SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 158158. January 17, 2005]

BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER) AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO,
MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO
SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Fifteenth Division), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), and CLOTHMAN KNITTING
CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73353 filed by the
Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting Corporation Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment
and Reforms (the petitioner union) and Raymond Tomaroy, Roel Sardonidos, Joseph Sederio, Maritchu Javellana,
Enrique Omadto, Efren Mogar, Francisco Bertulfo, Judy Roquero, Paterno Silvestre, Cayetano Palmon, Teodoro Ocop
and Joseph Estifano.
Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged in knitting/textiles.
[2]
It has
approximately one hundred forty-four (144) rank-and-file employees. The petitioner union is a legitimate labor
organization of rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners were rank-and-file employees of the respondent and
were also members and officers of the petitioner union.
In the year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and formed the petitioner union. It was
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on February 23, 2001. In reaction thereto, the
respondent, headed by its President, Paul U. Lee, gathered the employees and advised them not to listen to outsiders.
[3]

Meanwhile, another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of
registration on April 23, 2001 by the DOLE.
[4]
A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner union
with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the respondent issued a Memorandum
[5]
dated March 2,
2001, informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders from the
customers.
On March 10, 2001, another Memorandum
[6]
was issued by the respondent informing its employees at the Dyeing and
Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be effected for one week, from March 12
to 17, 2001. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave, and were asked to verify any changes in the schedule
from the Human Resources Division on March 17, 2001.
Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily shutdown its operations at the Dyeing and
Finishing Division effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It notified the DOLE of the said
shutdown on May 26, 2001.
[7]
The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal.
For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the textiles to Crayons, Inc., a sister company. On
June 11, 2001, while the respondents service truck with plate number TBK-158 was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan, the
group of petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and some companions approached the truck as it made its way towards Don
Pedro Street and blocked its way. As a result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to the respondents
compound. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of the petitioner union, staged a picket in
front of the respondents compound, carrying placards with slogans that read:
1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER.
2. Mr. Paul Lee Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13
th
month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER.
3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department.
4. Mr. Paul Lee Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay di
mo maibigay. BMC-SUPER.
5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon. BMC-SUPER.
[8]

On June 14, 2001, twenty-three (23) members of the petitioner union gathered in front of the respondents compound
carrying the same placards. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to the management with the following
priority demands: (a) resumption of work; and (b) 13
th
month pay.
[9]
The next day, members of the petitioner union and
their supporters gathered in front of the respondents compound.
[10]
From June 16, 2001 up to June 18, 2001, the
members, as well as supporters of the union, gathered again in front of the companys compound.
[11]

On June 25, 2001, the respondent filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the arbitration branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR 06-03332-2001.
[12]
The respondent alleged that the
picket of the members of the union from June 11, 2001 to June 18, 2001 in front of the companys compound
constituted an illegal strike. It cited the following reasons:
a) The strikers/picketers did not conduct a strike vote and no cooling-off period was observed;
b) The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;
c) The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeable issue;
d) The work slowdown/picket caused damages to the petitioner in the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00);
e) The illegal acts of respondents constrained petitioner to seek the services of undersigned counsel for an attorneys
fee of P50,000.00 and P2,000.00 per appearance.
[13]

In a Decision dated October 18, 2001, the Labor Arbiter granted the petition, declared the strike illegal and the
employment status of the union officers who participated therein as terminated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition filed by the petitioner is hereby GRANTED.
The strike conducted by the respondents is hereby declared as illegal.
Consequently, due to their illegal activities, the respondents namely: RAYMOND TOMAROY, President, ROEL
SARDONIDOS, Vice-President, JOSEPH SEDERIO, Secretary, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, Treasurer, ENRIQUE OMADTO,
Auditor, EFREN MOGAR, P.R.O., and FRANCISCO BERTULFO, P.R.O. and Board of Directors: JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO
SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP and JOSEPH ESTIFANO are hereby declared to have lost their
employment status with the petitioner.
[14]

The Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the respondent to implement a reduced working
day from the original six (6) days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of job orders, which
further led to its decision to temporarily stop the operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for one (1) week March
12 to 17, 2001. The affected employees were then requested to utilize their vacation leaves and were, thereafter,
admitted back to work. However, Tomaroy and members of the union staged a strike, and the labor unrest resulted in
the cancellation of job orders amounting to P6,380,817.50. The aforestated losses prompted the petitioner to close and
stop the business operations of its Dyeing and Finishing Division.
It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that it was only the workers in the Dyeing and
Finishing Division who were affected by the temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents conducted a picket in front
of the companys premises, the whole business operations of the respondent was affected. As borne out by the records,
the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioners therein failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike, to wit:
1. It was not based on a valid factual ground, either based on Collective Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor
Practice;
2. No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE;
3. There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union;
4. There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended date of the strike;
5. The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed; and
6. The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report was not fully observed.
[15]

Thus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal; hence, the union officers who
knowingly participated in an illegal strike, already lost their employment status.
[16]

Aggrieved, the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-CA-030216-01. In a Resolution
promulgated on May 10, 2002, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the Labor Arbiter a quo, the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
[17]

The NLRC reasoned that it found no instances and/or situation befitting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner union filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution
[18]
dated July 24,
2002.
The petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73353, raising the following
error:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSED (SIC) OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY FAILED TO APPRECIATE FACTS AND EVIDENCES, APPLICABLE LAWS AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AND, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS.
[19]

In a Resolution
[20]
dated October 25, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that, contrary to Section 3, Rule
46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner union did not contain the full
names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, as the petition merely mentioned BMC-SUPER,
et al. as the petitioners. Further, the petition and the certification on non-forum shopping were signed by Raymond P.
Tomaroy, who claimed to be the union president/authorized representative of petitioners without, however, any such
authorization from the labor union and the other petitioners covered by the abbreviation et al. Moreover, the petition
was not verified as required by Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, did not produce legal
effect as provided for in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In addition, the petition was signed by petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy in his capacity as union president/authorized
representative, assisted by Enrique T. Belarmino, Legal Head of Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment
and Reforms, neither of whom was a duly authorized member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hence, according
to the appellate court, neither of them had authority to conduct litigation before the CA.
[21]
A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the petitioner union which was similarly denied in a Resolution
[22]
dated April 21, 2003. The CA reasoned
that, contrary to the petitioners insistence that the verification was signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, page 16 of the
petition filed before it did not bear such signature. Moreover, the special power of attorney attached to the motion for
reconsideration was subscribed and sworn to by the signatories therein before Notary Public Orlando C. Dy only on
November 20, 2002, i.e., more than one (1) month after the filing of the petition on October 15, 2002. Consequently,
the special power of attorney did not cure the defect in the certification against forum shopping signed by Raymond
Tomaroy, which was, likewise, not accompanied by proof that he was authorized to file the petition on behalf of the
petitioner union.
The CA clarified that the authority of non-lawyers to represent the labor organization or members thereof applies only
to proceedings before the NLRC or Labor Arbiters, as provided for in Article 222 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, a
non-lawyer may appear before it only if he is a party-litigant. However, Raymond P. Tomaroy did not appear to be a
party in the case before the CA as his name was not mentioned in the caption nor in the body of the petition.
[23]

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition contending that:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF
TECHNICALITIES.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED [WHEN] IT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE
HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED ILLEGAL STRIKE.
[24]

On the first ground, the petitioners allege that they complied with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. They contend that the petition filed before the CA by the petitioner unions president was sanctioned by
Article 242 of the Labor Code, and the cases of Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. CFI of Bulacan,
[25]
Davao Free
Workers Front v. CIR,
[26]
and La Carlota Sugar Central v. CIR.
[27]
The petitioner union insists that it would be illogical for
the union, as an entity, to require all its members to sign the said petition and the certificate of non-forum shopping. It
avers that a labor union is a judicial entity which functions thru its officers. Thus, the president, as an officer of the
union, needed no special power of attorney to sign for the union. It stresses that it did not violate Section 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner union further invokes the policy that the rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of
substantial justice; when the rules strictly applied resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, this Court is empowered to support the rules.
The petitioners argue that they did not stage a strike, much more an illegal strike. They explain that a strike means work
stoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of the respondent was shutdown, it could not have caused
a work stoppage. The union members merely picketed in front of the respondents factory to urge the respondent to
open and order the resumption of the operations in its Dyeing and Finishing Division. There was, thus, no need to
comply with the requirements laid down by Article 263 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules.
For its part, the respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the petition filed before the CA
failed to comply with Section 1 of Rule 65, Section 3 of Rule 46, and Section 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and that
the requirement as to the signatories in the petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent reiterates that the petitioners staged an illegal strike, and that as officers of the union who participated
therein, the petitioners are deemed to have lost their employment status.
The contention of the petitioners is erroneous. They are of the erroneous impression that the only respondent in the
NLRC was the petitioner union and that it was sued in its representative capacity. The fact of the matter is that the
respondent sued not only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and members of its Board of Directors
as principal respondents, and sought the termination of the employment of the said officers. The Labor Arbiter
rendered judgment against all the respondents therein and declared the officers to have lost their employment
status. The NLRC affirmed the decision on appeal. It was not only the union that assailed the decision of the NLRC in the
CA, but also the dismissed officers. The petitioners (respondents therein) prayed for the reversal thereof and that
another judgment be rendered as prayed for by them in their position paper in the NLRC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Labor Arbiter that, after submission of this
Position Paper, the above entitled case be considered submitted for resolution, and the decision be rendered in favor of
the respondents employees:
1. Declaring Petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of working days, shutdown and UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES against
individual respondents;
2. Ordering petitioners be, jointly and severally, liable to pay respondents actual damages, payment of MORAL and
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of not less than P50,000.00 each individual employees and 10% of the total
monetary award for the Office of BMC-SUPER plus P10,000.00 litigation expenses;
3. Ordering that Petitioner Paul Lee be in contempt of court and be fined to pay individual respondents in the
amount of P50,000.00 each or imprisonment of Two (2) to Four (4) Years or both.
Other relief and remedies equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.
[28]

Under Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari shall contain
the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that the failure of the petitioners to
comply with the said requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full
names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the
factual background of the case and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the
original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification
shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of
the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of
copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should, thereafter, learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the
aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount
of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action indicates the names of the parties who
shall be named in the original petition:
Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number, if
assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition;
but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an
appropriate indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
In this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA does not contain the names of the petitioners officers of
the petitioner BMC-SUPER and of the members of the Board of Directors; even the petition itself does not contain the
full names and addresses of the said officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union. We quote
the title of the petition and the averments thereof having reference to the parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL.,
Petitioner,
-vs-
CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION,
Respondents.
[29]


Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al., is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be served with
summons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
Private Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under and
by virtue of Philippine Laws engaged in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don Pedro Street, Don
Pedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City.
Public Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, herein impleaded as the tribunal exercising
judicial functions who issued the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.
[30]

The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR
[31]
is misplaced. In the said case,
the Court held that the failure to specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking members of a labor
union in the decision or in the complaint was of no consequence. This is due to the fact that it was established that all
the union members went on strike as a result of the unfair labor practice of the employer, in consonance with the rule
that it is precisely the function of a labor union to carry the representation of its members, particularly against the
employers unfair labor practices against it and its members, and to file an action for their benefit and behalf without
joining each and every member as a separate party.
Significantly, the full names and addresses of the officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union
are set forth in their petition at bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and addresses of all the
petitioners to be stated in the title of the petition and in the petition itself. We quote the title of the petition and the
allegation therein having reference to the parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO,
MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO
SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO,
Petitioners.
[32]


1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN
MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND
JOSEPH ESTIFANO, the former is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, and the latter are
members of the former; they can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court at c/o H.O.
VICTORIA AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Unit 305 Web-Jet Building, 64 Quezon Avenue cor. BMA Avenue, Quezon
City.
[33]

On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not, therefore, commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should, thereafter, learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
As gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the certification of
non-forum shopping in his capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The officers and members of the Board of
Directors, who were, likewise, principal petitioners, did not execute any certification of non-forum shopping as
mandated by the said Rule. The rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners
and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.
[34]
Although petitioner Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his
position as president of the petitioner union to execute the certification for and in its behalf, he had no authority to do
so for and in behalf of its petitioners-officers, as well as the members of the Board of Directors thereof. The execution
by the individual petitioners of a special power of attorney subsequent to the dismissal of the petition by the CA
authorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite certification does not cure the fatal defect in their petition.
[35]

The respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA was correctly dismissed as it was not signed by
counsel. The respondent noted that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that petitioner Enrique Belarmino did not
manifest in the petition that he was the lawyer. The respondent, thus, contends that Tomaroy and Belarmino engaged
in the illegal practice of law, in violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We do not agree.
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him.
[36]
Considering that the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the pleading. For this
reason alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition.
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the petitioners and resolved the petition on its merits, we find that the
petitioner union, along with its supporters, staged a strike without complying with the requirements laid down in Article
263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
The petitioner union alleges that it could not have staged a strike because the operations at the Dyeing and Finishing
Division were temporarily stopped. It insists that it merely protested the unjustified closing of the respondents Dyeing
and Finishing Division by forming a picket in front of the respondents compound to urge the re-opening thereof.
We do not agree.
A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute.
[37]
A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
[38]

The members and the supporters of the petitioner union, headed by petitioner Tomaroy, thru concerted action, caused
a temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial dispute. This is evidenced in the June 13, 2001 spot report of
the Atlantic Security & Investigation Agency:
On or about 1445H of June 11, 2001, Mr. Jojo Flores and Mr. Rene Fabian were about to deliver fabrics in Bulacan with
service truck TBK-158. Upon reaching the corner of Don Pedro St. and McArthur Highway, they gave way to a big truck
turning to Don Pedro St. and at the same time the group of Mr. Raymond Tomaroy, the leader of BUKLURAN NG
MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
BMC SUPER were on their way to CKC compound. Seeing the group, Mr. Fabian greeted them by giving a quick forward
motion of his head. But instead, according to Mr. Fabian, Mr. Tomaroy with finger pointing on to Mr. Fabian accusing
him as the one responsible for the delay of their 13
th
month pay. Mr. Fabian just told the group BMC-SUPER to read the
Memorandum of the HRD dated June 8, 2001. Mr. Flores and Mr. Fabian returned to CKC, Don Pedro St., Marulas,
Valenzuela, to report the matter.
At about 1517H of same date, Mr. Tomaroy with 16 members of BMC SUPER staged a rally and/or gathered in front of
Clothman Knitting Corporation gate carrying placards with slogan read as follows:
1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER;
2. Mr. Paul Lee Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13
th
month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER;
3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department;
4. Mr. Paul Lee Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay di
mo maibigay BMC-SUPER;
5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon BMC-SUPER.
On or about 1640H at the same date, a PNP-Valenzuela Mobil car had SPO1 Palma, PO2 Manresa and PO1 Isip on
board. The police with the BMC-SUPER.
The Valenzuela Police left at about 1727H.
At about 1810H of the same date, the group of BMC-SUPER abandoned the area.
[39]

The subsequent Reports dated June 14, 15, 16 and 18, 2001 of the same agency further stated that members of the
petitioner union, along with other employees particularly from the knitting department, joined in the picket.
[40]
It is,
thus, apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters caused a temporary
work stoppage. The allegation that there can be no work stoppage because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing
Division had been shutdown is of no consequence. It bears stressing that the other divisions were fully
operational. There is nothing on record showing that the union members and the supporters who formed a picket line
in front of the respondents compound were assigned to the finishing department. As can be clearly inferred from the
spot reports, employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. The blockade of the delivery of trucks and
the attendance of employees from the other departments of the respondent meant work stoppage. The placards that
the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of employment as well as the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment.
Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike. In order for a strike to be valid, the
following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a
notice of strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to
the DOLE.
[41]
It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the
strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably
regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.
[42]

Considering that the petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid requirements, the strike staged on June 11 to
18, 2001 is illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who participated therein are deemed to have lost their
employment status.
[43]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

STEEL CORPORATION G. R. Nos. 169829-30
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
*

CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-
NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS,
Respondent. Promulgated:

April 16, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition is seeking to set
aside the Decision
[1]
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the Resolution
[2]
dated September 22, 2005 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials,
supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials.
[3]
On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Union
of the Energy Leaders General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to
represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.
[4]
Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election
[5]
but the same
was denied for having been filed out of time.
[6]


On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices. Said
election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their
votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete with
irregularities.
[7]
On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for Certification
Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner.
[8]
The Med-
Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and
further ordered the

conduct of the election with NAFLU and NO UNION as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the
Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.
[9]


On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a consolidated
decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with FUEL-GAS, respondent and NO UNION as
choices.
[10]
Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18, 1999.
[11]
Unsatisfied, petitioner and
FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.
[12]


On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated
without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent emerged as winner; hence,
the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.
[13]


On July 12, 2000, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721, rendered a Decision
[14]
which annulled and set aside
the August 27, 1999 decision and October 18, 1999 resolution of the Undersecretary. The CA further directed the holding
of a certification election with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices, to the exclusion of respondent.
[15]


On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS election protest but deferred the request of respondent to be
declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA.
[16]
Not satisfied
with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent appealed to the Labor Secretary.
[17]
It further filed a
Manifestation before the CA pointing out that in theApril 14, 2000 certification election, it emerged as winner, and thus,
the election should be considered as an intervening event sufficient to bar another certification election.
[18]
The CA,
however, dismissed said manifestation on December 28, 2000.
[19]


Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision
[20]
certifying respondent as the exclusive
bargaining agent of petitioners employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision.
[21]


As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for
reconsideration.
[22]


Finding no justification in petitioners refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor
practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latters refusal to bargain with it.
[23]


On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA
decision.
[24]
On February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision.
[25]


On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.
[26]
Again, on April 2, 2001, another
Notice of Strike
[27]
was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination
against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later consolidated with
the certified case.

On December 13, 2001, acting on the January 19, 2001 petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter
recommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent and FUEL-GAS as contenders.
[28]
The
decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct certification
election in a Resolution dated October 17, 2002.
[29]


Meanwhile, in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated April 17, 2002, declaring petitioner
as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor
practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the officers of the
union.
[30]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
[31]
of the resolution praying that additional employees be
dismissed. For its part, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
[32]


On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioners refusal to bargain and union
busting.
[33]
The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike.
[34]


On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union
busting.
[35]
Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the Labor Secretary certified
the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work.
[36]
The second certified case was docketed as
NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision
[37]
ordering petitioner to bargain
collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the reinstatement of the
employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of seniority rights and
diminution of salary.
[38]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
[39]
dated January
26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.

Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision
[40]
dated February 12,
2003 opted to resolve the parties respective motions for reconsideration collectively. In said decision, the NLRC
modified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the union officers whom it previously ordered terminated,
which in effect denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.
[41]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied in a Resolution dated June 30, 2003.
[42]
These decision and resolution became the subject of a petition
before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.

The petitions before the CA were later consolidated. In CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, herein petitioner argued that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS
CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
[43]



In the other case, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, petitioner herein argued that:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DIRECTING PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OF
THIS COURT DIRECTING THE HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.
IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR.
[44]



On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision
[45]
denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while
partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314. The decretal portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is DENIED while the Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, decreeing herein contending parties to comply with the directives of this
Tribunal in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.

SO ORDERED.


In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of the
NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioners claims are based on pure allegations and not
supported by any substantial evidence.
[46]


In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect, nullified and set aside. It is to be noted
that FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA added that
since it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was voted as the duly-
elected bargaining agent of petitioners rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its claim and it has no right to
demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.
[47]


Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[48]
which was denied in the Resolution
[49]
dated September 22, 2005.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE REINSTATEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN
ILLEGAL STRIKE.

II

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE AS
ILLEGAL THE STRIKE HELD BY THE UNION ON FEBRUARY 4, 2003.

III

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INVALIDATE
THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DIRECTING THE REINSTATEMENT OF
THE STRIKERS WHO DEFIED THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE LABOR SECRETARY.

IV

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE NLRC HAS RECONSIDERED ITS CONCLUSION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MARCH 2001 STRIKE.

V

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION MAY RECONSIDER IN THE SECOND CERTIFIED
CASE ITS DECISION ON THE FIRST CERTIFIED CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
[50]


Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim, petitioner
argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent as the
bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to conduct
another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike was
to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-strike, it is illegal.
[51]


Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code,
particularly Art. 264,
[52]
which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration
between the parties.
[53]
Since the labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still pending
compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said strike was based substantially on
the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal by express provision of
the law.

Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already resolved by the NLRC in
Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor dispute, namely, the alleged refusal of
petitioner to recognize respondent. As such, the NLRCs decision in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 constitutes res judicata in
the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.
[54]


Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost their
employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that they
committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their termination from
employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of the union
officers was warranted.
[55]


Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision
[56]
ordering the
reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with theFebruary 4, 2003 strike. It argues that since
the termination of the employees was due to their refusal to comply with the return-to-work order issued by the Labor
Secretary, not to their alleged participation in an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the decision.
[57]


Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the NLRC
may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.
[58]


The petition is meritorious.

Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the
negative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the
only issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union; and
the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation.

The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective
weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be
valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is
never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.
[59]


In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following
reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute
had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretarys return-to-work order.

Respondents notices of strike were founded on petitioners continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged the
strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-strike. As its
legal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize ones union and not other
contending groups, as the employees bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the
striking unions doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive
representative in the bargaining unit.
[60]


The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, it
has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask



petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled by
the court with finality,
[61]
petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain
respondents imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot
sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.

Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondents purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike
would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretarys return-to-work order and after the
dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike
successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds petitioners continued
refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.

Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:

When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.
[62]



The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the
police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted
great breadth of discretion to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic
enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
[63]


The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national
interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not
even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance of an
assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to
return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order.
[64]


A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the
workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
[65]


Says the Labor Code:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.
x x x

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving
the same grounds for the strike or lockout.


Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must
return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue
serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at
arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their
motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine
or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is
issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company,
to justify their action.
[66]


Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor
laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier
consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CAs decision. That way, the
collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to
bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as
the bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the
return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.

Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace
and progress of

society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the
union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision to
wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and
tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to
the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are
involved.
[67]


Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.

Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. x x x

Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground
for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.


It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a
strike that he may be declared to have lost employment

status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the
law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of
declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and
prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.
[68]
Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their
work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and
preventing management from filling up their positions.
[69]


WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in
that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal
strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155679 December 19, 2006
BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION (NAFLU), PATRICIA VILLANUEVA, EMILIA BANDOLA, RAQUEL CRUZ, DELIA RELATO,
REGINA CASTILLO, LOLITA DELOS ANGELES, MARISSA VILLORIA, MARITA ANTONIO, LOLITA LINDIO, ELIZA CARAULLIA,
LIZA SUA, and FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU), MYRNA DELA TORRE, AVELINA
AONUEVO, BERNICE BORCELO, NARLIE YAGIN, EVELYN SANTILLAN, LEONY SERDONCILO, TRINIDAD CUYA, ANDREA
LUMIBAO, GYNIE ARNEO, ELIZABETH CAPELLAN, JOSEPHINE DETOSIL, ZENAIDA FRANCISCO, and FLORENCIA
ANAGO, petitioners,
vs.
FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision
1
of May 28, 2002 setting aside the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution
2
of August 14, 1995 which reversed the December 15, 1992 Decision
3
of
the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners Patricia Villanueva, Emilia Bandola, Raquel Cruz, Delia Relato, Regina Castillo, Lolita delos Angeles, Marissa
Villoria, Marita Antonio, Lolita Lindio, Eliza Caraulia, and Liza Sua were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union.
Petitioners Myrna dela Torre, Avelina Aonuevo, Bernice Borcelo, Narlie Yagin, Evelyn Santillan, Leony Serdoncilo,
Trinidad Cuya, Andrea Lumibao, Gynie Arneo, Elizabeth Capellan, Josephine Detosil, Zenaida Francisco, and Florencia
Anago were officers of Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union.
The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective
collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations.
Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister companies
engaged in the garment business. Situated in one big compound along with another sister company, General Garments
Corporation (GGC), they have a common entrance.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. On even date,
petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days,
prompting respondents to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply
with procedural requirements.
4

On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations.
5
Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked out
by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the
apprehension that violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents
workers were prevented from reporting for work.
Petitioners further assert that respondents were "slighted" by the workers no-show, and as a punishment, the workers
as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents premises, petitioners, who claim
that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,
6
explain that those were for the convenience of union members
who reported every morning to check if the management would allow them to report for work.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the following requirements for the
staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission
of a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.
7

The Labor Arbiter, by Decision of December 15, 1992, finding for respondents, held that the strike was illegal.
8
The
decretal text of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the respondents guilty of an illegal strike. Consequently, their
following officers are declared to have lost their employment status:
BIFLEX LABOR UNION (NAFLU)
1. Reynaldo Santos President
2. Patricia Villanueva Vice President
3. Emilia Bandola Secretary
4. Raquel Cruz Treasurer
5. Delia Relato Auditor
6. Regina Castillo Board Member
7. Lolita delos Angeles Board Member
8. Marissa Villoria Board Member
9. Marita Antonio Board Member
10. Lolita Lindio Board Member
11. Eliza Caranlia Board Member
12. Liza Sua Board Member
FIFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU)
1. Myrna dela Torre President
2. Avelina Anonuevo Vice President
3. Barnice Borcelo Secretary
4. Nerlie Yagin Treasurer
5. Evelyn Santillan Auditor
6. Leony Serdoncilo Director
7. Trinidad Cuga Director
8. Andrea Lumibao Director
9. Gynie Arneo Director
10. Elizabeth Capellar Director
11. Josephine Detosil Director
12. Zenaida Francisco Director
13. Florencia Anago Director
SO ORDERED.
9

Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it holding that
there was no strike to speak of as no labor or industrial dispute existed between the parties.
10
It accordingly ordered
respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full backwages
from the date of their termination.
11

On respondents petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 28, 2002, reversed that of the NLRC and
reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.
In finding for respondents, the appellate court discredited petitioners claim of having been illegally locked out, given
their failure to even file a letter of protest or complaint with the management,
12
and their failure to comply with the
legal requirements of a valid strike.
13

The appellate court further noted that while petitioners claimed that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,
no copy thereof was ever produced before the Labor Arbiter.
14

Hence, the instant petition which faults the appellate court to have:
I
. . . ERRED IN INTERPRETING ART. 264 (A) OF THE LABOR CODE TO BE MANDATORY AND CALLING FOR THE AUTOMATIC
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS FOR HAVING ENGAGED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
II
. . . ERR[ED] IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ERRED IN IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER . . . DISMISSING PETITIONERS FROM WORK DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
III
. . . ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF HOLDING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES
SHOWED THAT RESPONDENTS WERE THE ONES WHO WERE GUILTY OF AN ILLEGAL LOCKOUT.
The petition fails.
That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga ng bayan organized by the
labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is not disputed.
Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike. It affects
numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and
conditions of employment.
15

Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work, refuse to work
and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
16

Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not
absolute.
17
For the protection of other significant state interests such as the "right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and growth"
18
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise,
oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be sanctioned. And it would
give imprimatur to workers joining demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to make
the necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel
"principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers"
19
aimed at fostering industrial peace.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were allowed by
respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Petitioners, nonetheless, assert that when they returned to work the day following the welga ng bayan on October 24,
1990, they were refused entry by the management, allegedly as punishment for their joining the welga. Hence, they
claim that they were illegally locked out by respondents.
If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the management or a complaint therefor
against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter observed, "[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their
contention for normally a locked-out union will immediately bring management before the bar of justice."
20

Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would just
the same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated Article
264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "*n+o person engaged in picketing shall obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares."
Even the NLRC, which ordered their reinstatement, took note of petitioners act of "physically blocking and preventing
the entry of complainants customers, supplies and even other employees who were not on strike."
21

In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means by
which it is carried out.
Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of knowingly participating in an illegal
strike, conformably with the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
22
this Court, passing on the use of the
word "may" in the immediately quoted provision, held that "[t]he law . . . grants the employer the option of declaring a
union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment." Reinstatement of a striker or retention
of his employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which this Court may not
supplant.
Costs against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Tinga, and,Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144899. February 5, 2004]
ELIZABETH C. BASCON and NOEMI V. COLE, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO CEBU
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., and GREGORIO IYOY,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals Decision
[1]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 51690, dated March 13,
2000, which set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 4
th
Division, dated November 25,
1998, in NLRC Case No. V-00234-97. The NLRC had reversed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter, dated April 24, 1997, in
NLRC-RAB-VII Case No. 07-0828-96, which held valid herein petitioners dismissal from employment. Petitioners also
challenge the appellate courts Resolution,
[2]
dated August 9, 2000, which denied their motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners in the instant case were employees of private respondent Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCH)
and members of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Metro Cebu Community Hospital (NAMA-MCCH), a labor union of
MCCH employees. Petitioner Elizabeth C. Bascon had been employed as a nurse by respondent MCCH since May 1984.
At the time of her termination from employment in April 1996, she already held the position of Head Nurse. The other
petitioner, Noemi V. Cole, had been working as a nursing aide with MCCH since August 1974. Both petitioners were
dismissed by the respondent hospital for allegedly participating in an illegal strike.
The instant controversy arose from an intra-union conflict between the NAMA-MCCH and the National Labor Federation
(NFL), the mother federation of NAMA-MCCH. In November 1995, NAMA-MCCH asked MCCH to renew their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which was set to expire on December 31, 1995. NFL, however, opposed this move by its
local affiliate. Mindful of the apparent intra-union dispute, MCCH decided to defer the CBA negotiations until there was
a determination as to which of said unions had the right to negotiate a new CBA.
Believing that their union was the certified collective bargaining agent, the members and officers of NAMA-MCCH staged
a series of mass actions inside MCCHs premises starting February 27, 1996. They marched around the hospital putting
up streamers, placards and posters.
On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) office in Region 7 issued two (2)
certifications stating that NAMA-MCCH was not a registered labor organization. This finding, however, did not deter
NAMA-MCCH from filing a notice of strike with the Region 7 Office of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). Said notice was, however, disregarded by the NCMB for want of legal personality of the union.
Meanwhile, the MCCH management received reports that petitioners participated in NAMA-MCCHs mass actions.
Consequently, notices were served on all union members, petitioners included, asking them to explain in writing why
they were wearing red and black ribbons and roaming around the hospital with placards. In their collective response
dated March 18, 1996, the union members, including petitioners, explained that wearing armbands and putting up
placards was their answer to MCCHs illegal refusal to negotiate with NAMA-MCCH.
Subsequently, on March 28, 1996, MCCH notified the petitioners that they were to be investigated for their activities in
the mass actions, with the hearings being scheduled on March 28, 1996 and April 1, 1996. Petitioners, however, denied
receiving said notices. In a notice dated April 8, 1996, MCCH ordered petitioners to desist from participating in the mass
actions conducted in the hospital premises with a warning that non-compliance therewith would result in the imposition
of disciplinary measures. Petitioners again claimed they did not receive said order. Petitioners Bascon and Cole were
then served notices terminating their employment effective April 12, 1996 and April 19, 1996, respectively.
The dismissal of petitioners did not deter NAMA-MCCH from staging more mass actions. The means of ingress to and
egress from the hospital were blocked. Employees and patients, including emergency cases, were harassed, according to
MCCH management, which also complained that mass actions held inside the hospital had created an atmosphere of
animosity and violence, aggravating the condition of ailing patients. Furthermore, the hospital also suffered heavy losses
brought about by a notable decline in the patient admission rates and the refusal of suppliers to extend credit. To
address its labor problems, MCCH sought an injunction from the NLRC on July 9, 1996 in Injunction Case No. V-0006-96.
Meanwhile, on July 1, 1996, Bascon and Cole filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, docketed as NLRC-RAB-VII Case No.
07-0828-96. They denied having participated in said mass actions or having received the notices (1) enjoining them from
wearing armbands and putting up placards, with warning that disciplinary measure would be imposed, and (2) informing
them of the schedule of hearing. They admit, however, to wearing armbands for union identity while nursing patients
as per instruction of their union leaders.
On July 16, 1996, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was duly issued in Injunction Case No. V-0006-96.
On August 27, 1996, the local government of Cebu City ordered the demolition of the picket staged by the members of
NAMA-MCCH for being both a public nuisance and a nuisance per se.
On September 18, 1996, the injunction was made permanent by an NLRC Resolution in Injunction Case No. V-0006-96,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for injunction is hereby GRANTED enjoining respondents in the course of
their strike/picket from committing the illegal acts mentioned in Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code more particularly the
blocking of the free ingress to and egress from petitioner hospital and from committing threats, coercion and
intimidation of the non-striking/picketing employees/workers reporting for work, vehicles/patients desiring to enter for
the purpose of seeking admission/confinement in petitioner hospital and for such other lawful purpose.
SO ORDERED.
[3]

In a Decision
[4]
dated April 24, 1997, the Labor Arbiter found the termination complained of in NLRC-RAB-VII Case No. 07-
0828-96 to be valid and legal, and dismissed the complaint. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were justly dismissed
because they actually participated in the illegal mass action. It also concluded that petitioners received the notices of
hearing, but deliberately refused to attend the scheduled investigation.
Petitioners then appealed the Labor Arbiters ruling to the NLRC, 4
th
Division, which docketed the appeal as NLRC Case
No. V-00234-97.
In its Decision
[5]
dated November 25, 1998, the NLRC, 4
th
Division reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and ordered
the reinstatement of petitioners with full backwages. First, it found that petitioners merely wore armbands for union
identity, per instruction of their union officials. Said wearing of armbands while nursing patients, is a constitutional right,
which cannot be curtailed if peacefully carried out. Second, it ruled that the placards complained of by MCCH did not
contain scurrilous, indecent or libelous remarks. Finally, it concluded that, in a belated but crude attempt to camouflage
the illegal dismissal of petitioners, MCCH merely fabricated the notices allegedly sent to petitioners.
Anent the charge of gross insubordination, the NLRC ruled that petitioners were not guilty thereof, because the
elements thereof had not been sufficiently proven, to wit: (1) reasonableness and lawfulness of the order or directive,
(2) sufficiency of knowledge on the part of the employee of such order, and (3) the connection of the order with the
duties which the employee had been engaged to discharge.
Unconvinced of the correctness of the NLRC decision, MCCH filed a motion for reconsideration presenting the following
documentary evidence:
1) Affidavits of Paz Velasco, Luciano Quitoy, Joseph Dagatan, and Gina Jumao-as to show that petitioners were duly
served the notices in question;
2) Letter reply of NAMA-MCCH dated March 18, 1996 wherein petitioners, together with the rest of the union members,
collectively acknowledged receipt of the March 15, 1996 directive;
3) Position Paper of terminated co-employees where the receipt of the subject notices were admitted as well as the
commission of the aforementioned protest mass actions; and
4) Appeal of private respondents, who did not join the protest mass action, to the Board of Trustees of MCCH to show
that reinstatement is no longer feasible in view of strained relationship.
On February 4, 1999, the NLRC denied the plea for reconsideration of MCCH.
Undeterred, MCCH filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51690.
In its Decision
[6]
dated March 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 51690 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision of public respondent NLRC 4
th
Division dated November 25, 1998 in
NLRC Case No. V-00234-97 is hereby REVERSED and the complaint of private respondents is dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner Metro Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH) is however ordered to pay the private respondents separation pay
equivalent to one-half month for every year of service in the interest of equity.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[7]

The appellate court held that Bascon and Cole were validly terminated for their gross insubordination or willful
disobedience as:
1) The order for petitioners to refrain from wearing armbands and putting up placards was legal, fair and reasonable.
2) The order was connected with the duties, which the petitioners had been engaged to discharge.
3) Said order was sufficiently made known to petitioners as receipt of the same by the latter was convincingly
substantiated by hard evidence.
The appellate court stressed that petitioners gross insubordination constituted unlawful acts undertaken in conjunction
with an illegal mass concerted action akin to an illegal strike. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners union
activities violated the rights of patients and third parties such that they were outside the ambit of legality and beyond
the mantle of protection of the freedom of speech.
Hence, the instant case, with the petitioners submitting for resolution the following issues:
I
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SUPPLANT ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS WITH THAT OF THE COMMISSION?
II
CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO
FINDING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION?
III
CAN AN EMPLOYEE BE TERMINATED FOR INSUBORDINATION FOR IPSO FACTO NOT SHOWING UP FOR THE
INVESTIGATION?
[8]

Anent the first and second issues, as a general rule, the findings of facts of the NLRC are deemed binding and conclusive
upon the Court. We have repeatedly said that the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, resort to judicial review of the
decisions of the NLRC in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to the
question of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[9]
However, where, as in the instant
case, the findings of facts of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, a departure from the general rule is
warranted. Thus, the Court may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.
[10]
Where the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter disagree on their finding of facts, the Court can review the records to determine which
findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
[11]

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,
[12]
we held that the special civil action of certiorari is the mode of judicial review of
the decisions of the NLRC either by this Court or the Court of Appeals, but the latter court is the more appropriate forum
in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and that, in the exercise of this power, the Court of
Appeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the NLRC.
[13]

With regard to the third issue, note that petitioners were terminated for allegedly participating in an illegal strike and
gross insubordination to the order prohibiting them from wearing armbands and putting up placards, not foripso
facto failing to show up in the scheduled investigation. Thus, the real issue is whether or not petitioners were validly
terminated for (1) allegedly participating in an illegal strike and/or (2) gross insubordination to the order to stop wearing
armbands and putting up placards.
As to the first ground, Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides in part that:
Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status
(Emphasis ours)
Thus, while a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike, an ordinary striking employee,
like petitioners herein, must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike (underscoring
supplied). There must be proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike.
[14]
But proof beyond reasonable doubt
is not required. Substantial evidence, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners actual participation in the illegal strike was limited to wearing
armbands and putting up placards. There was no finding that the armbands or the placards contained offensive words or
symbols. Thus, neither such wearing of armbands nor said putting up of placards can be construed as an illegal act. In
fact, per se, they are within the mantle of constitutional protection under freedom of speech.
Evidence on record shows that various illegal acts were committed by unidentified union members in the course of the
protracted mass action. And we commiserate with MCCH, patients, and third parties for the damage they suffered. But
we cannot hold petitioners responsible for acts they did not commit. The law, obviously solicitous of the welfare of the
common worker, requires, before termination may be considered, that an ordinary union member must have knowingly
participated in the commission of illegal acts during a strike.
As regards the appellate courts finding that petitioners were justly terminated for gross insubordination or willful
disobedience, Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in part:
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work.
However, willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages
the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made
known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
[15]

In this case, we find lacking the element of willfulness characterized by a perverse mental attitude on the part of
petitioners in disobeying their employers order as to warrant the ultimate penalty of dismissal. Wearing armbands and
putting up placards to express ones views without violating the rights of third parties, are legal per se and even
constitutionally protected. Thus, MCCH could have done well to respect petitioners right to freedom of speech instead
of threatening them with disciplinary action and eventually terminating them.
Neither are we convinced that petitioners exercise of the right to freedom of speech should be taken in conjunction
with the illegal acts committed by other union members in the course of the series of mass actions. It bears stressing
that said illegal acts were committed by other union members after petitioners were already terminated, not during the
time that the latter wore armbands and put up placards.
Finally, even if willful disobedience may be properly appreciated, still, the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. Not every
case of willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-connected order of the employer may be penalized with
dismissal. There must be reasonable proportionality between, on the one hand, the willful disobedience by the
employee and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed therefor.
[16]
In this case, evidence is wanting on the depravity of
conduct and willfulness of the disobedience on the part of petitioners, as contemplated by law. Wearing armbands to
signify union membership and putting up placards to express their views cannot be of such great dimension as to
warrant the extreme penalty of dismissal, especially considering the long years of service rendered by petitioners and
the fact that they have not heretofore been subject of any disciplinary action in the course of their employment with
MCCH.
The termination of petitioners employment not being for any of the just or authorized causes, it constitutes illegal
dismissal. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that:
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Hence, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to both reinstatement and full backwages as a matter of
course. MCCH alleges that due to strained relations, reinstatement is no longer possible. We disagree. In Quijano v.
Mercury Drug Corporation,
[17]
we stated that the doctrine of strained relations is inapplicable to a situation where the
employee has no say in the operation of the employers business. Petitioners herein are nurse and nursing aide,
respectively in MCCH and thus, have no prerogative in the operation of the business. As also held in the Mercury
Drug case:
To protect labors security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so
as not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost always results
in strained relations, and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation, otherwise, an unjustly dismissed
employee can never be reinstated.
[18]

We cannot in our conscience allow MCCH to unjustly deny petitioners their lawful occupation, especially at this late
point in their lives when it would be a near impossibility for them to find another employment. The employers power to
dismiss must be tempered with the employees right to security of tenure. Time and again we have said that the
preservation of the lifeblood of the toiling laborer comes before concern for business profits. Employers must be
reminded to exercise the power to dismiss with great caution, for the State will not hesitate to come to the succor of
workers wrongly dismissed by capricious employers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51690 dated March 13,
2000 is REVERSED. Private respondent Metro Cebu Community Hospital is hereby ordered to reinstate petitioners
Noemi V. Cole and Elizabeth C. Bascon without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay them full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits computed from the time they were dismissed up to the time of
their actual reinstatement.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163942 November 11, 2008
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT
HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth Division), THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC),
PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., owner and operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V.
ALVEZ, respondents.
x----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 166295 November 11, 2008
NUWHRAIN-DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In G.R. No. 163942, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the National Union of Workers in the Hotel
Restaurant and Allied Industries Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter (Union) seeks to set aside the January 19, 2004 Decision
1
and
June 1, 2004 Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which affirmed the October 9, 2002
Decision
3
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02.
In G.R. No. 166295, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Union seeks to nullify the May 6, 2004 Decision
4
and
November 25, 2004 Resolution
5
of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 which affirmed the January 31, 2002
6
and March 15,
2002
7
Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Secretary).
Evolution of the Present Petitions
The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a five star
service establishment owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. located in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto and
Esperanza V. Alvez are impleaded in their official capacities as the Hotel's General Manager and Director of Human
Resources, respectively.
On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel.
As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining
deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01. Thereafter,
conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike Vote
8
was conducted by the
Union on January 14, 2002 on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike.
Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly at its office located in the
Hotel's basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, or on
January 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented these
workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards.
In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also
prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack
of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.
Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and
charging them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair
labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during
the illegal strike. The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor
practice and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout, which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-
019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the
Hotel, while they continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotel's compound.
On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members;
and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10
days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union
engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked
the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.
Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB which was docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting.
On the same day, the Secretary, through her January 31, 2002 Order, assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, which was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02. The
Secretary's Order partly reads:
WHEREFORE, in order to have a complete determination of the bargaining deadlock and the other incidents of the
dispute, this Office hereby consolidates the two Notices of Strike - NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01 and NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-
02 - and CERTIFIES the entire labor dispute covered by these Notices and the intervening events, to the NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended,
under the following terms:
x x x x
d. the Hotel is given the option, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to merely reinstate the dismissed or suspended workers
in the payroll in light of the special circumstances attendant to their reinstatement;
x x x x
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to the Secretary's Order, the Hotel, on February 1, 2002, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum,
9
directing some
of the employees to return to work, while advising others not to do so, as they were placed under payroll reinstatement.
Unhappy with the Secretary's January 31, 2002 Order, the Union moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied
per the Secretary's subsequent March 15, 2002 Order. Affronted by the Secretary's January 31, 2002 and March 15,
2002 Orders, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70778.
Meanwhile, after due proceedings, the NLRC issued its October 9, 2002 Decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02, in
which it ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRC
also held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts were committed by the
Union; and that the strike violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA, which thereby caused the dismissal
of 29 Union officers and 61 Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61 dismissed Union members
financial assistance in the amount of month's pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits under their
retirement plan whichever was higher. The NLRC explained that the strike which occurred on January 18, 2002 was
illegal because it failed to comply with the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period
10
and the seven-day strike ban,
11
as the
strike occurred only 29 days after the submission of the notice of strike on December 20, 2001 and only four days after
the submission of the strike vote on January 14, 2002. The NLRC also ruled that even if the Union had complied with the
temporal requirements mandated by law, the strike would nonetheless be declared illegal because it was attended by
illegal acts committed by the Union officers and members.
The Union then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision which was denied in the February 7, 2003
NLRC Resolution. Unfazed, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 76568, and assailed both the October 9, 2002 Decision and the February 7, 2003 Resolution of the NLRC.
Soon thereafter, the CA promulgated its January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which dismissed the Union's
petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC. The CA ratiocinated that the Union failed to demonstrate that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion and capriciously exercised its judgment or exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner.
For this reason, the Union filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA, in its June 1, 2004 Resolution, denied for lack
of merit.
In the meantime, the CA promulgated its May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 which denied due course to and
consequently dismissed the Union's petition. The Union moved to reconsider the Decision, but the CA was unconvinced
and denied the motion for reconsideration in its November 25, 2004 Resolution.
Thus, the Union filed the present petitions.
The Union raises several interwoven issues in G.R. No. 163942, most eminent of which is whether the Union conducted
an illegal strike. The issues presented for resolution are:
-A-
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING AN
ILLEGAL STRIKE ON JANUARY 18, 2002 DESPITE RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION THAT THEY PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTEL'S GROOMING STANDARDS
-B-
WHETHER OR NOT THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY VALIDLY BE DISMISSED AND MORE THAN 200
MEMBERS BE VALIDLY SUSPENDED ON THE BASIS OF FOUR (4) SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS OF RESPONDENTS
-C-
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS IN PREVENTING UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK
COMMITTED AN ILLEGAL LOCK-OUT
12

In G.R. No. 166295, the Union solicits a riposte from this Court on whether the Secretary has discretion to impose
"payroll" reinstatement when he assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes.
The Court's Ruling
The Court shall first dispose of G.R. No. 166295.
According to the Union, there is no legal basis for allowing payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual or physical
reinstatement. As argued, Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code is clear on this point.
The Hotel, on the other hand, claims that the issue is now moot and any decision would be impossible to execute in view
of the Decision of the NLRC which upheld the dismissal of the Union officers and members.
The Union's position is untenable.
The Hotel correctly raises the argument that the issue was rendered moot when the NLRC upheld the dismissal of the
Union officers and members. In order, however, to settle this relevant and novel issue involving the breadth of the
power and jurisdiction of the Secretary in assumption of jurisdiction cases, we now decide the issue on the merits
instead of relying on mere technicalities.
We held in University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor:
With respect to the Secretary's Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual
respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article
263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase
"under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the
idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.
13

Thus, it was settled that in assumption of jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should impose actual reinstatement in
accordance with the intent and spirit of Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. As with most rules, however, this one is subject to
exceptions. We held in Manila Diamond Hotel Employees' Union v. Court of Appeals that payroll reinstatement is a
departure from the rule, and special circumstances which make actual reinstatement impracticable must be shown.
14
In
one case, payroll reinstatement was allowed where the employees previously occupied confidential positions, because
their actual reinstatement, the Court said, would be impracticable and would only serve to exacerbate the situation.
15
In
another case, this Court held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed payroll
reinstatement as an option in lieu of actual reinstatement for teachers who were to be reinstated in the middle of the
first term.
16
We held that the NLRC was merely trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering
and serious problem.
17

The peculiar circumstances in the present case validate the Secretary's decision to order payroll reinstatement instead
of actual reinstatement. It is obviously impracticable for the Hotel to actually reinstate the employees who shaved their
heads or cropped their hair because this was exactly the reason they were prevented from working in the first place.
Further, as with most labor disputes which have resulted in strikes, there is mutual antagonism, enmity, and animosity
between the union and the management. Payroll reinstatement, most especially in this case, would have been the only
avenue where further incidents and damages could be avoided. Public officials entrusted with specific jurisdictions enjoy
great confidence from this Court. The Secretary surely meant only to ensure industrial peace as she assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute. In this case, we are not ready to substitute our own findings in the absence of a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion on her part.
The issues raised in G.R. No. 163942, being interrelated, shall be discussed concurrently.
To be determined whether legal or not are the following acts of the Union:
(1) Reporting for work with their bald or cropped hair style on January 18, 2002; and
(2) The picketing of the Hotel premises on January 26, 2002.
The Union maintains that the mass picket conducted by its officers and members did not constitute a strike and was
merely an expression of their grievance resulting from the lockout effected by the Hotel management. On the other
hand, the Hotel argues that the Union's deliberate defiance of the company rules and regulations was a concerted effort
to paralyze the operations of the Hotel, as the Union officers and members knew pretty well that they would not be
allowed to work in their bald or cropped hair style. For this reason, the Hotel argues that the Union committed an illegal
strike on January 18, 2002 and on January 26, 2002.
We rule for the Hotel.
Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees
as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we cited the
various categories of an illegal strike, to wit:
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz.:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions;
or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid
strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice
against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for
example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the
DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
18

With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is liable for
conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons:
First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to
undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of
the Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides
service to top-notch clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings.
The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of the Hotel with full
heads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something is
amiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need to
advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and
members deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by the fact that
after coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had their heads shaved or their hair cropped at
the Union office in the Hotel's basement. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed
and calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union's proposals.
In view of the Union's collaborative effort to violate the Hotel's Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the Hotel to
choose between allowing its inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of its
reputation, or to refuse them work, even if it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in
either way would disrupt the operations of the Hotel. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union
was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed to
inflict serious damage to the Hotel's finances or its reputation. Thus, we hold that the Union's concerted violation of the
Hotel's Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel's operations is an
unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.
Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the CBA's "No Strike, No
Lockout" provision, which reads:
ARTICLE XXII - NO STRIKE/WORK STOPPAGE AND LOCKOUT
SECTION 1. No Strikes
The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slow-down of work, boycott, refusal to handle
accounts, picketing, sit-down strikes, sympathy strikes or any other form of interference and/or interruptions with any
of the normal operations of the HOTEL during the life of this Agreement.
The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The
concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted "no strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibition
is squarely applicable and legally binding.
19

Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the
Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving
their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code.
20
This rule prohibits the commission of any act which will disrupt or
impede the early settlement of the labor disputes that are under conciliation. Since the bargaining deadlock is being
conciliated by the NCMB, the Union's action to have their officers and members' heads shaved was manifestly calculated
to antagonize and embarrass the Hotel management and in doing so effectively disrupted the operations of the Hotel
and violated their duty to bargain collectively in good faith.
Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it
conducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatory
periods before conducting or holding a strike. Records reveal that the Union filed its Notice of Strike on the ground of
bargaining deadlock on December 20, 2001. The 30-day cooling-off period should have been until January 19, 2002. On
top of that, the strike vote was held on January 14, 2002 and was submitted to the NCMB only on January 18, 2002;
therefore, the 7-day strike ban should have prevented them from holding a strike until January 25, 2002. The concerted
action committed by the Union on January 18, 2002 which resulted in the disruption of the Hotel's operations clearly
violated the above-stated mandatory periods.
Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as
shown by the pictures
21
presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human barricades and
obstructed the driveway of the Hotel. There is no merit in the Union's argument that it was not its members but the
Hotel's security guards and the police officers who blocked the driveway, as it can be seen that the guards and/or police
officers were just trying to secure the entrance to the Hotel. The pictures clearly demonstrate the tense and highly
explosive situation brought about by the strikers' presence in the Hotel's driveway.
Furthermore, this Court, not being a trier of facts, finds no reason to alter or disturb the NLRC findings on this matter,
these findings being based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA.
22
Factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.
23
Likewise, we are not duty-bound to
delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arrived at
arbitrarily and/or bereft of any rational basis.
24

What then are the consequent liabilities of the Union officers and members for their participation in the illegal strike?
Regarding the Union officers and members' liabilities for their participation in the illegal picket and strike, Art. 264(a),
paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides that "[a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status x x x." The law makes a distinction between union officers and mere union members.
Union officers may be validly terminated from employment for their participation in an illegal strike, while union
members have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to lose their employment status.
25
Thus, it is necessary
for the company to adduce proof of the participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts during
the strikes.
26

Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code which imposes the
penalty of dismissal on "any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike." We, however, are of the
opinion that there is room for leniency with respect to the Union members. It is pertinent to note that the Hotel was
able to prove before the NLRC that the strikers blocked the ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent
that the Hotel failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the Union members in the commission of illegal
acts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in judgment or diligence, we are constrained to reinstate the 61
Union members.
Further, we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal strike but were not identified to have
committed illegal acts are entitled to be reinstated to their former positions but without backwages.
27
We then held in G
& S Transport Corporation v. Infante:
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in
determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of
course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise
illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work,
the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officer's Guild v. Compaia Maritima, as affirmed
in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this
exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.
28

In this light, we stand by our recent rulings and reinstate the 61 Union members without backwages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA's May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The CA's January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 is hereby SET ASIDE. The October 9, 2002 Decision of the
NLRC in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS, as follows:
[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005]
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE
BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO
COMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO,
ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS
GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL
EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL
BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA
BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO,
ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and
JESUS STA. BARBARA, JR.,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57500 and its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
[2]

Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (the Union, for
brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc.
had been the bone of contention between the Union and the petitioner. The petitioners refusal to negotiate for a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike on April 15, 1993.
The Union had to contend with another union the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE)
which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida
Fadrigon granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution on November 18, 1994 granting the appeal. He,
likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to the
Court which rendered judgment on February 4, 1997 affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus:
1. Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned
Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and
2. Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center
Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.
[3]

The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr.
Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss matters
pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the Court.
[4]
However, in a Letter to the Union
dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic
Act No. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the
Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the
following grounds:
3) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents as
required by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union.
4) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the National Labor Relations Commission.
[5]

Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations in a Letter dated October 16,
1997 and suggested the date, time and place of the initial meeting. The Union further reiterated its plea in another
Letter
[6]
dated October 28, 1997, to no avail.
Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary Laguesma as affirmed
by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following
acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-
organization.
[7]

A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. On
November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be
dismissed;
[8]
the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the
meeting where the strike vote was conducted.
On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes
[9]
of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on
November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results
were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.
[10]

On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on December 1, 1997, the
Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Union
likewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions, not limited to contempt and other penalties, against
the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith, to
bargain collectively with the Union, to adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guilty
of unfair labor practices, and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises.
[11]

On December 4, 1997, the SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor dispute. The decretal
portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center pursuant to Article
263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-
four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all
striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease
and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.
Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and counter-
proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreements in compliance with aforementioned
Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.
[12]

In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work.
For its part, the petitioner filed a petition
[13]
to declare the strike illegal with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97. In its position paper, the petitioner appended the affidavit of
Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the property across the hospital which was being used as a parking lot, at the corner of
Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Also included were the affidavits of Simon J. Tingzon and
Reggie B. Barawid, the petitioners security guards assigned in front of the hospital premises. They attested to the fact
that no secret balloting took place at the said parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. of November 10, 1997.
[14]
The
petitioner also appended the affidavit of Henry V. Vera Cruz, who alleged that he was a member of the Union and had
discovered that signatures on the Statements of Cash Receipt Over Disbursement submitted by the Union to the DOLE
purporting to be his were not his genuine signatures;
[15]
the affidavits of 17 of its employees, who declared that no
formal voting was held by the members of the Union on the said date, were also submitted. The latter employees also
declared that they were not members of any union, and yet were asked to sign documents purporting to be a strike vote
attendance and unnumbered strike vote ballots on different dates from November 8 to 11, 1997.
In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those members who
alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997.
[16]

In the meantime, on September 30, 1998, the Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition
for the cancellation of the respondent Unions certificate of registration. The decision was affirmed by the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations on December 29, 1998.
In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision on December 23, 1998 in NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-12-08644-97 in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal. The fallo of the
decision reads:
1. Declaring as illegal the strike staged by the respondents from November 28, 1997 to December 5, 1997;
2. Declaring respondent Jaime Ibabao, in his capacity as union president, the other union officers, and respondents
Ronald Q. Centeno, Michael Eustaquio and Henry Vera Cruz to have lost their employment status with petitioner; and
3. Ordering the above respondents to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00) by way of damages.
[17]

The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was
furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the
Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported
by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the
strike vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code,
the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma
which was affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike.
The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered a Decision
[18]
on June 14, 1999, granting their appeal
and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioners petition to declare the strike
illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled as
follows:
We find untenable the Labor Arbiters finding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10, 1997, claiming
that this is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across the hospital, and the
sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that no strike voting took place in the parking
lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all because the same was conducted
in the parking lot immediately/directly fronting, not across, the hospital building (Annexes 1-J, 1-K to 1-K-
6). Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike
voting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro
forma (Annexes H-2 to H-19).
[19]

The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that the NCMB
decided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such
request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which the NCMB agreed,
the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the strike vote was conducted.
[20]

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the said motion on September
30, 1999.
[21]

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC on the following
allegation:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, AND CONTRAVENED THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN REVERSING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 23, 1998 (ANNEX E)
AND IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE STAGED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM NOVEMBER 28, 1997 TO
DECEMBER 5, 1997.
[22]

On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed decision and
resolution of the NLRC.
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the following
ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE NLRCS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT STRIKE.
[23]

The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a strike vote to the
Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is
merely directory and not mandatory. The use of the word shall in the rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably indicates
the mandatory nature of the respondent Unions duty to submit the said notice of strike vote.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared that the respondents
complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike. The petitioner insists that, as gleaned from the affidavits of the
17 union members and that of the overseer, and contrary to the joint affidavit of the officers and some union members,
no meeting was held and no secret balloting was conducted on November 10, 1997.
The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held on the said date by the
respondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular inspection of the area where the respondents
members allegedly held the voting. The petitioner also points out that it adduced documentary evidence in the form of
affidavits executed by 17 members of the respondent union which remained unrebutted. The petitioner also posits that
the CA and the NLRC erred in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter; furthermore, there was no need for the
respondent union to stage a strike on November 28, 1997 because it had filed an urgent motion with the DOLE for the
enforcement and execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118915.
The petition is meritorious.
We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule
XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads:
Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the
purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer,
corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose.
The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board
and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as
well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off
period provided in this Rule.
Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines,
nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and
effect of law.
[24]

Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending
to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24)
hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union
members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when
it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC,
[25]
the Court enumerated the
notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to
the NCMB:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the
NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30)
days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union
busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.

4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice
to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership
in the bargaining unit concerned.
5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.
A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a notice of
strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the soonest
possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the
failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary
arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is
obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with
the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat
strikes, union bossism and even corruption.
[26]
A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to
the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-
day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late.
[27]
The 15 to 30 day
cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of
the NCMB conciliator/mediator,
[28]
while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify
whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
[29]

The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for
the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the
NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any
acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the
request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for
the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at
least 24 hours of the unions decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot
determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The
failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the
holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union illegal.
In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB before it
conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained that no strike
vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.
Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
[30]
and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code,
[31]
no labor organization shall declare a strike unless supported by a majority vote of the
members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and
the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
[32]
The union is thus mandated to allege and prove
compliance with the requirements of the law.
In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the
NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever
took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the
respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards
Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on
November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not
members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC
and the CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative
weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and the CA
anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were uniform and pro forma.
We agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted by the respondent Union
on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay
Avenue, Quezon City. This can be gleaned from the affidavit of Barbacena and the joint affidavit of Tingzon and Barawid,
respectively:
1. That I am working as an overseer of a parking lot owned by Mrs. Madelaine Dionisio and located right in front of
the Capitol Medical Center, specifically at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City;
2. That on November 10, 1997, during my entire tour of duty from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., no voting or election was
conducted in the aforementioned parking space for employees of the Capitol Medical Center and/or their guests, or by
any other group for that matter.
[33]


1. That I, Simon J. Tingzon, am a security officer of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency (hereinafter referred to
as VPSSA), assigned, since July 1997 up to the present, as Security Detachment Commander at Capitol Medical Center
(hereinafter referred to as CMC) located at Scout Magbanua corner Panay Avenue, Quezon City;
2. That my (Tingzon) functions as such include over-all in charge of security of all buildings and properties of CMC,
and roving in the entire premises including the parking lots of all the buildings of CMC;
3. That I, Reggie B. Barawid, am a security guard of VPSSA, assigned, since June 1997 up to the present, as security
guard at CMC;
4. That my (Barawid) functions as such include access control of all persons coming in and out of CMCs buildings and
properties. I also sometimes guard the parking areas of CMC;
5. That on November 10, 1997, both of us were on duty at CMC from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with me (Barawid)
assigned at the main door of the CMCs Main Building along Scout Magbanua St.;
6. That on said date, during our entire tour of duty, there was no voting or election conducted in any of the four
parking spaces for CMC personnel and guests.
[34]

The allegations in the foregoing affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret
balloting took place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay
Avenue, Quezon City. The respondents failed to prove the existence of a parking lot in front of the hospital other than
the parking lot across from it. Indeed, 17 of those who purportedly voted in a secret voting executed their separate
affidavits that no secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997, and that even if they were not members of the
respondent Union, were asked to vote and to sign attendance papers. The respondents failed to adduce substantial
evidence that the said affiants were coerced into executing the said affidavits. The bare fact that some portions of the
said affidavits are similarly worded does not constitute substantial evidence that the petitioner forced, intimidated or
coerced the affiants to execute the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and NLRC are SET
ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.