EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

,
G. R. No. 189755
July 04, 2012

FACTS
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto
Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with
the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision
including the receivables from the lots already sold.
As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water
facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water
of the residents for thirty (30) years.
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes
died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association
demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused
and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it
affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11,
Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However,
on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5
was not an open space
ISSUE
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open space as
defined in P. D. 1216.
RULING
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space. The Court used
the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdemgeneris to determine whether the area falls
under other similar facilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of
areas reserved for water facilities.
Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration
refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase other
similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like manner.
It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is
a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.
Phil Am. Life V. Ansaldo
Fatcs:

Ramon M. Paterno, Jr. filed a letter-complaint dated April 17, 1986 to Insurance
Commissioner alleging certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and
public consumers of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife)

On July 14, a hearing on the letter-complaint was held by respondent Commissioner on the
validity of the Contract of Agency complained of by private respondent.

The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena/Notice questioning the jurisdiction of the
Insurance commissioner and the legal standing of the private respondent. Respondent
Commissioner denied the Motion to Quash

ISSUE: whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls within the
jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.
HELD:
NO.
Under the Insurance Code, Insurance Commissioner has the authority to regulate the business of
insurance, which is defined as follows:
(2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance
business," within the meaning of this Code, shall include
(a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract;
(b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a
vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity
of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business,
specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within
the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance
equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of
this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2]; Emphasis supplied).

Since the contract of agency entered into between Philamlife and its agents is not included within
the meaning of an insurance business, Section 2 of the Insurance Code cannot be invoked to give
jurisdiction over the same to the Insurance Commissioner. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
NIASSI V. Nasipit Employees Labor Union

In October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (Wage Board) of
Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted
an additional PhP 12 per day cost of living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that
region. NIASSI a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte failed to
implement the wage order which triggers the Respondent Nasipit Employees Labor Union to file
a complaint to the NLRC which referred the case to the National Conciliation Mediation Board.
Petitioner argued that its employees were already receiving a wage higher than the minimum
wage, therefore excluded to the wage order. However, the arbitrator ruled in favour of the Union
on the reason that the Wage Order did not specifically prohibit the grant of wage increase to the
employees earning above minimum wage.
The arbitrator denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and CA dismissed the petition
for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employees earning above minimum wage are entitled to the wage
increase mandated in the wage order.

RUINGS:
NO. Unions complaint for the enforcement of Wage Order No. RXIII-02 is,
accordingly, DISMISSED
It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only
minimum wage earners are entitled to the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. The
beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific enough to cover only minimum wage
earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the prescribed minimum wage.
Clearly then, only employees receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled
to the wage increase set forth under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of
increase to correct wage distortions consequent to the implementation of such wage order.
COA V. Province of Cebu
g.r no.141386

The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under
Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in
the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public
schools.
The COA found out that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the appointed teachers and
scholarship grants were charged against the provincial Special Education Fund. Consequently,
COA issued notice of suspension to the Province of Cebu saying that the said salaries and
scholarship grants are not chargeable to the SEF as.
The province of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court. The court a quo
ruled in favour of the respondent.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for review to the SC. Invoking the legal maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius," petitioner alleges that since salaries, personnel-related benefits and
scholarship grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF under the
Local Government Code, they should be deemed excluded therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the salaries and personnel-benefits and the grant of scholarships are
chargeable to the SEF.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter
of course is compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are
necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
On the grant of scholarship, the doctrine is not applicable because it is neither necessary nor
indispensable to the operation and maintenance of public schools. Instead, such scholarship
grants may be charged to the General Funds of the province. Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where
the legislature has omitted it.

NAB vs. Mamauag

Two minors classified by the DSWD as moderate and mild retardates left the house of judge
Angeles very early in the morning of March 2 1995. Ana Lucero found the minors wandering
within the vicinity of the bus station. They narrated the maltreatment and non-payment of salary
by judge Angeles.
Lucero brought thye minors to the Police Station.At the police station, SPO1 Billedo recorded
the girls complaint in the police blotter and SPO1 Cario ("Cario") brought them to the East
Avenue Medical Center for the requisite medical examination. Later, the two girls were returned
to the police station where Cario interviewed them. Initial Investigation Report was reviewed
and signed by SPO2 Almario and approved by P/Insp. Mamauag. Later, SPO1 Felipe and SPO4
Garcia escorted the minors to the DSWD. P/Insp. Ganias signed the Letter of Turnover to the
DSWD.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal case
for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610
3
against Judge Angeles. Another was an
administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias,
Mamauag, Almario, Cario, Felipe, Billedo and Garcia.
The PNP chief on its decission, dismissed Billedo, Ganias and, Carino; Suspended Mamauag and
Almario, and; exonerated Garcia and Felipe.
Judge Angeles, not fully satisfied with the decission of the PNP chief filed a motion for partial
reconsideration which resulted to the dismissal of all Police Officers involved. Mamauag et al,
who are only suspended and exonerated on the first decission but dismissed in the second, filed
an appeal to the National Appelate Board.
NAB dismissed the respondents appeal.
The CA set aside the decission of the NAB and the second decission of the PNP chief on the
reason that a complainant may not appeal a decission from an administrative case. Sec. 45 of
R.A. 6975 does not clearly provide who may appeal (or for that matter make any motion for
reconsideration) from the decision of the PNP Chief, the last clause mentions"either party may
appeal with the Secretary" and by the doctrine of necessary implication this extends to said
decision of the PNP Chief.
ISSUE: whether or not a private complainant may appeal a decission arising from an
administrative case.
HELD:

By inference or necessary implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case
where the respondent is found guilty of the charges files against him. But when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining
authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that
the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes
that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
Montoya vs. Escayo
The private respondents who were all formerly employed as salesgirls in the petitioner's store
filed a complaint for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and
service leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and attorney's fees.
The petitioner-employer moved for the dismissal of the complaints, claiming that among others,
the private respondents failed to refer the dispute to the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible
settlement and to secure the certification required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of
the cases with the Labor Arbiter as mandated by P.D No. 1508.
Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera, ordered the dismissal of the complaints. The private
respondents sought the reversal of the Labor Arbiter's order before the respondent NLRC. The
public respondent rendered the assailed resolution reversing the order of Ovejera, and remanded
the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not labor cases were included under the P.D 1508,hence, reference to the
lupon is necessary.
HELD:
Petition is dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before the barangay
Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other government offices are not
applicable to labor cases.
Letter of Instructions No. 956 and Letter of Implementation No. 105 wee issued in connection
with the implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. These Letters were addressed
only to the following officials: all judges of the Courts of first Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts,
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Courts of Agrarian Relations, City Courts and
Municipal Courts, and all Fiscals and other Prosecuting Officers. These presidential issuances
make clear that the only official directed to oversee the implementation of the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D. No. 1508) are the then Minister of Justice, the then
Minister of Local Governments and Community Development, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. If the contention of the petitioner were correct, the then Minister (now
Secretary) of Labor and Employment would have been included in the list, and the two
presidential issuances also would have been addressed to the labor relations officers, labor
arbiters, and the members of the National Labor Relations Commission. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.

Atienza vs. Villarosa
The respondent Gov. Villarosa issued a memorandum stating that all Purchase Orders issued in
connection with the procurement of supplies, materials and equipment[s] including fuel,
repairs and maintenance needed in the transaction of public business or in the pursuit of any
undertaking, project or activity of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be approved by him, in
his capacity as local-chief executive.
Another memorandum was issued by him which requies all existing contract of employment
casual/job order basis and reappointment of the recommendees entered into by Vice-Governor
be terminated for being unauthorized.
Vice governor filed a petition for prohibition to the CA invoking pertinent provision of
the Local Government Code of 1991, and its implementing rules and regulations. The
appellate court dismissed the petition.
CA rendered the provisions relied upon by the petitioner as inapplicable. The court
reasoned that the approval of purchase orders is different from the power of the Vice-
Governor to sign warrants drawn against the public treasury.

ISSUE: Whether or not signing purchase order is included to the power of the Vice-
Governor to sign warrants drawn from the public treasury.
HELD:
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory
construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms.
The authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of theSangguniang
Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater
and includes the authority to approve purchase orders for the procurement of the
supplies, materials and equipment necessary for the operation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Petition is granted.