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Power politics and nationalist discourse in the struggle for 'Northern
Epirus': 1919-1921
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos
To cite this Article Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos(2000) 'Power politics and nationalist discourse in the struggle for
'Northern Epirus': 1919-1921', Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2: 2, 149 162
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/713683343
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Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 2, Number 2, 2000
Power politics and nationalist discourse in the struggle
for Northern Epirus: 19191921*
TRIADAFILOS TRIADAFILOPOULOS
On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the People decide. It was in fact
ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decides who the
people are.
Ivor Jennings
Introduction
By most counts, the validity of nationalist propaganda and its use in scholarly
debates is limited. Overtly nationalist literature serves a political purpose and
need not conform to general standards of scholarly writing. However, to be
effective, it must advance a particular cause while remaining within the realm
of seemingly legitimate discourse. In other words, its success depends on how
well the nations advocates understand and anticipate their audiences precon-
ceptions, values, and worldview. In short, nationalist literature must possess
the potential to persuade. Consequently, even the most partisan and seemingly
preposterous nationalist writings may illuminate particular questions or de-
bates by providing the discerning reader with unique insights into the ideals of
nationalists and their target audience.
This paper examines the writings of Greek and Albanian nationalists
regarding the question of Northern Epirus
1
between 1919 and 1921. Part of the
material under consideration was originally published in pamphlet form and
was presented to representatives of the Great Powers at the Paris Peace
Conference in February 1918. The remainder consists of ofcial statements
made by both the Greek and Albanian governments. At the Conference, both
sides sought to expand their states territory through revisions to the Greco-
Albanian border. Differing interpretations of the ethnic identity and national
consciousness of the territorys population were used to support their claims.
*I am grateful for helpful comments from and conversations with Elzbieta Matynia, Adamantia
Pollis, Barbara Syrrakos, Jane Cowan, Isa Blumi, and Shaun Young. I would also like to thank Dr.
Vassilis Fouskas and the journals two anonymous reviewers for their criticisms and suggestions.
Special thanks to Tina Tzatzanis for research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was read at
the Modern Greek Studies Associations 1997 Symposium in Kent, Ohio.
1
Northern Epirus extends northward from the northern boundary of Greece to just south of
Valona on the Adriatic to the lakes of Ochrid and Prespa in the east. It constitutes approximately
one-fourth of the total area of Albania and includes the towns of Gjirokaster (Argyrocastro), Korce
(Koritza), andHimare (Chimara), as well as the port of Sarande (Santi Quaranta). See Laurie Kain Hart
and Kristina Budina, Northern Epiros: the Greek minority in southern Albania, Cultural Survival
Quarterly, 3, Summer 1995, p. 55.
ISSN 1461-3190 print/ISSN 1469-963X online/00/02014914 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1461319002000041 8
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150 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
However, the contested region possessed a mixed population that did not
easily t either Greek or Albanian ethno-national categories. As such, the Great
Powers were amenable to arguments ostensibly presented to make sense of this
complicated case.
2
The general climate of international relations also worked
to the nationalists advantage. The victorious Allies were committed to carving
up the remnants of the fallen German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman
Empires. Woodrow Wilsons championing of the right to self-determination
and equitable treatment for small states held out the promise that territorial
claims constructed around the question of nationality would be considered
favourably by the Great Powers.
3
Indeed, for the rst time in the history of
European diplomacy, the primacy of the nation was recognized as the key
ordering principle of states and interstate relations.
4
Not surprisingly, then,
Greek and Albanian nationalists seized the opportunity to present their posi-
tions to the worlds self-appointed arbiters.
After presenting some background to both the problem of Northern Epirus
and the role of nationalism at the Paris Peace Conference, I examine the
Albanian and Greek sides arguments, citing similarities and differences in
their demands and rationales. Specically, I analyse each sides conception of
the nation and note how it was tailored to meet the criteria of the Great
Powers. Both Albanian and Greek nationalist writers presented arguments that
would resonate with individuals wielding power. Their espousal of what today
would be dubbed ethnic nationalism captured their eras understanding of the
legitimate grounds for claiming the right to self-determination. In other words,
their claims corresponded to the universal code of nationalist discourse,
understood and employed by diplomats, political leaders, journalists, and
scholars. Hence, I contend that these pamphlets tell us something about the
quality, status, and general reception of nationalism during this period. The
papers conclusion summarizes the studys arguments and ndings while also
drawing attention to the role of nationalist discourse in contemporary cases.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this paper does not claim to
present an exhaustive appraisal of all relevant materials. The difculty in
obtaining such sources cannot be overstated.
5
A truly comprehensive study
would require archival work and a thorough review of newspaper articles,
editorials, and other related material in several languages. Hence, what will be
presented should be taken as a model for further research and analysis.
The question of Northern Epirus from 1912 to 1919: a brief sketch
Greek claims to Northern Epirus preceded the First World War and were
present from the very founding of the Albanian State. Albania was granted
independence by the Great Powers at the London Conference of Ambassadors
2
E. P. Stickney, Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 19121923,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1926, p. 75.
3
For a sample of Wilsons rhetoric see H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference
of Paris Vol. III, Oxford University Press, London, 1920, p. 53.
4
E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 131.
5
A comprehensive bibliography of this material simply does not exist; the closest one gets is
contained in Stickney, op. cit.
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ThemesPower politics and nationalist discourse 151
in December 1912. The Conference appointed two commissions to delimit
Albanias northern frontier with Serbia and Montenegro and its southern
frontier with Greece. Greeces success during the Balkan Wars rekindled its
dream of reconstituting the Byzantine Empire in the form of a greater Greek
state.
6
Proponents of the Megali Idea (Great Idea) argued that all of Epirus,
including those districts claimed by the Albanians, should be ceded to Greece.
7
They defended their claim by arguing that the population of this territory was
overwhelmingly Greek, both in descent and national consciousness.
8
Albania
countered by calling for the incorporation of Northern and Southern Epirus, or
Chamuria, into Albania, on similar ethno-national grounds. Both sides ig-
nored the fact that the territory they demanded contained a mixed population.
According to a British Foreign Ofce research report:
Under Ottoman rule, before Greece became an independent Kingdom with a
frontier to defend, the population of the whole district of Epirus seem to have
thought of themselves as Moslems and Christians [rather] than as Greeks and
Albanians. Then, as now, there would have been extreme difculty in sorting
out pure Greek from pure Albanian, especially north of the present [1944]
frontier, and probably many of them were of mixed blood. (In fact, the ancestral
stock even of those sections of the population which appear today as denitely
Greek or denitely Albanian is perhaps identical.)
9
Ultimately, the GreekAlbanian border was delimited in a rather capricious
manner. After the international commission made up of representatives of the
six Great Powers (Great Britain, France, AustriaHungary, Italy, Germany,
Russia) failed to reach consensus,
10
Britains Sir Edward Grey proposed a
compromise which satised the Powers and largely ignored both the Greek
and Albanian positions.
11
The Protocol of Florence, which established the
6
See G. Augustinos, Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 18971914, East
European Monographs, Boulder, CO, 1977, p. 3.
7
M. Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History, I. B. Tauris, London, 1995, p. 79.
8
As Charles and Barbara Jelevich have noted, the emphasis of the Megali Idea was not on acquiring
territory that was, strictly speaking, ethnically Greek, but rather on obtaining lands in which Hellenic
civilization was believed to be predominant, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 18041920,
University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1977, p. 77. Also see A. Pollis, Notes on nationalism and
human rights in Greece, Journal of Modern Hellenism, 4, Autumn 1987, p. 151.
9
Britain, Foreign Ofce, The Greek Albanian Frontier, 26 August 1944, Public Archives of Canada,
Document No. [R 4346/39/90/1943], File 153-G (S), p. 3. It is worth noting that even this relatively
dispassionate and neutral British commentator adhered to the notion that pure ethnic categories did
in fact exist, although in this case the mixed blood of the people made them poor tools for sorting
out the present population.
10
According to Stickney: Fromwhat little is known of the acts of the commission, it appears certain
that an impasse developed, the delegates aligning themselves into two camps: those of the Triple
Alliance [Italy, AustriaHungary, Germany] maintained that the districts were Albanian, while the
Triple Entente [Britain, France, Russia] took the point of view that, although the older generations
in a number of villages spoke Albanian, the entire younger generation was Greek in its industrial and
intellectual life, its sentiments, and aspirations. Stickney, op. cit., p. 38.
11
Grey himself admitted that: [W]hen the whole comes to be stated it will be open on many points
to a great deal of criticism from anyone with local knowledge who looks at it purely on the merits
of the locality itself. It is to be borne in mind that in making the agreement the primary essential was
to preserve agreement between the Great Powers themselves, and if the agreement about Albania has
secured that it has done the work which is most essential in the interests of the peace of Europe. See
Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1913, LVI, 2282ff.
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152 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
GreekAlbanian border, left all of Northern Epirus within Albania and called
for the Greeks to evacuate their military forces from the region.
12
In return for
its co-operation, Greece was awarded several Aegean islands, which it had also
claimed at the Conference of Ambassadors.
13
The Greek Epirotes, however, did not let the matter rest. In February 1914
the Autonomous Northern Epirus Movement led by George Christaki
Zographos, a former Foreign Minister of Greece, mounted an armed resistance
to Albanian rule.
14
On 2 March 1914, the rebels declared the independence of
Northern Epirus. Fighting between irregular military bands was brought to a
formal end in May 1914 with the signing of the Convention of Corfu. The
Convention granted autonomy to the Greek Epirotes and allowed for an
ethnically mixed police force and access to education and religious services in
the Greek language.
15
However, the Convention was never tested. In August
1914 the First World War broke out and in October, at the request of the Allies,
Greek troops occupied Northern Epirus.
16
Greece quickly seized the moment
and invited representatives from Northern Epirus to sit in the Greek parlia-
ment in Athens. Shortly thereafter, the Greek Monarchy issued a decree
announcing the formal union of Northern Epirus with the Kingdom of
Greece.
17
The Allies rejected these policies and ordered Northern Epirote
deputies to relinquish their seats in the Greek legislature.
The secret Treaty of London, signed on 26 April 1915, further complicated
the question of Albanias post-war future. In exchange for entering the war on
the side of the Allies, Article 6 of the Treaty granted Italy full sovereignty over
the Albanian port of Vlore (Valona), the island of Saseno and surrounding
territory sufcient to assure defence of these points.
18
By Article 7, Albania was
to be reduced to an autonomous (not independent) entity encompassing only
the central portion of its 1913 territory.
19
Italy was to permit Greece to acquire
Northern Epirus while also allowing for the partition of Albanias eastern
territories by Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. Italy eventually rejected the
cession of Northern Epirus and in 1917 declared that all of Albania should be
united, declared independent, and placed under Italian protection.
20
In the
meantime, France had occupied and set up an Albanian Republic in the town
of Korce (Koritza). As the war drew to a close, Albania was occupied by
12
L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1958, p. 541.
13
G. B. Leon, Greece and the Albanian question at the outbreak of the First World War, Balkan
Studies, 1, 1970, p. 63.
14
See B. P. Papadakis, Histoire Diplomatique de la Question Nord-Epirote (19121957), J. Alevropoulos,
Athens, 1958, pp. 2429; B. Kondis, Greece and Albania: 19081914, Institute for Balkan Studies,
Thessaloniki, 1976, pp. 124125; A. Tounta-Phergade, Themata Hellenikes Diplomatikes Historias:
19121934 (Themes in Greek Diplomatic History: 19121934), Parateretes, Athens, 1987, p. 57.
15
Stickney, op. cit., p. 49; Kondis, op. cit., p. 131. Also see C. Skenderis, OVoreioepirotikos Agon: 1914
(The North Epirus Struggle: 1914), Athens, 1929, pp. 127129; and K. Manolopoulou-Varvitsiote,
Synchrona Provlemata Meionotiton sta Valkania (Contemporary Minority Problems in the Balkans), Eirini,
Athens, 1989, pp. 9293.
16
Stickney, op. cit., p. 57.
17
Ibid., p. 62.
18
H. W. V. Temperley(ed.), AHistory of the Peace Conference of Paris Vol. IV, OxfordUniversity Press,
London, 1920, p. 340.
19
Ibid., p. 341.
20
D. Dakin, The Unication of Greece: 17701923, St. Martins Press, New York, 1972, p. 222.
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ThemesPower politics and nationalist discourse 153
French, Italian, Serbian, and Greek troops.
21
The future of the country was
beholden to the conicting interests of the occupying forces.
Triumph of the nation-state? The Paris Peace Conference of 1919
Woodrow Wilsons championing of the rights of small and oppressed peoples
at the close of the First World War symbolized the triumph of the nation-state
ideal in international affairs. As a consequence of the War, the age of European
multiethnic empires had drawn to a denitive end. Wilson heralded the new
era by declaring that [n]o people must be forced under sovereignty under
which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the
purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty.
22
Wilsons advocacy of the right of self-determination was also indicative of the
dramatic shift in international relations following the nal collapse of the
European balance of power system. In its place
Wilson made the principle of national self-determination the basis for a new
world order. In his mind there was no gap between national self-determination
and democracy and between both these concepts and the idea of a self-polic-
ing system of collective security to replace the discredited system of inter-
national power politics.
23
The guidelines of Wilsons New World Order were presented in both the
Fourteen Points and the Four Points. Point Five of the Fourteen Points
called for the
[a]bsolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict
observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty
the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the government whose title is to be determined (emphasis added).
24
Similarly, Point Two of the Four Points called for
[t]he settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of
economic arrangement , or of political relationship upon the basis of the free
acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the
basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire
21
For a concise recounting of the diplomatic wrangling between Italy, France, and Greece see G.
B. Leontaritis, Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 19121918, East European
Monographs, Boulder, CO, 1990, pp. 321365.
22
Message From President Wilson to Russia, 9 June 1917, in J. B. Scott (ed.), Ofcial Statements
of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC, 1921, pp. 104105.
23
J. Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990,
p. 44. It is worth noting the hubris that drove Wilson and other architects of the New World order.
As Michael Burns has pointed out, Wilson arrived in Paris accompanied by geographers, statisticians,
historians, and political scientists, who pledged to work like engineers on a new construction
project . As we shall see below, this blind trust in the scientic and rational means of settling
territorial disputes was quickly seized upon by nationalist advocates, who in turn used the language
of their Western counterparts. M. Burns, Disturbed spirits: minority rights and New World Orders,
1919 and the 1990s, in S. F. Wells Jr and P. B. Smith (eds), New European Orders, 1919 and 1991, The
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 4446.
24
R. S. Baker, WoodrowWilson and World Settlement Vol. III Original Documents of the Peace Conference,
Peter Smith, Gloucester, MA, 1960, p. 43.
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154 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior inuence or mastery (emphasis
added).
25
Point Three of the Four Points and Point One of the Fourteen Points
renounced the secretive, unprincipled character of the old diplomacy. In its
place, Wilson requested that all states consent to be governed by the
same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized
society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States.
26
Wilsons vision was shared by many, particularly in Britain and the United
States. The failure of the old diplomacy was often cited by journalists and
academics as the root cause of the Great War.
27
Support for the rights of small
states was combined with a general ideological consensus regarding the
natural division of humanity into constituent nations.
28
Hence, the people
entitled to self-determination were invariably national communities dened
according to ethnic criteria.
29
Potential nations and ethnic minorities quickly
became the focal points of international interest. However, as a contemporary
observer aptly noted: Wilsonian principles did not, in themselves, comprise a
body of doctrine sufciently intelligible and precise to be interpreted in
diplomatic terms.
30
Consequently, national aspirations were manipulated and
used as bargaining counters in Great Power relations.
31
In reality, the principle
of self-determination could only be used in an ad hoc manner that reected the
interests of the Great Powers.
32
Thus, to be effective, both statesmen and
nationalists had to frame their arguments in accordance with the grander
aspirations of the Great Powers.
This clash between Wilsonian principles and traditional Great Power poli-
tics was clearly present in the case of Northern Epirus. On the one hand,
advocates of Greek and Albanian interests argued that the principle of self-de-
termination should be employed to settle the dispute. Conversely, both sides
also recognized that the Great Powers would employ some amount of back-
room bargaining.
33
As a result, both sides structured their arguments so as to
appeal to the Great Powers new-found principles and traditional strategic
interests. The key to their success, it was felt, lay in convincing the Powers that
their proposals were both genuine and conducive to international peace and
stability.
25
Ibid., pp. 4546.
26
Ibid., p. 46.
27
For a particularl y good example of this type of argument see Big and small nations: a plea for
new methods in Paris, The New Europe, Vol. XII 144, 17 July 1919, pp. 16.
28
See Hobsbawm, op. cit., pp. 107108.
29
K. S. Shehadi, Ethnic Self-determination and the Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper # 283, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1993, p. 16.
30
H. W. V. Temperley(ed.), AHistory of the Peace Conference of Paris Vol. VI, OxfordUniversity Press,
London, 1920, p. 543. See also G. Murray, Self-determination of minorities, Journal of the British
Institute of International Affairs, 1, January 1922, pp. 1011.
31
P. Smith, Introduction, in P. Smith (ed.), Ethnic Groups in International Relations: Comparative
Studies on Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 18501940, New York University
Press, New York, 1991, p. 6.
32
Shehadi, op. cit., p. 15. Also see M. Biddiss, Nationalism and the molding of modern Europe,
Journal of the Historical Association, 1, 1994, pp. 423424.
33
This point was hammered home by the Bolsheviks publication of the secret Treaty of London
in November 1917.
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ThemesPower politics and nationalist discourse 155
The nation as historical entity: the Albanian case
Mehmed Bey Konitza was an inuential gure in the Pan-Albanian Federation
of America, and Christo and Sevasti Dako were leaders of the Boston-based
Albanian National Party. As well as being included in Albanias ofcial
presentation to the Paris Peace Conference, their texts were distributed to
interested individuals and groups in the United States and Britain. One such
group was the London-based Anglo-Albanian Society, whose membership
included academics, clergy, and journalists.
34
The Society helped to distribute
Albanian nationalist literature through meetings and press releases. Interest-
ingly, the group was composed exclusively of British citizens not of Albanian
origin.
35
The chief claim made by all three Albanian writers centred on the conti-
nuity and homogeneity of the Albanian race. In the words of Sevasti K. Dako:
It is admitted today as an historical fact that the Albanian people is the most
ancient, the most compact, the most homogeneous, and the most important
factor of all the Balkan nations. His origin and his strong national consciousness,
that of being Albanian by race, language, customs and feeling, distinguish him
entirely from the neighboring races, and give him that proper individuality,
which enabled him to resist for centuries all endeavours of being denationalized
and assimilated.
36
Likewise, Mehmed Bey Konitza argued that Albanias division into three major
religious groupingsMuslim, Greek Orthodox Christian, and Roman Catholic
Christiandid not in any way divide the Albanian people. Rather, according
to Konitza, Albania [was] perhaps the only country in Europe where re-
ligion produced no dissension among the inhabitants, who remained united
at every period of their national history.
37
The Albanian writers traced their nations lineage back to ancient times,
arguing that they were the descendants of the Illyrians. They contended that
invasion and conquest by the Byzantine, Roman, and Ottoman Empires had
not unduly affected the purity of their people. For despite these setbacks, the
Albanians retained their language and their national manners and usages, and
remained a distinct people with a distinct national consciousness.
38
Even more
importantly, they argued that the Byzantines, whose Greek culture and civiliza-
tion dominated Epirus for fourteen centuries, did not inuence the Albanians
in any fundamental way.
39
According to these writers, the Albanian people
were genuinely distinct, unlike neighbouring Slavs and Greeks whose lineage
was marred by intermarriage. This purity made the Albanians a superior
34
Stickney, op. cit., p. 91.
35
Ibid.
36
S. K. Dako, Albanias Rights, Hopes and Aspirations, Atheneum, Boston, 1918, p. 3.
37
M. B. Konitza, The Albanian question, International Conciliation, 138, May 1919, p. 747.
38
C. A. Dako, The Strength of the National Consciousness of the Albanian People, Atheneum, Boston,
1918, pp. 2324. In Konitzas words: Such is Albanias history. The waves of successive Empires have
passed over her, and her people have remained staunch. The rule of Rome and of Byzantium have
passed. The Balkan medieval Empires were a mere ripple on the waters of time. The oodtide of the
Turkish Empire has ebbed, and Albania remains as a granite crag above the troubledwaters. Konitza,
op. cit., p. 770.
39
C. A. Dako, op. cit., p. 25.
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156 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
people: their strongly marked racial and linguistic unity [gives] them a
strength, which not all the other races of the Balkan Peninsula possess.
40
The emphasis on purity of descent and racial continuity was used to
legitimize Albanias territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference. The
London Conference of Ambassadors, they argued, had erred in not delimiting
Albanias borders according to its ethnographical limits. According to
Konitza, just boundaries would place parts of Serbia, Montenegro, and all of
Epirus within Albania.
41
Failure to accede to Albanian demands would in-
evitably lead to further instability and bloodshed.
42
Peace in the Balkans could
only be achieved through strict observation of Wilsonian principles, which
would naturally vindicate the Albanians.
43
Hence:
Whether the Albanian question be regarded from the point of view of justice or
from the political point of view for the sake of the peace of the Balkans, and
therefore of Europe, there can be but one solutionthe restoration of the Albanian
state within its ethnographical limits.
44
The Albanian writers strategy was to counter claims on their territory by
claiming parts of their neighbours lands and, in the case of Northern Epirus,
denying the legitimacy of their opponents claim altogether. According to
Konitza and Sevasti Dako, Greeces claims to Northern Epirus were com-
pletely unfounded. Greece demanded Northern Epirus simply to shut the
mouths of the Albanians to prevent us from demanding the restitution of
South Epirus.
45
Greek claims were reduced to propaganda designed to
confuse the noble efforts of President Wilson.
46
In essence, the Albanians
denied the very existence of the Greek minority in Northern Epirus. Instead
they claimed that all of Epirus was exclusively Albanian. If the diplomats in
Paris proved to be true to the principles they espoused, the Albanian position
on Northern Epirus would invariably be vindicated.
The ofcial Albanian delegations
47
presentation to the Great Powers mir-
rored that of the pamphleteers. Albanian ofcials also argued that the Albani-
40
S. Dako, op. cit., p. 17. It is important to note that Dakos mentioning of linguistic unity is
misleading. In fact, as Miranda Vickers points out: Natural barriers had divided the Albanian people
into two distinct groups with different dialects and great variations in their social structures. Those
who lived to the North of the Shkumbi river were Ghegs (amongst whom included the Albanians of
Kosova). The social organization of the Ghegs was tribal, based upon a tightly knit clan system
connecting various isolated homesteads. Those who lived south of the Shkumbi in the lowlands and
plains were Tosks, and constituted the bulk of the landless and subsistence-level peasantry. By the
time of the Ottoman conquest [14151421], the Tosks had abandoned the tribal clan system in favour
of a village based social organization. See Vickers, op. cit., p. 5.
41
Konitza, op. cit., p. 49.
42
S. Dako, op. cit., pp. 89.
43
Konitza, op. cit., pp. 778779.
44
Ibid., p. 779.
45
Ibid., p. 774.
46
Ibid.
47
It should be noted that the Albanians were hampered by the absence of a united diplomatic front
at the Peace Conference. Initially, Turkhan Pasha and Prenk Bib Doda accompanied twelve other
members of the Provisional Government to Paris. The legitimacy of this delegation was challenged
by Essad Pasha, a leading Albanian gure. After a bout of internal wrangling, the ofcial delegation
was reconstituted, this time with Mehdi Frasher and Lef Nosi assuming leadership roles. See Stickney,
op. cit., pp. 9293.
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ThemesPower politics and nationalist discourse 157
ans were a unied people deserving of the right to live together within a single
nation-state.
48
They supplemented this position by arguing that a strong
Albanian state with defensible borders and open trade routes was essential in
terms of securing peace in the Balkans. The size of the Greek minority in
Northern Epirus was downplayed and Greek complaints over the treatment
of the Epirotes rejected. The Albanians argued that the Greeks were using the
minority issue as a pretext for territorial aggrandizement, which, in turn,
threatened the stability of the region. Finally, in an attempt to appeal to
American public opinion, the Albanian delegation requested that the Confer-
ence give a temporary mandate to the government of the United States to
occupy and administer the disputed territory. After a year of such an arrange-
ment, a plebiscite could be held to determine the will of the population.
49
The nation as civilized community: the Greek case
All of the unofcial pro-Greek texts analysed in this study were written by
Nicholas J. Cassavetes, a Private in the United States Army during the First
World War and leader of the Pan-Epirotic Union of America. According to its
charter, the Union was committed to:
[T]he pursuance of union of the entire Northern Epirus with the mother land,
Greece: (a) By the enlightenment of the ofcial and public opinions of America
on the Hellenic character of the entire Province of North Epirus. (b) By their
unalterable determination to protest most vigorously against any attempt to
separate any portion of Northern Epirus from the mother-country, Greece.
50
Like his Albanian counterparts, Cassavetes published his material in English
and solicited the tribunal of the English-speaking world.
51
Above all, he aimed
at dispelling the claims of American-based Albanian nationalists. In Cas-
savetes words, [t]o these contentions of the Albanian propagandists and of
misguided Albanophiles, the Epirotes [with Cassavetes presumably in the lead]
answer with facts, dates, and numbers.
Cassavetes chief argument was that nationality must involve a will to
co-operate.
52
In making this argument, he differentiated between German and
Franco-British models of nationalism. The German variant saw race, religion,
and language as the determinants of the nation. Conversely, the Franco-British
theory emphasized national sentiment. Using the Franco-British model as a
guide, Cassavetes argued that by these standards the Albanians had no
national consciousness to speak of. As a consequence of this lack of national
consciousness, Cassavetes declared that: The Albanian people as a whole does
not aspire to a united nation. The Albanians as a whole do not demand that
Epirus be included in Albania. They object to a united and constitutional
government of Albania.
53
48
For a detailed summary of the ofcial Albanian delegations presentation at the Paris Peace
Conference see Stickney, op. cit., pp. 9293.
49
Ibid., p. 97.
50
N. J. Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Conference, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1919, p. 117.
51
N. J. Cassavetes, Epirus and Albania with a Map, George S. Vellonis, Ltd, London, 1919, p. 2.
52
Ibid., p. 22.
53
Ibid., p. 26.
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158 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
Cassavetes attributed this lack of national consciousness to three factors: (a)
the tribal nature of the Albanian people; (b) their religious divisions; and (c)
their immaturity. Regarding the rst point, Cassavetes called on numerous
commentaries written by English and French travellers, journalists, and schol-
ars to support his argument.
54
According to one of Cassavetes sources:
Each [Albanian] tribe hates the other with religious rancor. A war-like nation
like the Albanians would have long since won absolute independence and
founded a powerful Balkan state, had it not been for the utter absence of any
national striving for ideals. During all the centuries of their chequered existence
they have never advanced beyond the tribal stage (emphasis added).
55
Based on this evidence Cassavetes argued that
[i]t was simply shocking to think that a civilized, a cultured, a peaceful, and a
progressive people like the Epirotes should have ever been asked, not to say
forced, to live and be governed by people who are wanting in the most
elementary requisites of self-governing peoples.
56
Regarding the question of religious differences among the Albanians, Cas-
savetes was unequivocal: religious differences precluded the formation of a
true Albanian nation.
57
This was especially the case in Northern Epirus,
where it was not race or language that separates the two camps, but religion.
58
Cassavetes argued that Northern Epirus was divided into two hostile camps,
the Mohammedan Albanian Epirotes, and the Orthodox Greek Epirotes.
59
The
Orthodox population had been oppressed by their Albanian Muslim counter-
parts during the Ottoman period and therefore learned to hide their Greek
sentiments: They adopted the dress and language of their oppressors; but they
clung to the Christian Orthodox Church, the liturgy of which was in Greek.
60
Clearly, Cassavetes argument aimed at countering the Albanian nationalists
contention that the Orthodox believers in Northern Epirus could not be Greek
because they were Albanophones.
Perhaps the most interesting part of Cassavetes argument involves what he
considered to be the immaturity of the Albanian people. Drawing on the work
of scholars such as Arnold Toynbee, he concluded that the Albanians lack of
civilization and development precluded their ability to engage in real
nationalism. Conversely, Cassavetes argued that Greek nationalism was a
genuine force, which compelled the Greek Epirotes to demand union with
Mother Greece.
61
Indeed, [t]his [was] one of the most striking examples of
the protective power of Hellenism.
62
Even in admittedly hard cases, such as
the mixed town of Korce (Korytza), Cassavetes argued that the superiority of
54
See Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus, pp. 5459.
55
E. J. Dillon, Contemporary Review, April 1903; cited in Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus,
p. 42.
56
Ibid., p. 44.
57
Cassavetes, Epirus and Albania, p. 21.
58
N. J. Cassavetes, Northern Epirus and the principle of nationality, International Conciliation, 141,
August 1919, p. 903.
59
Ibid., p. 901.
60
Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus, p. 75.
61
Ibid., p. 111.
62
Ibid.
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ThemesPower politics and nationalist discourse 159
Greek culture and civilization justied the towns absorption into Greece.
63
Given the Albanians inferior status, it would be foolish for the Great Powers
to place the civilized Greek Epirotes under their rule. In Cassavetes words:
If the Christians are put under one and the same government with a vast
majority of these ignorant and fanatic Moslems, will it not be natural for them to
deal with the Christians in the standard Moslem methodas inferiors, as
slaves, as rayas (emphasis added)?
64
Thus, according to Cassavetes, the only solution compatible with the legitimate
principle of nationality required that the genuine will of the civilized Greek
Epirotes be recognized and that Northern Epirus be absorbed into the
Kingdom of Greece. To ignore the Epirotes will would mean abandoning
President Wilsons commitment to the self-determination of peoples and the
grounding of diplomacy in justice.
The ofcial Greek position on Northern Epirus echoed Cassavetes, partic-
ularly in terms of its rejection of race as a suitable means of establishing the
national character of the Epirotes. The chief Greek representatives at the Peace
Conference, Prime Minister Venizelos and Foreign Minister Politis, argued that
the will of the people ought to decide the question. In Politis words:
The national aspirations of Greece may be summed up in a single phrase: the
application, pure and simple, of the principle for which the war has been fought
and on the basis of which the peace is to be madethe great principle of the
right of peoples to dispose of themselves.
65
Added to this was Venizelos claim that the security and economic viability of
Greece and the Greek minority in Northern Epirus depended on the incorpo-
ration of the disputed territory into the Greek state. If Northern Epirus [w]ere
given to Albania Janina would be cut off from three important trade arteries,
Koritza, Argyrocastro, and Santi Quaranta [Moreover,] Koritza would be
completely isolated from her two main markets, Janina and Monastir-Sa-
lonika.
66
From the strategic point of view, the Greeks argued that the Acrocer-
aunian Mountains should form the boundary between Albania and Greek
Epirus.
67
Anything less would leave Greece dangerously exposed to attack
from the north.
Assessing the impact of Greek and Albanian nationalist appeals
Ultimately, the appeals, both ofcial and unofcial, of Greek and Albanian
nationalists played a rather limited role in the Great Powers nal decision
regarding the delimitation of Albanias southern frontier. In the end, neither
sides maximum demands were satised. That said, nationalist arguments did
63
InCassavetes words: If we are to consider not only the number of heads but what is inside them,
the case for union with Greece becomes clear. Here [in Korce], as elsewhere in Northern Epirus, the
Progressive and civilizing elements are those that desire a Greek future, and there can be little doubt
that the town will be better off as part of an ordered and established state than as part of one that
is likely for many years to be unsettled and turbulent. Cassavetes, Northern Epirus and the principle
of nationality, p. 910.
64
Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus, p. 46.
65
Cited in Stickney, op. cit., p. 77.
66
Ibid., p. 88.
67
Ibid.
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160 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
preclude some of the arrangements offered by the diplomats in Paris. For
example, France and Britain initially accepted most of the Greek delegations
claims
68
and on 14 January 1920 presented a memorandum calling for the
absorption of Northern Epirus into Greece. The same plan awarded parts of
Northern Albania to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and made
the remainder of Albania an Italian protectorate.
69
After receiving news of the
memorandum, Wilson rejected it outright, noting that [t]he memoran-
dum partitions the Albanian people against their vehement protests, among
three different alien powers (emphasis added).
70
Clearly, Wilson was serious
about putting an end to some of the worst excesses of the old diplomacy.
After months of diplomatic wrangling, during which Albania successfully
applied for membership in the League of Nations,
71
the nal decision of the
Conference of Ambassadors was announced. The declaration, signed by
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and issued on 9 November 1921, reafrmed
Albanias 1913 boundaries, as set by the Protocol of Florence.
72
The League of
Nations afrmed the decision and pledged to uphold Albanias territorial
integrity.
73
However, as Louis Sigalos notes: This declaration in reality estab-
lished Italy as the guardian of Albania with the League Council deciding when
Italy was to assume the role of Guardian.
74
In effect, then, the other Great
Powers accepted Italys demand that Albania remain within its sphere of
inuence, so long as Italian troops stayed off Albanian territory.
75
The old
diplomacy had simply been replaced by a more nuanced variant that implied
respect for small nations and yet allowed the Great Powers to dictate the terms
of interstate relations according to their interests.
76
Not surprisingly, then,
nationalist propaganda played a relatively minor role in this system.
68
Britain and France were initially supportive of Greece because they did not favour the extension
of Italian power in the Balkans. According to Harold Nicolson, the British attitude was clouded by
a doubt [as to] whether it was wise, if Italy were to obtain a footholdin Albania, to give her the strategic
advantages of Koritza and the Santi Quaranta road which was in fact the only line of communication
between Janina and Salonika. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, Grosset &Dunlap, London, 1965, p. 174.
69
L. Sigalos, The Greek Claims on Northern Epirus, Argonaut, Chicago, 1963, p. 50.
70
Ibid., p. 51.
71
For a detailed analysis of Albanias application to the League of Nations, see Stickney, op. cit.,
Chapter 7.
72
Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom, Williams & Norgate, London, 1929, pp. 366367.
73
Ibid., p. 369.
74
Sigalos, op. cit., p. 57. Also see Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, p. 318.
75
See Declaration by the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan in Regard
to Albania, signed at Paris, 9 November 1921, in League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. XII, No. 383,
1922. The Italians control over Albanias fortunes was formalized with the signing of the Pact of
Friendship and Security on 27 November 1926. In the words of historian T. Zavalani: It was clear that
the pact made Italy the supreme foreign force in Albania, and there could be little doubt that Italy
wanted to take over the country. T. Zavalani, Albanian nationalism, in P. F. Sugar and I. O. Lederer
(eds), Nationalism in Eastern Europe, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1969, p. 85.
76
It is worth emphasizing that the liberal-internationalis t spirit that had characterized Western
public opinion during and immediately after the war waned considerably during the course of the
negotiations, particularl y in the United States, where President Wilsons bid for Americas entry into
the League of Nations was defeated by isolationists in Congress. As Gordon Craig and Alexander
George have noted, Wilson went from being a man hailed as a world saviour in 1918, to a broken
individual forced to sit passively as his design for a democratic world system [was] rejected by an
American electorate whose ardor for a role in the world community cooled when its perspective costs
were realized. Wilsons loss of prestige at home badly weakened his stature among European
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ThemesPower politics and nationalist discourse 161
Conclusion
Nationalist claims are shaped by prevailing rules of discourse. Historically,
these rules have been established by centres of power. In the immediate
post-First World War era, nationalist claims were greatly inuenced by the
Great Powers endorsement of the right of national self-determination. This
doctrine facilitated the dismemberment of multiethnic empires and sanctied
the nation-state concept. The division of Europe along national lines was
advanced as a way of both promoting peace and extending the interests of the
European powers. This dubious marriage of justice and Realpolitik greatly
inuenced nationalist writers in small, peripheral states. The texts analysed
here suggest that Greek and Albanian nationalists were well aware of precisely
what those wielding power expected to hear. Their conception of the nation
and claims to territory were calculated to strike a responsive chord among the
diplomats in Paris.
This relationship between nationalist writers in the semi-periphery and
their audience in the core has not received adequate recognition among
scholars. Arguments such as those made by Cassavetes, Konitza, the Dakos
and the ofcial Greek and Albanian representatives at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence are typically denigrated as products of the Balkan imagination. This
position fails to appreciate the shared nature of nationalist discourse. The texts
surveyed here were not conceived of in a vacuum. Rather, they drew on
popular theories and beliefs held by Western intellectuals, political elites, and
diplomats. Indeed, the debate was not over the legitimacy of pure states and
just territorial frontiers; it was over which groups could legitimately claim
these privileges. Moreover, the struggle between Greek and Albanian national-
ist was not exclusively over territory. It was also over the right to lay aside the
mantle of cultural inferiority and claim membership within the civilized
community of European states.
More recently, the new states emerging out of the wreckage of Yugoslavia
and the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe have been eager to
take up residence West of the civilizational divide.
77
Contemporary nationalists
in these countries have appropriated the language of civilizational values to
promote their nations compatibility with the West.
78
Initially, this would
appear to be a positive development. However, as Adam Burgess has pointed
out:
Given the difculties of conforming to idealized standards of attention, the most
readily available means of getting attention and suggesting acceptance is deni-
grating ones neighbors as unredeemably backward and Easternin order to
shine in comparison. [It] is precisely through the language of a unique capacity to
diplomats, who preferred the old diplomacy to the new. See G. A. Craig and A. L. George, Force and
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, pp. 61, 70; and
T. A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1963. For accounts of
European diplomats reactions to Wilsons defeat at home, see G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds), The
Diplomats: 19191939, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953.
77
As Slavoj Zizek has noted, East European nationalists are principally interested in the struggle
for ones place: who will be admittedintegrated into the developed capitalist orderand who will
be excluded. S. Zizek, Ethnic Danse Macabre, The Guardian, 28 August 1992.
78
A. Burgess, National minority rights and the civilizing of Eastern Europe, Contention, 2,
Winter 1996, p. 27.
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162 Triadalos Triadalopoulos
embody civilized European standards that much of East European nationalism is
expressed. As the test of inclusion is largely in the language of civilized
conduct, every party tends toward the promotion of its own special qualities,
and in the process cements national prejudices against its barbaric neighbours
(emphasis added).
79
Burgesss argument is rendered all the more persuasive when we examine the
discourse emanating from contemporary nationalist circles. According to a
manifesto published in the journal of the Croatian Democratic Union, the
partys victory in the 1990 election marked
the inclusion [of Croatia] in the states of central Europe, the region to which it
has always belonged, except for the recent past when balkanisms and the
forcibly self-proclaimed national representatives have constantly subordinated
the Croatian state territory to an asiatic form of government, while the justied
anger and protests of certain Croatians have been qualied as terrorism and
even fascism.
80
Burgesss linking of contemporary integral nationalism to the discourse of
Western values strikes a blow to cruder interpretations, which tend to draw
a heavy line between nationalists and their audience; between the members of
tribes and their civilized counterparts in the West.
81
Greater recognition of this
fallacy should allow us to relax the rigid distinctions between types of national-
ism and encourage more studies on the substance of nationalist claims.
82
For the
imaginative exercise that underlies the creation and reinvention of national
identities is inuenced by both ideas and political forces that transcend state
borders.
83
Triadalos Triadalopoulos is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political
Science at the New School for Social Research in New York City. He is a
contributor to the forthcoming Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences and has
published articles in Citizenship Studies, East European Quarterly, and The Journal
of Politics.
Address for correspondence: 103 Cummer Avenue, Willowdale, Ontario M2M
2E6. Canada.
79
Ibid., pp. 2728.
80
Cited in M. Bakic-Hayden and R. Hayden, Orientalist variations on the theme Balkans:
symbolic geography in recent Yugoslav cultural politics, Slavic Review, 1, Spring 1992, p. 9.
81
For an example of this approach see R. D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History,
Vintage Books, New York, 1994.
82
My argument here is not that we should drop the various conceptual categories used to classify
nationalist identities or movements. Rather, we must go beyond these categories and examine the
distinctly political forces (international and domestic) that drive nationalist movements.
83
As Elizabeth Prodromou has pointed out, the post-Cold War national security discourse
emphasizing the democratic peace and the civilizational paradigm have been extremely inuential
in terms of inuencing the Wests perception of other countries identities, particularl y in the Balkans.
Commenting on the Greek case, Prodromou notes that because the integrative logic of the democratic
peace and the civilizational paradigm suggests that post-Cold War security strategy will give equal
weight to cultural andreligious variables, on the one hand, andto political , economic, andgeostrategic
variables, on the other, the Eastern Christian aspects of modern Greek culture have created a
perception paradox for Greece vis-a`-vis its European Union partners. See The perception paradox
of post-Cold War security in Greece, in G. T. Allison and K. Nicolaidis (eds), The Greek Paradox, The
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p. 125.
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