Virtue and Happiness Greek Thought and Literature 2013
Aristotle defines friendship as a mutual affection between to individuals who, must be well disposed towards each other, and recognized as wishing each others good, for one of three reason stated (8.1156a4-6). These three reasons are in loving, either what is good, or pleasant, or useful (8.1155b19). Consequently, there are three different kinds of friendship: friendship based on pleasure, friendship based on utility, and friendship that is based on goodness. Aristotles concept of friendship based on goodness, or perfect friendship, contributes the most of these three forms to our natural goal in life for happiness because, whereas friendships based on pleasure and utility are misplaced in their aspiration for personal-gain, a perfect friendship is most virtuous in its foundation of goodness and therefore contributes the most to happiness.
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlines how the friendship that is most virtuous also produces the most happiness. Happiness is defined as the natural goal of each human as it seems to be, the end to which our actions are directed (1.1097b21-22). Any endeavor we take up has some motivation of its own but its ultimate end purpose is happiness. For example, we work to earn money in order to have a more comfortable and happy life. Thus, happiness sits at the top of the pyramid of human desire, because we always choose it for itself, and never for any other reason (1.1097b1-2). Furthermore, happiness demands not only complete 2 goodness but a complete life (1.1100a4-5) and the good man will be most happy because his actions are virtuous, [what is] good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (1.1098a17-18). Consequently, in relation to friends, the man who has the most virtuous friendship will have the happiest life.
Friendship that is based on utility cannot contribute much to a persons happiness in life because, as its end purpose is not for good itself but rather simply for usefulness, it is not virtuous. Aristotle states that, with the disappearance of the ground for friendship, the friendship also breaks up (8.1156a22-23) so, those who are friend for the sake of utility part as soon as the advantage ceases (8.1157a15- 17). True happiness, however, is not brief but rather lasts a lifetime, the happy man will have the required quality, and in fact will be happy throughout his life; because he will spend all his timein virtuous conduct and contemplation (1.1100b19-22). Such a friendship cannot, then, contribute to happiness because it is easily broken. Furthermore, happiness, as stated before, lies in accordance with virtue but individuals in a friendship based on utility can never act with morality toward one another because the very foundation of their relationship is not virtuous. One or both of the friends is just an instrument for personal gain and there is no pleasure in the relationship by itself even though, every activity is perfected by its pleasure (10.1175a21-22). In such a friendship, one individual is seeking only personal gain and looks to give nothing back to the friend and as, virtue is a mean condition (2.1106b27-28), this individual is unbalanced in his concept of happiness looking to only receive and not give. 3
Furthermore, friendship based on utility is not virtuous because both individuals do not care much for the well-being of the other and only, take pleasure in each others company only in so far as they have hopes of advantage from it (8.1156a29-31). This contradicts Aristotles definition of moral virtue where he claims, it is the way that we behave in our dealings with other people that makes us just or unjust (1103b14-15) and that, virtues are neither feelings nor faculties [but] are dispositions (1106a12-13). The disposition of a friend in such a friendship based on utility is displaying a feigned attitude of affection for the friend simply for personal advantage, which is unjust and therefore not virtuous.
One could perhaps argue, then, that a friendship based on pleasure contributes the most to happiness. Such a friendship, however, is on the same level as a friendship based on utility because its end motivation is not for happiness but for personal pleasure, the chief interest is in their own pleasure and the opportunity of the moment (8.1156a33-34). Similarly, this form of friendship is easily broken because it originates from quick and brief feelings and over time the individuals in this bond will change, their tastes change too, so that they are quick to make and to break friendships; because their affection changes just as the things that please them do, and this sort of pleasure changes rapidly (8.1156a35-36). Aristotle argues that, happiness is found to be something perfect and self- sufficient (1.1097b21) and the friendship that is based on pleasure is neither perfect in its end motivation nor unbreakable in its bond. 4
Thus, both the friendship that is based on utility and the friendship that is based on pleasure cannot lead to happiness because the individuals in these relationships, love not what is good for [them] but was appears to be such (8.1155b26-27). These friendships are centered about personal gain but Aristotle states that, doing good to others is characteristic of virtue and the good man (9.1169b12-13). Friends that are only useful or pleasurable to be around are not truly friends but are rather just instruments that another individual uses and while, the happy man needs friends (9.1169b24) a person interested only in self-benefit cannot achieve true happiness.
The perfect friendship, which is based on goodness, is the most virtuous of the three forms and therefore contributes the most to a persons happiness in life. This friendship originates between two individuals who are good in their disposition, it is between good men that both love and friendship are chiefly found and in the highest form (8.1156b23-24). They are do not seek any benefit from one other another but, wish good for the other(8.1156b8-9). Aristotle states that, it seems that loving is the distinctive virtue of friends (1159b35) and since both of the people involved in the perfect friendship look only to love each other, their relationship is high in nobility. Accordingly, because, it is the virtuous activities that determine our happiness (1.1100b10-11), both individuals in such a relationship find happiness in their actions.
5 Furthermore, because a friendship based on goodness is equally beneficial to both individuals in its balance between giving and receiving love, it fits Aristotles definition of virtue. Two good friends, do not seek to be loved in return (8.1159a30) but only wish good upon each other, which results in a shared and equal love. Aristotle tells us in Book II that virtue is a mean condition, and thus the perfect friendship is in accordance with virtue since it is in a form of equilibrium.
Thus, because, the happy life seems to be lived in accordance with goodness (10.1177a1-2) and, the truly happy man will need friends of this sort [virtuous] (9.1170a1-2), the happiness that is based on goodness will contribute the most to a persons happiness over the friendships based on utility and pleasure.
A possible counter-argument to the concept that the perfect friendship generates the most happiness for a person is that, because it is not based on utility and pleasure, how could it be beneficial to either individual. However, the perfect friendship, because it is based on goodness, does include pleasure and utility, not as ends of the relationship but as secondary benefits. This friendship arises out of two good individuals where, each loves the other for what he is, and not for any incidental quality (8.1156b11-12). They did not use each other for their own satisfaction and value but found themselves to be similar in their goodness. Still, the friends in a perfect friendship can be useful to each other, each party is good both absolutely and for his friend, since the good are both good absolutely and useful to each other (8.1156b13-15) but this utility is shared equally and ranks below 6 goodness in terms of importance. As each individual cares for the wellbeing of his companion, he will be of use to him in ensuring his happiness.
Similarly with pleasure, Aristotle states that, what is absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant (8.1156b24-25). Because the perfect friendship is based on what is good, it is therefore also pleasant for both individuals. The difference is that the perfect friendship is not a path toward pleasure or utility but a path toward goodness and virtue that will also result with these secondary two attributes.
Thus, it is the perfect friendship that is both the best of Aristotles three forms of friendship and balanced in its mutual benefit, just like, virtue is a mean; but in respect of what is right and best, it is an extreme (2.1107a8-9). The two individuals in a perfect friendship do not seek pleasure and utility but still find them as incidental secondary motives to goodness. Many would say that the perfect friendship, then, is too ideal and cannot exist. Aristotle, however, argues that, such friendships are rare is natural, because men of this kind are few. And in addition they need time and intimacy (8.1156b25-26). When two good individuals find their second-selves, similar in beliefs, righteousness, and disposition, then in their goodness they wish each other good and seek nothing in return: this is the perfect friendship that is based on goodness and is permanent and supreme in its relation to virtue, consequently leading to a happy life.
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Source:
Aristotle, J. A. K. Thomson, Hugh Tredennick, Jonathan Barnes, and Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. London: Penguin, 2004. Print.