CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

PROVINCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee
FACTS:
- Lot 378 with an area an area of 22,783 sq. meters|||is part of Hacienda Mandalagan,| originally
registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar.|||
- On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the sum
of P300,000, payable in installments||.

- On February 8, 1924, said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares
obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name.

- the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod- Murcia
Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74|||

- On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, to
the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co.||| These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds

- mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision of the
Court of First and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the
foreclosure sale.|||
- Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and||| had to be reconstituted as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 in the name of the Bank

- the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Benares, for the sum of
P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof,
title would remain in the Bank

- Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein,
which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.|||

- the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1798, covering Lot 378 was issued in the name of plaintiff.|||

- plaintiff took steps to take possession of the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the
land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.|||

- defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378 in the year 1924-1925, through expropriation
proceedings|||

- since then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner|||
ISSUE: What is the main purpose of Torrens Registration?
HELD: TORRENS REGISTRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. The main purpose of the Torrens
System is to avoid conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry||| (Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, G.R. No. L-16257, January 31, 1963)

Republic vs. Court of Appeals
131 SCRA 532 (1984)

FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said
land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son
Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio
to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and
instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private
oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed
their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rios application
for registration.

The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a
favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed
their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court.

The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five months a
year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of
registration.

ISSUE: Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be
considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land
registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by
himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years
and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in his favor of said land.

TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondents-appellees.|||
FACTS:
- petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for
reconstitution of two original certificates of title
- petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel
Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
- lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence inadequate to show the prior
existence of the titles sought to be restored.|||
- petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but this
was denied.|||
- Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. LAND REGISTRATION; NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING. A land registration proceeding is "in
rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons
including the Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of
the filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to said application,
because all persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law.
2. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION. A decree of registration that has
become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined
but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. With the
certification duly issued by the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a
distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the
Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that
decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that
such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to
once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. US would be tantamount
to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof
(Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose
of the Torrens System.
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.|
FACTS:
- petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First Instance involving a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCTNo. 6406 in the name of
Romana Hitalia.|||
- OCT No. 6406 was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia
and Eduardo S. Baranda|||.
- Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No.
4517.|||
- Court||| finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, and ordered that the writ of possession be
carried out.|||
- motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was issue|||d
- Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.|||
- Court of Appeals deemed the petition.|||
- Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.|||

\ISSUE:
HELD:
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; ALLOWS CANCELLATION OF LIS PENDENS
UPON PROOF THAT THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE IS TO MOLEST THE ADVERSE PARTY; FAILURE
TO CANCEL NOTICE PURSUANT THERETO, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Respondent Judge
Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that the
notice oflis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides: "Cancellation of lis pendens.
Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of
Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof."|||
DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL. Under Sections 10 and 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrance, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.|||
Aurelio Balbin & Franciso Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969

FACTS:
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of
the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-
vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to
be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to
have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The register of deeds
denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears
that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. Mainly
because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by
petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Unsatisfied, petitioners referred
the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of
Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners should present the other three duplicate copies of the certificate of
title, coming from the previous sales, before the register of deeds annotate their transaction.

HELD:
Yes. Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of
title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the
registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instrument." obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of
the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented
constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of
registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under
section 43 of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that
the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until
otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in
existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright
conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to
be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this would not be followed,
if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration
would cease to be reliable.

TEODORO ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
FACTS:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the
municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name
of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer
certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds: 1.) That
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M.
Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2.) That in the sale of a conjugal property
acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but 3.)
Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose
of the whole property without violating the existing law. In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of
First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of
sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the
lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transaction appealed to
by the petitioner.

HELD:
No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain
inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal
grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of
deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. A register of deeds is
entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion
when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and
certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

MELITON GALLARDO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private
respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject
matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square
meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924
owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that
the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog
that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in
favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of
title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No.
23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro
Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was
made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the
private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. The Court of First Instance of
Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No.
23350) issued in the names of petitioners.

HELD:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed
"before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace,
who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated." was violated in this
case. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was
unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the
special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 Deeds of Conveyance, ... affecting lands,
whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in
accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, ... or bind the lands as
though made in accordance with the more prolix forms heretofore in use. It is therefore evident that Exhibit
"E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that
ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely
without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors.

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 708)
Facts:
On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the registration of two parcels of land,
located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The
Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that
said parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration
proceedings.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein
private respondents after finding that the applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open,
public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of
ownership for more than 80 years.
The CA affirmed the CFIs decision, holding that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of
Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10).

Issue/s:
Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private ownership.
Ruling:
No.
The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It
emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly the Executive Department is needed to declassify
land, which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes before registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various cases, stated that a parcel of
forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, an office under the Executive
Department, and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
In the present case, the two parcels of land were not declared by the Executive Department to be alienable and
disposable, thus it cannot be registered under private ownership.

IHVCP v. UP (200 SCRA 554)
Facts:
IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood. It renewed its timber
license, which was granted by the government and shall be valid for 25 years, in early 1960. Said license
authorizes the company to cut, collect and remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain
municipalities of Laguna, including Paete.
In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an experiment station for UP. The said experiment
station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete, occupied by IHVCP so UP, who claims ownership of said
portion of timberland, demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it, instead of the BIR. IHVCP rejected the
demand and it filed a suit against UP, claiming that R.A. 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure and seal
the timber cut by it within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges
prescribed by the BIR.
Issue/s:
Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the area, which means that the
Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain. In respect to the areas covered by
the timber license of IHVCP, the said Actremoved and segregated it from being a public forest.
The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any incidental receipts or income therefrom
shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. The provision of the Act is clear that UP,
being the owner of the land, has the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP
insofar as the property of the UP within it is concerned.
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, petitioners, vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, respondent.|||
FACTS:
- Petitioners filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre.|||
- they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square
meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.|||
- Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public domain.|||
- Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885
containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be
confirmed and registered in his name.
- applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885
to Angel Alpasan.|||
- Alpasan filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.|||
- Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the
rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share
to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.||
- Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with
the Court of Appeals|||
- petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
- Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by
them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui.|||
- complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals' decision that the disputed lot is
part of the public domain.|||
ISSUE: whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the
private applicants.|||
HELD: YES (not registrable)
CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS
DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.|||
FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case
of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition
on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part
of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.*
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner, vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL,
respondent.
FACTS:
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. RupertoVillareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry
then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.
ISSUE:
What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are
commonly known? Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution
or are they considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership.
RULING:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public
forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of
1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or
unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. As such,
they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership
until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application
for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED.