2011 Nancy D.

Simco Lecture
THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GRATITUDE
IN KANTS ETHICS
Hots+ox Sxi+ \xn M\nk Tixxoxs
\ns+n\c+: In this essay, we examine the grounds, nature and content, status, acqui-
sition and role, and justication of gratitude in Kants ethical system, making use of
student notes from Kants lectures on ethics. We are especially interested in questions
about the signicance of gratitude in Kants ethics. We examine Kants claim that
gratitude is a sacred duty, because it cannot be discharged, and explain how this claim
is consistent with his insistence that ought implies can. We argue that for Kant a
proper understanding of self-esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for,
possession of the virtue of gratitude.
In his 1797 The Metaphysics of Morals (Part II, The Doctrine of Virtue), Kant
places gratitude among the main positive duties of love to others, along
with benecence and sympathetic feeling. Kants discussions of the
various duties and corresponding virtues and vices featured in The Doctrine
of Virtue are fairly brief. In the Akademie edition of his works, his discussion
of gratitude, in the section Von der Picht der Dankbarkeit (On
the Duty of Gratitude), occupies roughly two full pages of text (MS, 6:
45456), while his discussion of ingratitude is given a mere paragraph
Houston Smit is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He specializes
in the history of medieval and early modern philosophy and is currently writing a book with the
working title Kants Theory of Cognition.
Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He has published
widely on topics in metaethics, normative ethics, and Kants ethics. He is editor of Oxford Studies
in Normative Ethics (2011) and is currently working on a book with Terry Horgan tentatively
entitled Illuminating Reasons: An Essay in Moral Phenomenology. Smit and Timmons are
also co-authors of Kants Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue forthcoming in Kants
Theory of Practical Justication, ed. M. Timmons and S. Baiasu (Oxford University Press).
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 49, Issue 4
December 2011
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 49, Issue 4 (2011), 295320.
ISSN 0038-4283, online ISSN 2041-6962. DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00077.x
295
(6: 459).
1
As we shall see, Kants remarks about gratitude and ingratitude
are quite rich, but his laconic treatment of them leaves much that is un-
developed, unexplained, and unexamined. In particular, his remarks raise
questions about the grounds, nature and content, status, acquisition and
role, and justication of gratitude in his ethical system.
2
Here is a list of
questions worth addressing in coming to an adequate understanding of
Kants conceptions of gratitude and ingratitude:
Grounds: What grounds the duty of gratitude? That is, which considerations
gure in making gratitude an appropriate response and, moreover, a
response that a beneciary in some sense owes to her benefactor, without it
being strictly morally required of her?
Nature and Content: Kant characterizes particular acts of gratitude as honoring
ones benefactor, and he makes general remarks about considerations
governing the content of ones duty of gratitude. In addition to questions
about these matters, there are particularly interesting questions about the
place of affect in Kants conception of gratitude. Fully sincere acts of
gratitude would seem to require that one perform them out of a grateful
heart that is manifested in having certain positive feelings such as gladness.
But how, if at all, do such feelings gure in Kantian gratitude?
Status: Kant claims that gratitude has a certain statusit is what he calls a
sacred duty, to be contrasted with ordinary duties. What makes it
sacred is that a beneciary cannot completely discharge this duty. But why
is this? And what is its signicance in Kants ethical theory?
Acquisition and Role: For Kant, acquiring the virtue of gratitude requires
overcoming a natural tendency toward ingratitude, rooted in a perceived
tension between being a beneciary and maintaining ones proper self-
esteem. What, exactly, is this tension, and what can Kants treatment of
this tension teach us about the role that he assigns gratitude in his account
of the virtuous agent?
Justication: Nowhere in his writings (that we know of) does Kant offer a
justication in the form of a derivation of the duty of gratitude. This is an
especially peculiar feature of his discussion in The Doctrine of Virtue, since
1
Citations from The Metaphysics of Morals (abbreviated MS) and from Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals (abbreviated G) are from Gregor 1996.
2
There is also a question about an alleged paradox involved in the very idea of there being
a debt of gratitude. Of course, Kant does take gratitude to be a duty, and he refers to a
beneciary being indebted to ones benefactor (see, e.g., MS, 6: 459). However, partly for
reasons of space and partly because the alleged paradox concerns the very idea of a debt of
gratitude and thus is not a special problem for Kants ethics, we will not be discussing it in this
paper. For more on the alleged paradox, see Lyons 1969, Weiss 1985, and Wellman 1999.
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
Kants primary aim in that book seems to be to show how basic duties to
oneself and to others can be derived from the categorical imperative. Is
there a need for such a derivation? If so, how does it go?
These questions indicate some of the complexity of gratitudeboth as a
response on some occasion (occurrent) and as a virtue. One aim of this essay
is to address these questions and, thereby, to elaborate what we take to be a
Kantian (if not Kants own) conception of gratitude. In doing so, we will make
use of student notes from Kants lectures on ethics.
3
Moreover, as indicated
by our title, we are especially interested in questions about the role or
signicance of gratitude in Kants ethics. We argue that for Kant a proper
understanding of self-esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for,
possession of the virtue of gratitude. In this way at least, the virtues of
self-esteem and gratitude are importantly related. But before defending this
claim, we begin by presenting an interpretation of Kants views of the
grounds, nature and content, and special status of gratitude. In the nal main
section of the paper (preceding our conclusion), we briey consider the topic
of justication.
1. GROUNDS
As a start, it is useful to distinguish objective from subjective grounds. The
objective grounds of gratitude are those conditions the obtaining of which
gure in making acts of gratitude objectively appropriate or owedappropriate
or owed from an ideal spectator point of view. It may thus be subjectively
appropriate for the recipient of a gift to feel or express gratitude toward
someone in cases where he or she believes, or perhaps reasonably believes,
that the objectively appropriate grounds of gratitude obtain, even if in fact
they do not (all) obtain. Understood in this way, the concept of an objective
ground is prior to its subjectivist cousin. In what immediately follows, we
focus on the objective grounds of gratitude in Kant, which have to do with his
conception of duties of love to others in general and the duty of benecence
in particular.
In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant divides ethical duties to others into duties of
(practical) love and duties of respect.
4
The basis of this distinction concerns
whether the performance of an action that fullls an ethical duty to others
3
We make use of the Collins notes taken in 178485 (cited in the text as Col.) and the later
Vigilantius notes (cited as Vig.) begun in 1793. Both sets of notes are included in Heath and
Schneewind 1997.
4
Kant distinguishes pathological love from practical love. The former refers to love as an
affect-laden emotion, while the latter refers to a maxim of benevolence (MS, 6: 449)roughly,
the maxim of genuine altruistic concern for the welfare of others, as we are about to explain.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
297
thereby imposes an obligation on select others. If so, then the duty is one of
love; if not, then it is a duty of respect. The idea is that in performing an action
that fullls a duty of love, ones action is not strictly owed to the recipient;
rather, it is a kindnesssomething meritoriousand as such calls for a
response on the part of the recipient. The fundamental duty of love in Kants
system is benecence and the response called forthe response that is due or
owedis gratitude. So the ground of gratitude is benecence. More precisely,
what grounds this kind of response are acts of benetting (or attempting to
benet) another that constitute what we may call genuine benecence. In
Kants writings, one nds three constraints that jointly contribute to an acts
being one of genuine benecence and thus grounding a response of gratitude.
These constraints concern (i) the intentions and motives of the benefactor; (ii)
the acts relation to strict or perfect duty, including its being meritorious; and
(iii) the happiness-related ends of the beneciary. We take these up in order.
(i) Although Kant is not entirely explicit about the matter, we may
presume that in order for an action to count as one of genuine benecence,
it must be done voluntarily and with the intention of promoting someone
elses happiness. A coerced act typically will not generate a debt of gratitude.
Nor will doing something that by luck or happenstance benets someone
elsesuch acts are not ones of genuine benecence. Motive, too, is impor-
tant. In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant writes that To be benecent, that is to
promote according to ones means the happiness of others in need, without
hoping for something in return, is everyones duty (MS, 6: 453; emphasis added).
5
In being genuinely benecent, one cannot be motivated merely by self-
interest. Indeed, according to Kant, if ones motive in helping someone is to
put him under obligation, one does not provide him a true benet. He thus
warns that a benefactor must also carefully avoid any appearance of
intending to bind the other [by bestowing a benet]; for if he showed that
he wanted to put the other under an obligation (which always humbles the
other in his own eyes), it would not be a true benet that he rendered him
(6: 453; emphasis added).
6
Of course, providing someone in need with a
benet and doing so from, say, malice, where the aim is to humiliate the
recipient, does not count as conferring a genuine benet either.
7
These
casesof self-interest, imposing obligation, and malicerepresent only
5
This claim about acting without hope of return can also be found at MS, 6: 393.
6
See also Col., 27: 443.
7
In the rst of these three casesacting from self-interestthe motive is presumably
permissible; however, acting out of malice involves a violation of the duty of respect strictly
owed to others. It is perhaps not clear what to say (without more detail) about cases in which
someone acts in order to impose a debt of gratitude on his recipient. Motives of all three sorts
(with a qualication presented in the next footnote) are at least prima facie incompatible with
genuine benecence.
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
some of the types of discounting motives. But the main point is clear: having
and acting on the virtue of benecence requires seeing the happiness-related
ends of others as providing one with moral reasons to help those in need.
Genuine or true benecence, for Kant, is helping others for their sakes and
thus is altruistically motivated.
8
(ii) However, that an agent intentionally and voluntarily benets (or
intends to benet) others and does so for their sake is not sufcient for that act
to be one of genuine benecence. A further condition, already mentioned, is
that the act not be strictly required: in performing an act of genuine bene-
cence, one cannot be fullling a perfect duty, that is, a duty the omission of
which would violate the beneciarys moral or legal rights.
9
One may volun-
tarily and intentionally do something that one solemnly promised to do for
someone else, and may even do it for that persons sake. But, at least in Kants
view, in making a solemn promise, one puts oneself under a strict obligation
to the promisee, compliance with which is a perfect duty. So in keeping ones
promise, one simply avoids wrong-doing. By contrast, acts of genuine bene-
cence are not required in this strict manner;
10
moreover, performing them is
consequently morally meritorious, deserving of what Kant calls positive
honor (Vig., 27: 665). The merit is earned in such cases because the agent
is altruistically motivated.
11
Here are three further points about the duty associated with the virtue of
benecence that bear on the grounds of gratitude. All concern the fact that an
action must be morally permissible in order to be meritorious. First, as Kant
makes clear in various places (MS, 6: 388, 450), acts of helping others in
response to which gratitude is owed must promote (or be intended to
promote) the morally permissible ends of those others. Helping a gangster
achieve his nefarious ends does not merit gratitude, regardless of what either
party may believe. Second and relatedly, violating the rights of some indi-
vidual as a means to, or in the process of, benetting someone else is generally
8
Of course, the issue of motivation is complicated by cases of motivational overdetermina-
tion, where one acts partly from self-interest and partly from altruism, a topic we will not take
up here. Note also that altruistic motivation is not incompatible with a benefactors realizing
that in acting on her maxim of benecence, her beneciary thereby comes to owe her a debt of
gratitude, and it is not incompatible with her thinking (in concert with recent work in positive
psychology) that benecence promotes ones own happiness.
9
The perfectimperfect distinction in Kant is multifaceted; here we focus on just one of the
facets.
10
While particular acts of benecence are not strictly required, adopting the maxim of
benecence is. As Kant notes, The law [requiring benecence] holds only for maxims, not for
determinate actions (MS, 6: 393).
11
Of course, in order for an act of benecence to be meritorious, the benefactor must confer
a genuine benet on the recipient (or have intended to do so). However, we take this to be an
enabling condition in relation to moral merit and not part of what makes the act meritorious.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
299
wrong, and thus is not an action that calls for gratitude.
12
Third, it is perhaps
not clear what Kant might say about an altruistically motivated action that,
suppose, greatly benets some needy person but at a signicant expense to
the benefactor, so signicant that he himself would nally come to need
the benecence of others (6: 454). Details seem to matter here. For instance,
assuming the case has to do with nancial matters, did the benefactor and/or
the beneciary foresee, or should either of them have foreseen, this unwel-
come outcome? What about someone altruistically sacricing his or her life to
save others?
13
We leave these and other questions of casuistry to the side.
(iii) The third general consideration that bears on the grounds of gratitude
concerns what we have referred to as the happiness-related ends of the
recipient. We have already noted Kants claim that genuine benecence
involves making others ends my own (provided only that these are not
immoral) (MS, 6: 450). Such ends include those, the satisfaction or obtaining
of which, the beneciary considers as constituting (or contributing to) her or his
happiness. The perspective of the beneciary partially determines what
counts as a genuine benet and, thus, whether a deed counts as an act of
genuine benecence: I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my
concepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to
benet him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benet him only in
accordance with his conception of happiness (6: 454). Conferring genuine
benets, Kant is here saying, involves taking into consideration the recipients
own ends. Forcing or trying to force some gift on another (competent)
person that the other person does not welcome presumably represents a
morally problematic form of paternalism in which the would-be benefactor
fails to respect the authority of the recipient to choose her or his own life plan.
Now there are many complications to sort out with respect to this general
condition concerning the recipients perspective. For instance, to (objectively)
merit gratitude, must the gift in fact be of benet to the recipient in light
of her (the recipients) happiness-related ends? Or rather is it enough that
the benefactor believes, or reasonably believes, that her gift is of benet to
the recipient in light of the recipients ends? Again, for reasons of space, we
12
We say generally because one can well imagine exceptions. I violate your property
rights if I break into your house to use your phone to make a life-saving call on behalf of another
injured party. In the Casuistical Questions appended to his discussion of benecence in The
Doctrine of Virtue (MS, 6: 454), Kant himself raises the question of whether the merit of some
acts of benecence might be great enough to outweigh the rights of a beneciary. His example
is of an estate serf who willingly consents to putting his welfare entirely in the hands of
his master, counting on the masters benecence. The idea is that in so doing, the serf is in
effect waiving certain natural rights he has as a person, which (typically) violates perfect duties
to self.
13
Kant briey raises this issue in his casuistical remarks on suicide (MS, 6: 42324).
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
set aside this question and others.
14
The most central point about respecting
the perspective of the beneciary has been made.
A concluding point is in order: the conditions that ground having a debt of
gratitude need to be distinguished from conditions that affect what and how
much is owed in fullling a debt of gratitude. We have been focusing exclu-
sively on the former. In discussing gratitude, Kant mentions the degree to
which a gift benets the recipient and the degree of self-sacrice on the part
of the benefactor in providing the benet.
15
Arguably, these factors bear most
directly on the content of some particular duty of gratitudewhat and how
much a recipient owes to her or his benefactorrather than on the question
of whether some debt of gratitude is owed. We take up the issue of content in
the next section.
2. NATURE AND CONTENT
Talk of gratitude in Kant refers to particular actions that one owes to her or
his benefactor as well as to an associated character trait that one has a duty
to cultivate and maintain. Issues arise concerning the general nature both of
such actions and of the associated character trait. In this section, we set forth
the main elements of Kants conception of gratitude, with an eye on the
question whether feelings of gratefulness are required to fulll a duty of
gratitude.
Kant begins his discussion of gratitude in The Doctrine of Virtue with the
claim that Gratitude consists in honoring a person because of a benet he has
rendered us, adding that respect for the benefactor is the feeling connected
with this judgment (MS, 6: 454). As we interpret these remarks, Kants view
is that conscious experiences and corresponding expressions of genuine grati-
tude constitute a certain distinctive complex attitudehonoringa proper
understanding of which involves reference to various psychological compo-
nents that help make the honoring in question an instance of genuine grati-
tude. Expanding on Kants remarks, there would seem to be ve elements
that combine to make an act one of genuine gratitude, each of which deserves
a brief comment.
First, for a conscious experience and associated act of gratitude to occur in
response to a genuine act of benecence, a beneciary must recognize that she
14
Fully explicating the grounds of gratitude would require saying much more about the
perspective of the recipient. For further discussion, see McConnell 1993, 3041.
15
These considerations reect the degree of merit associated with an act of benecence that,
for Kant, depends on (i) how costly the action is to the agent, (ii) the agents relation to the
recipient, and (iii) the extent to which the recipient is benetted. Kants own example of a good
deed with a high degree of merit is where at considerable self-sacrice I rescue a complete
stranger from great distress (MS, 6: 228).
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
301
is the recipient of a benet conferred voluntarily and intentionally by another
person. Second, the beneciary must interpret the benefactors act as one of
genuine benecence and thus as a morally meritorious action. Third, against
the background of this joint recognition and interpretation, the honoring that
constitutes gratitude consists in acknowledging, whether privately to oneself or
in a public act (perhaps verbally, perhaps nonverbally, or perhaps in both
ways), both the signicance of the benet received and the benefactors merit
as deserving of ones recognition and acknowledgment.
Fourth, a beneciarys response to benecence would not count as grati-
tude if ones motivating reason for honoring were other than (or at least did
not include as a main element) the thought that the benefactor had rendered
a genuine benet deserving of the sort of acknowledgment just described. For
instance, giving something in return solely for the purpose of encouraging
ones benefactor to give even more, and thus as a matter of mere self-interest,
may be understood as ofcially repaying a debt of gratitude in a very narrow
sense (where the focus is entirely on the outward gift or the service that the
beneciary offers as repayment for a benet). But if so, then it is important to
distinguish genuine gratitude from a mere outward act of repayment, where
the former is understood as requiring that ones principal reason for express-
ing gratitude is that one has benetted from the benefactors act of genuine
benecence.
Fifth, although Kant indicates that there is a feeling of respect connected
with genuine expressions of gratitude, he does not say that having this or any
other feeling is required for complying with the duty of gratitude. Here it is
worth noting that in connection with the negative duties of respect to others,
Kant explains that the respect in question refers not to a mere feeling but
rather to the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in
another person, and so as respect in the practical sense (MS, 6: 449). Acts of
gratitude are, of course, acts of commission, not mere omission, and so the
maxim just mentioned does not quite t them. But given the nature of the
honoring (lately noted) that constitutes gratitude, talk of positive respect in
this context should be understood as the maxim of acknowledging the sig-
nicance of the benet conferred and of the meritorious nature of the act of
benecence. And adopting (and acting on) this maxim is something that can
be required. (We will return to the issue of gratitude and feelings in a
moment.)
The ve components just described gure in Kants conception of the
general nature of acts of gratitude. With regard to more specic matters
concerning the content of this duty, Kant briey addresses questions regard-
ing what he refers to as extent and intensity. Extent concerns the issue of
to whom individuals owe a debt of gratitude (in addition to their immediate
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
benefactors). He claims that gratitude is owed not just to ones contemporar-
ies but also to ones predecessors, even to those one cannot identify with
certainty (MS, 6: 455). And he indicates that in cases where it is not possible
to show gratitude toward ones benefactor (perhaps because she has died),
then one ought to express ones gratitude by conferring benets on worthy
others.
16
Regarding the intensity of gratitudehow much a beneciary
ought to do for his benefactorKants suggested guideline is that one should
consider how useful the favor was to the one put under obligation and
how unselshly it was bestowed on him (6: 456).
17
In this paper, we will not
further explore questions that these particular matters of detail raise. Rather,
having remarked on the general nature and content of acts of gratitude, we
now wish to address our question about the role that feelings of gratefulness
play in Kants account of gratitude, both as an act and as a character trait.
Feelings of gratefulness or thankfulness are often described by those who
have them as involving positive feelings of gladness and joy, and they are
taken to be an important feature of ordinary experiences of gratitude.
18
Call
experiences of heartfelt gratitude that are accompanied by such feelings
(whether publicly expressed or not) instances of gratefulness.
19
Such
instances are to be distinguished from the sort of mere acknowledgment
16
Kant also mentions gratitude as an appropriate response to the service of animals. It is
worth noting that some philosophers argue that the extent of gratitude is much broader than
Kant seems to recognize. See Fitzgerald 1998 and Walker 198081.
17
See also Col., 27: 441. Regarding how much one is to do for a benefactor, Kant writes
that The least degree is to render equal services to the benefactor if he can receive them (if he
is still living) or, if he cannot, to render them to others (MS, 6: 456). What Kant means by talk
of equal services is not clear. It could be taken to mean that one is to do for the benefactor the
same sort of thing he or she received from the benefactor. For a general critique and consequent
rejection of the claim that properly expressed gratitude requires that one is to repay a debt of
gratitude by performing services equal in kind, see McConnell 1993, 4851. Alternatively, talk
of equality in the context of gratitude may be understood as the idea that one is to perform (if
possible) services of equal signicance, rather than of the same sort. It is worth noting that recent
experimental evidence gathered by social psychologists studying gratitude shows that peoples
feelings of gratitude vary in response to their perceptions regarding: (i) whether the benet was
conferred intentionally, (ii) how costly it was to the benefactor, (iii) how benecial the benet was
to the beneciary, and (iv) the antecedent closeness of the relationship between the benefactor
and the beneciary (see, e.g., McCullough et al. 2001). There is perhaps no better source in
Western philosophy for such details than Senecas De Beneciis, a manual of proper and
improper ways to give, receive, and return favors. See esp. chs. 14.
18
Walker 198081 distinguishes gratefulness from acts of gratitude. The psychological
attitudes and feelings associated with positive experiences of gratitude are the subject of much
recent psychological research on gratitude. See, e.g., Emmons 2007, Fredrickson 2004, and
Watkins 2004.
19
At MS, 6: 455, Kant refers to what Gregor translates as a grateful disposition, which
Kant claims is appropriate if not owed to those who, regardless of conferring a benet, are
benevolently disposed toward oneself. He calls this disposition appreciativeness. However, we
are inclined to interpret Kants duty of appreciativeness as one of acknowledging the good will of
others and not as involving sensible affect.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
303
constitutive of the honor involved in gratitude that we have been describing.
Our question, then, is whether for Kant fullling the duty of gratitude, in
addition to honoring ones benefactor, also requires that one have genuine
feelings of gratefulness toward ones benefactor. Putting this question about
Kants view to the side for a moment, one might argue that the duty of
gratitude requires that an outward expression of gratitude be sincere, that
sincerity requires being truly grateful, and that being truly grateful requires
having the sorts of feelings that count as gratefulness. After all, there is
something missing in someone who deeply begrudges or resents his bene-
factor but is able to (and does) manage to truthfully express (mere) acknowl-
edgment of the benefactors benecence in response to receiving a benet.
The same may be said of a beneciary who simply lacks any feeling of
gratefulness despite honestly acknowledging a benet. If this argument is
cogent, then unless Kants view can accommodate such feelings as part of
what is owed to ones benefactor, his view is (in this particular regard)
implausible.
In answer to our question about Kant, it is reasonably clear that Kants
duty of gratitude does notindeed, cannotinclude having sensible feelings
as a necessary component. Consider this passage from the Collins notes in
which Kant makes it clear that having a grateful heart (and thus having
feelings of gratefulness) is not required in fullling the duty of gratitude:
Gratitude is of two kinds: from duty, and from inclination. It comes from duty, when
we remain unmoved by the others kindness, but see that it behooves us to be
grateful; in that we have, not a grateful heart, but principles of gratitude. We are
grateful from inclination, insofar as we feel love in return. (Col., 27: 441)
Of course, these cool-hearted rather stern remarks of Kants are not sur-
prising in light of various claims in his own writings to the effect that feel-
ings (using this term to cover all kinds of sensible affects and passions) are
not under ones direct voluntary control and, thus, unlike actions, cannot
gure in what one is required to do on some occasion. Given the
ought-implies-can doctrine that Kant accepts, the ought involved in
the duty of gratitude cannot include the requirement to have feelings at
will. In response to the sincerity argument presented in the previous para-
graph, Kant (and many others) would likely make the simple reply that
sincerity in expressing (and having) gratitude does not morally require
having feelings at will.
Nevertheless, one can go on to ask how, if at all, feelings of gratefulness can
gure in Kants conception of gratitude. We think an answer can be inferred
from what Kant says about the duty of sympathetic feeling that, along with
benecence and gratitude, is a positive duty (of love) toward others. The
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
feelings in question, most generally speaking, are those of joy and sadness,
which are sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasure (MS, 6: 456) directed
at anothers situation. The main point Kant makes in The Doctrine of Virtue
about the duty of sympathetic feeling is the following:
But while it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys) of others,
it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an
indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to
make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the
feeling appropriate to them. (MS, 6: 457)
An active sympathetic response involves use of ones free will, and the
idea here (as we understand this passage) is that one has a duty to adopt a
maxim of benecence (as previously explained). And it is helping others in
need based on this disposition that one has a primary duty to adopt and
cultivate. This is benecence grounded in obligation; something that can be
commanded. But given ones natural compassionate endowment, one has an
indirect (instrumental) duty to cultivate the kinds of sensible feelings that,
guided properly by ones understanding of the duty of benecence, can lead
one to perform acts of benecence that the representation of duty alone
might not accomplish (MS, 6: 457). The instrumental value of sympathetic
feelings being stressed here might be taken to imply that coming to have a
developed disposition to have such feelings (based ultimately on consider-
ations of moral obligation) is not itself a moral virtue. But in the Collins notes,
we nd the following passage:
Well-wishing from love cannot be commanded, though well-wishing from obligation
can. If, however, we do well by someone from duty, we get used to this, so that we
can subsequently do it from love and inclination as well. If we speak well of someone,
simply because we see that he deserves it, we get used to this, so that afterwards we
intone his merits in everything. Thus even love from inclination is a moral virtue, and might
be commanded to this extent, that one should rst practise well-doing as a duty, and
later, through habituation, out of inclination as well. (Col., 27: 417; emphasis
added)
20
20
See also MS, 6: 402. Kant distinguishes well-wishing love from well-liking love. Well-
wishing love consists in the wish and inclination to promote the happiness of others. The love
that likes well is the pleasure we take in showing approval of anothers perfections (Col., 27:
417). In the Vigilantius notes, where the well-wishingwell-liking distinction is drawn in con-
nection with friendship, we nd this remark: For well-wishing to others is a universal duty of
love, which we owe to every man, since we must absolutely make it our maxim to promote
goodness in others (27: 675). In this same passage, Kant goes on to say that well-liking can
never be commanded as a duty at least as a duty we have toward all others since it is based on
the esteem the other has acquired through his characteristics, which, of course, will vary from
person to person.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
305
If, as this passage says, well-wishing from love, when properly cultivated, can
be a moral virtue, the same should hold for the complex attitude of heartfelt
gratefulness, whose manifestation involves feelings of gladness and perhaps
joy in exercising ones grateful disposition toward ones benefactor. Such
feelings can apparently be cultivated and appropriately channeled. So if such
feelings are subject to ones indirect control, then they can gure in a complex
character trait for which one is responsible.
21
Given that one ought (if pos-
sible) to cultivate such feelings, it is reasonable to suppose that the virtue of
gratitude is most fully developed when these feelings are in fact cultivated. We
will have more to say about the virtue of gratitude when we discuss its role in
section 4.
3. STATUS
In addition to the various elements that gure in expressing gratitude and (if
relevant) engaging in acts of reciprocation, Kant also claims that gratitude,
compared to other duties, has a special status.
But gratitude must also be considered, in particular, a sacred duty, that is, a duty the
violation of which (as a scandalous example) can destroy the moral incentive to
benecence in its very principle. For, a moral object is sacred if the obligation with
regard to it cannot be discharged completely by any act in keeping with it (so that
one who is under obligation always remains under obligation). Any other duty is an
ordinary duty.But one cannot, by any repayment of a kindness received, rid oneself
of the obligation for it, since the recipient can never win away from the benefactor
his priority of merit, namely having been the rst in benevolence. (MS, 6: 455)
This passage advances what we will call Kants nondischargeable thesis,
namely, the thesis that one cannot fully discharge ones debt of gratitude.
Kants reason for adopting this thesis seems to be the following. Consider a
case where, before some particular time, neither of two parties has provided
a genuine benet to the other (a benet that would partly fulll the duty of
benecence and thus count as meritorious). At the particular time in question,
one of the two parties performs an action of genuine benecence for the other
party who (at the time) is in dire need of help and does so at some personal
cost. The benefactors action is thus meritoriousan act of kindness that
was not strictly owed, was temporally prior to any act by the recipient, and
was done in order to benet her benefactor. With respect to the moral
relation between these two parties, one of them is said to have a priority of
21
At least one can be held responsible for striving to fully realize the virtue of gratitude as
involving a disposition to have grateful feelings. For a helpful discussion of the role of feelings in
gratitude, including issues about responsibility for having them, see McConnell 1993, ch. 3.
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
merit that, as Kant says, the recipient can never win away, owing to the
temporal priority. This fact about temporal priority (again, assuming that the
act in question constitutes a case of genuine altruistic kindness that is not
owed) seems to be the reason why one cannot completely discharge ones debt
of gratitude. We nd this same idea put even more forcefully in a passage
from Collins.
For benecence creates a debt that can never be repaid. Even if I return to my
benefactor fty times more than he gave me, I am still not yet quits with him, for he
did me a good turn that he did not owe me, and was the rst in doing so. Even if I
return it to him fty times over, I still do it merely to repay the benet and discharge
the debt. Here I can no longer get ahead of him; for he remains always the one who
was rst to show me a kindness. (Col., 27: 44243)
22
But why think that a benefactor being rst in benevolence yields the
result that the beneciary cannot fully discharge the obligation associated
with gratitude?
23
Even if in some sense ones debt of gratitude cannot be fully
discharged, does the so-called priority of merit on the part of the benefactor
nevertheless require some sort of special response on the part of the bene-
ciary? In any case, does the very idea of an obligation that one cannot
fully discharge violate the ought-implies-can doctrine that Kant himself
embraces? Let us take these three questions in order.
With regard to the moral signicance of being rst to act, our conjecture
is that for Kant there is a special value that attaches to an initial act of
benecence that cannot be matched by subsequent acts of gratitude. After all,
in pure cases of genuine benecence, the benefactor is not acting under a
perfect obligation; she is not under a strict requirement to offer help, particu-
larly in cases where help is costly to the benefactor. Whatever moral merit
accrues to the agent for her act of genuine benecence is apparently some-
thing that cannot be equaled; as Kant says in the second of the two quotes, in
outwardly repaying ones debt of gratitude, no matter how much one does in
return, one still does it merely to repay the benet and discharge the debt.
This remark about motivation perhaps cannot cover all cases of genuine
gratitude, but one can see what Kant is suggesting. Acting out of gratitude
22
See also Vig., 27: 696.
23
Throughout this discussion, it helps to think of cases in which a benefactor provides a very
signicant service to someone in dire need of help. In the Collins notes, there is a trifold
distinction among types of helping actions: To assist someone in distress is an act of charity; to
help him in regard to other needs is an act of kindness; and to aid him in matters of amenity is
an act of courtesy (27: 441). The paragraph immediately following, he cautions against
accepting benets unless it be under the following two conditions: rst, out of dire necessity,
and then with complete condence in our benefactor (27: 442). Kants claim that one cannot
fully discharge a debt of gratitude has (we think) the most intuitive grip in cases where the
beneciary is in dire need.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
307
signies that ones doing so involves a sense of debt to a particular person (or
group), so (at least intuitively) one can see that the moral quality of ones
motive is not (cannot be?) on a moral par with the benefactors presumed
motive of pure altruism. As we say, this is a conjecture that we think is
accurate as far as it goes but needs far more elaboration and defense than is
possible here. But, assuming it is roughly correct, we pass on to our second,
related question about the practical implications of nondischargeability.
Our second question is whether there is something one ought to do that
does not count as fully discharging the duty of gratitude but, nevertheless, is
somehow reective of this particular aspect of the duty. In addressing this
question, it is helpful to note that acts of gratitude, like acts of repaying a sum
of borrowed money or keeping a contract, are indeed forms of reciprocity.
With respect to repaying borrowed money, presumably the lenderborrower
relationship is such that it is possible (and expected) that the borrower can and
will fully discharge the obligation of repayment, once she has repaid in full
according to the terms of the loan. In fully discharging this obligation, she has,
going forward, completely extinguished it. In such cases, it is plausible to
claim that in repaying ones debt to the debtor, one is thereby quits with
him. At least part of the point of Kants sacredness thesis, we suggest, is to
put in relief the difference in moral signicance between benefactor
beneciary relations on the one hand and lenderborrower relations on the
other. Indeed, this is suggested by the remark, We . . . are thankful not
merely for the good we have received, but also for the fact that the other is
well disposed toward us (Col., 27: 441).
These reections help answer our second question. In being well disposed
toward a beneciary and, indeed, performing an action that a beneciary
recognizes is of moral merit, the benefactors act and associated disposition
arguably calls not only for being disposed to return the favor if the opportunity
arises but also for coming to have anongoing appreciation, inthe formof moral
esteem, for the benefactors act of kindness. (Remember, we are focusing on
cases where the benet is signicant.) So inadditionto being disposedto benet
ones benefactor if the occasion arises, one is to have an ongoing esteemfor the
benefactor, owing presumably to the benefactors priority of merit. And if this
is right, then obviously there is a sense in which what one owes to ones
benefactor is something that cannot be fully discharged in the sense of being
extinguishedin effect ending any morally signicant relationship between
benefactor andbeneciary. Inshort, because part of what one owes is anongoing
esteem for ones benefactor, the obligation in question cannot be fully dis-
charged, in the sense of being extinguished. Having performed a service or
given something to ones benefactor in response to an act of benecence, I am
still not yet quits with him. This is not because one needs to keep heaping on
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
the benets without end, but because an important element of the duty of
gratitude is ones ongoing esteem for the benefactor.
Finally, our third question: if a duty of gratitude is not fully dischargeable,
then does this run afoul of Kants commitment to the ought-implies-can
doctrine? If it is not possible to perform some action or series of actions that
would fully discharge a duty, then it would seem that ought does not imply
can. But given what we have just been saying, the tension here is merely
apparent. It is important to distinguish the notion of fully discharging a duty
from that of fully complying with (or fullling) a duty. We have glossed the
former as being able to do something that not only complies with the duty but
serves to extinguish the obligation. And our prime example has been of a
duciary obligation that can be fully discharged, so that once one has paid
what one owes, there is no lingering moral residue. To fully comply with a
duty, as we propose to understand this notion, simply involves not being in
violation of the duty. So if in response to a genuine act of benecence, one not
only outwardly does something to benet ones benefactor (on some appro-
priate occasion) but also comes to have an ongoing esteem for her in light of
her meritorious deed, then the beneciary is in full compliance with the duty:
one is doing all that one can and ought to do. In short, the duty of gratitude
does not require that one fully discharge, in the sense of extinguish, ones
obligation of gratitude; thus, there is no tension between the duty and the
ought-implies-can doctrine.
This section and the ones preceding it have focused on duties of
gratitudetheir grounds, nature and content, and status. But Kants discus-
sion of the duty of gratitude is embedded in a book on virtue. And as we are
about to explain, perhaps the most interesting aspect of Kants treatment of
gratitude concerns its acquisition and roletopics to which we now turn.
4. ACQUISITION AND ROLE
In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant has little to say about the acquisition and role
of gratitude. But in his lectures, he has much to say about natural impedi-
ments to gratitude: what makes gratitude difcult for us to acquire and
maintain. This reects how, for Kant as for Aristotle, virtue is an achieve-
ment that we admire and, thus, has to do with what is difcult for us. Of
particular interest is what Kant has to say about the relationship between
the vice of ingratitude and ones sense of self-esteem. Acquiring the virtue of
gratitude requires overcoming our natural tendency toward ingratitude. Any
full story of acquisition would have to include more than the overcoming of
natural countervailing tendencies, but Kant says little by way of providing
such a full story. In what follows, we will focus almost entirely on his account
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
309
of our natural tendency toward ingratitude and the role that proper self-
esteem plays in overcoming this tendency. As we mentioned at the outset,
we want to defend the thesis that having a proper understanding of self-
esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for, possession of the virtue
of gratitude.
4.1 Ingratitude and Self-Esteem
The natural tendency toward ingratitude that must be overcome to achieve
and maintain the virtue of gratitude is rooted in an apparent tension between
being a beneciary and maintaining proper self-esteem. According to Kant,
this tension cannot be resolved simply by determining never to be a bene-
ciary, because most all human agents from time to time are going to need the
help of others who offer to help out of genuine benecence, and agents in
serious need ought to be willing to (selectively) accept such offers. Agents are
confronted with this tension when they consider expressing gratitude or
performing acts of gratitude, for these expressions and acts involve an admis-
sion of dependence on others and thus of a kind of inequality, an admission
that would seem to be in conict with their need (and obligation) to preserve
a sense of their own true self-esteem. Given the importance we place on
maintaining self-esteem, this psychological tension naturally leads to the vice
of ingratitude.
In a nutshell, Kant holds that the perceived underlying tension between
gratitude and self-esteem is not genuine but, rather, is one that results from a
mistaken, if natural, conception of what grounds ones moral self-esteem. The
key to resolving the psychological tension in question, and avoiding the vice
of ingratitude, is achieving an understanding of the grounds of proper self-
esteem and recognizing that maintaining self-esteem is compatible with being
a beneciary. In our view, then, Kantian gratitude and a proper sense of
self-esteem (what Kant sometimes calls real self-esteem; MS, 6: 459) are
importantly related. To explain further, let us rst consider the grounds of
Kantian moral self-esteem and then turn to the psychological sources of
ingratitude.
4.1.1 The Grounds of Two Forms of Moral Self-Esteem
Kant recognizes two kinds of moral self-esteem individuated by their distinct
grounds. Every (normal) person, in Kants view, has a capacity for freely
setting her own ends and, in particular, a capacity for acting out of regard for
moral requirements. Acting in ways that realize this capacity by acting
morally whereby one engages in internal lawgiving represents the highest
exercise of freedom, or what Kant often refers to as ones autonomy. This
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
capacity is the ground of a persons inalienable dignitya characteristic
one has by nature that makes all persons moral equals.
But from our capacity for internal lawgiving and from the (natural) human beings
feeling himself compelled to revere the (moral) human being within his own person,
at the same time there comes exaltation of the highest self-esteem, the feeling of his
inner worth (valor), in terms of which he is above any price (pretium) and possesses an
inalienable dignity (dignitas interna), which instills in him respect for himself (reverentia).
(MS, 6: 436)
Call the kind of esteem that represents a proper response to a persons
autonomy recognition esteem. The idea (roughly) is that all human agents
have a moral standing or status that grounds moral requirement to self and
others, and that ought to be recognized as such. Recognition self-esteem
then is the esteem one ought to have for oneself in light of ones inalienable
dignity grounded in ones autonomy. In coming to understand ones dignity
as an autonomous agent, one can measure himself with every other being of
this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them (MS, 6: 435).
But notice that even if one can compare oneself with others in this regard,
ones possession of this inalienable dignity does not depend on any relation to
others; it is grounded in something one possesses as an individual.
Kant also recognizes a second sort of standing or status: one earned
through meritorious conduct. The proper response to this sort of moral status
may be called appraisal esteem.
24
In the Vigilantius notes, we nd a dis-
cussion of true moral honor in which Kant distinguishes negative from
positive honor-worthiness. Negative honor-worthiness has to do with know-
ingly complying with strict moral requirements, such that one is honor-
worthy in that the agent merely refrains from acting contrary to his
humanity and its worth (Vig., 27: 665). By contrast, positive honor-
worthiness results from the agents performing actions that involve merit
more than what is required of him (ibid.). By performing actions that are
honor-worthy, one is to some extent realizing ones rational nature by acting
morally.
25
While all persons are equally deserving of recognition esteem
regardless of their conduct and formed character, they often differ in whether
they deserve appraisal esteem and how much esteem their actions deserve.
24
Our use of the terms recognition and appraisal for two types of self-esteem is borrowed
from Darwall 1977.
25
Sensen (2010) argues that Kants concept of dignity involves the Stoic idea of dignity as
elevation. Additionally, he argues that dignity for Kant involves two dimensions: the idea of
being elevated in relation to nonhuman terrestrial creatures as a result of having autonomy, and
the idea of the kind of moral elevation that results from fully realizing ones autonomy through
acting morally. Some support for this reading comes from Kants remark that morality [fully
realizing ones autonomy], and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality [autonomy itself],
is that which alone has dignity (G, 4: 435).
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
311
For instance, with respect to performing meritorious actions, Kant remarks
that We can thus acquire merit in relation to others (27: 622). In this
important regard, the grounds of the two kinds of esteem differ. However, in
a crucial respect, they are similar. Neither form of esteem, including self-
esteem, is properly grounded in comparison with others. To explain further,
let us consider Kants account of the psychology of ingratitude.
4.1.2 The Psychological Sources of Ingratitude
This vice, according to Kant, has its primary source in a recipients false sense
of self-esteem and a consequent misunderstanding of the benefactor
beneciary relationship. In the Vigilantius notes, where we nd some detail
about the source of ingratitude, the emphasis is on appraisal self-esteem, while
in The Doctrine of Virtue, the emphasis is on recognition self-esteem. As we have
just been saying, we read these texts as supporting the claim that proper
self-esteem is important (if not absolutely necessary) for acquiring and main-
taining the virtue of gratitude.
Ingratitude involves a displeasure or discontent at the obligation the other
has laid on us, through the kindness he has shown towards us (Vig., 27:
69495). The basic pattern involved in the benefactorbeneciary relation-
ship producing such displeasure or discontent includes the following three
elements.
Inequalities: The benefactorbeneciary relationship involves certain kinds
of comparative inequality. Using the metaphor of relative heights, the
beneciary stands, as Kant says, a step lower than his benefactor who, by
comparison, is thereby elevated.
26
The sources of inequality include those
bearing on: (a) the superior position (at least temporarily) of ones bene-
factor in relation to some aspect of ones welfare, (b) the dependence of the
beneciary on the benefactor for help, (c) the benefactors moral merit in
acting from genuine benecence, and (d) the beneciarys consequent
indebtedness in accepting the help, which creates a kind of asymmetry in
ones relations with the benefactor.
Comparison-Evaluation: One or more of these recognized inequalities form
the basis of a comparison with ones benefactor that triggers in the bene-
ciary a felt threat to his standing as a personto his moral self-esteem.
Other-directed hostility: As a result, the beneciary comes to have hostile
feelings toward his benefactor that constitutes ingratitude.
26
Such remarks occur at MS, 6: 456 and 458.
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
We nd this pattern in both The Doctrine of Virtue and Vigilantius discussions of
ingratitude. We begin with the former.
In Kants brief treatment of this vice in The Doctrine of Virtue, the
perceived threat to ones self-esteem as a beneciary is said to rest on a
misunderstanding.
What makes such a vice possible is misunderstanding ones duty to oneself, the duty
of not needing and asking for others benecence, since this puts one under an
obligation to them, but rather preferring to bear the hardships of life oneself than to
burden others with them and so incur indebtedness (obligation); for we fear that by
showing gratitude we take the inferior position of a dependent in relation to his
protector, which is contrary to real self-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in
ones own person). (MS, 6: 459)
For our purposes, the crucial remark in this passage follows the semi-colon.
27
The claim (as we interpret it) is that one who is reluctant to show gratitude (or
who actively expresses ingratitude) toward ones benefactor misunderstands
the signicance of showing gratitude and, we should add, of just being grateful.
The misunderstanding results from thinking that gratitude expresses a kind of
inferiority that conicts withones real self-esteem. Inthis particular passage,
the parenthetical remark at the end strongly suggests that the focus here is on
recognition self-esteem. Since, as earlier explained, all persons possess the kind of
inalienable dignity that grounds proper recognitionesteem, being a beneciary
is not something that can alter ones fundamental moral equality with others.
The misunderstanding Kant claims one is liable to is, it seems, to suppose that
in accepting the role as a beneciary, one thereby comes to accept a kind of
27
This passage is revealing but also invites a particular misreading. The misreading would
be to suppose that according to Kant one has a duty to refrain always from asking others for
favors (asking for others benecence) or from otherwise accepting a freely given service or
material benet from someone (one takes to be) benevolently motivated. Such an interpretation
cannot be correct in light of the fact that specic acts of benecence are generally morally
optional and indeed meritorious. Such acts could not have either status if it were true that
accepting a benet is always a violation of duty on the part of the recipient. Kant does counsel
individuals to strive for self-sufciency and thus nondependence on others, and we nd refer-
ence to a duty to frugality in the Vigilantius discussion of ingratitude (27: 696). See The Lectures
on Ethics where the importance of self-sufciency is discussed at some length (esp. Of the Duties
to Oneself in Regard to Outer Circumstances; Col. 27: 39398 and Vig. 27: 65258). Hence,
as the above passage (properly understood) indicates, one does have a duty to try to ensure that
one does not need anothers benecence. However, To be able to rid oneself of all needs, one
would have to be a higher being. . . ; [but human beings], in respect of their physical nature, are
not capable of total self-sufciency. . . (Vig., 27: 653). Therefore, one is almost certainly going
to encounter circumstances in which one must rely on others benecence to meet genuine
needs as well as to pursue worthy goals. Finally, we have already cited a passage (see note 23)
in the Collins notes (27: 442) that warns against indiscriminately accepting benets and cites dire
need as a legitimate reason to accept a benet. So the sentence in the above passage up to the
semi-colon is properly understood as warning that a major source of ingratitude results from
being too willing to depend on others.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
313
inequality as of a dependent needing a protectora role that will strike the
beneciary as being one of servility. Of course, being in the position of a
beneciary does involve the various kinds of inequalities lately mentioned.
Kants point (again, as we interpret it) is that one misunderstands the
benefactorbeneciary relationship if one views the various inequalities
involved in that relationship as placing one in the position of a moral inferior.
And this misunderstanding is itself rooted in a failure to understand the basis of
real (recognition) self-esteem. These related misunderstandings are liable to
lead one to have the sort of hostile feelings of resentment and envy toward ones
benefactor that are characteristic of ingratitude.
While Kants remarks in The Doctrine of Virtue about ingratitude are very
brief, we nd much more in the way of a psychological explanation of this
vice in Vigilantius, where the discussion focuses primarily on perceived
threats to a beneciarys appraisal self-esteem. Let us take a closer look.
In these lecture notes, Kant explains that the so-called devilish vices of
envy, ingratitude, and malice (Shadenfreude) take the ground of their origin
from a property of human nature native to man . . . namely, the instinct of
antagonism or rivalry (Vig., 27: 692). And the inclination or impulse that
is associated with the instinct of rivalry is what is referred to in a number of
places as emulation (Aemulation), which prompts the activity of making
oneself equal to the other in every respect (27: 695).
28
The way in which this
instinct of rivalry manifests itself in human psychology is by persons compar-
ing themselves to others either with regard to their moral standing or with
regard to their prudential well-being (understood broadly), or both. Making
such comparisons often leads to a feeling of discontent with oneself: one sees
another person as having or doing better with regard to whatever it is that
is the basis of comparison. In light of ones discontent, the inclination in
question can motivate an individual in one of two directions: toward self-
improvement within the bounds of morality or toward some form of vicious
attitude, if not behavior. So we can draw a distinction between good and bad
forms of emulation. Both forms of this impulse are routes one might take in
hopes of making oneself equal to ones rival. Let us consider these two
routes in a bit more detail.
The impulse involved in good emulation must absolutely be cultivated;
and it serves merely to extend our animal nature and make it adequate to
humanity, or the intellectual being within us, and to its laws (Vig., 27: 695).
In other words, emulation is a natural impulse that (employed properly)
serves to prompt one to strive to perfect ones natural being and ones moral
28
See also Vig., 27: 67880 and 693.
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
beingKants fundamental positive duty to oneself.
29
When interpersonal
comparison yields the judgment that one is lacking with regard to one or
another merit, then, when put to good use, this impulse spurs one toward
self-improvement. Comparison with others in determining our own worth
can thus be aimed only at self-instruction concerning our value (Vig., 6:
70304). But the crucial idea here is that one is to use such comparisons with
others as a prompt to compare ones own behavior with the moral law.
Personal self-assessment, or the determination of ones own moral worth, the justum
sui ipsius aestimium [just estimate of oneself], rests on a comparison of ones action
with the law, and to that extent the humilitas comparationis [humble mode of compari-
son], i.e., the maxim of determining ones worth by comparison with others, and of
requiring in the process to accord oneself a lesser value, but a higher one to others,
is quite contrary to duty. . . . (Vig., 27: 703)
30
The remark about the duty not to judge ones worth through comparison
with others refers to the bad form of emulation, which Kant identies as the
primary source of the devilish vices. So while interpersonal comparisons of
moral worth have their instrumental value in relation to self-perfection when
properly understood, such comparisons can lead one to hostility toward
others. As Kant remarks:
[T]his is where the error lies. That method [of comparison involving positive
emulation] would establish true love of honour [love of honor-worthiness that is a
basis of true appraisal self-esteem] in us. But in judging himself and his inner worth,
man founds and measures it instead on a merely comparative estimate of his person
and condition against the worth and condition of other men. Hence arises love of
honour in a bad sense; if he nds himself lowered by comparison with the other, that
arouses in him dislike of the others person. . . . (Vig., 27: 695)
So it is the error involved in this bad use of interpersonal comparison that
leads to envy, ingratitude, and malice.
31, 32
Concerning ingratitude, here is
the relevant but difcult passage in Vigilantius:
29
In Vigilantius, it is noted that emulation can lead to envy, owing to a side of human
nature that has become malignant, despite the fact that the purpose of emulation really lay in
inciting men to constant cultivation of greater perfection in themselves by comparison with
others (27: 67879).
30
At Vig., 27: 704, Kant notes that the good that we can discern in [others] actions is
that now their actions become motives to prod us to enter into the practice of virtue, in that we
thereby become assured that in comparison with the law, and the fulllment of it achieved by
others, our practical virtue is still weak, or in some degree may surpass others.
31
Envy has its immediate ground in emulation (Vig., 27: 693) of the bad sort.
32
We are here interested in moral merit that accrues to an agent from genuine acts of
benecence and, thus, with envy and ingratitude having specically to do with ones moral
standing. Of course, as Kant recognizes, ones envy can be and often is directed toward another
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
315
The fact that the other has done more for us than he was required to do, arouses
ingratitude; for all his merita in regard to our person, or fortunes, bring it about that
we are thereby obliged to him on that account; but in that he has had an inuence
on our well-being, he has an advantage over us, whereby he is elevated above our
worth, and we, on the contrary, have become inferiores in his regard; for assuming that
the estimation of our self rests on a comparative judgement with the others worth [emphasis
added] this degradation displeases us; we are tortured by the obligation he has laid
upon us, and so envy hinders our participation and interest in his welfare. (27: 696)
Here again, Kant is referring to the various sources of inequality that are
characteristic of the benefactorbeneciary relationship, including inequality
in merit, fortunes (welfare), and indebtedness. He claims that the benecia-
ries, as a result of such inequalities, have become inferiors. As he notes a
few sentences after this particular passage, [Gratitude] seems to be contrary
to our self-esteem, since it can almost never appear without the benefactors
worth being coupled with a demeaning of the value of the other party (Vig.,
27: 696). Further, as the italicized clause in the passage above indicates,
dwelling on these comparative inequalities and using them for purposes of
judging ones own worth is a primary source (if not the source) of hostilities
directed toward ones benefactor that is characteristic of ingratitude, which
likely also includes envy. The preventive measure Kant is pressing is true
love of honour (a proper understanding of the ground of appraisal self-
esteem): a beneciary must rmly understand the true grounds of his moral
equality if he is to avoid feeling his appraisal self-esteem threatened by the
various inequalities brought about by the benefactorbeneciary relation-
ship. The proper source of any humility and consequent downgrading of
ones person one might feel with respect to appraisal self-esteem is comparing
oneself with the moral law. True humility follows unavoidably from our
sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law (MS, 6: 436).
Returning for a moment to the basic pattern characteristic of ingratitude,
the source of this vice according to Kant is in the comparisonevaluation
phase of the process leading to this vice. The faulty evaluation undergirding
ingratitude rests on a failure to properly appreciate and respond to the
grounds of real self-esteemwhether the esteem one ought to have for
oneself concerns ones standing as an autonomous agent and thus a moral
equal in this regard (recognition self-esteem), or the esteem that is appropriate
in comparing oneself with the moral law (appraisal self-esteem). This reading
persons material possessions, talents, and fortunate circumstances. Thus envy extends, not
only to all praiseworthy features necessary to man, but also to talents and fortunate circum-
stances of every kind (Vig., 27: 694). The paragraph immediately following this remark
discusses envy with respect to ones moral standing, distinguishing mere misliking or invidia in
genere (translated envy without ill will) from envy that becomes invidia qualicata, i.e., livor
(translated malicious envy or spite).
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of Kant supports our main interpretive claim that the virtue of proper self-
esteem (which Kant discusses in his treatment of servility in The Doctrine of
Virtue ) is importantly related to (if not necessary for) avoiding ingratitude and
cultivating and preserving the virtue of gratitude.
33, 34
How one is to proceed in cultivating and preserving not only a disposition
of gratitude but a grateful disposition (understood as a disposition for relevant
feelings) is not an issue Kant discusses. He does claim that among the various
duties of self-perfection the primary duty is one of moral self-scrutiny. As for
a regimen that would help one cultivate, develop, and preserve a grateful
disposition, Kant refers to a duty of frugality (see note 27), and in his discus-
sion of servility in The Doctrine of Virtue, he points to various types of action,
including accepting favors one can do without, that are important to avoid for
purposes of preserving the self-esteem one has as an autonomous agent.
4.2 The Positive Role of Gratitude
We turn nally and briey to the positive role of gratitude in the life of an
individual and of society. As for individuals, Kant advises that one should take
the occasion for gratitude as a moral kindness, that is, as an opportunity given one
to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of man, to combine the cordiality of a
benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence (attentiveness to the smallest
degree of this disposition in ones thought of duty), and so to cultivate ones love of
human beings. (MS, 6: 456)
The remarks here seem to be addressed to one who is at least somewhat
benevolently disposed in general. They suggest that one should viewoccasions
of communicating gratitude as an opportunity to further cultivate and
33
We have not attempted to argue that the virtue of self-esteem is necessary for acquiring
and maintaining the virtue of gratitude, hence our more cautious claim about the former virtue
being importantly related to the virtue of gratitude. A number of questions naturally arise
about the relation between gratitude and proper self-esteem. Is proper self-esteem partially
constitutive of the virtue of gratitude? Is each required to achieve and maintain the other? One
might think that gratitude helps one achieve and maintain a proper sense of self-esteem. For
example, the virtue of gratitude might help one become and stay focused, in a disinterested way,
on moral merit, and thus keep from falling into bad comparison of oneself with others (even with
respect to moral merit). It is also possible that the vice of ingratitude is not only produced by a
misunderstanding of what sort of equality is important, but also helps perpetuate, or ingrain,
that misunderstanding. We hope elsewhere to address these questions.
34
In addition to ingratitude, there is also nongratitudethe failure to be appropriately
responsive to anothers benecenceas well as misplaced gratitude that would need to be
considered in a full treatment of Kants account of vices associated with ingratitude. The
psychological sources of the former would seem to be various, while an overly servile attitude
(and thus a lack of proper self-esteem) would seem to be a common contributing factor to the
latter.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
317
strengthen ones practical, if not affective, love for humankind. This idea
of uniting the virtues suggests what is perhaps best viewed as a form of the
reciprocity of the virtues to the effect that possession (or perhaps full possession)
of a particular virtue by a human being requires the cultivation of many other
virtues. Unfortunately, we are not able to pursue this theme further here.
With respect to the role of gratitude in society, Kant warns that ingratitude
is a social harm because of its likely deterrent effect on benecence generally.
By contrast, having a grateful disposition that is manifested in acts of sincere
gratitude tends to encourage further acts of benecence on the part of the
benefactor (and perhaps others) toward oneself and others. In this way, the
virtue helps to promote the general welfare (happiness) of society. But just as
importantly, because gratitude involves a respect for others that is expressed
in honoring them, gratitude as a virtue also promotes a society held together
by bonds of mutual respect. One might think of the duty of benecencethe
duty to promote the welfare of othersas part of a more general duty of
sociability that includes a duty to promote relations of mutual respect,
distinct from and in addition to a duty to promote the welfare of others.
35
Given the role of gratitude in promoting both welfare and mutual respect,
one can thus view this virtue (and corresponding acts) as being instrumental
in fullling the duty of sociability.
5. JUSTIFICATION
Kant does not offer a justication for the claim that gratitude is a duty that
would constitute a derivation. That is, he does not provide an argument
featuring the categorical imperative as a premise, which, perhaps together
with other premises, not only leads to the conclusion that gratitude is a duty
but also serves to explain why it is a duty. As we noted at the outset, this is
especially odd in the context of The Doctrine of Virtue, where a main part of the
project of that work is to derive a system of duties from the categorical
imperative.
36
Perhaps Kant did not think a derivation is necessary since his
very conception of duties of love to others (really benecence),
37
when con-
trasted with duties of respect to others, involves the idea that fullling the
former, but not the latter, imposes corresponding obligations on others.
38
Such an answer might explain why Kant did not bother to provide a deri-
35
Berger (1975) emphasizes the role of gratitude in promoting and maintaining such
reciprocal relations of recognition and respect.
36
For a discussion of Kants derivations in The Doctrine of Virtue, see Smit and Timmons,
forthcoming.
37
The notion that carrying out a duty of love imposes an obligation on others is true only
of the duty of benecence, in contrast to gratitude and sympathetic feeling.
38
Gregor (1963, 196) offers this as a reason for the lack of derivation.
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HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS
vation, but one can still ask why an act of genuine benecence calls for
gratitude on the part of the beneciary, why gratitude is owed to the benefac-
tor.
39
Space does not permit a thorough treatment of this issue. So instead we
will make two very brief observations before concluding.
First, with regard to Kants formula of humanity requiring that all (nite)
rational agents treat persons as ends in themselves and thus with respect,
perhaps Kants thought was that ingratitude as well as culpable nongratitude
are failures to treat benefactors as ends in themselves. From this it would
follow that gratitude is owed. Clearly, what Kant calls ingratitude proper
(active ingratitude), involving intentions to harm ones benefactor, is a
failure to treat humanity as an end. And perhaps the same could be said of
nongratitude, where a beneciary simply fails to have or express gratitude.
40
Based on these two claims, one could then provide a justifying argument
having as premises the formula of humanity as well as claims to the effect that
to fail to have and express gratitude (as a result of ingratitude or nongratitude)
is to fail to treat ones benefactor as an end, leading to the conclusion that
gratitude is a duty. If, as we are inclined to think, the formula of humanity
provides the proper basis in Kants ethics for explanatory justications of
duties, then the argument just hinted at would count as the kind of justica-
tion sought for the duty of gratitude.
Our second observation is simply that claims about the negative and
positive roles of gratitude described in the previous section serve to provide a
role-based justication of the virtue of gratitude, and perhaps on this basis one
can provide a justication of the claim that acts of gratitude are owed to ones
benefactor. This would constitute a virtue-based approach to the duty of
gratitude.
6. CONCLUSION
Our aim has been to bring into focus some of the main elements that gure
in Kants views about the grounds, nature and content, status, acquisition and
role, and justication of gratitude, both as a duty to select others and as a
virtue in moral life. In exploring these topics, we have in most instances tried
to develop what we take to be a Kantian view, if not Kants own. Some of the
most intriguing aspects of Kants view of gratitude concern the psychological
sources of ingratitude that we nd in the student lecture notes that connect
39
This question is also raised by Guyer (1993, 38688) in his brief but insightful remarks
about Kant on gratitude. And, of course, it is at the heart of the so-called paradox of gratitude
mentioned above in note 2.
40
Kants notion of unappreciativeness (Unterkenntlichkeit) can perhaps be understood as
including nongratitude within its scope. See MS, 6: 459.
GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS
319
this vice with matters of proper self-esteem and their relation to the virtue of
gratitude. But by no means have we provided a thorough treatment of any of
these elements of gratitude in Kants moral philosophy.
41
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41
This is a thoroughly collaborative paper; order of authorship is alphabetical. A version of
this paper was given as the inaugural Nancy D. Simco Lecture, delivered at the University
of Memphis, April 6, 2011. It was also delivered at the University of Geneva, May 13, 2011. We
wish to thanks audiences at both universities for very helpful discussions. Thanks also to
Suzanne Dovi and Betsy Timmons for ongoing discussion as this paper was being developed.
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