FACTS Rodolfo F. Pehid was employed by the Villamor Golf Club (VGC) as an attendant in the mens locker room, and, thereafter, he became the Supervisor-in-Charge. His subordinates included Juanito Superal, Jr., Patricio Parilla, Ricardo Mendoza, Cesar Velasquez, Vicente Casabon, Pepito Buenaventura and Carlito Modelo. They agreed to establish a common fund from the tips they received from the customers, guests and members of the club for their mutual needs and benefits. Each member was to contribute the amount of P100.00 daily and by October 1998, it had reached the aggregate amount of P17,990. This agreement, however, was not known to the VGC management. Upon audit of the Locker Room Section, it was reported that there was an undeclared and unrecorded aggregate amount of P17,990.00 for the fund and that there was no record that the money had been distributed among those employed in the locker room. In the meantime, an administrative complaint was filed by Pehids subordinates charging him with misappropriating the P17,990.00. Management ultimately dismissed Pehid for gross misconduct in the performance of his duties and for acts of dishonesty that caused prejudice to the club after his submission of a verified explanation denying the claims filed against him. Pehid filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, separation pay/retirement benefits, damages and attorneys fees against petitioners VGC and/or Brig. Gen. Filamer Artajo (Ret. AFP), Col. Ruben Estepa, Lt. Milagros Aguillon, and the VGC Administrative Board of Inquiry. Labor arbiter ruled in favor of Pehid declaring that the acts attributed to Pehid were not committed in connection with his work as officer-in-charge of the locker room. NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter stating that he was legally dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. On appeal, CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter
ISSUE Whether or not there was Pehid, in allegedly misappropriating the funds constitutes gross misconduct, which is an act of dishonesty in violation of the Rules of Conduct of the club that caused prejudice to the VGC?
RULING NO. The voluntary contribution by the locker personnel amongst themselves to a mutual fund for their own personal benefit in times of need is not in any way connected with the work of the locker boys and the complainant. If ever there was misappropriation or loss of the said mutual fund, the respondent will not and cannot be in any way tend or cause to prejudice the club. Under VGC rule, the dishonesty of an employee to be a valid cause for dismissal must relate to or involve the misappropriation or malversation of the club funds, or cause or tend to cause prejudice to VGC. The substantial evidence on record indicates that the P17,990.00, which was accumulated from a portion of the tips given by the golfers from May 1998 to October 1998 and was allegedly misappropriated by the respondent as the purported custodian thereof, did not belong to VGC but to the forced savings of its locker room personnel. Company policies and regulations are, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, generally valid and binding and must be complied with by the parties unless finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation. However, while an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the companys business, an act allegedly in breach thereof must clearly and convincingly fall within the express intendment of such order.
432 San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC 174 SCRA 510 Dishonesty
FACTS Private respondents (Delen, Mercado, Misolas, Logan and Querubin) were former security guards of the petitioner, which dismissed them for falsification of their time cards. They made false entries in their time cards showing that they reported for work on February 19 and 20, 1983 when the truth was that they went on a hunting tap to San Juan, Batangas, with their chief Major Martin Asaytuno, then head of the Administrative Services Department of the Security Directorate of the petitioner. Besides the falsification of the entries for February 19 and 20, 1983 in their time cards, complainant Misolas was caught redhanded by Security Guard Romeo Martin at 7:45 A.M. on March 2, 1983 punching in not only his own time card but also the time cards of Delen and Querubin (p. 51, Rollo). Seeing Misolas in a tight fix, Querubin rushed to the bundy clock and punched in a time card (which turned out to be the card of one Rodrigo de Castro) to save Misolas and to make it appear to Martin that he (Querubin), punched in his own time card. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the complainants did go on a hunting trip, upon the invitation of their department head, Major Asaytuno. They went along to please him because they believed that his invitation was equivalent to a command. Being an army man, Asaytuno expected "total obedience" from his subordinates. When they reported for work on February 21, 1983, Major Asaytuno asked for their time cards and initialed the false entries showing that they reported for work on February 19-20. The Labor Arbiter held that under those circumstances 'the dismissal of the complainants cannot be sustained." and directed the company "to reinstate the complainants to their respective former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages and other benefits appurtenant to their respective positions." NLRC, on appeal by petitioner dismissed said appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court but was dismissed with the impression that the petitioner relieved Asaytuno from the offense while his subordinates were punished. Upon the second motion though, the Court now grants to resolve the case.
ISSUE Whether or not private respondents actions on February 19-20 constitute dishonesty, which is cause for their legal dismissal?
RULING YES. Although it may be conceded that the private respondents acted under some degree of moral compulsion when they agreed to accompany Major Asaytuno on a hunting trip to San Juan, Batangas, they were certainly under no compulsion from him to falsify their time cards and thereby defraud the company by collecting wages for the dates when they did not report for work. In order to be exempted (on the ground of obedience) it must be shown that both the person who gives the order and the person who executes it are acting within the limitations prescribed by law. The falsification and fraud which the private respondents committed against their employer were inexcusable. Major Asaytuno's initials on the false entries in their time cards did not purge the documents of their falsity. Their acts constituted dishonesty and serious misconduct, lawful grounds for their dismissal under Art. 282, sub-pars. (a) and (c), of the Labor Code.
433 Benguet Electric v. Fianza 425 SCRA 41 Insubordination
FACTS Josephine Fianza had been employed with petitioner Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO) since August 1, 1979. She occupied various positions, until, in 1991, she became Property Custodian under the Office of the General Manager, with a Salary Grade of 5. BENECOs General Manager, petitioner Gerardo P. Versoza, issued Office Order No. 42, addressed to Fianza informing her of the companys decision to temporarily reassign her and another employee to the Finance Department as Bill Distributor for exigency of service. Fianza acknowledged the order in protest and objects the reassignment. She continued to peform her duties as Property Custodian. In response, Versoza wrote to Fianza in a memorandum stating that her reassignment was for the overall improvement of the productivity of the company and that her position might be soon phased out upon approval of the already proposed Table of Organization as part of a sound business decision. And that if she fails to comply within 3 days, they would have to charge her with insubordination. Fianza filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with the NLRC-CAR while in the meantime, continued to report for work as Property Custodian. Versoza issued another memorandum stating that Fianza should report to her new assignment; otherwise, she would be considered absent without leave, and her salary withheld until she report for work in her new assignment. In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners BENECO and Verzosa averred that there was no constructive dismissal. They claimed that Fianzas transfer from Property Custodian to Bill Distributor was a valid exercise of management prerogative, exercised in the exigency of service. They pointed out that the position of Property Custodian under the Office of the General Manager has been abolished, and the functions thereof have been absorbed by other departments. Fianza maintained that there was a substantial demotion in rank from Property Custodian to Bill Distributor, which demotion negated managements claims of the validity of the transfer. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed Fianzas complaint, which upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed. Upon motion for reconsideration however, the CA reversed both the Labor Arbiter and NLRCs decision.
ISSUE Whether or not Fianzas refusal to obey the transfer order warrants dismissal?
RULING YES. Fianzas refusal to obey the transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of her employer sanctioned under Article 282 of the Labor Code and, therefore, warrants dismissal. It must be noted that during the preliminary conference, Fianza was advised that BENECO was willing to reinstate her, but because her position as Property Custodian was no longer existing, she would have to report for work as Bill Distributor. Fianza refused this offer. She must now bear the consequences of her refusal. To sanction the disregard or disobedience by employees of a reasonable rule or order laid down by management would be disastrous to the discipline and order within the enterprise. It is in the interest of both the employer and the employee to preserve and maintain order and discipline in the work environment. Deliberate disregard of company rules or defiance of management prerogative cannot be countenanced. This is not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or orders they regard as unjust or illegal. They can object thereto, ask to negotiate thereon, bring proceedings for redress against the employer. But until and unless the rules or orders are declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. It should be noted that Fianza was not terminated from employment, but was transferred to another department. Managements prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is generally not constitutive of constructive dismissal.
434 Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation v. Ursabia 502 SCRA 645 Insubordination
FACTS Petitioner Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation, a company engaged in the promotion of various consumer products, commodities, and goods, hired respondent Reynaldo Ursabia as a company driver assigned to pick up the products of Nestle Philippines, Inc., for promotion and marketing. On July 6, 2001, respondent failed to report for work. Petitioner, through its area supervisor, Gerry Garcia, issued a Memorandum dated July 9, 2001 regarding his absence and when respondent reported back to work on July 9, 2001, he was personally served with the foregoing memorandum but refused to acknowledge the same, hence, petitioner sent it through registered mail to his (respondent) last known address The following day, July 10, 2001, Garcia noticed some damage on the vehicle assigned to respondent, hence, he issued another Memorandum regarding said matter. Also, an anonymous note was discovered among the stocks of petitioner containing the words (Good news) be careful and save youre (sic) life because there's a time to come everybody x x x will die. The examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory allegedly showed that the handwriting of respondent has significant similarities with the said handwritten note. On August 6, 2001, respondent went to petitioners office and was served with a termination letter. Displeased with his termination, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of other monetary benefits. Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez rendered a decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a decision dated November 27, 2003, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbite. However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the NLRC and held that respondent was illegally dismissed.
ISSUE Whether or not there was a valid justification to respondents dismissal?
RULING YES. But not because of abandonment of work (NLRCs decision) or for the damage to the company car or for the anonymous note but for his willful disobedience of the memoranda issued by petitioner. To be validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the instant case, the failure of respondent to answer the July 9 and 10, 2001 memoranda of petitioner is clearly intentional. He reported to and loitered outside petitioners premises but never made any oral or written reply to the said memoranda. This shows respondents wrongful and perverse attitude to defy the reasonable orders, which undoubtedly pertain to his duties as an employee of petitioner. Indeed, to hold that there is no just cause to terminate respondent would demoralize the rank and file employees who religiously comply with the lawful orders of their employer. It may encourage respondent to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. In protecting the rights of the laborer, courts cannot authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.
435 Duncan Association v. Glaxo Wellcome 438 SCRA 343 Insubordination
FACTS Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative. Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals 3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, Tecson married Bettsy. Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing his job well. Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. They submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration.The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.
ISSUE Whether or not the dismissal of Tecson because of violation of the stipulation regarding marriages with employees of competitor company valid?
RULING YES. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. Tecson was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith."He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
436 Star Paper v. Simbol 487 SCRA 228 Insubordination
FACTS Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the company. Simbol met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995; Comia met Howard Comia, a co- employee, whom she married. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married; Estrella met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. Simbol and Comia allege that; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE Whether or not the dismissal pursuant to the companys policy against marrying co-employees valid?
RULING
NO. Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule
is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter- machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
437 Social Justice Secretary vs. DDB 570 SCRA 410 Insubordination
FACTS The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
ISSUE Whether or not violation of RA 9165 is a just cause for dismissal of employees?
RULING YES. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place. The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, but to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. As those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point.
438 SMC v. NLRC 551 SCRA 410 Insubordination
FACTS Ernesto M. Ibias (respondent) was employed by petitioner SMC initially as a CRO operator in its Metal Closure and Lithography Plant until he advanced as Zamatic operator. According to SMCs Policy on Employee Conduct, absences without permission or AWOPs are subject to disciplinary action characterized by progressively increasing weight. The same Policy on Employee Conduct also punishes falsification of company records or documents with discharge or termination for the first offense if the offender himself or somebody else benefits from falsification or would have benefited if falsification is not found on time. It appears that per company records, respondent was AWOP on the following dates in 1997: 2, 4 and 11 January; 26, 28 and 29 April; and 5, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 28 and 29 May. For his absences on 28 and 29 April and 7 and 8 May. Respondent was also alleged to have falsified his medical consultation card by stating therein that he was granted sick leave by the plant clinic on said dates when in truth he was not. Respondent was required to state in writing why he should not be subject to disciplinary action for falsifying his medical consultation card and asking him to explain why he should not be disciplined for not reporting for work since 26 May 1997. Respondent did not comply with these notices. He was again issued two Notices to Explain. Respondent submitted a handwritten explanation to the charges, to wit: Tungkol po sa ibinibintang po ninyong [sic] sa akin na falsification of medical consultation card ito po hindi ko magagawa at sa mga araw na hindi ko po ipinasok ito po ay may kaukulang supporting paper[s]. Not satisfied with the explanation, SMC conducted an administrative investigation. During the investigation, respondent admitted that he was absent on 28 and 29 April and 7 and 8 May 1997 and had not sought sick leave permission for those dates, and also denied falsifying or having had anything to do with the falsification of his medical consultation card. After the completion of the investigation, SMC concluded that respondent committed the offenses of excessive AWOPs and falsification of company records or documents, and accordingly dismissed him. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision, finding respondent to have been illegally dismissed and ordering his reinstatement and payment of full backwages, benefits and attorneys fees. SMC appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed with modification the decision of the labor arbiter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC relative to the illegality of respondents dismissal but modifying the monetary award.
ISSUE Whether or not the termination of employment of respondent is proportionate to his alleged offenses?
RULING NO on the falsification charges. In the instant case, while there may be no denying that respondents medical card had falsified entries in it, SMC was unable to prove, by substantial evidence, that it was respondent who made the unauthorized entries. Besides, SMCs (Your) Guide on Employee Conduct punishes the act of falsification of company records or documents; it does not punish mere possession of a falsified document. YES on the unauthorized absences. The Court observes that respondent admitted during the company-level investigation that that his absences were without permission. In the proceedings below he claimed that during the days that he was absent, he had attended to some family matters. He presented copies of two (2) medical certificates and a barangay certification that he attended hearings on some of the days when he was absent. These certifications, however, cannot work to erase his AWOPs. Respondents dismissal was well within the purview of SMCs management prerogative.
439 R.B. Michael Press v. Galit 545 SCRA 23 Insubordination
FACTS Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator. During his employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times, and was absent without leave for a total of nine and a half days. Respondent was ordered to render overtime service in order to comply with a job order deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day, respondent reported for work but petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. After the hearing, a copy of an Office Memorandum was served on him respondent was terminated from employment. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which ruled in favor of Galit. The NLRC dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which also dismissed it for lack of merit. Petitioners instituted the instant petition and claim that Galit was dismissed due to the following offenses: (1) tardiness constituting neglect of duty; (2) serious misconduct; and (3) insubordination or willful disobedience.
ISSUE Whether Galits refusal to render overtime work constitutes as insubordination which validates his dismissal from the company?
RULING YES. For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the present case, there is no question that petitioners order for respondent to render overtime service to meet a production deadline complies with the second requisite. Petitioners business is a printing press whose production schedule is sometimes flexible and varying. It is only reasonable that workers are sometimes asked to render overtime work in order to meet production deadlines. The fact that respondent refused to provide overtime work despite his knowledge that there is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that without him, the offset machine operator, no further printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness. After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a difficult employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final straw that broke the camels back, and, with his gross and habitual tardiness and absences, would merit dismissal from service.
440 Reyes v. Maxim Tea House 398 SCRA 288 Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duties
FACTS Respondent Maxims Tea House had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver. In the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997, petitioner was driving a Mitsubishi L300 van and was sent to fetch some employees of Savannah Moon, a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon City. Petitioner complied and took his usual route along Julia Vargas Street in Pasig City. He was headed towards Meralco Avenue at a cruising speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, when he noticed a ten- wheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the latters lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner maneuvered to avoid a collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a result, petitioner and seven of his passengers sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged. The management of Maxims required petitioner to submit, within forty-eight hours, a written explanation as to what happened that early morning of September 27, 1997. He complied but his employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was preventively suspended for thirty (30) days. On November 19, 1997, Maxims terminated petitioner for cause. Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just nor a valid cause for the severance of his employment, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter sustained the petitioners dismissal and found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no negligence on petitioners part. While the appellate court decided in favor of the employer and its manager.
ISSUE Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of petitioner that warrants his dismissal?
RULING NO. Under the Labor Code, gross negligence is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence is negligence characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In this case, however, there is no substantial basis to support a finding that petitioner committed gross negligence. The test to determine the existence of negligence is as follows: Did petitioner in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would use in the same situation? It is not disputed that petitioner tried to turn left to avoid a collision. To put it otherwise, petitioner did not insist on his right of way, notwithstanding the green light in his lane. Still, the collision took place as the ten-wheeler careened on the wrong lane. Clearly, petitioner exerted reasonable effort under the circumstances to avoid injury not only to himself but also to his passengers and the van he was driving. To hold that petitioner was grossly negligent under the circumstances goes against the factual circumstances shown. It appears to us he was more a victim of a vehicular accident rather than its cause. There being no clear showing that petitioner was culpable for gross negligence, petitioners dismissal is illegal. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the decision of the Third Division of the NLRC.
441 Fuentes v. NLRC 166 SCRA 752 Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duties
FACTS Petitioner was employed as a teller at the Philbanking's office at Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner received a cash deposit of P200,000.00. She counted the money with the assistance of a co-teller. Before she could start balancing her transactions, the Chief Teller handed her several payroll checks for validation. Finding the checks to be incomplete, petitioner left her cage to get other checks, without, however, bothering to put the P200,000.00 cash on her counter inside her drawer. When she returned to her cubicle after three (3) to five (5) minutes, she found that the checks for validation were still lacking, so she went out of her cubicle again to get the rest of the checks. On her way to a co- teller's cubicle, she noticed that the P200,000.00 pile on her counter had been re-arranged. She thus returned to her cage, counted the money and discovered that one (1) big bundle worth P50,000.00 was missing therefrom. She immediately asked her co-teller about it and getting a negative reply, she reported the matter to the Chief Teller. A search for the P50,000.00 having proved unavailing. Petitioner was asked to explain why she should not be held liable for the loss. She submitted her explanation. Subsequently, petitioner was dismissed for gross negligence. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement and backwages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. Petitioner's appeal to the NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit and her motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioners dismissal on the ground of gross negligence was justified?
RULING YES. The Court finds no cogent reason for reversing the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner was grossly negligent in the performance of her duties as a teller, which negligence resulted in the loss of P50,000.00. Applying the test of negligence, we ask: did the petitioner in doing the alleged negligent act use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, she is guilty of negligence. The circumstances surrounding the loss in question lend us no sympathy for the petitioner. It was established that petitioner simply left the pile of money within the easy reach of the crowd milling in front of her cage, instead of putting it in her drawer as required under the private respondent bank's General Memorandum No. 211 (Teller's Manual of Operations) which she was expected to know by heart. Although petitioner's infraction was not habitual, we took into account the substantial amount lost. Since the deposit slip for P200,000.00 had already been validated prior to the loss, the act of depositing had already been complete and from thereon, the bank had already assumed the deposit as a liability to its depositors. Cash deposits are not assets to banks but are recognized as current liabilities in its balance sheet. It would be most unfair to compel the bank to continue employing petitioner. An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties and whose continuance in his office is patently inimical to the employer's interest. "For the law in protecting the rights of the employee/laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
442 School of Holy Spirit v. Taguiam 558 SCRA 223 Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duties
FACTS Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. The class president, wrote a letter to the grade school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection, respondent distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to the pupils. Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit form was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. While the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. Petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative Charge to respondent for alleged gross negligence and required her to submit her written explanation. Thereafter, petitioners conducted a clarificatory hearing which respondent attended. Respondent also submitted her Affidavit of Explanation. Petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence Respondent in turn filed a complaint against the school and/or Sr. Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for reinstatement with full back wages and other money claims, damages and attorneys fees. In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils without any adult supervision. Respondent appealed to the NLRC, which however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in her favor.
ISSUE Whether or not respondents dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid?
RULING YES. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Maes permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Maes mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them. Notably, respondents negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we are in agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. As a result of gross negligence in the present case, petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent.