Rule 31 - CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE

OF HEARING OR TRIAL

Sec. 1. Consolidation.

G.R. No. L-30887, December 24, 1971
FELIPE RAYMUNDO, CESAR OBLIGACION, and
PEDRO GARCIA, who died during the pendency
of their appeal in the Honorable Court of
Appeals, succeeded by his widow, TRINIDAD
ALTESA and his children AMBROCIO,
ENGRACIA, RUFINA, AMPARO, DOMINADOR
and PABLO, all surnamed GARCIA, petitioners-
appellants, vs. FELICIANO FELIPE, respondent-
appellee.

G.R. No. L-29754 December 24, 1971
FELIPE RAYMUNDO, PEDRO GARCIA and
CRISPULO FELIPE, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. FELICIANO FELIPE, FAUSTINA CONTRERAS,
ANA SALONGA, ERNESTO SALONGA, GABRIEL
DIONISIO, ARTURO S. FELIPE, MATIAS
SANTOS, AMBROCIO R. CRUZ, CONRADO
FAUSTINO, ALFREDO C. VILLANUEVA, SIMEON
B. SAMSON, BRIGIDA V. SAMSON, and SAN
FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, INC., defendants-
appellees.

FACTS:
Background of the case
Petitioners Felipe Raymundo and Pedro Garcia
claim that they are the owners of certain parcels of
land. Before the last World War, the Filipino
employees of the San Francisco del Monte, Inc.
organized from exclusively among themselves a
mutual aid association which they named "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid." The plaintiff and the two defendants
abovenamed were among the members of that
association.

With its funds, the association purchased lots from
the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. for resale to its
members on the installment plan. Among the lots
acquired by the said association are the two now in
question. In turn, Lot 3 was purchased from the
association by the herein defendant Felipe
Raymundo while Lot 2 was bought by the defendant
Pedro Garcia.
Plaintiff Feliciano Felipe devised fraudulent means to
accomplish his knave purpose. There were two
public instruments involved herein, Deed of
Assignment (with respect to Lot 2) and a Deed of
Quitclaim (for Lot3).

Armed with the "Deed of Assignment" and the "Deed
Quitclaim", Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo G.
Villanueva, as plaintiffs, instituted an action for
specific performance, against the San Francisco del
Monte, Inc., wherein the title to the two lots in
question then still resided, to compel the said
corporation to convey to the first (Feliciano Felipe)
Lot 3, Block 159; and to the second (Alfredo G.
Villanueva) Lot 2. The defendants in the present
ease, Felipe Raymundo and Pedro Garcia owners,
of Lots 3 and 2, respectively, were not parties in that
action despite the fact that the plaintiff therein well
knew that those lots are owned by the said
Raymundo and Garcia and knew well that they have
been in possession of their respective lots for more
than 30 years already to the present.

The decision rendered in the said case ordered the
defendant therein, San Francisco del Monte, Inc. to
convey Lot 3, Block 159 to the plaintiff Feliciano
Felipe and Lot 2, same block, to the plaintiff Alfredo
G. Villanueva.The required deeds of conveyance
were executed by the defendant San Francisco del
Monte, Inc., as ordered in the decision.

First case: GR No. L-30887
(Civil Case No. Q-7668)

Feliciano Felipe filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of two parcels of land. Defendants filed
their answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint. Then, the defendants filed a motion for
leave amend their answer alleging that plaintiff
perpetrated fraud in securing the certificated of title
covering the said lots.

On July 6, 1964, the defendants' two motions
hereinabove mentioned were both orally and
simultaneously denied, the trial court ruling that the
certificates of title being relied upon by the plaintiff
cannot be attacked collaterally but only by means of
a separate action to that effect.

Then the defendants instituted their separate action,
Civil Case No. Q-8114(2
nd
case) of the same court,
for annulment of title or reconveyance of the lots in
question. When the continuation of the hearing of
Civil Case No. Q-7668 was called that morning,
defendants moved that said hearing be held in
abeyance, to be consolidated with the action just
instituted. This motion for consolidation of trial was
denied, trial proceeded as scheduled, and was
continued on July 8, 1964, when said trial was
terminated and Civil Case No. 7668 was submitted
for decision.

TC- in favor of Plaintiff Feliciano Felipe
CA- affirmed the trial court

Second Case: G.R. No. L-29754
(Civil Case No. Q-8114)

Felipe Raymundo and Pedro Garcia filed a
complaint for annulment of title or reconveyance.
Feliciano Felipe, on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action, filed a motion to dismiss
the same. On September 28, 1964, the trial court
issued an order denying said motion to dismiss.

Defendant Feliciano Felipe filed his answer on
October 3, 1964 (pp. 14-16, rec. on appeal), denying
the material allegations of the complaint and
asserting that his certificates of title over the lots in
question were not secured through fraud but
pursuant to court order.

On February 2, 1965, plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint alleging that they are the true and lawful
owners of their respective lots, having acquired the
same from the San Francisco del Monte, Inc., the
registered owner thereof, through their pre-war
mutual savings and loan association "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid", as evidenced by various receipts issued
in their favor by said association; that defendant
Feliciano Felipe obtained certificates of title covering
said lots in his own name by two false quit-claim
deeds as evidence in obtaining a favorable decision
in Civil Case No. Q-6882 of the Court First Instance
of Rizal, entitled "Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo
Villanueva vs. San Francisco del Monte, Inc.", an
action to compel the latter to convey lot No. 3 to
Felipe a lot No. 2 to Villanueva; that afterwards,
Alfredo Villanueva transferred back lot Not. 2 to
Felipe, who in turn sold the same to the spouses
Simeon and Brigida Samson; and that they were not
made parties and were therefore unaware of and
cannot be bound by said Civil Case No. Q-6882.

Trial court- issued an order dismissing the complaint;
the Court feels that it has no jurisdiction to hear
this case it having been decided not only once
but twice, by a court of equal jurisdiction and it
being at present the subject of an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not consolidation is proper

HELD: YES
The grave error committed by the trial court in Civil
Case No. Q-7668 was compounded by its refusal to
consolidate Civil Case No. Q-7668 with Civil Case
No. Q-8114, which consolidation should have been
ordered as allowed under section 1 of Rule 31 of the
Revised Rules of Court and controlling
jurisprudence, immediately after the institution of
Civil Case No. Q-8114 pursuant to the ruling of said
trial court.

Although consolidation of several cases involving the
same parties and subject-matter is a matter
addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint
hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more
cases are tried before the same judge, or even if
filed with the different branches of the same court of
first instance, provided one of such cases has not
been partially tried.

The fact that Civil Case No. Q-7668 was already
partly tried on July 6, 1964, should not justify the
refusal of the trial judge in consolidating the same
with Civil Case No. Q-8114, which was filed on July
7, 1964; because the evidence already submitted by
the plaintiffs in the first case could be submitted as
part of the evidence in the second case, without
further need of retaking the testimonies of the
witnesses, in view of the fact that both cases involve
as herein before stated the same parties, the same
subject-matter and the same issues. Pursuant to
section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
rules of consolidation should be liberally construed
to achieve the object of the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their
cases.

FRANCISCO SALAZAR vs. CFI OF LAGUNA and
SABINA RIVERA
G.R. No. 45642, September 25, 1937

Facts:
First case: petitioner instituted special proceeding
No. 3109 in the court of First Instance of Laguna
and, in the petition filed by him, prayed for the
probate of the will allegedly made on May 13, 1924,
by his deceased mother Damiana Capistrano, who
died in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on
December 21, 1936.

Second Case (Counter-Petition)The petition was
opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who filed
a pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-
Petition." In her pleading the respondent, after
opposing the probate of said will for the reasons
stated therein, prayed for the probate of the will of
the deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy
of which was attached thereto, and for the issuance,
to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof
and directing such publications as required by law.

The court denied the motion for publication and
ordered the respondent to institute another
proceeding and apply separately for the probate of
the alleged will.

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
and the court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order
setting aside the former one and directing that the
will presented by the respondent be set for
hearing, that the publications required by law be
made and that said will be heard jointly with the
will presented by the petitioner in the same
proceeding instituted by the latter.

Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses
for the publications made in the newspapers be
defrayed by the respondent.

The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration
which were denied and, finally, instituted
this certiorari proceeding. In order that the hearing
and publications ordered by the court may be carried
out, the respondent, on July 20, 1937, deposited
P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of
which had been sought by her.
Issue:
Whether or not the consolidation of the two
applications for probate of will is proper

Ruling:
YES. When the court ordered that the second will be
set for hearing that publication be made thereof and
that said will be heard in the same proceeding jointly
with the first will, it merely ordered the consolidation
of the two applications and the two hearing on the
probate of both wills, instead of conducting separate
hearing, undoubtedly because it understood that the
form so chosen was the most convenient for the
parties and their attorneys.

There are three ways of consolidation action or
special proceedings where the questions at issue
and the parties in interest are the same. The first
consists in recasting the cases already instituted,
conducting only one hearing and rendering only one
decision; the second takes place when the existing
cases are consolidated, only one hearing held and
only one decision rendered; and the third takes
place when, without recasting or consolidating the
cases, the principal one is heard, the hearing on the
others being suspended until judgment has been
rendered in the first case. The court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, may adopt any of these three
forms of consolidation whenever in its opinion the
proceeding is beneficial to and convenient for the
parties. The power so exercised is discretionary. In
the case under consideration, the court acquired
jurisdiction from the moment the counter-petition
was presented and the second will came to its
possession and under its control and, consequently,
it likewise had full discretion to order, as it did, the
probate thereof in the proceeding already instituted
for the purpose of rendering later only one decision.
It should furthermore be taken into consideration that
the consolidation so ordered was the form most
convenient for and beneficial to the parties as well
as to the court because if the first will were opposed
on the ground that it was revoked by the second will,
the best evidence of the revocation would be said
second will and once the publications are made, if
the second will was executed with the formalities
prescribed by law, the court could order the probate
thereof, without the necessity of multiplying the
proceedings.