Volume VII, Issue I Spring 2014 Te Ohio State University Allison Gorman Managing Editor for Content Marcus Andrews Communications Director Sam Whipple Marketing Director Holly Yanai Recruitment Chair Jim Schirmer Layout Editor JPIA Editorial Staf Cormac Bloomfeld Will Heinrichs Emily Noble Robert Reed Nima Dahir Cassidy Horton Evan Rogers Editors-in-Chief Rosie Izzi Todd Ives A special thanks to our faculty advisors, Dr. Paul A. Beck and Alicia Anzivine, and Te Ohio State Department of Political Science Chair, Dr. Richard Herrmann, for guiding us and making this journal possible. Te Journal of Politics JPIA and International Afars Volume VII | Issue I | Spring 2014 | Print Edition Contents Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution Saayee Arumugam, Te Ohio State University Producing (and Contesting) Gentrifcation in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global City Timothy Adams, Te Ohio State University Te Demographic Crisis in Russia Anna Dean, Te Ohio State University Somali Development Crisis: The Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia Bradley Hinger, Te Ohio State University 09 18 28 40 Te Journal of Politics and Internaltional Afairs at Te Ohio State University is published biannually through the Ohio State Department of Political Science at 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210. Te JPIA was founded in the autumn of 2006 and reestablished in Winter 2011. For further information, or to submit questions or comments, please contact us at journalupso@gmail.com All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrival system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the Editors-in-Chief of the JPIA. Te JPIA is copyrighted by the Ohio State Department of Political Science. Te content of all papers is copyrighted by the respective authors. All assertions of fact and statements of opinion are solely those of the authors. Tey do not necessarily represent or refect the views of the JPIA Editorial Board, the Faculty Advisors, Te Ohio State University, nor its faculty and administration. COPYRIGHT 2014 THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Editorial Foreword Editors-in-Chief Rosie Izzi Todd Ives Welcome, It is our great pleasure as the new Co Editors-in-Chief to present our frst edition of the Journal of Politics and International Afairs. Tis issue features the excellent work of a diverse set of Ohio State students, who have composed thorough, concise, unique, and well-written work to feature in our journal. Te editorial staf must be commended for their exceptional work in selecting and editing papers, promoting the journal, and having patience as we navigate the learning curves of taking over as Editors-in-Chief. For this edition, the Journal received many great submissions from across the country, but only four papers submitted by talented OSU students were chosen by our team of editors to be featured in this issue. As part of our goal of growing the Journals readership base and name across the country, we have increased our online presence on social media and worked with other organizations in the Political Science Department to increase outreach to students. As always, we are forever indebted to our wonderful Political Science Department for their support and backing throughout JPIAs inception. We would particularly like to thank Dr. Rick Herrmann for his belief and encouragement of the Journal, Dr. Paul Beck for his role as advisor for the Journal, and Alicia Anzivine for her assistance and guidance in our work. Finally, we would like to thank you, the reader for making this project meaningful. Our peers at Ohio State and across the country continue to produce extraordinary work that deserves to be showcased. Rosie Izzi and Todd Ives Editors-in-Chief 9 Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution Saayee Arumugam ABSTRACT. Recent advancements in directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have caused a boom in shale gas production. Simultaneously, environmental regulation has increased. Consequently, the coal industry is losing market share of the nations energy portfolio. Coal interests contend increased regulation is part of a greater war on coal waged by liberal political interests. While environmentalists overtly push for tighter regulations, the natural gas indus- try covertly provides charitable support to ensure regulations are implemented, through which competition from coal is limited. Environmentalists and gas interests have the same ends for very different reasons. This study applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation to discover the true driver behind the war on coal. 1. Introduction The recent boom in natural gas production has redefned the energy industry. Simultaneously, growing concern about climate change has fueled environmental policy debate. Economists, and the public at large, have a vested interest in understanding the implications of these seemingly clashing developments. While at face value it may seem that natural gas executives and environmentalists are at odds, they may in fact share common ends. This paper will examine the relationship between the regulatory policies sought by environmentalists and their impacts on the natural gas industry. Do these seemingly opposing parties actually share a common end? The question is a pressing one. Natural gas burns cleaner and more effciently than coal, which currently controls market share of the nations energy portfolio. As stricter emissions regulations are enforced, coals grip on market share will slip. Then, intuitively, the natural gas industry has an incentive to expedite this process. Are environmentalists providing politicians with a moral high ground as the natural gas industry quietly pads political war chests and secretly reaps the economic benefts of competition-limiting regulation? The natural gas industry and environmentalists may ft the paradigm of the bootleggers and Baptists coalitiondifferent actors who want the same ends for very different reasons (DeSombre 1995). I will apply Bruce Yandles bootleggers and Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution 11 10 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 Baptists theory of regulation to address the aforementioned question. In Section 2-I, I discuss the signifcance of the recent shale gas boom by reviewing existing literature. Later, Section 2-II delves into the bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation and establishes grounds by which the theory could explain the relationship between the natural gas industry and environmentalists. Section 3 provides a null hypothesis and empirical analysis utilizing public statements from politicians, lobbying disclosures, and records of campaign donations. Section 4 concludes. 2. Literature Review I. Background on Shale Gas Development Hydraulic fracturing, popularly known as fracking, has recently become an important and contentious topic in the United States. The process of fracking is nothing new; it dates back to the 1940s. It is a process of natural gas extraction in which water, chemicals and sand are pumped into a well at high pressures, which fractures the surrounding rock. These cracks are propped open by the sand or other proppants, which frees up trapped natural gas to fow from the fractures and be captured at the production well. In recent years, the advancement of directional horizontal drilling has allowed production of oil and gas in deep, shale rock formations previously thought to be too impermeable for commercial development (Kulander 2013). This set the stage for the modern day shale gas revolution. Natural gas production has soared in recent years, rising from approximately 16 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 1990 to over 22 tcf in 2010 (Tomain 2013). This has caused natural gas prices to decline and converge with coal prices. With such a boom, natural gas is capturing greater market share of the nations energy portfolio. In the electricity sector alone, natural gas has claimed about 30 percent of the market, while coal-fred electricity has declined from 50 percent to 42 percent (Tomain 2013). Figure 1 and Figure 2 below documents this shift in market share (data collected from United States Energy Information Administration): Old coal plants are retiring, and new projects face extensive review. This decline in coal is largely due to increased regulation and closer scrutiny by state regulators. States have become reluctant to approve construction of new coal plants due to the risk of dramatically increased utility rates that might result from national regulations and climate legislation (Powers 2010). When natural gas combusts, the amount of carbon dioxide produced is half that produced from coal combustion. Additionally, the externalities tied to coal combustion, including emissions of mercury, sulfur, and nitrous oxides, are all absent in natural gas combustion (Rao 2012). As a cleaner fuel, regulatory compliance costs for gas-fred power are lesser than costs for coal-fred power. By extension, natural gas interests leverage regulations to limit market competition from coal. Tighter emissions regulations enable natural gas to squeeze market share from coal. Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution 13 12 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 II. Bootleggers and Baptists Theory of Regulation Yandle derived his bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation from stories of states attempts to regulate alcoholic beverages by banning legal vendors from selling on Sundays. Baptists vehemently supported this policy to stop consumption of demon rum on Sundays. They endorsed such regulation on moral high ground. Bootleggers sought to limit competition, and thus tolerated the Baptists actions. Note it is not the broad Baptist principle, but the details of regulation that win the covert endorsement of bootleggers. For instance, bootleggers would not support limits on consumption, whereas Baptists would (Yandle 1983). A piece of regulation can be crafted such that it limits competition, yet gives the impression that it serves the public interest (Yandle 1983). Bootleggers who expect to proft from regulations sought by Baptists are vital to the process as they grease the political machinery with expected proceeds (Yandle 1999). The bootleggers and Baptists theory has often been applied to cases of environmental regulation, especially emissions policies. The scrubber regulations in the 1977 Clean Air Act ft the paradigm. All new coal-fred electric plants were required to be ftted with costly scrubbers, whether or not the plant burned dirty coal. Environmentalists, representing the Baptists, provided strong public support for such regulation, while interest groups tied to high-sulfur coal production quietly supported the regulation. Low-sulfur coal interests and consumers of electricity suffered, while high-sulfur coal interests captured positive returns from evening competition and claimed market share (Yandle 1999). This example provides a framework for the bootleggers and Baptists paradigm in the modern shale gas boom. 3. Hypothesis and Empirical Analysis I. Hypothesis The null hypothesis holds that no connection exists between the overt activities of environmentalists and covert actions of the natural gas industry to secure a common end. The alternative hypothesis supports the existence of the bootleggers and Baptists paradigm in which a connection exists. This model assumes for all intents and purposes, environmentalists overtly support policies reducing harmful emissions. In order to reject the null hypothesis, I must prove that environmentalists provided the moral high ground for politicians to support regulation, while the natural gas industry covertly greases the political machinery to ensure regulations are implemented. II. Empirical Analysis On June 25, 2013, President Barack Obama delivered his frst major speech, while in offce on climate change. He remarked: So today, for the sake of our children, and the health and safety of all Americans, Im directing the Environmental Protection Agency to put an end to the limitless dumping of carbon pollution from our power plants, and complete new pollution standards for both new and existing power plants. (Obama 2013) The increase in emissions regulation is explicitly justifed using rhetoric rooted in environmentalism. This satisfes the frst condition to reject the null hypothesispoliticians utilize environmentalism to take up moral high ground in pushing regulations. In Section 2-I, I have shown that the natural gas industry benefts from increased regulation over carbon and toxic air emissions. As a cleaner burning fuel, natural gas interests bear fewer compliance costs than coal interests. Thus, gas captures greater market share in the energy portfolio (Rao 2012). Logically, natural gas interests would favor harsher restrictions on emissions. Evidence suggests this holds true in practice. According to lobbying disclosures, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) spent $1,400,000 on lobbying 2013. INGAA declared climate change mitigation among their listed focuses, spending $280,000 on the issue. Additionally, the American Natural Gas Alliances third top recipient of funding was the Democratic Governors Association, which received nearly $126,000 in 2012. Most strikingly, fracking interests, mainly from Chesapeake Energy, donated $26 million to the Sierra Club for the Beyond Coal campaign from 2007-2010. In that time, the Sierra Club engaged in political lobbying and actively produced anti-coal literature and documentaries. Table A below lists U.S. Senators heralded by the League of Conservation Voters as the most pro-environment politicians in the 112th Congress. Table A also shows the amount of campaign contributions these Senators received from pro-fracking interests in election cycles from 2004- 2012 (two cycles at most). Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution 15 14 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 Table A Most Pro-Environment Senators and Campaign Donations from Fracking Interests Senator State Party Campaign Donations 04-12 Boxer CA D $6,650 Feinstein CA D $74,800 Bennet CO D $103,895 Udall, M CO D $69,850 Carper DE D $25,800 Coons DE D $2,000 Nelson FL D $18,000 Durbin IL D $12,000 Harkin IA D $13,500 Cardin MD D $22,885 Mikulski MD D $2,000 Levin, C. MI D $29,000 Franken MN D $3,000 Klobuchar MN D $7,000 Reid, H. NV D $30,250 Shaheen NH D $4,750 Menendez NJ D $20,900 Udall, T. NM D $19,800 Gillibrand NY D $23,500 Schumer NY D $16,350 Brown OH D $12,000 Merkley OR D $1,000 Wyden OR D $16,050 Reed, J. RI D $2,000 Whitehouse RI D $5,300 Johnson, Tim SD D $29,950 Leahy VT D $0 Sanders VT I $1,500 Cantwell WA D $5,750 Murray WA D $8,250 Rockefeller WV D $47,400 TOTAL CAMPAIGN DONATIONS $635,130 It is evident that natural gas interests are, indeed, quietly supporting politicians who push for increased environmental regulation, as documented in Table A. III. Results Two conditions were satisfed to reject the null hypothesis and suggest that the bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation is applicable to the shale gas boom. First, it is accepted truth that environmentalists overtly lobby for stricter environmental regulations. As illustrated, politicians use rhetoric evoking environmentalist themes in defending such regulation. Second, I have shown that the natural gas industry covertly supports these regulations. The private lobbying activities of the industry, including its campaign contributions to staunch environmentalists in the Senate, support this claim. The environmentalists, ftting the Baptists role, provide the public justifcation for politicians to sell to constituents. Meanwhile, the industry, ftting the bootleggers role, quietly endorses these regulations and pads campaign war chests, thereby securing durable regulation and private returns. 4. Conclusion The environmentalists and natural gas industry have the same ends, but for very different reasons. While the environmentalists are concerned with mitigating environmental concerns for posteritys sake, the natural gas industry is concerned with the private benefts of capturing coals market share in the US energy portfolio. The two actors, seemingly at odds like bootleggers and Baptists, have formed an unexpected coalition that has been successful in securing durable regulations benefting both parties. The bootleggers and Baptists model is a perpetual paradigm. In the long run, as natural gas captures greater market share from coal, gas interests will face diminishing gains from the bootleggers and Baptists relationship. Despite diminishing returns, bootleggers will continue their rent-seeking in order to capture share within the gas market. Large frms can shoulder the burden of high compliance costs unlike small frms. Hence, larger gas frms will seek competition-limiting environmental regulation, capturing market share from smaller frms. The perpetual bootleggers and Baptists paradigm will lead to economic consolidation among gas producers. The bootleggers and Baptists coalition is, by nature, one that goes unnoticed. Scholars have to look beyond what is easily seen. More often than not, durable regulation, as exemplifed by the standards on coal emissions, is belied by bootleggers and Baptists working in tandem. Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution 17 16 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 References Americas Natural Gas Alliance. Opensecrets RSS. http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ clientsum.php?id=D000046794. Database: Fracking Industry Contributions to 113th Congress. Citizens For Responsibility and Ethics in Washington. http://www.citizensforethics.org/pages/database-fracking-industry- contributions-to-113th-congress. DeSombre, Elizabeth. 1995. Baptists and Bootleggers for the Environment: The Origins of United States Unilateral Sanctions. The Journal of Environment and Development 4(1). 53-75. Interstate Natural Gas Assn of America. 2014. Opensecrets RSS. http://www.opensecrets.org/ pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00116145 Kulander, Christopher. 2013. Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Issues and Trends. Case Western Reserve Law Review 63(4). 10001-1041. League of Conservation Voters. 2012 National Environmental Scorecard. League of Conservation Voters. http://scorecard.lcv.org/. Obama, Barack. 2013. We Need to Act: Transcript of Obamas Climate Change Speech. Bloomberg. 25 June. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/-we-need-to-act- transcript-of-obama-s-climate-change-speech.html. Powers, Melissa. 2010. The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and The End Of Coal As A Source Of Cheap Electricity. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 12(2). 407- 436. Rao, Vikram. 2012. Shale Gas: The Promise and the Peril. Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI. Tomain, Joseph. 2013. Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy. Case Western Reserve Law Review 63(4). 1187-1215. Yandle, Bruce. 1983. Bootleggers and Baptists - The Education of a Regulatory Economist. Regulation 7(1). 12-16. Yandle, Bruce. 1999. Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect. Regulation 22(1) 5-7. Saayee Arumugam is a third year undergrad majoring in economics and political science. As an ardent student of public choice theory and regulatory economics, he specifcally applies economic theory in the realm of politics. Arumugam aspires to enter the policymaking arena, specializing in environmental and energy policy. Producing (and Contesting) Gentrifcation in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global City 19 18 Producing (and Contesting) Gentrifcation in Mumbai: Urbanization, Dislacement and Resistance in a Global City Timothy Adams ABSTRACT. Mumbai, the rapidly growing hub of Indian fnance capital, has been the locus of dramatic changes in urban governance over the last several decades. Once characterized by industrial production ad Indias mass working class movements, the state, private capital, and middle class residents of Mumbai are struggling to redefne the city in line with prevailing discourses of middle and upper-class conspicuous consumption and leisure. Practices of gentrif- cation -- the class-based transformation of urban space--have been essential to this physical and discursive remaking of the city, involving the wide-scale demolition and redevelopment of miles of informal and low-income housing, re- ferred to derogatorily as slums, and displacement of countless thousands of desperately poor residents. However, far from being helpless victims of an impregnable neoliberal juggernaut, slum residents and allies have organized to resist gentrifcation and demand more equitable housing conditions. This interplay of contesting interests among varying social scales and across institutions has been a defning characteristic of gentrifcation in Mumbai. Studying this exam- ple can provide us with a greater understanding of displacement and strategies of resistance in our own communities. Gentrifcation, or the class-based restructuring of urban space, has been transformed from a relatively isolated phenomenon contained to the advanced capitalist countries of the Global North to a generalized strategy of capital accumulation commonly utilized by the bourgeoning cities of Asia, South America and Africa. In Mumbai, a newly emerging hub of global fnance, gentrifcation has involved the disruptive and violent appropriation of working class and slum communities and a cultural struggle over the identity of the city itself. Although the urban state and private capital have been key actors in producing gentrifcation, the formal and informal strategies of resistance utilized by those facing displacement, in addition to the advocacy of the middle and upper-classes who desire gentrifcation, have fundamentally shaped the changes that have taken place. As I will show, the processes of gentrifcation in Mumbai have not been exclusively hierarchical or diffuse; rather, it has been a heterarchical process, enrolling individuals at all social scales in both the production and contestation of urban governance. In 1964, urban sociologist Ruth Glass identifed a peculiar spatial trend (Hackworth and Smith 2001). Middle and upper-class individuals, who had previously been confned principally to suburban communities, were purchasing and renovating houses in sites of severe poverty and capital divestment, increasing property values and displacing the poor residents. She termed this process gentrifcation, referring to transformation of city spaces by the landed gentry. Urban scholars refer to this upgrading of poor neighborhoods through the individual renovation of houses by wealthy individuals as second-wave gentrifcation (Smith 2002). Many urban scholars have expanded their understanding of gentrifcation beyond the limited set of second-wave practices identifed by Glass nearly 70 years ago. They now recognize gentrifcation to be a broad set of processes centering on the class-based transformation of urban space (Hackworth and Smith 2001; Smith 2002). This includes not only the physical restructuring of urban space the construction of new commercial buildings, hip sites of leisure and entertainment, and high-quality housing but also a discursive reimagining of the culture of cities and those who may legitimately reside within them (Hackworth and Smith 2001; Smith 2002; Fernandes 2004). This is clear in the development of the megacities of South Asia, especially Mumbai. Located on a peninsula in the western coast of India, Mumbai is an incredibly large and populous city, with over 16 million residents and a staggering population density of 24,000 people per square kilometer (Nijman 2010). Mumbais immense population has resulted in signifcant and systematic housing problems for more than a century (Nijman 2010). The most signifcant example of this is the prevalence of slums, defned broadly as destitute communities characterized by informal housing and employment. Over the last few decades, Mumbai has attempted to reconstitute itself as a site of global fnance and culture, elite leisure, and urban modernity (Fernandes 2004). However, nearly half of the citys population still lives in slums, while another quarter lives in low-quality housing (Nijman 2010). The intense density of the city, especially within slum areas, has practically guaranteed premium prices for slum land. Desperate to disassociate itself with discourses of poverty and slums and capitalize on the potential proftability of slums, the Mumbai state, along with major private capital, has carried out systematic reorganizations of people and space. The disruptive and often violent processes of urban transformation that characterizes contemporary development and gentrifcation in Mumbai is not a total break from the practices Producing (and Contesting) Gentrifcation in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global City 21 20 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 and strategies utilized in the past but is, in some ways, their continuation. Situating contemporary practices in a historical context illuminates the perpetuation of certain discourses and practices of urban governance and also reveals the ways that these have changed in response to both resistance and new developments in the broader socioeconomic context. The contemporary housing problems of Mumbai stretch well back into the period of British colonialism (Nijman, 2010). One example of this was the Native Town area of the city, reserved for the native, and especially poor, Indians, which grew enormously without any clear plan for ensuring the basic needs of residents. The 1872 census of Mumbai (then Bombay) stated, The intense density of the city has practically guaranteed premium prices for land, which has made slums an attractive target of redevelopment for the last several decades (Sundaram 1989:56, qtd. in Nijman 2010). Despite this awareness, the British largely ignored problems of housing and refused to undertake any serious efforts to address them. Severe health problems became common in Native Town and elsewhere, due to overcrowding and industrial pollution (Nijman 2010). As a result, the British shifted industrial production from this central region of the city to its outskirts, such as the northern town of Dharavi (Nijman 2010). Dharavi rapidly grew following independence until it became a site densely populated with poor migrants and heavily polluting industries. Over time, Dharavi greatly expanded to the north and northwest to occupy the heart of Greater Mumbai. Today, Dharavi has become a central target of slum redevelopment efforts as a result of its economically and politically strategic location (Nijman 2010). Throughout most of the 20th century, industrial production especially textile manufacturing served as the economic foundation of Mumbai (Anand and Rademacher 2011; Nijman 2010); Fernandes, 2004). Most of this production was located in slum and working-class communities, such as Dharavi and others. Industrial production in Mumbai was organized similarly to the Fordist industrial production strategies, based on mass production on assembly lines, standardized inputs, and strict divisions of labor, as seen in the United States (Fernandes 2004). As Mumbai developed into a center of industrial production, the city desired to appropriate and transform slum sites to foster the further development of industry (Anand and Rademacher 2011). However, also during this period, militant trade unions gained signifcant political and economic power and infuence throughout the city. Indeed, as Fernandes (2004) notes, through militant struggle, the industrial worker became conceptualized to many as the archetypal citizen of Mumbai, though this did not mean it was a site of worker-centered justice or leftism, as the policies and practices of the citys state certainly did not always conform to this imagination. Still, the relative power of trade unions during Mumbais manufacturing boom was signifcant in contesting and shaping the citys slum clearance projects (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The frst major post-independence attempt to eliminate slums in Mumbai emerged with the Slum Clearance Plan of 1956 (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The Plan utilized a strategy of direct slum clearance, demolishing slum communities, displacing residents without any providing any replacement housing, and establishing police surveillance in the razed sites. The purpose of the slum clearance strategy was to eliminate sites of economic and social disorder and establish new regulations to rationalize them. During the 1960s, the city began constructing public housing to provide accommodation to some of the residents displaced by the demolition project. However, there was not nearly enough public housing for the masses of people displaced by slum clearance (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The severe displacement and destruction wrought by the citys slum clearance programs provoked strong resistance (Anand and Rademacher 2011). Working class and poor residents of slum sites, often led by the renowned activist Mrinal Gore, known locally as water lady, organized to demand basic utilities, such as water and sanitation, and an end to wide-scale demolition. To that end, they organized morchas (protest marches) on the Bombay Municipal Corporation, which had governed the slum clearance project. Residents of slums, following Gores lead, made it clear that the problems of slums were the result of the failures of the state, rather than of the poor. They also demanded that the city should focus on improving slum areas if it was not able to construct public housing for all slum residents, (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The protests during the 1960s were somewhat successful in contesting and reshaping the citys housing programs, passing the Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act in 1971 (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The program inaugurated a change in the policy regime of urban governance that would continue until the early 1980s, although slum clearance remained a central strategy of urban development. The program inaugurated a strategy of slum improvement, as the slum residents had demanded. It created a Slum Improvement Board that constructed some infrastructure to extend basic utilities to slum areas. The city also attempted to Producing (and Contesting) Gentrifcation in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global City 23 22 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 organize slums on the basis of private property rights. It conducted a census of many slums areas, providing photopasses to residents deemed legitimate residents. These photopasses established legitimate access to the utilities extended by the Act of 1971 and conferred some protection from demolition. While the Act of 1971 certainly represented real improvements for many residents of slum communities, won through hard struggle, it ultimately perpetuated prevailing unequal and unjust social relations. For example, the photopass system that conferred ownership rights to some residents of slum communities also further marginalized and excluded those residents who were deemed illegitimate. Residents who were not given photopasses did not gain access to these utilities and faced the continual threat of displacement (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The regime of urban governance characterizing the 1960s through the early 1980s experienced a signifcant shock during the latter portion of the 20th century in response to changes in the broader political-economic context. Especially important was the collapse of the manufacturing economy, greatly disturbing the foundation of Mumbais economy (More and Whiteman 2007). Increasing global competition, paired with falling prices, signifcantly reduced the proftability of textile manufacturing This created serious demand among both private investors and city politicians for alternative, and more proftable, sites of capital investment. The citys private landowners saw the declining rent actualized through manufacturing and realized the potential for higher rents following the reorganization of land. All of these developments drove capital into the elite service sectors, especially fnance and real-estate. As Mumbais elite service sector has developed, the state and private capital have attempted to reorganize the city to refect and support the growth of its new economic orientation (Fernandes 2004; More and Whiteman 2007). This has involved the dismantling of working-class and poor centers and the construction of high-end restaurants, retail, and entertainment centers to cater to the middle and upper-class demands for hip leisure. This has also involved a renewed emphasis on slum clearance to eliminate what is perceived to be an obstacle to the citys desire to reach world- class status among the fnancial elite. As the political-economic characteristics of Mumbai have changed, its approaches to slum clearance have shifted signifcantly, utilizing strategies most representative of contemporary gentrifcation (Anand and Rademacher 2011; Smith, 2002). In 1995, the city passed the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS), establishing many of the practices of gentrifcation characterizing contemporary Mumbai. The policy exclusively targeted regularized slums, recognized as legitimate and endowed with some minimal property rights (Weinstein and Ren 2009). In contrast to previous strategies, the SRS strategy established a market-based approach to slum clearance and redevelopment . The purpose of this strategy was not only to remove the obstacle to proftability and the accumulation of capital represented by slums but, more fundamentally, to make the act of removal itself proftable. Under the SRS, the city contracted with private developers to redevelop slum areas (Anand and Rademacher 2011). In exchange for permits allowing the construction of luxury commercial and residential properties, private developers would construct high-rise public housing developments on the sites of demolished slums. The more units of public housing a developer constructed, the more permits for luxury construction it would receive. Although this strategy was hailed as progressive by policymakers, it provided assistance only to the small number of residents who were able to prove that they had lived in the demolished slum for several years, a feat practically impossible for many of them. Furthermore, by connecting public housing construction to the development of elite centers, it brought especially precarious populations into an environment of surveillance and control and directly linked slum clearance to the project of gentrifying Mumbai. Gentrifcation in Mumbai has not only been produced by the desires of the state and private capital but also through the demands of the middle and upper-classes. One example of this is the attempt by the urban middle and upper-classes to criminalize hawkers and remove them from public spaces (Anjaria 2006). Street hawkers, who set up informal businesses in city streets and passages, have been a common site in Mumbai for many decades, and the practice has been an important source of livelihood for countless people. More recently, NGOs and informal community groups, comprised primarily of middle and upper-class individuals, have begun characterizing hawkers as a nuisance that creates congestion, threatens public safety, and degrades the culture of the city (Anjaria 2006; Fernandes 2004; Ghertner 2011). In response to public pressure from the middle and upper-classes, the city ceased issuing the mandatory permits for street hawking. As a result, over 90% of hawkers today are in violation of the law and face the threat of state repression on a daily basis (Anjaria 2006). In November, 2004, the state announced its plan to demolish unregularized slums Producing (and Contesting) Gentrifcation in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global City 25 24 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 throughout the city (Weinsten and Ren 2009). The demolition was so systematic that by February over 90,000 homes had been destroyed. Because these slums were not recognized as legitimate, the city made no provisions for replacement housing. In some cases, the speed at which demolition was conducted resulted in the death of slum residents, whose houses were destroyed while they were still in them. Echoing the struggles against slum clearance in the 1960s, working-class and poor residents organized a massive protest movement to halt the demolitions. Thousands of slum residents and others held numerous protests outside the state government building. By the end of February, the state gave in to the movements demands and ceased demolitions (Weinstein and Ren 2009; Routledge 2010). The preceding examples only begin to illuminate the broad array of practices and discourses, strategies and policies of actors at all levels in society that characterize contemporary gentrifcation in Mumbai. Gentrifcation is always a drawn-out yet hierarchical project, enrolling individuals far beyond the state and private capital in the mission to reorganize urban spaces to accommodate the needs of investment and proft. However, as the examples of resistance outlined here demonstrate, gentrifcation is also highly contested and resisted, and the shape that it takes in a particular context often depends on the form that resistance takes, if it emerges at all. Although the case of Mumbai undoubtedly is unique, due to the immense size of the city and its slum communities, investigating the dynamics at work within this particular example can provide a more full understanding of gentrifcation and resistance elsewhere. Informed by this example, activists and scholars should begin to develop their own strategies of resistance to assist the struggle for justice and housing equity. References Anand, N., and Rademacher, A. 2011. Housing in the Urban Age: Inequality and Aspiration in Mumbai. Antipode, 43(5): 1748-1772. Fernandes, L. 2004. The Politics of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power and the Restructuring of Urban Space in India. Urban Studies, 41(12): 2415-2430. Ghertner, D. A. 2012. Nuisance Talk and the Propriety of Property: Middle Class Discourses of a Slum-Free Delhi. Antipode, 44(4): 1161-1187. Hackworth, J., and Smith, N. 2001.The Changing State of Gentrifcation. Tijdschriftvoor Economische en Sociale Geografe, 92(4): 464-477. More, N., and Whitehead, J. 2007. Revanchism in Mumbai? Political Economy of Rent Gaps and Urban Restructuring in a Global City. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(25): 2428-2434 Nijman, J. 2010. A Study of Space in Mumbais Slums. Tijdschriftvoor Economische en Sociale Geografe. 101(1): 4-17. Smith, N. 2002. New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrifcation as Global Urban Strategy. Antipode, 34(3): 427-450. Weinstein, L., and Xuefei, R. 2009. The Changing Right to the City: Urban Renewal and Housing Rights in Globalizing Shanghai and Mumbai. City & Community, 8(4): 407-430. 26 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 Tim Adams graduated from Ohio State University with dual degrees in political science and geography, and research distinction in geography. He completed an undergraduate research thesis that examined a case of public housing demolition and redevelopment in the Near East Side of Columbus, Ohio, and the role of OSU and other local institutions in organizing and effecting gentrifcation and neighborhood transformation. He also has participated in community coalitions for housing justice and equity. 27 Te Demographic Crisis in Russia 29 28 The Demographic Crisis in Russia Anna Dean ABSTRACT. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a prolonged period of population de- cline. This widely acknowledged demographic trend could, in the foreseeable future, have some serious implications. In regards to economics, depopulation will yield a diminution of the labor force, which then depreciates the nations overall economic potential. Socially, population decline initiates a breakdown of the nuclear family, which then in turn triggers the deterioration or at least the remaking of society as a whole. Lastly, the political ramifcations of Russian depopulation involve widespread civil unrest, fueled by extreme ethnic tensions between the shrinking Slavic population and the growing Muslim population. The culmination of all these factors bodes poorly for the future of Russia. In 2005, Vladimir Putin famously called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century (Frizell 2014). In April 2014, Ukrainian interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, pointing to the aforementioned quote and the recent events in the Crimea, claimed that Putin hopes to rebuild the Soviet Union (Frizell 2014). Many voices have articulated this concern, for Putins actions all tend to suggest that he wishes to restore Russia to a position of global prominence. However, Putin faces a number of obstacles in attaining this goal. One of the most signifcant obstacles lies in the nations demographics. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a prolonged period of population decline. This widely acknowledged demographic trend could, in the foreseeable future, overthrow all of President Putins ambitions and spell disaster for Russia. The following paper seeks to expound the argument that sustained Russian population decline inevitably precipitates a series of profound economic, social, and political implications. Therefore, rather than witnessing Russias restoration to all its former glory as President Putin hopes, the world will see a nation substantially weakened, since the extensive depopulation within Russia will, in all probability, fuel an economic, political, and social transformation of immense magnitude. Before examining each of the underlying causes in greater depth, the statistics that illustrate Russias demographic decline deserve some particular attention. In his book, Implosion, Ilan Berman explains Russias demographic decline in terms of a formula known as the total fertility rate or TFR (Berman 2013, 14). In order to sustain a stable population, countries require an average TFR of 2.1 live births per woman (Berman 2013, 14). Berman then cites U.S. Census Bureau statistics, stating: [I]n the years between 2000 and 2008, Russias average annual fertility rate was 1.34, far below the 2.1 necessary to maintain a population at its current size. Today, the situation is a bit better. According to U.S. government estimates, Russia now ranks 178th in the world, with a TFR of 1.61. (Berman 2013, 15) Despite this increase in Russias total fertility rate, many experts remain far from optimistic. For instance, the projections of the United Nations Population Division (UNPD) indicate that, in the year of 2030, Russias population will range only from 133 million to 115 million (Eberstadt 2009). The Russian Federations current population is about 143 million (Berman 2013). Thus, the UNPDs estimates appear quite daunting, revealing a decrease of 10 million people in seventeen years as the best-case scenario. These dismal forecasts most likely stem from the observed intransience of the underlying causes of Russias depopulation. Government offcials, economists, and political scientists have all named a wide range of reasons explaining Russias declining population; the most commonly articulated explanations include tremendously high mortality rates, a culture of abortion, an AIDS epidemic, and mass emigration. The abysmal and erratic mortality rates within Russia enjoy long-standing historical precedence. Russias turbulent past, including World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, World War II, Joseph Stalins purges, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, unsurprisingly yielded highly volatile mortality levels. Exploring Russias past and present life expectancy estimates provides great insight into the future of the country, since the single clearest and most comprehensible summary of a populations mortality prospects is its estimated expectation of life at birth (Eberstadt 2009). After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russias life expectancy estimates have remained noticeably low. Ilan Berman explains further, stating: In 2004, Russia ranked 122nd in the world in life expectancy, placing it in the bottom third of all nations and far out-side the norm for industrialized ones. By 2011, that number had Te Demographic Crisis in Russia 31 30 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 plunged some twenty-two places, to 144th. The average life expectancy for Russian citizens is now seventy years, putting them behind the citizens of Peru and Tongaand only slightly ahead of those in countries such as Tuvalu, Mongolia, and North Korea. (Berman, Implosion, 17) These deplorable mortality rates arise from persistent societal problems within Russia. Alcoholism is pervasive throughout Russia, and Russian scientists claim that twenty percent of the male deaths in modern Russia are alcohol-related (Berman 2013, 18). Similarly, violence remains highly problematic, considering that Russias patterns of death from injury and violence (by whatever provenance) are so extreme and brutal that they invite comparison only with the most tormented spots on the face of the planet today (Eberstadt 2009). The common culture of abortion within Russia is another important cause of the current depopulation. In the times of the Soviet Union, abortion was viewed as the best form of birth control; consequently, in 1965 the Health Ministry recorded 5.5 million abortions and only 2 million live births (Blyth 2013). The statistics from 1997 are equally as dismal, for they indicate that about seventy percent of Russian pregnancies ended in abortion (DaVanzo and Grammich 2001, 27). An article published by Reuters seeks to assure readers that wider availability of contraception and a resurgence of religion have reduced the numbers of abortions overall, but [the author must admit that] termination remains the top method of birth control in Russia (Reuters 2011). To compound the problems stemming from alcoholism, violence, and abortion, the Russian HIV/AIDS epidemic only exacerbates demographic and social woes. In 2000, the number of HIV carriers and AIDS patients is estimated to have increased fourfold, and this rapid spread of the disease is linked to the increasing intravenous drug use within Russia (DaVanzo and Grammich 2001, 56-57). Some 2.5 million Russians are addicted to drugs, and 90 percent of them use the heroin that has fooded into Russia from Afghanistan since the late 1990s (Mirovalev 2012). According to anti-drug czar Viktor Ivanov, heroin kills 80 Russians each day or 30,000 a year (Mirovalev 2012). The last commonly cited major cause of Russias dire depopulation problem is the fact that Russians have been feeing their homeland. More than two million people are believed to have left Russia during the thirteen years that President Vladimir Putin has been in power[and m]any of those who stay are thinking of leaving (Berman 2013, 23). The culmination of all of these factors casts a shadow over Russias future. The Malthusian theory of population, one of the most famous theories regarding both population and economics, maintains that population growth inevitably creates shortages, poverty, high unemployment, and all sorts of other economic ills. This disheartening notion, sometimes called the Malthusian fallacy, manages to persist in the minds of many journalists, economists, and political scientists today (Jacoby 2008). The persistence of this notion is unfortunate, since it leads many to believe that population decline is desirable. Nevertheless, the Malthusian theory of population proves false, for, as Jeff Jacoby argue in his article The Coming Population Bust, this discouraging notion fails to account for the potential inherent in each human being. Jacoby cogently states: Like other prejudices, the belief that more humanity means more misery resists compelling evidence to the contrary. In the past two centuries, the number of people living on earth has nearly septupled, climbing from 980 million to 6.5 billion. And yet human beings today are on the whole healthier, wealthier, longer-lived, better-fed, and better-educated than ever before True, fewer human beings would mean fewer mouths to feed. It would also mean fewer entrepreneurs, fewer pioneers, fewer problem-solvers. Which is why it is not an increase but the coming decrease in human population that should engender foreboding. (Jacoby 2008) Thus, according to Jacobys logic, Russias looming demographic crisis strongly suggests dire consequences for Russias economic prognostics. A shrinking labor force is likely to infict longstanding disadvantages on Russian economic potential, especially considering that Russias youth will begin to account for less and less of the total population. RIA Novosti, Russias largest news agency, reports that this trend is already coming to fruition; for, the Federal State Statistics Service maintains that the age group ranging from 15 to 29 made up only twenty-two percent of the total population in 2012, measuring 31.6 million people; whereas in 2009, it equaled twenty-four percent totaling 33.7 million (Pettersen 2013). This observation has many offcials worried. If this trend continues the number of young people in the age group of 15-29 could go down to 25 million in only ten years time, says Sergey Belokonev of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Pettersen 2013). Even President Putin has addressed the issue, though many of his critics complain the attention paid is both ephemeral and insignifcant. Still, the government has not been silent on the matter, and one article even claims that the Russian government has worked hard to foster a baby Te Demographic Crisis in Russia 33 32 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 boom, honouring families at pomp-flled Kremlin events, offering subsidies to parents with more than one child and even raffing off cars to women who give birth on the national holiday (Reuters 2011). Nonetheless, these efforts have done little in mitigating the impact of depopulation within the country, and many economists foresee signifcant economic problems in Russias near future. For example, in his book, Petrostate, Marshall Goldman contends that: Russias population shrinkage makes it diffcult to fnd enough young men to staff not only the army but also the industrial and agricultural workforce. [Furthermore,]a declining birth rate means that it will be harder and harder to support the increasing percentage of the population who have reached retirement age. (Goldman 2010, 198). Many economists regard youth as the safeguard for the future. Thus, when a countrys youthful population is steadily dwindling, the countrys prospective security dwindles alongside its people. In his article, Drunken Nation: Russias Depopulation Bomb, Nicholas Eberstadt paints an even bleaker picture for Russias future: Putins Kremlin made a fateful bet that natural resources oil, gas, and other extractive saleable commodities would be the springboard for the restoration of Moscows infuence as a great power on the world stage. In this gamble, Russian authorities have mainly ignored the nations human resource crisis. (Eberstadt 2009) In short, the likelihood that Russia will manage to outrun its demographic realities appear highly improbable. While natural resources are valuable, a thriving, innovative workforce remains the most vital driver in an economy. Consequently, Russia will feel the constraints of intractable population decline before long. The nuclear family, which typically comprises of a father, a mother, and a number of children born within wedlock, is the most basic unit of society. Historically, nuclear families have served as the societal building blocks that hold communities, states, and nations together. Therefore, the disintegration of this foundational unit of society, which coincides with sustained depopulation, proves immensely problematic. Russia has already shown signs that the nuclear family is steadily deteriorating. In 1980, Russias illegitimacy was relatively low, with less than one in nine newborns reportedly born out of wedlock; by 2005, however, reports indicated that Russias illegitimacy ratio almost tripled, approaching thirty percent (Eberstadt 2009). Additionally, marriage is increasingly less common and less stable (Eberstadt 2009). Consequently, nuclear families are becoming more and more rare, and those that persist tend to beget a noticeably smaller number of children. These trends appear quite irreversible, as Eberstadt articulates below: [T]his much is clear: to date, no European society that has embarked upon the same demographic transition as Russias declining marriage with rising divorce, the spread of cohabitation as alternative to marriage; delayed age at marriage and sub-replacement fertility regimens has reverted to more traditional family patterns and higher levels of completed family size. There is no reason to think that in Russia it will be any different. (Eberstadt 2009) If Eberstadt is correct, then Russia must contend with the constraints imposed by the changes within the family structure. In a book which documents the proceedings of a seminar held by the Council of Europe on the Implications of a Stationary or Declining Population, Max Wingen addresses how a declining population impacts the basic structure of the family, which then in turn reorganizes the entire structure of society. Wingen argues that long-term depopulation inevitably leads to lasting structural changes in the composition of the parent-child community which is one of the important elements of family socialization (Council of Europe 1976, 100-101). This consideration leads Wingen to suggest that the tendency towards smaller families may modify the capacities of the family in such a way as to render it largely powerless to fulfll its elementary social, education and cultural functions (Council of Europe 1976, 101). Furthermore, [i]t is often notedthat very small (one-child) families tend to form a milieu that is not conducive to socialization; the same is true of two-child families where the children are widely spaced, so that in practice two only-child situations occur (Council of Europe 1976, 101). These suppositions do not bode well for Russia, since a large number of Russian families, whether traditional or otherwise, are opting to have only one or two children. Since this is the case, many families will form the aforementioned milieu that hinders the parents ability to socialize their children. Socialization is the main mechanism through which families shape society. Thus, if families are rendered unable to perform this function, then some other body must fll this void. As soon as some other social organ assumes this role, the structure of society is fundamentally altered. This alteration could occur in the following manner. Considering that the family is the smallest, most basic unit of society, it is logical to infer that whichever social organ undertakes the task of socializing the Te Demographic Crisis in Russia 35 34 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 nations youth will unavoidably be larger and more complex than its predecessor. Once power or responsibility transfers to a more complex body, the signifcance of the family unit will most likely decrease even more. In sum, generations of children will turn to the larger and more complex social organ in order to receive elementary social, educational, and cultural instruction, and the familys societal importance will diminish and perhaps become a merely nominal unit of society. While these particular prognostications may never come to pass, the fact remains that Russias demographic crisis will have serious social implications, and the future of Russias stability will depend entirely on the reconstruction of the basic structures of Russian society. The political implications of the prospective demographic changes within Russia similarly indicate foreseeable complications to President Putins global ambitions for the nation. In addition to the other consequences attending Russian depopulation, which are hardly trivial, the rising Muslim population within Russia coinciding with the shrinking Slavic population sets the stage for extensive civil unrest. The growth of Islam in Russia is indisputable, and some analysts warn of the immensity of this trend, arguing: The implications of Islams ascendance in Russia are hard to overstate. Russia is going through a religious transformation that will be of greater consequence for the international community than the collapse of the Soviet Union, Paul Globe, a leading expert on Russias Muslims, has said. Russias religious transformation is still unfolding. At their current rate of growth, Muslims will make up one-ffth of Russias population by 2020. And by the middle of this century, offcials in Moscow predict that the Russian Federation might become majority Muslim. (Berman 2013, 30) Such a profound transformation appears exceedingly probable. The Muslim community continues to fourish, while the Slavic majority fails to meet the total fertility rate of 2.1 necessary for replenishment. Furthermore, [e]xperts say only migration can help plug the demographic black hole, but that is a solution with potential explosive side effects given the countrys ethnic tensions (Reuters 2011). Russia has had a long history of ethic tensions stemming from religious differences, which is only exacerbated by radical Islamic terrorism. These tensions, which are especially noticeable in the North Caucasus, have received particular attention in the media due to the Chechen involvement in the Boston Bombing terrorist attack and the security fears that accompanied the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Nevertheless, whether the media notices or not, the tensions are real, and they will have momentous repercussions as the demographic shift takes place. Today, the unrest is spreading from the North Caucasus to Russias heartland, and ethnic violence is on the rise (Berman 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rise in ethnic violence in Russia has been propelled by a surge in extreme right-wing nationalism (Berman 2013, 34). Even so, Russian nationalism is not limited to the Far Right, as Berman illustrates below: More and more, Russians from across the political spectrum are identifying with and organizing around a nationalism that is increasingly tinged with racism. The level of xenophobia today is rising among various social groups, Russias Civic Chamber, an offcial civil society oversight body created by Vladimir Putinnoted in its 2012 annual report. An especially sharp rise can be observed among the citizens of major cities and among those people with high levels of education. Their phobias relate frst and foremost to migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, and are motivated by insurmountable cultural differences. The result has been the creation of what one specialist has called a fashion for xenophobia throughout the country. (Berman 2013, 35) These observations dishearten many who wish to see Russia embrace a more tolerant culture, since the political and cultural divisions between the shrinking Slavic majority and the growing Muslim minority appear to be worsening. Prejudices among the Slavic population are reinforced by brutal terrorist attacks, which occur with horrifying frequency. Russias most violent terrorist organization, the Caucasus Emirate, carried out 511 terrorist attacks in 2009 alone, and by the end of 2010, the number had jumped to 583 (Berman 2013, 45). To complicate matters further, the local attitudes in Russias Muslim communities demonstrate a hardening of radical religious beliefs. Berman describes these beliefs, saying: A poll conducted in early 2011 by the regional journal Nations of Dagestan found that 30 percent of Dagestani youth, including members of Dagestans universities and police schools, said they would choose to live under a Muslim-run religious regime. More than a third of those polled indicated they would not turn in a friend or family member responsible for terrorism to authorities. These fndings mirror those of human rights groups and NGOs active in the Caucasus, which have documented an upsurge in support for Islamic extremism and adherence to radical religious ideas there. (Berman 2013, 45- Te Demographic Crisis in Russia 37 36 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 46) Evidently, the polarization between the Slavic and Muslim populations is currently a self- perpetuating cycle. Islamic extremism is present in some of the Muslim communities within Russia. This leads the Slavic majority to distrust the Muslim minority. This distrust angers the Muslim minority and further alienates them from the Slavic majority. The alienation causes more people in the Muslim minority to embrace Islamic extremism, which only restarts this destructive cycle of polarization. Therefore, due to the increasing polarization between the Slavic majority and the Muslim minority, Russias demographic transformation threatens its future political stability. In conclusion, the looming demographic crisis in Russia is leading the nation down an unsettling and unfamiliar path. While the future is by no means certain and predictions are wholly speculative, the declining population within Russia undoubtedly raises substantial economic, social, and political concerns. In summation, depopulation has the potential to decimate the labor force, destroy the structure of the nuclear family, and generate civil unrest. The culmination of all these factors casts a shadow of uncertainty over the future of Russia. Nevertheless, the Russian government, led by President Putin, appears relatively unmoved by these prognostications, as Eberstadt describes, stating: Moscows leadership is advancing into this uncertain terrain not only with insouciance but with highly ambitious goals. In late 2007, for example, the Kremlin outlined the objective of achieving and maintaining an average annual pace of economic growth in the decades ahead on the order of nearly 7 percent a year But history offers no examples of a society that has demonstrated sustained material advance in the face of long-term population decline. It seems highly unlikely that such an ambitious agenda can be achieved in the face of Russias current demographic crisis. Sooner or later, Russian leadership will have to acknowledge that these daunting long-term developments are shrinking their countrys social and political potential. (Eberstadt 2009) Thus, while Russias demise is far from inevitable, these daunting long-term developments are hard to ignore. Furthermore, the longevity of the major causes of Russias declining population, namely alcoholism, violence, abortion, drug abuse, an AIDS epidemic, and mass emigration, solidify the presumption that Russia will not attain its former glory. Instead, the world will see a fundamentally transformed Russia, since the extensive population decline will essentially remake the nation, though probably not in accordance with President Putins ambitions. Te Demographic Crisis in Russia 39 38 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 References Berman, Ilan. 2013a. Implosion: The End of Russia and What It Means for America. 2013b. Russia, Poised for Failure: Column. USA Today. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/ opinion/2013/09/17/russia-putin-far-east-failure-column/2828717/>. Blyth, Kristen. 2013. Abortion: A Matter of Life and Death. The Moscow News. http:// themoscownews.com/russia/20130813/191845415/Abortion:%20A-matter-of-life-and- death.html. DaVanzo, Julie, and Population Matters (Project). 2001. Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the Russian Federation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Eberstadt, Nicholas. 2009. Drunken Nation: Russias Depopulation Bomb. World Affairs Journal. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/drunken-nation-russia%E2%80%99s- depopulation-bomb (May 6, 2014). Frizell, Sam. 2014. Ukraine PM: Putin Wants To Rebuild Soviet Union. TIME.com. http:// time.com/69161/ukraine-yatsenyuk-putin-soviet-union/ (May 6, 2014). Goldman, Marshall I. 2010. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. Jacoby, Jeff. 170AD. The Coming Population Bust. Boston.com. http://www.boston.com/ bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/06/18/the_coming_population_bust/ (May 6, 2014). Mirovalev, Mansur. 2012. Russia Drug Abuse Top Problem, According To Poll. Huffngton Post. http://www.huffngtonpost.com/2012/07/12/russia-drug-abuse_n_1667786.html (May 6, 2014). Pettersen, Trude. 2013. Russias Youth Population in Steady Decline. Barentsobserver. http:// barentsobserver.com/en/society/2013/06/russias-youth-population-steady-decline-19-06 (May 6, 2014). Reuters. 2011. Russia: Worlds Highest Rate of Abortions. Daily News. http://www.iol.co.za/ dailynews/lifestyle/russia-world-s-highest-rate-of-abortions-1.1176756#.U2h7e_ldWSp. Seminar on the Implications of a Stationary or Declining Population, and Council of Europe. 1978. Population Decline in Europe: Implications of a Declining or Stationary Population. New York: St. Martins Press. Anna Dean graduated The Ohio State University in May of 2014 with a degree in Political Science and International Relations summa cum laude with Honors Distinction. Next fall she will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Philosophy at the University of Dallas. 41 Somali Development Crisis: Te Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia 40 Somali Development Crisis: The Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia Bradley Hinger ABSTRACT. Somalia still has a problem with ineffective central governance that began when colonial rule ended in the 1960s. Recently, a new democratic government has taken offce vowing to bring an end to this troubling post-co- lonial legacy. Despite its promotion of a new vision for the country, Somalis continue to be plagued by violence, malnutrition, and political and economic instability. This paper argues that responsibility for this uphill struggle lies in Western redevelopment strategies that aim to liberalize the global south. Neoliberal discourses of entrepreneurialism and self-responsibility have allowed the new Somali government to disengage from enacting policies to change the harsh and unforgiving living environment that many Somalis experience every day. Neoliberal governmental failure to regulate and direct change in Somalia has affected two important populations, both committed to the development of the, in different ways. Grafting Western neoliberal values onto a previously illiberal nation has only exacerbated the inequality, contradictions, and dissonance that it set out to remedy. As globalization allows for the easy transfer of ideas, neoliberalism has become especially salient in governance frameworks. Strategies for the development of economically underperforming cities and countries have been dominated by neoliberal thought. Discourse frames social and political strategies in economic terms, using various techniques to get individuals, populations, institutions, and spaces to act entrepreneurial (Spence 2012). These ideas of reliance on the private sector and individual responsibility are very characteristic of what has been called roll out neoliberalism. The downward rescaling of the states economic regulatory involvement has been a recent occurrence over the past 30 years. During the 1980s, a dismantling or roll-back of Fordist-Keyensian policies of capital accumulation led to a state withdrawal from its typically welfarist regime (Coq-Huelva 2013). A decade later, in place of these policies, the state began to encourage, or roll-out, policies onto the private sector, changing the structure of the system entirely. Responsibility for socio-economic issues such as welfare, crime, unemployment, and homelessness was then placed on the individual, and continues to be today. However, this is not to say that the state has no role in controlling these issues. The emphasis has switched from direct state involvement in correcting these problems to one of state regulation of private responses (Peck and Tickell 2002). The mentality of neoliberalism with its promotion of self-responsibility and competition has been quickly pushed by economically and politically stable countries upon developing nations. However, little attention is paid to their historical context and institutional performance. What allows this framework to be easily transferable is its use of the idea of the expert. Politically and economically dominant countries have developed an expertise about economic matters that these emerging nations lack. Expertise comes along with discourses of truth and reason, using rational choice to get people to recognize and act on their (narrow) self-interest problems and their solutions are taken out of the realm of politics traditionally considered because they are viewed as being truthful and objective (Spence 2012). Developing nations coopt these strategies, which appear to work so well in other contexts, and attempt to apply them to the distinct situations in their countries. This has happened to many different countries, in various states of development. Discourses of world class cit[ies] in India (Ghertner 2012; Ellis 2012), policies for economic recovery through housing in Brazil (Nuijten et al. 2012), and the urbanization of China (He and Wu 2009) have blinded these governments and policy makers to the realities of the lived environment which they intend to change. Here, we will focus on how roll-out neoliberalism has been pushed on different groups within Somalia with differing effects due to different experiences and identities. It will show that neoliberal discourses of individual responsibility and competition continue to overshadow and divert accountability of the Somali government for the poor living conditions in the country. First, this paper will give a background to the Somali confict and explain the roots of many of the social and political problems that continue to plague the nation. Next, the paper will show the ways the country has encouraged and reaped the benefts of the diaspora, Somalis displaced from the country as a result of instability, as an ideal neoliberal subject. It will show how these discourses of economic redevelopment and social progress have pushed individuals within the Somali diaspora to prop up the poor and disadvantaged. This has helped the state disengage from the task of long term change. Finally, it will show how attempts to harness the neoliberal subjects within Somalia have failed despite the encouragement of self-responsibility and citizen involvement. In a recent talk at The Ohio State University, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud explained that Somalia was a young country, its history only going back 40 years (Mohamud 43 Somali Development Crisis: Te Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia 42 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 2013). He appealed to the sizable Somali audience, most of whom were members of the large diaspora population in Columbus, to come back and use the skills and experiences that they had gained in the United States to help shape and rebuild the country. He positioned them at the forefront of a new Somalia, assuring them that the country was starting to turn itself around; that there were institutions to support them in their business ventures. There was no talk of state help for the starving or the unhealthy masses that still reside in the country. Instead, he appealed to neoliberal ideas, asking the diaspora to bring their savings earned abroad back to the country. Mohamuds speech is a clear example of roll-out neoliberalism in which the private sector become[s] responsible for tasks formerly considered to be the responsibility of the state (Nuijten et al. 2012). The Somali government has bought into the neoliberal mentality that has been pushed onto it by Western governments as the ultimate strategy for redevelopment. The Somali government is trying to use discourses of responsibility to spur on the Somali people to rebuild the economy for them. However, these efforts have gone unheeded as the leaders have been unable to harness the neoliberal subjects within the country to rebuild. A Short Somali Political History Pre-Colonial Somali political structure was a highly federalized system as it followed very closely their clan based societal organization. These clans consist of people connected through various levels of kinship and social classifcations. They still exist today and continue to hold power in times of central government instability. There are fve levels: clan-group, clan, sub-clan, primary lineage, and dia-paying group (Lewis 1982, 4). Each of these segments has different functions and a decreasing number of members. The clan-family is the broadest and highest level of the clan structure. There are four main nomadic clan families: the Darood historically centered in the middle of the country, the Isaaq in the north, the Hawiye in the east and far south, and the Dir in the far north as well as two historically agricultural clan families, the Digil and the Rahanweyn, are historically based in the south along the coast (Lewis 1982, 9). These families can consist of more than a million members and for that reason are not very politically coherent. However, clan-family ties are very strong among individuals and can cause otherwise non-existent tensions among people of differing clans. Usually, these clan ties are measured back approximately 30 generations to a common ancestor (Lewis 1982, 4). Between the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, Somalia was subject to various regimes of European colonial power, with control passing from Portugal to Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. These colonial powers composed illegitimate boundaries and different colonial histories, languages, and political systems, which began to create new, previously nonexistent cleavages within the country as well as solidify and institutionalize those already existing (Besteman 1999, 12). This practice is unremarkable as it was repeated time and time again by colonial powers throughout the region and the globe. However, particularly in Somalia, it served to create very defnite geographical axis of difference, legitimizing and exacerbating these cleavages. In the summer of 1960, both the British and what had been the Italian territories in Somalia gained their independence and the frst Somali Republic was established. This republic saw a well-functioning democracy with multiparty elections for nine years (Adam 2008, 1). However, clans increasingly fought for group dominance and the government was ripped apart by corruption and infghting. In October 1969, Siyaad Barre successfully conducted a military coup, wresting control of the country. Barre aligned Somalia with the Soviet Union and it began to fund his increasingly powerful army. The Soviet support came as a result of Barres adherence to scientifc socialism (Adam 2008, 9). This socialism promoted a reliance on education, training, technical competence, specialization, and experience in order to further support institutions that were functioning reasonably well (Adam 2008, 10). However, socialism was short lived in Somalia and quickly Barre began to shift his focus from objective qualifcations for power to clan specifc appointments. This clan-based favoritism used trustworthy men selected by the ruler to be placed in positions of power and control (Adam 2008, 10). Specifcally, Barre favored members of the Darod clan- family in his own sub-clan, Marehan, his mothers, Ogaden, and that of his son-in-law, Dulbahante (Adam 2008, 11). Soon, rich or powerful members of other clan groups began to feel persecuted under Barres rule. He began to arrest and exile any opposing clans in the Somali ruling class. Eventually Somalia was cut off from Soviets and began to be funded by The United States, Italy, and China. Barre began to incite wars between other threatening clans, arming some against others and aggravating existing clan tensions to prolong his power. Eventually, the United States began to question the Somali governments human rights record and withdrew both economic and military aid by 1989 and in the beginning of 1991, the Barres regime came to an end (Adam 2008, 15). 45 Somali Development Crisis: Te Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia 44 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 In the years that followed Siyaad Barres fall from power, there was general lawlessness resulting from an attempted power grab by many different clan leaders and warlords trying to fll the political vacuum. The factional fghting eventually became a civil war reportedly costing the lives of 300,000 people in 1992 (Shay 2008, 10). Operation Restore Hope, started by the UN with the help of the United States, set out to provide nutritional aid to the thousands of people starving due to the war, disarm fghting factions, and attempt to formulate a Western style government (Shay 2008, 10). Despite its lofty goals, the UN quickly found itself in a much more precarious situation as they came under heavy losses in battles against local militias. Additionally, these militias began to see control of food distribution as an important means by which to gain control over the country. For that reason, many of the different factions sought themselves to gain power over UN relief dispersal and use it as they saw ft. This exacerbated the humanitarian crisis present in Somalia even further (Shay 2008, 11). After the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, informal Islamic courts were created to maintain order in the country. The success of these courts is attributed to their ability to maintain order through strict discipline under Sharia law (Shay 2008, 99). These informal groups eventually evolved into a more centralized pseudo-government called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was characterized by highly repressive governance and radical Islamic law. In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. began to see the intensifcation of Islamic rule in Somalia as a possible breeding ground for terrorist activity. It decided to take action and supported the Ethopian dismantling of the ICU in 2006. The Ethiopian military rule of the capital was brutal and contributed to the further crumbling of Somali society. Many Somalis saw the U.S.s participation in the overthrow of the ICU as a power grab spurred only by fears of an increase in international terrorism stemming from the country and became wary of Western involvement in Somali politics (Ibrahim 2010). After Ethiopian troops took control of the south of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a government that had been founded in 2004 and ousted by the ICU in June of 2006, was restored to power (Shay 2008, 121). The TFG was a Western style centralized democracy, and many Somalis were wary of it due to its history of corruption and marginalization of large sections of society (International Crisis Group 2011). Despite this, on Monday August 20, 2012, a selection committee made up of clan elders selected 250 individuals for the 275 member parliament and in early September of that year, Hassan Sheik Mohamud was elected president (Al-Jazeera 2012a, Al-Jazeera 2012c). In the summer of 2012, a provisional constitution was drafted but it is still awaiting endorsement by parliament (Al-Jazeera 2012d). Responsibility and Development In an opinion piece posted on Al-Jazeera, former Somali Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon wrote that Somalia has turned a corner and there is no going back (Shirdon 2013). He explained that Somalia was seeing a return to normalcy as exemplifed by extension of government into outer regions, economic recovery, and the return of social organizations such as a new sports club. In a similar article, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud talked about the great progress that has been made in the judicial and economic sectors, as well as the security of the nation. (Mohamud 2013b) He acknowledged the gains that still must be made, however. He assured readers that new political systems taking root and promotion of democratic values in the country have and will continue to help the country rise above, what he called, merely being dealt a bad hand. Through the optimistic outlooks of these political leaders, one would hardly expect there to be the stagnation of solutions to extensive poverty, inequality, and lack of representation present in Somalia. Still, however, it appears that their optimism may be unfounded. We must ask, what is the function of these public statements in light of all of the negative press? These statements play a role in persuading members of the Somali diaspora to bring their money and skills back to Somalia. In this section I will examine how Somalis are asked to examine the environment in the country as a place of investment for the individual entrepreneur. Little to nothing was said about the diasporas distinct history in and away from Somalia, working on the assumption that theses Somalis wanted to return to the country. Additionally, Somalia was not framed as a place to live but instead to spend, thereby framing the country as a whole in a distinctly neoliberal manner. In the Al-Jazeera article, former Prime Minister Shirdon is, without a doubt, attempting to engage with would-be Somali investors. He explains the institutions that supposedly exist, as well as those being built, promise the security of investments. Shirdon talks of Somalia having a bright future being within touching distance (Shirdon 2013). Similarly, President Mohamud assures partnersthat we are on the right path (Mohamud 2013b). This branding of Somalia as a stable and secure country is just one discourse in a cacophony of chatter around what Somalia could be. Like a new business in need of capital, Somalia is presenting itself as a land of possibility with 47 Somali Development Crisis: Te Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia 46 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 a multitude of opportunities for monetary gain. Somalia remains a nation of many subjectivities despite the fact that the government continues to talk of the country as a homogenous nation. It is often framed as a nation where all people embody what is Somali and want the same outcome for the country. This is exemplifed by Mohamuds speech at Ohio State. His positioning of the country as a mere 40 years old has created a common, yet undoubtedly sanitized, history for the people in the country. This discursive homogenizing of identities is a distinctly neoliberal practice in the way it tries to reproduce a more easily governed uniformity through talk of national identity and Somali unity. The essentializing of identities helps to form seemingly smooth and constant populations, despite the absence of such, to be targeted the diaspora. The push of these ideals on the diaspora is not surprising as it is already a major player in the countys economy by means of sending remittances. It is estimated that the diaspora sends around $2.3 billion back to Somalia every year, or approximately 35% of the Somali GDP. These remittances make up around 80% of the startup capital for Somali businesses (UNDP 2012, 30). The government understands the power that this money has in helping the Somali economy to stay afoat (Mohamud 2013b). As long as the leaders of Somalia reap the benefts of this cash fow, they will refuse to acknowledge their unwillingness to produce long term progress within their country through policy decisions. In his speech, the President beseeched the members of the Somali community in Columbus come back to Somalia to set up businesses as well as help to rebuild the country (Mohamud 2013a). Somalia has been framed as a place prime for the competitive processes that neoliberal thought encourages. President Mohamud has not only set Somalia forward as a place of investment for non-Somali investors but has pushed the idea of the diaspora as a group of investors to be won over. He told the diaspora to start businesses in Somalia as the time was ripe and the economic environment ideal, peddling in entrepreneurial discourse. These people would be cash cows for the Somali government even more than they already are through remittances if they were to bring their money and entrepreneurial skills back to Somalia. Mohamud placed the responsibility for the recovery of the country on the people who no longer lived there by also leveraging emotions against them. He talked of families left behind in Somalia who would need help to restore the country. The tone of his talk seemed to put forward the idea that if the people who had gained skills, not to mention supposed reserves of cash, and experience living in the United States would not help their families and fellow Somalis, then no one would. He disassociated the role of the government from the welfare of its people by explaining that they were doing what they could by creating and maintaining the structures and security necessary to rebuild a Somali economy and boost the well-being of the Somali people. The shifting of social responsibility from the state to the people is a distinctively neoliberal idea and has played out in many different ways in different contexts (Fairbanks 2011; Rankin and Delany 2011; DeFillipis et al. 2006). For this reason, the government will continue to petition the diaspora to return. Discourse and Reality With the Somali governments reach outside the country shepherding the diaspora back to Somalia, this governance of roll-out neoliberalism is being pushed within the country. Despite the efforts of the Somali leaders, the discourses of progress have not been loud enough to be heard by the Somali people. This section will contrast Shirdon and Mohamuds public statements that the country has provided Somalis with an environment in which that they can best become entrepreneurial citizens with the lives and experiences of Somalis who live inside the country to show the disparity between the two accounts. The backlash to political and economic instability has been a continually insecure country, in which extremist groups have been able to take hold due to the opportunities that they provide for the Somalis. In February of 2013, Shirdon embarked on a months long Listening Tour to hear the voices of the Somali people. On this tour and in his writing, he praised the Somalis he met with for their resilience as a people. This tour functioned as a way for the Somali people to buy into the neoliberal system of governance through the promotion of individual action. This section, however, will show that very little progress has been made and that both the views of the Somali people and the governments talk have not been realized. Despite Somali leaders espousal of an ever-improving political situation in Somalia, the experiences of the people living in the country differs. The political processes and institutions continue to be questioned by both Somalis and international groups alike. The legitimacy of presidential election results have been damaged by multiple accusations of bribery from inside and outside the parliament. Reports have made that bribes of up to $50,000 were being given to those voting to ensure that President Mohamud, described initially as a dark horse in the election, won the race (Al-Jazeera 2012a). Senior diplomats, members of parliament, and people connected to 49 Somali Development Crisis: Te Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia 48 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 the technical selection committee [have said] that there is bribery going on all sides and some of those MPs [Members of Parliament] have accepted that money (Al-Jazeera 2012a). These claims have done nothing to help the already tenuous view of government stability and transparency. In its 2012 report on perceptions of government transparency, Transparency International places Somalia last, tied with North Korea, ranking scoring 8 points on its scale out of a possible 100. Additionally, a UN Development Program report on the status of Somali youth, defned as those between the ages 14-29, found perceptions of government equally dismal. Regardless of the fact that Somalis younger than 30 make up 70% of the total population, over 65% said that they either did not care to be involved in politics, wanted to be a little less involved, or wanted to be much less involved in politics (UN Development Program (UNDP) 2012, 69). The report asked respondents for their reasoning for these answers and many explained their distrust in the legitimacy of the government and its ability to create change (UNDP 2012, 68). A gap between talk of economic recovery and rates of poverty and unemployment continues to warrant questioning. According to the UNDP, 78% of Somalis live below the poverty line with a majority living in the agricultural areas of the country, those most often without political representation (UNDP 2012, 25). A large food crisis stemming from the political turmoil of the early 1990s continues to be a problem. The food crisis was declared over in 2011, however, in another discursive inconsistency, a third of the population remains unable to meet their nutritional needs (UNDP 2012, 34). A majority of international aid has focused on meeting short term goals, seeming to overlook systemic issues in the interest of building more capital for the corrupt government to deal out as they see ft. Employment remains a large problem in Somalia. From 2002 to 2012, unemployment for Somalis aged 14 to 64 rose from 47 to 53, signaling an economy far worse than described by the president and prime minister. In the most populous age bracket, 14-29, unemployment is even higher, estimated at 67% (UNDP 2012, 61). Of those who are employed, more are self-employed than are a paid employee (UNDP 2012, 64). Most South- Central Somalis in the youth age bracket believe that the problem exists because of a disparity between the educational demands of many jobs and the educational opportunities that exist in the country (UNDP 2012, 65). Security remains an issue with many Somalis, especially those in South-Central Somalia. Perceptions of peace rate 2.1 out of 5 in the region as opposed to a 4.6 and 3.3 in autonomous regions Somaliland and Puntland, respectively (UNDP 2012, 71). Somalis are still afraid of al-Shabaab, the ever-present terrorist organization (Al-Jazeera 2013a; Johnson 2013). They acknowledge the threat that the group continues to pose and are most aware of the control that Shabaab has over a large part of the country. The government of Somalia in one way or another is taking responsibility, but we very well know that the majority of the areas are in the hands of al-Shabab, Abdullahi Mohamed said. For any person who wants to go back and to have security provided by the central government, that means they can only go back to where there is a central government. That is only in Mogadishu, the capital city. (Swanson 2013) When asked why they turned to a life of violence and crime, many speak of the benefts that groups such as al-Shabaab provide for them. These groups can provide an outlet for Somalis who believe that they have no voice to voice their opinions through acts of violence. This civic governmentality acts beyond the formal government providing opportunities, both social and economic, to otherwise powerless people (Roy 2009). The most interesting aspect is the way that these informal governance systems end up reproducing the same structures as the formal governments that they seem to run against. An interview with a Somali ex-pirate revealed the resources that illegitimate and illicit activities can give. After he was unable to continue his education and the education that he had received was not enough, he was unable to fnd employment. He was lured into piracy by frustration as well as seeing his friends leading luxurious lives with money from piracy, able to earn sums of $70,000 U.S. (UNDP 2012, 41). He was asked what his solution to these problems were and answered, [I] believe that job creation for the youth is the answer (UNDP 2012, 41). This account is very similar to the way Hezbollah in Lebanon and criminal dons in Jamaica interact with the underrepresented. Both Shabaab and Hezbollah are grassroots governmentalit[ies that have] come to turn on formations of civic identity and a broader civic commitment in order to organize politically and economically marginalized groups (Roy 2009). Despite the crime and violence that the Jamaican dons perpetuate, they have taken the place of the state as it has retreated from the provision of social and security services to the lower classes (Jaffe 2012). These dons derive their fnancial power from political parties in Jamaica, comparable to the way that al-Shabaab was born out of legitimate politics, act[ing] as brokers between the urban poor and politicians (Jaffe 2012). 51 Somali Development Crisis: Te Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia 50 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 Through their writing and speaking, the leaders of Somalia refuse to admit the extent to which the country is still foundering. They place the responsibility on the Somali people, attempting to elicit conversation around what the people need, however, the responses appear to have been largely discarded. These meetings helped to shore up the neoliberal mentality through the ideas that the citizens were in charge of their own fate and that they had the agency to change it through discussion. This idea of participation is very similar to that of gentrifcation in Recife, Brazil. The Recife local government held meetings to involve the people in the redevelopment of the area (Nuijten et al. 2012). However, as is the case in Somalia, the people of Recife had no real input into redevelopment plans and these meetings served to pacify them and give them a false sense of purpose. Conclusion The Somali government would like to have many believe that the country is pulling itself of the turmoil of the past 20 years, however, the country still has much progress to make. Their distinctly neoliberal approach to redevelopment has had varying effects on different groups of Somalis. The diaspora, a more fnancially and politically secure population, has been able to live up to the neoliberal ideal pushed by the President and former Prime Minister, sending money back to the country, with remittances acting as welfare payments. These principles have not transferred as easily to the people living in Somalia. Their lack of perceived political and economic agency has made them unreceptive to the governments neoliberal discourses. However, the neoliberal mentality clearly still exists, as criminal enterprises exploit it, leading a number of Somalis to a life of crime. The interplay between the formal and illegitimate and their in/ability to entice struggling Somalis may be an interesting subject for further inquiry. The Somali governments focus on economic redevelopment as its primary driver for social welfare is clearly misguided. 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Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. http://www.transparency. org/cpi2012/results. Accessed November 18, 2013. United Nations Development Programme. 2012. Somali Human Development Report 2012: Empowering Youth for Peace and Development. 55 54 Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs | Spring 2014 Bradley Hinger is a fourth year student at Ohio State University from Cincinnati, majoring in political science with minors in geography and international economics and social development. After graduation, he wishes to pursue graduate studies in political and economic geography. 56 Submission of Manuscripts Te Journal of Politics and International Afairs (JPIA) welcomes submissions from undergraduates and graduates of any school, class, or major. We seek to publish manuscripts of the highest quality and papers selected for publication are generally exceptionally written, with well-developed theses, and exhibit articulate arguments with original analysis. 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Fact-Based Regulation For Environmental Protection in Shale Gas Development by The Energy Institute at The University of Texas at Austin, February 2012