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Aristotles Perfect Friendship in Accordance with


Virtue and Happiness
Greek Thought and Literature
2013

Aristotle defines friendship as a mutual affection between to individuals who,
must be well disposed towards each other, and recognized as wishing each others
good, for one of three reason stated (8.1156a4-6). These three reasons are in
loving, either what is good, or pleasant, or useful (8.1155b19). Consequently, there
are three different kinds of friendship: friendship based on pleasure, friendship
based on utility, and friendship that is based on goodness. Aristotles concept of
friendship based on goodness, or perfect friendship, contributes the most of these
three forms to our natural goal in life for happiness because, whereas friendships
based on pleasure and utility are misplaced in their aspiration for personal-gain, a
perfect friendship is most virtuous in its foundation of goodness and therefore
contributes the most to happiness.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlines how the friendship that is most
virtuous also produces the most happiness. Happiness is defined as the natural goal
of each human as it seems to be, the end to which our actions are directed
(1.1097b21-22). Any endeavor we take up has some motivation of its own but its
ultimate end purpose is happiness. For example, we work to earn money in order to
have a more comfortable and happy life. Thus, happiness sits at the top of the
pyramid of human desire, because we always choose it for itself, and never for any
other reason (1.1097b1-2). Furthermore, happiness demands not only complete
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goodness but a complete life (1.1100a4-5) and the good man will be most happy
because his actions are virtuous, [what is] good for man is an activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue (1.1098a17-18). Consequently, in relation to friends, the
man who has the most virtuous friendship will have the happiest life.

Friendship that is based on utility cannot contribute much to a persons
happiness in life because, as its end purpose is not for good itself but rather simply
for usefulness, it is not virtuous. Aristotle states that, with the disappearance of the
ground for friendship, the friendship also breaks up (8.1156a22-23) so, those who
are friend for the sake of utility part as soon as the advantage ceases (8.1157a15-
17). True happiness, however, is not brief but rather lasts a lifetime, the happy man
will have the required quality, and in fact will be happy throughout his life; because
he will spend all his timein virtuous conduct and contemplation (1.1100b19-22).
Such a friendship cannot, then, contribute to happiness because it is easily broken.
Furthermore, happiness, as stated before, lies in accordance with virtue but
individuals in a friendship based on utility can never act with morality toward one
another because the very foundation of their relationship is not virtuous. One or
both of the friends is just an instrument for personal gain and there is no pleasure in
the relationship by itself even though, every activity is perfected by its pleasure
(10.1175a21-22). In such a friendship, one individual is seeking only personal gain
and looks to give nothing back to the friend and as, virtue is a mean condition
(2.1106b27-28), this individual is unbalanced in his concept of happiness looking
to only receive and not give.
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Furthermore, friendship based on utility is not virtuous because both
individuals do not care much for the well-being of the other and only, take pleasure
in each others company only in so far as they have hopes of advantage from it
(8.1156a29-31). This contradicts Aristotles definition of moral virtue where he
claims, it is the way that we behave in our dealings with other people that makes us
just or unjust (1103b14-15) and that, virtues are neither feelings nor faculties
[but] are dispositions (1106a12-13). The disposition of a friend in such a friendship
based on utility is displaying a feigned attitude of affection for the friend simply for
personal advantage, which is unjust and therefore not virtuous.

One could perhaps argue, then, that a friendship based on pleasure
contributes the most to happiness. Such a friendship, however, is on the same level
as a friendship based on utility because its end motivation is not for happiness but
for personal pleasure, the chief interest is in their own pleasure and the
opportunity of the moment (8.1156a33-34). Similarly, this form of friendship is
easily broken because it originates from quick and brief feelings and over time the
individuals in this bond will change, their tastes change too, so that they are quick
to make and to break friendships; because their affection changes just as the things
that please them do, and this sort of pleasure changes rapidly (8.1156a35-36).
Aristotle argues that, happiness is found to be something perfect and self-
sufficient (1.1097b21) and the friendship that is based on pleasure is neither
perfect in its end motivation nor unbreakable in its bond.
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Thus, both the friendship that is based on utility and the friendship that is
based on pleasure cannot lead to happiness because the individuals in these
relationships, love not what is good for [them] but was appears to be such
(8.1155b26-27). These friendships are centered about personal gain but Aristotle
states that, doing good to others is characteristic of virtue and the good man
(9.1169b12-13). Friends that are only useful or pleasurable to be around are not
truly friends but are rather just instruments that another individual uses and while,
the happy man needs friends (9.1169b24) a person interested only in self-benefit
cannot achieve true happiness.

The perfect friendship, which is based on goodness, is the most virtuous of
the three forms and therefore contributes the most to a persons happiness in life.
This friendship originates between two individuals who are good in their
disposition, it is between good men that both love and friendship are chiefly found
and in the highest form (8.1156b23-24). They are do not seek any benefit from one
other another but, wish good for the other(8.1156b8-9). Aristotle states that, it
seems that loving is the distinctive virtue of friends (1159b35) and since both of
the people involved in the perfect friendship look only to love each other, their
relationship is high in nobility. Accordingly, because, it is the virtuous activities that
determine our happiness (1.1100b10-11), both individuals in such a relationship
find happiness in their actions.

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Furthermore, because a friendship based on goodness is equally beneficial to
both individuals in its balance between giving and receiving love, it fits Aristotles
definition of virtue. Two good friends, do not seek to be loved in return
(8.1159a30) but only wish good upon each other, which results in a shared and
equal love. Aristotle tells us in Book II that virtue is a mean condition, and thus the
perfect friendship is in accordance with virtue since it is in a form of equilibrium.

Thus, because, the happy life seems to be lived in accordance with
goodness (10.1177a1-2) and, the truly happy man will need friends of this sort
[virtuous] (9.1170a1-2), the happiness that is based on goodness will contribute
the most to a persons happiness over the friendships based on utility and pleasure.

A possible counter-argument to the concept that the perfect friendship
generates the most happiness for a person is that, because it is not based on utility
and pleasure, how could it be beneficial to either individual. However, the perfect
friendship, because it is based on goodness, does include pleasure and utility, not as
ends of the relationship but as secondary benefits. This friendship arises out of two
good individuals where, each loves the other for what he is, and not for any
incidental quality (8.1156b11-12). They did not use each other for their own
satisfaction and value but found themselves to be similar in their goodness. Still, the
friends in a perfect friendship can be useful to each other, each party is good both
absolutely and for his friend, since the good are both good absolutely and useful to
each other (8.1156b13-15) but this utility is shared equally and ranks below
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goodness in terms of importance. As each individual cares for the wellbeing of his
companion, he will be of use to him in ensuring his happiness.

Similarly with pleasure, Aristotle states that, what is absolutely good is also
absolutely pleasant (8.1156b24-25). Because the perfect friendship is based on
what is good, it is therefore also pleasant for both individuals. The difference is that
the perfect friendship is not a path toward pleasure or utility but a path toward
goodness and virtue that will also result with these secondary two attributes.

Thus, it is the perfect friendship that is both the best of Aristotles three
forms of friendship and balanced in its mutual benefit, just like, virtue is a mean;
but in respect of what is right and best, it is an extreme (2.1107a8-9). The two
individuals in a perfect friendship do not seek pleasure and utility but still find them
as incidental secondary motives to goodness. Many would say that the perfect
friendship, then, is too ideal and cannot exist. Aristotle, however, argues that, such
friendships are rare is natural, because men of this kind are few. And in addition
they need time and intimacy (8.1156b25-26). When two good individuals find their
second-selves, similar in beliefs, righteousness, and disposition, then in their
goodness they wish each other good and seek nothing in return: this is the perfect
friendship that is based on goodness and is permanent and supreme in its relation
to virtue, consequently leading to a happy life.



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Source:

Aristotle, J. A. K. Thomson, Hugh Tredennick, Jonathan Barnes, and Aristotle. The
Nicomachean Ethics. London: Penguin, 2004. Print.

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