Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN J. NTONIO M. CRPIO, petitioner,
vs.
T!E E"ECUTI#E SECRETR$, T!E SECRETR$ OF %OC% GO#ERNMENTS, T!E SECRETR$ OF
NTION% &EFENSE a'( T!E NTION% TRESURER, respondents.

PRS, J.:
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision that is at the core of the controversy
now confronting us, thus
Article !"#, $ection %
&he $tate shall establish and 'aintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be ad'inistered and controlled by a national police co''ission. &he
authority of local e(ecutives over the police units in their )urisdiction shall be provided by law.
1
*ith the afore+uoted provision in 'ind, Congress passed Republic Act No. %,-. entitled /AN AC&
E$&AB0#$1#N2 &1E P1#0#PP#NE NA&#3NA0 P30#CE 4N5ER A RE3R2AN#6E5 5EPAR&MEN& 37 &1E
#N&ER#3R AN5 03CA0 23"ERNMEN&, AN5 73R 3&1ER P4RP3$E$/ as the consolidated version of 1ouse
Bill No. 89%:; and $enate Bill No. ;%9.
7ollowing the said Act<s approval by President Cora=on C. A+uino on 5ece'ber :9, :,,>, it was published on
5ece'ber :-, :,,>.
2
Presently, however, petitioner as citi=en, ta(payer and 'e'ber of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the
Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on 5ece'ber 8>, :,,>, see?ing this Court<s declaration of
unconstitutionality of RA %,-. with prayer for te'porary restraining order.
But in an en banc resolution dated 5ece'ber 8-, :,,>, *e si'ply re+uired the public respondents to file their
Co''ent, without however giving due course to the petition and the prayer therein. 1ence, the Act too? effect
after fifteen days following its publication, or on @anuary :, :,,:.
)
Before we settle down on the 'erits of the petition, it would li?ewise be well to discuss albeit briefly the history of
our police force and the reasons for the ordination of $ection %, Article !"# in our present Constitution.
5uring the Co''onwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of the Philippine 2round
7orce AP27B, now the Ar'ed 7orces of the Philippines AA7PB. &he PC was 'ade part of the P27 but its
ad'inistrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the then 5epart'ent of the #nterior. After the
war, it re'ained as the /National Police/ under the 5epart'ent of National 5efense, as a 'a)or service
co'ponent of the A7P.
4
0ater, the #ntegration Act of :,-.
*
created the #ntegrated National Police A#NPB under the 3ffice of the President,
with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian co'ponents. &he PCC#NP was headed by
the PC Chief who, as concurrent 5irectorC2eneral of the #NP, e(ercised co''and functions over the #NP.
6
&he National Police Co''ission ANAP30C3MB
+
e(ercised ad'inistrative control and supervision while the local
e(ecutives e(ercised operational supervision and direction over the #NP units assigned within their respective
localities. ,
&he setCup whereby the #NP was placed under the co''and of the 'ilitary co'ponent, which is the PC, severely
eroded the #NP<s civilian character and the 'ultiplicity in the governance of the PCC#NP resulted in inefficient
police service.
9
Moreover, the integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in ine+uities since
the 'ilitary co'ponent had superior benefits and privileges.
10
&he Constitutional Co''ission of :,D% was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the syste'. &hus, Co'.
&eodulo C. Natividad e(plained that
1
((( ((( (((
MR. NA&#"#5A5. . . . &he basic tenet of a 'odern police organi=ation is to
re'ove it fro' the 'ilitary.
11
((( ((( (((
1ere in our draft Constitution, we have already 'ade a constitutional postulate that the 'ilitary
cannot occupy any civil service position Ein $ection % of the Article on the Civil $ervice
12
F
&herefore, in ?eeping with this and because of the universal acceptance that a police force is a
civilian function, a public service, and should not be perfor'ed by 'ilitary force, one of the basic
refor's we are presenting here is that it should be separated fro' the 'ilitary force which is the
PC.
1)
((( ((( (((
7urther'ore
((( ((( (((
. . . the civilian police cannot blosso' into full profession because 'ost of the ?ey positions are
being occupied by the 'ilitary $o, it is up to this Co''ission to re'ove the police fro' such a
situation so that it can develop into a truly professional civilian police. . . .
14
1ence, the /one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character/ provision that is now Article !"#, $ection
% of the :,D- Constitution.
And so we now co'e to the 'erits of the petition at hand.
#n the 'ain, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA %,-. e'asculated the National Police
Co''ission by li'iting its power /to administrative control/ over the Philippine National Police APNPB, thus,
/control/ re'ained with the 5epart'ent $ecretary under who' both the National Police Co''ission and the PNP
were placed.
1*
*e do not share this view.
&o begin with, one need only refer to the funda'entally accepted principle in Constitutional 0aw that the President
has control of all e(ecutive depart'ents, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner<s contention on the 'atter.
&his presidential power of control over the e(ecutive branch of govern'ent e(tends over all e(ecutive officers
fro' Cabinet $ecretary to the lowliest cler?
1+
and has been held by us, in the land'ar? case of Mondano vs.
Silvosa,
1,
to 'ean /the power of Ethe PresidentF to alter or 'odify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the perfor'ance of his duties and to substitute the )udg'ent of the for'er with that of the latter./ #t is
said to be at the very /heart of the 'eaning of Chief E(ecutive./
19
E+ually well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the /5octrine of Gualified
Political Agency/. As the President cannot be e(pected to e(ercise his control powers all at the sa'e ti'e and in
person,
20
he will have to delegate so'e of the' to his Cabinet 'e'bers.
4nder this doctrine, which recogni=es the establish'ent of a single e(ecutive,
21
/all e(ecutive and ad'inistrative
organi=ations are ad)uncts of the E(ecutive 5epart'ent, the heads of the various e(ecutive depart'ents are
assistants and agents of the Chief E(ecutive, and, e(cept in cases where the Chief E(ecutive is re+uired by the
Constitution or law to act in person on the e(igencies of the situation de'and that he act personally, the
'ultifarious e(ecutive and ad'inistrative functions of the Chief E(ecutive are perfor'ed by and through the
e(ecutive depart'ents, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive./
22
Ae'phasis oursB
&hus, and in short, /the President<s power of control is directly e(ercised by hi' over the 'e'bers of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective )urisdictions in the
e(ecutive depart'ent./
2)
Additionally, the circu'stance that the NAP30C3M and the PNP are placed under the reorgani=ed 5epart'ent of
#nterior and 0ocal 2overn'ent is 'erely an ad'inistrative realign'ent that would bolster a syste' of coordination
and cooperation a'ong the citi=enry, local e(ecutives and the integrated law enforce'ent agencies and public
safety agencies created under the assailed Act,
24
the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidi=ed by the
national govern'ent.
2
$uch organi=ational setCup does not detract fro' the 'andate of the Constitution that the national police force
shall be ad'inistered and controlled by a national police co''ission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in
+uestion ade+uately provides for ad'inistration and control at the co''ission level, as shown in the following
provisions, to wit
$ec. :;. Powers and Functions of the Commission. H &he Co''ission shall e(ercise the
following powers and functions
((( ((( (((
AiB Approve or 'odify plans and progra's on education and training, logistical re+uire'ents,
co''unications, records, infor'ation syste's, cri'e laboratory, cri'e prevention and cri'e
reportingI
A)B Affir', reverse or 'odify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary actions
involving de'otion or dis'issal fro' the service i'posed upon 'e'bers of the Philippine
National Police by the Chief of the PNPI
A?B E(ercise appellate )urisdiction through .the regional. appellate boards over ad'inistrative
cases against police'en and over decisions on clai's for police benefitsI
((( ((( (((
$ec. 8%. &he Co''and and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP . . .
$uch co''and and direction of the Chief of the PNP 'ay be delegated to subordinate officials
with respect to the units under their respective co''ands, in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Co''ission. . . .
((( ((( (((
$ec. 9.. . . . &o enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief of the PNP 'ay
constitute such other support units as 'ay be necessary sub)ect to the approval of the
Co''ission. . . .
((( ((( (((
$ec. 9-. . . . &here shall be established a perfor'ance evaluation syste' which shall be
ad'inistered in accordance with the rules, regulations and standardsI and a code of conduct
pro'ulgated by the Co''ission for 'e'bers of the PNP. . . .
((( ((( (((
Petitioner further asserts that in 'anifest derogation of the power of control of the NAP30C3M over the PNP, RA
%,-. vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial 5irector and the Chiefs of Police in the 2overnors and
Mayors, respectivelyI the power of /operational supervision and control/ over police units in city and 'unicipal
'ayorsI in the Civil $ervice Co''ission, participation in appoint'ents to the positions of $enior $uperintendent
to 5eputy 5irectorC2eneral as well as the ad'inistration of +ualifying entrance e(a'inationsI disciplinary powers
over PNP 'e'bers in the /People<s 0aw Enforce'ent Boards/ and in city and 'unicipal 'ayors.
2*
3nce 'ore, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.
#t is true that when the Constitutional Co''issioners of :,D% provided that the authority of local e(ecutives over
the police units in their )urisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that the dayCtoCday functions of police
wor? li?e cri'e, investigation, cri'e prevention activities, traffic control, etc., would be under the operational
control of the local e(ecutives as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to the local e(ecutives.
26
&hey reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordis', bossis', and sanctuaries for vices and abuses.
2+
#t would appear then that by vesting in the local e(ecutives the power to choose the officers in +uestion, the Act
went beyond the bounds of the Constitution<s intent.
Not so. *e find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every presu'ption should be indulged in
favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in +uestion should give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the funda'ental
law.
2,
4nder the +uestioned provisions, which read as follows
3
5. PAR&#C#PA&#3N 37 03CA0 E!EC4&#"E$ #N &1E A5M#N#$&RA&#3N 37 &1E PNP.
$ec. .:. Powers of Local overnment !fficials over the P"P #nits or Forces.
2overnors and 'ayors shall be deputi$ed as representatives of the Co''ission in their
respective territorial )urisdictions. %s such, the local e(ecutives shall discharge the following
functions
a.B Provincial 2overnor H A:B . . .
&he provincial governor shall choose the provincial director fro' a list of three A9B eligibles
reco''ended by the PNP Regional 5irector.
;B . . . City and 'unicipal 'ayors shall have the following authority over the PNP units in their
respective )urisdictions
i.B Authority to choose the chief of police fro' a list of five A.B eligibles reco''ended by the
Provincial Police 5irector. . . . AE'phasis oursB
full control re'ains with the National Police Co''ission.
*e agree, and so hold, with the view of the $olicitor 2eneral that /there is no usurpation of the power of control of
the NAP30C3M under $ection .: because under this very sa'e provision, it is clear that the local e(ecutives are
only acting as representatives of the NAP30C3M. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAP30C3M
for their actions in the e(ercise of their functions under that section. &hus, unless counter'anded by the
NAP30C3M, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAP30C3M./
29
#t is significant to note that the local
officials, as NAP30C3M representatives, will choose the officers concerned fro' a list of eligibles Athose who
'eet the general +ualifications for appoint'ent to the PNPB
)0
to be reco''ended by PNP officials.
&he sa'e holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and control e(ercised by
the local officials. &hose officials would si'ply be acting as representatives of the Co''ission.
As regards the assertion involving the Civil $ervice Co''ission, suffice it to say that the +uestioned provisions,
which read
$ec. 9:. %ppointment of P"P !fficers and Members. H &he Appoint'ent of the officers and
'e'bers of the PNP shall be effected in the following 'anner
a.B Police 3fficer # to $enior Police 3fficer #". H Appointed by the PNP regional director for
regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national head+uarters personnel and attested
by the Civil $ervice Co''issionI
b.B #nspector to $uperintendent. H Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as reco''ended by their
i''ediate superiors, and attested by the Civil $ervice Co''issionI
c.B $enior $uperintendent to 5eputy 5irectorC2eneral. H Appointed by the President upon
reco''endation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper endorse'ent by the Chair'an of the Civil
$ervice
Co''ission . . .
$ec. 98. Examinations for Policemen. H &he Civil $ervice Co''ission shall ad'inister the
+ualifying entrance e(a'inations for police'en on the basis of the standards set by the
NAP30C3M.
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly professionali=e the
sa'e.
&he grant of disciplinary powers over PNP 'e'bers to the /People<s 0aw Enforce'ent Boards/ Aor the P0EBB
and city and 'unicipal 'ayors is also not in derogation of the co''ission<s power of control over the PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Co''ission e(ercises appellate )urisdiction, thru the regional appellate boards, over
decisions of both the P0EB and the said 'ayors. &his is so under $ection 8>AcB. 7urther'ore, it is the
Co''ission which shall issue the i'ple'enting guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the P0EB for in the
conduct of its hearings, and it 'ay assign NAP30C3M hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the P0EBs
A$ection ;9Cd;, d.B.
4
As a disciplinary board pri'arily created to hear and decide citi=en<s co'plaints against erring officers and
'e'bers of the PNP, the establish'ent of P0EBs in every city, and 'unicipality would all the 'ore help
professionali=e the police force.
Petitioner would li?ewise have this Court i'agine that $ection :8 of the +uestioned Act, the pertinent portion of
which reads
$ec. :8. &elationship of the 'epartment with the 'epartment of "ational 'efense. H 5uring a
period of twentyC four A8;B 'onths fro' the effectivity of this Act, the Ar'ed 7orces of the
Philippines AA7PB shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and e(ternal security of
the $tate Provided, that said period 'ay be e(tended by the President, if he finds it )ustifiable, for
another period not e(ceeding twentyCfour A8;B 'onths, after which, the 5epart'ent shall
auto'atically ta?e over fro' the A7P the pri'ary role of preserving internal security, leaving to
the A7P its pri'ary role of preserving e(ternal security.
((( ((( (((
constitutes an /encroach'ent upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, e(ecutive control
and co''anderCinCchief powers./
&hat *e are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here. A re)ection thus of petitioner<s sub'ission
anent $ection :8 of the Act should be in order in the light of the following e(changes during the C3NC3M
deliberations of *ednesday, 3ctober :, :,D%
((( ((( (((
MR. R35R#23. @ust a few +uestions. &he President of the Philippines is the Co''anderCinC
Chief of all the ar'ed forces.
MR. NA&#"#5A5. Jes, Mada' President.
MR. R35R#23. $ince the national police is not integrated with the ar'ed forces, # do not
suppose they co'e under the Co''anderCinCChief powers of the President of the Philippines.
MR. NA&#"#5A5. &hey do, Mada' President. By law they are under the supervision and control
of the President of the Philippines.
MR. R35R#23. Jes, but the President is not the Co''anderCinCChief of the national police.
MR. NA&#"#5A5. 1e is the President.
MR. R35R#23. Jes, the E(ecutive. But they do not co'e under that specific provision that the
President is Co''anderCinCChief of all the ar'ed forces.
MR. NA&#"#5A5. No, not under the Co''anderCinCChief provision.
MR. R35R#23. &here are two other powers of the President. &he President has control over
depart'ents, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local govern'ents. 4nder which does
the police fall, under control or under supervisionK
MR. NA&#"#5A5. Both, Mada' President.
MR. R35R#23. Control and $upervision.
MR. NA&#"#5A5. Jes, in fact, the National Police Co''ission is under the 3ffice of the
President. AC3NC3M REC3R5$, "ol. ., p. 8,%B
#t thus beco'es all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives 'uscle to and enforces
the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Co''anderCinCChief powers of the President.
&his is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the 'ilitary, is not a part of the Ar'ed
7orces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the govern'ent, it properly co'es within, and is sub)ect to, the
e(ercise by the President of the power of e(ecutive control.
Conse+uently, $ection :8 does not constitute abdication of co''anderCinCchief powers. #t si'ply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assu'e the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the $tate. 4nder this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of
his war powers. #t would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as
Co''anderCinCChief, is not a 'e'ber of the Ar'ed 7orces. 1e re'ains a civilian whose duties under the
5
Co''anderCinCChief provision /represent only a part of the organic duties i'posed upon hi'. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature./
)1
1is position as a civilian Co''anderCinCChief is consistent with, and a
testa'ent to, the constitutional principle that /civilian authority is, at all ti'es, supre'e over the 'ilitary./ AArticle
##, $ection 9, :,D- ConstitutionB
7inally, petitioner sub'its that the creation of a /$pecial 3versight Co''ittee/ under $ection D; of the Act,
especially the inclusion therein of so'e legislators as 'e'bers Ana'ely the respective Chair'en of the
Co''ittee on 0ocal 2overn'ent and the Co''ittee on National 5efense and $ecurity in the $enate, and the
respective Chair'en of the Co''ittee on Public 3rder and $ecurity and the Co''ittee on National 5efense in
the 1ouse of RepresentativesB is an /unconstitutional encroach'ent upon and a di'inution of, the President<s
power of control over all e(ecutive depart'ents, bureaus and offices./
But there is not the least interference with the President<s power of control under $ection D;. &he $pecial
3versight Co''ittee is si'ply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tas?ed solely with planning and
overseeing the i''ediate /transfer, 'erger andLor absorption/ into the 5epart'ent of the #nterior and 0ocal
2overn'ents of the /involved agencies./ &his it will underta?e in accordance with the phases of i'ple'entation
already laid down in $ection D. of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the co''ittee itself
would cease altogether.
)2
As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it e(ercises, decidedly do not
constitute an encroach'ent and in di'inution of the power of control which properly belongs to the President.
*hat is 'ore, no e(ecutive depart'ent, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority, of the co''ittee.
))
As a last word, it would not be a'iss to point out here that under the Constitution, there are the soCcalled
independent Constitutional Co''issions, na'ely &he Civil $ervice Co''ission, Co''ission on Audit, and the
Co''ission on Elections. AArticle #!CA, $ection :B
As these Co''issions perfor' vital govern'ental functions, they have to be protected fro' e(ternal influences
and political pressures. 1ence, they were 'ade constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any
depart'ent of the govern'ent.
)4
Certainly, they are not under the control of the President.
&he Constitution also created an independent office called the /Co''ission on 1u'an Rights./ AArticle !###,
$ection :-E:FB.1owever, this Co''ission is not on the sa'e level as the Constitutional Co''issions under
Article #!, although it is independent li?e the latter Co''issions.
)*
#t still had to be constituted thru E(ecutive
3rder No. :%9 Adated May ., :,D-B.
#n contrast, Article !"#, $ection % thereof, 'erely 'andates the statutory creation of a national police co''ission
that will ad'inister and control the national police force to be established thereunder.
&his co''ission is, for obvious reasons, not in the sa'e category as the independent Constitutional
Co''issions of Article #! and the other constitutionally created independent 3ffice, na'ely, the Co''ission on
1u'an Rights.
By way of resu'e, the three Constitutional Co''issions ACivil $ervice, Audit, ElectionsB and the additional
co''ission created by the Constitution A1u'an RightsB are all independent of the E(ecutiveI but the National
Police Co''ission is not.
)6
#n fact, it was stressed during the C3NC3M deliberations that this co''ission would
be under the President, and hence 'ay be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the $ecretary of
the #nterior and 0ocal 2overn'ent.
*1ERE73RE, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant petition is hereby 5#$M#$$E5 for lac? of
'erit.
$3 3R5ERE5.
Narvasa, C.@., MelencioC1errera, 2utierre=, @r., Cru=, 7eliciano, Padilla, Bidin, 2riMoCA+uino, Medialdea,
Regalado, 5avide, @r., Ro'ero and Nocon, @@., concur.
6