Crim Digests Garcia Articles 6-20

CRIMREV DIGESTS FOR ARTICLES 6-20 (GARCIA)
ARTICLE 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance.
PEOPLE v. LIZADA (Castriciones)

ARTICLE 6 DOCTRINE: Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be
distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures
necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end.
[47]
One perpetrating
preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the
preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is
guilty of such consummated offense.

FACTS:
Rose Orosilla left her husband, they had three children: Analia, Jepsy, and
Rossel
Rose met respondent and they decided to live together
Rose worked as an Avon saleslady, they have a video shop at home
In 1996 while Rose was at work, respondent entered Analias room and
raped her (finger then organ) and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
This happened again in 1997 and twice a week after that from 96-98
While being raped one time, Rossel saw what was happening/Rossel was
berated and nobody reported anything to anyone
During a fight one day between Rose and respondent, Analia revealed that
she was being molested by respondent
Rose was shocked and the mother-daughter-duo reported the events to a
kagawad and later on to the Western Police District
NBI test showed there was no sign of extragenital physical injuries/hymen
still intact
Analia revealed she was being raped, Rose filed an additional charge for
rape
Respondent avers he treats Roses children like his own children and that
this suit was filed for the sole purpose of Roses desire to acquire and take
control of the video shop and his other properties
Trial Court found respondent guilty for four counts of rape

ISSUE:
Whether or not requisite quantum of evidence was obtained against respondent so as
to warrant a conviction.

HELD/RATIO: YES.
In light of the evidence on record, we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of
attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who
shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.
[37]

For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of
age.
[38]

Lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form
of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton
manner.
[39]

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of
execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.
[40]

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with
the crime intended to be committed.
[41]

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
CRIMREV GARCIA 2014-15|| CASTRICIONES | CONSTANTINO | NOCHE | SANTOS | SUAREZ | VARELA | VILLAMOR 2

which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished
from preparatory acts which consist of devising means or measures necessary for
accomplishment of a desired object or end.
[47]
One perpetrating preparatory acts is
not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts
constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such
consummated offense.
[48]

In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-
appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts
of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By
the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape
which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of
rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution
however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only
because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant
is guilty only of attempted rape.
[58]

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He
commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing
his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his
own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus,
his penis merely touched Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as the crime
committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him
should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.

BALEROS v. PEOPLE (Constantino)

DOCTRINE: The attempt that which the penal code punishes is that which has a
logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the
of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
realization and consummation

FACTS:
The victim MALOU was a tenant in building (unit 307) close to UST where
she was a medical student.
On the night of the incident, as she was asleep on a folding bed outside her
bedroom, she was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth
pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move.
Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She fought
her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free and she was
able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and she proceeded to her bedroom to ask help from her
maid, security guard, and other classmates (who were also tenants). They
found that the perpetrator has escaped through the window.
A week prior to the incident the petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David
(CHITO) confided his feelings for Malou but the latter rejected him.
Upon investigation the following day, a handkerchief with chloroform was
found from Chitos belongings. Chito denied the allegations.
TC found him guilty of attempted rape.
CA affirmed TCs decision.

ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.

HELD/RATIO: YES.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man
who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the
same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru
Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang, stated that "the attempt which the
Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete
offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what
obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact
from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance
of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-
soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act
that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape
Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there
was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For
what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had
no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on,
the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken
if the victim had been rendered unconscious.
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice
disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and

probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE v. LABIAGA (Noche)

DOCTRINE: (FRUSTRATED MURDER cf. ATTEMPTED MURDER)
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have
been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention.

FACTS:
At 7:00p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, stepped outside of his
house in Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. LABIAGA who was 5m away shot
him with a shotgun.
Gregorio called his daughter Judy Jojo Conde for help. Judy and his other
daughter, Glenelyn, rushed to Gregorios aid but LABIAGA also shot Judy in
the abdomen.
After shooting JUDY, LABIAGA said [s]he is already dead, and fled the
crime scene with his co-accused Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag.
At Sara District Hospital where the victims were rushed, JUDY was
pronounced dead on arrival while GREGORIO made a full recovery.
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the
incident. He found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one
centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and abrasion wounds hematoma
formation in his right shoulder.
For JUDYs death, LABIAGA, BARCENAS AND DEMAPANAG were
charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case
No. 2001-1555.
For GREGORIOs shooting, they were charged with Frustrated Murder with
the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
The cases were joined. BARCENAS remained at large. DEMAPANAG was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Not giving credence to LABIAGAs theory of self-defense, the RTC Br. 66 of
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, it found LABIAGA guilty of MURDER for JUDYs killing
and FRUSTRATED MURDER for GREGORIOs shooting.
CA Cebu affirmed DEMAPANAGs acquittal and LABIAGAs guilty verdict for
MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER with the only modification being the
additional award of moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE:
WON LABIAGA is guilty of FRUSTRATED MURDER in shooting Gregorio
(Note: SC upheld CA-Cebus verdict for JUDYs MURDER.)

HELD/RATIO: NO.
The SC held that LABIAGA should be convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER,
and not frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 for shooting Gregorio. (SC
also increased the award of damages.)
The SC noted that in Serrano v. People, it distinguished a frustrated felony
from an attempted felony:
1.) In [a] frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in [an]
attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In [a] frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the
crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in
[an] attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.
The SC noted that wound sustained by GREGORIO were not mortal, as
admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura.
Said the SC: In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the
wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the
evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the
victims death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE (Santos)

DOCTRINE: There is no crime of frustrated theft. It is immaterial that the offender is
able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed
all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from
such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted
or consummated.

FACTS:
Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were charged with the crime of theft.
Lago, a security guard manning his post at the open parking area of the
Super Sale Club in SM North EDSA, saw Valenzuela hauling cases of
detergents in a push cart, of the well-known brand Tide and Tide
Ultramatic, and unloading them in an open parking space where Calderon
was waiting.
Valenzuela then haled a taxi and directed it towards the parking space
Calderon loaded the cartons and boarded the cab.
Lago who saw everything proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving and
requested to see the receipt of the merchandise.
Both Valenzuela and Calderon tried to flee on foot, but Lago fired a warning
shot alerting his fellow security guards.
Both were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise was
recovered.
They were first brought to the SM Security office then transferred to Baler
Station II, Q.C. for investigation.
From the records, 4 other people were apprehended, however only
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with theft by the Asst. City
Prosecutor.
They pleaded not guilty on arraignment, at the trial both claimed to be
innocent bystanders;
Calderon was only in the vicinity to withdraw from his ATM account.
Valenzuela was walking by the parking lot to ride a tricycle.

RTC convicted both of the crime of consummated theft.
Both filed their respective Notice of Appeal but only Valenzuela filed a brief,
Calderons appeal deemed abandoned.
Valenzuela insists that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since
he never freely disposed of the stolen articles. CA rejected contention and
affirmed conviction.
Hence the present Petition for Review.

ISSUE:
W/N theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage.

HELD/RATIO: NO.
There is no crime of frustrated theft. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following
elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is
able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed
all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from
such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted
or consummated.

PEOPLE v. QUINANOLA (Suarez)

DOCTRINE: There is NO CRIME of FRUSTRATED RAPE.

FACTS:
In People vs. Orita, 1 this Court has declared that the crime of frustrated rape is non-
existent. The pronouncement more than six years after the promulgation of the
decision in Orita, the RTC of Cebu City has convicted accused Quianola Escuadro
of the crime of frustrated rape, principally on the strength of People vs. Eriia 2 which
this Court, in the Orita decision, has considered to be a "stray" decision. The decision
of the RTC of Cebu City imposing upon each of the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua "of Forty (40) Years," has been brought up by them to this Court. The
appeal opens up the whole case for review.
The two accused were charged with the crime of rape of fifteen year old Catalina
Carciller.
Accuseds held the victim at gunpoint and forcibly brought her towards the nearby
school. After undressing the victim, Accused Quianola "started to pump, to push and
pull" 5 even as Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from him. She felt his
organ "on the lips of (her) genitalia." 6 When Quianola had satisfied his lust,
Escuadro took his turn by placing himself on top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the
sex organ of Escuadro "on the lips of (her) vulva".
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their defense,
interposed alibi, ill motive on the part of an "uncle" of the complainant, and insufficient
identification.
RTC found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "frustrated
rape" and sentenced them with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

ISSUE:
W/N the ACCUSEDS WERE GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED RAPE

HELD/RATIO: NO.
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal knowledge"
unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that
the vagina be penetrated or that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be
ruptured. 36 The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man's penis
merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ 37 or, as once so said in a case, by
the "mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act."
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so
stands, there is no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, 47 the Court
has explicitly pronounced:
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also
all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is
left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to
produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated We have set the uniform rule
that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking
into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape
can ever be committed.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of a
clear conspiracy between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to
perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. Each of them therefore is responsible not
only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the
other as well. 49

PEOPLE v ORANDE (Varela)

DOCTRINE: The uniform rule is that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ without rupture of the hymen is sufficient to warrant conviction of the
accused.

FACTS:

The accused, Arnulfo Orande, is charged 4 counts of the rape of Jessica
Castro.
Orande was the common law husband of Jessicas mom, Girlie. They all
lived in the house of Girlies mom home, where Girlies brother took one
room and her sister the other. Girlie worked at the fish market at Paco
Market.
In April 94 while Girlie was at the fish market, armed with a knife he ordered
Jessica to undress and he raped her. The accused also threatened her
safety and the safety of her family if she told anyone. He raped her 3 other
times all on or before the age of 12 and while Girlie was not home. It was
only when Jessica was confronted by her teacher, she told all. Mrs. Mojica
the teacher told the aunt of Jessica and the Aunt together with Jessica filed
the case.

ISSUE:
W/N the court gravely erred in convicting the accused of frustrated Rape.

HELD/RATIO: PARTLY MODIFIED.
Conviction stands but as to the frustrated Rape he is right.
He succeeded in nudging her sex organ with the tip of his penis but was
unable to accomplish penetration, due to the resistance put up.
The court has held from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
the victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that moment also the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Thus the felony is consummated.
The uniform rule is that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is
not essential. Any penetration is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ
without rupture of the hymen is sufficient to warrant conviction of the accused.

PEOPLE v PAREJA (Castriciones)

ARTICLE 6 DOCTRINE: The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight
(something the culprits had not taken into account) may not be considered as
voluntary desistance from the commission of the crime so as to remove the element
of asportation from the complex crime charged. Such failure to consummate the
robbery was not caused solely by their own volition and inabilities.

FACTS:
Generoso Jacob is 54 years old and sleeps in a one bed room house along
with his children, TV, and Betamax
They were woken up one night when three masked robbers entered their
house, one pointed a gun at Jacobs daughter Emelita and asked Asan
yung TV
Man tried to carry the TV but it was heavy so he said Ger, tulungan mo ako
to one of his companions
Emelita took this opportunity to unmask the gunman and found out it was co-
accused Toledo, their neighbour
Three robbers fled empty handed when they heard roused neighbors
coming
Emelita saw his father lying in a pool of blood, dead/autopsy revealed he
died from a stab wound
Respondent gives the alibi of being in a funeral during the time of the alleged
intrusion at the Jacob house
Sabina, another daughter of Jacob, also testifies that she saw Pareja during
the robbery
Trial Court found respondents guilty

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants were properly.

HELD/RATIO: YES.
It is beyond dispute that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide as defined in Art.
297 of the Revised Penal Code. Robbery was the intended purpose of the intruders
trespass into the residence of the Jacobs. Generoso Jacobs killing was on the
occasion of a robbery which, however, was not consummated.
The failure to cart away the goods due to their weight (something the culprits
had not taken into account) may not be considered as voluntary desistance from the
commission of the crime so as to remove the element of asportation from the complex
crime charged. Such failure to consummate the robbery was not caused solely by
their own volition and inabilities. It was likewise brought about by factors such as
their unmasking and the arrival of neighbors who respondent to Emelitas shouts for
help. These circumstances forced them to flee, leaving behind the objects.

PEOPLE v. REYES (Constantino)

DOCTRINE: That the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is
necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused
capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the
pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of
the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the
pudendum. People v. Campuhan
The touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking
or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of
the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias
or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape proceeds
from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons pubis
or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain some
degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is required,
however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and

convincingly established. People v. Bali-balita

FACTS:
13 yr old AAA with her sister 9 yr old BBB was watching TV at the house of
Reyes that was just across from their house.
When the sisters were about to leave, Reyes pulled AAA to the store
attached to his sala and told her in their dialect Come here and let us have
sex.
Alarmed, AAA tried to pull away from Reyes and BBB tried to pull her sister
away but due to Reyess superior strength, he was able to overcome the two
and BBB was left crying outside of the store.
Inside the store, Reyes kissed AAA and mashed her breasts. He threatened
her: If you will shout, I will kill you.
She fought back by boxing and pushing him away, but her efforts were futile.
He twice tried to pry open her legs, but she strained hard to close them. On
the second attempt, however, her effort was not enough to prevent him from
pulling her legs apart, and he then thrust his penis into her vagina and made
push and pull movements.
Although his penis achieved only a slight penetration of her vagina, he
succeeded in satisfying his lust and afterwards he threatened the girls that if
they told anyone that he was going to kill them.
CCC the mother found out what happened the same evening and brought
her daughter to the barangay the following day to file the complaint.
The medico legal findings showed that there were contusions to the labia
majora right and left, but no there were no hymenal lacerations.
TC found Reyes guilty, CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
W/N the evidence adduced by the State competently proved that the crime reached
the consummated stage

HELD/RATIO : YES.
Reyes insists that the fact that AAAs hymen had remained intact, per the
medico-legal report, revealed that no rape had been committed. the law applicable at
the time of the rape of AAA, defined and punished rape thusly:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:1. By
using force or intimidation;2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As the text of the law itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is
not among the means of consummating rape. All that the law required is that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the
law. By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman." This understanding of rape explains why the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates the crime.
During her examination of AAA, Dra. Gancinia found pamamaga (swelling)
on the victims labia majora. Dra. Gancinia opined that such swelling was possibly
caused by the insertion of a hard object, like a hard penis, or by friction with hard
objects even without removing the panties or pants of AAA. Although such medical
finding, left alone, was susceptible of different probable interpretations, AAAs
testimonial narration about how Reyes had sexually assaulted her, including how his
penis had only slightly penetrated her vagina, confirmed that he had carnal
knowledge of her.
More specifically, the presence of the swelling in AAAs labia majora was an
indication of the penetration by the erect penis of the labia majora of the accused. As
such, there was sufficient factual foundation for finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape
(The case now cites the doctrines provided.)

ARTICLE 7. When light felonies are punishable. Light felonies are punishable
only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those
committed against person or property.

ARTICLE 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. Conspiracy and
proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law
specially provides a penalty therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony
proposes its execution to some other person or persons.

PEOPLE v. PAGALASAN (Noche)

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence.

FACTS:
Spouses GEORGE and Desiree Lim resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision,
General Santos City with their three young children, one of whom was 10-
year-old CHRISTOPHER NEAL. They had a maid, Julita Sarno and a
security guard, Ferdinand Cortez.
On September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., while the Lims were watching the TV
in the masters bedroom. JULITA opened the kitchen door when she heard
knocks, thinking it was CORTEZ. Four masked men, about 55 to 56 tall,
each armed with handguns, two of whom were holding hand grenades,
barged into the kitchen. JULITA saw CORTEZ, hands tied and lying on the
floor.
On orders of the intruders, JULITA knocked on the bedroom door. 3 of the
masked men barged into the room to confront the Spouses Lim. They then
ransacked the house, getting cash and valuables. The masked men gave
Desiree a handwritten note (Note 1). In Note 1, the kidnappers said that the
Lims should coordinate with them, without police or military help and that
they will be contacted by telegram or telephone by the call sign Mubarak 2.

The four masked men left with GEORGE and CHRISTOPHER NEAL,
forcing them to ride the Lims Nissan car.
At Sitio Tupi two of the masked men alighted from the car, and brought
CHRISTOPHER NEAL with them. They boarded another vehicle. The two
cars went separate ways. GEORGE was transferred to the front seat of the
Nissan car which was driven by PAGALASAN.
By this time policemen have been informed of the incident and a checkpoint
was set-up at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road.
Before approaching the check-point, PAGALASAN took off his mask and
warned GEORGE not to give them away. Sensing something amiss,
PAGALASAN was nonetheless accosted and GEORGE told the police the
incident.
During Custodial Investigation, PAGALASAN was provided Atty. Tomas C.
Falgui as his counsel. PAGALASAN confessed to have participated in the
kidnapping. He implicated Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin (Ronnies brother), a
Muslim known as Ferdinand, and Bong (a resident of Purok Islam).
Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were
arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos City.
On September 6 GEORGE received another handwritten letter (Note 2),
ordering the release of Michael and Ronie Puntuan because they were
innocent, and demanding P3,000,000 for CHRISTOPHER NEALs release.
On September 9 GEORGE received another handwritten letter (Note 3), this
time from MUBARAK II or 2 informing him and his wife that the kidnappers
did not want the military to be involved nor innocent people to be prejudiced.
The spouses were also warned that their son would not be released alive
unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three days.
The next day, CHRISTOPHER NEAL was rescued by policemen without any
ransom being paid.
An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against PAGALASAN with
Br. 22 RTC General Santos City (Criminal Case No. 11062). Another case
charging PAGALASAN, Ronnie Cabalo,
Aladin Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a certain John Doe identified as Fernando,
and Peter Doe with kidnapping for ransom was filed (Criminal Case No.
11098).
In Criminal Case No. 11098, the RTC ruled that with or without the
confession of PAGALASAN, the prosecution adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt that he, in conspiracy with three others, kidnapped
GEORGE and CHRISTOPHER NEAL. They were meted out the 2 DEATH
PENALTY sentences.
The instant case is an automatic review.

ISSUE:
WON PAGALASAN ET AL. are guilty of kidnapping for ransom?

HELD/RATIO: YES.
The SC upheld that PAGALASAN is guilty of kidnapping CHRISTOPHER
NEAL under Article 267 of the RPC.
For his defense, PAGALASAN challenged the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession he made during custodial investigation. He claims that he was
only forced to drive the Nissan car by the other kidnappers that without proof of the
conspiracy (i.e. his confession), he is not a principal by direct participation.
SC noted, There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability
must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime
itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Further, Each
conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.
The SC held that the collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the
appellant and his cohorts before, during and after the kidnapping constitute
indubitable proof that the appellant and his three companions conspired with each
other to attain a common objective: to kidnap George and Christopher and detain
them illegally. It held that PAGALASAN is a principal by direct participation.
However, the SC found that the prosecution failed to prove kidnappers
intent to extort ransom. The notes from the kidnappers relied upon by the prosecution
taken together did not prove such intent, and it was not clear who sent notes 2 and 3,
some of the kidnappers already being in custody.
Lastly, the SC found that PAGALASAN is also guilty of slight illegal
detention.
SC AFFIRMED RTC Decision WITH MODIFICATION:
- PAGALASAN guilty of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the RPC but
there being no modifying circumstances, sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua;
- PAGALASAN also guilty of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the RPC, with
the sentence of an indeterminate penalty of from nine years and four months of
prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to sixteen years and five months of
reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum;
- P150,000 as moral damages and P50,000 as exemplary damages.

PEOPLE v. CASTILLO (Santos)

DOCTRINE: To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be
a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused
to the commission of the crime without any space for baseless suppositions or
frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the
commission of the crime itself.
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and
(2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of
an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough.

FACTS:

On March 1, 1995, Horacio Cebrero IV (Rocky) the 6 year old son of the
Sps. Cebrero was kidnapped from their residence in Classic Homes, B. F.
Paraaque, Metro Manila.
That morning a tricycle arrived to pick Rocky up for school, the accused
Evangeline Padayhag was inside. They went to a nearby Mcdonalds where
they were joined by the other accused, Elizabeth Castillo.
When Luis Cebrero, the father, came home from work he was informed by
his other son that Rocky did not attend school. He began to call up his
friends looking for Rocky and went straight to the police station to report his
son missing.T
That evening, he received a telephone call from a woman asking for his ATM
card, the following night the ransom demand increased to P1Million.
The next day, there was no ransom call, but Luis told his wife to collect
money. Mrs. Cebrero withdrew P800,000 in P1000 denomination to which
the bank provided a list containing the serial numbers.
The following evening Luis received a call instructing him to make the drop
on the terrace in front of the church called Sabadista in Paco, Obando,
Bulacan
The Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the Philippine Army was informed
of the pay-off, and they positioned themselves near the site.
2 women picked up the bag and immediately left. The police were unable to
catch them since they disappeared.
The following evening, after 4 days, Rocky was returned home.
In the next few days the police showed photos of the 2 women around the
site to which they were informed that the 2 women already left for the
province.
The ISG, with the help of the respective barangay officials of the separate
provinces of the 2 women was able to find them.
Evangeline Padayhag voluntarily went to Camp Crame to clear her name,
while Elizabeth Castillo was arrested when a search warrant for her house
resulted to the finding of a black bag with money of which the serial numbers
matched with the list furnished by the bank to Mrs. Cebrero.
After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
Hence this automatic review of the SC.

ISSUE:
W/N both accuseds guilt have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. NO.
W/N Padayhag is a co-conspirator. NO.

HELD/RATIO:
With the evidence of Castillos own testimony established, the prosecutions
witnesses did little more than corroborate what Castillo herself had admitted. The trial
court based its decision on the testimonies of all the witnesses, including Castillos.
The SC recognized that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
Castillos guilt.
The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence on
record shows that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in
concert with Castillo to commit the same criminal act.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a
sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to
the commission of the crime without any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied
theories to filter through. Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the
commission of the crime itself.
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of
intent; and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur.
Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act
must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action
is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a
common design.
Padayhags act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity
with Castillos plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that
Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhags
boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit Padayhags
boyfriend that the two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had
deceived her.
To impose criminal liability, the law requires that there be intentional
participation in the criminal act, not the unwitting cooperation of a deceived individual.

People v Larranaga (Suarez)

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such point to a joint design and community of interest.

FACTS:
These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a college beauty
queen along with her comely and courageous sister. Sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were abducted by the accused and held at a safe house. They
took turns guarding the victims while others look for another vehicle which
they can use to transport the victims. Then they were brought to secondary
location where the accused took turns raping them. While one of the
accused was raping Jacqueline, two of them led Marijoy to a cliff and
mercilessly pushed her into the ravine which was almost 150 meters deep.
The accused made Jacqueline run on the road while being chased by their
van. When they caught up with her, she was brought inside the van where
one of them beat her until she passed out. In the aftermath of the kidnapping
and rape, she was made to disappear. Where she is and what further crimes
were inflicted upon her remain unknown and unsolved up to the present.
After almost ten months, one of the accused who goes by the alias Tisoy
Tagalog, bothered by his conscience and recurrent nightmares admitted
before the police his participation in the abduction and rape of the sisters. He

identified his co-conspirators and became the state witness in the case. RTC
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentenced each of them two (2) reclusiones perpetua.
Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
W/N the crimes committed by the accused were attended by conspiracy

HELD/RATIO: YES.
Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessaryit may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves when such point to a joint design and community of interest.
Otherwise stated, it may be shown in the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. The accuseds actions showed that they have the
same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters.

PEOPLE v. FERNAN (Varela)

PEOPLE v. GARCHITORENA (Castriciones)
ARTICLE 8 DOCTRINE: Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which
show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and community of
interest among the accused

FACTS:
Mauro Biay was a balut vendor who, one night was stabbed repeatedly by
respondent while respondents companions held Mauro back by twisting his
arm/Cause of death was hypovolemic shock second to multiple stab wounds
After Mauro was slumped on the floor dead, respondent instructed his
companions to run away
Mauros sister Dulce Borero saw everything as it unfolded and wanted to call
for help but no voice left her mouth as she did
She went home to call their elder brother Teodoro and returned to an empty
crime scene/a tricycle had taken Mauro to the hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival
Co-defendant Pamplona denied the charge; Co-defendant Garcia claimed
he was commuting from work and was picked up at home by policemen;
respondent claims insanity (schizophrenia) as backed by a doctor from the
National Center for Mental Health
Trial Court found them all guilty/they denied their involvement, respondent
asserts exempting circumstance because of mental disorder/CA affirms

ISSUES:
Whether or not the guilt of the crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt

HELD/RATIO: YES.
Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused conspired to
assault the victim Mauro Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called the
victim and prompted the latter to approach their group near the artesian well. When
the victim was near enough, accused Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey Pamplona
restrained Mauro Biay and overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two
accused, Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona, together with their co-accused Arnold
Garchitorena instructed his two co-accused to run. Conspiracy is apparent in the
concerted action of the three accused. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148). Conspiracy may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts
of the accused which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action
and community of interest among the accused (People vs. Sicad, et al., 391 SCRA
19).
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as
there was no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or
that he participated in their criminal designs.
[21]
We are not persuaded. In People v.
Maldo,
[22]
we stated:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused
prior to, during or subsequent to the
incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose,
concert of action or community of
interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually
hit by each of the conspirators for the act of one
of them is deemed the act of all. (citations
omitted, emphasis ours)
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were
together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common
objective. Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona,
together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then
stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too
strong. All means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until
he fell to the ground and expired. The three accused-appellants prior act of waiting
for the victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common
design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused
rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of one
is the act of all

PEOPLE V. CARANDANG (Villamor)

DOCTRINE: THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR CONSPIRACY TO EXIST THAT
THERE BE A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME TO ELAPSE TO AFFORD FULL

OPPORTUNITY FOR MEDITATION AND REFLECTION.

FACTS:
In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma
Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused
Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house.
Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team composed of the officers who
accompanied him during the interrogation, with him as team leader. When
the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., they alighted from their
vehicles and surrounded Milan's house.
SPO1 Montecalvo's group went to the left side of the house, while SPO2
Red's group proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually met at the
back of the house near Milan's room. The door to Milan's room was open,
enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside.
SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room would not put up
a fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt.
However, when the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan
immediately shut the door. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door
open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo
shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo
and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the other.
Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not
able to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1
Montecalvo, who was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at
the assailants when Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to
the ground. SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan
lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and
hit Milan.
SPO1 Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.
SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan
stepped out of the house and was also brought to a hospital, but Carandang
and Chua remained holed up inside the house for several hours.
There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and Chua,
during which they requested for the presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and
media man Ramon Tulfo. It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when
Carandang and Chua surrendered. SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were found
dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs
and gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding Carandang, Milan and
Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder. CA affirmed
Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with
Carandang due to their acts of closing the door and not peaceably talking to
the police officers. According to them, those acts were caused by their being
frightened by the police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear.
Milan and Chua further assert that the fortuitous and unexpected character
of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled out a finding
of conspiracy. They claim that the incident happened so fast, giving them no
opportunity to stop Carandang. Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered
"Sugurin mo na!" to Milan, appellants argue that no crime was committed
due to the same as all the victims had already been shot when said words
were shouted.
Furthermore, it appears to have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or
lack of reflection and did not inherently carry with it inducement or
temptation.
ISSUE:
Did the court a quo err in holding that there was conspiracy among the appellants?

HELD/RATIO: NO.
The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established
fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and
SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible
therefor. The trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua's actuations
showed that they acted in concert against the police officers. That the three acted in
concert can be gleaned from their actuations. First, when they learned of the
presence of the police officers, they closed the door. Not one of them came out to talk
peacefully with the police officers. Instead, Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red
did not even have the chance to touch their firearms at that instant.
At first glance, Milan's act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution
in the furtherance of the crime. On second look, however, that act actually facilitated
the commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the police officers were
trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic positions
which gave them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and
PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden
barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the suddenness of the attack, said police
officers were not able to return fire.
Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy
consisted of lending encouragement and moral ascendancy to his co-
conspirators as evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the
already fallen police officers with the obvious intention to finish them off.
Moreover, he did not immediately surrender even when he had the opportunity
to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until their
arrest. As we have held in People v. Sumalpong, conspiracy may also be proven by
other means.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims
(Milan's closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves,
allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua's

directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan's following such
instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to
prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milan's act of attacking SPO1
Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these
facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of
the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct
participation. Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of
conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR
CONSPIRACY TO EXIST THAT THERE BE A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME TO
ELAPSE TO AFFORD FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR MEDITATION AND
REFLECTION. Instead, conspiracy arises on THE VERY MOMENT the plotters
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony. As held by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, Milan's act of closing the door facilitated the commission of
the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the
police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and
Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves.
Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying
circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to
defend themselves or to retaliate.

PEOPLE v. BOKINGCO (Noche)

DOCTRINE: Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are
essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.

FACTS:
Noli Pasion and his wife, Elsa, resided in a house along Mac Arthur Highway
in Balibago, Angeles City. The 1st floor of their house also served as their
pawnshop. NOLI maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of
his house. One of the apartments were leased to his brother-in-law, Dante
Vitalicio. Some of the apartments were still under construction, and the
accused are among the 13 constructions workers hired by NOLI for the
construction.
According to VITALICIO: At around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, while
VITALICIO was doing his laundry, NOLI passed through his apartment. A
few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment3. VITALICIO went
to Apartment3 and peeped through a screen door. He saw BOKINGCO
hitting something on the floor. BOKINGCO rushed VITALICIO but he
managed to push BOKINGCO away. BOKINGCO tried to chase VITALICIO
but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. VITALICIO went home and was
informed by his wife that NOLI was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment3.
VITALICIO went back to Apartment3 and saw NOLIs body lying flat on the
kitchen floor.
According to ELSA: ELSA said that when she heard banging sounds and her
husbands moans, she tried to go down from their masters bedroom at the
2nd floor of their apartment. Before reaching the kitchen, COL blocked her
way. COL sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her
chin. COL instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa
informed him that she does not know the combination lock. ELSA tried
offering him money but COL dragged her towards the back door by holding
her neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, ELSA saw
BOKINGCO open the screen door and heard him tell Col: tara, patay na
siya. COL ran away with BOKINGCO. ELSA found NOLI husband lying on
the kitchen floor of Apartment3, bathed in his own blood.
NOLI and VITALICIO were brought to the hospital where NOLI expired a few
hours later.
An information for MURDER was filed against BOKINGCO and COL. During
Pre-Trial, BOKINGCO admitted to killing NOLI with a hammer out of his ill-
feelings.
RTC Angeles found both guilty of MURDER for NOLIs death.
On appeal, appellants argued that BOKINGCOs admission cannot be used
against his alleged co-conspirator. CA affirmed RTC but lowered the
sentence from the Death penalty to Reclusion Perpetua.

ISSUE:
WON COL is guilty of MURDER as co-conspirator?

HELD/RATIO:
SC noted that there is no question on BOKINGCOs guilt. However it did not
agree with the finding of pre-meditation.
SC found that there was no evidence of conspiracy.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the
case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an
unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are
essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.
The SC noted that ELSAs testimony proves that while BOKINGCO was
attacking NOLI, COL was in another apartment forcing ELSA to open their pawnshop
vault.
The SC concluded, Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill
Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves
were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-
up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
SC REVERSED and SET ASIDE CA decision.
1) COL is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
2) BOKINGCO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
* Penalty reduced to six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum
* P75,000.00 as indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate
damages; P15,000.00 as attorneys fees; and costs.

People v Pondivida (Suarez)

ARTICLE 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. Grave
felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties
which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of this
Code.

Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in
their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the above-
mentioned article.

Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a
penalty of arrest menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both; is provided.
ARTICLE 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Art. 11. J ustifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed
in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in
case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making
defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided
that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this
Art. are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which
causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose.

PEOPLE v. GUTIERREZ (Villamor)

DOCTRINE: Self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded.

FACTS:
On May 17, 2003, at 9:00 pm, the deceased Leo Salvador Regis, private
complainants Marcelo, Gallemit, Boneo and Dalit were talking to each other
in front of the house of Regis at Cembo, Makati City.
They noticed the presence of appellant and thought that appellant would just
pass by. However, when appellant was 2 arms length away in front of them,
appellant suddenly raised his arm and shot Regis with a .45 caliber pistol.
After he was hit on the chest, Regis said "Aray!," embraced Randy Marcelo
who was seated on his left, and fell off his chair to the ground.
Gallemit, Boneo and Dalit stood from their seats. Appellant fired several
shots thereafter, one of which hit Dalits arm; he hid behind a car. Appellant
then pursued Dalit but did not catch him, prompting appellant to say:
"Pagnaabutan ko kayo, pagpapatayin ko kayo!" Dalit contacted the police
while hiding in BLISS. Regis was brought to the OSMAK where he died.
Appellant for his part asserted self-defense. He came from an ihaw-ihaw
restaurant and has drunk 2 bottles of beer. While passing by, he noticed a
group of 5 youngsters. Among them was Boneo. One in the group cursed
him "tang ina mo!" He was the only passerby, he stopped and looked at
them, (2) from the group approached him. He was suddenly boxed by Regis.
When he fell on the ground, Ado continuously beat him, then suddenly, a
gun fell from Leo Regis. He got hold of it, and when Regis was supposed to
attack him again, he kicked Leo who fall down. Appellant stood up and fired
a shot at Regis. He continuously fired the gun towards the ground so as to
warn the others. He fled the scene, and threw the gun on a vacant lot. He
took a jeepney going to Pateros, but since, he had no money, he alighted
somewhere, and rested. When he finally regained his senses, he went to
Cubao and borrowed money from one of their retailers.
RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on
three (3) counts. The OSG asserted that the trial court correctly gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rejected
appellants claim of self-defense. But the appellant should be held liable only
for attempted murder and not for frustrated murder, since the wound inflicted
on Alexis B. Dalit was not life-threatening. CA affirmed and modified the part
in re Dalit.
ISSUE: Did the appellant validly offer proof of self-defense? NO.
HELD: Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for
crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It REQUIRES (a) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we held: By invoking self-defense,
the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly.
While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved,
no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

In Razon v. People, we held: Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted
and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

PEOPLE v. REGALARIO (Varela)

PEOPLE v. FONTANILA (Castriciones)

ARTICLE 11 DOCTRINE: It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for
murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.

FACTS:
Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road of Butbut when he was
struck down by respondent Fontanilla with a piece of wood called
bellang/After falling down, Fontanilla hit Jose with a piece of stone
Sons-in law of Olais shouted at Fontanilla and scared him off since it
seemed like he was going to continue hitting Olais
Cause of death was revealed to be a fractured skull
Fontanilla claims self defense saying Olais was drunk while waving around
night stick/Fontanilla claims Olais was a karate expert and that he was
boxing and kicking Respondent/reason why respondent picked up a piece of
stone in self defense
Trial Court ruled Fontanilla guilty of murder/CA amended punishment from
RP-death to RP only, upon noting the absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was self-defense.

HELD/RATIO: NONE.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for
murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
[22]
Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the
burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,
[23]
and he
would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof.
[24]
He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his
own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.
[25]
Nonetheless, the burden to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the
proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals
that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two,
Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was
not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victims fistic
attack and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some
injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity
was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital;
hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to
him. Nor was any medication applied to him.
[26]
In contrast, the physician who
examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than
once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla
and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill,
not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be
significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the
accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

JOSUE v. PEOPLE (Villamor)

DOCTRINE: "Unlawful aggression" here presupposes an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.

FACTS:
May 1, 2004, 11:15 pm, Macario, a barangay tanod, was buying medicine
from a store near the petitioners residence in Obrero, Tondo when he saw
the petitioner going towards him, while shouting to ask him why he had
painted the petitioners vehicle.
Macario denied the petitioners accusation, but petitioner still pointed and
shot his gun at Macario. The gunshots fired by the petitioner hit Macarios
elbow and fingers. As the unarmed Macario tried to flee from his assailant,
the petitioner still fired his gun at him, causing him to sustain a gunshot
wound at his back. Macario was then rushed to the Chinese General
Hospital for medical treatment.
Dr. Tiongson confirmed that Macario sustained (3) gunshot wounds: (1) one
on his right hand, (2) one on his left elbow, and (3) one indicating a bullets
entry point at the posterior of the chest, exiting at the anterior line. That the
victims injuries were fatal, if not medically attended to.
For his defense, the petitioner declared to have merely acted in self-defense.
He claimed that he, together with his son Rafael, was watching a television
program when they heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney
was being opened. He then went to the place where his jeepney was
parked, armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he saw
Macario, together with Matias and Akong, in the act of removing the locks of
his vehicles battery. When the petitioner sought the attention of Macarios
group, Macario pointed his .38 caliber gun at the petitioner and pulled its
trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The petitioner then got his gun
and used it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario again

tried to use his gun, but it still jammed then fell on the ground. As Macario
reached down for the gun, the petitioner fired at him once more, hitting him
at the back. When Macario still tried to fire his gun, the petitioner fired at him
for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his gun. The
petitioner got Macarios gun and kept it in his residence.
RTC find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide. CA affirmed the rulings of the RTC and thus, dismissed
the appeal.

ISSUE:
Is there a valid self-defense?

HELD/RATIO: NONE
If no unlawful aggression is proved, then no self-defense may be successfully
pleaded. "Unlawful aggression" here presupposes an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.
Significantly, among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Villanueva,
who, while being a friend of the petitioner, had testified against the petitioner as an
eyewitness and specifically identified the petitioner as the assailant that caused the
wounds sustained by the victim Macario. Even the petitioner cites in the petition he
filed with this Court the prosecutions claim that at the time he fired the first gunshot,
he was shouting, "Papatayin kita! (I will kill you!)"
In the present case, particularly significant to this element of "unlawful
aggression" is the trial courts finding that Macario was unarmed at the time of
the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol.
According to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was even the petitioner who
confronted the victim, who was then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store.
Granting that the victim tried to steal the petitioners car battery, such did not equate
to a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point during the fight, Macario even
tried to run away from his assailant, yet the petitioner continued to chase the victim
and, using his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the mortal wound on his
chest. Contrary to the petitioners defense, there then appeared to be no "real danger
to his life or personal safety," for no unlawful aggression, which would have otherwise
justified him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense, emanated from
Macarios end.

TOLEDO v. PEOPLE (Noche)

DOCTRINE: Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC and accident,
under Article 12, paragraph 4 are intrinsically antithetical defenses from criminal
liability and may not be invoked at the same time. Self-defense implies freedom of
action while accident implies the complete absence of freedom of action.

FACTS:
On 16 September 1995, when TOLEDO was coming home from an errand
he asked the group of RICKY GUARTE who were drinking gin in the Guarte
residence to refrain from making any noise. TOLEDO then went inside his
house, which is about five (5) meters away from the Guarte residence, to
sleep.
Later, as the RICKY was about to sleep, the Guarte Residence was stoned 3
times. Ricky saw TOLEDO, his uncle, throwing rocks at their house. RICKY
went to TOLEDOs house to ask the latter why he was stoning their house.
Without any warning, TOLEDO met RICKY at the doorstep of his house and
stabbed RICKY in the abdomen with a bolo. Eliza had followed his son
RICKY and shouted for help upon seeing that RICKY was stabbed. Ricky
was asked by one of his drinking mates, Lani Famero, who stabbed him and
RICKY replied that it was TOLEDO.
RICKY was rushed to the Romblon Provincial Hospital on a tricycle, but died
while he was being operated on due to his injuries.
After trial, Br. 82 of RTC of Odiongan, Romblon convicted TOLEDO of
homicide over his defense of accident. (TOLEDO claims his bolo
accidentally hit RICKY on the stomach) On appeal, TOLEDO claims self-
defense in addition to Accident. (TOLEDO claimed that RICKY rushed
towards him with a balisong.) The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
WON TOLEDO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

HELD/RATIO: YES.
The SC emphasized that a change in theory may not be allowed on appeal.
It then discussed how Accident and Self-Defense are incompatible defenses:
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same
time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense
as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The
accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate
acts. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in
accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have
transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other
hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent.
The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the
complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness
of the act.
The SC then noted that as defenses from criminal liability, the burden of
proof was with TOLEDO. However, the evidence TOLEDO relies upon (his testimony)
is not credible.
SC AFFIRMED CA.

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably
with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and
custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise,
he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful insuperable cause.
MADALI v. PEOPLE CASTRICIONES

DOCTRINE: Under RA 9344, crimes committed by a person below 15 years of age
shall be exempt from criminal liability; crimes committed by persons between 15 and
18 years of age shall be exempt from criminal liability unless it is proven that he acted
with discernment; if found guilty, however, there shall be automatic suspension of
sentence, even if the juvenile is 18 years or more at the time of pronouncement of his
guilt.

FACTS:
BBB sells wares aboard a ship docked at the Romblon Pier; she was assisted by
her son 15 year old son AAA, and two other boys, Jovencio and Raymund
One day, AAA, Jovencio, Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino went up the reservoir
beside the Romblon High School; once there, they blindfolded AAA while
Bernardo blurted out Join the rugby boys.
From there, Bernardino and Raymund struck AAA with a fresh and hard coconut
frond and Rodel, wearing brass knuckles, punched him in the head and the body;
the hazing proved too much for AAA and he lost consciousness
They proceeded to tie the handkerchief around AAAs neck and attach it to a
dogchain; with this contraption, the three boys pulled AAAs body up a tree
Jovencio can only raise objection everytime AAA got hit; Bernardo suggested to
finish AAA off saying Since were all here, lets get on with it.; the three
malefactors warned Jovencio not to warn anyone or else he would be next;
Jovencio did not tell anyone
3 days later, someone reported a dead body near the Romblon High School; the
police who arrived in the scene saw a cadaver emitting a foul smell with maggots
tied to a tree with a handkerchief-dog chain contraption, as well as paraphernalia
in inhaling rugby, empty bottles of gin, and a coconut frond
Autopsy revealed that the blows in the head caused AAAs death even before he
was wrung from the tree
Jovencio narrated the incident implicating Bernardino, Raymund, and Rodel; all
of the accused had alibis saying they were kilometres away and either at home
or with family at other peoples homes
After the court ruled the accused guilty of homicide (penalty is indeterminate
sentence of 4 years 2 months 1 day), Bernardino applied for probation; Raymund
and Rodel appealed their convictions in the CA but TC decision was affirmed but
in lieu of RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act), Raymunds case was
dismissed and Rodels sentence was suspended; petitioners contest these
findings

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA decision was with legal basis.

HELD/RATIO: YES. PETITION DENIED.
Raymond is exempt from criminal liability (because he as 14 at the time of
commission) and should be released to the custody of his parents/guardian,
pursuant to Sec. 6 and 20 of RA 9344; this exemption however does not apply to
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance existing laws

As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without
discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. x x x.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences
of his unlawful act.
24
Such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case.

The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel
acted with discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to
reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew,
therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He
fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a
person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law, but always in the proper period.

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 68, the maximum penalty should be within prision
mayor, which is a degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be in the medium period of
prision mayor or 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence

Law, the minimum should be anywhere within the penalty next lower in degree, that
is, prision correccional. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals,
which is 6 months and one day of prision correccional to 8 years and one day of
prision mayor, is in order. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should
be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The Court of Appeals awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00
as moral damages in favor of the heirs of the victim. In addition, Rodel and Raymund
are ordered to pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the actual damages
for funeral expenses, which the prosecution claimed to have incurred but failed to
support by receipts.

PEOPLE V RICHARD O. SARCIA - CHUA

DOCTRINE: While Sec 38 of RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice Welfare Act) provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches
the maximum age of 21.

FACTS:
Accused was charged with raping AAA, 5 year old child sometime in 1996.(the
initial complaint filed by the victims father was for acts of lasciviousness, in case
maam asks). The complaint was filed almost 4 years after the incident.
Sometime during December 16, 1996, AAA (the 5yo minor) was playing with her
cousin and two other playmates in the yard of Saling Crisologos house
(relationship of this person with the accused or the victim was not specified).
Suddenly appellant appeared and invited AAA to go with him to the backyard of
said house. She agreed. Upon reaching the place, appellant removed AAAs
shorts and underwear and proceeded to rape her.
NOTE: During the time that the accused testified before the SC on March 14,
2002, he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age.
The trial court found that the rape incident could have taken place in any month
and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact
date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of
rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused is guilty of rape. (incidental issue to the topic)
2. Whether the Juvenile Justice Welfare Act (JJWA) applies in suspending the
sentence of the accused. (IMPORTANT)

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. The accused is guilty of rape because it was proven that he had carnal
knowledge with a minor. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free
consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.

2. NO. SECTION 38 and 40 of the JJWA is MOOT and ACADEMIC in this case. The
SC ruled that despite being a heinous crime, the accused can still be given a
suspension of sentence under sec 38 of the JJWA. However, while Sec 38 of RA
9344 (Juvenile Justice Welfare Act) provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21.

During the trial, the accused was already 31 years old, and the judgment of the RTC
had been promulgated before the JJWA was passed. Thus, the application of for the
suspension of sentence is moot and academic.

Accused is entitled to appropriate disposition under sec 51 of the JJWA, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children in agricultural camps and other
training facilities.
(In case youre wondering why this is under Art 12 of the RPC, par 3 of the same was
repealed by the JJWA to provide that children above 15 but below 18 years of age
who acted without discernment are exempt from criminal liability.)

PEOPLE v. MANTALBA CONSTANTINO

DOCTRINE: The appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of
the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant
filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006,
appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38
of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. Nevertheless, the appellant shall be
entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement
of convicted children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities.

FACTS:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan
City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was
17 years old at the time, was selling shabu.

A team of police officers conducted a buy-bust operation. Using marked money,
two poseur-buyers approached Mantalaba and bought shabu from him.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police
officers made an inventory of the items recovered from Mantalaba which are: (1)
one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small
sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces
of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill.
The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the
presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline
substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and
RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Two separate Informations were filed (eventually consolidated) before the RTC of
Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty. CA affirmed Ruling of RTC.

ISSUE: W/N lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: NO. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt proved through evidence procured from
buy-bust operation and testimony of witnesses, plus all the requirements for the
proper chain of custody had been observed.
The appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer
avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of
sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this
would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction,
suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed
his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective
in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA,
the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was
already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to
the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled
to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5
of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in
Section 98 of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of
life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means
that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature
of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was
enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon, thus:

XXX where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised
Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its
duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native
to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently
be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article
61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the
stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or
more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance,
the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of
privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and
68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even
more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated
second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid
anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence,
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties
to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall
likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in
Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in
this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There
could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which
must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of
fine and public censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or
even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the
second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any
event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of
drug offenses.Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have
efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an

imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be
appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of
the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be
one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no
other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is
applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an
indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable,
became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper
imposable penalty.

PEOPLE V FLORENCIO, EDDIE, EL YNOR, FRANKLIN AND, ERIC (ALL
SURNAMED AGACER) - NOCHE

DOCTRINE: MINORITY available even if not raised during trial (and even if Birth
Certificate only presented to the SC on M.R.); DEATH before final conviction
extinguishes criminal and civil liability

FACTS:
In a 2011 decision, the SC affirmed the CA Decision affirming the RTC
Cagayan's conviction of the AGACERS for the Murder of Cesario Agacer.
In this M.R., the Appellants challenge the finding of conspiracy, treachery. The
mitigating circumstance of minority is also claimed for FRANKLIN, who was 16
years and 106 days old at the time of the incident.
Appellants also claim that FLORENCIO's death in February 7, 2007 while serving
his sentence extinguished his criminal and civil liability. (Unfortunately, this fact
was not raised in the 2011 case before the SC.)
OSG commented that conspiracy and treachery were duly established but
agreed with the claim that FRANKLIN was a minor.

ISSUES:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and treachery
in the commission of the crime charged?
2. Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of appellant
Franklin?
3. Does the death of appellant Florencio extinguish his criminal and civil liabilities?

HELD/RATIO:
1. SC did not review its finding of conspiracy and treachery as the appellants merely
reiterated previous arguments in their M.R.

2. SC, relying on FRANKILIN's Certificate of Live Birth, found that he was born on
"December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of the commission
of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It
provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in
the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with
less discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during
the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our consideration,
since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and
his heirs."

As to the appropriate penalty:
"The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. A degree lower is reclusion
temporal. There being no aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on Franklin should be reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as maximum, which ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium period
of which ranges from eight

(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Due to the seriousness of the crime and
the manner it was committed, the penalty must be imposed at its most severe range.

3. SC, noted that is Art. 89 applicable. It is also settled that [u]pon the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal. SC declared that FLORENCIO's criminal liability
and civil liability was extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

SC PARTIALLY GRANTED the M.R.
- modified FRANKLIN's sentence
- FLORENCIO's criminal and civil liabilities EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final
conviction, judgment of his conviction was SET ASIDE.

PEOPLE v. BALDOGO SANTOS

DOCTRINE: For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, the fear
must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily
harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to accused for escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat. (This is
the only part of the case related to ARTICLE 12; this freakin case was swamped with

ARTICLE 14 stuff.)

FACTS:
This was an automatic review of the Joint Judgement of the RTC against the
accused-appellant (BALDOGO).
Julio Camacho, Sr. was employed as a security guard in the Ihawig Prison and
Penal Colony in Puerto Princesa City.
He and his wife with their 4 children lived in a compound inside the sub-colony.
Edgar Bermas (BERMAS) and BALDOGO were assigned as domestic helpers
for the Camacho family. They stayed in a hut about 10meters away from the
house.
One evening after the said helpers served dinner, Julio Sr. left to attend a bible
study leaving Jorge (14yo) and Julie (12yo) in the house.
Julie went to the sala to study and despite hearing BERMAS call her from the
kitchen, she ignored him.
A few minutes later she heard a loud sound coming from the kitchen, which
prompted her to stand up and run towards it.
She was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face
down and bloodied.
The vicinity, lit by a fluorescent lamp, clearly showed BALDOGO and BERMAS
standing over Jorge, each armed with a bolo.
She was so horrified but couldnt scream so she ran back to the sala but
BALDOGO overtook her and tied her hands at the back with a torn t-shirt and
placed a piece of cloth in her mouth.
BALDOGO dragged her outside the house and with the aid of a flashlight, walked
towards the direction of the mountain.
After awhile BERMAS caught up with them with rations and they retrieved a bag
with their clothes and belongings from the trunk of a tamarind tree, where they
stayed for the night.
The following morning they continued their ascent up the mountain where
BERMAS left them.
After almost 5 days BALDOGO told her he was leaving and she should fend for
herself.
Julie found a river and followed its course until she saw a hut, she informed the
occupant of the hut that she was the girl the police authorities were looking for.
She was taken to the personnel of the penal colony and police officers who took
custody of her.
Apparently, that night, when Julio Sr. arrived home, he noticed the tv was on but
no one was watching, he looked for the children everywhere, even in the
accuseds hut.
He and a trustee of the penal farm rushed back to the house and found the
bloodied body of Jorge by the dirty kitchen. They brought him to the hospital but
he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The autopsy report stated that the victim was:
Stabbed on the breast once and at the back seven times.
He sustained a lacerated wound on the neck where the layers of the neck,
trachea and esophagus had been cut.
Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to
multiple stab wounds and laceration of the neck.
Two Informations were filed against BALDOGO and BERMAS, but BERMAS
died before arraignment.
During trial BALDOGO denied everything and insisted that BERMAS, who was
allegedly maltreated by the Uncle of the victims, killed and kidnapped both
victims to get even. And that BERMAS threatened to kill him too.
The RTC found BALDOGO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of:
MURDER in Criminal Case No. 12900, as defined and penalized in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and appreciating against him the specific aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage and use of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to
offset the same, and pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 1,
of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing the supreme penalty of death
and to pay for damages.
KIDNAPPING in Criminal Case No. 12903, as principal of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and there being no modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to the
provisions of the second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, and not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the
offended party damages.
Hence, this automatic review.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the trial court erred in finding BALDOGO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for both crimes.
2. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation and generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove
that BALDOGO killed Jorge. However, the prosecution adduced indubitable proof
that he conspired with BERMAS not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and
detaining Julie.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony
pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent. It is not required that
there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony;

rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the
conspirators had the same purpose and were united in its execution.

The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-
serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and
positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged.

[Accused-appellants insistence that he was forced by BERMAS, under pain
of death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining
Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of
the crimes charged, the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and
actual damages of death or great bodily harm must be present and the
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
accused for escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat.] Article 12
issue.

2. A. RE: MURDER - While the Court agrees that BALDOGO is guilty of murder, it
does not agree with the rulings of the trial court that the crime was qualified by
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation.
- The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag
containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the
house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill
Jorge and kidnap Julie.
- It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from
the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and
Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to adduce
any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did it
present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned and prepared
to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then
clung to their determination to commit the said crimes.
Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no
evidence that they took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to
kill Jorge.
- Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the
killing of Jorge.
Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
- Because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas purposely
sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or
accomplishment or to evade their arrest.
Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was
killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified
by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-appellant and BERMAS, he
was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor
children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put up a
defense is attended by treachery. Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant
should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

B. RE: KIDNAPPING - The trial court convicted accused-appellant of
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the
Spanish Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 267Detencin ilegal grave.Ser castigado con la pena de reclusin
temporal el particular que secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en cualquier
forma le privare de libertad.
Secuestrare means sequestration. To sequester is to separate for a special
purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from circulation. It also means to lock-up or
imprison. Encerrare is a broader concept than secuestrare.

Encerrare includes not
only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time.
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code is alleged in
both Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed murder and
kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony by final judgment for the crime
of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. The prosecution
is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of evidence as the
crime itself.
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison
record of accused-appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide. The excerpt
of the prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court to prove the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory.
Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible
absent proof that the original of the judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the
same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact
that accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final
judgment for homicide has been rendered against him.


RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

TY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES SUAREZ

DOCTRINE: It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of
such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It
should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere
threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.
A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against
his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused
for escape.

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45,
seeking to set aside the Decision1of the Court of Appeals. The Decision affirmed
with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P.
22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila.
The said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital well knowing that at the time of issue
she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account Closed" and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital
the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. Seven checks for Thirty
Thousand Pesos each to pay for the hospitalization of her mother and sister.
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not
guilty.5
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She averred that she was forced to issue
the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and
harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She
also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The
"debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental,
psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and
to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a
promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect
her mothers immediate discharge.
RTC: found her guilty.
CA: affirmed RTC Decision. In its assailed Decision, the CA rejected Tys
defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals
knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the
mere act of issuing a worthless check
punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability.

RULING: PETITION DENIED. Conviction Affirmed.
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites
must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based
on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future
injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape.

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty
claims that she was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly
demanded of her before her mother could be discharged--for fear that her mothers
health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or
worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening
such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment
would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws
intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners
flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes
was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit
a crime.

At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.42 B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the
obligation.43The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.44 As this Court held in Lim v. People of the
Philippines,45 "what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the
fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is
ORDERED to
pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the
seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance
with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private
complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks.

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify
or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the
minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his
agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect
which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow
beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those
above mentioned.
URBANO v. PEOPLE VARELA

DOCTRINE: When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance
or as an essential element of self defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is
enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying

FACTS:
(Petitioner) Rodel Urbano and victim Brigido Tomeldon were at the compound of
Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) coming from a picnic from a nearby town with
same other co-workers, they drunk beer in a restaurant. September 28, 1993
The two had a heated altercation, which led to Tomeldon insulting the Urbano,
which led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight. Urbano delivered a lucky punch which Orje Salazar witnessed. Tomeldon
then toppled but was caught before he fell to the ground but such caused his
nose bleed and rendered him unconscious.
Urbano and the other co-workers brought Tomeldon to the office of LIWAD
general manage where he spent the night. Upon arriving 6:00pm of that day
Tomeldon then told his wife of the incident, and complained of pain and was
brought to the hospital.
October 2 and 7, Tomelden went back to the hospital for his pains. It was
discovered that he had a brain injury, a cerebral haemorrhage, then he was
confined. Later released but continued to feel ill, 12 days later he died.
RTC guilty of homicide, CA affirmed

ISSUE:
W/N the mitigating circumstances of 1) no intention to commit so grave a wrong and
that sufficient provocation on the part of the victim can be appreciated in this case

HELD/RATIO: YES
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an
essential element of self defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it
is enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying
The provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and
should immediately proceed the act, thus provocation was present
Tomeldons insulting remarks directed at the petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. the altercation started
while drinking with co-workers Urbano told the others to prepare to leave, where
the victim took offense and said he had no right to stop them from drinking
especially since he was paying
Being that Urbano was smaller and was trying to avoid to fight and got a lucky
punch speaks to the fact the he did not mean to commit so grave a wrong.
The mitigating circumstances should be applied.

PEOPLE v. IGNAS VILLAMOR

DOCTRINE: For voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance to exist, the
following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary.

FACTS:
Appellants wife, Wilma, confided to her close friend, Romenda, that she was
having an affair with Nemesio. Before Wilma left for Taiwan, she spent a day with
her close friend and paramour Nemesio. They checked in at Dangwa Inn, with
Nemesio and Wilma sharing a room.
Romenda received from Taiwan 4 letters. The two letters were meant by Wilma
to be read by her paramour. Wilma also instructed Romenda to reveal to
appellant her affair with Nemesio.
Appellant became furious when it was revealed to him. He declared that There
will be a day for Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio.
On March 10, 1996 at 10 PM, at the Trading Post, 2 gunshots shattered the
quiet evening. Witness Bayanes recognized appellant. Witness Manis said that

the scene was dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights of passing
vehicles, but he was familiar with appellants build, hairstyle and manner of
walking.
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He said that on the last week of
February 1996, he entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben
Anoma, to operate a bakery in Kapaya, Nueva Vizcaya. Ben Anoma
corroborated appellants alibi.
TC found appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and considered the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any
mitigating circumstance. Trial court, later, amended its judgment and imposed
death by lethal injection. Hence, this automatic review. Note that the amended
information DOES NOT, unlike the original information, CHARGE APPELLANT
WITH MURDER but with mere unlawful killing albeit through the use of an
unlicensed firearm. Note further that the amended information does not definitely
and categorically state that the unlawful killing was attended by the aggravating
or qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity.
Appellant contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower
court should have considered at least the mitigating circumstance of IMMEDIATE
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE as well as that of PASSION AND
OBFUSCATION. Appellant points out that the victims act of maintaining an
adulterous relationship with appellants wife constituted a grave offense to his
honor, not to mention the shame, anguish, and anxiety he was subjected to.
Even the mere sight of the victim must have triggered an uncontrollable
emotional outburst on appellants part, so that even a chance meeting caused in
him an irresistible impulse powerful enough to overcome all reason and restraint.
Secondly, appellant points out that the trial court failed to consider his
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER as a mitigating circumstance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant, June Ignas, is entitled to benefit any mitigating
circumstance.

HELD: NO.
The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in appellants favor. The view of the OSG that for the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the vindication must be
immediate is not entirely accurate. The word immediate in the English text is not the
correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the RPC, which uses the word
PROXIMA. Spanish text allows a lapse of time between the grave offense and the
actual vindication. SC agrees with the SolGen that the lapse of (2) weeks between his
discovery of his wifes infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour could no
longer be considered proximate.

Mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation inexistent. The rule is that the
mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and
obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same
facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that
passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to
be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery
of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient
time for appellant to reflect and cool off.

For voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance to exist, the following
requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for
information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police investigators
from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant for
questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing
the victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor
voluntary.

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is ORDERED TO PAY the heirs of the victim,
Nemesio Lopate, the following sums: a) P7,000 as actual damages; b) P1,020,000 for
loss of earning capacity; c) P50,000 as civil indemnity; d) P25,000 as temperate
damages; and e) P20,000 as attorneys fees. Costs de oficio.

ARTICLE 14 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v. NAZARENO - CHUA

PEOPLE v. TABARNERO - CASTRICIONES
DOCTRINE: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that treachery
should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength would
nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this
circumstance was not considered in the trial court as the same is already absorbed in
treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him
clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to
the person attacked.
FACTS:
Appeal from decision of CA, affirming RTC decision convicting respondents of Murder

Gary Taberno was a 22 year old construction worker who was supposed to marry his
live-in partner Mary Jane Acibar; her father, Ernesto Canatoy, stopped this planned
marriage causing Gary to leave Ernestos house (MJ preggy)
On Oct 23, 99, Ernesto visited the MJs house with his father Alberto but since he was
not let inside, shouted his pleas from outside asking Ernesto what he did wrong, and
that he really loved MJ and wanted to marry her; when Gary was about to leave,
Ernesto opened the gate struck Gary with a lead pipe; even while the blow was aimed
to the head, Gary caught the pipe with his hands, causing his fingers to break; to
prevent further damage, Gary embraced Ernesto and felt a bladed weapon tucked in
Ernestos back; Gary lost control and stabbed Ernesto
March 3, 00: father and son charged with murder; March 27, warrants of arrest
released;
April 22, 01 Gary surrendered to barangay tanod Alarma 6 months later, who
accompanied the same to the police station; Gary later on pleaded self defense and
denied that he did not conspire with Alberto to kill Ernesto
On the other hand, Alberto was arrested later on August 5, 01 but denied the
allegations; the court, however, still proceeded with a reverse trial since it was started
that way with Gary; Alberto claims that he stayed away from their home because he
did not want to be implicated in the killing, that he wanted to support his family and
that he had no quarrel with Ernesto
Emerito Acibar testified that he saw a certain Toning Kulit and another person
holding Ernesto while Gary and Alberto stabbed Ernesto with fan knives; the four
assailants left when help arrived and Emerito was able to bring Ernesto to the hospital;
Emerito was sure there were four assailants who boarded an XLT type car
SP02 Morales testified that in Ernestos dying declaration in the Bulacan Hospital,
Ernesto identified Gary and Alberto as his stabbers; Morales also said Emerito did not
mention that he was a witness
RTC convicted father and son Alberto and Gary guilty of murder; CA affirmed decision
with exemplary damages for presence of treachery; Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not (1) mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense/voluntary
surrender and (2) aggravating circumstance of treachery were present. (1) NO/NO and (2) YES
HELD: CA DECISION AFFIRMED, MODIFIED TO PHP75K CIVIL INDEMNITY
No self-defense/incomplete self-defense since there was no unlawful aggression;
No mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender since Gary surrendered 6 months
later, negates the requisite of spontaneity
Alberto is a principal by direct participation
o Since he participated in the stabbing
o Dying declaration is binding under Rule 130, Sec. 37
Killing of Ernesto is qualified by treachery
Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon
Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less
evade, the assault.
[59]
We agree with the Solicitor General.

In the cases cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able to observe any means,
method or form in the execution of the killing which rendered the victim
defenseless. InAmamangpang, the first thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate
on the bamboo floor, blood oozing from his neck and about to be struck by the
accused. In Icalla, the witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing from the scene of the crime
with a knife in his hand. In Sambulan, the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with
a bolo. Since, in these cases, there was no restraint upon the victims or any other circumstance
which would have rendered them defenseless, the Court ruled that it should look into the
commencement of the attack in order to determine whether the same was done swiftly and
unexpectedly. However, the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means
by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured.

In People v. Montejo,
[60]
the prosecution witnesses testified that after challenging the victim to a
fight, the accused stabbed the victim in the chest while he was held in the arms by the accused
and a companion. Not requiring a swift and unexpected commencement to the attack, the Court
held:

Thus, there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when he
was being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the
accused's purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim may offer
[People v. Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v. Lunar, G.R.
No. L-15579, May 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 119.] In the instant case, it has been established that the
accused-appellant stabbed the victim on the chest while his companions held both of the victim's
arms.

In People v. Alvarado,
[61]
the accused and his companions shouted to the victim: Lumabas ka
kalbo, kung matapang ka. When the victim went out of the house, the accuseds companions
held the victims hands while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling which should have
warned the victim of a possible attack, the mere fact that the accuseds companions held the
hands of the victim while the accused stabbed him was considered by this Court to
constitute alevosia.

We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery. However, even
assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to
murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not considered in the
trial court as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing
Ernesto while two persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force
out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked. In People v. Gemoya,
[62]
we
held:

Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of
the crime (People vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]). When four armed assailants, two of
whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said
that excessive force was purposely sought and employed. (Emphasis ours.)

In all, there is no doubt that the offense committed by the accused is murder.

PEOPLE v. BOKINGCO - CONSTANTINO

PEOPLE VILBAR - CHUA

PEOPLE v. DEARO NOCHE

PEOPLE v. NAELGA - SANTOS
DOCTRINE: INSTIGATION - the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the
commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal.

ENTRAPMENT - ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.
Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to
be acquitted.
The local law enforcement in Rosales, Pangasinan was informed by a civilian asset
that accused-appellant Elly Naelga (NAELGA) was selling illegal drugs (SHABU) at
the Rosales Public Market.
PO2 Sembran was tasked to act as poseur-buyer, with PO1 Danilo Asis, Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Jesus Caspillo, and PO1 Rosauro Valdez as backup operatives.
The money used for the buy-bust operation was provided by the Rosales Treasurers
Office and affixed thereto were his signature and that of the municipal treasurer of
Rosales.
PO2 Sembran narrated that on July 15, 2003 around 3pm :
He went inside the public market and approached NAELGA.
PO2 Sembran was familiar with NAELGA, because the polices confidential agent had
been monitoring accused-appellants activities for several weeks.
He spoke to NAELGA, who then asked PO2 Sembran if he was a security guard, to
which he answered in the affirmative.
PO2 Sembran asked the accused-appellant what he could use to keep him awake
while on duty as a security guard. NAELGA suggested that he drink Red Bull.
PO2 Sembran replied that he already did, but that did not work, and that he was
caught sleeping on his post.
NAELGA then declared that he knew something more effective, as he passed his
index finger under his nose as if sniffing something.
When PO2 Sembran asked what that meant, NAELGA said that he was referring to
bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran said he was willing to try this and to buy Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) worth of shabu.
NAELGA told PO2 Sembran to give him the money and committed to return with the
shabu. PO2 Sembran gave appellant four One Hundred Pesos (P400.00) in marked
bills. Upon receiving the money, accused-appellant left.
PO2 Sembran went back to the police station to plan the arrest of accused-appellant.
PO2 Sembran and his fellow police officers returned to the public market almost an
hour later.
They waited for NAELGA until he finally arrived, alighting from a tricycle.
PO2 Sembran followed him in an alley. There were people sleeping on bamboo tables
in the alley, and PO2 Sembran expressed apprehension at being noticed. NAELGA
reassured him that they would not be disturbed and immediately asked for the balance
of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00).
PO2 Sembran gave accused-appellant the marked money. Thereupon, accused-
appellant took out a sachet containing white granules and handed it to PO2 Sembran,
who then revealed that he was a policeman.
NAELGA tried to run, but PO2 Sembran held on to the formers belt.
PO2 Sembran was able to recover the One-Hundred-Peso (P100.00) bill from
accused-appellant, who had already used the Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) he
earlier received to buy shabu.
Accused-appellant was taken into custody, and PO2 Sembran executed an affidavit of
arrest.
The plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance purchased from
NAELGA for P500.00 was marked EN and taken to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office for laboratory examination.
Upon arraignment on 27 August 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
In the pre-trial, the defense only admitted to the identity of the accused-appellant and
the fact of his apprehension, but denied any knowledge of the existence of a buy-bust
operation. The defense limited its testimonial evidence to that of NAELGA himself.
The prosecution supported its version of the events through documentary evidence
and the testimonies of its two witnesses from the Rosales Police Station in Rosales,
Pangasinan, namely: PO2 Noe Sembran and PO1 Rosauro Valdez.
NAELGA testified, denying the accusations against him alleging that:
He was employed by a Muslim named Khadi to sell compact discs (CDs) in a stall
located inside the public market of Rosales, Pangasinan. PO2 Sembran, who
introduced himself as a security guard, had previously been buying CDs from him.
On 15 July 2003, PO2 Sembran came and asked NAELGA to buy shabu for him
saying, We need that this evening.
He told PO2 Sembran that he did not know anybody selling shabu; nonetheless, PO2
Sembran left P400.00, which was placed beside him. NAELGA took the money,
because it might get lost.
NAELGA admitted, although not certain, that what he bought was shabu, he handed it
over to PO2 Sembran when the latter came back, and while he was leaving the place,
PO2 Sembran called him back uttering, Pare, come here, and then handcuffed him.
PO2 Sembran told him, Pare, I am a policeman (pulis ako).
On cross examination, NAELGA admitted buying the subject shabu in Urdaneta City.
RTC rendered judgment on the merits. Finding the accused Elly Naelga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu as charged, defined and penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9165. (DDA) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment, and imposing on him a
fine of P500,000.00.
CA Affirmed
SC Affirmed
ISSUE: W/N the NAELGA was instigated to sell shabu. NO.
HELD/RATIO:
The SC found no instigation in this case. The general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that
the criminal act was done upon the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in
its commission. This is particularly true in that class of cases where the offense is of a kind
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him
free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.

In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically
induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-
principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would
have to be acquitted.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid and effective mode of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea ofcommitting a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing
or prodding him to commit the offense.

While accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached and asked him to
buy shabu for him, the same cannot be considered as an act of instigation, but an act of feigned
solicitation. Instigation is resorted to for purposes of entrapment, based on the tip received from
the police informant that accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs in the public market of
Rosales. In fact, it was accused-appellant who suggested to PO2 Sembran to use shabu; and,
despite accused-appellants statement that he did not know anybody selling shabu, he still took
the money from PO2 Sembran and directly went to Urdaneta, where he claimed to have bought
the illegal drug. Then he returned to the Rosales public market and gave the drug to PO2
Sembran.

NAELGAs claim that he is a victim of a frame-up is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because
being a victim can easily be feigned and fabricated. There being no proof of ill motive on the part
of the police operatives to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the
credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the claim of the accused-appellant.

While the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents
should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence, for the claim of frame-up to
prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this
presumption of regularity, which the defense was not able to proffer.

SC Affirmed CA.
Relate to: [R.A. 9165 Dangerous Drugs Act 2002] Section 25:
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender
Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the
contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.

ARTICLE 16-20 PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

PEOPLE v. DULAY SUAREZ

PEOPLE v. GAMBOA VARELA
DOCTRINE: The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not,
loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving
the commission of the crime by the accused.
FACTS SHORTER VERSION:
Lucia Chan was kidnapped by at least 12 people, from her home by force and intimidation and
the use of high powered firearms; negotiated ransom amount from 20 Million to 400,000.00;
during the pay-off, four of them got caught which led to most of the accused to being arrested
then after. Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty"
thinking the penalty would be lighter than the actual penalty for kidnapping for ransom which was
death. Judged asked if they were sure and the rest of the accused then followed suit. RTC
convicted and CA affirmed.
FACTS:
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish
deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Two persons, one
of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chans residence to
inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box
of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left.
The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony
Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two
came back that afternoon, Chan offered instead to accompany them to the airport to
retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao
declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to
Chans residence, once inside Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chans son, Levy Chan
(Levy) as the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan out. Levy thereafter proceeded
to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.
After travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a certain house. Edwin
Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her
mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women, Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora
Evad (Evad). Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed,
guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol). They said
that they would kill her unless the pay 20 Miliion.
2 days later she was transferred, Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of
the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as
Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao). Thian Perpenian
(Perpenian) and Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and
asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"
Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he
was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed
to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get an
agreed amount of 400 thousand pesos for her release.
(MEAN WHILE) Inspector Ouano and Inspector Mancao were the police assigned to
investigate. While they investigated, they noticed a taxi cab whose passengers kept
on staring at the house and decided to follow them all the way to Calamba, Laguna
where in one resort they believed to have seen Chan.
(Inspector Arnado) received information that the abductors acceded to a P400,000.00
ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at
around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and
strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant.
A van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed
towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted
the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and
Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the P400,000.00 ransom.
Then after the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of
Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified in court as
Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.
After the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier
plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the consequences of
a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous
pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving
evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will
[outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall
have finished the presentation of its evidence.
On hearing this clarification by the judge, the other appellants likewise manifested,
through their counsel their choice to change their pleas as well.
The trial court separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the
consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative.
RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom thus
appealed to the CA which they in turn affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the improvident plea entered (changed) was acceptable.
HELD/RATIO: NO
In People v. Oden the SC laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt;
2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability, and
3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.

The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused
where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea.
first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on
a free and informed judgement but there is no definite or concrete rule as to how to
ascertain this. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty,
is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the
crime or furnish its missing details.
The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-
appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea in fact Karim had the
mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and
that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will
not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was
not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and
indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no
condition attached. We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty
Although the pleas rendered, this Court will still not set aside the condemnatory
judgment. Despite the trial court judges shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on
accused-appellants culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of
judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because
then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is made,
whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused

ONG v. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
3. The accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as
T494 1100 by 20 by 14.
Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside
the warehouse, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of
the warehouse, was in charge of the tires.
After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires
remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all
thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was
forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the
robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
On February 27, 1995, a buy bust operation was conducted in appellant's store in
Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon.
Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20
by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his
display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any
more in stock. Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires
from his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck
tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found
that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial
numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team
confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the
warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went
inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the
barangay and his own lawyer. The buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13)
tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were
confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.
Accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had
any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred
that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13)
Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each.
Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18
February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise
(Gold Link).
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13)
tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing.
Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.
CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused Ong is guilty of violation of PD 1612. YES
HELD:

Fencing- act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
3. The accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything
of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of
evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires
were stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar

was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice Inventory List. Witnesses for the
prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang
Salaysay taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. The report led to the conduct of
a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen
(13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the
serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession. Ong likewise
admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link.
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the
fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four
(24) years, ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for
all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is
disputable. In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D.
1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the
value of the property.

PEOPLE v. DIMAT - CASTRICIONES
DOCTRINE: The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article
or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for
himself or for another.
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law before the Manila RTC.
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo
Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000
Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing
plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles
engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management
Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City,
bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle,
they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its
chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari
on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and
there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose
Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate
number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons
Gallerias parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the
1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino
under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado.
He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one
which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were
not actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
and sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to
pay P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as
well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC decision but modified the penalty
to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dimat sold the Nissan Safari to Sonia Delgado for gain.
HELD: YES. DECISION AFFIRMED.
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of
the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did
not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded
as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the
prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the
Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or
robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter
gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly
showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and
even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt
already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that
Tolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way.
Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official
receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official
receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise
to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an
illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to

check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no
moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

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CRIMREV DIGESTS FOR ARTICLES 6-20 (GARCIA)

ARTICLE 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

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