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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

ARTICLE VII - EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1
Marcos vs Maglapus (GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989) (GR No. 88211, October 27, 1989)
Estrada vs Arroyo (GR No. 146710, March 2, 2011)
Soliven vs Makasiar (GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988)

Section 13
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary (GR No. 83896, February 22, 1991)

Section 15
Aytona vs Castillo (GR No. l-19313, January 19, 1962)
In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta (A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC.
November 9, 1998)
De Castro vs Judicial and Bar Council (GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010) (GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010)

Section 16
Sarmiento vs Mison (GR No. L-79974, December 17, 1987)
Pimentel vs Ermita (GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005)
Luego vs Civil Service Commission (GR No. L-69137, August 5, 1986)

Section 17
Drilon vs Lim (GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994)
Villena vs Secretary of Interior (GR No. L-27811, November 17, 1967)
Ang-angco vs Castillo (GR No. L-17169, November 30,

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Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211. Oct. 27, 1989

FACTS: On September 15, 1989. The court decided (8-7) that the disapproval of Aquino to issue travel
documents to Marcoses are not made with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that it will post threat
to national security. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Hawaii. President Aquino said in a statement
that the remains of Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to the country until such time as the
government, under Corys or succeeding administration decide otherwise. This was done to prevent any
tranquility of the state and order of society which might arise from those who will take the death of Marcos
passionately. Petitioners, family of Marcos, asserted that they have right to travel and return.

ISSUE: W/N Ferdinand Marcos can still return. W/N he still has this right.


HELD: No. A corpse does not have civil personality. Therefore, it can be restricted to enter the country

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JOSEPH ESTRADA petitioner v GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO respondent
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
Ponente: Puno, J.:

FACTS:

This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that precipitated the case at bar thus
follows:

1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice-president.
2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his family of
receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage.
3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one by one
resigned
withdrawing their support.
4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7 Impeachment Trial
began.
5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the president.
6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davide
administered
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner left Malacanang
and issued
a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him, the president to the vice
president becoming the acting president
7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.
8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency.

ISSUES:
There are several important issues sprouting in this case.
1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in regard the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
2. WON Estrada merely resigned as President
3. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
4. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

HELD:
The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

1. The question on the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is subject to judicial review. It is a legal
question, which is justiciable.

At first, it can be said that acquisition of the presidential seat of respondent Arroyo would be similar to
that of former President Corazon Aquino as they were placed into position by means of the call of the
people in a revolutionary mass demonstration known as EDSA I for Aquino, and EDSA II for Arroyo.

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It has been stressed by private respondents that Arroyo ascended the presidency through people
power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has
exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments.
Consequently, the grounds of the case show that such is a political question.

SC read the case Lawyers League vs Pres. Aquino, which decided that the legitimacy of Aquino
administration in question was a political question. The Freedom Constitution declared that Aquino's
government was a result a successful peaceful revolution by the sovereign Filipino people, hence a
political question. In contrast, Arroyo's government was not revolutionary in character. Arroyo swore
under the 1987 Constitution.

There is a legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves
the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government; it presented
then a political question. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President, presenting a legal and justiciable question.

2. It was held that Estrada has resigned as President.

The issue was whether the petitioner resigned as President or should he be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public in view of Art. VII
Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution.

It was said that there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. There is no formal requirement as to form of a valid resignation. It can be oral. It can
be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using the TOTALITY TEST, Estrada was held to have resigned as President.

Intent to Resign. There was public pressure for petitioner to resign. In the diary of Executive Secretary
Eduardo Angara called "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," an authoritative window to the state of
mind of the petitioner was provided. On January 20, 2:30 pm he proposed for a snap election for
president in May, emphasizing that he would not be a candidate. This is an indication that he
intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

As his support from his officials were withdrawn, he was even advised to have a "dignified exit or
resignation." Estrada did not object to this suggestion but stated that he would never leave the
country. At 10:00 p.m. he said to Angara "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to
a week in the palace." This was proof petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace.
Estrada became concerned with peaceful and orderly transfer of power when he told Angara ""Ed,
magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly
transfer of power." The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

Acts of Relinquishment. In the press release containing his final statement before he and his family left
Malacanang, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
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say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve
the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the past tense.

3. The law which concerned this issue was Article VII Sec.11 which provides in part:

"Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President."

"If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office"

The operative facts concerning this issue are:
*Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of
the House;
*Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
*Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175; followed by House Resolution No. 176 a resolution expressing the support of the
house of representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, adopted January 24, 2001.

Clearly, from the given facts, both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of temporary inability. The Court
has no jurisdiction to review the temporary inability and to revise thereafter the decision of both
houses of Congress recognizing Arroyo as President because this question involves the Legislature's
discretionary authority.

4. It was held the Estrada is not immune for liability. His claim that he must the impeachment proceeding
must first be decided before civil or criminal prosecution begin is untenable for he has been
considered resigned from office. Hence the impeachment tribunal and proceeding has ceased.
Hence, as a non-sitting President, he can be tried for civil and criminal charges filed against him.

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5. Petitioner contended that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
stated that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases
violation of his right to due process. It was held that there was not enough evidence to warrant the
Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. The
evidence given by petitioner that Ombudsman has been biased by the pervasive prejudicial publicity
against him was insubstantial.

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SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by the
President
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the
then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar
averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would
sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not
be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
theexercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like
Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS SECRETARY OF UNION

94 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet Singularity of Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this
EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on
the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article
7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8
(1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

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AYTONA VS CASTILLO

the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the
next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas
position and at the same time heappointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank
governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-
presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which,
and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to
continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his
appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried maneuvers
to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a
general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since
his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only
legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

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In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998
Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan
City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and
9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited
by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in
the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason
to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban
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DE CASTRO VS. JBC
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
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The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of
the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4
(1) thereof.

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SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE
FACTS: Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary
of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING: Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

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PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in
an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against
the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the
consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in
an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered
by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil
service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-
appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that
such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one
year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress
was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that the president was in good
faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is
the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be
constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary
or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have
the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that
the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.

NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Ad Interim Appointments
Appointments in an Acting
Capacity
Description
It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Acting appointments are a way
of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can
also be a way of circumventing
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COA does not alter its permanent character (Matibag
vs Benipayo)
the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
When
Effective
Upon Acceptance by Appointee Upon Acceptance by Appointee
When
Made
When Congress is in recess Any time when there is vacancy
Submitted
to the COA
Yes No


16 | P a g e

Luego vs CSC,
Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The
appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner
whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondents appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC
Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

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VILLENA VS SECRETARY INFERIOR
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The
Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision
over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with
the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal
officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the
Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under
existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions
govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of
the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is
under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of
the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument
that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater
power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law.
Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a
legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be
more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078,
Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The
power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for
an impartial investigation.

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ANG-ANGCO VS CASTILLO
Facts: The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not
covered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels approached Collector of Customs Ang-
Angco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release
certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angco
which stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action
on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance who
expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally released
the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrative
complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been discharging the
duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered his judgment
against the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service.

Previous History: Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative case
in subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government.

Holding: The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees in the classified civil
service.

Reasoning: It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of
the procedure laid down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said
that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.

The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers
and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised.
This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of
departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this
constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Significance: It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct action on the
administrative case of an employee under classified service even with the authority of the President without
submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service.