Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
- - -
- - -
33
Note Leiders remark: . . . if this mission and its results, which can not be traced in any
other chronicle, are a historical fact, it is according to my knowledge the only available written
instance to fix an origin to an indigenous Muslim community (1998).
47
- - -
- - -
- - - (Tha Tun Aung [1927], 42-44)
. . . [As regards] the efforts of the three envoys of King Rum Pashya to
promote their religion Muhammadanism in the capital of Mrauk-oo, Envoy
Kadi built a large Muhammadan mosque at Baungdut port to carry on his
missionary work.
34
Moreover, Envoys Musha and Honumya also built their
own mosques and brought in [or ? were to build their own mosques and to
bring in] Muhammadan preachers from Delhi to make them preach to the
people. . . . Noticing these in the kingdom, Mra War, a young monk,
anticipated that the Religion professed by our four Rakhine races might fade
and [eventually] be wiped out in the capital, visited the Palace and warned
the king and ministers and learned persons in the assembly as follows: . . .
Your Majesty should beware . . . I have noticed this. The three envoys of King
Rum Pashya, with a view to promoting their religion Muhammadanism in the
capital of Mrauk-oo and to wiping out Buddhism professed by us, the four
[Rakhine] races, are preaching [Muhammadanism] every day to the people
of four races in the kingdom, and some citizens in the kingdom have
converted to it and have been listening to Muhammadan sermons. . . . Since
their [the Muslims] ancestors had begun to rule India, they spread their
religion. The religious buildingsincluding the stupas in which their Lords
utensils were enshrined and the statues and stupas dedicated to their Lord
built by the Hindus (the brahmanas, kshatriyas and mahala and their
ancestors), who had faith in [?Buddhism/Hinduism] and who had been
worshipping them from the days when the Buddha was alive, had fallen into
ruin or perished. . . . Now it is evident that the Religion [Hinduism] has died
out and Hindus have become Muhammadans. Likewise, the four races and
the Religion [Buddhism] will be wiped out soon. . . . (Tha Tun Aung 1927, 42-
44)
It is clear from the above excerpt that Tha Tun Aungs intention is to highlight
how Mra War warned the king of the threat posed by the missionary works of three
Muslim envoys. It can also be learnt that Mra War drew attention to the demise of
34
This sentence is unclear.
48
Brahmanism and Buddhism in India after the Muslim invasion so that the king would
comprehend the scale of the problem.
Mra Wars Shwe Myin Dhammathat
It is said that Mra War studied at Nalanda University in India together with Maha
Pyinnyagyaw and King Min Ba. Mra War, as he had witnessed first-hand what
happened in India, warned the Rakhine monarch and ministers to prevent the decline
of Buddhism in Rakhine. Because of his farsightedness, the Rakhines remember him as
a national hero.
King Zalatta Min Sawmun heeded Mra Wars warning. He implored
Mra War to do whatever was needed properly. (Tha Tun Aung 1927, 44)
Getting permission from the king, Mra War wrote the Shwe Myin Dhammathat based
on the Manu Dhammathat under the guidance of his mentor Ven. Aggamuni, who
was dwelling in the Taungnyo monastery in Mrauk-oo, and submitted it to the king.
The Shwe Myin Dhammathat served as the constitution of the Rakhine kingdom
in those days. Every citizens had to abide by it. It has 48 sections, which are virtually
the same as the exhortations in Lawkathara Pyo written by Rakhine Thumyat in Minhtis
reign in the Lemro period. The Amyo Leba Sonmagan [Section on the Exhortation to
the People of Four Races] in Lawkathara Pyo is apparently based on the Mangala-
sutta. Thus, the Shwe Myin Dhammathat also should be regarded as a text based on
the Mangala-sutta. Some of the exhortations from the Shwe Myin Dhammathat will be
compared with those from Lawkathara Pyo and Mangala-sutta below. The excerpts
from Lawkathara Pyo are from Min Thu Wuns (1955) Lawkathara Pyo Ahpye Abeikdan
[An exegesis of the Lawkathara Pyo].
Shwe Myin, no. 1: First, to take refuge in the Three Jewels [the Buddha, the
Dhamma and the Sangha] without being remiss is one [rule].
35
Lawkathara, stanza 1: Pay heed to the exhortations of a holy person who is
desirous of your welfare. Revere and have faith in the Three Jewelsthe Buddha, the
Dhamma and the Sanghawhich are prominent like the sun.
36
(Min Thu Wun 1955, 2)
The first exhortation from the Shwe Myin Dhammathat is what has prevented
Buddhism from decline. That is why the Rakhines proudly say if one is a Rakhine, one
must be a Buddhist.
35
36
49
Shwe Myin, no. 2: To obey the exhortations of ones parents and teachers to
the letter is one [rule].
37
Lawkathara, stanza 2: Obey the exhortations of ones parents and teachers,
who have genuine concern for ones welfare and who want one to live long and be
healthy.
38
(Min Thu Wun 1955, 4)
Thus, the second rule laid down in the Shwe Myin Dhammathat is exactly the
same as that set down in Lawkathara Pyo.
Shwe Myin, no. 9: To respect and associate with the wise, who know how to
behave to gain happiness here and hereafter, is one [rule].
39
Lawkathara, stanza 5: Respect and associate with righteous people who know
what would be beneficial to us in this life and in the life hereafter.
40
(Min Thu Wun 1955,
10)
Mangala-sutta: Associating with the wise [is the supreme blessing].
41
Thus the ninth rule in the Shwe Myin Dhammathat is the same as stanza 5 of
Lawkathara Pyo and one of the thirty-eight mangala [blessings] from the Mangala-
sutta.
Shwe Myin, no. 10: To steer clear of those who behave immorally knowing their
conduct is not beneficial either in this life or in the life hereafter, is one [rule].
42
37
38
- - -
39
40
41
42
- - -
50
Lawkathara, stanza 6: Always avoid fools, who are unwise and immoral and
whose actions are not beneficial to humans in this life or in the life hereafter, disliking
and regarding them as ones enemies.
43
(Min Thu Wun 1955, 12)
Mangala-sutta: Avoiding fools [is the supreme blessing].
44
Thus, the tenth rule of the Shwe Myin Dhammathat is the same as stanza 6 of
Lawkathara Pyo and one of the thirty-eight mangala [blessings] from the Mangala-
sutta.
Shwe Myin, no. 15: To look after ones parents, to whom you owe a debt of
gratitude, having deep affection for and paying respect to them, is one [rule].
45
Lawkathara, stanza 8: Have deep affection for ones parents, pay respect to
them as if they were Buddhist temples or stupas, look after them and be deferential to
them . . .
46
(Min Thu Wun 1955, 16)
Mangala-sutta: Looking after ones mother and father [is the supreme
blessing].
47
Thus, the 25
th
rule in the Shwe Myin Dhammathat is the same as stanza 8 of
Lawkathara Pyo and one of the thirty-eight mangala [blessings] from the Mangala-
sutta.
These comparisons are made so that readers would get the gist of the Shwe
Myin Dhammathat. They also show that the purpose of the Shwe Myin Dhammathat
was to prevent Buddhism from decline, to make all the Rakhines profess Buddhism, and
to ensure that the political, economic and social policies based on Buddhism would
be firmly established in Rakhine. Tha Tun Aung discusses how King Zalatta Min Sawmun
enforced this law as follows:
- - - ()
43
44
45
46
- - -
47
51
. . . In 887 ME [AD 1525], Zalatta Min Sawmun promulgated the Shwe
Myin Dhammathat in his kingdom and decided that [the Muslims] were not
to communicate with [the people of] the four Rakhine races. Accordingly,
it is most important that [the Rakhines of] the four races were to preserve
[their own races] by abstaining from communicating with the people of
other races. If [a Rakhine] fails to preserve his race by fraternizing with the
people of other races, the persons of good lineage are to abstain from
associating with him, from even having meals together with him. (Tha Tun
Aung 1927, 66)
Thus, the king had ordered that the Rakhines were not to communicate with
those who violated the Shwe Myin Dhammathat by associating with the people of
other races.
Therefore, the three envoys effort to spread Islam in the capital Mrauk-oo by
bringing in preachers from Delhi would have been nullified by the Shwe Myin
Dhammathat. If a Rakhine Buddhist was converted to Islam by those Muslim preachers,
he would be ostracized by other Rakhines. The Hindus converted to Islam when the
Muslims occupied India only to avoid being killed. If a person assumes that the people
in Rakhine which was ruled by a Buddhist king and where Buddhism had been
flourishing for hundreds of years, would forsake their Religion and profess Islam, one
must ask him Are you out of your mind?
Zaw Min Htut says it is hard to say that all the Islam converts in those days were
archers (ancestors of present-day Kamans) and that no civilians were among the
converts because he underrates how well rooted Buddhism was in Rakhine (where it
had been flourishing for hundreds of years), because he fails to comprehend the
importance of the Shwe Myin Dhammathat, and because he wants to tell a fabricated
story that the Bengalis who called themselves Rohingyas had come to Rakhine in earlier
periods.
The first rule of the Shwe Myin Dhammathat (ie to take refuge in the Three
Jewelsthe Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha) was not formulated in the Mrauk-
oo period. It was a Rakhine religious custom that went back to the Lemro Period. This
is attested by the first stanza of Lawkathara Pyo, which children had to commit to
memory under the monastic education system in Rakhine in those days. Thus, the
Rakhines had customarily been paying reverence to the Three Jewels throughout
their lives. This custom was turned into a rule in the Shwe Myin Dhammathat. King
52
Zalatta Min Sawmun made Buddhism the State Religion with the aid of Mra War, and
King Min Ba stamped out the Muslims.
The Tabaung
48
Kala Ko Shinpyu (Novitiate the Indians)
Various chronicles deal with Min Bas efforts comprehensively. In a nutshell,
when the sultan of Delhi [kala deli pasa min] presented a medallion bearing the title
Zaukbauk Shah, King Min Ba sent back Kadi, the Sultans envoy, with a message to the
following effect: My great-grandfather Min Sawmun made over the twelve towns of
Bengal to the Sultan of Delhi to get military assistance from the latter when the
Myanmar king of Innwa invaded Rakhine. This was over a hundred years ago. I will
take back the territory controlled by the earlier Rakhine kings. If you do not want to
fight a war, you are to send the dewun thanas [?village headmen] of the twelve towns
of Bengal to me.
Then, when he considered leading his army to the Muslim land [kalapyi], his
learned minister Kaung Kyawhtin Sa informed him that he had heard children saying a
tabaung: kala ko naing lo, sahpo hma mi the, wathetaung ko hti tin, kala ko shinpyu
(If you want to defeat the Kalas [Muslims], stoke up a fire in the kitchen, hoist a finial
on the Wathe hill, and novitiate the Kalas.). He then explicated this tabaung as
follows:
( )
[Kaung Kyawhtin Sa] explains: The phrase kala ko naing lo, sahpo hma
mi the [if you want to defeat the Kalas [Muslims], stoke up a fire in the
kitchen] means that kala mi sinpali mokeseit [?bearded Muslims] must be put
nowhere but in the port of Baungdut, which is the kitchen [of the kingdom].
Wathetaung ko hti tin [hoist a finial on the Wathe hill] means build a stupa
on top of Wathe hill. Kala ko shinpyu [novitiate the Kalas] implies that all the
Kalas must be made to have shaven heads. There is a phrase kala pazun
se-hnit tan ko ma lun ya in an ancient document. You are the twelfth king;
Rakhine kingdom will regain control of the twelve towns of Bengal during
your reign. [The king] then conferred on Kaung Kyawhtin Sa the title
48
Tabaung is something uttered by children or mad persons which is interpreted as a
prophecy.
53
Vimala, which his ancestors usually conferred on royal officials.
(Candamalalankara [1931], 2.58, 59).
All this indicates how King Min Ba, in implementing the rules laid down in the
Shwe Myin Dhammathat to ostracize the Rakhines who associated with the persons of
other races, made the Muslims shave their heads to prevent the people from mixing up
the Muslims and Rakhines. Moreover, the king made the Muslim traders who came to
Mrauk-oo to stay and conduct business only in the port of Baungdut. These facts show
that the three Muslim envoys efforts to spread Islam had been thwarted. King Min Ba,
as foretold by Minister Vimala, successfully reincorporated the twelve towns of Bengal
into his kingdom.
Thus, Zaw Min Htut says that it is hard to say that no civilians were among the
[Islam] converts because he has underrated the Rakhines deep-rooted faith in
Buddhism and failed to connect the exhortations of the Shwe Myin Dhammathat and
King Min Bas efforts.
If the three Muslim envoys were permitted to carry on their missionary works,
they would have built many mosques in Mrauk-oo. However, Sandikhan is the only
mosque in Mrauk-oo said to be built in King Min Sawmuns reign, and it was built for
Muslim warriors. Historians like Harvey (1967) and Hall (1950) also mention only this
mosque.
Zaw Min Htut gives a list of twelve mosques in his book, under the heading
History of Rohingyas and Their Ancient Monuments (Chapter 8, c). To say that other
mosques are ancient ones, we will need Archaeology Departments confirmation.
Are Luces and Dr. Than Tuns Statements Correct?
Zaw Min Htut introduces his history of the new Rohingya race with the story of
the ships which were wrecked in King Maha Taing Candras reign in the Wethali period
as narrated in the Rakhine chronicles. He says that that was in 788 AD. However,
Wethali period and Mrauk-oo period were separated by Lemro period. In order to say
that Rohingyas were of Arab descent, Zaw Min Htuts mentor Ba Tha mentions Hazrat
Ali, Prophet Muhammads son-in-law. Ba Tha explains how Alis son Mohammad Hanif
took refuge in Rakhine when he lost a war, how he defeated Queen Koyapuri who
lived in the Mayu range which separated Maungdaw and Buthidaung and how he
converted her to Islam. Then, Ba Tha concludes that Islam spread in Rakhine from those
Arabs and later spread to Myanmar proper. However, his fabrications do not include
the condition of Islam in Lemro period. Thus, Lemro-period was a missing link. While
Rohingya historians were having difficulty to supply this missing link, an article written by
Than Tun appears in the May 1994 issue of Kalya Magazine. Zaw Min Htut seems to
have had an idea after reading this article. To supply the missing link, he quotes what
are useful for his purpose from Than Tuns article and G H Luces (1985) Phases of Pre-
54
Pagan Burma: Language and History (Chapter VIII. Mru and Kumi [N. Arakan]) as
follows:
(G.H Luce) ()
(Comilla)
( )
(Naaf) (May Yu)
()
Harvey
()
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 28)
Translation:
G H Luce, former Professor of History, Rangoon University, says that the
Rakhine kings mentioned in the 14
th
-century inscriptions found in the
Chindwin valley had Indian names and were Muslims. He goes on to say
that the Muslims reached the Rakhine border soon after conquering Bengal
in 1202, and doubtless destroyed Patikkara (Comilla), a Buddhist kingdom
well known to the early kings of Pagan. He concludes that they seem to
have fought with the local tribes at the border and Muslim military leaders or
local tribal chiefs who had converted to Islam settled on the Myanmar side
of the border.
55
Myanmar historian Dr. Than Tun observes: . . . I wonder whether the
Muslim king was Rohingya from the May Yu river region to the east of Naaf
River. They used to say that they have been living there for over a thousand
years. Even if they were not there that long ago, they probably settled there
around AD 1202 when Muslims invaded Bengal.
In the middle of the 12
th
century, Rakhine was in a state of anarchy.
Harvey has affirmed that Rakhine region was overgrown with jungle to the
extent that even the Mahamuni image/temple could not be found. It can
be assumed from Harveys statement and Dr. Than Tuns above conclusion
that Islam from Bengal came to Rakhine in about the 13
th
century AD.
Dr. Than Tuns statement coincides with the findings of Rohingya
historians.
As can be seen above, Zaw Min Htut has quoted Luce, Than Tun and Harvey. However,
he quotes them selectively to supply the missing link between the Wethali and Mrauk-
oo period, ie the Lemro period. He has omitted some parts from the original texts.
Moreover, Zaw Min Htut seems to have read only Luces and Dr. Than Tuns
statements, not the articles in which their statements are critiqued. Luce cannot rebut
the critiques because he has passed away. Than Tun, however, read the reviews and
corrected his mistakes in Feb 1995 issue of Kalya Magazine. Zaw Min Htut does not
seem to have read this either.
Therefore, I will discuss the matter to highlight how Zaw Min Htut uses the
mistakes made by these historians, to emphasize the correct statements made in the
critiques, and to make Than Tuns corrections known to the readers here.
First, Luces words may be quoted here. In the chapter on Mru and Kumi (N.
Arakan), Luce says:
. . . The main inhabitants of the Mayu river region east of the Naaf, who
are known today as the Rohinjas, are a fine type of devout and scholarly-
minded Muslims, who claim to have inhabited this region for over a thousand
years. This is an exaggeration. But Muslim invaders, we know, occupied
Bengal in 1202,
19
and soon thereafter reached the Arakan border, doubtless
destroying the last Buddhist kingdom of Patikkar (Comilla), well known to
the early kings of Pagan. It is likely enough that fighting occurred on this
frontier, involving the local tribesmen, and that some Muslim generals or
converted local chiefs established themselves on the Burma side of the
frontier. (Luce 1985, 1.95)
In this passage, because he does not find the phrase for over a thousand years
acceptable, Luce remarks: This is an exaggeration. Zaw Min Htut, however, has
omitted this remark in quoting Luces words.
56
Now, let us examine Than Tuns statements. In an article entitled Chin, Mru
Hnint Hkumi (Myauk Rakhine) [Chin, Mru and Kumi (N. Rakhine)] in Kalya Magazine
(August 1994), Than Tun states as follows:
- - - - - -
(Naaf) (Mayu) (ROHINGA)
(COMILLA)
(Than
Tun 1994)
Translation:
. . . Rakhine king also had a Muslim name. He came to the king of
Awa. . . . I wonder whether the Muslim king was Rohingya from the Mayu river
region to the east of Naaf river. They usually say that they have been living
there for over a thousand years. Even if they were not there that long ago,
they probably settled there around AD 1202 when Muslims invaded Bengal.
Say 800 years ago. Patikkara (Comilla), a Buddhist kingdom around there
was probably destroyed because they [the Muslims] invaded the region. It
seems that this inscription records to the effect that some Muslim chiefs had
friendly relations with the king of Awa. (Than Tun 1994).
It can be learnt from comparing the statements made by Luce and Than Tun
that Than Tun does not brush aside the statement for over a thousand years like Luce.
He just reduces the time a bit, saying Say 800 years ago. Moreover, Than Tun says: I
wonder whether the Muslim king was Rohingya, suggesting that he wants to accept
that the Muslims from the Mayu river region to the east of Naaf (Maungdaw and
Buthidaung) were Rohingyas.
The chief source Luce and Than Tun use in writing about the Rohingyas is the
Htupayon inscription in Sagaing, which was inscribed by King Narapati of Awa in 804
ME (AD 1442). The inscription describes how the people from the eight directions of the
compass came to Innwa to pay homage to King Narapati when he ascended the
throne. The inscription runs as follows:
57
- - - (King Narapatis Inscription, lines 20-23, in
Archaeology Department 1987, 35-36)
Translation:
The Rakhine king, who has descended from the Panthe kings
Kaccapati and Assapati, who rule over the Sak [Thets], Mrun and Khyan
[Chins], and whom the kings of Pagan formerly made to invade
Mijjhimadesa [the Middle Region in India], came . . . giving a priceless
emerald bracelet and surrendering himself, together with many villages and
towns and white umbrella, myauksi [?drums], etc. [to King Narapati of Awa].
Hence, [King Narapati] placed him under his protection and let him rule over
the territory he formerly had been ruling [as a vassal].
In the above excerpt, the inscription mentions the Rakhine king, who has descended
from the Panthe kings. The Rakhine king referred to in this inscription was King Naranu
(1433-1459), a contemporary of King Narapati of Awa, who had this inscription
engraved. King Naranu also took the Muslim name Ali Khin. Although he adopted this
Muslim title because he did not want to disobey his elder brother King Min Sawmun, he
was a Buddhist king who promoted Buddhism. This is attested by the fact that he
included the attributes of the Buddha (iti pi so bhagava, swakkhato, suppatipanno
. . .
49
) in his message sent to the king of Awa and that he vowed in a love letter sent to
Sawyinmi, Queen of Thandwe as follows: May I be able to take refuge in the Three
Flowers [ie the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha] together with you, my lady.
50
He erected a stupa referred to as Nyidaw Zedi (meaning Younger Brothers Stupa) near
the four-faced stupa built by his elder brother Min Sawmun. A Rakhine chronicler
remarks that Buddhism shone like the sun during his reign (Candamalalankara [1931],
2.22-27).
The scribe who engraved the Htupayon inscription at Sagaing might not have
known these facts about King Narapati. The fact that King Naranu had taken the
Muslim title Ali Khin very likely led the scribe to assume that this king was a Muslim, and
hence to refer to him as being descended from the Panthe kings. Pe Maung Tin
(1978) defines the word Panthe as a Muslim from Yunnan in China in his Batha Lawka
Kyan [Treatise on Language]. This phrase has led Luce and Than Tun, who have not
studied Rakhine history, to wrongly assume that King Naranu of Rakhine was a Muslim.
The Rakhines pointed out the mistakes made by these two historians in the Kalya
Magazine in March 1995, in the Yokeshin Te Kabya Magazine in July 1995 and in the
Rakhine Thahaya Magazine (no. 2) in February 1996. Maung Rakhines words in an
49
50
58
article named Koloni Wada Somwe [Vile heritage of Colonialism] may be quoted
here as follows:
The main citation on writing about Rohingya by both Prof.Luce and
Dr.ThanTun is Sagaing Htuparyon Phra stone inscriptions. The King who
inscribed it was Innwa King Narapati and the year of inscription was 804 M.E
or 1442 A.D. Prof. Luce stated that the stone inscription has recorded the
paying respects to King Narapati by peoples of all directions of Myanmar.
The necessary gist containing in part of the inscriptions which the learned
professors referred to read: .Rakhine king, descendent of Panthay
Muslim kings, takes shelter under the power and glory of King Narapati.
At this point, it is considered that the two professors drew a conclusion
that Panthay Muslims are northern Muslims and those are the ones who
inhabit Naaf and Eastern Mayu river area, referring to the one and only
phrase in the inscriptions Panthay, Muslim king. As a matter of fact, the
term Rohingya is neither the one in use nor even coined before 1948, the
year of Myanmar Independence, let alone those long, long years in the past.
It is true that about ninety per cent of the population now living in Naaf
and eastern Mayu river area are Muslims. It is well known that those Muslims
are Chittagonians of Bengal origian who have come and settled in that part
of the country before Independence. In contemporary authentic records
such as A.C.Banarjees work, personal records of local chief U Maung Nyo,
Sittwe (Akyab) District Gazetteers, memoir of U San Htwann Aung, the report
presented by Enquiry Commission headed by Commissioner James Ester, the
report presented by (former) Commissioner of Rakhine (Arakan) Division
Maung Htin, a famous author, they are recorded as Chittagonians. No one
has described them as Rogingyas.
In the above mentioned records, it is clearly stated that during the years
of Myanmar (Burmese) governors and initial period of British colonial rule, the
Chittagonias came to the Mayu area as seasonal laborers and usually went
back to their homeland, Chittagong region, just across the River Naaf. One
can read in the records that afterwards, since a handful have illegally
migrated into the area, the Muslim population burst into horrible numbers
because of the economic and political policies of colonial government. U
Hla Htwann Pru, a leading Rakhine statesman, in his book entitled The
Treausre-Trove of Rakhine Sate, wrote that during the British regime, an
enquiry commission headed by Commissioner James Ester was formed and
empowered to make enquires about illegal immigration of Chittagonians
into Sittwe (Akyb) district rising to alarming numbers and that the report
warned if no drastic action would be taken , racial turmoils would follow
soon. The warning came true as ethnic conflicts followed during World War
II so that native Rakhines suffered untold miseries due to the open border-
crossing policy of colonialists.
59
A Former commissioner of Rakhine (Arakan) Division, U Htin Phat (Writer
Maung Htin) wrote the following lines regarding the move taken by
Chittagonian Musilms residing on the other side of Naaf river to form a
separate zone in the region and due to the immigration and emigration
policy of post-independence government led to Mujahid rebellion.
..post-war policy of Chittagonions is to migrate and settle in the new
area along the Maya mountain range and Kalapanzin river valley east of
Naaf river.The person who initiated and incited the movement is a
Chittagonian who have lived in Rakhine (Arakan) Division for many years. He
has already organized and prepared would-be settlers to migrate into the
area in large numbers. However, soon after Myanmars Independence, the
situation turned the other way round. At that time, as Myanmar government
took serious consideration of border crossings, no mass migrations could be
executed. As a result, Mujahid rebellion started and grew in numbers and
rebel leader Cassim became well-known.
During the reign of the AFPFL government, a similar plot was hatched
by a group of educated Muslim leaders to create the Muslim state in the
area for the illegally settled Muslims. They coined a new term Rohingya,
wrote and propagated a fake theory as if they were an indigenous race of
Myanmar inhabited in the country for nearly a thousand years. The newly-
coined term attracted the attention of educated Rakhines soon after its
debut in 1950. They strongly refused the term (Rohingya) in contemporary
journals and magazines. It is believed that the learned professors knew it.
Moreover, it is noticed in the writings of two eminent historians that
Muslims occupied Bengal in 1202 A.D, destroyed Patikkara (Comilla) and
approached Rakhine border. As a result, the professors assume that the
Muslim king settled in Mayu river region in that period. As far as the
assumption put forward by the two scholars are concerned, the present
writer would like to encourage a study of the authoritative works on the
subject History of Chittagone by S.B. Qanungo, Ancient Arakan by
Pamela Gutman and History of Indo-Pakistan by Prof.M.Ahshad and Prof.
H.Rahman. According to them, even though Muslims annexed Bengal in
1202 A.D, they penetrated into Chittagong region in the 13
th
century and the
area was under their suzerainty only in the middle of the 14
th
century. It is
quite clear that no Muslim kings or chieftains of any descriptions settled in
Mayu river area at any time. Historical records and annals of Rakhine and
Bengal amply prove it. The Buddhist religious edifices of Vesali and Mrauk Oo
periods still existing along the Naaf and Mayu River are solid evidences to
60
refute the assumption sponsored by the learned scholars. (Maung Rakhine
1995)
51
After this article appeared in the Kalya Magazine, Than Tun discussed with the
editors of the magazine and published a corrigendum in the February 1995 issue of the
magazine as follows:
(For the statement . . . I wonder whether the Muslim king was Rohingya
from the Mayu river region to the east of Naaf river. . . . in Dr. Than Tuns
Chin, Mru and Kumi (N. Rakhine), in the bottom paragraph of the second
column on p. 28 of Kalya Magazine, no. 114 (February 1994), read . . . could
not have been Rohingya as pointed out by Rakhines.) (Dr. Than Tun and the
Board of Editors)
52
Than Tuns above corrigendum nullifies the efforts of Zaw Min Htut who quotes other
texts selectively to fabricate the history of Rohingya. His attempt to provide the missing
link in the history of Rohingya also comes to naught.
Zaw Min Htut tries to connect Harveys statement that Rakhine was in a state of
anarchy in the middle of the 12
th
century in Lemro period with Than Tuns discussion on
Patikkara. However, Harvey does not intend to say that the Muslims from Bengal
entered Rakhine during the period when anarchy prevailed. He is merely describing
the political instability during the period of transition between Wethali and Lemro
periods as follows:
Like the rest of Indo-China, the country suffered chronically from raids.
Akyab district [now Sittwe district] was exposed to the hill tribes and in the
tenth century Shans temporarily overran it. Settled government was the
exception. In the middle of the twelfth century even the famous Mahamuni
image could not be found, for it had been overgrown with jungle in the
prevailing anarchy. But the Arakanese were usually quite able to look after
themselves. . . . (Harvey 1967, 137-38)
51
Maung Rakhine, Koloni Wada Somwe, Kalya Magazine, March 1995; English version
taken from Vile Heritage of Colonialism, posted by arakan ther <http://rohingyaterrorists.
blogspot.com/2012/06/vile-heritage-of-colonialism.html> (accessed on 15 May 2014). I do not
know whether Maung Rakhine and arakan ther who posted this article are the same person or
not.
52
( (
) - - - - (NAAF)
(Mayu) (ROHINGA)
) ( ) (Kalya
Magazine, February 1995).
61
To use this statement to fill in the gap (from 11
th
to 14
th
centuries AD in Lemro
period) in Rohingya history, Zaw Min Htut connects it with Than Tuns statement as
follows:
- - -
()
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 28)
Translation:
. . . they probably settled there around AD 1202 when Muslims invaded
Bengal.
In the middle of the 12
th
century, Rakhine was in a state of anarchy.
Harvey has affirmed that Rakhine region was overgrown with jungle to the
extent that even the Mahamuni image/temple could not be found.
Zaw Min Htuts intention is to mislead readers to believe that Islam took root in
Rakhine, more precisely in Maungdaw and Buthidaung in Mayu river region, in the
periods following AD 1202 when Rakhine was in a state of chaos. He concludes:
- - - Harvey
()
[sic.]
- - - (Zaw Min Htut
2001, 28)
Translation:
. . . It can be assumed from Harveys statement and Dr. Than Tuns
above conclusion that Islam from Bengal actually spread to Rakhine in
about the 13
th
century AD.
Dr. Than Tuns statement coincides with the findings of the Rohingya
researchers.
Readers can see in this conclusion that Zaw Min Htut means to say that the
Muslims who called themselves Rohingyas began to come and settle in Rakhine in the
62
8
th
century during Maha Taing Candras reign in Wethali period, and Islam spread from
Bengal to Rakhine during Lemro period in the 13
th
century.
Review of Chapter 3
After pointing out Zaw Min Htuts lies in Chapters 1 and 2, I will now discuss his
fabrications in Chapter 3.
Misquoting Hall and San Shwe Bu
Zaw Min Htut introduces Chapter 3 with a false statement as follows:
D.G.E
Hall
- - - (Zaw Min 2001,
31)
Translation:
As stated in the previous chapter, it is learnt that local people converted
to Islam because Arabs, Persians and Gauri Pathans [ie Pathans from Gaur]
came and settled in Rakhine and missionaries from the Arab land and India
came to spread Islam. As regards this, D G E Hall explains that the existence
of both Buddhist and Islamic monuments all over Rakhine indicates how
Buddhism had been flourishing in Rakhine since the beginning of the
Christian era and how Islam took root [there] through Arabs.
Rakhine historian U Shwe Bu has concluded that as Bangladesh and
Rakhine were contiguous with each other, there doubtless would have been
Muslims on the Rakhine side.
Thus, Zaw Min Htut repeats his false claims in Chapters 1 and 2 here as if his
statement that local people converted to Islam because Arabs . . . is a proven fact.
He even implies that it was confirmed by Hall. To enable the readers to check his
statements against those of Hall, Halls statements may be quoted here:
. . . In 1459 it [Chittagong] came into the hands of Arakan, which held it
until it was finally annexed to the Mughal Empire in 1666. Mohammedanism
64
spread to Arakan, but failed to make much impression upon its Buddhism.
Mrohaung had its Sandihkan Mosque and its kings assumed Mohammedan
titles, but the predominance of Buddhism was never shaken. (Hall 1950, 58)
. . . Although mainly Buddhist, they [the Arakanese] had been
influenced by long centuries of contact with Muslim India. . . .
Buddhism would seem to have reached Arakan long before its arrival in
the interior of Burma, and the famous Mahamuni image, brought from
Arakan by the Burmese in 1785, and now to be seen in the Arakan Pagoda
at Mandalay, may date from the early Christian era. . . . (Hall 1955, 328-29)
In the first excerpt, Hall discusses how Ba Saw Hpru (1459-1482) was a Buddhist
king despite his Muslim title Kalima Shah and how he conquered Chittagong, how the
kings of Mrauk-oo period were Buddhists even though some had Muslim names, and
that the Mughals were able to occupy Chittagong only in 1666, when King Canda
Sudhamma (who did not adopt a Muslim title) was reigning in Rakhine.
In the second excerpt, Hall deals briefly with how the Rakhines began professing
Buddhism in the early Christian era and, despite their religion, had contacts with the
Muslim India. He says nothing about how the Rakhines became Muslims or how Islam
spread to Rakhine from the Arab land. Now, the readers will realize how Zaw Min Htut
has misquoted Halls work.
Furthermore, Zaw Min Htut misquotes San Shwe Bu, honorary archaeological
officer as follows: . . . as Bangladesh and Rakhine were contiguous with each other,
there doubtless would have been Muslims on the Rakhine side. San Shwe Bu says no
such thing in any of his works. Morris Collis and San Shwe Bu (1925) say that Islam had
not been introduced into Rakhine until the Lemro period in their paper Arakans Place
in the Civilization of the Bay. Their words may be cited here:
. . . During these five hundred years Arakan became a Holy Land. It
had no political importance, but was a place of pilgrimage for the Buddhist
world.
. . .
. . . Bengal was absorbed into this great polity [ie Muslim sultanic polity]
in 1293 A. D. But that was its extreme eastern limit. It never passed into Indo-
China; and its influence from its arrival in 1203 to 1430 was negligible upon
Arakan. (Collis and San Shwe Bu 1925)
This is the only paper of Shan Shwe Bu that mentions Muslims in connection with
Rakhine. Zaw Min Htuts statement concerning San Shwe Bus view is just a complete
fabrication.
65
Zaw Min Htut Who Does Not Understand His Own Words
Quoting Tha Tun Aungs chronicle, Zaw Min Htut asserts in Chapter 2 that some
Rakhine Buddhists converted to Islam in King Zalatta Min Sawmuns reign owing to the
three Muslim envoys efforts to spread Islam. He reiterates this in Chapters 3 and 4.
While quoting the same chronicle in Chapter 3, Zaw Min Htut (2001, 32) falsely
implies that Nyana, Kyi and Hla Tun Hpru have mentioned that some Buddhists in
Rakhine converted to Islam. Citing the same source, he says in Chapter 4 as follows:
( )
(-)
()
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001,
40) [Emphasis added]
Translation:
U Hla Tun Hpru, a Rakhine historian and a seasoned political leader
(member of the State Council of Burma in the socialist era) has concluded:
Among the Muslims in Rakhine are the ethnic Kamans, who have
decended from the archers and spearmen of Rakhine King Ba Saw Hprus
reign (1459-1482). [They] became Muslims owing to the sermons delivered
by the three envoys headed by Kadi from the Persian Empire who visited
Rakhine in about 1531 in King Min Bas reign and by the Islam missionaries
they brought in from India. . . .
The text in bold face is not included in Hla Tun Hprus work; it is inserted by Zaw Min Htut.
In Chapter 3, however, he contradicts his previous statement by saying that
Muslims were sternly repressed in the reigns of Kings Min Ba (AD 1531-1555) and Canda
Vijaya (AD 1710-1730) (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 35).
53
He does not seem to realize that he
is contradicting himself.
Does he not write Some Rakhine Buddhists converted to Islam in King Zalatta
Min Sawmuns reign (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 27-28, 32)? If that statement were true, those
Rakhine apostates certainly would have been repressed in King Min Bas reign as he
has stated in page 35.
53
- - - ( -) ( -)
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 35).
66
As King Zalatta Sawmun had passed the law (the Shwe Myin Dhammathat) that
required the Rakhines to ostracize renegade Rakhine Buddhists, such conversions could
not have happened anymore. To facilitate such ostracism, King Min Ba implemented
the tabaung kala ko shin pyu (novitiate the Muslims, ie shave the heads of the
Muslims). The king had the Muslims shaved their heads so that the people would not
confuse them with Rakhines. He also reoccupied the twelve towns of Bengal, and built
a stupa known as Yan Aung Zeyya, meaning Victory, or Shitthaung to celebrate his
victory. At the same time, he took the Muslim title Zabauk Shah to show that he was
the ruler also of the Muslims, indicating his political guile.
54
It would be absurd to say that the Rakhine Buddhists would breach the Shwe
Myin Dhammathat and convert to Islam when the kingdom was ruled by a Rakhine
Buddhist king.
Bogus historians who call themselves Rohingyas need to understand that the
Rakhines had been professing Buddhism from the Dinnyawadi, Wethali, Lemro and
Mrauk-oo periods onwards. Although they were able to force the Hindus in India to
profess Islam after conquering India, the Muslim kings were never able to invade
Rakhine. The Rakhines were the ones who had conquered them.
The Rakhine kings were able to defend the kingdom against the enemies from
the west. As promoters of the Religion, they built pagodas and temples and
preserved their deeply cherished customs and traditions. Comprehending this,
Myanmar historian Dr. Kyaw Thet wrote in his Pyidaungzu Myanmar Nainggan
Thamaing [A history of the Union of Myanmar] as follows:
The people of Rakhine were able to prevent Indians from crossing the
border and dominating them. If the Rakhines could not prevent the Indians
from entering Rakhine, we will now see Rakhine as a Pakistani territory.
55
In
preventing foreigners from crossing the border and dominating them for
centuries, the Rakhines armed themselves with the mindset and society that
differed from those of Indians. Their language, literature, traditional
costume, way of life and, most importantly, their religion played integral
parts in preserving their identity as a Myanmar national race. (Kyaw Thet
1961, 120)
54
Leider has remarked: the use of Muslim names on the coins seems to be a political
one, it may be interpreted as the expression of political overlordship over a Muslim community in
the area south of Chittagong and maybe in parts of Arakan as well; but the available evidence
leads me to think that the importance of the use of Muslim names should not be overrated
(Leider 1998).
55
Here, he is referring to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
67
Zaw Min Htuts Fabricated List of Rakhine Kings with Muslim Names
After misquoting the writings of Rakhine historians in Chapter 3, Zaw Min Htut
fabricates a list of Rakhine kings with Muslim names.
Ba Tha, a bogus Rohingya historian has misrepresented the facts concerning
the Rakhine kings with Muslim titles in Guardian Monthly (May 1960), by mentioning
Narameikhla (aka Min Sawmun), who had never adopted a Muslim name,
as having a
Muslim name Samoon (Ba Tha 1960). Ba Tha does not seem to know that Sawmun is
a Rakhine name. Zaw Min Htut expands on Ba Thas list as follows:
Table 4.Zaw Min Htuts List of the Rakhine Kings with Muslim Names
56
Rakhine Names Muslim Names
Regnal
Dates
Remarks
Narameikhla
Sawmun Khin (aka)
Solaiman Khan
1430-1433
Samoon in Ba Tha (1960); Solaiman Shah in
Jilani and Alam (1998)
57
Min Hkari
Ali Khin (aka) Ali
Khan
1434-1459
Ba Sawhpru Kalima Shah 1459-1482
56
The list in Ba Tha (1960) is as follows:
1. Nara Meik Hla 1404-1433 Samoon 5. Min Palaung 1571-1593 Sikandar Shah
2. Nara Nu (Min Khari) 1433-1459 Ali Khan 6. Min Yaza Gyi 1593-1612 Salim Shah I
3. Ba Saw Phyu 1459-1482 Kalima Shah 7. Min Kha Maung 1612-1622 Hussain Shah
4. Min Bin (Min Pa Gyi) 1531-1553 Zabek Shah
(Sultan)
8. Thirithusamma 1622-1637 Salim Shah II
The list in Ba Tha (1963) is the same, but it is in Burmese (Ba Tha 1963, 21). In 1998, Jilani translated
Ba Tha (1963) into English and Alam edited it (Jilani and Alam 1998). They give the following list
as the Rakhine kings who had adopted Muslim names, citing Ba Shins (1961) "Coming of Islam
to Burma to 1700 A.D. (Lecture before Asian History Congress (Unpublished Ms., New Delhi) as
its source.
1. Naramekhla (Solaiman Shah): 1430 1434
A.D.
10. Meng Saw Oo (Jalal Shah): 1515-
2. Meng Khari (a) Naranu(Ali Khan): 1434-
1459
11. Thatasa (Ali Shah): 1515-1521
3. Ba Saw Pru (Kalima Shah): 1459-1482 12. Min KhaungRaza (El-Shah Azad): 1521-1531
4. Dawlya (Mathu Shah): 1482-1492 13. Min Bin(a)Min Pa Gri(Zabuk Shah): 1531-1553
5. Ba Saw Nyo (Mohammed Shah): 1492-
1493
14. Min Dikha (Daud Khan): 1553-1555
6. Ran Aung(Noori Shah): 1493-1494 15. Min Phalaung (Sikender Shah): 1571-1591
7. Salimgathu (Sheik Abdullh Shah): 1494-
1501
16. Min Razagri (Salim Shah): 1593-1612
8. Meng Raza(Ilias Snah-I): 1501-1513
17. Min Khamaung (Hussain Shah): 1612-
1622
9. Kasabadi (Ilias Shah-II): 1513-1515 18. ThiriThudama(SalimShah-II): 1622-1637
57
Jilani and Alam 1998.
68
Rakhine Names Muslim Names
Regnal
Dates
Remarks
Min Dawlya Mohammed Shah I 1482-1492 Mathu Shah in Jilani and Alam (1998)
Ba Sawnyo Mohammed Shah II 1492-1494
Mohammed Shah (1492-1493) in Jilani and
Alam (1998)
Min Rannaung Noori Shah 1494 1493-1494 in Jilani and Alam (1998)
Salinkathu
?Sheik/Syed
Abdullah Shah
1494-1501
Min Raza Ilias Shah 1501-1523 1501-1513 in Jilani and Alam (1998)
another king named Kasabadi (Ilias Shah II)
(1513-1515) in Jilani and Alam (1998)
Min Saw Oo Jalal Shah 1525 1515 Jilani and Alam (1998)
Thazata Ali Shah 1525-1521 1515-1521 in Jilani and Alam (1998)
another king named Min Khaung Raza (El-
Shah Azad) (1521-1531) in Jilani and Alam
(1998)
Min Bin (Min Ba Gyi) Zabauk Shah 1531-1553
another king named Min Dikha (Daud Khan)
(1553-1555) in Jilani and Alam (1963)
Min Hpalaung Sikander Shah 1571-1593 1571-1591 in Jilani and Alam (1998)
Min Raza Gyi Salim Shah I 1593-1612
another king named Min Khamaung (Hussain
Shah) (1612-1622) in Ba Tha (1960) and Jilani
and Alam (1998)
Siri Sudhama (pron.
Thiri Thudhamma)
Salim Shah II 1622-1638 1622-1637 in Jilani and Alam (1998)
Source: Zaw Min Htut 2001, 37.
As Ba Thas eager pupil, Zaw Min Htut provides two Muslim names for
Narameikhla (Min Sawmun): Sawmun Khan and Solaiman Khan. In Chapter 4 he says:
- - -
() ()
- - - (Zaw Min
Htut 2001, 47)
92
China. Persian traveler Ibn Khurdadbeh and Arab traveler Sulaiman, both of the 9
th
century AD, and Persian traveler Ibn al-Faqih of the 10
th
century AD mention southern
Myanmar in their records. This leads Yegar to speculate that Muslim trade colonies had
been established in Bago by that time. According to him, southern Myanmar, or more
precisely, the coastal regions of Arakan, the Ayeyarwaddy Delta, Bago and the coastal
regions of Tanintharyi were known to the Muslim sailors who travelled in the eastern
waters. (Yegar 1972, 2)
Myanmar historian Ba Shin, in contrast, believes:
. . . as far as the seaways are concerned, the ties between Islam and
Buddhist Burma were very limited. In the tenth century the Arabs and the
Persians knew little about the regions north of the ports of Sumatra, except
for the Andaman Islands (Ba Shin 1961, Coming of Islam to Burma, down to
1700 A. D., Lecture before Asian History Congress (Unpublished, New Delhi);
qtd. in Yegar 1972, 3).
Thus, these scholars disagree as to the date when Muslim travelers arrived in the coastal
regions of Myanmar.
Yegar goes on to say that Shwehpyin brothers, two sons of an Arab trader, who
came to Myanmar in the Pagan period are the earliest Muslims mentioned in the
Myanmar chronicles (1972, 2), that the Mon king Razadarit (1385-1423) was able to
conquer Dagon only with the help of Muslim sailors (1972, 9), and that when Tabinshweti
(1531-1550) seized the port of Martaban in 1541, many Muslims took active part in the
defense of the town (1972, 10).
Yegar continues to discuss how the Bamar kings of the sixteenth century settled
the Muslims near Myedu in present-day Shwebo district, Upper Myanmar. Those villages
are still in existence. Most of those Indians had been war captives, captured during the
reigns of successive kings. The earliest Muslims settled in Myedu were the ones who
defended Bago in 1539 and 1599. Among them were the Muslims captured when King
Tabinshwehti invaded Rakhine in 1546. King Anaukhpetlun (1605-1628), when he
conquered Thanlyin, took captive De Brito and the Muslims who had assisted the latter.
They were resettled in Myedu and surrounding localitiesSagaing, Yamethin and
Kyaukse. When King Sane invaded Thandwe in 1707, thousands of Muslim captives
were brought back to Myanmar. In 1708, three thousand Muslims from Rakhine
migrated to Myedu. They were settled in Shwebo, Yamethin and Taungoo districts.
(Yegar 1972, 11)
The Rakhine chronicle relates that the Rakhine Royal Guard and the Kaman
archers joined forces and rebelled in King Canda Vijayas reign, and that three
thousand Muslims from Thandwe escaped to Myedu when the Rakhine king smashed
the rebellion. It is also said that they were captives brought back from Thaungti island
when King Min Ba conquered the twelve towns of Bengal (Candamalalankara [1931],
93
2.68, 248). The Muslims King Min Ba captured in Thaungti island presumably were the
ones who fled in King Canda Vijayas reign.
A comparison of Zaw Min Htuts and Yegars discussions shows that Zaw Min
Htuts statements are unsupported by evidence; they are pure speculations. He says
that there were similar incidents of shipwrecks in the old days in the port towns such
as Kyaukhpru, Pathein, Thanlyin, Mottama and Myeit without giving evidence (Zaw
Min Htut 2001, 49). This is nonsense. Kyaukhpru was a colonial-era town founded only
in 1838, while Thanlyin became well known only because a Portuguese named De Brito
rebelled against King Min Yazagyi of Rakhine and King Anaukhpetlun of Myanmar with
his naval forces. They did not exist in the old days as mentioned by Zaw Min Htut.
As a matter of fact, the Arab and Persian seafarers of the 9
th
and 10
th
centuries
only refer to the coastal regions in a very general way. They never give the names of
specific localities. Also, Yegar only suggests that the localities mentions in the travelers
records were probably located in the Ayeyarwaddy delta or along the Tanintharyi or
Mottama coast.
Moreover, Zaw Min Htut discusses:
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 51)
Translation:
. . . as the followers of Islam settled [in Rakhine] because their ships were
wrecked, as the Arab and Persian traders established trade centres and as
they moved on to pastures new, they spread all over Myanmar. (Zaw Min
Htut 2001, 51)
In this way, he claims that the Muslims who call themselves Rohingyas and who are now
living in various parts of Myanmar (Kachin, Karen and Mon States, Ayeyarwaddy, Bago,
Yangon divisions, etc) for various reasons are the descendants of the Muslims who
entered Myanmar in the ancient times.
However, it should be noted here that the prisoners the Bamar kings captured
in wars and Muslim refugees were not allowed to move to greener pastures. As pointed
out by Yegar, the Bamar kings took care to distribute the Muslim settlers in small groups
and in many villages so as to prevent the formation of a strong Muslim force which
might constitute a threat to the kingdom (Yegar 1972,12).
It can be learnt from Yegars discussion that in the monarchical days the
Muslims spread over various districts in Myanmar and their population was not high.
94
Additionally, they lived side by side with the Bamars and assimilated to the culture of
the Bamar Buddhists; they became Bamar in all respects except in religion. The Bamars
called them Myedu Muslims, Bamar Muslims or Pathi Kalas. They were not connected
with the Chittagonians who immigrated into Myanmar in the British colonial era. To
conceal how those Chittagonians spread all over Myanmar, Zaw Min Htut states that
Rakhine became a bulwark of Islam, and Muslims peacefully spread to various parts
of Myanmar
82
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 52), and that When the Rakhines migrated to Lower
Myanmar in 1599 (during King Min Razagyis reign), many Muslims followed them; in
other words, Muslims spread to various parts of Myanmar via Rakhine
83
(Zaw Min Htut
2001, 54). Here, he is implying that all the Muslims in present-day Myanmar have
descended from the Muslims who were in Myanmar in the reigns of Myanmar kings.
When he refers to the Muslims who came to Lower Myanmar in 1599, Zaw Min
Htut probably means the fifty thousand warriors from the twelve towns of Bengal who
were pressed into military service temporarily in King Min Razagyis reign. He refers to
them as the ancestors of present-day Rohingyas as if they remained in Rakhine (Zaw
Min Htut 2001, 35). Now, he is saying that they were able to migrate to various parts of
Myanmar, as if they stayed behind in Myanmar. Thus, he is implying that those fifty
thousand warriors who returned to the twelve towns of Bengal after completing their
military service in King Min Razagyis reign remained behind in Rakhine and Myanmar.
His intention is to claim that the Chittagonian Muslims who migrated into Myanmar in
the British colonial era and those who entered Myanmar illegally via Rakhine in recent
times were the Muslims who had been living in Myanmar from ancient times. From this,
he very likely intends to refer to those Chittagonian Muslims as Rohingyas and claim
that there are millions of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. I believe the readers would
have noticed that Zaw Min Htut has stated in Chapter 4 that it is learnt that there were
millions of Muslims (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 40).
82
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 52)
83
- - -
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 54)
Review of Chapter 6
Zaw Min Htut quotes the Ananda Candras Inscription in Wethali in Chapter 6 to show
that some Sanskrit words are akin to Rohingya words; and, as has been discussed
above (in Review of Chapter 2, see on page 41), his attempt to mislead readers has
backfired on him. Moreover, in connection with this inscription, he claims that the
Rohingyas had their own literature. However, as pointed out in my Review of Chapter
2, Qanungo and Leider mention the literary works cited by Zaw Min Htut as Bengali
works. Now, Ill review his other fabrications in Chapter 6: Rohingyas Participation in
the Anti-Colonialist Movement, Race Riots During the War and in 1942, and The
Origins of the Mujahid Movement.
Portrayal of All the Muslims in Rakhine as Rohingyas
Zaw Min Htut introduces the section entitled Rohingyas Participation in the
Anti-Colonialist Movement in Chapter 6 with his lamentation:
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 61)
Translation:
It is disheartening that the role played by the Rohingyas in the anti-
colonialist struggle does not receive much attention. If we study the matter
carefully, [we will see that] the role played by the Rohingyas was not
insignificant.
He then says that the headmaster of the national high school in Akyab was a
Rohingya named U Zindondin [?Zainuddin], and refers to Thiripyanchi U Ba Sein, U Ba
Shin (BSc.) (who was a leader in the first student boycott), and U Tun Sein (BSc., BL) (who
was the first chairman of the University Students Union) as Rohingyas from Thandwe
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 61). In fact, they were Myedu Muslims from Thandwe. The Muslims
from Thandwe are descendants of the Muslims brought from Myedu during King
Bodawhpayas reign, and they only speak Bamar language. They do not know the
Bengali dialect spoken by Chittagonians. Furthermore, as there were no Rohingyas in
the colonial era, Zaw Min Htuts claim that U Zindondin [?Zainuddin] and the Myedu
Muslims from Thandwe were Rohingyas clearly is a barefaced lie.
Then, he describes U Hpo Khine, a very well-known Kaman Muslim lawyer, of
Akyab and daughter Daw Aye Nyunt as Rohingya nationalists, failing to acknowledge
the Kamans. It does not seem that the late U Hpo Khine would have wanted to be
mistaken as a Rohingya. The Kamans, who were royal archers and who came to
96
Rakhine with Shah Shuja, a Mughal prince, during King Canda Sudhammas reign i n
the Mrauk-oo period, would not want to be mistaken as Chittagonians who had
immigrated during the British colonial era and who had entered Rakhine illegally in the
post-independence era. U Hpo Khine always lost whenever he contested a
parliamentary seat in Buthidaung constituency because he did not get any vote from
the Bengali-speaking Muslims as he could not speak the Chittagonian Bengali dialect.
The Causes of 1942 Race Riot
Zaw Min Htut discusses in Chapter 6, under a subheading entitled World War II
Era and the Race Riot of 1942, as follows:
- - - -
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 63)
Translation:
. . . As everything that happened during the Muslim Rakhine riot involved
racial and political matters, it is necessary for writers to present these without
exaggeration or partiality. . . .
However, his discussion is full of falsehoods. He was very economical with the truth.
In presenting the causes of the Rakhine Kala riot of 1942, he has left out the
main causes and accuses that the Rakhines were the ones who began the riot. He
says:
- - -
( )
- - -
- - - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001,
63)
97
Translation:
. . . Indians of various races [from Myanmar] . . . escaped via Rakhine by
land along the Taunggoke route or by water. At that time (on the eve of
war), anarchy prevailed in the large towns in Rakhine. Robberies, assaults
and murders were rampant. Fanatical Rakhine youths in the localities in
which Rakhines were predominant played a leading role [in these
attacks]. . . .
. . .
. . . It is learnt that the Muslim Rakhine riot began in Retchaung, Panhka
and Paing in Myebon township and Panmyaungyi town in Minbya township
around March 1942.
Thus, he alleges that Rakhine youths caused the race riot when Rakhine plunged into
anarchy due to World War II, seemingly failing to take into account the racial tension
between Rakhines and Chittagonian Muslims before the war spilt over into India and
Burma. The basic cause of the riot was British governments giving permission to
Chittagonian Muslims to migrate into Myanmar without any restrictions or, in other
words, the rapid increase of Indian Muslim population in Myanmar. As has been
explained above, the inquiry commission headed by financial expert James Baxter had
predicted in 1940 that failure to curb the steady increase of Muslim population could
lead to race riots (Government of Burma 1941).
Yegar has discussed that the Myanmar Buddhists resented that the Indian
immigration in the British colonial era had led to the increase of the Zerbadees (persons
of mixed Muslim and Bamar descent), which in turn had given rise to a new class with
a different religion and culture in their midst. This brought about tension between the
immigrant Indians and indigenous peoples of Myanmar. Then, the publication of a
book written by a Muslim named Maung Shwe Hpi which reviled Buddhism sparked off
an anti-Indian riot. In July 1938, a large group of people held an anti-Muslim rally at the
Shwedagon pagoda. Despite the governments attempts to contain it, the riot not
only continued in Yangon, but spread to Yenangyaung, Mandalay, Sagaing and
Shwebo. The government formed a committee to inquire into the matter. The
committee found that although the immediate cause was the publication of Maung
Shwe Hpis book, the underlying causes were political, economic, and social and not
religious. It reported its finding that the continuing immigration of Indians had
concerned the Bamars, especially in Lower Myanmar. (Yegar 1972, 38)
Based on these findings, the committee headed by James Baxter
recommended that Indian immigration should be curbed (Government of Burma
1941). A law was passed in 1941 to restrict immigration. However, as Yegar has stated,
Japanese forces invaded Myanmar before the law was put into operation (1972, 35-
39).
98
A study of Baxters report (Government of Burma 1941) indicates that the steady
immigration of Indians (especially Muslims) into Myanmar was the main cause of the
race riot. Another basic cause was the British governments divide-and-rule policy, as
Maung Htin discusses as follows:
. . . World War II shook the whole country in 1940-41, and Rakhine
descended into chaos. Waves of Indians fleeing war entered Myanmar by
the route of Badaung Taunggoke, setting off seismic waves in Sittwe, which
in turn led to the destabilization of the valley of Kalabazin. . . . The events in
Rakhine in those days were comparable to those in Myanmar proper. The
retreat of the British forces afforded Myanmar revolutionaries a golden
opportunity. Therefore, retreating [British] forces turned different ethnic
peoples against one another to facilitate their retreat. Their way of turning
[the ethnic peoples] one against another was not really out of the ordinary.
They just handed over the weapons they could not carry to non-Myanmars
ostensibly to protect themselves. Those weapons stirred up serious troubles
in Myanmar. The British forces retreating to India also pursued the same
policy in Rakhine. They handed over a fearsome array of weapons to non-
Rakhines. (Maung Htin 1960, 53-54)
A study of Maung Htins discussion shows that the British forces gave an array of
weapons to non-Rakhines or, more precisely, to Rajput Kalas (remnants of the British
Rajput force) to ease their retreat, thus planting the seeds a Kala Rakhine race riot.
Maung Htin merely says that The British [forces] handed over a fearsome array
of weapons to non-Rakhines. However, the Rakhine Pyine Hpyitsin Thamaing names
whom they gave their weapons as follows (in the chapter on Politics):
. . . At that time (March 1942), the Rajput soldiers from the British army
were rampaging in Sittwe. The Rajput soldiers joined forces with local Kalas
and killed the Rakhines. Sayagyi Maung Tha Tuns sons from Sittwe were
killed. (Rakhine State Council 1983, 36)
A Rakhine political leader Bonpauk Tha Kyaw also recorded his first-hand experience
as follows:
. . . It was before a week had passed after the British military
administration was introduced in Sittwe. Hearing loud bangs at the door
around nine oclock at night, we (Bonpauk Tha Kyaw and friend Maung Saw
Htwee) got scared. We saw about forty Kalas with swords and sticks in their
hands surrounding the house, and among them were some Rajput soldiers
armed with rifles.
. . . A Rajput corporal and three Rajput soldiers entered the house, guns
at the ready. . . . They rummaged about the house. They took the things,
including clothes, the members of the household could not carry and also
took our clothes. . . . They told us to go with them to the military
99
headquarters. . . . The Rajput corporal followed close behind us. About three
Rajput soldiers were left behind on the main road. . . . Maung Saw Htwee
shoved the Rajput corporal who was standing only about a foot away from
the two of us, screamed Run! and ran. I also ran. We had to run like hell.
(Tha Kyaw 1973, 65-67)
Thus, the British forces sowed the seeds of race riot by handing over a large
quantity of weapons to non-Rakhine Rajput Kalas to clear the way for their retreat.
Rajput soldiers banded together with local Kalas and terrorized the Rakhines. It can
therefore be concluded that the British governments divide-and-rule policy was one
of the main causes of the Kala Rakhine riot.
To sum up, the main causes of the Kala Rakhine race riot of 1942 were the British
governments immigration policy which allowed the Indians to migrate to Myanmar
without any restrictions and its policy of divide and rule. These policies had been
stoking up racial hatred between indigenous Rakhine Buddhists and immigrant Muslims
for years.
Immediate Cause of the Race Riot of 1942
We have learnt the root causes of the Kala Rakhine riot. What was the
immediate cause of this riot? Was it provoked by fanatic Rakhine youths when Rakhine
was in a state of anarchy as Zaw Min Htut has asserted? The Rakhine Pyine Hpyitsin
Thamaing relates how the riot began as follows:
. . . The Kalas of Retchaung killed the two brothers, one of who was the
village headman of Chaunggyi village in Myebon township. Therefore, a
Rakhine force headed by Thein Kyaw Aung and Kyaw Ya set fire to the Kala
village of Retchaung, igniting a Kala Rakhine race riot. (Rakhine State
Council 1983, 36)
Retchaung mentioned in the above document was the Retchaung village in
Myebon township which was mainly inhabited by Kala Muslims. Its headman was a
Rakhine. The Kalas were dissatisfied with being ruled by a Rakhine headman.
Therefore, when Rakhine was in a state of chaos during the war, the Kalas killed the
headman and his brother brutally, setting off a chain reaction that eventually led to a
race riot. The Rakhines, Thein Kyaw Aung, Kyaw Ya et al. took revenge on the Kalas of
Retchaung village by setting fire to the village, and this triggered a conflagration of
race riot.
Fanning or Extinguishing the Flames of Riot?
Zaw Min Htut portrays U Oo Kyaw Khine, Deputy Commissioner who
endeavoured to put out the flames of riot, as the culprit who handed out weapons to
the Rakhines. Furthermore, he misquotes Bonpauk Tha Kyaws (1973) Tawhlanye Hkayi
100
We to misrepresent U Oo Kyaw Khine and Bonpauk Tha Kyaw who had strove to
extinguish the flames of riot as who fanned the flames as follows:
(
)
( )
( ) - - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 63-
64)
Translation:
According to Bonpauk Tha Kyaw, a Rakhine political leader, the British
government charged U Oo Kyaw Khine (ICS), Deputy Commissioner, with
governing Arakan division under martial law when they retreated to India in
early 1942. U Oo Kyaw Khine imposed martial law. By that time [British]
military forces had withdrawn. Only the members of the police force had
arms and ammunitions. The majority of the policemen were Rakhines.
Rakhine fanatics turned Myebon, Minbya, Mrauk-oo and Pauktaw towns into
autonomous regions and administered them under martial law. The Rakhine
National Unity Organization (RNUO), formed with Rakhine dignitaries and
intellectuals, was unable to control those extremists. U Gandhama took
charge of Mrauk-oo township; U Thein Kyaw Aung, U Kyaw Ya and U Pan
Aung administered Minbya and U Tun Hla Aung ruled Pauktaw. They were
governing those townships according to martial law.
Zaw Min Htut continues:
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 64)
101
Translation:
. . . For the Rohingyas only had sticks, swords and zip guns, whereas the
Rakhines had rifles. It is said that U Oo Kyaw Khine, a deputy commissioner
[appointed by] the British government, procured rifles from police stations
and policemen and that Karens from British forces sold their weapons when
they returned home. That was how the Rakhines obtained rifles. (Zaw Min
Htut 2001, 64)
Thus Zaw Min Htut has misrepresented U Oo Kyaw Khine, who made efforts to extinguish
the riot, as fanning the flames of riot by selling/providing rifles to Rakhines.
In fact U Oo Kyaw Khine discharged his duty by making every effort to contain
the violence. He constantly toured around the locality under his charge on a naval
boat with Gurkha and Rajput soldiers on board. Bonpauk Tha Kyaw mentions this in his
book as follows:
. . . U Kyaw Khine . . . was touring around the towns in Akyab District on
MGBs [ie. motor gun boats] packed with Gurkha and Rajput soldiers to
administer them. While we were in the lockup in Minbya, one day, after 9
oclock at night, the whole Minbya town was in tumult, with people running
helter-skelter. We stood on a chair in the lockup and looked out; we saw U
Kyaw Khine, together with Gurkha and Rajput soldiers, coming up [the street]
in an orderly fashion, holding lanterns and carrying their rifles at the ready.
On their way from Pauktaw River, where Pauktaw town was located, to
Minbya, they came across a boat crammed with Thakin Maung Maung and
more than ten civilians; [the soldiers] shot and killed them, keeping not a
single person alive. Then, they came to Minbya. (Tha Kyaw 1973, 73)
It is clear from this document that the armed soldiers were Gurkhas and Rajputs,
and that the British armed non-Rakhines to control the Rakhines, in accordance with
their divide-and-rule policy. The armed men were not Rakhines as Zaw Min Htut has
alleged. Moreover, U Kyaw Khine was the one who ordered to fire upon Thakin Maung
Maung and his followers who were Rakhines because he suspected that they were
adding fuel to the fire. In fact, this could even lead the Rakhines to regard U Kyaw
Khine as a British governments henchman or as a public enemy. From the legal and
administrative point of view, however, U Oo Kyaw Khine could be regarded as a good
public servant. Maung Htin, who had served as a deputy commissioner of Rakhine
praises U Oo Kyaw Khine as follows:
. . . In the post-war era, the townsfolk of Sittwe expressed differing views
about U Oo Kyaw Khine. Chittagonians also did the same. One person
reminisced about the favours he did; one expressed disparaging remarks
about him. Whatever they said, nobody could deny that U Oo Kyaw Khine
was a person who loved his birthplace, who was a dutiful public servants,
and who met his death at the hands of retreating British troops while
courageously maintaining security in Akyab District. (Maung Htin 1960, 54)
102
Similarly, U Oo Kyaw Khines efforts to bring the riot to an end are mentioned in the
Pyine Hpyitsin Thamaing as follows:
. . . U Oo Kyaw Khine relocated the administrative council to Buthidaung
when the Japanese bombed Akyab town on 23 March 1942. He went
around on board a navy vessel to control Akyab District. He tried to meet
Rakhine political leaders U Tha Zan Hla, U Aung Tun Oo and U Aung Zan
Wai. . . . Moreover, U Oo Kyaw Khine made efforts to discuss with Marakan,
a rich Kala who was taking refuge in Gudabyin village in Buthidaung
township from war, to work out a settlement to end the riot. However, his
efforts were to no avail. Nevertheless, he did not give up. When he took
Rakhine elders to that village again by boat to negotiate with Kala elders,
an armed Kala who had been lying in wait fired his rifle from the
riverbank/shore, and U Oo Kyaw Khine died on the boat. (Rakhine State
Council 1983, 35-37)
A study of these documents shows that Zaw Min Htuts allegation that U Oo Kyaw Khine
provided the Rakhines with weapons was completely untrue.
Zaw Min Htut makes allegations not only about U Oo Kyaw Khine, but also about
Bonpauk Tha Kyaw. He implies that Bonpauk Tha Kyaw bought rifles from the Karens
and used them to attack and drive out the Muslims without substantiating his allegation
with evidence as follows:
- - -
( )
( )
( )
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 65)
Translation:
. . . It can be concluded that [Bonpauk Tha Kyaw] used the weapons
he had obtained from the Karens in driving out the Muslims. This resulted in
the death of more than fifty thousand Rohingya Muslims in the inner towns in
Rakhine. Altogether two hundred Rohingya villages in Myebon, Minbya,
Mrauk-oo, Kyauktaw, Pauktaw and Ponnagyun were burnt down, and more
than two hundred thousand persons had escaped to Maungdaw and
Buthidaung townships by about April or May 1942, trekking through jungles
and over mountains.
103
Bonpauk Tha Kyaw, despite the fact that he had to struggle free from a Muslim
Rajput corporal, three or four soldiers armed with rifles and about forty Indian civilians
armed with sticks and swords and run for his life, did his best to end the riot. He says:
. . . I explained the plans for our struggle against British colonial rule and
our struggle for independence in detail to Sayagyi (Thaukkya Aung). As we
needed to fight the British colonialists who were our common enemy,
Hkamwis, Chins, Muslims and Rakhines must unite; and hence we need to
put a stop to the ongoing Kala Rakhine race riot. I explained this repeatedly.
After I had explained this for two or three days, Sayagyi accepted [my
advice] without reservation. Therefore, he undertook to arrange a meeting
between U Thein Kyaw Aung, who lived in Kyauktaw Township which was
engulf in the flames of Kala Rakhine riot, and me. . . . At Minbya bungalow,
their leaders including U Thein Kyaw Aung, U Maung Kyaw Ya and I discussed
the struggle against British imperialism and the courses of action to be taken
to regain independence for two or three days. . . . As the majority of the
leaders including U Thein Kyaw Aung accepted them [our ideas], the
majority of the captains and troopers under them also accepted them. . . .
The ultimate cause of the Kala Rakhine riot was British colonialists policy of
divide and rule. (Tha Kyaw 1973, 76-77)
. . . Whatever were the underlying causes, to struggle against British
colonialism and to struggle for independence were the duties we need to
perform immediately. Therefore, I am pleased to have been able to risk my
life to carry out these duties. (Tha Kyaw 1973, 79)
Bonpauk Tha Kyaws statements clearly indicate that he made an all-out effort to
extinguish the flames of race riot before the arrival of the BIA forces headed by Bo Yan
Aung. As he has stated that his discussion with other leaders made most of them
accept that their real enemies were British colonialists, it can be regarded that he was
able at least to damp down the flames, if not to put them out.
Although Zaw Min Htut has alleged that Bonpauk Tha Kyaws intention in
procuring rifles and bullets from Akyab prison and wooing the Karen soldiers was to kill
or drive out the Muslims, I believe that his intention was to use those weapons to defend
his homeland and to drive out the British colonialists. By wooing Karen soldiers he was
trying to win over friends who would help the Rakhines for their security, and Bonpauk
Tha Kyaw deserves to be praised for this.
Taking Advantage of the Riot to Overstate the Muslim Population
After misquoting Bonpauk Tha Kyaw, Zaw Min Htut exaggerates the account of
how the Muslims escaped to Maungdaw and Buthidaung as follows:
104
- - -
( )
( )
( )
- - -
( )
( ) (
)
- - - (Zaw Min Htut
2001, 65-66)
Translation:
. . . more than fifty thousand Rohingya Muslims lost their lives in the inner
towns in Rakhine. More than two hundred Rohingya villages in Myebon,
Minbya, Mrauk-oo, Kyauktaw, Pauktaw and Ponnagyun townships were set
to fire, and more than two hundred thousand persons had escaped to
Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships by about April or May 1942, trekking
through jungles and over mountains. . . .
During the riot, about ten thousand Rakhines and more than sixty
thousand Rohingyas reached the refugee camp in India. The post-war era
government of Myanmar (General Aung Sans regime) issued entry passes
to the refugees after scrutiny, took them back and resettled them. . . . Here,
as stated in previous chapters, it is learnt that Rohingyas from Rakhine had
fled to Bengal before and during King Bodawhpayas reign. Those refugees
105
reentered [Rakhine] and resettled there in the British colonial era and the
refugees fleeing from the riot of 1942 also returned [later]. These are the
reasons why the Rohingya population is high in Maungdaw and Buthidaung
townships.
Thus, Zaw Min Htut attributes the high population density of Rohingyas in
present-day Maungdaw and Buthidaung to the remigration of refugees1) those who
had escaped to British India [before and] during Bodawhpayas reign, and 2) those
who fled from the riot in 1942. (This has been discussed above in Review on Chapter 4,
see on page 76.)
Furthermore, Zaw Min Htut maintains that the number of Muslims who escaped
to India during the 1942 riot was sixty thousand. However the number Yegar gives was
only 22,000 (1972, 95). Moreover, Yegar, citing Anthony Irwins (1945) Burmese Outpost
(London: Collins) (p. 27), says:
. . . After the end of the war and during the following years, the regions
Muslim population increased greatly, thanks to the immigration of the
Chittagongs who came in the wake of the British, as well as to the return of
thousands of the Arakanese Muslim refugees who had in 1942 fled from the
south of Arakan and who returned to the north after the war. (Yegar 1972,
96)
Thus, Zaw Min Htuts statement that the high population density of Rohingyas in
present-day Maungdaw and Buthidaung was due to the remigration of refugees1)
those who had escaped to British India before and during Bodawhpayas reign and 2)
those who fled from the riot in 1942is not supported by evidence. It is just a flat-out
lie.
Compared with the population figures given in the census of 1931, Zaw Min
Htuts figures are excessively high. According to him, the number of Muslims killed was
fifty thousand, that of those who fled to Maungdaw and Buthidaung was two hundred
thousand, and the number of persons who arrived at the refugee camp in India was
sixty thousand, adding up to 310,000 Muslims. According to the census of 1931, the
number of Indians in Rakhine was 217,800, and that in Sittwe District was 210,990, and
these figures included Hindus.
84
Thus, the number of Muslims Zaw Min Htut mentions
exceeds the census figure by about a hundred thousand, indicating that he is just
overstating the figures to give a reason for the high Muslim population in present-day
Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships.
Whatever Zaw Min Htut says, the figures given in the Burma Gazetteer: Akyab
District and the census of 1931 for Muslim population in Rakhine and the statement in
the Burmese Outpost that Chittagonians had poured into Rakhine clearly show that the
84
Government of Burma 1941, 49.
106
majority of the Muslims in present-day Sittwe District are Chittagonians or are of
Chittagonian descent.
Efforts to End the Riot and the Wounds this Riot had Inflicted
Now, readers have seen Zaw Min Htuts fabrications concerning the riot of 1942.
The efforts to end the riot and the wounds inflicted by this riot will be discussed here,
even though Zaw Min Htut does not mention them.
As has been stated above, U Oo Kyaw Khine lost his life at the hands of Muslims
while trying his best to quench the flames of riot. Then, a Karen force, a part of the
Deputy Commissioners office which U Oo Kyaw Khine had relocated to Buthidaung,
marshalled the youngsters in town and defended the town against Muslim attacks.
Meanwhile, a ten-member delegation formed with Rakhine elders who came from
Sittwe to Buthidaung to escape from war and Rakhine elders from Buthidaung, went to
Sittwe to report Bo Yan Aung, head of the BIA force there, on the threat posed by Kalas.
By that time (May 1942), Bo Yan Aung had captured Sittwe. Bo Yan Aung told them:
Since its main duty is to drive out the British forces and capture Sittwe, BIA should not
get involved in the ongoing race riot. (Rakhine State Council 1983, 40)
Then, a peace mission was formed with U Tha Zan Hla and U Paasiha of
RNUO and U Hpo Khine, lawyer and U Ya Sin from the Muslim side, and was sent to
Buthidaung via Rathedaung (Rakhine State Council 1983, 40). When this committee
arrived in Buthidaung, Kalas were attacking the town ferociously.
While the peace mission was in Buthidaung, a platoon commanded by
Bo Yan Naung and Bo Myo Nyunt (from Bo Yan Aungs column) went in a
caravan of trucks to Maungdaw, where they held a rally and gave speeches
mainly on anti-colonialist struggle and national unity. After the rally, a meal
was served. Then the Kalas set upon the BIA platoon . . . and the whole
platoon was annihilated. (Rakhine State Council 1983, 41)
When this incident was reported, Bo Yan Aung came to Buthidaung with two
companies on board Aungzeyya.
After arriving in Buthidaung, Bo Yan Aung personally conducted the
investigation. . . . As he suspected that the two Kala representatives were
responsible [for the incident], he had those two representatives and many
Kala Muslims taken into custody, and interrogated them. Then, he decided
that they were innocent and released them. (Rakhine State Council 1983,
41-42)
Bonpauk Tha Kyaw, who was among Bo Yan Aungs troops, describes this incident in
his Tawhlanye Hkayi We as follows:
Two days after Bo Yan Aungs force left [?Sittwe], the Kala refugees who
had been testing their strength came and fired into Buthidaung from its
107
southern entrance. As [?the armed men defending the town] had taken up
positions on the knolls near the southern entrance, the enemies could only
make a limited attack; they fell back, carrying the dead and wounded with
them. A soldier who was about nine yards away from me got shot. To make
an effort to end the Kala Rakhine race riot, Bo Yan Aung was accompanied
by U Paasiha and Rakhine Muslim leaders U Hpo Khine and U Yasin,
barristers-at-law. Although Bo Yan Aung and I, together with these persons,
tried our best to stop the Kala Rakhine race riot, Bo Yan Naung and a group
of Rakhines were killed by the scheming Muslim leaders in cold blood. (Tha
Kyaw 1973, 92-93)
Bo Yan Aung, while striving to extinguish the flames of riot, received an order
from the War Office in Yangon to withdraw the BIA troops. Accordingly, he planned to
pull back on 26 June 1942. This news horrified the townsfolk, who scrambled to board
the ship Miwa, which was lashed to Aungzeyya, the ship used by Bo Yan Aungs troops.
Unfortunately, Miwa had been holed by malefactors. Water poured in and the ship
sank, claiming about 400 lives. (Rakhine State Council 1983, 42)
Bo Yan Aung had to withdraw to Sittwe without succeeding to end the riot. He
arranged the formation of civil administrative committees headed by RNUO members
from the towns in Rakhine, such as Sittwe, Minbya, Mrauk-oo and Kyauktaw. Military
matters, however, were controlled by the Japanese.
Northern Rakhine which was engulfed in the race riot gradually returned to
normality. Rakhine leaders gave protection to the Indian villages in Pauktaw, Minbya,
Mrauk-oo and Kyauktaw townships. In Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, where
Rakhine villages were torched and about twenty thousand Rakhines were killed, the
race riot ended because it had weakened the local Rakhines to the extent that they
would never recover and because the Japanese army made the region its foothold.
To the Rakhines, this tragic event brought losses that could not be replaced: 1)
the riot claimed about twenty thousand lives; 2) all the Rakhine villages in Buthidaung
and Maungdaw townships and some Rakhine villages in Rathedaung townships were
burnt down; 3) a loss of labour made rehabilitation of cultivable land impossible; and
4) the increase in Muslim population that resulted from more Chittagonian Muslim
immigration made the rehabilitation of Rakhine villages impossible.
Mujahid InsurgencyAn Outcome of the Riot
Zaw Min Htut discusses the main causes of the Mujahid
85
insurgency in Chapter
6 under the subheading entitled The Origins of Mujahid movement. He implies that
85
The word mujahid (Persian/Arabic [mujhid]) means a person doing Jihad
(struggle), or a holy warrior. Its plural form is mujahideen (Arabic [mujahidin]).
However, I will be using Mujahids as the plural form throughout this book.
108
the following five reasons are mentioned by Yegar (1972) as the main reasons of the
insurgency:
()
()
( )
()
()
() (Zaw Min Htut 2001,
146-47)
Translation:
1) the Rohingyas were not allowed to resettle in the villages in the inner
towns of Rakhine, which they had to abandon in 1942
2) more than thirteen thousand refugees who had fled to Ronpur camp
in Bengal in 1942 to escape the race riot were not allowed to return
3) the property of the refugees were confiscated
4) most of the officers who had worked for the British government were
dismissed from their jobs
5) the British governments promise to establish an autonomous area
[?Muslim National Area] was not fulfilled.
The first three reasons are not mentioned by Yegar. They were the grievances voiced
by the Mujahids when they negotiated a peace deal with the representatives of the
AFPFL government in July 1948. The last two reasons are discussed by Yegar. Zaw Min
Htut just presents these reasons as Yegars views. As readers should know the root
causes of Mujahid insurgency, Yegars discussion may be quoted here:
. . . The Mujahids rebellion was localized in the north of Arakan, in the
regions of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and that part of Rathedaung . . . Most
of the population of this area is Muslim. During the period of British rule,
disaffection between the Buddhist population and the Muslims in Arakan
developed for the same economic and social reasons . . . The accumulated
tensions reached an explosive point at the time of the British evacuation
109
before the advancing Japanese forces. Gangs of Arakanese Buddhists in
southern Arakan, where the Buddhists are in the majority, attacked Muslim
villages and massacred their inhabitants. Whole villages were sacked and
their inhabitants all murdered. . . . Muslim refugees streamed to northern
Arakan . . . [Muslim majority in Maungdaw and Buthidaung] began to mete
out similar punishment upon the Buddhist minority in their midst. These acts
. . . caused the Buddhist population in northern Arakan to flee . . .. It was in
this manner that Arakan became divided into two separate areas, one
Buddhist and the other Muslim.
The Japanese invaded Arakan at the end of 1942 . . . The Japanese
ruled in these areas until the beginning of 1945. Most of the Muslims were pro-
British and many of them joined their service in work units, reconnaisance
[sic.], and espionage on the other side of the border or in underground
activities. In order to strenghten [sic.] their standing in the region and
encourage Muslim loyalty, the British had published a declaration granting
them the status of a Muslim National Area. This entire area was reconquered
by the British at the beginning of 1945. . . . After the end of the war and during
the following years, the regions Muslim population increased greatly, thanks
to the immigration of the Chittagongs who came in the wake of the British,
as well as to the return of thousands of the Arakanese Muslim refugees who
had in 1942 fled from the south of Arakan and who returned to the north
after the war.
. . . after Burma was granted independence, a great many Muslim
officers and officials were dismissed and replaced by Arakanese Buddhists.
These latter tried to rehabilitate the deserted ruined Arakanese villages. Part
of the Arakan population uprooted during the community riots at the
beginning of the war was returned, and the Muslims who had grabbed their
land were removed. These arrangements, together with the remembrance
of British promises unfulfilled - to establish a National Area - led the Muslims
to acts of sabotage against the government. The Muslims boycotted the
Arakanese villagers who were returned and resettled again on their own
lands, deprived them of drinking water and food supplies, and found all sorts
of other ways to bedevil them, until eventually these villagers were forced to
leave and go back south. Gangs of Muslims began to roam about, armed
with the guns and ammunition left over in large quantities in the region after
the war. There were many clashes. Many Muslims even began to nurture
hopes of separating the Maungdaw region from Burma altogether and of
creating an independent Muslim state between the rivers Kaladan and
Mayu, or of annexing the area to Pakistan [ie East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh)]. . . . [in May, 1946] Arakanese Muslims addressed themselves
to Ali Jinnah and asked his assistance in the annexing of the region to
Pakistan that was about to be formed. . . . The Rohinga did not especially
favor it. Jinnah himself assured General Aung San that he was not a
supporter of the plan.
110
For a time the Muslims were rather subdued and quiet on the subject,
even after Pakistan became an independent state (in August, 1947); but in
April, 1948, there was a renewal of excitement on this score in the wake of
the return of lands to the displaced villagers of Arakan. The moulvis began
to incite to jihad against the Arakanese infidels. Within a short time many
Mujahids gathered at a place called Taung Bazaar. An armed police boat
sent out to disperse them met with fire. In the ensuing shooting, policemen
were killed. With this head-on clash, the Mujahids rebellion had begun.
(Yegar 1972, 97) [Emphasis added]
The above excerpt from Yegars work shows that only the last two of the five
reasons Zaw Min Htut mentions are correct. We can ignore Zaw Min Htuts statements
and sum up Yegars discussion as follows: The unrestricted immigration of Indians into
Myanmar during British colonial era brought about hatred between native Buddhists
(esp. Myanmars and Rakhines) and immigrant Indians for economic and social reasons.
A race riot erupted in Rakhine in World War II era, Rakhines from Maungdaw and
Buthidaung had to flee, and Muslims became the majority of the population there. In
this way, the region that had been Rakhines ancestral homeland became a region in
which Muslim immigrants were predominant. Taking advantage of this, these Muslim
immigrants even planned to take over Maungdaw and Buthidaung and to secede
from Myanmar and join [East] Pakistan. In this way, the Mujahid insurgency began.
Yegar also gives the following information in his book:
The rebellion spread quickly, for the central government was busy
putting down rebellions that broke out in other places in Burma . . . Sober
Muslim leaders tried, on the one hand, to influence the rebels to desist from
their undisciplined behavior, and on the other, to explain to the government
that the rebellion was the work of a handful of individuals, that the vast
majority of the Arakanese Muslims did not support them and were even
themselves among the victims of the rebels . . .
The government also made attempts to negotiate with the rebels. In
July, 1948, a government delegation came to them to hear them out: the
rebels claimed that the Rohinga were indigenous sons of Arakan,
descendants of Muslim settlers of hundreds of years ago, differing from the
neighbouring Chittagongs despite the similarities in language, culture, race,
and despite the identity of religion. The propaganda of the extremists
among the Arakanese attempted to identify themselves with the Pakistan
Muslims.
Muslims were not accepted for military service. The government
replaced Muslim civil servants, policemen and headmen by Arakanese who
increasingly offended the Muslim community, discriminating against them,
putting their elders to ridicule, treating them as Kalas, and even extorting
money and bribes from them, and arresting them arbitrarily. . . . The
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Arakanese conducted propaganda against the Rohinga, accusing them of
being pro-Pakistan and of aspiring to annexation to Pakistan . . .
. . . The Muslims were not resettled in the villages from which they had
been driven out in 1942 (with the exception of the villages they left in the
Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions). Some 13000 Rohinga still living in
refugee camps in India and Pakistan whence they had fled during the war,
were unable to return; as for those who did manage to return, they were
considered illegal Pakistani immigrants. The properties and lands of all these
refugees have been confiscated [during the riot]. The Mujahids took to arms
only after all their protests and complaints brought no results.
. . . All the attempts to hold talks together failed. . . . (Yegar 1972, 97-98)
[Emphasis added]
The text in bold face in the above excerpt is what Zaw Min Htut has presented as
Yegars views. However, they clearly were the grievances expressed by Mujahids.
It can be concluded from Yegars discussion that the riot between native
Buddhists and immigrant Muslims in World War II era, the predominance of Muslims in
Maungdaw and Buthidaung which led the Muslims to attempt to take over Rakhines
ancestral land, and the rebellion of the disaffected Mujahids who justified their action
on religious grounds, all originated in the British colonialists policy of open immigration.
Rakhine Historians View on Mujahid Insurgency
Khingyi Hpyaws View
After discussing Yegars opinions on Mujahid insurgency, let me discuss Rakhine
historians views briefly. First, let us study Khingyi Hpyaws view. He wrote in Rakhine
Dazaung Magazine as follows:
. . . Mujahin
86
is the name of a Muslim insurgent group which was formed
clandestinely to engage in an armed struggle against the Union of Myanmar
and the Rakhines. As regards the emergence of the Mujahid insurgent
group, there was an organization named Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam [meaning
Council of Islamic Clergy], which was formed by Muslims in Maungdaw.
With the guidance of this organization and help of some Muslim officers, the
Muslims formed the Mujahid insurgent group in 1947.
Their objectives were to wage an armed struggle against the Myanmar
government and the Rakhines with a view to separating Maungdaw,
Buthidaung and Rathedaung regions from the Union of Myanmar and to
incorporate them into Pakistan. The Mujahin group had to follow the orders
of Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam, which collected land rent from the Kalas who
unlawfully took possession of the cultivated land in the wake of the Kala
86
Probably the Rakhine pronunciation of the word mujahideen.
112
Rakhine riot in 1942, to spend on various matters concerning the Mujahin.
Moreover, it raised a substantial amount of funds through contributions from
some of its members and some Muslim government servants for procuring
arms and ammunitions to fight against Rakhine Buddhists and Myanmar
government, and stockpiled weapons. In soliciting donations, they gave the
purpose of raising funds as to build schools. They actually built thirteen
schools for appearances' sake. Those schools were called
[?Arabic schools, i.e. madrasahs or Islamic schools], meaning
theological seminaries in Muslims language [?Arabic or Urdu].
In accordance with the decision made by this organization, Maulvis
Azizaroman and Yusuf from Maungdaw went to India and invited Maulana
Muhammad Mujahid Khan, the ?Mufti of Peshawar,
87
and Maulana Ibrahim
to open Islamic schools. When they arrived, a meeting was held at the
Islamic school in Dulara village in Maungdaw in December 1947.
It was decided at this meeting that Arabic and Urdu are to be taught
in those Islamic schools, and that Bamar language was not to be taught at
all, and, if the Myanmar government objected, the Muslims were to rebel
[against the government] as a united force.
An insurgent group was formed with Zafar Husain, Dudumya and
Muhammad Singh (aka Osin Ulla) (appointed as captains) and their
followers and was named the Mujahin League. The directives the Mujahin
insurgents were to follow in fighting against the Myanmar government got
to Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam, and were distributed to the insurgents. I heard
that a copy of the directive was obtained from Adu Wali [?Abdul Walid] and
government officers had sent it [?to the authorities] on 11 April 1948 under
Diary No. 11/48.
Additionally, at a meeting held at the school in Kanyindan village on 14
April 1948, the members of Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam decided to have Muslims
included in the AFPFL committee in Maungdaw for the ostensible purpose of
crushing Mujahid insurgents. It can be regarded that some Muslims have
now joined some AFPFL committees for a similar reason.
In June 1948, B A Onmawmya and Zahir Husain distributed pamphlets
stamped with the words Mujahin Government, in Bengali and Urdu
languages. The pamphlets, saying that the Myanmar government was an
evil government
88
[?infidel government] according to their religion, urged
all the Muslims in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung to unite and rise
up, fighting side by side with the Mujahins [against the government] to
87
The person who presided over the whole judicial and theological hierarchy in Peshawar.
88
113
liberate all the Muslims from the oppression of the evil government and evil
people
89
[?infidel government and infidels]. (Khingyi Hpyaw 1960, 23, 24,
29)
San Tun Aungs View
After giving Khingyi Hpyaws views on the Mujahid rebellion, let me give the
main facts about the Mujahids as recorded by San Tun Aung, a Rakhine political leader
and a native of Buthidaung, who had observed the rebellion first-hand.
A group of young men outfitted in black uniforms headed by
Muhammad and Mustabi (who later became a Mujahid leader), shouting
Pakistan Zindabad (Long Live Pakistan or Victory to Pakistan) marched
by the police post in Gwazon village at about 11:00 am on a day of the first
week of May 1947. This is an indication of their intention. After that, a large
meeting attended by representatives of many villages was held; there they
decided to take up arms and chose Dabyuchaung village, which was
situated seven miles to the southeast of Buthidaung, as the armed insurgents
headquarters.
With the help of surrounding villages, barracks for the members [of the
insurgent group] were built in a short time.
With [this village] as their base, they wooed [the people in] the villages
nearby. A singer by the name of Zafar Kawal, who not only had travelled
around Myanmar, but was of noble descent, became the head of this
group, and his charisma expedited the growth of the group.
Some so-called dignitaries of the town could not contain themselves.
They were to-ing and fro-ing between Dabyuchaung village and the town.
As every village had a large quantity of arms and ammunitions, [the
Mujahins] were able to form a group of 2,700 armed men easily.
. . .
When the Mujahid movement began in Buthidaung township,
Dudumya, secretary of Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam who resided in
Alethangyaw village in Maungdaw township, together with more than three
hundred armed men, joined the Mujahid. The Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam,
although named as a religious organization, played a leading role in politics.
It chose candidates for the Parliament, spread propaganda, canvassed for
vote during the elections and made political decisions.
I have discussed the matter with Mr. Abdul Khai, who was a police
inspector at that time and who later became a member of parliament. He
told me that [the rebellion] resulted because the British government had
89
114
inspired them [to break away] when they reentered Myanmar. Seeking
Muslims help, the British government had promised them that it would
establish a Muslim autonomous state. He told me that the rebellion was
brought about by this and the outbreak of the Rakhine Muslim riot. Therefore
it would be unconvincing to say that the Mujahid insurgency had nothing to
do with Jamiat-ul-Ulama e-Islam.
. . .
I was not only the leader of a volunteer force guarding the town, but
also a person responsible for the security of the whole town when the
Mujahids laid siege to Buthidaung town and a battle was fought for more
than forty days. I saw with my own eyes Muslim elders, with Pakistan flags in
their hands, leading the Mujahid force. I had to be extra vigilant because I
learnt that [the people] inside the town were helping them and sending
provisions [to them].
. . .
When the Mujahids from the northern part of Buthidaung township
advanced on Buthidaung town, every village welcomed them, praising and
garlanding Captain Shukur and Zafar Kawal. It was learnt that the region
was resounded with their rallying cry Pakistan Zindabad. Could this not be
regarded as the wish of local Muslim populace?
How would these people who were pro-Pakistan love Myanmar?
Moreover, the Mujahids were unable to extricate themselves from the strings
pulled by the puppeteers from Pakistan. . . . (San Tun Aung 1969, 10, 11, 12)
It can be learnt from U San Tun Aungs record and Khingyi Hpyaws discussion
that the purpose of Mujahid uprising was to fight against the Myanmar government
and the Rakhines with a view to turning the region around Maungdaw, Buthidaung
and Rathedaung into an autonomous Muslim state. After establishing their own Muslim
state, they intended to secede from Myanmar and join East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh).
San Tun Aungs and Khingyi Hpyaws statements are true facts, which agree
with the information given by Maung Htin. Part of Maung Htins discussion will be
reproduced here.
Maung Htins View
Dissatisfied with the political structure [established] in Myanmar [after it
regained independence], the White Flag communists went underground.
Strong aftershocks of it were felt in Rakhine, and the Mujahid movement
began amid them. The post-war era Chittagonians policy was to turn the
Mayu hill region and Kalabazin valley on the other side [on the east side] of
115
Naaf River into their new territory. The person who first propounded this
policy was a Chittagonian who had lived in Rakhine for years. He had
planned to enter [Rakhine] en masse with his tribe to resettle [there];
however, his plan went awry when Myanmar regained independence
[because] the Myanmar government paid special attention to control
immigration and emigration. This made it impossible for Chittagonians to
enter Myanmar freely. Therefore, this Chittagonian began disseminating
anti-Myanmar government propaganda through various newspapers in
Dhaka. Later, the Mujahid movement grew gradually, making the rebel
leader Kasim famous. (Maung Htin 1960, 58)
It can be learnt from the above excerpts that Maung Htin and Khingyi Hpyaw
agree that the political goal of the Chittagonians was to establish a Muslim state and
to separate it from Myanmar and incorporate it into East Pakistan. This is also
corroborated by San Tun Aungs record.
These three authors have highlighted the fact that the Chittagonians who
immigrated during British colonial era intended to turn Buthidaung-Maungdaw region
into their new territory as they had become predominant in the region, and to make
this territory a part of East Pakistan.
Thus, the Chittagonian Muslims had disguised as Mujahids (warriors for the
faith) and took up arms to pursue their political goal of establishing a new territory.
Portrayal of Rohingyas as Patriots
Now, let us consider whether Zaw Min Htuts portrayal of Mujahids as patriots
and his statement that the Mujahid insurgency failed only because of Rohingya
policemens attack are acceptable by checking his statements against the
information given in Yegars work. Zaw Min Htut first says:
-
- - - (Zaw Min Htut
2001, 67-68)
Translation:
More important reasons for the emergence of Mujahid movement were
because [the Muslims] were concerned by the wounds of the Muslim
116
Rakhine riot of 1942 and because the Rakhines had their own underground
armed groups. Rohingyas believed that they would suffer losses just like in
the 1942 riot if they did not have an armed group. The Mujahid movement
was initiated by Rohingya youthsKawal Jawhar, U Swalay, U Rashid et al.,
and was soon controlled by Kasim and became well known. However, the
Mujahids failed to get public support in later times because they began to
oppress their own people. . . .
In Chapter 8 (under the subheading Myanmar Army and Ethnic Rohingyas),
however, he contradicts these statements, saying:
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 100)
Translation:
. . . Some Rohingya patriotic young men took up arms against the AFPFL
government, making Maungdaw-Buthidaung region in Rakhine as their base
in the post-independence era, because the Rohingyas from Rakhine had
been deprived of their rights.
Thus, after saying the Mujahids failed to get public support as if he sympathizes with
the people, Zaw Min Htut refers to Mujahid insurgents as patriots.
Moreover, Zaw Min Htut does not accept that the Mujahids were forced into
surrendering by Myanmar Armys offensives. He praises the Mujahids, saying that U Nus
regime had to make various offers to persuade the Mujahids to surrender because it
was unable to crush them. He goes on to say that a few local Rohingya leaders and
Rohingya policemen led the annihilation of the Mujahid group as follows:
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min
Htut 2001, 68)
Translation:
. . . At that time (?1950), a few local Rohingya leaders and Rohingya
policemen led the annihilation of the Mujahid group. Police Constable U
Kasim and Dy. Police Constable U Miramat led a force and fought
117
courageously in wiping out the Mujahids, and hence the government
awarded them Yethura titles in 1955 in recognition of their loyalty to the
nation.
- - -
(Zaw Min Htut
2001, 100-101)
Translation:
. . . At that time (1948-50), U Nus regime was not in a position to crush
Rohingya armed forces, and hence it made various offers to persuade the
Rohingyas to make their armed men lay down their arms. The ceremony of
Mujahids surrendering was attended by Brig. Gen. Aung Gyi, the then Vice
Chief-of-Staff [of the Myanmar Army].
In the first paragraph, Zaw Min Htut means to say how the Myanmar army was
having to fight against the Mujahids while U Nus regime was in a tight corner, with
various insurgent groups rebelling against it. At that time, a Chin battalion had to
defend the ?Rakhine/Buthidaung-Maungdaw region so that it would not fall into the
hands of the Mujahids. However, Zaw Min Htut states how some local Rohingya leaders
and Rohingya policemen quelled the rebellion, portraying the Rohingyas as the heroes
who had saved the region.
The second paragraph only has two sentences. In the first sentence, Zaw Min
Htut implies that the insurgents surrendered only because of the promises U Nus
government made, and in the second sentence, he says that Brig. Gen. Aung Gyi
attended the ceremony in which the Mujahids surrendered. Thus, he presents these
facts as if they were connected, and implies that the surrender was not a result of the
armys offensives. In fact, ten years intervened between these two events. The year U
Nu made them some promises was 1950, whereas the year the Mujahids surrendered
was 1961. Zaw Min Htut is just trying to distort the facts here.
The Mujahid insurgents were forced to surrender by the Monsoon Operation
headed by Brig. Gen. Aung Gyi and the conclusion of an agreement between
Myanmar and Pakistan to cooperate on border affairs, which had extinguished their
hopes. Concerning this, Yegars discussion may be quoted here:
All the attempts to hold talks together [in 1948] failed. The rebels made
rapid progress and banished the Arakanese villagers who had been
resettled. There was heavy fighting against army units and police patrols in
the region which for a long time had been under virtual siege. In June, 1949,
government control was reduced to the port of Akyab only, whereas the
118
Mujahids were in possession of all of northern Arakan, and other groups of
Arakanese rebels had other districts in their control. Because of the paucity
of regular troops, the government formed special Arakanese Territorial
Forces; they performed many acts of cruelty against the Muslims; and the
rebels, for their part, returned the full measure of acts of cruelty against the
Arakanese.
Political tensions between Burma and Pakistan were created when
Pakistani newspapers began writing about the suppression of Arakanese
Muslims by the government of Burma. In 1950, Prime Minister U Nu,
accompanied by the Pakistan Ambassador, went to visit Maungdaw. . . . in
1952, accusations of Arakanese Muslim persecution were renewed in the
press of Pakistan. The Burmese newspapers reacted by describing the
persecution of Buddhists by fanatic Muslims in Pakistan who compelled them
to convert to Islam. They reiterated the old rumors that had already been
bruited about in previous years, that the Mujahids were getting arms and
finances from Pakistan. These rumors were denied both by the government
of Pakistan and by the government of Burma . . . The aid the Mujahids
received in Pakistan was not given officially, but it cannot be denied that
there were Pakistanis who supported the Mujahids, seeing them as national
and religious heroes.
. . . Arakanese Buddhist monks proclaimed protest fasts in Rangoon
against the Mujahids. As a result of this pressure, the government launched
an extensive campaign in November (Operation Monsoon). The major
centers of the Mujahids were captured and several of their important leaders
were killed. Since then their threat has been vastly reduced. Their ranks broke
up into small units which continued to loot and terrorize Muslims and Buddhist
alike, especially in the remote regions difficult of access.
. . . Kassem [Kasim], the Mujahid leader, had . . . been arrested in
Chittagong. . . the rebel leader was not handed over [to Myanmar]. . . . After
his release from jail, Kassem remained in Chittagong where he runs a hotel
to this very day.
Kassems forces, although scattered, set up a camp for their families on
the Pakistani side of the border and continued their revolt by smuggling rice
and by plunder - until July 4, 1961, when 290 Mujahids of the southern region
of Maungdaw were captured by Brig. Gen. Aung Gyi . . . The rebels felt that
there was no longer any hope for their rebellion, especially since an
agreement had been reached between Burma and Pakistan at the
beginning of 1961 which also provided for cooperation between the border
commands of Pakistan and Burma . . . The balance of the Mujahid gangs,
numbering just a few hundreds, surrendered on November 15, 1961, in east
Buthidaung to Brigadier Aung Gyi. . . .
119
Thus ended the Mujahid rebellion; but before it was over, it had given
rise to political results which were also affected by the great hatred existing
between the Muslims and the Buddhists in Arakan . . . (Yegar 1972, 98-101)
Yegars above description shows that in 1949 U Nus government was able to defend
only the urban areas in Sittwe, Maungdaw and Buthidaung. In the outlying areas, the
Mujahids and other insurgent groups held sway.
Mujahids oppression of the Rakhine civilians led Rakhine monks in Yangon to
go on a hunger strike, compelling U Nus government to launch a military operation
against the Mujahids in 1954. This operation caused the disintegration of the Mujahid
group. Zaw Min Htut omits these facts and says that the disintegration of the Mujahid
group was brought about by an attack led by Rohingya civilians and police officers.
He fails to mention that Brig. Gen. Aung Gyi led a military operation against the
Mujahids in 1961, capturing 290 insurgents and forcing the remnants of the Mujahid
League to surrender. Zaw Min Htut has distorted the facts to say that what had
persuaded the Mujahid insurgents to surrender were U Nus offers. He seemingly desires
to highlight U Nus offers and to portray Mujahids not as defeatists, but as patriotic
Muslim heroes.
The Alethangyaw Convention which Moshe Yegar Fails to Mention
As stated above, Yegar remarks that the Mujahid rebellion had given rise to
political results. What are they? He has pointed out that the Muslims objected to the
demand of the Arakan Party for the status of a state for Arakan within the framework
of the Union of Burma (Yegar 1972, 101). He also discusses how U Kyaw Min, leader
of this party, failed in all his attempts, after the 1951 elections, to win over the Muslim
Members of Parliament from Arakan to form an all-Arakan faction within Parliament,
with the promise of securing their rights as Muslims in the State to be constituted; how
the large majority of the Muslim organizations of the Rohinga of Maungdaw and
Buthidaung demanded autonomy for the region, to be directly governed by the
central government in Rangoon without any Arakanese officials or any Arakanese
influence whatsoever; and that their minimal demand was the creation of a
separate district without autonomy but governed from the center (Yegar 1972, 102).
These facts are true. These objections and demands made by Muslim intellectuals
should not be dissociated from the Mujahid insurgency, but should be regarded as the
political results of the insurgency as Yegar has observed.
An important part of this political movement was the Alethangyaw Convention,
which was held in June 1951 in the Alethangyaw village in southern Maungdaw
township. It is said that the convention was attended by Muslim representatives from
various parts of Rakhine and Myanmar. This convention was where the Chittagonian
Muslims explicitly stated their intention to take over northern Rakhine. The demands
made in the open letters from this convention to the British government, written in
English, had served as guidelines for future generations of Muslims. When Prime Minister
120
U Nu planned to establish the Rakhine State in 1961, the Muslims from Maungdaw and
Buthidaung raised strong objections and expressed their desires. Everything they
presented was based on the policy laid down at the Alethangyaw Convention. Some
of the decisions made in this convention, which Yegar does not mention in his work, will
be given here:
Rakhines and Muslims are the two most important racial groups in
Rakhine, Rakhine and Muslim populations being the highest and second
highest, respectively. . . . Autonomous regions for Rakhines and Muslims within
the Union should be established. In the following matters, the Rakhines and
Muslims should be made to act jointly:
1) the formation of a single defense force to defend Rakhine State
2) the administration of the Sittwe port which belonged to both races
3) concerning (i) the cooperation in defense matters and (ii) the sharing
of the portwhich are of equal interest to Muslims and Rakhinesa scheme
by which Rakhines and Muslims would participate in equal ratio should be
adopted.
Northern Rakhine State should be established as an autonomous Muslim
State like Shan and Karen States as soon as possible. This Muslim state should
have State Army, State Police Force and State Security Force controlled by
the Union government. . . . A representative of the Muslim State in northern
Rakhine should be appointed as Minister for Muslim Affairs in the central
government. . . .
An assurance should be made that the Muslims, in suitable proportions,
would be included in the Union governments armed forces, permanent
forces, temporary forces, police force, educational institutions and law
enforcement agencies. . . .
The permission to open Islamic high schools and colleges should be
granted. Arabic language and the history and culture of Islam should be
allowed to be taught in those schools. Using Urdu language as a medium of
teaching in all the subjects should be allowed in Muslim primary and middle
schools. Muslims should not be made to learn other literature against their
wishes. (Hla Tun Hpru 1974. Report to the ???th meeting of Rakhine State
Council. I have no access to the original report.)
Note that the word Muslim is used in the above excerpts. The word Rohingya
had not come into use when the Alethangyaw Convention was held in 1951. The
Muslims of Maungdaw and Buthidaung used the word Muslim to avoid using the word
Bengali although they were Chittagonian Bengalis. The word Rohingya was first used
only in an article in the Guardian Daily published on 20 August 1951 by Mr. Gaffar, MP.
It was a new word used to refer to the Chittagonian Bengalis.
121
Let us compare the resolutions made at the Alethangyaw convention (above)
with the line taken by the Muslims who called themselves Rohingyas on the
establishment of the new Rakhine State in 1960. First, Yegars discussion of the position
taken by Mr. Sultan Mahmud (MP) on this matter will be cited here. Sultan Mahmud,
representing the Muslims in the townships in Rakhine, except Maungdaw and
Buthidaung, submitted a memorandum to the inquiry commission on Rakhine State.
This memorandum mentions the demands of the Muslims who supported the
establishment of the whole of Rakhine as a state. The majority of the Muslims from
Maungdaw and Buthidaung, however, disagreed with Sultan Mahmuds proposal and
desired to establish a Rohingya Muslim State with those two townships.
According to Yegar, Sultan Mahmud states in his memorandum as follows:
. . . they would support the State only on two conditions: if the
Arakanese Buddhists would support their demands; and if the constitutions
of the State would include, specifically, religious, cultural, economic,
political, administrative, and educational guarantees for Muslims. The Head
of State of the new State of Arakan would alternate: once a Muslim and
once a non-Muslim. When the Head of State was a Muslim, the Speaker of
the State Council would be a non-Muslim, but his deputy, a Muslim; and vice
versa. The same arrangement would also be in effect in the appointments,
committees and other bodies. No less than one-third of the States
ministers were to be Muslims. No law affecting Muslims would be passed
unless and until the majority of the Muslim Members of the Council voted for
it. In the matter of appointments to jobs in Muslim areas, the Chief of State
would act on the advice of the Muslim Members of his Cabinet. In all
appointments to government posts, to public services, to municipal positions
and the like, Muslims would enjoy a just proportion in accordance with their
percentage in the population. . . . No pupil would be forced to participate
in religious classes not of his own religion. Every religious sect would be
allowed training in his own religion in all institutions of learning. Every and any
religious sect would be permitted to set up its own educational institutions
that would be recognized by the government. Muslims would be completely
free to develop their own special Rohinga language . . . and to spread their
religion. A special officer for Muslim Affairs would be appointed whose job it
would be to investigate complaints and obstructions, and to report on them
to the Chief of State. . . . (Yegar 1972, 104)
Let me continue to mention the demands made by other Muslim organizations.
Twenty two demands made by the leaders of Rakhine Muslim organizations at a press
conference on 27 October 1960 appeared in a paper submitted to the inquiry
commission on Rakhine State. Some of these demands are cited here to enable the
readers to compare them with the resolutions made at the Alethangyaw Convention
and the suggestions made by Sultan Mahmood.
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. . . 1) All the Muslims now living in Rakhine, with the exception of those
who are holding Foreigner Registration Cards (FRC) or foreign passports,
should be recognized as the citizens of the Union of Myanmar.
2) All the Muslim members of parliament from Rakhine, whichever
locality elected them, should become members of the Rakhine State
Council like the non-Muslim members of parliament from Rakhine.
4) A person should be nominated from among the Muslims and non-
Muslims alternately for the position of the head of Rakhine State who, ex-
officio, would serve as Minister for Rakhine Affairs and as a member of the
Union government. If a non-Muslim serves a term of one year, a Muslim must
be made to serve a term of one year after that.
5) If the head of Rakhine State is a Muslim, that of the State Council must
be a non-Muslim and vice versa.
6) . . . Not less than one-third of the cabinet ministers must be Muslims.
7) . . . A bill that encroaches on the rights and liberties the Muslims are
enjoying as a distinct society [within Myanmar] should not be passed as law
if the majority of the Muslims in the State Council oppose it.
9) Muslims must be included in the State Services Commission in
proportion [to population]. Moreover, a Muslim and a non-Muslim must
alternate as the chairman of this commission.
11) Muslims must have equal rights in the State Services Commission, all
the other selection boards and organizations, corporations and municipal
committees.
14) State government must make special endeavours to raise the
educational and economic levels of the Muslims and minorities in the State.
15) The State funds and the funds allotted by the Union Government
must be expended for areas in which the Muslims and non-Muslims reside as
proportionately as possible on the basis of population.
21) . . . In resettling the Buddhists from [East] Pakistan in Rakhine, they
must be settled only in the localities in which non-Muslims reside.
22) When the Frontier Administration in Mayyu Frontier Region is
dissolved and the administration is taken over by the Rakhine State
[government], the region must be governed as a separate region, and no
change nor interference in the existing civil administration must be made.
(Guardian Daily [Rangoon], 27 October, 1960)
123
Readers may compare these demands with those made by Mr. Sultan Mahmud
and the resolutions made at the Alethangyaw Convention.
A study of the above three documents shows that the Chittagonian Muslims
who called themselves Rohingyas concurred in expressing their desire to establish a
separate Muslim State or Region that comprised Maungdaw, Buthidaung and part of
Rathedaung in northern Rakhine because of their predominant position there. They
also wanted the government to recognize them as citizens and to not resettle Buddhists
who at that time were in East Pakistan in their Muslim State. Sultan Mahmud, who did
not demand the establishment of a Muslim State or Region, but desired the foundation
of the Rakhine State, however, just wanted the Rakhines to make an assurance that
the Muslims would enjoy certain rights. However, his demands were more serious than
those made for the establishment of a Muslim State.
All in all, as a result of the Mujahid insurgency, the Rakhines could not turn their
ancestral land into a state without Muslims interference. The Rakhines had to relinquish
control of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and part of Rathedaung, where a minority of
Rakhines felt imprisoned by the predominant Bengali Muslims.
Review of Chapter 7
Portraying Chittagonian Muslims as an Indigenous Race of Myanmar
Zaw Min Htut introduces Chapter 7 Legal Issues and Rohingyas with the words: The
right of the persons who are Union citizens by birth to acquire Union citizenship is one of
the fundamental human rights.
90
[?He seems to mean: the right to acquire Union
citizenship is one of the fundamental human rights of the persons who are born within
the Union]. Then he cites Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
91
In this way, he claims that the Rohingyas
have the right to acquire Myanmar citizenship as they are natural-born citizens of the
Union of Myanmar. Thus, he is demanding privileges for the so-called Rohingyas.
Then he refers to articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution of the Union of Burma
(1947), and cites the Union Citizenship Act of 1948 as follows:
Section 3 (a) For the purpose of section 11 of the Constitution the
expression any of the indigenous races of Burma shall mean the
Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan race and
such racial group as has settled in any of the territories included within the
Union as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1823 A.D. (1185
B.E.).
92
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 71)
Holding onto the phrase a period anterior to 1823 A.D. (1185 B.E.) in this law, Zaw Min
Htut claims as follows:
()
()
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 74)
It is mentioned in the report (dated 12 July 1825) of Robertson,
commander of a British force, that the population of Rakhine at that time
was about 100,000sixty thousand Rakhine Buddhists and thirty thousand
90
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 69)
91
United Nations 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December, 1948), Article 15.
92
Government of Burma 1948, Union Citizenship Act (Burma Act No. LXVI of 1948), Article
3 (a).
125
Muslims. There is no reason to refute that the descendants of those thirty
thousand Muslims are Myanmar nationals. . . .
However, the thirty thousand Muslims mentioned by Robertson comprised of, inter alios,
the captives brought back from the twelve towns of Bengal during the reigns of Mrauk-
oo-period kings, the Muslims bought from Portuguese pirates and the Myedu Muslims
(ie the Muslims brought back to Myanmar by King Bodawhpaya). They could be
regarded as Indians (mostly Bengalis) who had been living in Rakhine in those days.
However, there is no evidence that they were Rohingyas.
The thirty thousand Muslims Zaw Min Htut refers to are the ones mentioned in
Banerjees work. With the intention of inflating the Muslim population, he discusses as
follows:
- - -
- - -
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 74)
Translation:
. . . The people from Rakhine who took refuge in Chittagong to escape
Bamar invasion in 1784 and because of the lack of security under
Lemrowuns rule after 1785, returned home when relative security was
restored after 1826. . . . Those [refugees] included not only Rakhine Buddhists,
but also a large number of Muslims and hill peoples. . . .
As Zaw Min Htut represents the Muslims who had immigrated during the colonial era as
indigenous Muslims in Chapter 4, I have refuted that they were immigrants by citing the
works of Smart and Yegar.
Furthermore, Zaw Min Htut attributes the high population density of Rohingyas
in present-day Maungdaw and Buthidaung to the remigration of approximately two
hundred thousand refugees who had escaped from the riot of 1942; and this has been
discussed in Chapter 6 (under the subheading Taking Advantage of the Riot to
Overstate the Muslim Population).
He does not stop with this. He refers to Mr. Gani Markan, who contested for a
seat in the legislative council as a Myanmar representative from Maungdaw and
Buthidaung under 91-department scheme in the colonial period as follows:
- - -
() [sic.] ()
126
() ()
(Zaw Min Htut 2001,
75)
Translation:
. . . A general election was held in November 1936. Ten members of the
legislative council were elected from ten constituencies in Rakhine9 for
Myanmar nationals and 1 for Indians in Sittwe. The Rohingyas were allowed
to vote in the constituencies for Myanmar nationals, and a Rohingya by the
name of U Gani Markan was elected as a Myanmar representative from
Maungdaw-Buthidaung constituency.
93
Thus, according to Zaw Min Htut, the Muslims who had the vote in this election were
Myanmar nationals, Mr. Gani Markan was a Muslim and a Myanmar representative,
and all those Muslims, including Gani Markan, were Rohingyas. Although, as an
accomplished liar and with his writing skills, he can adroitly portray the Indians who
immigrated in the colonial era as Myanmar nationals, Zaw Min Htut cannot change
Smarts record (Government of Burma 1917), which gives the populations of indigenous
Buddhists and of Indian immigrants as recorded in the census of 1911. The census does
not mention a race called Rohingya. It only mentions Bengalis and Kaman Muslims.
Zaw Min Htut should understand that true historical facts cannot be kept dark.
Zaw Min Htut discusses at some length how the Muslims from Maungdaw and
Buthidaung were entitled to contest, and some even won, in the three parliamentary
general elections held under AFPFL rule. He means to say that they had the rights to
vote and to contest in the elections only because they were Myanmar nationals. It is
true that the Muslims from Maungdaw and Buthidaung had enjoyed those rights;
nevertheless, they were not recognized Rohingyas. It was clearly stated in the 100
th
press conference held during SLORC era that the Muslims who called themselves
Rohingyas were not recognized as an indigenous race of Myanmar.
In 1988, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) fell from power, and the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took over the reins of government.
When the government planned to hold multi-party democracy general elections in
1990, seven Muslim parties from Maungdaw and Buthidaung ran for the elections. The
SLORC government did not include Rohingya among the list of national races in
93
Since the name Rohingya was not used throughout the colonial era, how could Gani
Markan be recognized as a Rohingya? Zaw Min Htut has not proved that Gani Markan was a
Rohingya or even a Muslim. Furthermore, if there were Rohingyas in the parliament, why
could/did they not make the government recognize Rohingya as an ethnic group?
127
Myanmar. Brig. General Khin Nyunt, secretary 1 of SLORC, made a statement on this
matter in the 100
th
press conference of SLORC on 13 July 1990 as follows:
. . . Some political organizations are claiming that certain races which
are not officially recognized as national races to be considered to be
national races.... We do not recognize nationalities depending on their faith.
Those who are not in the nationalities list previously in trying to obtain
nationalities status can harm the drafting of the constitution. . . .
94
After this press conference, the Muslim parties which formerly planned to name their
parties as Rohingya parties took other names. Those parties were:
1) National Democratic Party for Human Rights
2) Mayyu Development Student Youth Organization (Arakan)
3) National Ethnic Reformation Party
4) ?National United Party of Arakan
5) Amyotha Party
6) Rakhine Nationalities League for Democracy
7) Kaman National League for Democracy
Although those parties had to change their names because they were not allowed to
use the name Rohingya, Zaw Min Htut says:
()
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 87)
Translation:
. . . The Rohingya nationals, just like their brethren nationals, had the right
to vote in 1990 elections. Every Rohingya who had reached the age of 18
were allowed to vote, and the establishment of Rohingya political parties
legally were allowed.
He then gives brief histories of those seven political parties. Despite Zaw Min
Htuts references to Rohingya nationals and Rohingya political parties, the name
Rohingya was not used in the names of those parties. Why? The answer can be
found in the above press statement made by Brig. General Khin Nyunt, who denied the
use of the word Rohingya as an ethnonym, pointing out that Those who are not in
94
Burma Press Summary, (from The Working People's Daily), Vol. IV, No. 7, July 1990, <http:/
www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BPS90-07.pdf> (accessed on 15 May 2014)
128
the nationalities list previously in trying to obtain nationalities status can harm the
drafting of the constitution.
Moreover, Zaw Min Htut states as follows:
()
(Three Generations)
- - - (Zaw Min Htut 2001, 76-77)
Translation:
During the BSPP era, a person could run for the elections only if his/her
grandparents, parents and he/her himself/herself were Myanmar citizens
under the constitution of 1947. Dr. Nyi Nyi, Minister for Mining and U Win Ko,
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs had to resign as members of the Pyithu
Hluttaw
95
because they did not have the qualifications for membership of
the Parliament. Thus Rohingyas had the right to run for and vote in the
elections for the Pyithu Hluttaw and different levels of Pyithu Councils
96
. (Zaw
Min Htut, p. 76-77)
In addition, he says:
() ()
(Zaw Min Htut, p. 92)
Translation:
Every Rohingya who had reached the age of 18 were allowed to run
for Myanmars last general elections held on 27 May 1990, during the SLORC
era, because Rohingya was an ethnic minority group of Myanmar. (Zaw Min
Htut 2001, 92)
95
the unicameral legislature of Myanmar during the socialist era.
96
administrative councils during the socialist era.
129
It is true that Dr. Nyi Nyi and U Win Ko had to resign as members of the Pyithu Hluttaw in
the BSPP era because they did not have qualifications to become members of the
Pyithu Hluttaw under the constitution. However, Zaw Min Htuts statement that the
Muslims who called themselves Rohingyas were allowed to stand for the Pyithu Hluttaw
and the hierarchy of Pyithu Councils is a flat-out lie. In the Rakhine State, Muslims could
not even become full-fledged members of the BSPP. They had to content themselves
with becoming provisional members of the party or party sympathizers. They were
appointed as chairmen of village-level councils only in Muslim villages.
Moreover, when the BSPP government launched an operation codenamed
Naga Min (King Dragon) to check identity documents, more than four hundred
thousand so-called Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State fled to the other side of the
border, as the entire world knew. Why did they take flight? The answer is obvious. They
were not indigenous people; they were not even citizens. That was why they dared
not face scrutiny and took flight. Zaw Min Htut further states that the Rohingyas were
allowed to vote in and run for the elections in 1990 because they were an ethnic
minority group of Myanmar.
97
The SLORC did not recognize the Muslims who called
themselves Rohingyas as an indigenous race. This is clear from the statement made by
Secretary 1 of SLORC at the 100
th
press conference of SLORC.
Muslims Plan to Seize Maungdaw on 13 May
Zaw Min Htut discusses so-called Rohingyas political movements under various
subheadings in Chapter 7 Legal Issues and Rohingyas. One of those subheadings is
88 Democracy Movement and Ethnic Rohingyas. He relates how the democracy
97
Zaw Min Htut discusses the spread of Islam in Rakhine and the Muslim population in
Rakhine before and during the colonial era. Of course, it is true that there were Muslims in those
days. However, Zaw Min Htut fails to prove that they were Rohingyas, although he refers to
them as Rohingyas. If they were Rohingyas, why did the British government not include
Rohingya as a race in their censuses? Zaw Min Htut claims that the Rohingyas had/have their
own language and literature. However Rohingya is not in the list of the languages spoken in
Myanmar in the censuses conducted during the colonial era, especially in the census of 1931,
which even included twenty Indian languages, fifteen European languages and eleven
languages grouped as Other Languages.
Zaw Min Htut mentions several Rohingyas who stood for or won in and vote in the
elections (during the colonial era [in 1936)], during the post-independence era under AFPFL rule,
during the socialist era, and during the SLORC/SPDC era). It is true that Muslims were allowed to
vote and compete in the elections held in Myanmar if they were citizens, and I believe they will
continue to enjoy those rights in the future. This shows that successive Myanmar governments
have not been oppressing religious minorities. However Zaw Min Htut has not proved anywhere
in his book that those Muslims were/are Rohingyas. In fact, he has never proved the existence
of a single Rohingya. He just replaces the word Muslim with Rohingya whenever he wants to.
Moreover the fact that successive Myanmar governments allowed the Muslims (Zaw Min
Htut has referred to) to vote and compete in the elections indicates that the governments had
recognized them as citizens and had issued them IDs (NRCs or Citizenship Cards). Therefore, the
Kalas in Arakan who, or whose parents, do not have IDs clearly must be illegal immigrants.
130
movement of 1988 began and how the Muslims attempt to seize Maungdaw township
on 13 May 1988 was connected with it as follows:
()
()
(Zaw Min Htut
2001, 85)
Translation:
. . . On 13 May 1988, a popular uprising against one-party dictatorship
broke out in Maungdaw township in Rakhine State. This uprising was jointly
orchestrated by local Rohingyas and Rakhines. However, the Lon Htein (anti-
riot force) of BSPP fired on [the demonstrators] to crush the uprising, killing
two Rohingya youths and wounding many people.
Zaw Min Htut makes a barefaced lie that the incident in Maungdaw was a popular
uprising against one-party dictatorship, and that it was jointly engineered by Rohingyas
and Rakhines. But it was not. No Rakhine was involved in it either. In fact, this incident
was perpetrated by the Muslims whose intention was to attack the Rakhine minorities
in Maungdaw town and township.
Zaw Min Htut also proudly states that a Muslim political leader by the name of
Dr. Tun Aung from Maungdaw town delivered a speech at a mass rally in Maungdaw
on 13 August as follows:
- - -
- - - ()
(Zaw Min Htut 2001, 86)
Translation:
. . . Dr. Tun Aung, a Rohingya who was the leader of the democracy
movement committee in Maungdaw . . . expressed, inter alia, that the
demonstrations that took place in Maungdaw on 13 August marked the start
of a democracy movement in Myanmar and urged the people to continue
this movement with perseverance and patience and in harmony until
democracy prevails in Myanmar.
Note that Tun Aung said 13 August instead of 13 May for the date of Muslim
uprising in Maungdaw. As the Muslim uprising posed a serious threat to the safety of
131
Rakhine Buddhists in Maungdaw township who were a minority there, the Myoma
Sayadaw (the abbot of the Myoma monastery), who was chairman of the Township
Sanghanayaka Committee in Maungdaw, reported the matter to the Central
Sanghanayaka Committee on 28 September 1988. The important parts of this letter
may be cited here:
. . . A group of kalazoes
98
who call themselves Rakhine Ywahaunggya
have taken refuge in Bangladesh and are issuing leaflets named
Ywahaunggya and distributing them worldwide. According to them apart
from the 186,996 Kalas Myanmar [government] has allowed to return under
Hintha Operation in 1979, there are about five hundred and fifty thousand
Kalas in Bangladesh and other Muslim countries. They are demanding
[Myanmar] to let those Kalas return. After 9 pm on Friday, 13/5/88, about
fifty thousand Kalas closed in on Maungdaw from the south, east and north
sides to kill the Rakhine Buddhists. On the same day, they demolished the
Myothit monastery in Ward 4 and surrounded the main monastery building.
Rakhines narrowly escaped being massacred only because the Peoples
Police Force and the No. 2 battalion of Lon Htein (Anti-Riot Force) reacted in
time to prevent the attack. If their [the kalazoes] attempt was successful,
they would bring in two hundred and fifty thousand people from
Bangladesh, take over the region as a Muslim territory and incorporate it into
Bangladesh. It was a despicable act.
. . . Therefore, I would like to implore you to take this report into careful
consideration and guide the authorities as you think necessary for the
welfare of the Sasana.
This letter clearly indicates how serious the threat posed by the so-called Rohingyas
was. The Rakhine Buddhists in Maungdaw and Buthidaung could do nothing to remove
this threat as they were a minority there. They would be able to eliminate this threat
only with the help of other nationals of the Union.
A Monuddin Nasir wrote an article on the incident of 13 May, entitled Rohingya
Issue Calls for Early Solution, in the Friday Weekly (dated 2 September 1988) published
in our neighboring country. The author said that the Myanmar government had passed
the Burma Immigration Act
99
and launched twelve operations against the Rohingya
Muslims. Under this law the Muslims in Rakhine were foreign nationals who had no right
to reside in Myanmar, and the Myanmar government had been oppressing the Muslims
pursuant to this law. Therefore, he continued, more than a million Muslims had
abandoned their land. Moreover, the Myanmar government launched the Galon
98
Kalazo literally means a bad Kala.
99
I dont know which law he is referring to.
132
Operation in 1979 in preparation to pass a new law named Burma Citizenship Law,
100
which recognized the Rohingyas as foreigners and deprived them of the right to vote
or stand for the elections. He went on to say that this [Galon] operation was the most
harmful operation for the Muslims, and that now there were around four hundred and
fifty thousand Muslims in Bangladesh who were eager to return to their mother land.
The author also referred to Shabbir Hussein, head of the Arakan Rohingya
Islamic Front as saying that the Muslims in Rakhine had been crusading for a long time,
and that they were now taking part in Myanmars uprising against dictatorship.
The author also said he was told by a government official who was made to
leave Myanmar quite recently that the Muslims in Rakhine staged a demonstration on
13 May, and that the Myanmar government had suspended most of the government
servants who were regarded as organizers.
Then, the author said that the majority of the one million Muslims who had left
Myanmar were living in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, some gulf countries and in India, and
that the Muslims of Rakhine should take up arms and risk their lives if they were not
allowed to take part in the national reconciliation talks.
Thus, the author condemned Myanmars immigration law, and his statements
that this law had led a million Muslims to flee the country and that four hundred and
fifty thousand Muslims were eager to remigrate to their mother land suggest that his
intention was to exploit the political instability in Myanmar to the Muslims advantage.
This article corroborates the statement in the report made by the chairman of
the township Sanghanayaka committee of Maungdaw township that the Muslims were
demanding permission for the return of around five hundred and fifty thousand Muslims.
It is obvious that the intention behind the 13 May incident was to pave the way for the
return of the Muslims who had fled to avoid the governments actions taken pursuant
to the immigration law. It was the prompt actions of the Peoples Police Force and the
No. 2 battalion of Lon Htein (Anti-Riot Force) that had saved the Rakhines in
Maungdaw. As stated above, Maung Htin who formerly was the commissioner of
Rakhine has pointed out that the aim of the Muslims who called themselves Rohingyas
was to turn Maungdaw and Buthidaung into a Muslim territory. As the purpose of the
incident of 13 May also was the same, let me quote him again:
. . . The post-war era Chittagonians policy was to turn the Mayu hill
region and Kalabazin valley on the other side [on the east side] of Naaf River
into their new territory. The person who first propounded this policy was a
100
?Government of Burma 1982. Burma Citizenship Law (Pyitthu Hluttaw Law no. 4),
published in the Working Peoples Daily, 16 October 1982. For an unofficial translation of this law,
follow this link: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae64f71b.html> (accessed on 15 May 2014)
133
Chittagonian who had lived for years in Rakhine. He had planned to enter
[Rakhine] en masse with his tribe to resettle [there] . . . (Maung Htin 1960, 58)
This statement agrees with the article written by Monuddin Nasir in the Friday
Weekly and the report made by the chairman of the Maungdaw township
Sanghanayaka committee. The Chittagonian Muslims intention is to reenter Rakhine
en masse, and this could be prevented only with the help of the citizens of the Union
who are our siblings.
Review of Chapter 8
Be Loyal to the Union
Zaw Min Htut gives the title of Chapter 8 as Governments Recognition of Rohingyas
in the Post-Colonial Era. This chapter is arranged in seven sections: Excerpts from
Prime Minister U Nus Broadcast Speech, Excerpts from the Speeches Made at Rallies
by U Ba Swe, Prime Minister and Former Minister for Defense, Notifications Issued by
the Frontier Administrative Department Subordinate to Prime Minister, Excerpts from
Myanma Swezonkyan [Encyclopedia Birmanica], Indigenous Language Programs
and Rohingya Language Program of Burma Broadcasting Station, Excerpts from the
Hkitye Journal Published by Myanmar Military, and Vice Chief-of-Staff Brig. Gen. Aung
Gyis Speech Delivered at the Ceremony of Mujahids Surrendering on 8 July 1961.
Zaw Min Htut presents the speeches made by U Nu, U Ba Swe and Brig. Gen.
Aung Gyi who had spoken as Myanmars leaders to sway the Muslims while Myanmar
was quelling the Mujahid rebellion. They used the word Rohingya in some of their
speeches, the broadcasting of Rohingya Language Program was allowed from 15 May
1961 to 1 October 1965, and Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships were administered
as Mayu Frontier Region. Nevertheless, they were not recognizing the so-called
Rohingyas as a national race of Myanmar.
101
U Nu and other political leaders of
Myanmar were just using their political guile to deal with the political situation at that
101
It is impossible to use U Nu and U Ba Swes politicking to prove that the government
recognized the so-called Rohingyas as an ethnic group, indigenous or non-indigenous. They
used all their political guile to gain or stay in power. Consider how U Nu made an election
promise to adopt Buddhism as a state religion. After he was re-elected as Prime Minister in the
parliamentary session held on 4 April 1960, his government formed an advisory committee to help
them draft a bill to adopt Buddhism as the state religion. U Nu did not have power to adopt
Buddhism as state religion. Only the parliament had that power. Therefore, U Nu tabled the Third
Amendment of the Constitution to make Buddhism the State religion in the parliament on 17
August 1961, and some objections were raised (Proceedings of the Third Session of the
Parliament, 5/3, 1961, 309ff.). The issue was put to the vote, and the parliament passed the Third
Amendment of the Constitution by a vote of 324 to 28 on 26 August 1961 (Hanthawady
[Mandalay], 27 October 1961). I have not found any evidence that U Nu made any attempt to
recognize Rohingya as an ethnic group. It is true that Rohingya Language Program was
broadcast for some years from 1961 onwards. However, neither the Burma Broadcasting Station
nor Prime Minister U Nu had the power to recognize Rohingya as an ethnic group. This program
was put to a stop in the BSPP era. If a government of Myanmar really had recognized Rohingya
as an ethnic group, there certainly should be some official documents, such as parliamentary
records. Also, if the prime minister himself did not have that power, how could Brig. Gen. Aung
Gyi have that power at that time? He was not even a member of the cabinet and Myanmar
was not under military rule at that time.
135
time. They never recognized those people as a national race like the Kachin, Kayah,
Karen, Chin, Mon, Myanmar, Rakhine and Shan.
The heads of successive governments of Myanmar had to deal with the affairs
of the so-called Rohingyas from its western frontier. The immigration problem
bequeathed to them by the British imperialists had been a headache for Myanmars
successive governments. It brought about the Kala-Bamar riot in 1938 before World
War II broke out, the Kala-Rakhine riot in 1942, and the Mujahid rebellion in 1948. As
Yegar has remarked, this insurgency had given rise to political results; When the
Mujahids surrender, Mr. Gaffar, MP, tried to win the governments confidence by giving
a press conference to state that they were not pro-Pakistan separatists.
Zaw Min Htut also mentions the speech Brig. Aung Gyi delivered at the
ceremony of Mujahids surrendering. However, the main purpose of his speech was to
tell the Muslims in Maungdaw and Buthidaung, including the Mujahids, to give their full
allegiance to the Union of Burma.
Zaw Min Htut reproduces Brig. Gen. Aung Gyis speech from the Myanma Alin
[New Light of Myanmar] (Rangoon) to try to prove that the leaders of Myanmar had
recognized the so-called Rohingyas as an indigenous ethnic group. A study of the
speech, however, shows that Brig. Gen. Aung Gyis intention was to tell them to be loyal
to the Union, not to recognize them as indigenous people even though he referred to
them as Rohingyas.
102
102
It is true that Brig. Gen. Aung Gyi used the word Rohingya in his speech. It seems that
he did not check whether Rohingya was recognized by the government as an ethnic group of
Myanmar and did not know the history of the so-called Rohingyas.
Conclusion
Now, I have reviewed Zaw Min Htuts book and exposed the falsehoods in it. I believe
the readers have learnt the true history of the Chittagonian Muslims who call themselves
Rohingyas.
To sum up my review, the so-called Rohingyas entered Myanmar during the
colonial era when they could freely immigrate to the country as agricultural labourers.
Their number in Akyab district increased rapidly within sixty years (from 1870 to 1930),
and they even outnumbered indigenous Rakhines in Maungdaw and Buthidaung
townships. Although the British government planned to put a curb on their migration
to Myanmar, it was unable to implement this plan because World War II spilt over into
Myanmar.
World War II had caused many problems for Rakhines. Many Rakhines lost their
lives during the race riot of 1942 and those who survived the riot lost their property.
While they were still licking the wounds of this riot, the British who were Myanmars
former overlords, swayed the Muslims of Maungdaw and Buthidaung in 1945, saying
they would let them establish a Muslim state. After the British army had reentered
Myanmar, Chittagonian Muslims flooded into Rakhine, jacking up the Muslim
population in Maungdaw and Buthidaung.
British army officers promise encouraged the Muslims in Rakhine to strive for the
establishment of a Muslim state. As they had become predominant over the Rakhines
in Buthidaung and Maungdaw region, they planned to use this situation to translate
British governments fake promise (to establish a Muslim State) into reality. They
intended to take over Maungdaw, Buthidaung and part of Rathedaung and to
incorporate them into East Pakistan. The Mujahid insurgency bore testimony to this
intention. The Muslim parliament members, on the other hand, demanded the
government to establish a Muslim State, or at least a new region with Maungdaw and
Buthidaung placed under direct control of the central government, which also
reflected their political goal: to take over part of Rakhine as their new territory.
The right to establish a state the Muslims have been demanding is the right only
enjoyed by indigenous races. The Chittagonian Bengalis who call themselves
Rohingyas do not have that right. To overcome this obstacle, they have invented a
history of indigenous Rohingya Muslims, and are using the media for their propaganda
campaign and demanding the establishment of a Muslim State.
Successive Myanmar governments knew the Muslims policy to enter en masse
into Rakhine to acquire a new territory. Therefore they had turned down the Muslims
demands and recognized them only as associate citizens. A new citizenship law was
enacted during the BSPP era. When the immigration officers scrutinized them for
137
registration, the Muslims who called themselves Rohingyas escaped to the other side
of the border to avoid scrutiny. This turned into a refugee crisis which the United Nations
had to mediate, and this had led the international media to frequently use the word
Rohingya as the ethnonym of a new Muslim ethnic group in Myanmar. In this way, the
word Rohingya has become widely known. As the so-called Rohingyas are making all-
out efforts to achieve their political goal, by both peaceful and violent means, some
people have come to believe their false history and regarded their movement as a
human rights movement of the oppressed people. Zaw Min Htuts book entitled The
Union of Burma and Ethnic Rohingyas also is published with a view to misinforming the
Myanmars working or living abroad about the history of so-called Rohingyas.
To conclude, the purpose of the false history Zaw Min Htut has presented is to
enable the Muslims to take over the homeland of Rakhine Buddhists.
Khine Mra War
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