the inference is that the law has deliberately
intented to place the symbolic possession, which the execution of the public document
implies, after the materials possession. This argument, however, would only be forceful if the
title, mentioned by this article, includes public instruments, and this would only be true if
public instruments are not included in the idea of the possession spoken of in said article. In
other words the strength of the arguments rests in that this possession is precisely the
materials and does not include the symbolic. Consequently, the argument is deficient for it is
begging the same question, because if this possession includes the symbolic, which is
acquired by the execution of a public instruments, it should be understood that the title,
mentioned by the law as the next cause of preference, does not include instruments.
Furthermore, our interpretation of this article 1473 is more in consonance with the principles
of the justice. The execution of the public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the realty
sold (art. 1462, Civil Code ) and its possession by the vedee (art. 438).Under these
conditions the sale is considered consummated and completely transfers to the vendee all of
the thing. the vendee by virtue of this sale has acquired everything and nothing, absolutely
nothing, is left to the vendor. Form this moment the vendor is a stranger to the thing sold like
any other who has never been its owner. As the obligation of even delivering it. If he
continues taking materials possession of it, is simply on account of the vendee's tolerance
and, in this sense, his possession is vendor's possession. And if the latter should have to ask
him for the delivery of this materials possession it would not be by virtue of the sale, because
this has been already consummated and has produced all its effects, but by virtue of the
vendee's ownership, in the same were not the vendor. This means that after the sale of the
realty by means of a public instruments, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not
transmitted anything to this second sale, takes materials possession of the thing, he does it
as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights to the
thing lawfully acquired by the first vendee.
We are of the opinion that the possession mentioned in the article 1473 (for determining who
has better right when the same piece of land has been sold several times by the vendor )
includes not the materials but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the
execution of a public instrument.
The Supreme Court of Spain and Mr. Manresa are of the same opinion. On pp. 157 ,158 Vol. X, of
his treatise on the Spanish Civil Code. Manresa comments:

II. Observacion comun a la venta de muebles y a la de inmuebles. Hemos interpretado el

precepto de articulo 1.473, en sus parrafos 1. y 3. en el sentido mas racional mas racional,
aunque no tal vez en el mas adecuado a las palabras que se emplean. Las palabras tomar
posesion, y primero en la posesion las hemos considerado como equivalentes a la de la
tradicion real o fingida a que se refieren los articulos 1.462 al 1. 464 porque si la posesion
materials del objeto puede otorgar preferencia e cuestiones de possesion y asi lo re-conoe
el articulo 445. no debe darla nunca en cuestiones de propiedad y de la propiedad habla
expresamente el articulo 1.473. Asi en nuestra opinion, robustecida por la doctrine que
rectamente se deriva de la sentencia de 24 de Novembre de 1894, vendida una finca A. en
escritura publica despues a B., aunque se incate materialmente este del inmueble, la etrega
de la cosa elvendedor carecia ya de la facultad de disponer de ella .
The statement of Sr. Manresa which is said to sustain the theory of the Court of Appeals, expresses,
as we under stand that statement, the literal meaning of article 1473, for the decision of November
24, 1894 reflects, according to the learned author, the intention of the lawmaker and is in the
conformity with the principles of justice. now under both the a Spanish and Philippine rules of
interpretation, the spirit, the intent, the law prevails over its letter.
Counsel for defendant denies that the land was sold to plaintiff's Tomasa Quimson or that the Court
of Appeals so founds. All that latter court declared, he says, was that a deed of the land was
executed by the original owner on June 7, 1932.
The findings that a deed of conveyance was made by Dionisio Quimson in favor of his daughter
could have no other meaning, in the absence of any qualifying statement , that the land was sold by
the father to his daughter. Furthermore, this was the trial court's explicit finding which was not
reversed by the Court of Appeals and stand as the fact of the case. Looking into the documents itself
Exhibits A states categorically that the vendor received form the vendee the consideration of sale, P
250, acknowledge before the notary public the notary public having executed the instruments of his
own free will.
The expression in the court's decision in the case of Cruzado vs. Escaler (34 Phil., 17), cited by the
Court of Appeals, Apparently to the effect that physical possession by the purchaser is essential to
the consummation of a sale of real of estate, is at best obiter dictum; for the court distinctly found
that the sale to plaintiff's Cruzado's father was a sham, execution with the sole purpose of enabling
the senior Cruzado to mortgage the property and become procurador. And with reference to the
failure of the second vendee, Escaler, to register his purchase, the court disregarded the omission
as well as the entry of the first sale in the registry because that entry was made by the plaintiff, son
and heir of the first supposed vendee, more than a score years after the alleged transaction, when
the plaintiff was no longer or had any right therein (in the land). Because it already belonged to the
defendant Escaler, its lawful owner." When Escaler, the second purchase was sued he had become
the owner of the land by prescription. The defendant's possession in the present case fell far short of
having ripened into title by prescription when the plaintiff commenced her action.
For the reasons above stated, we are constrained to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Because the Appellate Court found for the defendant, it made no findings on damages for the latter's
used of the property in controversy. Not being authorized in this appeal to examine the evidence we
have to accept the trials court's appraisal of the damages. Judge Llanes assessed the damages of P
180 for the occupation of the agricultural years 143-44,1944-45 and 1945-46, and P 60 a year
thereafter until the possession of the property was restituted to the plaintiffs.
Let judgment be entered in accordance with the tenor of this decision, with costs against the
defendant.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 129760 December 29, 1998
RICARDO CHENG, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON B. GENATO and ERNESTO R. DA JOSE & SOCORRO DA JOSE, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) 1 dated July 7, 1997 in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 44706 entitled "Ricardo Cheng, plaintiffappellee vs. Ramon B. Genato, defendant-appellant, Ernesto R. Da Jose & Socorro B. Da Jose,
Intervenors-Appellants" which reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 of Quezon City
dated January 18, 1994. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, appealed decision is hereby REVERSED

and SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered ordering;
1. The dismissal of the complaint;
2. The cancellation of the annotations of the defendant-appellant's Affidavit to Annul
Contract to Sell and plaintiff-appellee's Notice of Adverse Claim in the subject TCT's,
namely, TCT No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T-76.197 (M);
3. Payment by the intervenors-appellants of the remaining balance of the purchase
price pursuant to their agreement with the defendant-appellant to suspend
encashment of the three post-dated checks issued since 1989.
4. Ordering the execution by the defendant-appellant Genato of the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject two lots covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T76.197 (M) in favor of intervenors-appellants Spouses Da Jose;
5. The return by defendant-appellant Genato of the P50,000.00 paid to him by the
plaintiff-appellee Cheng, and
6. Payment by plaintiff-appellee Cheng of moral damages to herein intervenorsappellants Da Jose of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00, attorney's
fees of P50,000.00, and costs of suit; and to defendant-appellant, of P100,000.00 in
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 in attorney's fees. The amounts payable to the
defendant-appellant may be compensated by plaintiff appellee with the amount
ordered under the immediately foregoing paragraph which defendant-appellant has
to pay the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED. 2
The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Ramon B. Genato (Genato) is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise
Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M) 3 and TCT No. T-76.197
(M) 4 with an aggregate area of 35,821square meters, more or less.

On September 6, 1989, respondent Genato entered into an agreement with respondent-spouses

Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose (Da Jose spouses) over the above-mentioned two
parcels of land. The agreement culminated in the execution of a contract to sell for which the
purchase price was P80.00 per square meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was duly
annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on the same day. Clauses 1and 3 thereof
provide:
1. That the purchase price shall be EIGHTY (P80.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency
per square meter, of which the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS
shall be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR as partial down payment at the time of
execution of this Contract to Sell.
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the VENDEE, Thirty (30) DAYS after the execution of this contract, and only
after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and authenticity of
documents, and that no restrictions, limitations, and developments imposed on
and/or affecting the property subject of this contract shall be detrimental to his
interest, the VENDEE shall pay to the VENDOR, NINE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (P950,00.00) PESOS. Philippine Currency, representing the full
payment of the agreed Down Payment, after which complete possession of the
property shall be given to the VENDEE to enable him to prepare the premises and
any development therein.
On October 4, 1989, the Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles mentioned in
clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by respondent Genato an extension of another
30 days or until November 5, 1989. However, according to Genato, the extension was granted on
condition that a new set of documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989. 6 This was
denied by the Da Jose spouses.

Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose
spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell, 7 on October 13, 1989. Moreover,
no annotation of the said affidavit at the back of his titles was made right away. The affidavit
contained, inter alia, the following paragraphs;

xxx xxx xxx

That it was agreed between the parties that the agreed downpayment of
P950,000.00 shall be paid thirty (30) days after the execution of the Contract, that is
on or before October 6, 1989;
The supposed VENDEES failed to pay the said full downpayment even up to this
writing, a breach of contract;
That this affidavit is being executed to Annul the aforesaid Contract to Sell for the
vendee having committed a breach of contract for not having complied with the
obligation as provided in the Contract to Sell; 8

On October 24, 1989, herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genato's residence and
expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo
Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his
contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to
Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the back of the titles.
Despite these, Cheng went ahead and issued a check for P50,000.00 upon the assurance by
Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses will be annulled for which Genato
issued a handwritten receipt (Exh. "D"), written in this wise:
10/24/89
Received from Ricardo Cheng
the Sum of Fifty Thousand Only (P50.000-)
as partial for T-76196 (M)
T-76197 (M) area 35.821 Sq.m.
Paradise Farm, Gaya-Gaya, San Jose Del Monte
P70/m2 Bulacan
plus C. G. T. etc.
Check # 470393 (SGD.) Ramon B. Genato
10/24/89 9
On October 25, 1989, Genato deposited Cheng's check. On the same day, Cheng called up Genato
reminding him to register the affidavit to annul the contract to sell. 10
The following day, or on October 26, 1989, acting on Cheng's request, Genato caused the
registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in the
Registry
of Deeds, Meycauayan, Bulacan as primary entry No. 262702.

11

While the Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan on
October 27, 1989, they met Genato by coincidence. It was only then that the Da Jose spouses
discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and
protested against the rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he (Genato) had given
them (Da Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish their verification of his titles, that the
period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down
payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the Contract he had with them. The
agreement to continue with their contract was formalized in a conforme letter dated October 27,
1989.
Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his contract with the
Da Jose spouses and the return of Cheng's P50,000.00 check. Consequently, on October 30, 1989,

Cheng's lawyer sent a letter 12 to Genato demanding compliance with their agreement to sell the
property to him stating that the contract to sell between him and Genato was already perfected and
threatening legal action.

On November 2, 1989, Genato sent a letter 13 to Cheng (Exh. "6") enclosing a BPI Cashier's Check for
P50,000.00 and expressed regret for his inability to "consummate his transaction" with him. After having
received the letter of Genato on November 4, 1989, Cheng, however, returned the said check to the
former via RCPI telegram 14 dated November 6, 1989, reiterating that "our contract to sell your property
had already been perfected."

Meanwhile, also on November 2, 1989, Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse claim 15 and had it
annotated on the subject TCT's.

On the same day, consistent with the decision of Genato and the Da Jose spouses to continue with
their Contract to Sell of September 6, 1989, the Da Jose spouses paid Genato the complete down
payment of P950,000.00 and delivered to him three (3) postdated checks (all dated May 6, 1990, the
stipulated due date) in the total amount of P1,865,680.00 to cover full payment of the balance of the
agreed purchase price. However, due to the filing of the pendency of this case, the three (3)
postdated checks have not been encashed.
On December 8, 1989, Cheng instituted a complaint 16 for specific performance to compel Genato to
execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus damages and prayer for preliminary
attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to
the total agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which
Genato acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected.

In Answer 17 thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of an option-bid
deposit, and never stated that it was a partial payment, nor is it an earnest money and that it was subject
to condition that the prior contract with the Da Jose spouses be first cancelled.

The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention, 18 asserted that they have a superior right to the
property as first buyers. They alleged that the unilateral cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without
effect and void. They also cited Cheng's bad faith as a buyer being duly informed by Genato of the
existing annotated Contract to Sell on the titles.

After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to Cheng unerringly
meant a sale and not just a priority or an option to buy. It cannot be true that the transaction was
subjected to some condition or reservation, like the priority in favor of the Da Jose spouses as first
buyer because, if it were otherwise, the receipt would have provided such material condition or
reservation, especially as it was Genato himself who had made the receipt in his own hand. It also
opined that there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell by virtue of the Affidavit to Annul the
Contract to Sell. Time was of the essence in the execution of the agreement between Genato and
Cheng, under this circumstance demand, extrajudicial or judicial, is not necessary. It falls under the
exception to the rule provided in Article 1169 19 of the Civil Code. The right of Genato to unilaterally
rescind the contract is said to be under Article 1191 20 of the Civil Code. Additionally, after reference was
made to the substance of the agreement between Genato and the Da Jose spouses, the lower court also
concluded that Cheng should be preferred over the intervenors-Da Jose spouses in the purchase of the
subject properties. Thus, on January 18, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 executed between

defendant Ramon Genato, as vendor, and intervenors Spouses Ernesto and Socorro
Da Jose, as vendees, resolved and rescinded in accordance with Art. 1191, Civil
Code, by virtue of defendant's affidavit to annul contract to sell dated October 13,
1989 and as the consequence of intervenors' failure to execute within seven (7) days
from October 4, 1989 another contract to sell pursuant to their mutual agreement
with defendant;
2. Ordering defendant to return to the intervenors the sum of P1,000,000.00, plus
interest at the legal rate from November 2, 1989 until full payment;
3. Directing defendant to return to the intervenors the three (3) postdated checks
immediately upon finality of this judgment;
4. Commanding defendant to execute with and in favor of the plaintiff Ricardo Cheng,
as vendee, a deed of conveyance and sale of the real properties described and
covered in Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-76-196 (M) and T-76.197 (M) of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, at the rate of P70.000/square
meter, less the amount of P50,000.00 alreaddy paid to defendant, which is
considered as part of the purchase price, with the plaintiff being liable for payment of
the capital gains taxes and other expenses of the transfer pursuant to the agreement
to sell dated October 24, 1989; and
5 Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff and the intervenors as follows:
a/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to plaintiff;
b/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to intervenors;
c/ P20,000.00, as and for attorney's fees, to plaintiff;
d/ P20,000.00, as and for attorney's fees, to
intervenors; and
e/ Cost of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, herein respondents Ramon Genato and Da Jose spouses
appealed to the court a quo which reversed such judgment and ruled that the prior contract to sell in
favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly rescinded; that the subsequent contract to sell between
Genato and Cheng, embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without force and effect due to the
failure to rescind the prior contract; and that Cheng should pay damages to the respondents herein
being found to be in bad faith.
Hence this petition. 21
This petition for review, assails the Court of Appeals' Decision on the following grounds: (1) that the
Da Jose spouses' Contract to Sell has been validly rescinded or resolved; (2) that Ricardo Cheng's
own contract with Genato was not just a contract to sell but one of conditional contract of sale which

gave him better rights, thus precluding the application of the rule on double sales under Article 1544,
Civil Code; and (3) that, in any case, it was error to hold him liable for damages.
The petition must be denied for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error which would warrant a contrary ruling.
No reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no valid and
effective rescission or resolution of the Da Jose spouses Contract to Sell, contrary to petitioner's
contentions and the trial court's erroneous ruling.
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure
of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. 22 It is one where the happening of the event gives
rise to an obligation. Thus, for its non-fulfillment there will be no contract to speak of, the obligor having
failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. In fact with this
circumstance, there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent, the suspensive
condition not having occurred as yet. 23 Emphasis should be made that the breach contemplated in Article
1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation already extant, not a failure
of a condition to render binding that obligation. 24

Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case
because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has
not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses' contention that no further condition was agreed when they
were granted the 30-days extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their
contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 should be upheld for the following reason, to wit; firstly, If
this were not true, Genato could not have been persuaded to continue his contract with them and
later on agree to accept the full settlement of the purchase price knowing fully well that he himself
imposed such sine qua non condition in order for the extension to be valid; secondly, Genato could
have immediately annotated his affidavit to annul the contract to sell on his title when it was
executed on October 13, 1989 and not only on October 26, 1989 after Cheng reminded him of the
annotation; thirdly, Genato could have sent at least a notice of such fact, there being no stipulation
authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his titles and
make it available to other would be buyers. It likewise settles the holding of the trial court that
Genato "needed money urgently."
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that the Da Jose spouses defaulted, as claimed by Genato, in
their Contract to Sell, the execution by Genato of the affidavit to annul the contract is not even called
for. For with or without the aforesaid affidavit their non-payment to complete the full downpayment of
the purchase price ipso facto avoids their contract to sell, it being subjected to a suspensive
condition. When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place
only if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. 25 If the suspensive
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. 26

Nevertheless, this being so Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or written, to the
Da Jose spouses for his decision to rescind their contract. In many cases, 27 even though we upheld
the validity of a stipulation in a contract to sell authorizing automatic rescission for a violation of its terms
and conditions, at least a written notice must be sent to the defaulter informing him of the same. The act
of a party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made known to the other. 28 For such act is always
provisional. It is always subject to scrutiny and review by the courts in case the alleged defaulter brings
the matter to the proper courts. In University of the Philippines vs. De Los Angeles, 29 this Court stressed
and we quote:

In other words, the party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or
rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its
own risk. For it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court that will
conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in law.
But the law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself
injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to
protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the other's breach will have to
passively sit and watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until
the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he
should exercise due diligence to minimize its own damages (Civil Code, Article
2203).
This rule validates, both in equity and justice, contracts such as the one at bat, in order to avoid and
prevent the defaulting party from assuming the offer as still in effect due to the obligee's tolerance for
such non-fulfillment. Resultantly, litigations of this sort shall be prevented and the relations among
would-be parties may be preserved. Thus, Ricardo Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell
between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's unilateral
rescission finds no support in this case.
Anent the issue on the nature of the agreement between Cheng and Genato, the records of this
case are replete with admissions 30 that Cheng believed it to be one of a Contract to Sell and not one of
Conditional Contract of Sale which he, in a transparent turn-around, now pleads in this Petition. This
ambivalent stance of Cheng is even noted by the appellate court, thus:

At the outset, this Court notes that plaintiff-appellee was inconsistent in

characterizing the contract he allegedly entered into. In his complaint. 31 Cheng
alleged that the P50,000.00 down payment was earnest money. And next, his
testimony 32 was offered to prove that the transaction between him and Genato on
October 24, 1989 was actually a perfected contract to sell. 33

Settled is the rule that an issue which was not raised during the trial in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. 34 Issues of fact and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 35 In fact, both courts below correctly held that the receipt
which was the result of their agreement, is a contract to sell. This was, in fact Cheng's contention in his
pleadings before said courts. This patent twist only operates against Cheng's posture which is indicative
of the weakness of his claim.

But even if we are to assume that the receipt, Exh. "D," is to be treated as a conditional contract of
sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive condition that the
earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or
rescinded a condition never met, as Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed
himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier contract with the Da Jose spouses. In fact, a careful
reading of the receipt, Exh. "D," alone would not even show that a conditional contract of sale has
been entered by Genato and Cheng. When the requisites of a valid contract of sale are lacking in
said receipt, therefore the "sale" is neither valid or enfoceable. 36
To support his now new theory that the transaction was a conditional contract of sale, petitioner
invokes the case of Coronel vs. Court of Appeals 37 as the law that should govern their Petition. We do
not agree. Apparently, the factual milieu in Coronel is not on all fours with those in the case at bar.

In Coronel, this Court found that the petitioners therein clearly intended to transfer title to the buyer
which petitioner themselves admitted in their pleading. The agreement of the parties therein was

definitively outlined in the "Receipt of Down Payment" both as to property, the purchase price, the
delivery of the seller of the property and the manner of the transfer of title subject to the specific
condition that upon the transfer in their names of the subject property the Coronels will execute the
deed of absolute sale.
Whereas, in the instant case, even by a careful perusal of the receipt, Exh. "D," alone such kind of
circumstances cannot be ascertained without however resorting to the exceptions of the Rule on
Parol Evidence.
To our mind, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the agreement between
Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell, which was, in fact, petitioner connection in his pleadings
before the said courts. Consequently, both to mind, which read:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
he oldest title, provided there is good faith.
However, a meticulous reading of the aforequoted provision shows that said law is not apropos to
the instant case. This provision connotes that the following circumstances must concur:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly the same
subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions.
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each represent conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each have bought from the very same seller.
These situations obviously are lacking in a contract to sell for neither a transfer of ownership nor a
sales transaction has been consummated. The contract to be binding upon the obligee or the vendor
depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of an event.
Notwithstanding this contrary finding with the appellate court, we are of the view that the governing
principle of Article 1544, Civil Code, should apply in this situation. Jurisprudence 38 teaches us that the
governing principle is PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE (first in time, stronger in right). For not only
was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long before petitioner's
intrusion as a second buyer. This principle only applies when the special rules provided in the aforcited
article of the Civil Code do not apply or fit the specific circumstances mandated under said law or by
jurisprudence interpreting the article.

The rule exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer to be able to displace the
first buyer are:

(1) that the second buyer must show that he acted in good faith (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and
of the first buyer's rights) from the time of acquisition until title is transferred to him by registration or
failing registration, by delivery of possession; 39
(2) the second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the
first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law. 40
Thus, in the case at bar, the knowledge gained by the Da Jose spouses, as first buyers, of the new
agreement between Cheng and Genato will not defeat their rights as first buyers except where
Cheng, as second buyer, registers or annotates his transaction or agreement on the title of the
subject properties in good faith ahead of the Da Jose spouses. Moreover, although the Da Jose
spouses, as first buyers, knew of the second transaction it will not bar them from availing of their
rights granted by law, among them, to register first their agreement as against the second buyer.
In contrast, knowledge gained by Cheng of the first transaction between the Da Jose spouses and
Genato defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second transaction, since such knowledge
taints his prior registration with bad faith.
"Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the books of the registry,
including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even
marginal notes. 41 In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. 42 We have ruled 43 before that when a Deed of
Sale is inscribed in the registry of property on the original document itself, what was done with respect to
said entries or annotations and marginal notes amounted to a registration of the sale. In this light, we see
no reason why we should not give priority in right the annotation made by the Da Jose spouses with
respect to their Contract to Sell dated September 6, 1989.

Moreover, registration alone in such cases without good faith is not sufficient. Good faith must
concur with registration for such prior right to be enforceable. In the instant case, the annotation
made by the Da Jose spouses on the titles of Genato of their "Contract To Sell" more than satisfies
this requirement. Whereas in the case of Genato's agreement with Cheng such is unavailing. For
even before the receipt, Exh. "D," was issued to Cheng information of such pre-existing agreement
has been brought to his knowledge which did not deter him from pursuing his agreement with
Genato. We give credence to the factual finding of the appellate court that "Cheng himself admitted
that it was he who sought Genato in order to inquire about the property and offered to buy the
same. 44 And since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of
the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of
Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in
entering into such agreement. As we have held in Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co.: 45

One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect . . . of title in his vendor
cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against . . . . an
interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of
facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. A purchaser
cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in
the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful
closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title,
will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the
title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as
would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. Good faith, or lack of

it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but in ascertaining the intention by
which one is actuated on a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the
evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may
with safety, be determined. So it is that "the honesty of intention," "the honest lawful
intent," which constitutes good faith implies a "freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry," and so it is that proof of such
knowledge overcomes the presumption of good faith in which the courts always
indulge in the absence of the proof to the contrary. "Good faith, or the want of it, is
not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition
of mind which can only be judge of by actual or fancied tokens or signs." (Wilder vs.
Gilman, 55 Vt. 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas vs. Miller, 108 Cal., 250; Breaux-Renoudet,
Cypress Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs.
Bromely, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.) (Emphasis ours)
Damages were awarded by the appellate court on the basis of its finding that petitioner "was in bad
faith when he filed the suit for specific performance knowing fully well that his agreement with
Genato did not push through. 46Such bad faith, coupled with his wrongful interference with the
contractual relations between Genato and the Da Jose spouses, which culminated in his filing of the
present suit and thereby creating what the counsel for the respondents describes as "a prolonged and
economically unhealthy gridlock 47 on both the land itself and the respondents' rights provides ample basis
for the damages awarded. Based on these overwhelming evidence of bad faith on the part of herein
petitioner Ricardo Cheng, we find that the award of damages made by the appellate court is in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED EN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.