Pergamon

Electoral Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 447-46{)

Copyr i ght 1996 Elsevier Sci ence Ltd
Pr i nt ed in Gr eat Britain. All r i ght s r eser ved
0261- 3794/ 96 $15. 00+0. 00
0261-3794(95)00056-9
Baromet er El ecti ons i n Comparati ve
Perspect i ve
CHRI STOPHER J ANDERSON
J L Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL' 60208-2001, USA and Department of Political Science,
Rice University, PO Box 1892, Houston,
TX 77251-1892, USA
DANIEl. S WARD
Department of Political Science, Rice University, PO Box 1892, Houston,
TX 77251-1892, USA
This paper develops a conceptual framework for studying the perfor-
mance of the government in what we term ' barometer elections'.
Barometer elections are defined as elections that reflect changes in
citizens' attitudes toward the government in response to changing politi-
cal and economic conditions, absent the opportunity to install a new
executive. We classify British by-elections and German Land elections as
barometer elections and test a general model that incorporates the
electoral cycle; public opinion toward the government; economic condi-
tions; and previous performance as determinants of election outcomes.
Considering both short-term and long-term changes in public attitudes and
economic performance in the empirical analysis, we find that barometer
election outcomes can be explained with a similar set of independent
variables across systems. Copyright 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd
ba.rom.e.ter n. 1 An instrument for measuring pressure. 2 Anything that indicates changes
(The Doubleday Dictionary, 1975, p. 58)
In any meani ngf ul , or der ed syst em of democr at i c gover nment , el ect i ons are
i nt ended to carry out di st i nct i ve funct i ons. Evi dence for this is f ound i n t he basi c
st ruct ural di versi t y of vot i ng syst ems i n t he democr at i c worl d. Whet her we consi der
t he t i mi ng of el ect i ons, vot e count i ng met hods, bal l ot forms, or any ot her institu-
t i onal fact or for aggregat i ng ci t i zens' pr ef er ences, t he desi gners of democr at i c
pol i t i es i ncor por at e t hese el ement s wi t h foret hought . Varyi ng degrees of pol i cy
r esponsi veness, part y responsi bi l i t y, or vot er efficacy, resul t from t he combi nat i on
of rul es t hat defi ne t he system. I n this paper we cont end, however , t hat t here are
aspect s of democr at i c pr ocesses t hat may be essent i al l y i mmune to st ruct ural
reforms. One such c ompone nt we l abel t he ' bar omet er el ect i on' . We do not argue
t hat t hese el ect i ons cannot be changed i n form, but i nst ead t hat t hei r f unct i on will
be served i n what ever form t hey appear. Thi s paper is an effort to expl or e barom-
et er el ect i ons across t wo di st i nct el ect oral systems, Ger many and Great Britain. If
448 Bar ome t e r el ect i ons i n compar at i ve perspect i ve
we are correct in our characterization of such elections, a general model, contain-
ing a basic and portable set of variables, should help explain their out comes in a
systematic manner.
Both definitions of ' baromet er' quot ed above fit the conceptualization that we
propose here. Barometer elections measure pressure on the government by taking
account of changes in the political environment. Though most elections may, in
one way or another, fit this general definition, we are interested particularly in
elections that are viewed by office holders and ot her political elites as performing
such a role. Put simply, we argue that citizens use these elections to send signals
to key political actors regarding the i ncumbent government ' s performance. I
Specifically, we consider elections that reflect changes in public attitudes and
behavior t oward the government as a response to political and economi c condi-
tions, absent the d i r e c t opport uni t y to reinstall or remove the party in power, as
baromet er elections.
For the purposes of this study, we characterize British by-elections and German
Land elections as baromet er elections. The study of such elections is not new;
British by-elections have been subject to considerable examination (Cook and
Ramsden, 1973; Mughan, 1986, 1988; Norris, 1990). Less common, but in the same
vein, has been the work on by-elections outside the UK (Norris and Feigert, 1989)
and German Land elections (Dinkel, 1977, 1981). US mid-term congressional
elections have been explored in considerable detail and might be considered the
most frequently studied form of baromet er election (Campbell, 1960; Tufte, 1973,
1975, 1978; Erikson, 1988, 1990; Campbell, 1993). Finally, there is an extensive
and growi ng body of literature on so-called ' second-order' national elections (Reif
and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). These are elections that take
place at the national level within the cont ext of the national party system and
electoral rules, but whi ch have no immediate consequence for the distribution of
power at the national level. The most famous example of such second-order
elections are European Parliament elections.
When treated as i ndependent variables, there is little doubt that baromet er
elections such as British by-elections or German Land elections matter, even if they
do not usually lead to shifts in power at the level of the national executive. Thus,
it has been shown that baromet er elections have systematic effects on support for
bot h governing and opposition parties. Clarke and Zuk (1989) demonstrate, for
example, that by-election results affect public opinion toward the British Liberals;
Anderson (1995b) shows that by-elections and Land elections influence governing
party support in Britain and Germany.
Separately, by-elections and Land elections have been studied as barometers of
support for the governing party (or parties). Our interest is in viewing t hem collec-
tively in this manner. Despite the fact that many similar hypot heses have been
tested in these literatures, they have remained essentially disparate. In this paper,
we seek to explore whet her a process of evaluation of the government is common
across different political systems t hrough the means of a baromet er election. In the
following sections we first review the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of
previous research; we extract a number of shared assumptions from the literature
and propose a set of general hypotheses; wc t hen focus on model specification and
test the proposed hypotheses; we concl ude with a discussion of the statistical
results and their implications for our goal of generating a general theory of baro-
met er elections.
CHRISTOPHER J ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WARD
Baromet er El ect i ons i n Great Bri t ai n a nd Ge r many
449
Midterm elections in the US are almost perfectly structured to perform the role of
a baromet er election. Scheduled wi t hout fail at the half-way point in a presidential
term, they seem to compel voters to evaluate the performance of the party in
power. British by-elections and German Land elections also fall into the category of
baromet er elections, but wi t hout the regularity of the mid-point timing. Similar to
midterm elections in the US, i ncumbent parties in these countries almost invariably
lose support bet ween general elections.
The factors most commonl y empl oyed to study by-elections in Britain and Land
elections in Germany are similar to the ones used in the study of midterm election
results in the US. They include the state of the economy, executive popularity, and
partisan support. However, given that British by-elections and German Land elections
are held at irregular intervals during the course of a legislative period, time also plays
a role in these elections, thus making t hem attractive candidates for analysis.
Whet her the election is called early in the national government ' s term, in the middle,
or late, may have a systematic impact on the out come of the election, according to
students of by-elections and Land elections (Norris, 1990; Dinkel, 1977).
In the case of British by-elections, the work by Mughan (1986, 1988), Norris
(1990), and Norris and Feigert (1989) is the most systematic. Mughan identifies a
referendum and an economi c model of by-election results, where executive
popularity and i ncumbent party support are the determinants of by-election results
in the referendum model, and the state of the economy (measured in tmemploy-
ment and inflation) is the determinant of by-election out comes in the economi c
model. Studying British by-elections over the 1950-1983 period, Mughan finds that
' [t]o the limited extent that short term fluctuations in approval ratings do structure
the government vote in by-elections, this type of midterm contest may reasonably
be interpreted as a referendum on the economi c and political performance of the
party in office' (Mughan, 1988, p. 42).
Norris examines British by-elections from the 1940s to the late 1980s in terms
somewhat similar to Mughan' s analyses. She also examines the effects of the state
of the economy, party support, and executive popularity on by-election outcomes.
In her model, the economy influences party support and executive popularity. Party
and executive support, in turn, affect by-election vote shares. Norris concludes that
' local by-elections can be seen, wi t h some legitimacy, as representing a referendum
on government performance' (Norris, 1990, pp. 142-143).
Although the work on by-election results in Britain and ot her Anglo-American
democracies like Canada, New Zealand and Australia, is extensive and dates back
over 50 years (see Cook and Ramsden, 1973), it is also largely descriptive in nature.
The opposite is true for research on German Land elections. Although this litera-
ture is very sparse, it is fairly systematic and rigorously empirical. The best example
of this strand of research is the work by Dinkel (1977, 1981; see also Fabritius,
1978).
Dinkel examines the fortunes of governing parties in German Land elections
relative to the previous national elections over the 1949-1972 period. He finds that
' . . . t he governing parties at the federal level do noticeably worse in Land elections
during the course of the legislative period than the Bundestag-election results in
the same Limder before and after Land elections woul d lead one to believe' (Dinkel,
1981, p. 135). 2 The factors examined in Dinkel' s work are time and regional
450 Barometer elections in comparative perspective
strength of a party. He finds that the timing of a Land election is a major factor
predicting the magnitude of the government ' s loss. The closer the election date to
the actual midterm, the worse the governing parties do. His results also indicate
that governing parties do less badly in regions where they are usually strong.
Unfortunately and unlike the work on by-elections, this line of research does not
consider the impact of executive popularity, party support, or the state of the
economy.
Overall, we can summarize that the research on by-elections considers the role
of the economy, executive and party support, and concludes that there is evidence
to view by-elections as barometers, while the research on German Land elections
has not systematically considered these factors and has instead relied on the role
of timing and regional strength. Despite this and despite the fact that these elections
take place in t wo different electoral arenas, previous research provides us with suffi-
cient support to view these t wo different forms of election as a single type: barom-
eter elections. They reflect systematic changes in public attitudes toward, or
support for, the government. In the ensuing analysis we seek to identify a general
set of explanations for the out comes of these elections.
Expl ai ni ng Losses i n Ba r o me t e r El e c t i ons
Apart from the analytical linkages among the different approaches to barometer
elections, it is important to recognize a clear empirical linkage as well. Parties in
power regularly, almost invariably, lose support in such elections. Hence, the
purpose of any model of baromet er election out comes must be to understand the
magnitude of that loss. By identifying the factors that are systematically related to
baromet er election results, the underlying processes will emerge in sharper relief.
Changes in vote shares for governing parties in by-elections and Land elections
produce an unmistakable pattern: governing parties tend to lose votes in baromet er
elections. Of the 323 British by-elections from 1950-1991 we analyze in this paper,
only a small number resulted in a vote gain for the incumbents. The story is
repeated in German Land elections, where the government tends to lose in baro-
met er elections. The average change in vote share for the government in British
by-elections over the period considered here is -9. 36 per cent, whereas it is -3. 96
per cent in the case of German Land elections (1950-1992).
Clearly, the direction of baromet er election out comes is not in quest i on--part i es
in power lose support. More interesting is the cause of these results and explana-
tions for variation in the magnitude of loss within and across systems. The research
on by-elections and Land elections suggests a number of hypotheses. In order to
enhance our understanding of the baromet er phenomenon, we turn to the exten-
sive literature on US midterm elections as well.
Looking in'st at political variables, there is ample evidence to suggest that popular
governments should do better in barometer elections, everything else being equal.
Given that both Britain and Germany are parliamentary democracies with strong polit-
ical parties and executives, we can investigate the effects of both party support and
executive approval on barometer election outcomes. Further, based on the surge and
decline thesis,3 we woul d expect that governments whi ch perform better in the previ-
ous election do worse in the subsequent one. The inclusion of British by-elections
and German Land elections in our study is an opportunity to consider the effects of
election timing on barometer election outcomes as well. Following previous research
CHRISTOPHER J ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WAR[) 451
on electoral cycles in second-order national elections, by-elections and Land elections,
we expect a curvilinear relationship bet ween time and government vote share in the
barometer election (Reif, 1984; Norris, 1990; Marsh and Franklin, 1996). In other
words, the closer the election date to the absolute midterm of the electoral cycle,
the worse the expect ed magnitude of vote loss for the government.
When it comes to the impact of the economy on election outcomes, scholars
have relied quite successfully on the reward-punishment hypothesis (also often
called the responsibility hypothesis), the best known and most widely tested
hypothesis to guide scholarly work of this kind (cf. Downs, 1957; Key, 1968;
Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). This hypothesis states that the mass public holds the
i ncumbent government accountable for the state of the economy. When the
economy performs well, the government can take credit, but when there is a slump,
the executive and/ or the governing parties are usually the first ones to be blamed
by the mass public.
We can list the hypot heses tested in this paper as follows:
H3pothesis 1. The state of tile national economy is positively associated with
government performance in barometer elections (reward-punish).
HypothesL~ 2. The popularity of the executive is positively ,lSSociated with his/her
party' s performance in barometer elections.
Hypothesis .3. The level of partisan support t\)r the governing party in the
electorate is positively associated with its performance in barometer elections.
Hypothesis 4. The date of the barometer election will exhibit a curvilinear relation-
ship with the electoral performance of the government. That is, the closer the
date of the barometer election to the exact midterm point of the electoral cycle,
the worse the government ' s performance.
Hypothesis 5. A party' s performance in the previous election will be negatively
associated with its performance in the barometer election (surge and decline).
Model , Data, and Meas urement
Since we seek to make inferences about baromet er elections across countries with
quite different political institutions, electoral rules, and party systems, we need to
const ruct a theoretical model that is comparable across countries. Hence, wc seek
to develop a baseline model of such elections that can be tested using comparable
variables. As a result, the model necessarily will emphasize cross-national similari-
ties at the expense of country-specific factors in order to identify common under-
lying dynamics of baromet er election outcomes.
Because the dependent variable needs to reflect the performance of the govern-
ing party, we use changes in the share of the popul ar vote in bot h countries. Yet,
the vote share variable differs slightly across the systems in order to be sensitive to
the particular systemic cont ext in whi ch the election takes place. In Britain,
comment at ors and the public pay attention to the by-election result in a
constituency, while in Germany peopl e pay attention to changes in the govern-
ment ' s fortunes in a Land. Since the focus of public attention differs across systems,
452 Barometer elections in comparative perspective
t he dependent variable is an i ndi cat or of such differences. In the British case it is
the vot e share for the Prime Minister' s part y in t he by-election; in Germany it is
t he vot e share for the Chancel l or' s part y in a Land election.
The general model that is empl oyed to exami ne bar omet er el ect i ons in the t wo
count ri es i nvest i gat ed here looks as follows:
A vote share -- f (previous vote share; executive approval; partisan
support; economy; time).
By i ncl udi ng a measure of vot e share for the gover nment in the previ ous el ect i on
we can gauge t he effects of various expl anat or y variables on a relatively stable base
of mass support.4 In addition, this measure capt ures the possi bl e surge and decl i ne
i dent i fi ed in bar omet er el ect i on results. The coeffi ci ent for this variable is expect ed
to be negative given that it is easi er to lose an absol ut e per cent age of the el ect orat e
based on a larger vot e share. This formul at i on is also conveni ent because it means
that onl y current values of t he i ndependent economi c variables need be i ncl uded
in t he model i nst ead of a more compl ex lagged model formulation.
The economi c variables that this analysis focuses on are the obj ect i ve rates of
unempl oyment and inflation.5 They are what Nannest ad and Paldam call the 'Big
Two' since t hey are by far t he most wi del y used and most consi st ent l y significant
i ndi cat ors of economi c per f or mance (Nannest ad and Paldam, 1994). Unempl oyment
and inflation are also t hose variables that const i t ut e t he chi ef targets of post -war
economi c management in Europe. Public opi ni on polls show time and again that
inflation and unempl oyment are t hose economi c issues of most concer n to the
general publ i c (Alt, 1979; Hibbs, 1987; Norpot h, 1992). Given that citizens can
devot e only l i mi t ed resources to gat heri ng and di gest i ng i nformat i on about the
economy and politics, unempl oyment and inflation are t hose variables that are
easiest to underst and and about whi ch i nformat i on is easily and most publ i cl y avail-
able t hrough t he mass media.6
Two measures of suppor t for t he gover nment are used: execut i ve approval and
governi ng part y support . In t he British case we measure execut i ve approval by the
per cent age of r espondent s answeri ng ' Satisfied' to the quest i on ' Are you satisfied
or dissatisfied wi t h. . , as Prime Minister?' Governi ng part y suppor t is measured by
the responses to t he question: ' If t here wer e a general el ect i on t omor r ow, whi ch
part y woul d you support ?' In t he German case, approval for the Chancel l or' s
handl i ng of his job is gauged by ' Do you- - by and l ar ge- - agr ee wi t h the pol i ci es of
t he Chancel l or . . .?', wher eas t he quest i on wor di ng for part y suppor t is: ' If t here
wer e a Bundestag el ect i on next Sunday, whi ch part y woul d you vot e for? '7
We test for the effects of t i me on bar omet er el ect i on out comes by i ncl udi ng a
variable that count s t he number of quart ers since the general election. Time can
be empl oyed in t wo ways: first, as a linear variable that woul d indicate whet her
t here is a linear t rend t owar d great er losses for the gover nment over time; and
second, we can test whet her t here is a curvi l i near rel at i onshi p bet ween time and
bar omet er el ect i on out comes by squaring the time variable.
Changes in govemi ng part y support are expect ed to be det ermi ned by changes in
publ i c opi ni on and economi c conditions, as defined above. We measure change in
t wo ways: first, as the average change from the general election quart er to each subse-
quent quarter; and second, as the change from the last quarter before the baromet er
el ect i on to the quarter of the baromet er election. The first measurement t echni que
is i nt ended to capt ure the effects of long-term trends in economi c performance and
CHRISTOPHER J ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WARD 453
government popularity since the last general election; the second is designed to deter-
mine whet her short-term changes, just prior to the vote choice, have an impact on
barometer election outcomes.
Analysis
We rely on a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations, the results of whi ch
are presented in Tables 1-4. For bot h nations, t wo separate sets of models were
tested; the first uses change variables measured as the average change from the
quarter of the general election and each subsequent quarter t hrough the barome-
ter election (Tables 1 and 3); the second set uses simple change from the quarter
prior to the baromet er election (Tables 2 and 4). 8 Performance in the general
election is included in every model, as is the time variable, and change in inflation
and unempl oyment . In each of the four tables, Model 1 includes executive popular-
ity, while Model 2 substitutes aggregate partisan support. Because these variables
are highly correlated, they are not included in the model together.
Turning first to German Land elections (Tables 1 and 2), we find strong economi c
and political effects, although the results do not conform to some of the conven-
tional wisdom. First, we should point out that the general election variable is signif-
icant and in the expect ed negative direction in every model. In other words, the
better the governing party performed in the previous election, the larger the decline
in the baromet er election. Originally devel oped to describe US midtcrms, thc notion
of ' surge and decline' finds consistent support in the case of German Land elections.
Likewise, the time variables work as expected. Though they do not emerge as statis-
tically significant in each model, the t i me variable is always negative and the t i me 2
variable is always positive, suggesting a curvilinear relationship bet ween time and
change in electoral performance for the governing party.
An interesting finding in the German case is the consistently strong positive effect
of unempl oyment - - as unempl oyment increases, the governing party' s electoral
fortunes improve. This finding is not wi t hout precedent, or rational explanation, if
we move beyond the simple reward-puni shment hypothesis. When the party in
power is taken into consideration, a more complete, and compl ex picture emerges.
The literature on the so-called issue priorities or issue saliencies of political parties
in the cont ext of economi c voting models suggests that governing parties do not
necessarily get punished when economi c conditions worsen. According to this
perspective, voters assign different compet enci es and/ or priorities to political
parties for dealing with specific economi c outcomes. When it comes to economi c
performance generally and unempl oyment specifically, researchers have found that
German voters believe that the Christian Democrats are better able to handle the
economy (Anderson, 1995a; Anderson and Zelle, 1995). The literature on German
vote functions has borne this out by repeatedly finding positive relationships
bet ween unempl oyment and inflation on the one hand and government support on
the ot her hand, particularly when the government is led by Christian Democrats
(Rattinger, 1991; Anderson, 1995a). Given that the Christian Democrats were the
governing party for the vast majority of the time period analyzed in this paper, it
is reasonable to conjecture that the positive coefficient for unempl oyment is a result
of the Christian Democrats' presence as a governing party. ~'
Finally, we find that party support, rather than executive popularity, has a system-
atic effect on the governing party' s fortunes in baromet er elections that take place
454 B a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s i n c o mp a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e
TABLE 1. Long-term effects on German Land
election results, 1950-1992
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 10.762* 9.365t
(4.200) (4.173)
AInflation -0.548 -0.785
(1.830) (1.619)
AUnemployment 7.447 9.241,
(3.496) (3.503)
APopularity 0.432
(0.492)
APartisanship 1.548*
(0.622)
General Election -0.255* -0.256*
(0.086) (0.083)
Time - 1.023* -0.696
(0.588) (0.589)
Time 2 0.060 0.044
(0.038) (0.038)
R 2 0.173 0.225
SE 5.9047 5.7927
N 92 89
Standard error in parentheses; *significant at
0.10; *significant at 0.05; $significant at 0.01.
Note: Change variables measured as average
change from general election quarter.
TABLE 2: Short-term effects on German Land
electoral results, 1950-1992
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 10.626, 10.273,
(3.807) (3.756)
AInflation -0.652 -0.577
(0.550) (0.540)
&Unemployment 5.517** 4.159*
(2.373) (2.360)
APopularity 0.172
(0. 157)
APartisanship 0.432 *
(0. 172)
General election -0.266* -0.258*
(0.073) (0.072)
Time -0.924 -0.971"
(0.576) (0.568)
Time 2 0.055 0.057
(0.037) (0.037)
R 2 0.193 0.239
SE 5.8809 5.7811
N 96 93
Standard error in parentheses; *significant at
0.10; tsignificant at 0.05; *significant at 0.01.
Note: change variables measured as change
from previous quarter.
CHRISTOPHER J ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WARD
TABLE 3. Long-term effects on British by-election
results, 1950-1991
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 6.883* 2.903
(2.178) (2.020)
AInflation 0.093 -0.668"
(0.232) (0.146)
AUnemployment O. 563 1.134*
(0.434) (0.407)
APopularity O. 010
(0.044)
APartisanship O. 591 *
(0.080)
General Election -0.142" -0.108"
(0.030) (0.027)
Time -2.667* - 1.437*
(0.398) (0.358)
Time 2 0.119" 0.070"
(0.020) (0.018)
R 2 0.241 0.345
SE 7.2566 6.9946
N 276 308
Standard error in parentheses; *significant at 0.01.
Note: Change variables measured as average
change from general election quarter.
455
TABLE 4. Short-term effects on British by-election
results, 1950-1991
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 9.643t 5.500t
(2.082) (2.171 )
&Inflation - 1.417 t - 1.121 t
(0.329) (0.354)
AUnemployment -3.011 -5. 885t
(2.023) (2.202)
&Popularity 0.245t
(O.090)
APartisanship 0.578t
(0.142)
General Election -0. 146t -0. 104t
(0.028) (0.029)
Time -3. 096t -2. 125t
(0.373) (0.385)
Time 2 0.136t 0.087t
(0.018) (0.019)
R 2 0.312 0.207
SE 6.8914 7.6872
N 269 309
Standard error in parentheses; *significant at
0.05; tsignificant at 0.01.
Note: Change variables measured as change
from previous quarter.
456 B a r o me t e r e l e c t i ons i n c o mp a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e
in a parliamentary system. The consistent pattern of loss in Land elections is dimin-
ished when the party is stronger in the electorate, and the effect holds regardless
of the measurement used. It is interesting that the Chancellor' s popularity has no
measurable impact on his own party' s baromet er election outcomes, whi ch
contrasts with the finding for presidential popularity in US midterm elections.
British by-elections provide us wi t h some of the most intriguing results. Like Land
elections, we fred that previous performance has a consistent and significant
negative impact on performance in the baromet er election. Again, we find that the
length of time from the general to the by-election shows a curvilinear relationship
to baromet er outcomes; bot h coefficients are statistically significant in every model.
Here the effects of time show to be quite dramatic substantively. Vote share is
reduced by nearly eight percent age points when t i me and t i me 2 combi ned have
their maxi mum effect.
In contrast to the German case, inflation consistently emerges as statistically
significant and negative using bot h long and short-term measures of change.
Unemployment, however, produces inconsistent findings. When measured as the
average change from the general election quarter to each subsequent quarter until
the by-election, we find that increased unempl oyment is positively associated with
governing party performance, similar to our findings for German Land elections.
When we measure unempl oyment change simply from the quarter prior to the by-
election, a negative effect emerges, whi ch is consistent with the reward-punish-
ment hypothesis. All ot her findings remain consistent in the face of this sign change
for unempl oyment , suggesting that the results are not simply sensitive to model
specification, but that the t wo measures of unempl oyment change are capturing
different and meaningful patterns.
Finally, bot h political measures emerge as statistically significant and positive
determinants of by-election outcomes. In the long term change models, however,
only party support has a significant effect, as was the case in Land elections. When
short-term change is measured, bot h party approval and Prime Minister popularity
have a positive impact on election returns. Generally, we can say that executive
popularity, when it matters at all, appears to be a short-term force in barometer
elections. Party support, on the ot her hand, may capture more consistent long-term
political effects.
Di s c u s s i o n
In this paper we suggest a t heory of baromet er elections. We defme barometer
elections as those that measure pressure on the government by taking account of
changes in the political and economi c environment. In particular, we identify
elections that are viewed by office holders and ot her political elites as performing
the role of a baromet er of the political climate at the time these elections are held.
This means that in principle baromet er elections can and do take place in a variety
of countries with different electoral and political systems. Specifically, we examine
elections that reflect changes in public attitudes and behavior toward the govern-
ment as a response to political and economi c conditions, but whi ch lack the oppor-
tunity to install a new executive.
This paper also tests a general model of baromet er elections. The model includes
the following elements: the state of the economy; executive popularity; partisan
strength in the electorate; previous performance; and time. The test was performed
CHRISTOPHER J ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WARD 4S7
wi t h d a t a o n b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s i n Gr e a t Br i t ai n a n d Ge r ma n y , wh e r e we cl assi -
f i ed Br i t i s h b y - e l e c t i o n s a n d Ge r ma n Land e l e c t i o n s as p e r f o r mi n g t h e r ol e o f bar()-
me t e r e l e c t i o n s i n t h e r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l s ys t e ms . Gi v e n t ha t t h e s e e l e c t i o n s ar e
v i e we d as b a r o me t e r s , t h e y p r o v i d e e x c e l l e n t t e s t c a s e s b e c a u s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t
di f f e r e nt k i n d s o f e l e c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e i n d i s t i n c t e l e c t o r a l s t r uc t ur e s .
Th e q u e s t i o n we s o u g h t t o a n s we r wa s t hus : gi ve n t ha t t h e s e e l e c t i o n s a r e
t y p i c a l l y v i e we d as b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s , h o w d o t h e y r e f l e c t t h e c u r r e n t pol i t i c a l
c l i ma t e ? I r oni c a l l y f or s t u d e n t s o f Ame r i c a n mi d t e r m e l e c t i ons , t h e s t r o n g e s t
f i ndi ngs f r o m o u r anal ys i s s u g g e s t t ha t Br i t i sh a n d Ge r ma n b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s
c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l l o w a p a t t e r n o f s ur ge a n d d e c l i n e . Th e s u c c e s s o f g o v e r n me n t s i n
b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s is s i gni f i c a nt l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y h o w we l l t h e y di d pr e vi ous l y. I n
o t h e r wo r d s , Ge r ma n a n d Br i t i sh g o v e r n me n t s s uf f er mo r e i n b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s ,
t h e b e t t e r t h e y p e r f o r m i n t h e p r e v i o u s g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . Ba r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s a r c
al s o c l e a r l y c r e a t u r e s o f t h e e l e c t o r a l c yc l e . I n b o t h c o u n t r i e s we f i nd t ha t gove r n-
me n t s d o b e t t e r t h e f u r t h e r b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s a r e r e mo v e d f r o m t h e mi d p o i n t o f
t h e e l e c t o r a l cycl e. Thus , t i me is u n d o u b t e d l y an i mp o r t a n t d e t e r mi n a n t o f bar o-
me t e r e l e c t i o n s i n Ge r ma n y a n d Gr e a t Br i t ai n.
Over al l , we o b t a i n r e s ul t s t ha t a r e c o n s i s t e n t wi t h o u r h y p o t h e s e s ( t a k i n g pol i t -
i cal c o n t e x t i nt o a c c o u n t ) i n t wo c o u n t r i e s wi t h r e g a r d t o t h e pol i t i c a l a n d t i me-
r e l a t e d va r i a bl e s . Ho we v e r , we we r e n o t t ot a l l y s u c c e s s f u l at f i n d i n g s y s t e ma t i c a nd
eas i l y e x p l a i n a b l e e c o n o mi c e f f e c t s o n t h e o u t c o me s o f b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s . Not e
t ha t t hi s is u n l i k e l y t o b e t h e r e s ul t o f mo d e l mi s s - s p e c i f i c a t i o n as we t r i e d a wi d e
va r i e t y o f o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s . Th e mi x e d e v i d e n c e l e a ds us t o t wo , a l be i t r e l a t e d,
c o n c l u s i o n s . Fi r st , t h e r e s ul t s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e i mp a c t o f t h e s t a t e o f t h e e c o n o my
o n b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n o u t c o me s d e mo n s t r a t e s t ha t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t we e n t h e
e c o n o my a n d p u b l i c s u p p o r t is l i kel y t o b e mu c h mo r e c o mp l e x t h a n a s s u me d b y
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e wa r d - p u n i s h me n t h y p o t h e s i s b a s e d o n r e s e a r c h o n t h e Ame r i c a n
p r e s i d e n t i a l p o p u l a r i t y a n d e l e c t i o n o u t c o me s ( Lewi s - Beck, 1988; Cl a r ke et aL,
1992; Po we l l a n d Wh i t t e n , 1993; An d e r s o n , 1995a) . Se c o n d , b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s
ma y n o t b e t h e p l a c e t o l o o k f or e f f e c t s o f t h e e c o n o my o n e l e c t i o n o u t c o me s as
t h e y a r e - - a c c o r d i n g t o o u r r e s u l t s - - mu c h mo r e p o p u l a r i t y c o n t e s t s a n d r e f l e c t i o n s
o f t h e p o l i t i c a l mo o d o f t h e mo me n t t h a n o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o r e wa r d a n d p u n i s h
i n c u mb e n t g o v e r n me n t s f or e c o n o mi c p e r f o r ma n c e . Af t e r all, v o t e s i n b a r o me t e r
e l e c t i o n s ar e s o me wh a t l es s c o n s e q u e n t i a l t h a n i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s .
Ou r f i ndi ngs al s o l e a d t o s e ve r a l s u g g e s t i o n s f or f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h . We p r o p o s e t o
e v a l u a t e o t h e r e l e c t i o n s u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s . Ca n d i d a t e s t ha t
c o me t o mi n d a r e l egi s l at i ve e l e c t i o n s i n Fr a n c e a n d mi d t e r m c o n g r e s s i o n a l
e l e c t i o n s i n t h e US, t h o u g h t h e p r o b l e m o f s uf f i c i e nt da t a p o i n t s wi l l c o n t i n u e t o
p l a g u e s u c h anal ys es . Eu r o p e a n e l e c t i o n s a r e al s o a wo n d e r f u l l a b o r a t o r y t ha t ma y
l e n d t h e ms e l v e s t o t h e s t u d y o f b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n s ( van d c r Ei j k a n d Fr ankl i n,
1996) . Aus t r i a n Land e l e c t i o n s s h o u l d b e s i mi l a r t o Ge r ma n Land e l e c t i o n s , g i v e n
t h e r e l a t i ve s i mi l a r i t y o f t h e t wo s ys t e ms . Wh e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e s ul t s o b t a i n e d f or
t h e Ge r ma n c a s e h o l d i n s i mi l a r s y s t e ms c o u l d b e t e s t e d t he r e . Fi nal l y, c a n d i d a t e s
f or t h e s t u d y o f b y - e l e c t i o n s a r e o t h e r We s t mi n s t e r - t y p e s y s t e ms l i ke Aus t r a l i a o r
Ne w Ze a l a n d o r s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n s i n t h e US.
Over al l , we b e l i e v e t ha t t h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a me wo r k o f t he b a r o me t e r e l e c t i o n
p r o v i d e s a c h a n c e t o c o n s i d e r a cl as s o f e l e c t i o n s t ha t we r e p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d
' s e c o n d - o r d e r ' e l e c t i o n s o r n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t e wo r t h y b e c a u s e o f c r os s - na t i ona l
d i f f e r e n c e s i n e l e c t o r a l s t r u c t u r e s ( Mi l l er , 1988) . Mt h o u g h al l e l e c t i o n s ma t t e r , t h e y
458 Bar omet er elections i n comparat i ve perspect i ve
mat t er i n di fferent ways. Bar omet er el ect i ons may not install a ne w gover nment ,
but t hey pl ay an i mpor t ant and i dent i fi abl e rol e in a count r y' s pol i t i cal dynami cs.
They pr ovi de oppor t uni t i es for ci t i zens t o send signals t o pol i t i cal leaders, whi c h
are i gnor ed wi t h consi der abl e risk. By uni fyi ng t he el ement s t hat i nf l uence t he
out comes of t hese el ect i ons concept ual l y and empi ri cal l y, we are abl e t o st udy
el ect i ons across space and t i me wi t hout consi der abl e loss of general i t y.
Acknowledgements
This paper was first pr es ent ed at t he Wor ks hop on The E c o n o my a n d Pol i t i cal
Be h a v i o r , Ri ce Uni versi t y, 22- 23 April 1995. We woul d like t o t hank t he wor ks hop
part i ci pant s, Harol d Cl arke and t he anonymous r evi ewer s for t hei r hel pf ul sugges-
t i ons and cri t i ci sms. Thanks also t o Hans Rat t i nger f or hel pf ul hi nt s and Hol l y
Teet er s Reynol ds for r esear ch assi st ance. The publ i c opi ni on data wer e gener ousl y
pr ovi ded by Gal l up Britain and t he Inst i t ut fiir Demos kopi e Al l ensbach. The Ger man
e c onomi c and publ i c opi ni on dat a are avai l abl e as ZA-800 f r om t he Zent r al ar chi v
fiir Empi r i sche Sozi al forschung, Uni versi t y of Col ogne. None of t he i ndi vi dual s or
or gani zat i ons named above are r esponsi bl e for t he results r epor t ed here.
Notes
1. Often referred to as ' referenda' , we choose the more agnostic term ' barometer election'
for such contests because of the specific individual level assumptions implied by the
notion of a referendum.
2. This is our own translation.
3. The surge and decline hypothesis was first enunciated by Campbell (1960). The basic
premise is that a surge in turnout during high-stimulus general elections brings ' bonus'
votes to the winning candidate' s party, which are subsequently lost in the low-stimulus
midterm election, causing a decline for that party. A related, but competing, explanation
is labelled the ' exposure thesis' (Oppenhei mer et al., 1986; Waterman et al., 1991), which
posits a party equilibrium, or a normal compl ement of seats. When short term forces push
a party beyond that number, the party is said to be ' overexposed' and hence vulnerable
to a fall in the subsequent election. What these two perspectives add to the debate is
consideration of the particular outcomes of the prior general election, an important
element of our notion of elections as barometers.
4. A similar strategy is employed by Powell and Whitten (1993) in a paper on economic
voting, where, in order to control for lagged effects, the level of government vote share
in the previous election is included in the models.
5. The economic data for Germany are taken from the German Statistical Office's Wirtschaft
und Statistik, as well as the Mont hl y Report o f the Deut sche Bundesbank, while the British
data were taken from the British Central Statistical Office' s Mont hl y Digest of Statistics.
6. It is assumed that it is sensible and acceptable to use objective indicators of economic
performance (cf. Kramer, 1983). Kramer argues that people' s images of economic perfor-
ma nc e - whi l e susceptible to occasional errors at the individual l evel --are typically correct
and unbiased in the aggregate, since ' errors in individual perceptions are assumed to be
distributed randomly so that aggregate perceptions are accurate and reliable' (Clarke et
al., 1992, p. 54).
7. The German public opinion data were collected by the Institute fiir Demoskopie,
Allensbach, whereas the British public opinion data were gathered by the Gallup poll. All
monthly surveys are based on random national samples of about 1000 to 2000 respon-
dents each. There is no reason to assume that the samples are biased in any systematic
fashion. Since the analysis is based on over 40 years of monthly polls, the tests performed
below are as inclusive as possible.
8. Technically, our data are a pooled cross-sectional time-series, with a greater number of
time points than cross-sections. Using the change in vote share as the dependent variable
CHRISTOPHER J ANDERSON AND DANIEL S WARD 459
and the level of the previous vote share together with changes in the other independent
variables on the right hand side means that OLS is an appropriate estimation technique
(Beck and Katz, 1995, p. 645). We should point out that the time periods in our data set
occur at irregular and variable intervals. Such an uneven spacing of time points combined
with the cross-sectional nature of the data makes familiar tests for serial correlation, such
as Durbin-Watson's d or h inappropriate. In accordance with the argument made by Beck
and Katz, and Powell and Whitten in their cross-national study of economic voting (Powell
and Whitten, 1993, p. 411), we contend that concerns over serial correlation are sharply
reduced by constructing our dependent variable as a change variable and including previ-
ous vote level as an independent variable.
9. We can report that in a separate run of the model including interactions between
economic effects and political party the expect ed 'issue priority' pattern emerges (see also
Clarke et al., 1992; Anderson, 1995a).
Ref erences
&It, James (1979) The Politics of Economic Decline. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Anderson, Christopher (1995a) Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in
Five European Democracies. M E Sharpe, Armonk.
Anderson, Chri st opher (1995b) Party Systems and the Dynamics of Government Support:
Britain and Germany, 1960-1990, European Journal of Political Research, 27,
93-118.
Anderson, Christopher and Zelle, Carsten (1995) Helmut Kohl and the CDU Victory. German
Politics and Society, 13(1) 12-35.
Beck, Nathaniel and Katz, Jonathan N. (1995) What To Do (and Not To Do) With Time-series
Cross-Section Data, American Political Science Review, 69, 634-647.
Campbell, Angus (1960) Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 24, 397-418.
Campbell, James (1993) The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections. University of
Kentucky Press, Lexington, KY.
Clarke, Harold and Zuk, Gary (1989) The Dynamics of Third Party Support: The British
Liberals, 1951-1979, American Journal of Political Science, 33, 196-221.
Clarke, Harold, Elliott, Euel, Mishler, William, Stewart, Marianne, Whiteley, Paul and Zuk,
Gary (1992) Controversies in Political Economy: Canada, Great Britain, the United
States. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Cook, Chris and Ramsden, John (1973) By-elections in British Politics. Macmillan, London.
Dinkel, Reiner (1977) Der Zusammenhang zwischen Bundestags- und Landtags-wahlergeb-
nissen, PoHtische Vierteljahresschrift, 18(2/3) 348-359.
Dinkel, Reiner (1981) Zur Gesetzm~lgigkeit der Trendverschiebungen zwischen Lantags- und
Bundestagswahlen, Zeitschrift f ~r Parlamentsfragen, 12( 1 ) 135 - 139.
Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theo~, of Democracy. Harper & Row, New York
van der Eijk, Cees and Franklin, Mark (Eds) (1996) Choosing Europe? The European
Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. University of Michigan Press, Ann
Arbor (forthcoming).
Erikson, Robert S (1988) The Puzzle of Midterm Loss, Journal of Politics, 50, 1101-1029.
Erikson, Robert S (1990) Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the
Macrolevel Evidence, American Journal of Political Science, 34, 373-399.
Fabritius, Georg (1978) Wechselwirkungen zwischen Landtagswahlen und Bundespolitik.
Anton Hain, Meisenheim.
Hibbs, Douglas (1987) The Political Econo,ny of l ndust ri al Democracies. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Key, V O (1968) The Responsible Electorate. Vintage Books, New York.
Kramer, Gerald (1983) The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- Versus Individual-level
Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting, American Political Science
Review, 77, 92-111.
Lewis-Beck, Michael (1988) Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies.
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
460 Bar ome t e r el ect i ons i n compar at i ve perspect i ve
Marsh, Mi chael and Franklin, Mark (1995) Under st andi ng European Elections, 1979-1994, in
Cees van der Eijk and Mark Frankl i n (Eds), Choosi ng Europe? The European Electorate
and Nat i onal Politics i n t he Face o f Union. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
(fort hcomi ng).
Miller, Wi l l i am L (1988) I r r el evant Elections? The Qual i t y o f Local Democracy i n Britain.
Oxf or d Uni versi t y Press, New York.
Mughan, Ant hony (1986) Towar d a Political Expl anat i on of Gover nment Vote Losses in
Mi dt erm By-Elections, Ame r i c an Pol i t i cal Science Revi ew, 80(3) 761-775.
Mughan, Ant hony (1988) On t he By-Election Vote of Gover nment s in Britain, Legi sl at i ve
St udi es Quart erl y, 13(1) 29-48.
Nannest ad, Pet er and Paldam, Martin (1994) The VP-Function: a Survey of t he Literature on
Vote and Popul ari t y Funct i ons aft er 25 years, Publ i c Choice, 79, 213-245.
Nor pot h, Hel mut (1992) Conf i dence Regained." Economi cs, Mrs That cher and t he Bri t i sh
Voter. Uni versi t y of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Norris, Pi ppa (1990) Bri t i sh By-elections. Oxf or d University Press, New York.
Norris, Pi ppa and Feigert, Frank (1989) Gover nment and Thi rd-part y Performance in Mi dt erm
By-elections: The Canadian, British, and Australian Exper i ence, El ect oral Studies, 8
117-130.
Oppenhei mer , Bruce, Stimson, James and Wat er man, Ri chard (1986) I nt er pr et i ng US
Congressi onal Elections: The Exposure Thesis, Legi sl at i ve St udi es Quart erl y, 11, 227-247.
Powell, G Bingham and Whi t t en, Guy (1993) A Cross-National Analysis of Economi c Voting:
Taki ng Account of t he Political Cont ext , Ame r i c an J o u r n a l o f Pol i t i cal Science, 37,
391-414.
Rattinger, Hans (1991) Unempl oyment and Elections in West Germany, in Hel mut Nor pot h,
Michael Lewis-Beck and Jean-Domi ni que Lafay (Eds), Economi c and Politics: The Cal cul us
o f Support (pp. 49-62). Uni versi t y of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Reif, Karlheinz (1984) National Electoral Cycles and European Elections, Electoral Studies,
3, 244-255.
Reif, Karl hei nz and Schmitt, Her mann (1980) Nine Second-Order National Elections: A
Concept ual Fr amewor k for t he Analysis of European Election Results, European J our nal
o f Pol i t i cal Research, 8(1) 3-44.
Tufte, Edward (1973) The Rel at i onshi p Bet ween Seats and Vot es in Two-part y Systems,
Ame r i c an Pol i t i cal Science Revi ew, 67, 540-554.
Tufte, Edward (1975) Det er mi nant s of t he Out comes of Mi dt erm Congressi onal Elections,
Ame r i c an Pol i t i cal Science Revi ew, 69, 812-826.
Tufte, Edward (1978) Pol i t i cal Cont rol o f t he Economy. Pr i ncet on University Press,
Pri ncet on.
Wat er man, Richard, Oppenhei mer , Bruce and Stimson, James (1991) Sequence and
Equi l i bri um in Congressi onal Elections: An I nt egr at ed Appr oach, J our nal o f Politics, 53,
372-393.