THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148225. March 3, 2010.]

CARMEN DEL PRADO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA
CABALLERO, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 26, 2000 and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The facts are as follows:
In a judgment rendered on February 1, 1985 in Cadastral Case No. N-6 (LRC
Rec. No. N-611), Judge Juan Y. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 14, adjudicated in favor of Spouses Antonio L.
Caballero and Leonarda B. Caballero several parcels of land
situated in Guba, Cebu City, one of which was Cadastral Lot No.
11909, the subject of this controversy. 2 On May 21, 1987, Antonio
Caballero moved for the issuance of the final decree of registration
for their lots.3 Consequently, on May 25, 1987, the same court,
through then Presiding Judge Renato C. Dacudao, ordered the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration to issue
the decree of registration and the corresponding titles of the lots in
favor of the Caballeros. 4
On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner, Carmen del
Prado, Lot No. 11909 on the basis of the tax declaration covering
the property. The pertinent portion of the deed of sale reads as follows:
That we, Spouses ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and
LEONARDA B. CABALLERO, Filipinos, both of legal age
and residents of Talamban, Cebu City, Philippines, for
and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, paid by
CARMEN DEL PRADO, Filipino, of legal age, single and a
resident of Sikatuna St., Cebu City, Philippines, the
receipt of which is full is hereby acknowledged, do by
these presents SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER, ASSIGN &
CONVEY unto the said CARMEN DEL PRADO, her heirs,
assigns and/or successors-in-interest, one (1)
unregistered parcel of land, situated at Guba, Cebu City,
Philippines, and more particularly described and
bounded, as follows: DTIaHE
"A parcel of land known as Cad. Lot No. 11909,
bounded as follows:
North : Lot 11903
East : Lot 11908
West : Lot 11910
South : Lot 11858 & 11912
containing an area of 4,000 square meters,
more or less, covered by Tax Dec. No. 00787
of the Cebu City Assessor's Office, Cebu City."
of which parcel of land we are the absolute and lawful
owners.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1305, covering Lot No.
11909, was issued only on November 15, 1990, and entered in the
"Registration Book" of the City of Cebu on December 19,
1990. 5 Therein, the technical description of Lot No. 11909 states
that said lot measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less. 6
On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral
proceedings a "Petition for Registration of Document Under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529" 7 in order that a certificate of title
be issued in her name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909. In the
petition, petitioner alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated
that the sale was for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in which case, the vendor
was bound to deliver all that was included within said boundaries even when
it exceeded the area specified in the contract. Respondents opposed, on
the main ground that only 4,000 sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to
petitioner. They claimed that the sale was not for a cuerpo cierto. They
moved for the outright dismissal of the petition on grounds of prescription
and lack of jurisdiction.
After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had
established a clear and positive right to Lot No. 11909. The
intended sale between the parties was for a lump sum, since there
was no evidence presented that the property was sold for a price
per unit. It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale was the parcel
of land, known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not only a portion thereof. 8
Thus, on August 2, 1993, the court a quo rendered its decision with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby granted and judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of herein petitioner. The Register of Deeds of the
City of Cebu is hereby ordered and directed to effect the
registration in his office of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Spouses Antonio Caballero and Leonarda
Caballero and Petitioner, Carmen del Prado dated June
11, 1990 covering Lot No. 11909 after payment of all
fees prescribed by law. Additionally, the Register of
Deeds of the City of Cebu is hereby ordered to cancel
Original Certificate No. 1305 in the name of Antonio
Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and the Transfer
Certificate of Title be issued in the name of Petitioner
Carmen del Prado covering the entire parcel of land
known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909.9
An appeal was duly filed. On September 26, 2000, the CA
promulgated the assailed decision, reversing and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. EcDSHT
The CA no longer touched on the character of the sale, because it found
that petitioner availed herself of an improper remedy. The "petition for
registration of document" is not one of the remedies provided under P.D.
No. 1529, after the original registration has been effected. Thus, the CA
ruled that the lower court committed an error when it assumed jurisdiction
over the petition, which prayed for a remedy not sanctioned under
the Property Registration Decree. Accordingly, the CA disposed, as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
No pronouncement as to costs. 10
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT
CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE TRIAL
COURT[;]
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
FAILING TO RULE THAT THE SALE OF
THE LOT IS FOR A LUMP SUM
OR CUERPO CIERTO[;]
III.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION
FOR REGISTRATION OF THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 11 JUNE
1990 EXECUTED BETWEEN HEREIN
PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENTS[.] 11
The core issue in this case is whether or not the sale of the land
was for a lump sum or not.
Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale shows that it is
a sale of a real estate for a lump sum, governed under Article 1542 of the
Civil Code. 12In the contract, it was stated that the land contains an area of
4,000 sq m more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the
East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the
West by Lot No. 11910. When the OCT was issued, the area of Lot No.
11909 was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq
m. In accordance with Article 1542, respondents are, therefore,
duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated,
without any corresponding increase in the price. Thus, petitioner
concludes that she is entitled to have the certificate of title,
covering the whole Lot No. 11909, which was originally issued in
the names of respondents, transferred to her name.
We do not agree. ETHIDa
In Esguerra v. Trinidad, 13 the Court had occasion to discuss the matter of
sales involving real estates. The Court's pronouncement is quite instructive:
In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose
between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price
contract wherein the purchase price is determined by
way of reference to a stated rate per unit area
(e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or a lump sum
contract which states a full purchase price for an
immovable the area of which may be declared based on
the estimate or where both the area and boundaries are
stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 square meters, etc.).
In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (478 SCRA
451), the Court discussed the distinction:
". . . In a unit price contract, the statement of
area of immovable is not conclusive and the
price may be reduced or increased depending
on the area actually delivered. If the vendor
delivers less than the area agreed upon, the
vendee may oblige the vendor to deliver all
that may be stated in the contract or demand
for the proportionate reduction of the purchase
price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor
delivers more than the area stated in the
contract, the vendee has the option to accept
only the amount agreed upon or to accept the
whole area, provided he pays for the additional
area at the contract rate.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case where the area of an immovable is
stated in the contract based on an estimate,
the actual area delivered may not measure up
exactly with the area stated in the contract.
According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in
the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum
and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit
of measure or number, there shall be no
increase or decrease of the price, although
there be a greater or less areas or number
than that stated in the contract. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Where both the area and the boundaries of the
immovable are declared, the area covered
within the boundaries of the immovable
prevailsover the stated area. In cases of
conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the
latter which should prevail. What really
defines a piece of groundis not the area,
calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the
land and indicating its limits. In a contract of
sale of land in a mass, it is well established
that the specific boundaries stated in the
contract must control over any statement with
respect to the area contained within its
boundaries. It is not of vital consequence that
a deed or contract of sale of land should
disclose the area with mathematical accuracy.
It is sufficient if its extent is objectively
indicated with sufficient precision to enable
one to identify it. An error as to the superficial
area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the
vendor is to deliver everything within the
boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety
thereof that distinguishes the determinate
object. 14
The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not
hard and fast and admits of an exception. It held:
A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less"
or similar words in designating quantity covers only
a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land
sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with
reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all
risk of quantity in the land. HaIATC
Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of
unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area.
Courts must consider a host of other factors. In one
case (see Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343 [2001]), the
Court found substantial discrepancy in area due to
contemporaneous circumstances. Citing change in the
physical nature of the property, it was therein
established that the excess area at the southern portion
was a product of reclamation, which explained why the
land's technical description in the deed of sale indicated
the seashore as its southern boundary, hence, the
inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared
unreasonable. 15
In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price
contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00
for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, bounded on
the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the
South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No.
11910. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries
stated in the contract must control over any other statement, with respect to
the area contained within its boundaries. 16
Black's Law Dictionary 17 defines the phrase "more or less" to mean:
About; substantially; or approximately; implying that
both parties assume the risk of any ordinary
discrepancy. The words are intended to cover slight
or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity, Carter v.
Finch, 186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d 408; and are ordinarily
to be interpreted as taking care of unsubstantial
differences or differences of small importance compared
to the whole number of items transferred.
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a
slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is obviously
sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess
or deficiency that should be deemed included in the deed of sale.
We take exception to the avowed rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.
After an assiduous scrutiny of the records, we lend credence to respondents'
claim that they intended to sell only 4,000 sq m of the whole Lot No. 11909,
contrary to the findings of the lower court. The records reveal that when the
parties made an ocular inspection, petitioner specifically pointed to that
portion of the lot, which she preferred to purchase, since there were mango
trees planted and a deep well thereon. After the sale, respondents delivered
and segregated the area of 4,000 sq m in favor of petitioner by fencing off
the area of 10,475 sq m belonging to them. 18
Contracts are the law between the contracting parties. Sale, by its very
nature, is a consensual contract, because it is perfected by mere consent.
The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following: (a) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for
the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or
its equivalent. All these elements are present in the instant case. 19
More importantly, we find no reversible error in the decision of the
CA. Petitioner's recourse, by filing the petition for registration in
the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after one year
from the date of entry of the decree of registration. 20 Inasmuch as the
petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running of the
period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering that the
prescribed one-year period had long since expired, the decree of
registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in favor of respondents,
had become incontrovertible. 21 cHDaEI
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171531. January 30, 2009.]
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS
OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL and
VICTORIA V. MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA P.
TUGADE (ILUMINADA and LEONORA P. TUGADE,
HEIRS OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA G. DELA
CRUZ (by and through ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ),
HILARIA G. COBERO and ALFREDO G. COBERO)
and SIONY G. TEPOL (by and through ELENA T.
RIVAS and ELESIO TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS OF
DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J p:
This is a petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Court of Appeals' Decision dated 22 March 2005 2 and Resolution dated 9
February 2006 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462. The Court of Appeals
reversed the 12 November 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 73 4 which granted the motion to
dismiss filed by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. (petitioner). The appellate
court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo),
filed a complaint seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an
area of 23.7229 hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404 in the name of
Pablo. 5 In the alternative, the respondents prayed that damages be
awarded in their favor. 6
OCT No. 404 7 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents'
complaint. It contained several annotations in the memorandum of
encumbrances which showed that the property had already been
sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and
Restituto Morales. Respondents also attached copies of the following
documents as integral parts of their complaint: Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-8241, 8 TCT No. T-8242, 9 TCT No. T-10863, 10 the
Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of
Sales 11 executed by Cipriano Pascua, Sr. (Cipriano), and the Deed of Sale
with Mortgage 12 between spouses Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo
(spouses Rodolfo) and petitioner. HICSaD
In their complaint, 13 respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate
sometime in June 1945 and was survived by his four children, one
of whom was the deceased Cipriano. 14 On 13 February 1967,
Cipriano executed a document denominated as "Extrajudicial
Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales", 15 wherein
he declared himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the
sales made by the decedent during his lifetime, including the
alleged sale of the disputed property to spouses Rodolfo.
Respondents likewise averred that on the following day 14
February 1967, TCT No. T-8241 16 was issued in the name of
Cipriano "without OCT No. 404 having been
cancelled." 17 However, TCT No. T-8241 was not signed by the
Register of Deeds. On the same day, TCT No. T-8242 was issued in
the name of the spouses Rodolfo and TCT No. T-8241 was thereby
cancelled. 18 Subsequently, on 31 October 1969, the spouses
Rodolfo sold the disputed property to petitioner by virtue of a Deed
of Sale with Mortgage. Consequently, on 5 November 1969, TCT
No. T-8242 was cancelled and TCT No. T-10863 19 was issued in
the name of petitioner. 20
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of
Cipriano, filed on 24 January 1997 a petition before the RTC of Olongapo
City, Branch 75, for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate of OCT No. 404,
docketed as Other Case No. 04-0-97. 21 The RTC denied the
petition. 22 The trial court held that petitioner was already the owner of the
land, noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent transfer of the
property to it at the back of OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to the
property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss 23 the complaint on the
grounds that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations,
more than 28 years having elapsed from the issuance of TCT No. T-
10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the complaint
states no cause of action as it is an innocent purchaser for value, it
having relied on the clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
Impleaded as defendants, the heirs of Cipriano filed an answer to the
complaint in which they denied knowledge of the existence of the
extrajudicial settlement allegedly executed by Cipriano and averred that the
latter, during his lifetime, did not execute any document transferring
ownership of the property. 24 TcCEDS
The Register of Deeds and the National Treasurer filed, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, an answer averring that the six (6)-
year period fixed in Section 102 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 for the filing of an action against the Assurance Fund had
long prescribed since the transfer of ownership over the property
was registered through the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 in favor of
petitioner as early as 1969. They also claimed that respondents have no
cause of action against the Assurance Fund since they were not actually
deprived of ownership over the property, as they could have recovered the
property had it not been for their inaction for over 28 years. 25
The RTC granted petitioner's motion to dismiss. 26 Noting that
respondents had never claimed nor established that they have been in
possession of the property and that they did not present any evidence to
show that petitioner has not been in possession of the property either, the
RTC applied the doctrine that an action to quiet title prescribes where the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a case
of implied or constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately
claimed to be the sole heir of Pablo in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate which led to the issuance of TCT No. T-8241 in his favor. As the
prescriptive period for reconveyance of a fraudulently registered real
property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
title, the trial court held that the action for reconveyance had already
prescribed with the lapse of more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT
No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969 as of the filing of the complaint on 21
November 1997.
The RTC added that it is an enshrined rule that even a registered
owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches.
The RTC further held that petitioner had the right to rely on TCT No. T-8242
in the name of spouses Rodolfo. Petitioner is not obliged to go beyond the
title considering that there were no circumstances surrounding the sale
sufficient to put it into inquiry. IcESaA
Concerning the Assurance Fund, the RTC held that the claim against it had
long prescribed since Section 102 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for a six-year
period within which a plaintiff may file an action against the fund and in this
case the period should be counted from the time of the issuance of the
challenged TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969 and thus expired in 1975.
Undaunted, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. 27
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order. 28 In ordering the
reinstatement of the complaint, the appellate court ruled that the averments
in respondents' complaint before the RTC make out a case for quieting of
title which has not prescribed. Respondents did not have to prove
possession over the property since petitioner as the movant in a motion to
dismiss hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint.
The appellate court found that possession over the property was sufficiently
alleged in the complaint which stated that "neither petitioner nor the Rodolfo
spouses ever had possession of the disputed property" as "a number of the
Pascua heirs either had been (still are) in actual, continuous and adverse
possession thereof or had been enjoying (still are enjoying) the use
thereof." 29 By the same token, laches had not set in, the Court of Appeals
added.
The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is
an innocent purchaser for value is contrary to the allegations in respondents'
complaint.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the RTC's
granting of the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court
of Appeals' reversal of the RTC's ruling.
The petition is meritorious.
It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or
not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint. 30 The admission, however, is limited only to
all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. 31
The factual allegations in respondents' complaint should be considered in
tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to
it as annexes or integral parts. In a number of cases, the Court held that in
addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties should
be considered in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. 32 Likewise, other facts not alleged in the
complaint may be considered where the motion to dismiss was heard with
the submission of evidence, or if documentary evidence admitted by
stipulation discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim. 33 For while the
court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint, the motion
does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not
true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts
inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded. 34

In the case at bar, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to
dismiss. At the hearing, the parties presented documentary evidence.
Among the documents marked and offered in evidence are the annexes of
the complaint. 35 HCITcA
Based on the standards set by this Court in relation to the factual allegations
and documentary annexes of the complaint as well as the exhibits offered at
the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondents' complaint does not state a cause of action against petitioner.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the
name of the spouses Rodolfo, who were petitioner's predecessors-in-
interest, or any circumstance from which it could reasonably be inferred that
petitioner had any actual knowledge of facts that would impel it to make
further inquiry into the title of the spouses Rodolfo. 36 It is basic that a
person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but
only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since
"the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned", it follows that where
there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon,
the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect
or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If
the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the
certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would
entirely be futile and nugatory. The public shall then be denied of
its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Torrens
system of registration. In the end, the business community stands
to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably. 37
Contrary to the assertion of respondents, OCT No. 404 was
expressly cancelled by TCT No. T-8241. The alleged non-signature
by the Register of Deeds Soliman Achacoso, does not affect the
validity of TCT No. T-8241 since he signed TCT No. T-8242 and
issued both titles on the same day. There is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. The presumption is
further bolstered by the fact that TCT No. T-8241 was certified to
be on file with the Registry of Deeds and registered in the name of
Cipriano. It is enough that petitioner had examined the latest
certificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of the
immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not
bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of title
of the person from whom he had purchased the property. 38
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation
of Sales executed by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs
of Pablo, is not binding on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has operative
effect under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides
that: ESaITA
SEC. 44.Statutory Liens Affecting Title. Every
registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted on said certificate and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a forgery, the
Court still has to uphold the title of petitioner. The case law is that although
generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, there
are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a
valid title. 39 And one such instance is where the certificate of title
was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the
forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right
to rely upon what appeared in the certificate. 40
The Court cannot give credence to respondents' claims that the
Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales
was not registered and that OCT No. 404 was not cancelled by the
Register of Deeds. The Register of Deeds of Zambales certified that
the extrajudicial settlement was recorded on 14 February 1967, per
Entry No. 18590. This is in compliance with Section 56 of Act No.
496, 41 the applicable law at the time of registration, which provides
that: EHIcaT
Sec. 56.Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book
in which he shall enter in the order of their reception all
deeds and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of
writs and other process filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall note in such book the year,
month, day, hour, and minute of reception of all
instruments, in the order in which they are
received. They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the memorandum of
each instrument when made on the certificate of title to
which it refers shall bear the same date. [Emphasis
supplied]
Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument
or entry affecting registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies, constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering. 42
Thirdly, respondents cannot make out a case for quieting of title
since OCT No. 404 had already been cancelled. Respondents have
no title to anchor their complaint on. 43 Title to real property refers
to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the
right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he
can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property. 44 cIHSTC
Moreover, there is nothing in the complaint which specified that the
respondents were in possession of the property. They merely alleged that
the occupants or possessors are "others not defendant Spouses
Rodolfo" 45 who could be anybody, and that the property is in actual
possession of "a number of the Pascua heirs" 46who could either be the
respondents or the heirs of Cipriano. The admission of the truth of material
and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an
admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in
the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor
conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant
matters. 47
The other heirs of Pablo should have filed an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust within ten
(10) years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. 48 The
legal relationship between Cipriano and the other heirs of Pablo is
governed by Article 1456 of the Civil Code which provides that if a
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
From the above discussion, there is no question that petitioner is
an innocent purchaser for value; hence, no cause of action for
cancellation of title will lie against it.49 The RTC was correct in
granting petitioner's motion to dismiss. IcADSE
Lastly, respondents' claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper.
Section 101 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall
not be liable for any loss, damage or deprivation of any right or interest in
land which may have been caused by a breach of trust, whether express,
implied or constructive. Even assuming arguendo that they are entitled to
claim against the Assurance Fund, the respondents' claim has already
prescribed since any action for compensation against the Assurance Fund
must be brought within a period of six (6) years from the time the right to
bring such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 12 November
1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 in Civil
Case No. 432-097 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.























FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154270. March 9, 2010.]
TEOFISTO OO, PRECY O. NAMBATAC, VICTORIA
O. MANUGAS and POLOR O.
CONSOLACION, petitioners, vs. VICENTE N.
LIM,respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The subject of controversy is Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu
City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-9969-(O-20449),
over which the contending parties in this action for quieting of title,
initiated by respondent Vicente N. Lim (Lim) in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Cebu City, assert exclusive ownership, to the exclusion of
the other. In its decision dated July 30, 1996, 1 the RTC favored Lim, and
ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449) and the issuance of
a new certificate of title in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim (Luisa), Lim's
deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest.
On appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC on January 28, 2002. 2 It later denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsiderationthrough the resolution dated June 17, 2002. 3
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for
the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-
9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during World
War II by his mother, Luisa; 4 that Lot No. 943 of the Balamban
Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in 1937 to
Luisa by Spouses Diego Oo and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oo), the
lot's registered owners; and that although the deed evidencing the
sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oo
(Antonio), the only legitimate heir of Spouses Oo, had executed
on April 23, 1961 in favor of Luisa a notarized document
denominated as confirmation of sale, 5 which was duly filed in the
Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu.
Zosimo Oo and petitioner Teofisto Oo (Oos) opposed Lim's
petition, contending that they had the certificate of title in their
possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oo.
On account of the Oos' opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim
converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for
quieting of title, 6 averring additionally that he and his
predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its
fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter
alia, that the Oos be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be
cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Luisa in lieu
of said OCT.
In their answer, 7 the Oos claimed that their predecessors-in-
interest, Spouses Oo, never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that
the confirmation of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was
fabricated, his signature thereon not being authentic.
RTC Ruling
On July 30, 1996, after trial, the RTC rendered its decision, 8 viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered quieting plaintiff's title to Lot No. 943 of the
Balamban (Cebu) Cadastre, and directing the Register
of Deeds of Cebu
(1)To register the aforestated April 23, 1961
Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943 of the Balamban,
Cebu Cadastre by Antonio Oo in favor of Luisa Narvios-
Lim;
(2)To cancel the original certificate of title covering the
said Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre; and,
(3)To issue in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim, a new
duplicate certificate of title No. RO-9969 (O-20449) of
the Register of Deeds of Cebu, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the
lost duplicate certificate of title, and shall in all respects
be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
certificate, and shall be regarded as such for all
purposes of this decree, pursuant to the last paragraph
of Section 109, Presidential Decree No. 1529. AcSIDE
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of the
land since 1937; that their possession had never been disturbed by
the Oos, except on two occasions in 1993 when the Oos seized
the harvested copra from the Lims' caretaker; that the Lims had
since declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes, and had
paid the taxes corresponding to the lot; that the signature of
Antonio on the confirmation of sale was genuine, thereby giving more
weight to the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the
document and affirmatively testified that Antonio and Luisa had both
appeared before him to acknowledge the instrument as true than to the
testimony of the expert witness who attested that Antonio's signature was a
forgery.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the Oos maintained that the confirmation of sale was spurious;
that the property, being a titled one, could not be acquired by the Lims
through prescription; that their (the Oos) action to claim the property could
not be barred by laches; and that the action instituted by the Lims
constituted a collateral attack against their registered title.
The CA affirmed the RTC, however, and found that Spouses Oo
had sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that such sale had been
confirmed by their son Antonio. The CA ruled that the action for
quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that
the Lims' undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek
the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on their own title.
Nonetheless, the CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the
name of Luisa, considering that the owner's duplicate was still intact in the
possession of the Oos.
The decree of the CA decision was as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. However, the dispositive portion of the decision
appealed from is CORRECTED as follows:
(1)Within five (5) days from finality of the
decision, defendants-appellants are
directed to present the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969
(O-20449) to the Register of Deeds
who shall thereupon register the
"Confirmation of Sale" of Lot No. 943,
Balamban Cadastre, Cebu, executed
on April 23, 1961 by Antonio Oo in
favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim, and issue
a new transfer certificate of title to
and in the name of the latter upon
cancellation of the outstanding
original and owner's duplicate
certificate of title.
(2)In the event defendants-appellants neglect
or refuse to present the owner's copy
of the title to the Register of Deeds as
herein directed, the said title, by force
of this decision, shall be deemed
annulled, and the Register of Deeds
shall make a memorandum of such
fact in the record and in the new
transfer certificate of title to be issued
to Luisa Narvios-Lim.
(3)Defendants-appellants shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 10
The CA denied the Oos' motion for reconsideration 11 on June 17,
2002. 12
Hence, this appeal. IDCHTE
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues:
1.Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be
collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil
action to quiet title;
2.Whether or not the ownership over registered land
could be lost by prescription, laches, or
adverse possession;
3.Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by
Spouses Oo in favor of Luisa and whether or
not said deed was lost during World War II;
4.Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by
Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and
5.Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio
in that confirmation of sale was genuine.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
A.
Action for cancellation of title
is not an attack on the title
The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of title should be
disallowed because it constituted a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-
(O-20449), citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz.:
Section 48.Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The petitioners' contention is not well taken.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is
to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. 13 The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or
set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief,
an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 14
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any
cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. 15 Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title. 16 In such action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants,
not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant,
who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so
entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will
see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and
even abuse the property as he deems fit. 17
Lim's complaint pertinently alleged:
18.If indeed, the genuine original of the Owner's
Duplicate of the Reconstituted Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-9699 (O-20449) for Lot 943, Balamban
Cadastre . . . is in Defendant's (Oo's) possession, then
VNL submits the following PROPOSITIONS:
xxx xxx xxx
18.2.Therefore, the Original of Owner's Duplicate
Certificate (which Respondents [Defendants Oos] claim
in their Opposition is in their possession) must be
surrendered to VNL upon order of this Court, after the
Court shall have determined VNL's mother's acquisition
of the attributes of ownership over said Lot 943, in this
action, in accordance with Section 107, P.D. 1529,
Property Registration Decree . . .
xxx xxx xxx
[t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for Lot 943
be issued directly in favor of LUISA NARVIOS, to
complete her title to said Lot; 18
The averments readily show that the action was neither a direct nor a
collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only
that the existing title registered in the name of the petitioners' predecessors
had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lim's mother,
and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of
OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or challenge the judgment by which the title
of the lot involved had been decreed. In other words, the action sought
the removal of a cloud from Lim's title, and the confirmation of
Lim's ownership over the disputed property as the successor-in-
interest of Luisa.
B.
Prescription was not relevant
The petitioners assert that the lot, being titled in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest, could not be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
The assertion is unwarranted.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership
and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and
under the conditions laid down by law. 19 However, prescription was
not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim
did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain
period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been
voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to
Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.
Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by virtue
of sale; that from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she had
taken over its possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed
her obligation by paying real property taxes on the property, as evidenced
by tax declarations issued in her name; 20 and that in view of the delivery
of the property, coupled with Luisa's actual occupation of it, all that
remained to be done was the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in
her name. cdrep
C.
Forgery, being a question of fact,
could not be dealt with now
The petitioners submit that Lim's evidence did not preponderantly show that
the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both the
trial and the appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonio's
signature on the confirmation of sale was a forgery.
Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the evaluation and
appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.
The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the
evidence, because the Court is not a trier of facts. 21 Although this rule
admits of certain exceptions, viz.: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case, and the findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and,
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record, 22 it does not appear now that any of the exceptions is present
herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal for
that reason.
It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the
RTC that the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or forged. The CA
ruled that the testimony of the notary public who had notarized
the confirmation of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared
before him prevailed over that of the petitioners' expert witness. The
concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonio's signature
now binds the Court. 23
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the
evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the
truth. 24 It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He
established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title
to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of
their better title other than their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title.
Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such
registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The
petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-
owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be
held in trust for another person by the registered owner. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the
decision dated January 28, 2002 is affirmed.
The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. cCaEDA











EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-21703-04. August 31, 1966.]
MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners-
appellants, vs. MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent-
appellee.
Harold M. Hernando for petitioners-appellants.
Rafael Ruiz for respondent-appellee.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L.R.C. Rec. No.
1188, and 42 L. R. C. Rec. No. 1194, denying petitioners' motion to
compel respondent to surrender their owners' duplicates of
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066, as well as from a
subsequent order of the same court, refusing, upon petitioners'
motion, to reconsider the first order of denial.
The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and
Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of
several parcels of land, to wit: Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and
15912, of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161 and also Lots Nos.
20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the
Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to
a decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940.
On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes
filed in the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of
writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of
Title above referred to.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that
he is only in possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he
has been in, and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e., Lots
Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale
(not recorded) from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the
latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation
of these disputed lots.
After due hearing on this incident, the court a quo issued, on 20
December 1962, the writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos.
15891 and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the
other lots covered by both titles.
Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of
possession.
Subsequently, petitioners in the above stated cadastral cases, as plaintiffs,
commenced, on 15 January 1963, before the same court of first instance, an
ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots, or
their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as
defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659.
Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the
complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots,
alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or
opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession, i.e., he is their
(plaintiffs') co-owner, he having bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H.
Reyes, the latter's undivided one- third (1/3) share, interest and
participation to these disputed lots.
Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented,
on 25 February 1963, in the cadastral cases aforementioned, a
motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and
deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of
Title Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed this motion.
The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the
parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in
Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the
merits by it. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order to a motion for
reconsideration, but without success; hence, the present appeal.
Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court,
contending that, since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are
not the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or
value, and moral damages, these lots are not in litigation in this
ordinary civil case, and that since respondent had already raised
the issue of ownership and possession of these lots in his
opposition to the (petitioners') motion for issuance of writ of
possession and, despite this opposition, the courta quo granted the
writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent is barred and
estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case,
under the principle of res judicata.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintain that, having pleaded a
counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said Civil Case No. 3659,
the trial court correctly held that these lots are subjects of litigation in this
ordinary civil case. He also maintains that petitioners not having impleaded
their brother, Francisco H. Reyes, or his heirs as parties in their motion for
issuance of writ of execution, and because these heirs have not intervened
in this particular incident, the writ of possession issued by the trial court is,
at most, valid only with respect to their (petitioners') undivided two-third
(2/3) share and participation in these disputed lots; hence, he concludes
that he is not barred and estopped from raising the issue of ownership and
possession of the undivided one-third (1/3) share and participation of
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, which share respondent allegedly
bought from the latter.
In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter argument of
respondent-appellee by showing that they previously obtained special
authority from the heirs of their deceased brother to represent them in the
proceedings had in the court below.
The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between
petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee has a better right to
the possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of
certificates of title.
While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are
subjects in litigation in 'Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that
respondent, as defendant therein, had presented a counterclaim
for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid and
plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from
the registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein,
the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates
of title. In a decided case, this Court has already held that: the owner of
the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered
and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right
to the possession of the owner's duplicate than one whose name
does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right
to the possession thereof. Thus this Court said:
"Como acertadamente dijo el Jusgado, lo unico que se
suscita es si Ana Umbao de Carpio tiene derecho a la
posesion del duplicado para al dueo del Certificado de
Titulo Original No. 698, con preferencia a la opositora-
apelante. A nuestro juicio, la solucion es clara a
includible. Hallandose admitido que el decreto final que
se dicto en el expediente catastral en 28 de mayo de
1936, en relacion con el lote No. 778, fue a favor de
Ana Umbao y que el duplicado para el dueo del
Certificado de Titulo Original No. 698 se expidito por el
Registrado de Titulos a favor de la misma, es obvio que
quien tiene derecho a poseer el certificado de titulo es
ella y no la apelante (art. 41 de la Ley No. 496, tal como
ha sido reformado)
"Alega la apelante que ella tiene tanto derecho como is
apelada a poseer el titulo porque el terreno a que se
refiere es de la prepiedad de laa tres hermanas. La
pretencion no es meritoria. Segun el articulo 41 de la
Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido enmendado, el duplicado
para el dueo debe expedirse por el Registrador a
numbre de la personala cuyo favor se ha decretado el
terreno y dispone, adems que dicho duplicado debe
entregarsele al dueno inscrito. Si la apelante cree que
tiene derecho a participar en el lote No. 778, como
coheredera, debe ejercitar una accion independiente,
encaminada a obtener su participacion." (El Director de
Terrenos contra Abacahin, 72 Phil. 326)
It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an
independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in
the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil
Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected, and
considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights
thereto, the provision on notice of lis pendens under Section 24,
Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of recording
the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question are litigated
in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no justifiable reason for
respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of
certificates of title.
In view of the above consideration, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the
merits of the second contention of petitioners-appellants.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from should be, as they are hereby,
reversed and in accordance with this opinion, respondent Mateo Raval
Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners the owners'
duplicate of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066. With
costs against respondent appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes.


























EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.]
HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, as guardian of the
incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, and ARMINIO
RIVERA, defendants-appellees.
[G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE
DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM. GREGORIO DY
TAM, petitioner-appellant, vs. REMEDIOS R.
ESPIRITU, in her capacity as judicial guardian of
the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, counter-
petitioner, ARMINIO RIVERA,administrator-appellee.
Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar for appellants.
De Los Santos & De los Santos and E. L. Gonzales for
appellees.
SYLLABUS
1.PATERNITY AND FILIATION; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
STATUS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BARS CLAIM TO SHARE IN THE
ESTATE. Appellants claims that they are the children of the decedent
by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with S.K.; that during the
subsistence of the marriage, the decedent had contracted in 1922
another marriage with M.R.; that as heirs, they are entitled to the
decedent's one-half share in the properties acquired during the second
marriage. Held: The various official and public documents executed by
the decedent himself convincingly shows that he had not contracted
marriage with any person other than M.R., and that he had no child.
Thus in marriage certificate it was clearly stated that he was single
when he married M.R. in 1922; in the sworn application for alien
certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950, he declared under oath
that no child; and in several other documents executed by him and
presented in evidence he had consistently referred to M. R. alone his
wife; he had never mentioned S. K. as his wife, or their alleged children.
On the other hand, appellants did not present in evidence the marriage
certificate of the decedent and their mother, which is the best evidence
of the alleged marriage; or gave any explanation for the non-
presentation thereof or of its loss neither have they presented any
competent secondary evidence of the supposed marriage. The finding,
therefore, of the lower court that the appellants are not heirs of the
decedent is correct.
2.HUSBAND AND WIFE; PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING
MARRIAGE PRESUMED CONJUGAL; PRESUMPTION, HOW OVERCOME.
The evidence shows that the properties in questions were
brought by the wife with her separate and exclusive money,
although during her marriage with the decedents; that the
spouse had adopted a system of separation of properties; that
the wife had been administering said properties, to the
exclusion of her husband; and that said properties were
registered in her name. Thus, the disputable presumption of
law that properties acquired during marriage are conjugal
properties has been overcome.
3.EVIDENCE; DECLARATION AND ADMISSION AGAINST OWN
INTEREST; PERSON BOUND THEREBY. The decedent had
acknowledged the fact that he had obtained from his wife sums of
money which belongs exclusively to the latter and had not been paid to
her up to the present. He also acknowledged that he had not given any
money to his wife and that they have actually adopted a system of
separation of property, each of them not having any interest or
participation whatsoever in the property of the other. These
declarations and admission of fact made by the decedent against his
interest are binding upon him, his heirs and successors in interests and
third persons as well.
4.DAMAGES; WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY NOT BE SENTENCED TO
PAY. The complaint in question contains nothing derogatory to the
good name or reputation of the defendants-appellees. On the contrary,
it may be surmised from said pleading that the defendant spouse had
no knowledge of the alleged previous marriage of the decedent.
Moreover, there was no showing that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith.
Hence, the latter should not be sentenced to pay damages.
5.SUCCESSION; DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP; NOT PROPER IN
CIVIL CASE. The declaration of heirship is improper in a civil case it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in a Special
proceedings.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in the above entitled case, which were jointly tried.
On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special
Proceeding No. 1537 of said court, entitled "In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam". The petition therein
filed, dated April 24, 1952, states that petitioner is the son of
Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; that the
deceased was survived by:
Li Hong Hap40 years
Li Ho37 years
Gregorio Dy Tam33 years
Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho29 years
Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian27 years
Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee25 years
William Litam alias Li Bun Hua23 years
Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin22 years
that the foregoing children of the decedent "by a marriage celebrated in
China in 1911 with Sia Khin, now deceased"; that "after the death of
Rafael Litam, petitioner and his co-heirs came to know" that the
decedent had, during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin,
"contracted in 1922 in the Philippines . . . another marriage with
Marcosa Rivera, Filipino citizen"; that "the decedent left as his property
among others, his one-half (1/2) share valued at P65,000 in the
purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera, which .
. . partnership consisted of the following real property acquired during
the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera, to wit:
(1)"Three (3) parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of
Deeds of the province of Pampanga:
(2)"One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds of
the province of Bulacan."
and that the decedent had left neither a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed,
therefore, that, after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration
be issued to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the decedent".
Soon thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed a counter- petition: (1)
substantially denying the alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin,
as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; (2)
asserting that the properties described herein are her paraphernal
properties, and that the decedent had left unpaid debts, and certain
properties in Bulan and Casiguran, Sorsogon, and in Virac,
Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock in a private corporation known
by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; and (3) praying that her nephew,
Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased.
In due course, the court granted this petition and
letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera, who
assumed his duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory
of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as said
inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the
petition, dated April 24, 1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the latter
filed, on November 29, 1952, a motion for the removal of
Rivera as administrator of the aforementioned estate. This led to
a number of incidents hinging on the question whether said properties
belong in common to the decedent and Marcosa Rivera or to the latter
exclusively.
Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special
Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, guardian of
Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on
April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters
aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 of the same
court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and
Arminio Rivera. In said complaint, plaintiffs therein reproduced
substantially the allegations made in the aforementioned petition of
Gregorio Dy Tam dated April 24. 1952, except that the properties
acquired "during the existence of marriage" between Rafael Litam and
Marcosa Rivera "and/or with their joint efforts during the time that they
lived as husband and wife" were said to be more than those specified in
said petition, namely:
"(1)3 parcels of land situated in the
Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, issued
on July 29, 1947;
"(2)2 Parcels of land, together with all
buildings and improvements thereon except those
expressly noted in the title as belonging to other
persons, situated in the Municipality of Navotas,
Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal, issued on October 4, 1938;
"(3)1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality
of Malabon, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 23248 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal, issued on June 12, 1933;
"(4)1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-
Badia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21809 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on
May 25, 1939;
"(5)1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-
16049) situated in Barrio of Quibadia, Municipality of
Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Bulacan, issued on April 9, 1943;
"Other properties are located in Bataan
province.
"All properties total an assessed value of
approximately P150,000.00."
In said complaint, plaintiffs prayed that the
judgment be rendered:
"(1)declaring the aforesaid properties as
belonging to the conjugal partnership or tenancy in
common which existed between the deceased Rafael
Litam and the incompetent Marcosa Rivera;
"(2)ordering the defendants to deliver the
aforesaid properties to the administration of the estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam (Rule 75, section 2, Rules
of Court);
"(3)ordering the said defendants further to
render an accounting of the fruits they collected from
the aforesaid properties and to deliver the same to the
administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael
Litam;

"(4)ordering the said defendants to pay the
administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael
Litam damages in double the value of the fruits
mentioned in the preceding paragraph which they
embezzled; and
"(5)ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
"The plaintiffs further pray for such other remedy as the
Court may deem just and equitable in the premises."
In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in
effect, the allegations in her counter-petition, dated July 12, 1952, in
Special Proceeding No. 1537, and set up some affirmative and special
defenses, as well as a counter-claim for attorney's fees and damages in
the aggregate sum of P110,000.00.
Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No.
2071 and in the aforementioned incidents in Special Proceeding No.
1537, both were jointly heard. Later on, the court rendered a decision.
"(1)Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs
against the plaintiffs;
"(2)Sentencing the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
2071, under the defendants' counterclaim, to pay jointly
and severally each of the defendants the sum of
P5,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;
"(3)Declaring that the properties in question,
namely: the fishponds, consisting of three parcels,
situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer
certificate of Title No. 1228 of the land records of
Pampanga, one-half undivided portion of the fishponds,
consisting of two parcels, situated in Navotas, Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, the
parcel of land with the improvements thereon situated
in Malabon, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 23248, both of the land records of Rizal, and
the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in
Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the land records of
Bulacan, are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal
properties of Marcosa Rivera; and
"(4)Declaring that the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2071 (who are the same persons alleged to be
children of Rafael Litam in the petition, dated April 24,
1952, filed by the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537) are
not the children of the deceased Rafael Litam, and that
his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera."
The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by the
petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2071. The issues for determination are: (1) Are appellants the
legitimate children of Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive
owner of the properties in question, or do the same constitute a
common property of her and the decedent?
The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin
were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
appellants herein. In this connection, the lower court had the following
to say:
". . . the evidence weikhs very heavily in favor
of the theory of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 to
the effect that the said deceased Rafael Litam was not
married to Sia Khin and that plaintiffs, are not the
children of the said decedent. The plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2071 and the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 have
utterly failed to prove their alleged status as children of
Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin.
"It appears from the evidence presented by the
defendants in civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator
and the counter-petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that
there was no such marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that the plaintiffs named
in Civil Case No. 2071 are not children of said deceased.
The various official and public documents executed by
Rafael Litam himself convincingly show that he had not
contracted any marriage with any person other than
Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no child. In the
marriage certificate, (Exhibit 55) it was clearly stated
that he was single when he married Marcosa Rivera on
June 10, 1922. In the sworn application for alien
certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950 (Exhibit 1),
Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under oath that he
had no child. In the several other documents executed
by him and presented in evidence, (Exhibits 19, 21, 22,
23, 46 and 46-A) Rafael Litam had consistently referred
to Marcosa Rivera alone as his wife; he
had never mentioned of Sia Khin as his wife, or of his
alleged children.
The witnesses presented by the defendants in
Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and counter
petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 positively testified to the
effect that they know that Rafael Litam did not have any
child, nor was he married with Sia Khin. An impartial
and disinterested witness, Felipe Cruz, likewise testified
that he has known Rafael Litam even before his
marriage with Marcosa Rivera and that said Rafael Litam
did not have any child.
"On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2071 and the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537
presented in support of their theory the testimony of
their lone witness, Luis Litam, and certain documentary
evidence. It is noteworthy that the said plaintiffs and
said petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage
certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the
opinion of the Court, is the competent and best
evidence of the alleged marriage between them. No
explanation has been given for the non-presentation of
said marriage certificate, nor has there been any
showing of its loss. Neither have said plaintiffs and said
petitioner presented any competent secondary
evidence of the supposed marriage.
"The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam,
cannot be given any credence and value at all. His
testimony is mostly hearsay, as according to him, he
was merely informed by Rafael Litam of the latter's
supposed marriage with Sia Khin. His testimony is
uncorroborated. The court noticed that the said witness
was only 22 years old when he testified, and it appears
in the petition filed by the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No.
1537 that said witness is the youngest of all the alleged
eight children of Rafael Litam. The Court is at a loss to
understand why one or some of the older alleged
children of Rafael Litam were not presented as
witnesses in view of the unreliable testimony of Luis
Litam, and considering that older persons are better
qualified to testify on the matters sought to be proved
which allegedly happened a long time ago.
"The birth certificate presented by the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 2071 and petitioner in Sp. Proc. No.
1537 cannot be given even little consideration, because
the name of the father of the children appearing therein
is not Rafael Litam, but different persons. It is very
significant to note that the names of the father of the
persons appearing in said birth certificates are Dy
Tham, Li Tam, Lee Tham, Rafael Dy Tam, and that said
persons were born in different places, some in Amoy,
China, another Fukien, China, and the other in Limtao,
China. It also appears in said birth certificates that the
children's mothers named therein are different, some
being Sia Khim, others Sia Quien, the other Sia Khun,
and still another Sia Kian. These documents do not
establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and
the persons named therein as father. Besides, it does
not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael
Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation
and filing thereof.
"The other documentary evidence presented
by the said plaintiffs and petitioner are entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged
marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin and the alleged statue of the plaintiffs as children
of said decedent.
"It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that
the plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not heirs
of the said decedent, his only heir being his surviving
wife, Marcosa Rivera." (Emphasis ours.)
The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from
are borne out by the records and the conclusion drawn from said facts
is, to our mind, substantially correct.
Appellants' evidence on this point consists of the testimony of
appellant Li Bun Lin, who said that he is, also known as Luis Litam; that
his co-appellants are his brothers and sisters; that their parents are the
decedent and Sia Khin, who were married in China in 1911; and that Sia
Khin died in Manila during the Japanese occupation. He likewise,
identified several pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which were claimed
to be family portraits, but the lower court rejected their admission in
evidence. Although we agree with herein appellants that this was an
error, it is clear to us that said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam,
as well as the other evidence adverted to in the above-quoted portion
of the decision appealed from, are far from sufficient to outweigh, or
even offset, the evidence in favor of the appellees.
It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married
Marcosa Rivera in 1922. In the very petition of appellant Gregorio Dy
Tam, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952, he alleged
that Marcosa Rivera is "the surviving spouse of the decedent". In their
complaint in Civil Case No. 2071, appellants specifically admitted and
averred "the existence of the marriage between said Rafael Litam and
Marcosa Rivera" which would have been void ab initio, and, hence,
inexistent legally, if appellants' pretense were true or they believed it to
be so and that they had "lived as husband and wife". Again, although
Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his aforementioned petition, that he and
his co-heirs "came to know" about the marriage of the decedent and
Marcosa Rivera "after the death of Rafael Litam", the very testimony of
Li Bun Lin, as witness for the appellants, show, beyond doubt, that said
appellants knew, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam that he and
Marcosa Rivera were living in Malabon, Rizal, openly and publicly, as
husband and wife, and regarded her as his lawful wife. Indeed, in the
course of his testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to her as his "mother".
In other words, aside from the circumstance that the wedding
and marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is
undisputed, it is, also, an established fact that they had the
general reputation of being legally married and were so
regarded by the community and by appellants herein, during
the lifetime of Rafael Litam.

Upon the other hand, appellants maintain, in effect, that
Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of bigamy; that he had, likewise,
willfully and maliciously falsified public and official documents; and that,
although appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa
Rivera whom appellants knew resided only a few kilometers away,
in Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending to
his business in Manila, the decedent had succeeded, for about thirty
(30) years, in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of
his alleged relations with the other. Apart from the highly improbable
nature of the last part of appellants' pretense, it is obvious that the
same can not be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of
the strongest possible kind, not only because it entails the commission
by Rafael Litam of grave criminal offenses which are derogatory to his
honor, but, also, because death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him
of the most effective means of defense. The proof for appellants herein
does not satisfy such requirement.
As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence
thereon was analyzed by the lower court in the following language:
"It has been established by the evidence that
the properties in question were bought by Marcosa
Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. The
fishponds situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, the
one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the fishponds
situated in Navotas, Rizal with Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 35836, and the property situated in Hulong-
Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, with Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 23248 were all purchased by Marcosa Rivera with
the money she earned and accumulated while she was
still single; while the fishponds situated in Macabebe,
Pampanga with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228
were purchased by her with the money she inherited
from her late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money
she received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces
of jewelry she inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera
and her sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties in
question, having been bought by Marcosa Rivera,
although during her marriage with Rafael Litam, with
her exclusive and separate money, said properties are
undeniably her paraphernal properties. (Art. 1396,
Spanish Civil Code, which is the same as Art. 148 of the
Civil Code of the Phil.)
"Great importance should be given to the
documentary evidence, vis: Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 19, 46
and 46-A, presented by the defendants, in Civil Case
No. 2071 and the administrator and counter- petitioner
in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, which prove beyond
peradventure of any doubt that the properties in
question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa
Rivera. In Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably
declared under his oath that the money paid by Marcosa
Rivera for the fishponds in Obando, Bulacan was her
exclusive and separate money which was earned by her
while she was still single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, both
dated June 16, 1947, same Rafael Litam, also under
oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00
and P10,000.00 loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the
spouses Catalino Pascual and Juliana Pascual, and to
Juliana Pascual, respectively, are the separate and
exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which money
Rafael Litam had no interest whatsoever. In Exhibit 19,
same Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact that he had
obtained, before the outbreak of the second world war,
from Marcosa Rivera the sum of P135,000.00 which
belongs exclusively to the latter, and that after the
liberation, or more specifically, on January 4, 1946, he
stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of
P62,000.00, also belonging exclusively to the latter,
which amounts, totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of
interests, have not, according to the evidence, been
paid to her up to the present. In Exhibits 46 and 46-A, it
was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that he had not
given any money to his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that
they have actually adopted a system of separation of
property, each of them not having any interest or
participation whatsoever in the property of the other.
These declarations and admission of fact made by
Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him,
his heirs and successors in interests and third persons
as well. (Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court).
"The finding of this Court that the properties in
question are paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera,
having been bought by her with her separate and
exclusive money, is further strengthened by the fact
that, as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when
Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she was
already rich, she having already earned and saved
money as 'consignataria' while she was still single. It
also appears that she was born of a rich family, her
father, Eduardo Rivera, being the owner of fishponds,
commercial and residential lands and buildings, (Exhibits
5 to 18, inclusive), with an assessed value of around
P150,000.00 (Exhibits 25 and 42, inclusive), now worth
approximately a million pesos, and most of which
properties as may be seen from the certificates of title
were acquired by him way back in the years 1916 and
1919. When Eduardo Rivera died on February 5, 1942,
his cash and jewelry were inherited by his eldest
daughter, Rafaela Rivera, and when the latter died
single on July 2, 1943, Marcosa Rivera inherited her
cash amounting to P150,000.00, Philippine currency,
and and her pieces of jewelry. It is with this amount
and with the proceeds of the sale of some of said pieces
of jewelry that Marcosa Rivera purchased the fishponds
in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga.
"On the other hand, it appears from the
evidence that when Rafael Litam was on June 10, 1922,
married to Marcosa Rivera, he was poor. He had to
borrow from Marcosa Rivera, the sum of P135,000.00
belonging exclusively to her before the outbreak of the
war, and to steal from her further sum of P62,000.00
after the liberation (Exhibit 10). The said amounts
totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of the stipulated
interests, according to the evidence, have not been paid
to Marcosa Rivera up to the present. Rafael Litam did
not contribute any amount of money or labor to the
properties in question, as he and Marcosa Rivera
maintained an absolute separation of property (Exhibits
46 and 46-A). Besides, during his lifetime he used to go
his office in Manila everyday.
"Another circumstance which clearly proves
that the properties in question belong exclusively to
Marcosa Rivera is the established fact that before she
became incompetent sometime in the early part of the
year, 1953, she had been administering said properties,
to the exclusion of Rafael Litam. In fact, as may be seen
from the very documentary evidence (Exhibit 'EE', same
as Nxh. 50) presented by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
2071 themselves and petitioner in Sp. Proc. No.
1537, she alone leased the properties in question,
situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and the
corresponding lease contract, dated July 13, 1948 was
signed by her as lessor and by Rafael Suarez, Jr. as
lessees. Furthermore, the properties in question have
been declared in the name of Marcosa Rivera alone, and
she alone pays the real estate taxes due thereon.
(Exhibits 43, 44 & 45.)
"Further strong proofs that the properties in
question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa
Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said
properties. All the said properties are registered in the
name of 'Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam.' This
circumstance indicates that the properties in question
belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her
paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the
titles covering the same should have been issued in the
names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words
'married to Rafael Litam' written after the name of
Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles
are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa
Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered
by said titles.
"On the other hand, the evidence presented by
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and petitioner in Sp.
Proc. No. 1537 in support of their contention that the
properties in question are conjugal is, in the mind of the
Court, very weak, unreliable, and mostly incompetent,
and cannot overcome the clear, convincing and almost
conclusive proofs presented by the opposite party.
Scant or no consideration at all could be given by the
Court to the immaterial, incompetent and unbelievable
testimonies of the witnesses presented by the said
plaintiffs and petitioners. The disputable presumption of
law that the properties acquired during the marriage are
conjugal properties, upon which legal presumption said
plaintiffs and petitioner mainly rely has been decisively
overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of
evidence adduced in these cases that the properties in
question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa
Rivera." (Emphasis ours.)
Appellants' counsel assail the decision appealed from upon the
ground that the lower court had been partial to the appellees and had
not accorded to the appellants a fair and just hearing.
As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have
been, and should have been, more liberal in the reception of evidence.
Appellants' witnesses (Li Bun Lin, Dominador Gadi, Benigno Musni and
Rafael B. Suarez) should have been allowed to testify on the alleged
title of Rafael Litam to certain properties and on his alleged reasons for
the language used in the public and official documents relied upon by
the appellees. However, it is apparent to us that said evidence cannot
affect the decision in these cases.
The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would
have depended mainly upon their individual appraisal of certain facts,
upon their respectiveinferences therefrom and their biases or view
points, and upon a number of other factors affecting their credibility. At
best, said testimony could not possibly prevail over the repeated
admissions made by the decedent against his own interest in Exhibits
19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted to in the abovequoted portion of
the decision appealed from), which admissions are corroborated by the
fact that the deceased father of Marcosa Rivera was well to do; that
aside from her share in his estate, she had, likewise, inherited from a
sister who died single and without issue; that the lands in dispute were
registered, and some were, also, leased, in her name, instead of hers
and that of the decedent; and that the latter lived in her house in
Malabon, Rizal.

Appellants contend that the transactions covered by said
Exhibits 19, 21 to 23 and 46 and 46-A, as well as by the other deeds
referred to in the decision appealed from, were caused to be made in
the name of Marcosa Rivera, to the exclusion of her husband, in order
to evade the constitutional provision disqualifying foreigners from the
acquisition of private agricultural lands, except by succession. Apart
from being based, solely, upon a surmise, without any evidentiary
support, this pretense is refuted by the fact that said residential
property in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, was acquired on April 12,
1933, or prior to the adoption of our Constitution (see Exhibits Z and
AA). Her transactions subsequently thereto, merely followed, therefore,
the pattern of her activities before the drafting of said fundamental law.
This notwithstanding, we do not believe that appellants should
be sentenced to pay damages. The petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in
Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071
contain nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the
herein appellees. On the contrary, it may be surmised from said
pleadings that Marcosa Rivera had no knowledge of the alleged
previous marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin. Moreover, the records
do not show that appellants have acted in bad faith.
Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not
have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the
only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case
No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in
Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will
not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
partition.
Wherefore, with the elimination of the award for damages in
favor of the herein appellees, and of said declaration of heirship, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with
costs against the appellants. It is so ordered.











FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-57757. August 31, 1987.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG
AND MAXIMO VITUG, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; TORRENS TITLE; A PERSON DEALING WITH
REGISTERED LAND HAS A RIGHT TO RELY UPON THE FACE OF THE TITLE.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing
with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. A torrens title
concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a
final degree of registration. Once the title is registered the owner
may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals
of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
2.CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS; PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGALITY
WILL NOT PREVAIL WHEN THE TITLE IS IN THE NAME OF ONLY
ONE SPOUSE AND RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES ARE
INVOLVED. The presumption of conjugality in Article 160 of the Civil
Code applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and
wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the
properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was
already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a
spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the
name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties
are involved.
3.ID.; CONTRACTS; MORTGAGE; MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH. The PNB
had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the
properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in
good faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were
constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor.
4.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF
PROPERTY AND PARTITION, ACTION IN PERSONAM. Although actions
for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions,
however, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular
individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in
said cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that
the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above
described mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal
nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage
applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor
without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners
thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the
PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith so its right thereto is beyond
question.
5.CIVIL LAW; LACHES; FAILURE TO ASSERT RIGHTS WITHIN 17 YEARS
BARS ACTION. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from
questioning the title of Donata Montemayor to the said properties. They
never raised the conjugal nature of the property nor took issue as to the
ownership of their mother, Donata Montemayor, over the same. Indeed
private respondents were among the defendants in said two cases
wherein in their answers to the complaint they asserted that the
properties in question are paraphernal properties belonging
exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in nature.
Thus they leased the properties from their mother Donata
Montemayor for many years knowing her to be the owner. They
were in possession of the property for a long time and they knew
that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and
thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did not do
anything. It is only after 17 years that they remembered to assert their
rights. Certainly, the are guilty of laches.
D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J p:
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the
spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil
Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in
the name of the widow? This is the issue posed in this petition to review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60903
which is an action for reconveyance and damages. *
On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son,
Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) several parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 2289 Pampanga to guarantee the loan granted by
the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of
P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Pampanga. 1
On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor
of PNB certain properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888
Pampanga to guarantee the payment of the loan account of her son
Salvador Vitug in the amount of P35,200.00, which mortgage was
duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 2
The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles covering said properties
were all in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow
and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were mortgaged to
PNB 3 and were free from all liens and encumbrances. 4
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the
mortgaged properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They
were sold at public auction on May 20, 1968 in which the PNB was
the highest bidder. The titles thereto were thereafter consolidated
in the name of PNB. cdrep
Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their
accounts with the PNB so the latter foreclosed the properties
covered by TCT No. 2889 which were sold at public auction and
likewise PNB was the buyer thereof. On August 30, 1968, a certificate
of sale was issued by the Register of Deeds covering said properties in favor
of the PNB. When the title of the PNB was consolidated a new title was
issued in its name. 5
On September 2, 1969, the PNB sold the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 2887 and 2888 Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V.
de Guzman, Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V.
Gutierrez in those names the corresponding titles were issued. 6
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife
was Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina
and Julio all surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is survived by his 6 children:
Leonardo, Juan, Candido, Francisco and Donaciano, all surnamed Vitug.
Juan Vitug is also dead and is survived by his only daughter Florencia Vitug.
The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with
whom he had 8 children, namely, Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador,
Prudencio and Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug
represented by his wife Natalia Laquian, and the late Francisco Vitug who is
survived by 11 children, namely, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio,
Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio, Jesus and Luz.
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so his estate was settled
and distributed in Special Proceeding No. 422 in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor was the Administratrix. 7
Meanwhile, on May 12, 1958, Donata Montemayor executed a
contract of lease of Lot No. 24, which is covered by TCT No. 2887-R
in favor of her children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed
Vitug. This lease was extended on August 31, 1963. By virtue of a general
power of attorney executed by Donata Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in
favor of Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease on Sept.
19, 1967 of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug. 8
On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an
action for partition and reconveyance with damages in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special
administrator of the intestate estate of Donata Montemayor who
died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia,
Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro,
Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio, Jesus and Luz, all
surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.
The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to
be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof.
They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of
the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs.
Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an
action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the
properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
In a decision of Sept. 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the
complaint with costs against the plaintiffs and ordered them to pay
attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to the defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs
then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on May 20, 1981, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows: prcd
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set
aside, and another one entered in accordance with the
tenor of the prayer of appellant's complaint with the
modification that the sale at public auction of the 22
parcels be considered valid with respect to the 1/2
thereof. No costs."
Hence the herein petition for certiorari filed by the PNB raising the following
assignments of error:
"I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN FLORENCIA VITUG
VS. DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., 91 PHIL. 286
(1953) BECAUSE:

A.BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A
SPECIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION AND/OR APPLICATION OF A
PROVISION OF A GENERAL LAW, THE FORMER
PREVAILS.
B.THE DOCTRINE OF STARE
DECISIS IS NOT A MECHANICAL FORMULA OF
ADHERENCE.
C.PNB WAS NOT A PARTY, AND HAD
NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABOVECITED CASE.
D.SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG
AND MAXIMO VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN
SAID CASE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RECOGNIZING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT 496, AS
AMENDED (THE LAND REGISTRATION).
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
IGNORING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF OWNERSHIP OF
DONATA MONTEMAYOR OVER THE PROPERTIES
WHICH WERE REGISTERED EXCLUSIVELY IN HER
NAME WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (PRAGMACIO
VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG), AS LESSEES, ENTERED
INTO A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH DONATA
MONTEMAYOR AS THE OWNER-LESSOR.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PNB WAS A MORTGAGEE IN BAD
FAITH."
The petition is impressed with merit.
When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were
registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on
the torrens certificate of title covering said properties the
mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and
the mortgages were duly constituted and registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds.
In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB
had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and
no more. On its face the properties are owned by Donata
Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor
question the status of said registered owner and her ownership
thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the
same. LibLex
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing
with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. 9
A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered
by a final degree of registration. 10 Once the title is registered the owner
may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals of the
court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his
land. 11
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 160.All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of
the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the
title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in
the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse. 12 And this
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved. 13
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of
the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in
good faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were
constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the
mortgagor. 14
True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this Court, namely
Vitug vs. Montemayor decided on May 15, 1952, which is an action
for recovery of possession of a share in said parcels of land, 15 and
in the subsequent action for partition between the same parties
decided on Oct. 20, 1953, 16 this court found the 30 parcels of land
in question to be conjugal in nature and awarded the
corresponding share to the property of Florencia Vitug, an heir of
the late Clodualdo Vitug from the first marriage. In said cases this
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. In the dispositive part of the
decision of the trial court it made the observation that "but from the conduct
of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existence of their
marital life, the inference is clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal
intention of transmitting the full ownership of the 30 parcels of
land to his wife Donata Montemayor, thus considering the 1/2 of
the funds of the conjugal property so advanced for the purchase of
said parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug
on his death." 17 That must be the reason why the property was
registered in the name of Donata Montemayor as widow after the
death of Clodualdo Vitug. 18
At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for
partition are real actions, however, they are actions
in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are
parties thereto. 19 The PNB not being a party in said cases is not
bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was
aware of the said decisions when it extended the above described
mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of
said properties it would not have approved the mortgage
applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor
without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners
thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public
auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith so its right
thereto is beyond question. 20
Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of
Donata Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the
conjugal nature of the property nor took issue as to the ownership
of their mother, Donata Montemayor, over the same. Indeed
private respondents were among the defendants in said two cases
wherein in their answers to the complaint they asserted that the
properties in question are paraphernal properties belonging
exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in
nature. 21 Thus they leased the properties from their mother
Donata Montemayor for many years knowing her to be the owner.
They were in possession of the property for a long time and they
knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB
and thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did not do
anything. 22 It is only after 17 years that they remembered to
assert their rights. Certainly, the are guilty of laches. 23
Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug
as occupants and lessees of the property in question cannot now dispute the
ownership of their mother over the same who was their lessor. 24
WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of
P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.