NDI 2013 6WS CUBA

TELECOM NEG
Notes
Integrate EU CP stuff from the juniors if you want to go for itthese cards
are just a supplement
You can and should read Castro good from the Castro cred DA on case.
**CASE ANSWERS**
Democracy
1NC Democracy
Censorship means they dont solve
Miami Herald 11 this article is an editorial from the Miami Herald. (Cuba is no Egypt, February 14, 2011,
http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/newsroom?ContentRecord_id=DE4CA7CB-1CDD-44FF-983E-A5BCD4C9DD63)
Cuba is a different place. In Cuba, none of the trappings of democracy have existed for half a century. It is
not part of the Castro playbook to permit any activity that would nurture the popular aspiration for
liberty. Access to the Internet for everyone are you kidding? There is no opposition press, real or make-
believe, no opposition parties, foreign reporters are closely monitored and the average citizen has
practically no access to independent sources of information. Egypts business class is reported to be in
anguish over the turmoil because its hurting the economy. In Cuba, there is no business class the military runs the
economy. Nor is there any civil society to speak of. In Cuba, moreover, the military is an uncondtional appendage of the Castro
regime. In Egypt, the armed forces are an institution apart. Officers must support the regime, but the institutions ultimate loyalty is
tied to the state and to the militarys own traditions and customs, not to the political fortunes of one individual. In Cuba, its all
about loyalty to Fidel and Raul. Officers are closely scrutinized for signs of disloyalty (and publicly disgraced, even executed,
if they fall under a cloud of suspicion). Fidel Castro has no use for the trappings of democracy because he has no
interest in democracy. His is a zipped-up, no-nonsense totalitarian regime, designed to perpetuate one-
man rule, brooking no opposition and making no concessions to foreign or domestic critics. In the place of
normal civic organizations, there are the notorious Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
neighbors spying on neighbors. Principled and outspoken critics of the regime are thrown in prison and
left to rot. Dissidents honored by foreign human rights groups are rarely allowed to go abroad to accept
their honors. Fidel and Raul Castro have had 50 years to hone the apparatus of Cubas paranoid tyranny. Crushing dissent
has been their principal preoccupation. If the streets of Havana do not burst forth with protest, it is
not because Cubas people are any less thirsty for liberty than the people in Cairo. But, unlike Hosni Mubarak
and Sadat and Nasser before that the Castro brothers have foreclosed every avenue of rebellion and taken every
conceivable step to stifle the longing for freedom. Like the Sun King, Louis XIV, Fidel Castro has been able to
proudly proclaim that he is the state.
Internet democracy promotion fails worsens relations and furthers the
digital divide
Firchow 12 (Pamina, Assistant Professor of the Practice at the Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies, A Cuban Spring? The use of the Internet as a tool of democracy promotion by USAID in Cuba,
5/23/12, http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2012/files/22913.pdf)

One of the problems with using Internet for democracy promotion is that several studies have found that
Internet-based collective action makes it more difficult to achieve long-term political goals (Gladwell, 2010;
Johnson, 2005; Schmitt 2003). Gladwell (2010), in particular, argues that the Internet is far more likely to create weak
ties than the strong ties that social movement theorists argue are the bedrock of costly political action.
Finally, Faris and Etling (2008) argue that collective action on the Internet could lead to the displacement of an
authoritarian regime, but are structurally incapable of replacing it. This clearly would be detrimental to
the relationship between the democracy promotion and development aid arms of USAID, since a
cooperative authoritarian government is better for development concerns than a thin and fragile
democracy with a weak infrastructure. Another concern with using Internet promulgation as a tool for
democracy promotion is the limited group of recipient civil society actors. Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani (2009)
find that democracy promotion in Georgia failed to connect with all but an elite group of civil society actors
before the rose revolution in 2003. This led to a weak and uneven transition to democracy, where external actors
were ill- prepared to address the many problems that arose in the sphere of democratic development.
Susan Stewart (2009) concludes from various studies conducted of democracy promotion before and after the color revolutions
that democracy promotion approaches are relatively standard: first, democracy promotion agencies wait
until a leader emerges in the opposition, then they support him or her and the corresponding movement
more or less unconditionally. Stewart argues that this has the negative effects for democracy promoters to be
unprepared for environments where these individuals do not emerge and also to fail to take into account
that these individuals come from the same structural environments as the leaders in power and are likely
to exhibit similar or the same problematic leadership traits. She deduces that the traditional approach of external
democracy promotion actors in authoritarian contexts, which is to rely heavily on support for civil society, has had only limited
success in the case of Belarus. In addition, Clay Shirky (2011) makes the argument that policy that is designed to support
dissidents on the Internet can backfire because the authoritarian regimes will seek to block the Internet
and dissidents and thus furthering the digital divide and undermining the possibility for any online civil
society to emerge. Although this does not seem to currently be the case in Cuba, it does demonstrate the precarious situation
and that any kind of democracy promotion involving the Internet can lead to unintended consequences.
Online dissidents in Cuba are always on the edge of losing connectivity, either by phone or Internet, and
any kind of illegal activity is likely going to exacerbate this action whether it is directly targeted toward
them or the dissident community as a whole.
Squo solvesreforms
Bilbao 13 Tomas Bilbao is the Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group in Washington, DC. (What Cuba's Reforms Tell
Us About the Country's Leadership, January 14, 2013, http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/14/what-cubas-reforms-tell-us-
about-the-countrys-leadership-by-tomas-bilbao/)
I. Cuban Leadership Seeks Legitimacy by Responding to Popular Demands Cubas reforms indicate that the
current Cuban leadership understands it must deliver results to gain legitimacy. Fidel legitimated his rule
by virtue of being father of the revolution. Unlike his brother, Raul cannot simply blame Cuban workers for
the countrys poor economic performance and impel the Cuban people to make endless sacrifices in the
name of the revolution. Instead, he seeks to legitimize his government by addressing some of the long-held grievances that
Cubans dared not vocalize during his brothers rule. In 2011, the VI Party Congress approved the Guidelines of the
Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution, ushering in a series of reforms. According to the
Cuban government, the Guidelines are an expression of the will of the people influenced by more than
781,000 public suggestions received from average citizens in 163,000 meetings held throughout the
country between December 2010 and February 2011. The final version of the Guidelines even contains a side-by-side
comparison of original reform proposals and the final outcomes, accompanied by an explanation of any modifications. Cuban
leaders have gone to great lengths to legitimize the reforms with an unprecedented solicitation of public
input. These efforts to respond to public demands harken back to a December 2007 speech by Raul, delivered following Fidels
illness, in which he set a starkly different tone than his brother: those occupying a leadership post must know how to listen and how
to create an opportune environment for the rest to express themselves with absolute freedom. II. Cuban Leadership is Not
Monolithic While the Cuban government has boasted about public debate surrounding the reform process, little has been said about
the ongoing debate among the countrys leaders. It would be a mistake to assume that Cubas leadership is
monolithic by virtue of its authoritarianism. At closer look, the reform process reveals differences of opinion within the
leadership with Raul setting high expectations for reforms and some within his regime responding with attempts to delay and water
down changes. Pervasive throughout the reform process is a tension between those in the government who understand the urgent
need for reform and those fighting to preserve the status quo. For instance, in the first Guideline, the introduction of market reforms
is promptly followed by a commitment to continued central planning. Likewise, while the Guidelines highlight the importance of
private enterprise growth, they concurrently establish fiscal policies aimed at preventing both the individual accumulation of wealth
and social inequity. These inherent contradictions may reveal divergence within the regime.
Squo solves information access
Campos 6/6 (Pedro, Havana Times staff writer, Cuba: Internet Access for the Nouveaux Riche and
Dissidents, 6/6/13, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94248)

HAVANA TIMES With a great song and dance, the Cuban government haughtily announced the broadening of
Internet access on the island by opening 118 cybercafs across the country and lowering web navigation
rates to 4.50 CUC (or US $ 5.20) an hour. It has also, clearly declared that there are no plans of taking Internet services to Cuban
homes for the time being. Since the matter has already been addressed by a number of analysts and journalists, I will limit myself to
commenting on some elements that seem to me of considerable importance. The measure does, undeniably, expand the
Internet services hitherto available in Cuba and lowers navigation rates. It is also true, as a friend of mine says that
you have to start somewhere. It is another small, very small step taken by Cubas current administration, which has
gradually, and unhurriedly, been eliminating the absurd regulations and restrictions that had been imposed
on the Cuban people in the name of socialism and the struggle against imperialism. We have to acknowledge that Raul
Castro has worked to dismantle, partially or totally, some of the absurd regulations set up when his
brother was at the helm, at a time when he was second-in-command.
The transition fails
Suchlicki 12 Jaime Suchlicki is the founding Director of the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami and
Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies. He is also the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor of
History. (Getting Ready for Life after Castro, May 11, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=0,0)
In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly
concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban
nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of
the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the Post-Castro
Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties
in Post-Castro Cuba, Mtias F. Traviesco-Diz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized
without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to
exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the
complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist
Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, Jnos Kornai). Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major
need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry.
Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates
have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition,
environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention.
(Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.) Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only
challenges facing Cuba in the future. A major problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of the
military. (The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent
years, the military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario, the
military will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited democratic system in which
Cubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the political
process. An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible. A
powerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as an
unacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence. Its control of key economic sectors
under the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its role
strictly to external security. Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy may not be able to absorb
large numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them.
The role of the military will also be shaped by social conflicts that may emerge in a post-Castro period. For the first half of the
twentieth century, political violence was seen by many as a legitimate method to effect political change, and
this could well have an effect on societal expectations in the future. Communist rule has engendered
profound hatred and resentment. Political vendettas will be rampant; differences over how to
restructure society will be profound; factionalism in society and in the political process
will be common. It will be difficult to create mass political parties as numerous leaders and groups vie for power and develop
competing ideas about the organization of society, economic policy, the nature of the political system, and unraveling the legacy of
decades of communist dictatorship. A newly free and restless labor movement will complicate matters for any
future government. During the Castro era, the labor movement remained docile under continuous government control; only
one unified labor movement was allowed. In a democratic Cuba, labor will not be a passive instrument of any
government. Rival labor organizations will develop programs to protect the rights of workers, and to
demand better salaries and welfare for their members. A militant and vociferous labor movement
will surely characterize post-Castro Cuba. Similarly, the apparent harmonious race relations of the Castro era
may also experience severe strains. There has been a gradual Africanization of the Cuban population over
the past several decades due to greater intermarriage and out-migration of a million mostly white Cubans.
This has led to some fear and resentment among whites in the island. At the same time, blacks feel that they
have been left out of the political process, as whites still dominate the higher echelons of the Castro power
structure. The dollarization of the economy and the recent relaxation in the amount of remittances
allowed to flow from the U.S. to Cuba has accentuated these differences. Since most Cuban-Americans are white,
black Cubans receive fewer dollars from abroad. Significant racial tension could well result as these feelings and frustrations are
aired in a politically open environment. (Race Relations in Cuba, Juan Antonio Alvarado - in Spanish). Perhaps the most difficult
problem that a post-Castro leadership will have to face is acceptance of the rule of law. (Establishing the Rule of Law in Cuba, Laura
Patallo Snchez.) Every day, Cubans violate communist laws: they steal from state enterprises, participate in
the black market, and engage in all types of illegal activities, including widespread graft and corruption.
They do this to survive. Getting rid of those necessary vices will not be easy, especially since many of them
pre-date the Castro era. Unwillingness to obey laws will be matched by the unwillingness to sacrifice and endure the difficult
years that will follow the end of communism. A whole generation has grown up under the constant exhortations and pressures of the
communist leadership to work hard and sacrifice for the sake of society. The youth are alienated from the political
process, and are eager for a better life. Many want to immigrate to the United States. If the present rate of
visa requests at the U.S. consular office in Havana is any indication, more than two million Cubans want
to move permanently to the United States. Under the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, Cubans will be free to
visit the United States. Many will come as tourists and stay as illegal immigrants; others will be claimed as
legal immigrants by relatives who are already naturalized citizens. A significant out-migration is certain, posing an
added major problem for U.S. policymakers at a time of increasing anti-immigration sentiment. While many Cubans want to leave
Cuba, few Cuban-Americans will be inclined to abandon their lives in the United States and return to the island, especially if Cuba
experiences a slow and painful transition period. Although those exiles who are allowed to return will be welcomed initially as
business partners and investors, they are also likely to be resented, especially if they become involved in domestic politics.
Readjusting the views and values of the exile population to those of the island will be a difficult and
lengthy process. (The Role of the Cuban-American Community in the Cuban Transition, Sergio Diaz Briquets and Jorge Perez-
Lopez). The future of Cuba is therefore clouded with problems and uncertainties. More than five decades of communism have left
profound scars on Cuban society. As in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, reconstruction may be slow, painful, and tortuous. Unlike
these countries, Cuba has at least three unique advantages: a long history of close relations with the United States; excellent
preconditions for tourism; and a large and wealthy exile population. These factors could converge to transform the country's living
standards, but only if the future Cuban leadership creates the necessary conditions for an open, legally fair economy and an open,
tolerant, and responsible political system. Unfortunately, life in Cuba is likely to remain difficult for a while longer.
No Middle East impact
Cook 7CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of
Pennsylvania(Steven, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, 6 /28, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265)
Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan
Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey
and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians,
Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern
leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the
conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather
than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario
in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad
against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the
Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally,
there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly
involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other
than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed
forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in
Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current
situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American
fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite
militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The
Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous
conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent
local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

2NC Censorship
Plan fails Cuba will monopolize the technology
Schmidt and Cohen 10 (Eric, Member of the President's Council of Advisers on Science and
Technology and Chair of the New America Foundation, and Jared, Adjunct Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, The Digital Disruption Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power, November/December
2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66781/eric-schmidt-and-jared-cohen/the-digital-
disruption#)

A second and equally large group of developing countries are the "connecting nations" -- places where technological
development is still nascent and where both governments and citizens are testing out tools and their
potential impact. In these states, connection technologies are not yet sufficiently prevalent to present
major opportunities or challenges. Although these states will invariably rise into the ranks of the partially connected, it is too early to determine
what this will mean for the relationship among citizens, their governments, and neighboring nations. Some of these states, such as Cuba,
Myanmar (also called Burma), and Yemen, have tried to wall off access to certain technologies entirely. For example, they have
confined access to cell phones to the elite; this, however, has led to a communications black market, which is most often used for daily
communication but harbors the capacity to foment opposition. Activists in these states and in their diasporas -- such as those working along Myanmar's
border with Thailand -- try daily to break the information blockade. In the short term, the regimes that govern these nations will do
their best to maintain monopolies on the tools of communication.
No possibility of dissent
Amnesty International 10 Amnesty International is an international humanitarian organization.
(RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOMOF EXPRESSION IN CUBA, 2010, http://www.amnistia-
internacional.pt/dmdocuments/Cuba_FreedomExpression.pdf)
In recent years the Cuban government has taken some limited steps to address long-standing suppression of
freedom of expression in the country. While welcome, these changes have had only a limited effect. The legal,
bureaucratic and administrative infrastructure built up over the years to silence government opponents
and maintain the one party system remains largely intact. Those who voice views beyond those permitted
by the authorities continue to be intimidated and harassed, arbitrarily detained2 or imprisoned after
unfair, often summary, trials. The principle that no one should be imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their opinions is
one of the most widely accepted norms of international human rights law. Yet over the years, hundreds of prisoners of
conscience have been imprisoned in Cuba for the peaceful expression of their views. Some were imprisoned
following large-scale crackdowns on political dissent; others were individually targeted. At the time of writing, 54 prisoners of
conscience continued to be held by the Cuban authorities for peacefully exercising their right to freedom
of expression. Harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention and criminal prosecutions, all continue to be
used to restrict the expression of views critical of the government. Those targeted are dissidents and critics, in many
cases independent journalists and political and human rights activists. Cubans use the possibilities offered by the
internet and new communications technologies to bypass state censorship in order to express ideas and
opinions and to seek, receive and impart information. Independent reporting by individuals or small groups, including
independent press agencies, continues to defy government control. However, the virtual state monopoly on the broadcast
media and the press remains intact; private ownership of mass media is prohibited under the
Constitution. Similar restrictions apply to the internet, despite some relaxation of state control over the
past year. As a result, most Cubans are denied ready access to information that is independent of
government sources or to opinions that differ from state ideology. The current legal framework and the
way in which it is enforced by the authorities seriously limits freedom of expression. A range of laws are used to
curb the legitimate expression of opinion and dissent. People continue to face unfounded criminal prosecution, as
well as harassment and intimidation by state security and police officials, for expressing and distributing
information or opinions critical of the government. Unlawful restrictions on freedom of expression are
underpinned by other restrictions on human rights, such as the rights to freedom of association, of
peaceful assembly and of movement. Arbitrary detention, interrogations and warnings at police stations,
and other forms of temporary arrests are frequently used by the authorities to intimidate individuals
critical of the prevailing state system. The cumulative effect of such practices has been to create a climate
of fear in Cuban society and inhibit the development of freedom of expression. The judiciary is neither
independent nor impartial and allows criminal proceedings to be brought against those critical of the government as a mechanism to
prevent, deter or punish them for expressing dissenting views. The complicity of the state judicial system in
prosecuting government critics, often in summary trials that fail to meet international fair trial
standards,3 has a profound chilling effect on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.
Political dissidents and other critics of the government were in many cases harassed and intimidated by organized groups of
government supporters; these may include local members of the communist party and members of pro-government mass
organizations, in particular Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and Rapid Response Brigades. There are reports of
combined activities between government supporters, state officials and law enforcement agencies to
harass dissidents. Although the government has taken some small steps towards enhancing respect for human rights, such as
signing up to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), restrictions to freedom of expression
remain largely intact. The Cuban government has sought to justify failings in the protection of human rights by pointing to the
undoubted negative effects of the US embargo. No matter how detrimental its impact, the US embargo is a lame excuse for violating
the rights of citizens, as it can in no way diminish the obligation on the Cuban government to protect, respect and fulfil the human
rights of all Cubans. As Cuba embarks on the long and challenging process of legal and political reform, it will need to consider the
depth and complexity of the interrelationship between the various aspects of social structures that will need to be modified.4
However, the respect, protection and fulfilment of all human rights civil, political, economic, social and cultural must be a
primary and urgent objective of that process.
2NC Reforms Solve
Term limits and stepping down solves
Miroff 13 Nick Miroff covers Cuba for GlobalPost. He is also a contributor to National Public Radio, and has written for the
Washington Post, Mother Jones, Sporting News, the San Francisco Chronicle, and other publications. (End of the Castro Era,
February 18, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/cuba/130215/cuba-castro-term-limits-elections)
So President Raul Castros declaration in 2011 that he wanted the government to implement term limits for
top posts was a clear and relatively radical break with his older brothers iron-man leadership
philosophy. We have arrived at the conclusion that its advisable to limit the fundamental political and state offices to a
maximum period of two consecutive terms of five years, Castro said during a Communist Party Conference the only such meeting
in the previous 15 years to set the islands long-term agenda. The term limits would also apply to the presidency, meaning that the
81-year-old Castro who is set to kick off his second term this month will be termed out of office in February
2018 at age 86. A constitutional change is still required to enshrine the term limits in law. But as with almost any political
decision, if Castro wants it, it will be so. The younger Castro has been running Cuba since 2006, when a health crisis forced
his older brother to step aside temporarily, then permanently. Raul Castro was officially elected president by the islands hand-
picked State Council, not direct popular vote in February 2008. Cubans held parliamentary elections earlier this month, when 612
candidates ran unopposed for 612 seats in the National Assembly of People's Power. The rubber-stamp legislature, which meets
twice a year, will install the 31 members of the State Council next week. They, in turn, will re-elect Castro. Assuming he keeps his
word, the February 2018 end-date means that barring health problems of his own Castro will have five
years to steward an extraordinarily challenging transition for his country, toward a socialist system that
can stand on its own after he and his brother are gone. Cuba is entering a period of transformation, and its future will
be defined in these next five years a long time in the life of a single person, but barely a sigh in history, wrote novelist Leonardo
Padura. Most pressing among his worries is the health of cancer-stricken Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, Cubas largest financial
benefactor. He hasnt been seen in public since he underwent surgery for an undisclosed form of cancer in December. His chosen
successor, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, is a close ally of the Castros who would probably maintain the economic cooperation
agreements that provide Havana with billions worth of oil and hard currency. If Venezuelas opposition comes to power, however,
Cuba could be plunged into another economic crisis. Then there is Cubas relationship to the United States. Castro has
repeatedly stated that hes willing to sit down and discuss any issue with the Obama Administration, no
matter how sensitive. But US lawmakers maintain that as long as Cuba holds American subcontractor Alan Gross in prison on
espionage charges, no progress will be possible. That may suit Castro just fine, at least for now. His decision to lift travel
restrictions on Cubans and enact other migration reforms has been popular, but its created new risks for his
government. More than 400,000 Cubans now visit the island from the United States each year, and their
money and cultural attitudes will exert an ever-greater influence. Castros government seems to be betting it can
manage the countrys reconciliation with the nearly 2 million Cubans living abroad while maintaining strict control over the islands
affairs. It needs their money and their investments. But a re-engagement and an increase in the number of Cubans migrating
abroad for work while keeping property on the island will probably increase the pressure for democratic reform of
the one-party communist system. Its one thing for Raul Castro to handle that challenge, even at his advanced age. But it will
be another matter entirely for the next generation of leaders who lack the historic credentials of having fought in the 1959
Revolution. Most Cubans were born after the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the America they see in
Hollywood movies and US sitcoms doesnt look like the mortal threat Fidel Castro warned their grandparents about.
Lots of other changes and momentum solve
Orsi 4/16/11 Peter Orsi is a writer for the Associated Press. (Raul Castro Proposes Political Term Limits In Cuba,
4/16/11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/16/raul-castro-term-limits-cuba_n_850141.html)
HAVANA -- Raul Castro proposed term limits Saturday for Cuban politicians including himself a remarkable
gesture on an island ruled for 52 years by him and his brother. The 79-year-old president lamented the lack of young
leaders in government, saying the country was paying the price for errors made in the past. Castro told delegates to a crucial
Communist Party summit that he would launch a "systematic rejuvenation" of the government. He said politicians and other
important officials should be restricted to two consecutive five-year terms, including "the current president of the Council of State
and his ministers" a reference to himself. Castro officially took over from his brother Fidel in 2008, meaning he would be at least
86 at the end of a second term, depending on how the law is written. The proposal was made toward the end of a 2 1/2
hour speech in which the Cuban leader forcefully backed a laundry list of changes to the country's socialist
economic system, including the eventual elimination of ration books and other subsidies, the
decentralization of the island nation's economy and a new reliance on supply and demand
in some sectors. Still, he drew a line in the Caribbean sand as to which reforms should remain, telling party luminaries that
he had rejected dozens of suggested reforms that would have allowed the concentration of property in private hands. Castro said
the country had ignored its problems for too long, and made clear Cuba had to make tough decisions if it
wanted to survive. "No country or person can spend more than they have," he said. "Two plus two is four. Never
five, much less six or seven as we have sometimes pretended." Dressed in a white guayabera shirt, the Cuban leader alternated
between reassurances that the economic changes were compatible with socialism, and a brutal assessment of the mistakes the
country had made. Fidel Castro was not present for the speech. Raul Castro said the monthly ration book of basic foods,
perhaps the most cherished of subsidies, represented an "unbearable burden ... and a disincentive for
work." He said the changes he is proposing will come "without hurry, but without pause." Still, he added that
"there will never be room for shock therapy" in Cuba. Of term limits, Castro said he and his brother had made various attempts to
promote young leaders, but that they had not worked out well perhaps a reference to the 2009 firing of Cuba's photogenic foreign
minister and vice president, who were later accused of lusting too obviously for power. "Today we face the consequences of not
having a reserve of substitutes ready," Castro said. Like the proposals on economic changes, the term-limit idea does not yet
carry the force of law since the party gathering lacks the powers of parliament. But it's all but certain to be acted on quickly
by the National Assembly. The Communist Party is the only political organization recognized on the island, and most
politicians are members. Cubans vote for municipal and national assemblies, which in turn elect senior leaders including the
president. Currently there is no set limit on their terms. Since taking office, Raul Castro has leased tens of thousands of
hectares of fallow government land to small farmers, and enacted reforms that allow Cubans to go into
business for themselves, rent out homes and hire employees. Cubans are watching to see whether other changes
emerge from the Congress such as the end of a near-total ban on buying and selling private property, or details on promises to
extend bank credits. Raul Castro has also pledged to end Cuba's unusual two-tiered currency system, where
wages are paid in pesos, while many imported goods are available only in a dollar-linked economy beyond
most people's reach. The president, however, has said little about how or when he will accomplish that.
2NC Squo Solves Telecom
Access growing now
Reuters 13 (Cuba to increase unrestricted Internet access at new outlets, May 29, 2013,
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2013/news/regional/05/29/cuba-to-increase-unrestricted-internet-access-at-new-outlets/)
HAVANA, (Reuters) Cuba will begin offering broader Internet access next month through 118 outlets around
the country, according to a decree in the governments Official Gazette on Tuesday, in a step long awaited by many Cubans. It said
Internet would be made available starting June 4 at offices of ETECSA, the state telecommunications
monopoly, and elsewhere in what a government blogger said was a first step toward home service. Maybe it
will take a while but the next step is to connect Cubans from their houses. This is the advance party, said
blogger Yohandry Fontana, who often is first to report official information and viewpoints, commenting on Twitter. The decree made
clear that the new Internet access would be closely monitored, warning users it could not be used to endanger or prejudice public
security, or the integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Currently, unrestricted access to Internet in Cuba is available
only to select institutions and professionals and to luxury hotels catering to tourists. The communist-led island
says that 2.6 million Cubans, out of a population of 11.2 million, have access to the Internet, but until now
most have only been able to explore a limited, state-controlled intranet basket of approved websites.
Cuban government has expanded internet access
BBC 13 British Broadcasting Corporation. (Cuba 'to offer' limited public internet access, May 31, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22696637)
The government of Cuba has said it will soon expand public access to the internet, although it will maintain
restrictions for access at home. It said that 118 internet points would be set up on the Caribbean island from 4
June, to allow web surfing for $4.5 (3) an hour. Cuba's average salary is $20 a month, and it has one of the lowest levels of
internet access in the world. Most Cubans can connect only at work, at school, or in luxury hotels. Traffic will be monitored The
easing of restrictions was published in the official paper, Gaceta Oficial. It said that member of the public will
be able to access international websites for $4.5 (3) an hour - down from $6 - or $0.6 (0.4) an hour for national sites.
The cost for checking emails will remain unchanged at $1.50 (1). The government also reaffirmed that it would continue
monitoring internet traffic closely. Cuba's telecommunications company, Etecsa, will "immediately" stop access to users if they
commit "any violation of the norms of ethical behaviour promoted by the Cuban state", the Ministry of Communications said in its
government decree. Only some professionals, like journalists and doctors, are allowed to surf the internet at
home. Most Cubans, however, can get online only in their places of work or study, or check their email at
post offices. They can also use internet points in hotels which mostly cater to international tourists. Slow
connection Up until recently, Cuba relied upon slow and expensive satellite links for internet connections. But in January, Etecsa
announced it would start using an under-sea fibre-optic cable from Venezuela that would provide high-
speed internet connection. The Communist-led government has blamed limited bandwidth for restricting web access, saying
it is forced to prioritise it for universities, companies and research centres.

2NC Middle East D
Middle East war would be short and small-scale
FERGUSON 2006 (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and
Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)
Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich,
the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such
language can for now, at least safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another
world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with
those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and
Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria
and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position
to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an
American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great
power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East
war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first
heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington,
Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point
during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON
3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this
war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six
days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being
made in Washington.
No escalation
A) Arab states wont escalate
COOK et al 2007 (Steven A., fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ray Takeyh (fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations) Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 2007 Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast,
International Herald Tribune
Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly
involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made
it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never
committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in
Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo,
Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they
have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over
powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic
struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and
accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed
an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle
East.
B) No economic damage and no great power intervention
KELLEY 2002 (Jack, national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 7)
During the Cold War, there was reason to suppose an Arab-Israeli war could spark a third world war. In
those days, Israel was a client of the United States. The radical Arab states were clients of the Soviet Union. If the proxies got into a tiff, the conflict
could spread to the principals. The closest we came to this was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptians, in a surprise attack, dealt a severe
blow to Israeli defense forces. Only an airlift of M-60 tanks from U.S. bases in Germany kept Israel from being overrun. Once its initial battle losses had
been replaced, Israel quickly regained the initiative, routing Egyptian and Syrian forces. Israeli troops were poised to take Cairo and Damascus. The
Soviets were willing to permit the United States to restore the status quo ante. But they threatened to intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. So
we prevailed upon the Israelis to stop short of humiliating their enemies. The Yom Kippur War was a near thing for the world. Only three times in
history have U.S. forces gone to DEFCON 1, the highest war footing. The Yom Kippur War was one of those times. Now the Cold War is over.
Russia is a shadow of what we thought the Soviet Union was, and is more or less an ally in the war on terror.
Radical Arabs have lost their sponsor. And Egypt has, after a fashion, switched sides. There is no longer good
reason to suppose a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would spread. Another consequence of the Yom Kippur war was the
Arab oil embargo. But the oil "weapon" has lost much of its bang. We are more dependent upon foreign oil now than we were then,
but less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, since new sources elsewhere have been developed. And
Arab governments have become so dependent upon oil revenues that the loss of them would harm Arabs
more than the loss of their oil would harm us.

Econ
1NC Cuban Economy
The aff doesnt overcome structural problems with the Cuban economy
Sweig and Bustamente 13 JULIA E. SWEIG is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know. MICHAEL J. BUSTAMANTE is
a Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. (Cuba After Communism, July/August 2013, Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139458/julia-e-sweig-and-michael-j-bustamante/cuba-after-communism?page=show)
Nevertheless, Cuba faces serious obstacles in its quest for greater economic vitality. Unlike China and Vietnam
at the start of their reform efforts, Cuba is an underdeveloped country with developed-world problems. Not only
is the population aging (18 percent of the population is over 60), but the countrys economy is heavily tilted toward
the services sector. When Vietnam began its doi moi (renovation) economic reforms in 1986, services accounted for about 33
percent of GDP, whereas the productive base represented nearly 67 percent. By contrast, services in Cuba make up close to
75 percent of the islands GDP -- the result of 20-plus years of severe industrial decay and low rates of savings and
investment. Service exports (mainly of health-care professionals), combined with tourism and remittances,
constitute the countrys primary defense against a sustained balance-of-payments deficit. Cuban officials and
economists recognize this structural weakness and have emphasized the need to boost exports and foster a more dynamic domestic
market. Yet so far, the state has not been able to remedy the imbalance. In the sugar industry, once a mainstay,
production continues to flounder despite a recent uptick in global prices and new Brazilian investment.
Meanwhile, a corruption scandal and declining world prices have weakened the nickel industry, leading to
the closing of one of the islands three processing facilities. More broadly, Cuban productivity remains
anemic, and the country has been unable to capitalize on its highly educated work force. Although important,
the expansion of the small-business sector cannot resolve these core issues. There are now 181
legal categories for self-employment, but they are concentrated almost exclusively in the services sector, including proprietors of
independent restaurants, food stands, and bed-and-breakfasts. Start-up funds are scarce, fees for required licenses are
high, and some of the legal categories are senselessly specific. It also remains unclear whether the chance to earn a
legitimate profit will lure black-market enterprises out into the open. No surprise, then, that the expansion of self-employment has
not yet enabled the state to meet its targets for slimming down its bloated payrolls. In late 2010, Castro pledged to eliminate
500,000 state jobs in the first six months of 2011, with an eye to incorporating over 1.8 million workers (out of a total estimated
work force of 5.3 million) into the private sector by 2015. But the government managed to eliminate only 137,000 positions that first
year. Still, the reforms are making a serious impact. Small businesses currently employ some 400,000 citizens, an increase
of 154 percent since the liberalization of self-employment began in October 2010. To spur further growth, moreover, authorities
recently launched a wholesale company that will allow emerging enterprises to purchase supplies on the same terms as state-run
companies, thus addressing a major complaint of business owners. To supplement these gains, Cuba needs to continue
rebuilding its productive capacities in core areas such as agriculture. Before Ral Castro came to power,
approximately 20 percent of the cultivable land in the country lay fallow and Cuba imported half its domestic food supply -- a
significant part of which came from the United States, under a 2000 exception to the trade embargo. To increase domestic
production, the state has handed over more than 3.7 million acres of land to private farmers, whose crops
now account for 57 percent of the total food production in the country despite their occupying just under
25 percent of the arable land. Yet aggregate food-production levels in most basic categories still hover at
or slightly below 2002 levels.
Tons of barriers to foreign investment that the aff doesnt overcome
Sweig and Bustamente 13 JULIA E. SWEIG is Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know. MICHAEL J. BUSTAMANTE is
a Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. (Cuba After Communism, July/August 2013, Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139458/julia-e-sweig-and-michael-j-bustamante/cuba-after-communism?page=show)
The port project underscores some of the broader dilemmas constraining foreign investment in Cuba and the countrys overall
growth prospects. Havana designated Mariel as a special economic development zone -- an area where
foreign companies are given special incentives and prerogatives -- in an effort to attract badly needed
investment dollars. Cuban officials also aim to take advantage of the countrys well-educated population and establish
investment zones geared toward high-tech innovation and other high-value-added activities, such as biotechnology. Yet without
links to local industries, such investment zones could become economic islands, providing employment to
locals and income to the Cuban government but reduced multiplier effects. The islands dual-currency
system makes the challenge all the more difficult. A byproduct of the circulation of U.S. dollars in the 1990s -- first in the
black market, then legally -- the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) today functions as the currency of the tourist
sector and is required for the purchase of many consumer items. For common Cuban citizens, the value of
the CUC is pegged to the dollar, with one CUC equal to 25 Cuban pesos (CUP), the currency in which most
state workers are paid. Consequently, citizens who receive hard currency from abroad or who earn money in
CUC, such as workers who collect tips from foreign tourists, enjoy much higher incomes than workers
who rely solely on salaries paid in CUP. Even worse, the values of the CUC and the CUP are considered equal
within and between state enterprises. This bizarre accounting practice helped insulate CUP prices from
inflation during the depths of the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, but today it
makes it difficult for analysts and investors to estimate the real costs of doing business on the island or the
value of state companies. Economists agree that the least disruptive way to move toward a single currency would be to
gradually merge the two exchange rates in tandem with a steady rise in GDP and salaries overall. But in the meantime, the
artificial one-to-one ratio within the state sector has the effect of overvaluing the CUPs international
exchange rate and thus decreasing the competiveness of domestic goods. Paradoxically, the dual-currency
regime protects imports at the expense of domestic production.
Remittances solve
Chavez 13 Juan is a writer for the Miami Herald. (REMITTANCES FROM CUBANS ABROAD DRIVE THE ISLANDS
ECONOMY, the latest mention of anything in the article was about the entire 2012 year; figured it was from 2013,
http://www.cubanalisis.com/SECTION%20IN%20ENGLISH/REMITTANCES%20FROM%20CUBANS%20ABROAD....htm)
Cash remittances to Cuba in 2012 surpassed all revenue coming from the main components of
the Cuban economy while becoming the largest element of support to the retail market, according to a
study by a Miami-based analysis group. The study, titled Remittances to Cuba: the Most Powerful Engine of the Cuban Economy,
was done by The Havana Consulting Group. It concludes that in 2012, remittances reached $2.605 billion. The number
represents an increase of more than 13 percent compared to the previous year of nearly $2.3 billion. Today remittances to the
island reach 62 percent of Cuban homes, support close to 90 percent of the retail market and allow
employment of tens of thousands of people, the study says. The remarkable upward trend has also been a common
denominator in goods (electrical appliances, clothes and consumer items, among others) that Cubans abroad ship to relatives
or friends in Cuba. This category amounted to $2.5 billion in 2012, according to the study. Both categories (money and
goods) together surpassed $5.105 billion. The remittances have left behind the powerful sugar industry ($391
million) which by 1993 had entered its biggest crisis and it is still in decline they surpass tourism ($2.613 billion) in
volume and performance, provide more revenue than nickel exports ($1.413 billion) and the pharmaceuticals
produced by the Cuban biotechnological industry ($500 million), the study says. And this without subtracting
costs in each category, which would make the difference significantly larger. The injection of remittances
has been a powerful pillar for the countrys economy, which has been practically stagnant and with high levels
of unemployment. But its role has now been strengthened because of the deteriorating economy, according to
experts familiar with the issue. In October 2010, the Cuban crisis forced Ral Castros government to launch market reforms and
other emergency initiatives. The reforms, which a large part of the opposition calls insufficient and cosmetic, include a
larger participation of foreign investment, self-employment and services in dozens of labor categories. The
study emphasized that the Obama administrations policies contributed to the increase of remittances. During his first term, Obama
lifted most of the restrictions of travel and remittances while easing up religious, cultural and educational exchanges. Without any
doubts, the arrival of President Barack Obama at the White House has directly influenced the increment of remittances in the last
four years, an increment that has almost reached $1 billion in such a short time, says The Havana Consulting Groups study. The
study highlights that cash remittances in 2012 surpassed, at a ratio of 3 to 1, the salaries the government pays to the approximately 4
million workers who work for the public sector. Officially, the average salary in Cuba is 455 pesos a month, equivalent to $19. If to
this value we add remittances arriving in the form of goods, the ratio would then be 5.5 to 1, a monumental difference, the study
says. Another point that has favored the increase of remittances is closely linked to the migration flow of
Cubans abroad, the study adds. The flow has been kept at 47,000 people annually, almost a half-million in
the last decade.
Reforms solve
Shank 11 Michael Shank is the US Vice President of the Institute for Economics and Peace. (Cuba's Economic Reforms
Herald New Resolve by Castro; Time for US to Reform Relationship, 11/14/11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-shank/us-
cuba-policy_b_1091316.html)
Things are changing quickly in Cuba. Last week, on November 10, the Cuban government, under President Raul
Castro's leadership, launched its most progressive economic reform initiative yet by legalizing the sale and
purchase of private property. For Cuba watchers and Castro critics, this was noteworthy given that Cubans have not
been allowed to trade real estate since the 1959 revolution. Having traveled myself to Cuba last year, as part of a
Congressional staff delegation, this comes as little surprise; the winds of economic change were already blowing. But for those in the
US Congress critical of Cuba's economic policies -- e.g. US Senator Bob Menendez and US Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen --
this may confound. Why the about-face and will it last? It turns out, as illuminated in a 98-page report published this month by the
Center for Democracy in the Americas, Cuba's recent economic reforms are indicative of a new resolve. Bolstering
this claim, the authors found that "Cuba's reform process is here to stay and the changes are most likely
irreversible." The report, titled "Cuba's New Resolve: Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy," shows that the
economic policy trends in Cuba parallel the very conversations in Congress and throughout US state
legislatures, whether it's reducing the numbers of employees on the state payroll, reducing government
spending for social safety nets, or supporting small businesses. In fact, President Castro is spurring new
private sector enterprise, enabling Cubans to open small businesses, hire workers, and create farming and
manufacturing cooperatives that will function as small businesses. Tea Party types in the US, and proponents of
smaller government, should like what Castro is doing. He's cutting one million workers on the state payroll, reducing ration card
allocations, and ending some state subsidies entirely. Castro is also decentralizing government by handing over state
responsibilities to provincial and municipal leaderships with the aim to build capacity and implement
decisions locally. All of this should make Washington happy. Yet while US President Barack Obama is on board the US-Cuba
relationship transformation train, doing more to improve US-Cuba relations than recent predecessors, there are still ample
roadblocks in Congress keeping our two countries from increased economic cooperation. Don't forget that Cuba, until recently, was
the United States' largest rice export market and the fifth largest export market in Latin America for U.S. farm exports. Furthermore,
Cuba holds the potential for $20 billion in trade with America over a three-year term. Our economy could clearly benefit from better
relations. The longer we wait the more ground we lose. Brazil's former President Lula da Silva capitalized on Cuba's
appetite for growth, proposed investments in industrial, agriculture and infrastructure projects, including
ports and hotels, and an agreement with Brazil's oil company. Venezuela and China are already investing
in Cuba's oil industry, and Spain is weighing in with millions in microcredit to boost Cuba's small
business industry.
No impact to bioterror
Dove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New
York University, Whos Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist? Jan 24 2012,
http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]
The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, were left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single
exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it. There have been at least three well-
documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent thats not on the list. Im focusing entirely on
the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to
inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but its not clear those attacks were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so theres
no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their
enemies. Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax
incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of
weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on bad meat, but in the 1990s
Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a
government-run lab: the 2001 Amerithrax attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the governments main
bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died. That gives us a grand total of around
105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded
bioweapons research labs. Remember that. Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these
cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated
restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent thats not on the select list). 751 people got sick, but nobody
died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the
sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadnt come forward afterward with a
confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major
bioterrorist attack. The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum
Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the
roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated
members, so this release over the worlds largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.
Nobody got sick or died. From the cults perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it
was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of
the top select agents is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups.
Its a really crappy bioterrorist weapon. Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our
biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

2NC Alt Causes
Structural problems like the currency and the service sector
Optenhoegel and Pronold 12 Uwe Optenhoegel is a political consultant and is currently the Director of
Friedrich Ebert Stiftungs office for Cuba. Florian Pronold is Vice-Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, state
party leader of the SPD in Bavaria and speaker of the circle of friends of Cuba in the Bundestag. (Cuba In Search of an Orderly
Transition, Social Europe Journal, 9/26/12, http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/09/cuba-in-search-of-an-orderly-transition/)
The state of the economy as reform of the economic model gets under way is extremely poor. Half a century
after the Revolution Cuba has not been able to get its planned economy off the ground. Within the framework of the division of
labour of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) the country was committed to deliver sugar or other foodstuffs
and raw materials. When the Eastern European economic community and thus the Soviet subsidies ceased
Cuba had to completely rebuild its economy. Fidel Castro passed this task on to his brother and then Defence Minister
Raul and his Forcas Armadas Revolutionarias (FAR). The successful completion of this mission marked the entry
of the Cuban military into the economy, at least in its more modern sectors. Since then they have extended
their influence and today are the pragmatic driving force behind the reforms. Although in this way collapse was
avoided the economic sectors built up since then tourism, nickel exporting and, to a certain extent, health
services and biotechnology have not developed enough to cover the countrys need for foreign currency.
For years Cuba has lived with a structural foreign trade deficit, with high foreign debts and, as a result, a
shortage of liquidity. When Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela at the end of the 1990s Fidel Castro found a new source
of subsidies. Although they kept alive the ailing planned economy, at the same time they stymied the promising reform efforts, a
serious wrong decision that cost Cuba a lost decade with regard to economic policy. Meanwhile, the island has an economic
structure in which the productive sectors account for only around a quarter of value added, with the
service sector accounting for the rest. Cuban economists talk of a dysfunctional tertiarisation that
threatens the healthy development of the economy. Since the beginning of the 1990s the Cuban economy has not
been in a position to ensure the necessary recapitalisation, the basis of its very existence. Gross fixed-asset
investments fell by 47 per cent between 1989 and 2007. In 2006 they accounted for only 13.5 per cent of
GDP and remain at this level today. This is half the level of 1989 and around half of what is regarded as necessary for
sustainable growth. Thus Cuba lies below the Latin American average of around 20 per cent. The country is de-industrialised
and there are almost no intact value chains, to say nothing of the dilapidation of the infrastructure. The
dual currency that followed dollarisation at the start of the 1990s continues to have grave consequences
for Cubas wage earners. It became the main catalyst of social differentiation. Wages were paid in the Cuban peso,
which has little purchasing power. Most basic necessities are traded in the convertible CUC, however. For
this reason Cubans who have access to foreign currency are much better off than their fellow countrymen
who do not. People acquire hard currency either through remittances from Cubans living abroad, through
tourism or through foreign trade. Generally speaking, additional incomes from remittances and from the black
market or private economic activities significantly exceed regular incomes. Thus paid work is becoming
increasingly unimportant. This system creates entirely the wrong incentives. The fact that a waitress, a taxi driver or the
cleaners at a tourist place earn four times as much as a doctor or a teacher is leading to the inversion of Cubas social pyramid.
Consequently, many young people are asking themselves whether its worth getting a good education. And
more and more highly qualified professionals are emigrating to places where they can earn good money
even without qualifications.
Deficits
Pujol 11 Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy's Secretary 1990-1997, Member of the Board of Directors 2002-
2004, 2004-2006. (MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO TRY
TO SOLVE THEM, ASCE, 2011, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/pujol.pdf)
Large Fiscal Deficits The global financial crisis, compounded by the damage inflicted by three hurricanes in
2008, forced Cuban authorities to run a fiscal deficit of 6.7% of GDP in that year, stop payment of credits
received from Spain, China and other creditors, and cut back in many investment projects. Significant
limitations regarding the availability of foreign exchange to pay for imports and finance investment
projects contributed to a sharp deceleration in economic activity. In order to reduce the fiscal deficit the
government adopted a very sharp readjustment in its expenditure plans and implemented a 6% across the
board cut in government expenditures in 2009. Expenditure cut backs were further intensified during 2010. Housing
construction and maintenance have particularly suffered from the lack of funding, but most other
government activities have also been affected. Meanwhile, since 2008 there has been growing monetary
injections to cover the domestic fiscal deficit and therefore money in the hands of the public (liquidity)
has been increasing, reaching over 40% of GDP; since there has not been a concomitant increase in
domestic output, this has contributed to the rise in domestic prices and a decline in real wages. Large
Balance of Payments Deficit Large and persistent deficits in the balance of payments since 2008 have generated
substantial foreign exchange shortages. As a consequence of the combination of an increase in imports, a deceleration of
exports, greater obligations to service a growing external debt, and lower availability of external financing, the demand for
foreign exchange could not be met. Increases in international market prices, particularly of foodstuffs and
fuel, increased the balance of payments imbalance and were one of the factors that triggered the need for
a reform of the Cuban governments economic policies. Given Cubas fixed exchange rate, the above-mentioned
external pressures ended up affecting the banking system, and the lack of foreign exchange led to
substantial delays in making payments abroad for imports and other obligations. Many foreign exporters began
to curtail their supplies to the island or demanded payment in advance. In view of the credit crunch, foreign banks cut back
their exposure on the island by over 16% in the first half of last year, according to the latest statistics published by
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).2 The total external debt of Cuba to the members of the Paris Club as
of December 31, 2010, totaled US$30,471 million, according to a publication of that organization. Outside
the Paris Club, Cubas largest long-standing creditor is Argentina, with an estimated $1.8bn owed.3 China is rapidly becoming
Havanas lender of last resort, as it recently racked up large loans to Cuba, perhaps as much as US$4 billion, according to some
Cuban sources. In response to the deterioration of the balance of payments, the authorities took steps to reduce monetary outflows
by lowering travel expenses, suspending imports, postponing investments that required outflows, and limiting the ability of foreign
enterprises operating in the island and individuals to withdraw hard currency from their bank accounts. In 2009, Cuba slashed
spending on food importing food and other basics by 34% percent, to $9.6 billion, from $12.7 billion the previous year. Further cuts
were implemented in 2010. But so far, the moves have not been enough to rein in the deficit. The freeze of the
bank accounts of foreign firms operating in Cuba affected not only the image of the country abroad but
also resulted in a cut back of short term credits, thus contributing to the fall in imports and the increase in
cash payments abroad. The structure and composition of Cuban exports is extremely narrow and there is
an excessive dependence of exports of services (such as medical, educational and military services) that have little if
any backward linkages. The agricultural and industrial sectors are totally unrelated to the expansion of
export of these services, so there is no multiplier effect on the domestic economy. The sugar industry and
tourism stopped playing such a role years back, as the sugar industry has practically disappeared and
tourism had stagnated in recent times. The global economic crisis also hit tourism. Last year, the number of foreign visitors
rose by 3% but the tourism sectors earnings fell by 10%. Travelers from Canada, the U.S., Argentina and Russia increased, but those
originating from the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany, France and Mexico declined. Travelers from Canada comprise the
largest number of visitors from abroad; they reached 945,248 in 2010. The second largest group is Cubans residing in the United
States, whose numbers have grown exponentially in the last three years. According to estimates of tourism operators, some 300,000
Cubans living abroad visited the island in 2009 and more than 370,000 in 2010. While tourist receipts were higher in 2010 than in
2009, at US $2,395 million, they are still below the level in 2005.
The currency system
Pujol 11 Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy's Secretary 1990-1997, Member of the Board of Directors 2002-
2004, 2004-2006. (MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING TO TRY
TO SOLVE THEM, ASCE, 2011, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/pujol.pdf)
Overvalued Exchange Rate and Complex Multiple Currency System Cuba has two forms of domestic currency. State
employees are paid in pesos moneda nacional (CUP), which can be used to pay for subsidized rations, bus
fare, additional food items at agro markets, and many forms of entertainment. Foreign currency, such as
dollars and euros, are most often exchanged for convertible pesos (CUC), which can be used at larger
government supermarkets, for individual (as opposed to collective) taxis, and at most clothing and appliance
stores. Each convertible peso (CUC) is worth 24 pesos in moneda nacional (CUP) at government exchange houses. Eliminating the
dual currency system has been one of the main talking points in the reform debates, but so far little has been done in this regard. The
existence of this dual currency system is perceived as a source of discrimination between those that receive payments in one
currency versus the other. In particular, while most states employees are paid in moneda nacional, they have to
pay in convertible pesos for many items that they buy in the official stores. In a sense the dual system acts as
a hidden tax on workers who receive payment in moneda nacional. The maintenance of an exchange rate
that is not representative of market conditions has contributed to the problems faced by the banking
system and the difficulties in obtaining financing from abroad. In addition, the prevalence of an overvalued
exchange rate and a complex multiple currency system makes it nearly impossible to determine the real
profitability of various economic activities and results in all kinds of hidden cross subsidies and other
economic distortions. Cuban economist Pavel Vidal Alejandro has pointed out that the official exchange rate of one
peso cubano in moneda nacional (CUP) equal to one peso cubano en moneda convertible (CUC) distorts
almost any economic measurement and the excessive value given to the peso cubano en moneda
convertible makes a group of enterprises appear artificially profitable while making another group of
enterprises appear unprofitable, without there being a true relationship between profitability and
efficiency.
2NC Remittances Solve
Largest sector of the economy
Morales and Scarpaci 13 Emilio and Joseph are from the Havana Consulting Group. (Remittances Drive the
Cuban Economy, last updated June 11, 2013,
http://thehavanaconsultinggroups.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=345%3Aremittances-drive-the-cuban-
economy&catid=48%3Aremittances&lang=en)
It was a devastating ideological blow at the beginning of the so-called Special Period in a Time of Peace because it revealed that the
Cuban exile community had become a lifeline for the island. Suddenly, U.S. dollars started inundating the
island and would never leave. Both the Cuban society and the exile community were startled by this bold
move. The former Cuban leader probably never imagined that the forced opening up to dollars was going to become the most
efficient driver in the economy over the last 20 years. Not a single Cuban economist foresaw that outcome. Today, remittances
reach 62% of Cuban households, sustain about 90% of the retail market, and provide tens of thousands of
jobs. Money sent from overseas far exceeds the value of the once powerful sugar industry which, in 1993,
began a huge decline from which it has not recovered. Remittances in 2013 surpass net profits from
tourism, nickel, and medical products manufactured by the Cuban biotech industry. The table above shows that
remittances ($5.1 billion) outstrip the leading four sectors of the Cuban economy combined ($4.9 billion). Moreover, the figures for
items 4 through 7 do not take into account expenses incurred in generating those gross revenues (i.e., costs of processing sugar,
manufacturing drugs, food imports, etc.). Sending remittances does not cost the Cuban government money, but it
circulates throughout he economy and supports most Cubans in some way. White House Policies Trigger Growth
in Remittances Barack Obamas arrival in the White House has directly influenced the increase in money being
sent to Cuba. In the past four years, $1 billion USD of remittances have infused the Cuban economy. Cash remittances in 2012
reached a record $2.61 billion USD; a 13.5% increase over 2011. In other words, cash remittances outweigh government salaries by 3
to 1. The current monthly mean salary according to ONEI (the official government statistics agency) is 445 Cuban pesos, or the
equivalent of just under $19 USD. Today, the economically active work force is 5.01 million workers, of which about 80% (4.08
million) draw state paychecks, whereas the balance is self-employed, agricultural, or cooperative workers. If we use the official
exchange rates that one Cuban convertible peso (CUC) equals 24 pesos (CUP) or one US dollar, the annual payout for state
workers is three times less than the volume of money that Cuban migrs send to family back home.
Include in-kind remittance contributions (gifts, appliances, clothing, etc., brought to Cuba during visits), and the ratio leaps to 5.5 to
1. Behind this growth in sending money to Cuba is the opening up of travel to Cuba as well as eliminating restrictions on sending
money there. In 2012, just over a half a million Cubans residing abroad visited Cuba, making them the second largest
tourist group in the islands market; only Canadians (1.1 million visits) surpass them. Out-migration from Cuba about
47,000 annually on average over the past decade or nearly a half million migrsis also a contributing factor because
those who have most recently left the island are the ones most inclined to send money back home. That was
not the pattern with the original exile community in the 1960s; sending dollars to the island was forbidden back then. We also need
to acknowledge that several reforms introduced by the Cuban government in the past three years have
encouraged remittances. This cash infusion helps to start home restaurants (paladares), B&Bs, car rentals,
and more recently the buying and selling of private cars and real-estate. These businesses are aided by the
1.6 million cell phones in use today available to the general public only since 2007of which 70% are
paid for by Cubans living off the island.
SQ remittances solve economic development and political reforms
Goldstein 11 (Josh, Principal Director for Economic Citizenship & Disability Inclusion at the Center
for Financial Inclusion, 2/1/11, Cuba & Remittances: Can the Money in the Mail Drive Reform?
http://cfi-blog.org/2011/02/01/remittances-a-key-driver-of-economic-reform-in-cuba/)

With up to one million state workers moving off the government payroll in the next year, President Ral Castro and the Cuban
leadership seem committed to strengthening the microenterprise and small business sectorwith self-
employment now the certain future of so many Cuban workers. Could remittances from the United States play a key role in
providing finance to these new start-up enterprises, in the absence of private or public banks in a position to lend? On January 19th,
the Center for Financial Inclusion, in conjunction with the Cuba Study Group sponsored the Cuba Small Business Summit, which
was hosted by the Council of the Americas, at its headquarters in New York. The summit focused on the outlook for profound change
in the employment picture in Cuba in the wake of a new commitment to economic reform announced in September 2010 by the
Cuban government. One question was on everyones mind. Were the newly enacted economic reforms beginning to make a
difference in the lives of ordinary Cubans? The answer from the panel of experts, many of whom had recently visited Cuba, was a
confident, if anecdotal, yes. Most compelling was the consensus finding that the government was doing everything it
could to expedite the issuing of business licenses to the growing number of people wanting to establish
micro-businessesup to 75,000 since October. Whatever the number, more and more entrepreneurs are seen hawking their
wares and services in the streets, and unlike in the past, the state media is no longer excoriating them for being ingrates and
pilferers, but speaking of them with respect, if not reverence. This represents a sea change in the official view and the sixth
Communist Party Congress in April will focus on the need for economic change and may go even further in endorsing the growth of
private enterprise. (Already, the government has lowered remittance transaction costs.) Fortuitously, on the eve of the summit,
President Barack Obama used his executive authority to open the way for a vast expansion of remittances to
the islandeven now approaching more than $2 billion a year in hard currency and another $2 billion in
merchandise remittances. Residents of the United States will for the first time be permitted to remit to nonrelatives up to
$500 per quarter, per recipientwith no limit on the number of possible recipients. At least in theory, remitted money could
serve as a source of working capital for legions of new micro- and small businesses. Remittances could
answer in the short term one of the greatest challenges of creating a microenterprise and small business sector
from scratch in Cubathe lack of financial capital. Merchandise remittances might also provide access to some key
goods at near wholesale pricesthe lack of wholesale markets being identified as a huge obstacle to business creation on the island.
And remittances will certainly increase in importance for the newly self-employed by cushioning the transition from
cradle-to-grave social welfare (however meager) provided by the Cuban state, to a scary new world where the safety net is full
of holes.
2NC Reforms Solve
Theyre accelerating and solve the economy
The Economist 13 Obvi. (Money starts to talk, July 20, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21581990-and-eventually-perhaps-one-currency-tempo-reform-accelerates-money-
starts)
AT 9.01am one morning earlier this month, Marino Murillo, a member of Cubas ruling Politburo, strode on to the stage at the
International Press Centre in Havana, gave a concise account of the governments economic plans, and took questions for 45
minutes. What would have been routine elsewhere was remarkable in communist Cuba, for three reasons. Gone is the
interminable waiting around for the late-night rants of Fidel Castro: punctuality is one of the hallmarks of the
government led since 2006 by his younger brother, Ral. And after internecine political battles over liberalising
economic reforms, the government is confident enough of its message to have invited a small group of
foreign journalists to hear itthe first such initiative in many years. Third was the message itself. Mr Murillo, a
burly former army colonel who is in charge of implementing economic reforms (officially dubbed updating), stressed that the core
of the system remained social property. But he also talked of wealth creation and the need for price signals and
market factors. Life has shown that the state cant do everything, he said. Success will lie in how to maintain
macro balance while giving space to the market and wealth creation. Under 313 guidelines approved by a Communist Party
Congress in 2011, Ral Castro is trying to revive the islands moribund economy by transferring a chunk of it
from state to private hands and by streamlining a cumbersome central-planning system. So far the changes
have centred on farming and small business. The government has handed over, on ten-year renewable leases, nearly 1.5m
hectares (3.7m acres) of land to private farmers or co-operatives, who now occupy 70% of farmland. Farmers can sell almost
half their output to the highest bidder, rather than handing all of it over to the state as in the past. About
400,000 Cubans work in the budding private sector of small business and self-employment, up from
150,000 three years ago. Cubans can now buy and sell houses and cars freely and travel abroad. From last
month, they can surf the internet at what will soon be a network of 118 telecoms centres, though the price of
$4.50 an hour is about a quarter of the average monthly wage for a state worker. The tempo of reform is
accelerating. Over the next 18 months, Mr Murillo said, the government will loosen two of the economys most
crippling shackles. Starting next year, state enterprises will be allowed to keep half their post-tax profits, to
reinvest or distribute to their workers. Their managers will be given much more autonomy. Companies that post
persistent losses will, in theory, be liquidated. Mr Murillo is also preparing to unify Cubas twin
currencies, the source of convoluted distortions and hidden subsidies. Most wages and prices are set in Cuban pesos (CUPs), 25 of
which buy a dollar. The tourist economy operates with convertible pesos (or CUCs), set at par to the dollar. In fact, CUCs are not
freely convertible, because state companies are allowed to pretend that each of their CUPs is worth one CUC. The upshot is that
ordinary Cubans are paid a pittance (the average monthly wage of 466 CUPs is worth just $19). Income inequality is rising sharply as
more Cubans obtain CUCs, either as remittances from relatives abroad or because they work in tourism or the growing private
sector. And since scarce foreign exchange is assigned by government fiat, companies have had no incentive to export or substitute
imports. The logical step would be to unify the two currencies by devaluing the CUC and revaluing the CUP, though this would
trigger inflation and boost demand for imports. Instead, officials say that within the next few weeks several industriesstarting with
sugar, biotechnology and shellfishwill be allowed to start experimenting with different exchange rates. Pavel Vidal, a former
official at Cubas Central Bank now teaching at the Javeriana University in Cali, Colombia, thinks that these companies will get 12
pesos to the dollar for exports, will pay for imports at seven and book oil imports from Venezuela, Cubas main benefactor, at four to
the dollar. This experimental devaluation should generate opportunities as well as costs. Since companies need management
autonomy to take advantage of them, Mr Vidal thinks it is positive that currency and enterprise reform are
happening together. But he points out that multiple exchange rates tend to generate corruption and hidden subsidiesvices
that officials have pledged to fight. If they succeed in their aim of boosting productivity, these reforms are likely to lead to job losses.
Ral Castro originally said that the state would lay off 1.1m workers by 2014. He was forced to backtrack, because many feared losing
the little they have (and the opportunity for pilfering that state jobs offer). Instead, the government is quietly easing
workers off the state payroll. It is encouragingor obligingthem to form co-operatives. The constitution was
recently changed to allow co-operatives outside farming; 197 have so far been authorised, according to Carlos Mateu Pereira, an
adviser to the Labour Ministry. State-owned restaurants are to become co-ops; many transport businesses will
go down the same route. So will some wholesale markets. There is talk that professionals, such as
architects and lawyers, may be able to form co-opssomething which reformist economists favoured from
the outset.
Reforms solve the economy and liberalization
Huffington Post 2/25/13 (Cuba Under Raul Castro: Economic Reform as Priority?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturo-lopez-levy/cuba-under-raul-castro_b_2754397.html)

Raul Castro's first presidential term was marked by economic reform and political liberalization. Over the last five
years, the government created important institutional foundations for a mixed economy and a less vertical
relationship between the state and civil society. Beginning in 2009, a commission to discuss and implement the reforms was created,
and through its own initiative, the Council of State instituted an anti-corruption general agency, while restructuring
various ministries, in particular, the Super Ministry for Basic Industry in charge of Energy and Mining, and the Sugar Industry. The
institutional changes have been accompanied by fiscal, credit and migration reform, a law for cooperatives, as well as
the legalization of various markets for consumer goods (real estate, used cars, fast food and restaurants) and services
(transportation) directly impacting Cubans' daily lives. The presidential succession from Fidel to Raul Castro has been
complemented by an almost completely renovated Council of Ministers and an inter-generational transition in the military
command at the level of regional armies and in the party and government at intermediate levels. The Economy as Priority The
strategic nature of the economic transition is expressed in the changes in the composition of the labor force. In
less than three years between 2010 and 2013, the number of individuals working in small businesses practically tripled, from around
160,000 to 390,000. The liberalization of the licensing process and the amplifying of the production scale on which these
businesses operate are significant. Likewise, contracts between state and non-state sectors have been liberalized, opening
the possibility for improved productive and administrative synergies between the two, as well as the creation of wholesale markets
and credit mechanisms to support the emerging private sector. By the end of 2012, the law of cooperatives was approved, indicating
a move away from government control over significant areas of agricultural production, services, small industries and
transportation. The legislation included mechanisms to create as well as dissolve such entities, offering a legal framework for their
operation within market logic. The law allows for the creation of second degree or cluster cooperatives, a legal
mechanism that facilitates amplification of production, the coordination of activities and the establishment
of stable relationships between various cooperatives.
2NC Impact D
Experts agree theres no risk from bioterror
ONeill 4 ONeill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, Weapons of Minimum Destruction http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]
David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has
examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He
found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in
industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating
about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past,
we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders
have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they
ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent 28million on
stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s
and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims
of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a
'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story
of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear
Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would
happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is
any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as
smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons
repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are
massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the
evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says.
Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides
used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in
the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in
the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were
used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he
has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of
chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the
original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty
trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons]
only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical
rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the
numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the
Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as
Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities
gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases.
Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some
earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be
preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it
disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between
such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even
Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of
'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was
horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400,
others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study
which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been
greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical
and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction,
not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant
attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a
military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers
guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some
of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy
chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The
Tigers have not used WMD since.
Cyber
1NC Cyberattacks
They dont solve Huawei expansion into Africa which makes cyberattacks
inevitable
Reed 13 John Reed is a national security reporter for Foreign Policy. He comes to FP after editing Military.coms publication
Defense Tech and working as the associate editor of DoDBuzz. Between 2007 and 2010, he covered major trends in military aviation
and the defense industry around the world for Defense News and Inside the Air Force. (Africa's Big Brother Lives in Beijing, July
30, 2013, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/30/africas_big_brother_lives_in_beijing_huawei_china_surveillance?page=0,0)
Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei may have been all-but-barred from doing business in the U.S. over allegations that it's
basically an intelligence agency masquerading as a tech business. In Africa, however, Huawei is thriving. From Cairo to
Johannesburg, the Chinese telecom has offices in 18 countries and has invested billions of dollars in building
African communications networks since the late 1990s. The company's cheap cellular phones today
dominate many of Africa's most important markets -- and that was before Huawei teamed up with Microsoft earlier this
year to launch a low-cost smartphone on the continent. Just in the past few months, the firm closed a pair of telecommunications
deals in Africa each worth more than $700 million, part of an African business that brings in more than $3.5 billion annually for the
Chinese firm. According to Huawei's marketing materials, the projects are all part of a mission of "Enriching [African] Lives through
Communication." But current and former U.S. officials -- as well as outside security analysts -- worry there could be
another agenda behind Huawei's penetration into Africa. They suspect that the Chinese telecom could be
wiring the continent for surveillance. "There's a great deal of concern about Huawei acting to advance the
interests of the Chinese government in a strategic sense, which includes not only traditional espionage but
as a vehicle for economic espionage," former Department of Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff told FP. "If you
build the network on which all the data flows, you're in a perfect position to populate it with backdoors or
vulnerabilities that only you know about, you're upgrading it, each time you upgrade the network or
service it, that's an opportunity" to install spyware. "That's a strategic issue for the countries in
Africa and a strategic issue for us," added Chertoff.
Cant force out Huawei
O'Connor 13 (Nicholas C. O'Connor, U.S. Navy Lieutenant, Master of Science in Cyber Systems and
Operations. "THE LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF HUAWEI_S PENETRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA" March 2013.
calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/32876/13Mar_O'Connor_Nicholas.pdf?sequence=1)
VP

Another adversary that Huawei has had a relationship is Cuba. Huawei was consulted on projects such as
the construction of an undersea cable between Venezuela and Cuba (Anderson 2007, para. 6). Until recently,
there were too many restrictions for U.S. telecommunications companies to operate in Cuba. This was an opportunity for
investment that Huawei was able to seize. However, that may soon change. Under the new policy, U.S.
telecommunications providers will be able to establish fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities linking
the U.S. and Cuba (Condon 2009, para. 3). This may provide some competition for Huawei in Cuba, but
Huawei has the clear of advantage, having dealt with Cuba in the past.
No Huawei threat
Albert 12 Jacob is a freelance journalist living in NYC. (Trusting Huawei, The American Interest, October 31, 2012,
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1333)
The first sentence uttered to describe the U.S.-Chinese relationship in the third and final presidential
debate was President Obamas, and it contained both the words adversary and partner. Messaging
doesn't get much more mixed than that, and the Presidents opponent, Mitt Romney, was not much clearer. In such a hotly
contested election, we might be tempted to excuse the candidates for going out of their way to sound both tough and pacific on
China, and conclude that the Sino-American relationship is not quite as schizophrenic as it appeared in the final debate. But the
dynamic between Washington and Beijing is a fraught and contradictory mlange of increasing
interdependence and growing mistrust. Nothing illustrates this better than the recent case against the Chinese telecom
giant Huawei. Earlier this month, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that
Federal agencies and private businesses alike stop using equipment from Chinese telecoms like Huawei
and ZTE because of the risk that their products be used to conduct cyber espionage against the United
States. Experts consider the Huawei threat to be particularly pointed because of its size: It is currently locked in a back-and-forth
race with Swedish rival Ericsson for the title of largest telecommunications vendor in the world. The committees report
offers no hard evidence of espionage or information theft, despite its drafters having waded through a
years worth of interviews, testimony and data analysis. Rather, it stands as a broad indictment of the
Chinese way of doing business (that is, opaquely) and of the ideology of Chinas economic choices (that is,
heavy on state involvement). The report recommends taking a closer look at the unfair trade practices of the Chinese telecoms
sector, paying particular attention to Chinas continued financial support for key companies. Huawei is a private company,
not a state-owned enterprise, but the exact nature of its relationship with the Chinese government is the
reports predominant concern. There is, for instance, the problem that Huawei failed to explain its relationships with the
Chinese government and denied having any connection to or influence by the Chinese government beyond that which is typical
regulation. Then there is the fact that Huawei admits that the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] maintains a Party Committee
within the company, but . . . failed to explain what that Committee does on behalf of the Party, or which individuals compose the
Committee. The report cites an incident in 1987, when Huaweis founder and CEO, Ren Zhengfei, pooled 21,000 renmibi (about
$5,600 dollars at the time) with five other investors, none of whom, the report suspiciously notes, Ren had ever worked with before,
and one of whom had previous affiliation with the government. Most importantly, there is the shady story of Mr. Ren himself, a
former officer in Chinas Peoples Liberation Army who left the military thirty years ago. According to the report, Huawei refused to
describe Mr. Rens full military background [and] refused to state to whom he reported when he was in the military. It all boils
down to a question of trust. The report's concluding lines sum up the problem: Huawei and ZTE cannot
be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to
our systems. Cybersecurity experts have pointed out real vulnerabilities in several Huawei routers, but
such flaws are common in equipment manufactured by other telecoms as well. And though the point of
Huaweis lack of transparency with regard to the CCPs influence is well taken, especially when it comes to
using their products in sensitive sectors, the companys own rebuttals are worth paying attention to.
Huawei has protested that it is a private company whose goals are customer-oriented and commercially
minded. Testifying before Congress in September, a Huawei vice president explained that bowing to government pressure
would be a suicidal move for any corporation of its stature: Huawei has not and will not jeopardize our
global commercial success nor the integrity of our customers networks for any third party, government or
otherwise. Huawei has additionally pointed out that most of the telecom equipment produced by its
rivals is also manufactured in China, suggesting that its own equipment is no less potentially insecure
than that of its competitors.
Their impacts are all hypeno cyberattack
Walt 10 Stephen M. Walt 10 is the Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of international relations at
Harvard University "Is the cyber threat overblown?" March 30
walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/30/is_the_cyber_threat_overblown
Am I the only person -- well, besides Glenn Greenwald and Kevin Poulson -- who thinks the "cyber-warfare" business may be overblown? Its clear the U.S.
national security establishment is paying a lot more attention to the issue, and colleagues of mine -- including some pretty serious and level-headed people -- are
increasingly worried by the danger of some sort of "cyber-Katrina." I don't dismiss it entirely, but this sure looks to me like a classic opportunity
for threat-inflation. Mind you, I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of shenanigans going on in cyber-space, or that various forms of cyber-warfare don't
have military potential. So I'm not arguing for complete head-in-the-sand complacency. But heres what makes me worry that the threat is being
overstated. First, the whole issue is highly esoteric -- you really need to know a great deal about computer networks, software,
encryption, etc., to know how serious the danger might be. Unfortunately, details about a number of the alleged incidents that are
being invoked to demonstrate the risk of a "cyber-Katrina," or a cyber-9/11, remain classified, which makes it hard for us
lay-persons to gauge just how serious the problem really was or is. Moreover, even when we hear about computers
being penetrated by hackers, or parts of the internet crashing, etc., its hard to know how much valuable information
was stolen or how much actual damage was done. And as with other specialized areas of technology and/or military affairs, a lot of
the experts have a clear vested interest in hyping the threat, so as to create greater demand for
their services. Plus, we already seem to have politicians leaping on the issue as a way to grab some pork for their
states. Second, there are lots of different problems being lumped under a single banner, whether the label is "cyber-
terror" or "cyber-war." One issue is the use of various computer tools to degrade an enemys military capabilities (e.g., by disrupting communications nets, spoofing
sensors, etc.). A second issue is the alleged threat that bad guys would penetrate computer networks and shut down power grids, air traffic control, traffic lights, and other
important elements of infrastructure, the way that internet terrorists (led by a disgruntled computer expert) did in the movie Live Free and Die Hard. A third problem is
web-based criminal activity, including identity theft or simple fraud (e.g., those emails we all get from someone in Nigeria announcing that they have millions to give us
once we send them some account information). A fourth potential threat is cyber-espionage; i.e., clever foreign hackers penetrate Pentagon or defense contractors
computers and download valuable classified information. And then there are annoying activities like viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and other things that affect the
stability of web-based activities and disrupt commerce (and my ability to send posts into FP). This sounds like a rich menu of potential
trouble, and putting the phrase "cyber" in front of almost any noun makes it sound trendy and a bit
more frightening. But notice too that these are all somewhat different problems of quite different importance, and the appropriate response to each is likely to
be different too. Some issues -- such as the danger of cyber-espionage -- may not require elaborate technical
fixes but simply more rigorous security procedures to isolate classified material from the web. Other problems may not
require big federal programs to address, in part because both individuals and the private sector
have incentives to protect themselves (e.g., via firewalls or by backing up critical data). And as Greenwald warns, there may be real costs
to civil liberties if concerns about vague cyber dangers lead us to grant the NSA or some other government agency greater control over the Internet. Third, this is another
issue that cries out for some comparative cost-benefit analysis. Is the danger that some malign hacker crashes a power grid
greater than the likelihood that a blizzard would do the same thing? Is the risk of cyber-espionage
greater than the potential danger from more traditional forms of spying? Without a comparative assessment of different
risks and the costs of mitigating each one, we will allocate resources on the basis of hype rather than analysis. In short, my fear is not that we won't take reasonable
precautions against a potential set of dangers; my concern is that we will spend tens of billions of dollars protecting ourselves against a set of threats that are not as
dangerous as we are currently being told they are.
2NC Africa
Makes cyberattack super easy
Reed 13 John Reed is a national security reporter for Foreign Policy. He comes to FP after editing Military.coms publication
Defense Tech and working as the associate editor of DoDBuzz. Between 2007 and 2010, he covered major trends in military aviation
and the defense industry around the world for Defense News and Inside the Air Force. (Africa's Big Brother Lives in Beijing, July
30, 2013, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/30/africas_big_brother_lives_in_beijing_huawei_china_surveillance?page=0,0)
Huawei's deep involvement in African networks could only further China's economic expansion on the continent. It
could give the Chinese an edge in almost any business deal or security matter on the continent. U.S.
cybersecurity experts have repeatedly cited cases of Chinese hackers stealing American corporations'
negotiating strategies and business plans in order to give rival Chinese companies a leg up on their
American counterparts. In addition to giving Huawei -- and potentially the Chinese government -- vital intelligence on African
nations, Demchak worries that access to Africa's telecommunications infrastructure could make it even easier
for Chinese hackers to disguise their attacks by rerouting them through the continent. Basically, the
continent could serve as a giant laundromat for Chinese cyber-aggression. "One could imagine a
situation where the Chinese management of Africa's backbone in effect turns much of the continent into a
'bullet-proof host'," said Demchak describing a term for Web hosting services that permit illegal activities. "In that case,
laundering of bad cyber behaviors through these backbones could easily be largely untouchable and
uncontrollable externally by other nations," added Demchak. If she's right, Huawei's investments in Africa might not just
be problematic for the people who live on the continent. They could be an issue for all of us.
Huawei expansion into Africa makes cyber-espionage inevitable.
Neal 8/1 (Meghan, technology writer at Motherboard and former editor at the Huffington Post, Is China
Wiring Africa for Surveillance?, 8/1/13, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/is-china-wiring-africa-for-
surveillance)
Some in the US have long expected that China's massive telecom company Huawei is developing tools for
the Chinese government to commit cyber-espionage around the world. Now that Huawei's getting serious
about its expansion into Africa, eyebrows are being raised again. In 2012, a House committe labeled Huawei
a national security threat, and the US government has accused the firm of nefarious surveillance practices
many times in the last several years. That includes accusing it of helping the Iranian government monitor its
citizens and quash dissent, and having ties to the Taliban. Each time the company has denied the allegations, and
government investigations consistently fail to turn up any hard evidence. But now Huawei has invested billions of dollars
in Africa over the last two decades, providing affordable cell phones, internet access, and telecommunications networks
to the continent. Over the last few months Huawei has closed major deals in Africa to get more areas on the
grid. The company says it's bridging the digital divide, but others suspect it's wiring the continent for
surveillance. The loudest concerned party is former NSA and CIA head Michael Hayden, who has repeatedly raised
warning flags about Huawei's suspected espionage. "The Chinese see themselves in a global economic
competition with the United States, and they see real advantages of at least having the possibility of
exploiting African networks in the future," he told Foreign Policy yesterday. At this point, Huawei supplies back-end
telecommunications equipmentwi-fi routers, mobile networks, communications hardwareto a third of the world.
The thinking goes that if you build the infrastructure, you can easily build backdoors to get in and
ascertain information. And not only is China laying the brick, so to speak. In many cases it's also running
the networks for the African governments. If the allegations are true that Huawei provides a direct line to
Beijing, it's about to have a huge peep hole into Africa. "Even if there aren't any backdoors, which is a large hypothesis,
just the Chinese state having access to the architecture of your system is a tremendous advantage for the
Chinese should they want to engage in any electronic surveillance, any electronic eavesdropping," Hayden told FT.


2NC No Solve
Companies are not willing to invest and cant beat Huawei
O'Connor 13 (Nicholas C. O'Connor, U.S. Navy Lieutenant, Master of Science in Cyber Systems and
Operations. "THE LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF HUAWEI_S PENETRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA" March 2013.
calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/32876/13Mar_O'Connor_Nicholas.pdf?sequence=1)
VP

While it may seem as if Huawei is dominating technologies markets in Latin America, U.S. companies are
not always willing to take the risk of a relationship in adversarial countries. Reportedly, in May Costa Ricas
government invited some of the worlds biggest equipment manufacturers to build a sophisticated new mobile-telecoms network
in the Central American country. Only Huawei stepped forward (How Huawei Advances 2008, 3). In cases like this,
American companies had a chance to bid for the contract, but they declined. This shows that one of the
reasons for Huaweis economic success in Latin America is the lack of U.S. investment in the region. If
U.S. companies want to profit from Latin America, they need to be more aggressive in instances like this in
Costa Rica. In addition, Huaweis relationship with Costa Rica was soured over a difference in pricing. Huawei had wanted to
charge US$583m for the construction of 1.5m 3G linesmore than double the governments US$225m budget for the project
(How Huawei Advances 2008, 3). This damaged relationship left an opportunity for a U.S. company to step in
and compete for the contract. Once again, this did not occur, leaving Huawei to negotiate a new deal.
While it appears that U.S. telecommunications companies may be disinterested in investing in Latin
America, there is another possibility. These companies may fear that they cannot match Huaweis pricing, due
to unfair practices. The European Union (EU) has accused Huawei of exactly this.
US companies cant compete with Huawei in Latin America
O'Connor 13 (Nicholas C. O'Connor, U.S. Navy Lieutenant, Master of Science in Cyber Systems and
Operations. "THE LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF HUAWEI_S PENETRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA" March 2013.
calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/32876/13Mar_O'Connor_Nicholas.pdf?sequence=1)
VP

There are multiple reasons why Huawei is so successful in expanding into areas like Latin America. One
reason is the support it receives from the Chinese government. Huawei continues to receive tax privileges and
statesponsored credit from Beijing, thanks to its designation as a national champion of new technology (How Huawei Advances
2008, 3). This relationship allows Huawei to spend more money in its pursuit of global expansion. This
gives Huawei a great advantage over U.S. telecommunications companies, which are not sponsored by the
government. Another reason the advantage for Huaweis success in Latin America is the cheap labor it can provide.
Chinas vast, cheap labour force has allowed the company to offer products and services at a 2030%
discount to most of its competitors (How Huawei Advances 2008, 3). This is an advantage that Chinese companies like
Huawei have all over the world. However, it is even more relevant in Latin America, where much of the
population lives in poverty. This is an enormous advantage to have over U.S. companies, who cant
compete with Huaweis prices. This is the case in most products, not simply telecommunications. It is a major hurdle
faced by the U.S., and it still has no proven answer to cheap labor.
2NC No Threat
China doesnt want cyberwar
Patranobis 13 (Sutirtho Patranobis, Hindustan Times reporter in Beijing. China doesnt want
cyberspace hegemony June 15, 2013. http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/China/China-
doesn-t-want-cyberspace-hegemony/Article1-1076568.aspx) VP

China on Friday again dodged direct questions on the situation of US whistleblower Edward Snowden. Instead, it said, in a
statement clearly aimed at the US, that unlike some countries fighting a cyber-war, it was for forming rules and
regulations to maintain cyber security. What cyberspace needs is not war or hegemony, not
irresponsible attacks or accusations but regulation and cooperation, Hua Chunying, foreign ministry
spokesperson said at the daily briefing. Hua was answering questions on Snowden, hiding in Hong Kong after leaking details about
US cyber surveillance systems. China has repeatedly said it is one of the major victims of cyber-attacks. What has
happened recently has shown China is indeed one of the major victims of cyber-attacks, Hua said, adding that the
international community should come up with regulations on cyber security. She said the Chinese foreign
ministry had set up an office to carry out cyber security-related diplomatic activities. We are looking to
conduct dialogue with the international community including with the US. We will carry out cooperation with the
U.S. through the cyber security working group within the framework of the strategic security dialogue, she said. The
spokesperson said that China maintains that relevant international regulations should be made within the framework of the UN and
that Beijing had made specific proposals.
Not enough evidence of spying their evidence is paranoid
O'Connor 13 (Nicholas C. O'Connor, U.S. Navy Lieutenant, Master of Science in Cyber Systems and
Operations. "THE LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF HUAWEI_S PENETRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA" March 2013.
calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/32876/13Mar_O'Connor_Nicholas.pdf?sequence=1)
VP

In order to properly prove the suspicions of espionage, someone must provide some form of evidence
against Huawei. Since none has been found to date, any type of proof would lend some validity to the accusations.
This evidence could come in many different forms. One type of evidence that is missing is physical evidence. If
some type of espionage tool was discovered in a piece of Huawei hardware or software, this would certainly validate
these suspicions. However, nobody has found anything of the sort in past investigations. A second type of evidence that
is missing is documentation. There are no documents that have been found linking Huawei to espionage. An
example of a valuable document would be one linking Huawei to the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), showing that it was
performing espionage missions that were assisting the PLA. A third potential type of evidence would be a statement from
an insider. No current or former employees of Huawei have admitted to conducting espionage for the
company. A statement from a Huawei or Chinese government employee that linked Huawei to espionage could potentially be
the lead needed to find solid evidence. Until one of these types of evidence is discovered, it will be difficult to
validate claims of Huawei conducting espionage. Without this proof, it may be hard to limit Huaweis
continued global expansion.
2NC No Impact
No cyber impact
Healey 3/20 Jason, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, "No,
Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War", 2013, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us
America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite recent warnings. Our
cybervulnerabilities are undoubtedly grave and the threats we face are severe but far from comparable to nuclear
war. The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against
advanced threats (in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some
ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than
theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems." While it is true that cyber attacks might do these
things, it is also true they have not only never happened but are far more difficult to
accomplish than mainstream thinking believes. The consequences from cyber threats may be similar in
some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are incredibly dissimilar. Eighty years ago,
the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and cause their populations
to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality. A study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by the Atlantic Council
and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has shown a similar dynamic where the impact of disruptive cyberattacks
has been consistently overestimated. Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating from today's
concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects
that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused. No attacks, so far, have been both widespread
and persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any
widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia, have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss.
Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face
of determined defenses has so far been out of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of
course, if the United States is in a conflict with those nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers
should be worrying about. Plutonium trumps bytes in a shooting war. This is not all good news. Policymakers have
recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little significant progress. Worse, the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily
more worrying. Still, experts have been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of the 70 years
since the actual Pearl Harbor. The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber espionage could
someday accumulate into an existential threat. But it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only handwaving
estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it doesn't add up to
an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."
**OFF-CASE**
Politics
Links
Plan costs political capital no agreement and lack of interest
Aho 1/23/13 (Matthew Aho, Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor, What Does Obama's
Second Term Hold for U.S.-Cuba Relations? http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/our-
opinions?ContentRecord_id=c20ad778-24cd-46df-9fb2-3ebc664ed58d&ContentType_id=15d70174-
0c41-47c6-9bd5-cc875718b6c3&Group_id=4c543850-0014-4d3c-8f87-0cbbda2e1dc7)

Aside from easing some travel restrictions, there have been only two emergent themes on Cuba policy: support for
private-sector efforts to increase the flow of information to the Cuban people; and support for private economic
activity on the island. Cuba policy changes still require expenditures of political capital
disproportionate to the island's strategic and economic importance. Barring game-changing developmentssuch as
release of USAID subcontractor Alan Grossexecutive action during Obama's second term will likely focus on
furthering goals laid out during his first. Here, however, John Kerry's leadership could prove vital and create new
opportunities for U.S. business. In 2009 the White House directed the Treasury and Commerce departmentsin consultation with
Stateto authorize U.S. telecommunications firms to negotiate international roaming agreements with Cuba. This would allow U.S.
travelers to use their cell phones on the island and presumably increase communications flows with Cuba. It would also
generate some new revenue for U.S. firms. Three years later, there's still no agreementpartly because federal agencies
haven't clearly communicated how they will handle industry proposals to establish one. This issue may seem
insignificant, but in the context of U.S.Cuba relations it would be an historic first. Kerry could sit down with industry to revisit this
issue to help finally get an agreement signed.
The plans political contentious viewed as aiding the regime
Reuters 9 (4/14/09, Obama opens crack in U.S. embargo against Cuba
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/14/us-obama-cuba-idUSTRE53C3O620090414)

President Barack Obama opened a crack on Monday in a decades-old U.S. embargo against communist Cuba,
allowing American telecommunications firms to start providing service for Cubans and lifting restrictions on
family ties to the island. In a major shift from the Bush administration's hard-line approach to Havana, Obama ended limits on
family travel and money transfers to their homeland by Cubans in the United States. The moves by the White House do not
eliminate Washington's trade embargo against Cuba, set up 47 years ago, but they do hold out the prospect for
improving relations between the two longtime foes. "The president has directed that a series of steps be taken to reach out to
the Cuban people to support their desire to enjoy basic human rights," said White House spokesman Robert Gibbs. "These are
actions he has taken to open up the flow of information." U.S. officials said Obama hoped the new measures would
encourage Cuba's one-party state to implement democratic reforms long demanded by Washington as a condition for removing
sanctions imposed after Fidel Castro took power in 1959. Shares of companies that stand to gain from a thaw in U.S. ties with Cuba
soared on the news, led by Canadian mining and energy company Sherritt International, a major player in Cuba's nickel and oil
industry, whose stock rose 24.5 percent. Miami-based cruise operator Royal Caribbean also saw its shares rise on hopes that the No.
2 cruise ship operator and rival Carnival, could sail to Cuba, just 90 miles from the United States. U.S. telecommunications
companies will now be allowed to set up fiber-optic cable and satellite links with Cuba, start roaming service
agreements and permit U.S. residents to pay for telecoms, satellite radio and television services provided to people in Cuba, the
White House said. Obama also directed his government to look at starting regularly scheduled commercial flights to Cuba. Air travel
between the United States and Cuba is now limited to charter flights. While they insistently call for an end to the U.S. embargo
Cuba's leaders have in the past reacted with caution and suspicion to initiatives presented by Washington as seeking to "open up"
Cuba's communist political system. Havana rejects arguments that it needs Western-style democracy and has resisted as
"subversive" past U.S. efforts to channel funds and communications equipment to dissidents and independent journalists on the
island. PRAISE AND CRITICISM Supporters of easing U.S. sanctions against Cuba applauded the family-related policy changes,
which will affect an estimated 1.5 million Americans who have relatives in Cuba. They voiced hope it would lead to even bolder steps
by Obama to dismantle the trade embargo, which critics argue is an obsolete policy that has failed to foster change in Cuba. But
conservative critics of Obama's strategy said it would increase cash flow to help prop up Cuba's
government. Obama had promised in the presidential campaign to ease some restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, but
insisted he would not end the trade embargo until Cuba showed progress toward democracy. Obama's gesture comes before he
attends a Summit of the Americas in Trinidad later this week. White House Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough
said the issue of money transfers was critical to other countries in the region as well. "One thing that we hope we can encourage all of
our friends (at the summit) to do is to work with us to call on the Cuban government to reduce the cost associated with the
remittances sent to Cuban families," he told reporters. Cuba is among the U.S. foes Obama has said he would be
willing to engage diplomatically, instead of shunning them as his predecessor George W. Bush did. "I enthusiastically
applaud this, it is ground breaking ... ... I sincerely hope that this is the beginning of even more relaxation," said Silvia Wilhelm,
executive director of the Miami-based Cuban American Commission for Family Rights. Until now, Cubans living in the United States
had been allowed to travel to the island once a year and could send only $1,200 per person in cash to family members in Cuba.
Obama faced some resistance in the U.S. Congress, especially from opposition Republicans.

Appeasement DA
Link
Empirically, acts like the plan have been seen as appeasement to Cuba,
specifically true of telecommunications and turns case
Lopez 13 (Vanessa, Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies,
University of Miami. "The Failure of U.S. Attempts at Unilateral Rapprochement with Cuba" from Focus
on Cuba Issue 187, March 25, 2013. ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue187.htm) VP

Nearly every U.S. President since John F. Kennedy has tried to improve U.S. relations with Cuba. Some
administrations halted these efforts when it was clear the Castros were unwilling to take any action towards rapprochement. Other
administrations unilaterally liberalized U.S.-Cuba policy. Yet, Communist Cuba has continually rejected these efforts,
responding in ways injurious to U.S. interests. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford began secret talks with the
Cuban government. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's negotiating philosophy was clear "we are moving in a new direction; we'd
like to synchronize...steps will be unilateral, reciprocity is necessary." (1) The U.S. did not then set human rights and
democratization preconditions. In March of 1975, Kissinger announced that the U.S. was "ready to move in a new direction" with
Cuba and wanted to normalize relations with the island. However, the man who was able to bring rapprochement
between the U.S. and China, was unable to do the same with Cuba. Cuba's unambiguous rejection came by way of
Cuban troops being deployed to Angola. Ford announced that Cuban military intervention in Angola would prevent full diplomatic
relations between Cuba and the U.S. Cuba responded by sending more troops to Angola. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter was
eager to normalize U.S.-Cuba policy and ignored Cuba's military presence in Angola. Carter liberalized travel by U.S.
citizens to Cuba. and signed a maritime boundary and fishing rights accord. However, the State Department announced that
Cuba's deployment of military advisers to Ethiopia would prevent further rapprochement. Carter continued, undeterred, and the two
countries opened Interest Sections in Washington D.C. and Havana. Over the next few years, the Cuban government sent
almost 20,000 troops to Ethiopia, demanded that the U.S. military leave Guantanamo Bay, supported the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in April of 1980, launched the Mariel Boatlift into President Carter's
lap. The Reagan Administration came into office desiring improved relations with Cuba, but soon recognized the futility
of trying to ingratiate itself to the Cuban government. Cuba continued to support insurgencies and
terrorist groups around the world. Most notably, U.S. troops confronted Cuban troops in Grenada in 1983. The U.S.
tightened its Cuba policy until President Bill Clinton entered office. Clinton attempted to engage Cuba on bilateral
issues such as counter-narcotics measures, establishing modern telecommunications links, and
opening news bureaus on the island. Cuba responded by launching a Balsero Crisis. This forced the U.S. into
negotiations with the Cuban government that led to a U.S.-Cuba Immigration Accord, allowing a minimum of 20,000 Cubans a year
to enter the U.S. as permanent residents. The Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot policy followed. In February 1996, Cuban MiGs shot down
two Brothers to the Rescue planes killing three U.S. citizens and one resident over international waters. The
Clinton Administration halted its efforts at liberalization because of this unprecedented act of aggression
and Congress passed the Helms-Burton Law, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act in response. In 1999, Clinton
unilaterally expanded travel to Cuba for U.S. residents and Cuban-American families, but given Cuba's lack of response, did not take
further efforts at rapprochement. President George W. Bush left U.S.-Cuba policy untouched until the Black Cuban Spring of 2003.
Following the arrest and long sentences for 75 dissidents, Bush restricted travel and remittances to the
island in 2004 and took no known efforts to liberalize relations. U.S.-Cuba policy stayed frozen until President Barack Obama came
into office. Obama entered the Oval Office having made promises to liberalize Cuba policy. His Administration swiftly lifted
restrictions on Cuban-American travel to Cuba as well as remittances sent to the island. Cuba's response was to
arrest a U.S. citizen. Alan Gross was working as a USAID subcontractor, providing Jewish groups in the island with
communications equipment. He was tried and sentenced to 15 years in a Cuban jail. The U.S. government said Gross's
incarceration would prevent further liberalization. Various notable personalities have travelled to Cuba seeking Gross's
release, including President Jimmy Carter and Governor Bill Richardson, but these efforts have all failed. Despite Grosss continued
incarceration, in 2011, Obama also liberalized people-to-people travel, allowing more university, religious, and cultural programs
to travel to Cuba. History demonstrates that unilateral U.S. efforts have had, and are having, no impact on
Cuba's leadership. On the contrary, the Cuban government has interpreted U.S. openings towards Cuba as
signs of weakness, which have resulted in Cuba's hostility towards the U.S. and in some instances, in
reckless actions such as Mariel and the Balsero Crisis. Improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba is a laudable
goal, but to be successful, Cuba must be a willing participant. Cuba has an unambiguous pattern of harming
U.S. interests when the U.S. has engaged in attempts of unilateral rapprochement. If the U.S. would like to
protect its interests, it should demand that Cuba take the first step in any future efforts to improve relations between the two
countries and offer irreversible concessions.
EU CP
Solves Telecom
EU can fund Cuban telecom
Clegg 13 (Peter Clegg, Lecturer in Politics, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK. "EU-Cuban
Relations: An End To Constructive Engagement?" July 2, 2013.
www.erpic.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130%3Aeu-cuban-relations-an-end-to-
constructive-engagement&catid=31%3Aoctober-2003&Itemid=79) VP

The relationship between the EU and Cuba has been defined since 1996 by a so-called Common Position adopted
by the EU in December of that year. The Common Position set the parameters of the EUs policy of constructive
engagement with regard to Cuba and committed the Union to encourage a process of transition to
pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sustainable
recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. In stark comparison to the US view, the
EU believed that by engaging the Castro regime in particular policy areas the likelihood of peaceful change in Cuba would increase.
After the Common Position was approved the more difficult political dimension took a back seat to trade and development
cooperation and humanitarian aid disbursement. In the commercial field, significant progress was made and, by the end of
2001, the EU was Cubas most important partner in terms of trade and direct foreign investment. EU
exports to Cuba amounted to 1.43 billion in 2001 (44 percent from Spain, followed by Italy and France), while imports from Cuba
stood at 581 million. In terms of direct foreign investment in Cuba, the EU constitutes 56 percent of the total, with Spain and Italy
being the main contributors. At the present time more than 190 companies from across the EU operate in the island, with the
governments of Spain, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Belgium all actively engaged in trade promotion. The
majority of European investments are in the areas of tourism, telecommunications, oil exploration and
nickel.
The EU has necessary programs to invest
EU 10 (Delegation of the European Union to Cuba. "Programmes with Latin America" 2010.
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cuba/eu_cuba/tech_financial_cooperation/regional_thematic_programmes
/programmes/index_en.htm) VP

AL-INVEST Al-Invest is an economic co-operation programme that aims to support the internationalisation
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Latin America, in collaboration with their European partners
in order to contribute to reinforce social cohesion in the region. By directly funding projects for
organisations that represent and promote private sector development (PSD), such as Chambers of Commerce,
Trade Associations, Export-Promotion Agencies, etc.), the Al-Invest Programme facilitates the process of internationalisation of LA
SMEs. The fourth phase of the AL-INVEST (2009-2012) is implemented through 3 groups of business organisations (consortia)
belonging to three distinct geographical areas of Latin America and whose projects (Call for proposals
EuropeAid/127035/C/ACT/Multi) were awarded grants by the European Commission. During the first three phases, more than
1,000 activities have been implemented, in more than 25 commercial sectors; agro-industry, environment and
the telecommunications sectors have been some of the most supported sectors. Over 87,000 SMEs have
participated in Al-Invest projects. The European Commission (EC) has committed a total of 144 million in all phases which has
generated over 500 million worth of intra-regional trade and investment.

Solves Generic
CP Solves technology advances and make European companies more
competitive in Cuba
EU 2 ( Statement by EU embassies in Havana. "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign
Trade and Investment By European Companies in Cuba" July 2002. lexington.server278.com/969.shtml)
VP

Since Cuba began to decentralize its foreign trade and allow foreign investment, European companies
have been its principal economic partner. They provide a large proportion of the products, the financing
and the technology which the country requires and generate a very large proportion of the income from
exports and tax revenues. Their commitment to the development of the island is a long term one since they wish to
continue to help it to integrate itself with the rest of the world and to modernize its system of production. In this commitment and
objective, the Embassies of the Member States of the European Union support them as a demonstration of our Government's
interest in Cuba and in its future. The Programme of Co-operation between Cuba and the European Union emphasizes these
aspects of economic modernization, improvements in management and internationalization of the Cuban economy. (For the time
being it does this with technical and in anticipation of more ambitious programmes which would be available as progress is made in
these processes.) European good intentions will result in major mutual benefits the more secure and reliable
the legal framework which is established so that joint and foreign firms create wealth, employment and
exports and spread new technologies. The advantages for both parties will also increase if the legal
framework results in an operating cost competitive with that of other countries in the region. Cuba's comparative
advantages, centred more on the quality than on the price of its human capital, should not be eroded by excessive overheads and by
unnecessary difficulties and obstacles. The European companies have expounded to the Economic and Commercial Advisers their
experience of a legal framework which should improve in order to attract new investments and ensure that
current ones prosper and expand their activities. On the basis of the compilation and analysis of the difficulties which
have been reported, this working document has been prepared and it includes, after this statement of objectives, an analysis of
general aspects and sections devoted to the six spheres in which most problems have been reported. On this basis, we propose a
frank, constructive and respectful dialogue with the Cuban government based on better information concerning these topics and
which will explore the form, the talking partners, and the time limits in which they can be solved. These are questions relating to the
rules on economic activity in general, and on foreign trade and foreign investment in particular, where we believe that the situation
can be improved without affecting the consistency of the main lines of economic policy. The majority of these problems increase
companies' operating costs, and this increases import costs for the Cuban economy and/or slows the
development of joint companies. A reduction in some of these costs will result in greater economic
growth, an increase in the tax base and total takings, while the competitiveness of firms and of the country in general
will improve.

AT: I-Fiat
Predictable for Cuba EU is Cubas top investor
EU 10 (European Union Delegation to Cuba. Political and economic relations 2010.
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cuba/eu_cuba/political_relations/index_en.htm) VP

The EU is Cuba's second largest trading partner (19.4%) after Venezuela (24.9%). More precisely, the EU is Cuba's
second export partner (19% - beverages and tobacco, food and live animal, mineral fuels, crude material including nickel) after
Venezuela (30.6%) and is its second import partner (20.7% - machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, chemicals
and related products, food and live animals, etc) after China (25.7%) followed by Canada. EU trade with Cuba is characterized by a
trade balance in favour of the EU. EU imports from Cuba amounted in 2009 to 301.58 million, compared to EU exports to Cuba of
1.04 billion. Cuba benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences in its trade exchanges with the EU. The EU is Cuba's
first investor and approximately one third of all tourists visiting the island every year come from the EU. In 2009, the EU
held for the first time since 2001 a European pavilion at the 27th Havana international Trade Fair. In 2009 the
Fair attracted 1.230 enterprises of which 731 foreign firms from 54 countries. in 2010 more than 3,500 companies from 58 countries
participated in the Fair and 401 national enterprises signed trade contracts worth more than CUC 100 m (approx. . 82 m). The 29th
edition of FIHAV is scheduled for 31 Oct to 4 Nov 2011.
AT: EU likes Chinese Telecom
EU will fight Huawei and ZTE
Reuters 13 ("Exclusive: EU cites Chinese telecoms Huawei and ZTE for trade violations" May 18,
2013. www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-trade-eu-idUSBRE94H03J20130518) VP

(Reuters) - Europe's top trade official for the first time late on Friday officially cited Chinese mobile
telecommunications equipment makers Huawei and ZTE Corp for violating anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy guidelines. European Union Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said he was prepared to launch a
formal investigation into anti-competitive behavior by these Chinese companies in order to protect a
"strategic" sector of Europe's economy. "Huawei and ZTE are dumping their products on the European market," De Gucht
told Reuters in an exclusive interview before engaging with U.S. businesses as part of his preparations for negotiating a Transatlantic
free trade pact with the United States. Those talks are expected to begin in July. An investigation now into sales practices
of Chinese telecoms equipment companies would open up a new front in a multibillion-euro trade
offensive against a critical partner. The EU is China's most important trading partner, while for the EU, China is second
only to the United States. Chinese exports of goods to the 27-member bloc totaled 290 billion euros ($372 billion) last year, with 144
billion euros going the other way. Cheap capital for these Chinese companies "creates a distorted playing field
and that is what this is about," De Gucht said, referring to Huawei and ZTE, respectively the world's No. 2 and No. 5 telecom
equipment makers.
Cyber CP
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should lead a global discussion
of acceptable behaviors and protocols for cyber-spying and cyber-warfare
with the Peoples Republic of China.
That solves cybersecurity China is willing to help
McGregor 13 (James McGregor, chairman of APCO Worldwide, Greater China. "Is the Specter of a
'Cyber Cold War' Real?" on The Atlantic, April 27, 2013. www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/is-
the-specter-of-a-cyber-cold-war-real/275352/) VP

Real progress can only start with the separation of sleuthing and shoplifting. The U.S. and China should
lead a global discussion of acceptable behaviors and protocols for cyber-spying and cyber-warfare. Those
discussions could take years to become meaningful. But they at least open communications channels to avoid
accidents, or a "Cyber Pearl Harbor" as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta put it as he headed into retirement. Even a cursory
look at published studies makes it clear that both countries are cyber probing for ways to shut down each
other's financial markets, electric grids, telecom networks and transport systems in the event of conflict.
China certainly took note in March when U.S. National Security Agency and Cyber Command chief Gen. Keith Alexander told
Congress that 13 of the new 40 CYBERCOM teams being assembled would focus on offensive operations. The Obama
administration's approach so far is to enlist allies and engage China in quiet talks about cyber-security,
much like was done with some success when China was publicly denying mounting evidence of its nuclear proliferation. In the end,
China realized that such proliferation was against its own interests. A cyber security working group between the U.S.
and China is now being organized as a result of the recent visits to Beijing by Secs. Kerry and Lew and others.
Public statements from Chinese officials appear to accommodate this. "Cyberspace needs rules and cooperation, not
wars," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying said in mid-March. "China is willing, on the basis of the principles
of mutual respect and mutual trust, to have constructive dialogue and cooperation on this issue with the
international community including the United States to maintain the security, openness, and peace of the
Internet."
Solves China Relations
Discussions solve US/China relations cybersecurity is key
WSJ 6/8 (Wall Street Journal online. "Cybersecurity at Forefront of U.S.-China Summit" June 8, 2013.
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324299104578531361684549842.html) VP

President Barack Obama and China's new leader, Xi Jinping, made broad commitments Friday to work together on
cybersecurity and to improve military-to-military relations as the two leaders wound up a first round of talks during an informal
summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California. But both leaders said they'd not yet had detailed talks
on cybersecurityone of the most contentious bilateral issuesand Mr. Obama said they would have
"more extensive discussions" during a private dinner Friday night. They were due to hold more talks in the morning, before
winding up the summit around midday Saturday. At a news conference before the dinner, Mr. Obama said that China would
have similar concerns about cybersecurity as its economy became more dependent on research and entrepreneurship.
"Which is why I think we can work together on this rather than at cross purposes," he said. Mr. Xi said: "By conducting
good faith cooperation, we can remove misgivings and make information security and cybersecurity a
positive area of cooperation between China and the U.S." Chinese and U.S. officials are both hoping that the informal
format of the meetingthe two leaders' first since Mr. Xi became president in Marchwill give them the time and the right
atmosphere to forge a personal rapport and reverse a downward spiral in relations that many analysts fear could lead to conflict.
For Mr. Obama, who met Mr. Xi for the first time last year when he visited the U.S. as vice president, the summit was an opportunity
to get to know the man who will lead China over the next decade. But the Obama administration also had a long list of economic and
security concerns, many of which it has confronted China with for years, with mixed results. They include Chinese cyberespionage,
North Korea's nuclear program, Beijing's maritime disputes in Asia and Chinese market reforms. Mr. Xi, too, had much at
stake, bringing with him a proposal to redefine the relationship with the U.S. as one of equal "great
powers,"a personal initiative that is part of his broader campaign to promote a "Chinese dream" of a strong nation reclaiming the
position in the world that it held until the Opium Wars of the 19th Century. Before the first round of talks, the two leadersboth
wearing white dress shirts with open collars and no tieswalked together on the grounds of the estate in the 115-degree heat, and
shook hands in front of the cameras. They each made brief statements calling for a new era of bilateral relations,
although Mr. Obama stopped short of echoing Mr. Xi's "great power" formula. The news conference was dominated by
cybersecurity, talks on which could be complicated by the recent disclosures on electronic surveillance by Mr. Obama's own
government. "What both President Xi and I recognize is that because of these incredible advances in technology, that
the issue of cybersecurity and the need for rules and common approaches to cybersecurity are going to be
increasingly important as part of bilateral relationships and multilateral relationships," Mr. Obama said.
"In some ways these are uncharted waters and you don't have the kinds of protocols that cover military issues for example
and arms issues where nations have a lot of experiencing in trying to negotiate what's acceptable and what's not." Mr. Obama
sought to draw a distinction between activities such as hacking or cyber-theft, and the kind of surveillance conducted by the National
Security Agency. He also noted that cybersecurity wasn't just a concern for the U.S. and China, and that
problems were often caused by nonstate actors. "We're going to have to work very hard to build a system
of defense and protections both in the private sector and in public sector even as we negotiate with other countries around the
world in setting up common rules of the road," he said.

Solves US/China relations
Madhani 6/9 (Aamer Madhani, USA Today. "Obama, Xi get closer but gap remains on cybersecurity"
June 9, 2013. www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/08/obama-xi-take-stroll/2403823) VP

But on cybersecurity, an issue that Obama and Xi spent much of Saturday morning talking about, the two sides still
appear to be far apart. China has been widely linked to network break-ins of numerous Western companies and agencies. And
Obama issued an executive order this year to compel government and industry to share intelligence about network breaches, mainly
to protect the nation's infrastructure. The Pentagon also blamed China for cyberattacks in its annual report to U.S. lawmakers on
Chinese military capabilities. The report, published in May, stated that some of the recent cyberattacks in the United
States appeared "to be attributable directly to Chinese government and military." In their talks, Donilon said the
president made clear that "if it's not addressed, if it continues to be this direct theft of United States property,
that this was going to be very difficult problem in the economic relationship and was going to be an
inhibitor to the relationship really reaching its full potential." Donilon added that Obama presented detailed
examples of cybertheft, and told the Chinese officials that the U.S. government knows with certainty the intrusions are coming from
within China, "It is now at the center of the relationship; it is not an adjunct issue," Donilon said. On Friday, Obama
noted to reporters the "deep concerns" the U.S. government has about theft of intellectual property and hacking into private and
government networks. "What both President Xi and I recognize is that because of these incredible advances in technology, that
the issue of cybersecurity and the need for rules and common approaches to cybersecurity are going to be increasingly
important as part of bilateral relationships and multilateral relationships," said Obama, adding that world was
entering "uncharted waters" on the issue. At a news conference hosted by the Chinese following the summit, China State Councilor
Yang Jiechi downplayed differences between the two countries on cybersecurity. "China itself is also a victim of cyber
attacks, and we are staunch supporter of cyber security," Yang said. "On cyber security, China and the United
States both are faced with similar challenges. Cyber security should not become the root cause of mutual
suspicion and friction between our two countries. Rather, it should be a new bright spot in our
cooperation." No major announcements were expected to come out of the summit, but after the two leaders concluded their
talks, the White House announced that Obama and Xi had agreed on a joint effort to combat climate change, specifically the
production of "super greenhouse gases." Top aides expressed satisfaction with how the meetings went, while noting that much work
needs to be done to bridge the divide on some critical issues. Overall, Obama and Xi spent about eight hours together in talks,
Donilon said. "We've got a lot of work to do to take these broad understandings down to the level of specifics, and that will require
further discussions," Obama told reporters on Friday night.
China Rel Impact Laundry List
US China relations are vital to solve warming, prolif, free trade, pandemics,
and resource wars
Schell 13 (Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society
in New York, former professor and Dean at the University of California, Berkeleys Graduate School of
Journalism. "What Would A Successful U.S.-China Summit Look Like?" June 7, 2013.
www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/what-would-a-successful-us-china-summit-look-
like/276649/) VP

We have spent an unusually productive two days together here at Sunnylands. Although we have enjoyed the process of getting to
know each other better, obviously we have not solved all the difficult problems that beset U.S.-China relations. However, we want
the people of our respective countries -- indeed of the world, to know that we both are fully cognizant of the inescapable
roles and responsibilities our two countries now shoulder in our newly globalized world. Above all, we
recognize that we must adopt new and innovative modes of interaction if we are to avoid preventing certain
very contentious issues from obstructing our collective progress on equally urgent issues that bind us together in
common interest. We simply cannot allow any one of the great challenges of our generation -- that range from
climate change, nuclear proliferation, and world trade, to global pandemics, a shortage of water and the
peaceful settlement of territorial disputes -- to obstruct us from addressing all of the others. Only if the
U.S. and China are able to work shoulder to shoulder will these new global problems have any hope of
remedy. So, while we understand that we must continue to broach difficult problem areas where resolution will take time, we
also have dedicated ourselves anew not to abdicate our responsibility on the the challenges which will
determine the fates of the people's of both nations. You have our assurances that from henceforth we both will work
together to assure that both governments assume these new leadership roles in new and more constructive ways. While today we do
not have concrete answers to any of our common problems, we want to assure everyone on our common planet that in the
months to come we will bend ourselves with new and unstinting vigor to this task. We both recognize that
only through such a renewed effort will we ever be able to elevate U.S.-China relations to the level of
effective interaction that the world now requires.
Security
Security linkCyber
Affs rhetoric is constructed/bad
Peixi 13 Xi is a columnist with China.org.cn. (Cyber hype: Obama forsakes Confucius, embraces Jack Bauer, April 15, 2013,
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-04/15/content_28541559.htm)
Recent hype in the Obama administration over alleged cyber attacks originating from China signals the
return of classical American political mobilization and fear mongering. This is not a new topic for the world
audience. Stirring up resentment of China is not a new American strategy. The cyber attack narrative is an
abstract one, told primarily through private media channels. This gives anti-China spin doctors abundant room to
create their carefully crafted message. This new wave of anti-China rhetoric had its dress rehearsal during the Huawei-ZTE
congressional hearing back in September 2012. For instance, when the Chinese Huawei company was accused of
stealing commercial secrets from Cisco and Motorola, Huaweis senior vice president Charles Ding replied
that such accusations were groundless and the lawsuits ended either with Huawei as a winner or with the
other side dropping all charges. An investigative report released by the U.S. House of Representatives in
October 2012 had to use speculative words like China has the means, opportunity, and motive to use
telecommunications companies for malicious purposes to block Chinese companies access to the
American market. Apart from business considerations and a gaping inability for the U.S. to differentiate between business
policy and foreign policy, hostile anti-Chinese rhetoric serves to bridge the divide between American
Democrats and Republicans. President Obama introduced alleged fears over Chinese cyber security
during his second presidential inauguration. Obama has so far failed in his attempt to create a new Sputnik moment,
wherein both the American media and public react to a perceived foreign threat. Sputnik was the worlds first artificial satellite
launched by the Soviet Union in 1957. The United States responded by investing heavily in research, education and science,
culminating in the creation of the Internet and a wide array of various innovative technologies. The Soviet Union was unable to keep
pace with U.S. technological advances, and eventually collapsed under its own weight. Listing off the achievements made by China in
education and research investment, solar technology and high-speed rail construction, President Obama proposed a new Sputnik
moment slogan on December 6, 2010, in a speech delivered in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The U.S. president
emphasized that ideological differences should not get in the way of Democrats and Republicans making
the American economy more competitive. The same metaphor was used by Senator John Kerry, now
Secretary of State, when describing Chinas triumphs in economic sectors. Two years ago, China produced 5
percent of the worlds solar panels. Today they produce 60 percent. Were not even in the game. We invented this technology at the
Bell Laboratories 50 years ago. We dont have one company in the top 10 companies of the world. Shame on us, he said. But the
political metaphor failed to gain traction and never triggered any kind of media or public support. In truth, it cast China in a positive
light and made the U.S. look akin to the former Soviet Union. After all, China is now investing heavily in research and education.
This is a good thing. Education is a symbol of cultural icon Confucius and is valued by all Chinese people. President Obama
knows pretty well why the United States has been successful. Instead of citing from Obamas speech, let us echo the
observations made by one of the worlds most respected social scientists, Manuel Castells. He regards the American university
system as the source of knowledge and innovation, and as the real American superiority. He lists the flexibility, autonomy,
decentralized management, cooperation between faculty and graduate students in the graduate programs, intellectual openness,
resistance to endogamy, and commitment to academic values and excellence above anything else. Obama took pride in the same
thing and attempted to instill confidence in American people, revive a fledging tradition of innovation, and justify investment in the
American future. He also kicked off the 100,000 Strong Initiative, sending American students to study in China. To summarize,
Obama revealed a Confucius-like personality in part of his Chinese strategy during his first term in office. But his political metaphor
of a new Sputnik moment did not trickle down into the hearts of the American public, even though he repeated the slogan during the
2011 State of Union Address. The American model of political mobilization differs from the Chinese one.
Chinese politicians can rely on official media to publicize political slogans ranging from scientific outlook
on development by the Hu-Wen administration to Chinese dream by the newly-installed Xi-Li
administration. However, American politicians lack official media channels and have to pander to the
commercial media in order to receive coverage. After surviving the 2012 general election, President
Obama shifted his strategy and ushered in a sensational new political talking point: cyber security. He
exaggerated in his 2013 State of Union Address that foreign countries and companies steal American
corporate secrets, American enemies are seeking the ability to sabotage Americas power grid, financial
institutions, and air traffic control systems, and he signed a new executive order to strengthen cyber
defenses. He called for the Congress to pass new legislation as well. The topic of cyber security has accelerated and
now plays a role during the highest-level diplomatic exchanges. Security firm pioneer Kevin Mandia, Attorney
General Eric Holder, national security advisor Thomas Donilon, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and Obama himself all voiced
concerns over the alleged Chinese threat. President Obama also summoned 13 influential corporate CEOs for solutions. The U.S.
is playing hardball with China, and this game often is played for keeps. The obvious reason is that it plays to
the American psychological need of an evil Chinese image, hiding behind computer screens
stealing American secrets, poised ready to implement an immediate attack on critical American
infrastructure, and constituting a clear and present danger. In contrast to this narrative, the Chinese image
behind the new Sputnik moment slogan is so peaceful and positive, and this does not fit the American
stereotype about China. Meanwhile, Obama made concessions to the security-obsessed Republicans by
agreeing to expand American cyber security. He therefore found a way to dance with Republicans,
commercial media, and the public: appealing to their fear. This has been a typical American model for
political mobilization, compatible with Hollywood drama narratives. Obama has acquired a divine God-like
image leading the bewildered American public to stand up against threats from Communist China. He resembles the heroic
character Jack Bauer from the television series 24 Hours, who saves Americans from nuclear and chemical attacks. But there is a
difference. President Obama is handling cyber attack threats, not nuclear ones. How to bridge the difference? The American
elite have been very skillful in this. They have already matched the seriousness of cyber attacks with nuclear ones.
The Panetta-led Pentagon has long drawn a parallel between the two by saying that cyber threats have potential consequences
similar to the nuclear threat from the Cold War. Thomas Rid wrote in a Foreign Policy article: The world has yet to witness a
single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack and such statements are a plain insult
to survivors of Hiroshima. The most ironic thing that the Obama leadership had not come to realize is that the drama-
saturated narratives they conjured up clash with reality in the most miserable way: both the solely
confirmed state-sponsored cyber attack and the solely confirmed nuclear attack in the world were made
by the United States. Offensive defense like this will turn the world upside down.

Tech K
Link ICT
ICT creates a cyberspace of panoptic overexposition that connects private
life to all other facets of the world
Virilio 2k (Paul Virilio, French cultural theorist, teaches at the European Graduate School. The
Information Bomb, 2000) VP

Thanks to this 'real-time' illumination, the space-time of everyone's apartment becomes potentially connected
to all others, the fear of exposing one's private life gives way to the desire to over-expose it to everyone, to the point where, for
June Houston, the arrival of 'ghosts', which she so dreads, is merely the pretext for the invasion of her dwelling by the 'virtual
community' of furtive Internet inspectors and investigators. Flyvision - 'vision volante' - is also 'vision volfe', stolen vision: a vision
from which the blind spots of daily life disappear. It is, in fact, fair to say that this practice revolutionizes classical local television
from top to bottom. It revolutionizes the broadcasting of information programmes by contributing to the
total transformation of the transparency of sites and spaces of habitation, in the direction of a purely mediatic
trans-appearance of the real space of living beings. Now, this paradoxical situation is currently becoming widespread,
since the 'globalization of the single market' demands the over-exposure of every activity; it requires the
simultaneous creation of competition between companies, societies and even consumers themselves,
which now means individuals, not simply certain categories of 'target populations' . Hence the sudden,
untimely emergence of a universal, comparative advertising, which has relatively little to do with publicizing a brand or a
consumer product of some kind, since the aim is now, through the commerce if the visible, to inaugurate a genuine visual market,
which goes far beyond the promoting of a particular company. Seen like this, the gigantic concentration of telephone,
television and computer communications companies becomes easier to understand - the MCI-WORLD COM
merger (the biggest transaction of all time) and the sudden conversion of Westinghouse, which was once an electricity production
company and has now moved into the world telecommunications business. After the direct lighting of cities by the magic of
electricity in the twentieth century, the companies created by these mergers are pioneering an indirect lighting of the world for the
twenty-first century. Thanks to the promises of the magic of electronics, electro-optic lighting is going to
assist in the emergence of the virtual reality of cyberspace. Building the space of the multi-media networks with the
aid of tele-technologies surely then requires a new 'optic', a new global optics, capable of helping a
panoptical vision to appear, a vision which is indispensable if the 'market of the visible' is to be established. The much-
vaunted globalization requires that we all observe each other and compare ourselves with one another on a continual basis.

The expansion of ICT delocalizes the city in favor of a cybernetic control
that accelerates time and dilates space
Virilio 2k (Paul Virilio, French cultural theorist, teaches at the European Graduate School. The
Information Bomb, 2000) VP

Today, with the new policy of trade globalization, the city is foregrounded once more. As one of humanity's
major historic forms, the metropolis provides a focus for the vitality of the nations of the globe. But this local city is now only
a district, one borough among others of the invisible world meta-city whose 'centre is everywhere and whose
circumference nowhere' (pascal). The virtual hypercentre, of which real cities are only ever the periphery. And, with the
desertification of rural space, this phenomenon is further accentuating the decline of medium-sized
towns, incapable of holding out for long against the attraction of the metropoles, which have all the
telecommunications infrastructure, together with the highspeed air and rail links. The metro political phenomenon
of a catastrophic human hyper-concentration that is gradually coming to suppress the urgent need for a
genuine geopolitics of populations which were previously spread harmoniously over the whole of their territories. To
illustrate the recent consequences of domestic telecommunications for municipal politics, one last anecdote: since
the sudden proliferation of mobile phones, the Los Angeles police have found themselves presented with a
difficulty of a new kind. Whereas, in the past, drug dealing in its various forms was precisely situated in a number of
districts that were easily monitored by the narcotics squads, those squads are now entirely defeated by
the random and essentially de-localized meetings between dealers and users who all have mobile phones and can meet
wherever they decide - literally, anywhere. A single technical phenomenon which both facilitates metropolitan
concentration and the dispersal of major risks - this needed to be borne in mind if, in the future (at all events, very
soon), a cybernetic control appropriate to domestic networks was to be developed ... hence the relentless
advance of the Internet, the recently civilianized military network. The more that time intervals are
abolished, the more the image of space dilates: 'You would think that an explosion had occurred all over
the planet. The least nook and cranny are dragged out of the shade by a stark light,' wrote Ernst Junger of that illumination
which lights up the reality of the world.

Link Latin America
Cyberspace uses neoimperialist terminology recalling Eurocentric empire
building in Latin America the alternative allows Latin America to reclaim
their culture
Pitman and Taylor 7 (Dr. Thea Pitman, Senior Lecturer in Latin American Studies at the
University of Leeds, and Dr. Claire Taylor, Reader in Hispanic Studies at the University of Liverpool.
"Conclusion: Latin American Identity and Cyberspace" from Latin American Cyberculture and
Cyberliterature, 2007.
books.google.com/books?id=rLDPNkb1c3EC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) VP

The various contributions to this volume have all dealt with cultural products by Latin American practitioners that engage
with notions of cyberspace in a variety of forms, whether through their actual existence as online works, or through
interaction with the key tropes of cyberculture or hypertexts. As can be seen from these chapters, approaches to cyberspace
and the new practices it offers are varied, and are frequently inflected not only by their interactions with other, more established,
cultural forms, but also by regional differences. Thus the strategic use in a Sao Paulo suburb of globalised Internet technologies
(vebsites), and of cultural forms pre-existing the Net (rap music) to produce a localised expression of place has parallels with, and
yet is distinct from, GOrnez-Pelia's cyber-performance art, for example, which elaborates and plays with border identities. Similarly,
the practices of Latin American literary e-mags, for instance, which rely on some pre-existing norms of print culture, and yet
create tentative cybercommunities through renegoti-ations of local and global space, share some concerns
with the 'social netwar of the Zapatistas and other NGOs, and yet have clearly different political and cultural
aims. Thus each of the practitioners examined in this volume has engaged with cyberspace in different, although interconnected
ways: rather than there being a Latin American cyberculture, it is instead a question of differing practices
which make use, often strategically, of globalised technologies for temporary negotiations and
representations. Such strategic uses of technology must entail a thinking through of the common conceptualisations of online
practice in itself. A brief survey of the metaphors used in English to describe Net activity, including terminology
such as 'surfing', the 'Information Superhighway', or 'blogs', foregrounds issues of travel as the primary
conceptualisation of the activity of the Internet user, as do equivalent terms used in Spanish and Portuguese 6navegar, 'la
supercarretera de informacion' / 'la cstrada super da infonnacao', 'bitacoras', or 'cibernautaTinternauta'. Arguably, these travel
metaphors can be linked to the notion of the tourist gaze (see, for example, Nakamura 2002: 40), and even, as some
have claimed, to an implied (neo)colonial perspective. David Trend, for example, points out that: 'it takes little imagination to
recognize the parallels between the unexplored territory of the cyberworld and the 'new world' imagined
by the colonizers of the modern era. This view of the Internet as primordial battleground can be seen as
an extension of historical patterns of Enlightenment advance' (Trend 2001: 296). Clearly, therefore, there are
neo-colonialist assumptions underlying many of the value-laden terms that are used to describe online
activity, just as there are in the metaphors and tropes of travel and travel writing (see, for example. Pratt 1992). Indeed, this has
been confirmed by Timothy Allen Jackson who argues that cyberspace 'embodies the last territorial frontier for
empire-building', and that the new media may 'contribute to the construction of enclaves of the technologically plugged-in
surrounded by the plugged out' (Jackson 2001: 349). These metaphors, in particular Jackson's provocative use of the 'last frontier',
and Trend's reference to the 'new world', all suggest connotations of empire-building which have problematic implications for Latin
American cybercult tire. Indeed, we might note that while the metaphors used in English reflect more closely a modern tourist and
leisure gaze, the equivalents in Spanish are more clearly colonialist ones; the use of navegar' in place of 'surfing', for instance, recalls
the Iberian empires in the Americas which were built precisely on the act of navigating the seas to conquer 'new' lands. Similarly. the
blog neologism has been most frequently translated as bitacora' in Spanish a term which cannot help but recall the founding
cuadernos de bitacora of Columbus. Thus the term used to refer to the one of the most popular forms ol Internet
expression amongst Latin Americans, inevitably evokes the founding moments of 'discovery' of the continent, a
process which involved Eurocentric naming, identifying, and labelling of the Americas as other. For this reason, the various
studies within this volume must be read in the light of this problematic terminology, in which there lies an
inevitable tension between the expression of Latin American identities, and the neo-colonialist metaphors
which pervade Net discourse. Nevertheless, it may not be a question of Latin American practitioners simply
taking up, uncritically. this imperialistic baggage: we may ask whether it could be a case of, to paraphrase Ashcroft et
al.'s famous formulation, Latin America writing or Nagging back to the metropolis (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1989). Clearly,
the question remains as to whether the assumption of these terms such as navegar or bitlicoras can be strategic; whether it
might represent a form of reclaiming the ground for Latin Americans, and of refusing to offer cyberculture
or blogs for the imperial gaze. Although tltese terms have not always been engaged with in a self-conscious way by Latin
American practitioners online, there is nevertheless a growing awareness of the need to interrogate these terms.
Impact Nuke War
Acceleration of war technologies make nuclear war inevitable as warning
time decreases and kills political decisions
Virilio 77 (Paul Virilio, French cultural theorist, teaches at the European Graduate School. The State
of Emergency Speed and Politics, September 1977) VP

In fact, without the violence of speed, that of weapons would not be so fearsome. In the current context, to
disarm would thus mean first and foremost to decelerate, to defuse the race toward the end. Any treaty that does not
limit the speed of this race (the speed of means of communicating destruction) will not limit strategic arms, since from now on the
essential object of strategy consists in maintaining the non-place of a general delocalization of means
that alone still allows us to gain fractions of seconds, which gain is indispensable to any freedom of
action. As General Fuller wrote, "When the combatants threw javelins at each other, the weapon's initial speed was such that one
could see it on its trajectory and parry its effects with one's shield. But when the javelin was replaced by the bullet, the speed was so
great that parry became impossible." Impossible to move one's body out of the way, but possible if one moved out of the weapon's
range; possible as well through the shelter of the trench, greater than that of the shield-possible, in other words, through space and
matter. Today, the reduction of warning time that results from the supersonic speeds of assault leaves so
little time for detection, identification and response that in the case of a surprise attack the supreme
authority would have to risk abandoning his supremacy of decision by authorizing the lowest echelon of
the defense system to immediately launch anti-missile missiles. The two political superpowers have thus far
preferred to avoid this situation through negotiations, renouncing anti-missile defense at the same time. Given the lack of
space, an active defense requires at least the material time to intervene. But these are the "war materials"
that disappear in the acceleration of the means of communicating destruction. There remains only a
passive defense that consists less in reinforcing itself against the megaton powers of nuclear weapons
than in a series of constant, unpredictable, aberrant movements, movements which are thus strategically
effectivefor at least a little while longer, we hope. In fact, war now rests entirely on the deregulation of time and
space. This is why the technical maneuver that consists in complexifying the vector by constantly improving
its performances has now totally supplanted tactical maneuvers on the terrain, as we have seen. General
Ailleret points this out in his history of weapons by stating that the definition of arms programs has become one of the essential
elements of strategy. If in ancient conventional warfare we could still talk about army maneuvers in the fields, in the current state
of affairs, if this maneuver still exists, it no longer needs a "field." The invasion of the instant succeeds the invasion of the territory.
The countdown becomes the scene of battle, the final frontier. The opposing sides can easily ban bacteriological, geodesic or
meteorological warfare. In reality, what is currently at stake with strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT I) is no longer the
explosive but the vector, the vector of nuclear deliverance, or more precisely its performances. The reason for this is simple:
where the molecular or nuclear explosive's blast made a given area unfit for existence, that of the implosive
(vehicles and vectors) suddenly reduces reaction time, and the time for political decision, to nothing. If over
thirty years ago the nuclear explosive completed the cycle of spatial wars, at the end of this century the implosive (beyond
politically and economically invaded territories) inaugurates the war of time. In full peaceful coexistence, without any
declaration of hostilities, and more surely than by any other kind of conflict, rapidity delivers us from this world. We have to face
the facts: today, speed is war, the last war. But let's go back to 1962, to the crucial events of the Cuban missile crisis.
At that time, the two superpowers had fifteen minutes' warning time for war. The installation of Russian
rockets on Castro's island threatened to reduce the Americans' warning to thirty seconds, which was unacceptable
for President Kennedy, whatever the risks of his categorical refusal. We all know what happened: the installation of a direct line-
the "hot line" -and the interconnection of the two Heads of State! Ten years later, in 1972, when the normal warning time
was down to several minutes-ten for ballistic missiles, a mere two for satellite weapons-Nixon and Brezhnev
signed the first strategic arms limitation agreement in Moscow. In fact, this agreement aims less at the quantitative limitation
of weapons (as its adversary/partners claim) than at the preservation of a properly "human" political power, since
the constant progress of rapidity threatens from one day to the next to reduce the warning time for nuclear war
to less than one fatal minute-thus finally abolishing the Head of State's power of reflection and decision in
favor of a pure and simple automation of defense systems. The decision for hostilities would then belong
only to several strategic computer programs. After having been (because of its destructive capacities) the equivalent of
total war-the nuclear missile launching submarine alone is able to destroy 500 cities-the war machine suddenly becomes
(thanks to the reflexes of the strategic calculator) the very decision for war. What will remain, then, of the "political
reasons" for deterrence? Let us recall that in 1962, among the reasons that made General de Gaulle decide to have the
populations ratify the decision to elect the President of the Republic by universal suffrage, there was the credibility of deterrence,
the legitimacy of the referendum being a fundamental element of this very deterrence. What will remain of all this in the
automation of deterrence? in the automation of decision?
Impact Accident
ICT integration will result in a global crash
Virilio 2k (Paul Virilio, French cultural theorist, teaches at the European Graduate School. The
Information Bomb, 2000) VP

And what are we to say of the enthusiasm of post-industrial companies for the cellphone which enables them to
abolish the distinction between working hours and private life for their employees? Or the introduction in
Britain not simply of 'parttime' but of 'zero-hour' contracts, accompanied by the provision of a mobile phone. When the
company needs you, it calls and you come running. The reinvention of a domestic servility ultimately on a par with
the electronic incarceration of offenders in the closed circuit of a police station. The smaller the world becomes as a
result of the relativistic effect of telecommunications, the more violently situations are concertinaed,
with the risk of an economic and social crash that would merely be the extension of the visual crash of
this 'market of the visible', in which the virtual bubble of the (interconnected) financial markets is never
any other than the inevitable consequence of that visual bubble of a politics which has become both
panoptical and cybernetic.
Impact Ontology
The expansion of cyberspace is twilight of humanity the virtual consumes
the physical which mutates and displaces humans from their ontological
homes Time disappears into acceleration without space to resist capital
simulation Hope is fleeting as we disappear into the hyperbeing
Sharma 5 (Dr. Rajesh Kumar Sharma, Department of English, Punjabi University. "The Diasporic
Condition" Seminar on Contemporary Diasporic Literature: Writing History, Culture, Self, February
2005. litarkay.tripod.com/diaspora.htm) VP

The Ontology of Diaspora Scattered across, sowed across cross-sowed, cross-scattered: that is the diaspora. Its ontology, in
itself and in relation to its ecology, is of interface and dispersion, of remix, of transplantation (including that of
organic communities and organisms, of organs and nano-biocybernetic systems). It is the ontology of soil and roots, of
roots dreaming in seeds of the arrival elsewhere in order to reproduce. And maybe, in order to reengineer. The issue is not so
much of the location of culture as of the (techno-)culture of dislocation. At the present moment of history, the
concepts of liminality and in-betweenness seem metonymic: symptomatic of displacements. Consider the disappearance of
space(s), whether as a consequence of the emergence of biotechnology or of the movement of information at the
speed of light. The postmodern hypertechnological enframing of the human from the inside,
complementing the modern technological enframing from the outside on which Heidegger broods anxiously
(Question 328-34), accomplished through genetic engineering, especially the DNA re-sequencing, lays to rest the cyborg as
the other of the human. The cyborg disappears into the human, hardwired invisibly into the human
being. The ontology of diaspora is, thus, not only cultural and political-economic but also, deeply and all over the surface,
political-technological. Techno-ontology is no longer science fiction. How to theorize subjectivity in the case of a child
who is prematurely delivered and then intricated into machines that will nurture and redeliver it at the appropriate time? What
happens when the Real and the Imaginary get technologically mediated? What kind of subject emerges from the technological
matrix/material womb (Smith-Windsor)? How does it resolve the oedipus complex when the mother happens to be, for a fairly long
gestation period, a machine, and the father an anonymous sperm donor? If technology can be shown to make no difference, then a
good deal of psychoanalytical theory cannot be taken seriously. But if it makes a difference, then it would have to be rewritten. What
does it mean to have the other technically literally technically inside us? Under the skin, along the nerves, in the corpuscles, on
the genes? The human being, Heideggers privileged being-there, can no longer afford to defer the question
of being: because for the first time in history does he face the danger of being displaced from there. Of
being self-displaced. The lethal irony of (Winamp) skins, (web) cookies and (chat-room) avatars is already
lost upon us; so naturally has technology been growing in upon our awareness. Habit is what we wear inside.
What wears us inside. For cookies are no longer just eaten. They also eat: the disk space. Racism should not be
a problem: skins are downloadable, changeable, upgradeable. And avatars are not incarnations of the gods
descended on earth: they are babbling and foul-mouthed specters in cyberspace, carnal to the point of
pornography yet non-incarnate. And memory hangs when you fail to recall something. You dont commit to memory or
interpret, but download. You do not put under erasure like Derrida, but overwrite. You no longer go down the memory lane but
scroll up. And postmodernism, relieved of the jargon of theory, gets explained away as a copy and paste operation.
No wonder the postcolonial Saraswati of theory, Spivak (SpiVc?), takes to cyberese as a terrestrial fish to the Martian waters.[5]
Technological practices are, thus, already at it: refixing our cognitive wiring and making our imaginary
comprehensively and fundamentally technological. The structures of feeling are being redesigned and upgraded. And
the Memeticists seem hell-bent on proving, in an extreme download of the work of the Geneticists, that human beings are essentially
information clusters, because all that is it derives from bit. We have indeed come a long way from Heideggers navet: Mans
essence consists in his being more than merely human (Letter 247). The most frightening irony is that the posthuman tissues and
fragments of disembodiment should be the metaphysical progeny of a certain kind of humanism, of the humanism of instrumental
rationality that surgically and for ever cut asunder techn from poisis (The Question 318-320; 335). And techne, having
attained maturity, is ready to deliver the human clone in a final non-act of ontological displacement: the
clone as the other of the cyborg as the other of the human. The human twice removed from the human.
And then the clone of the clone. An endless, and gruesome, play of deferral and (non-)difference, waiting
to open up. Who says deconstruction is only a metaphysics? Could anything get more physical? Deconstruction with
techno-human body. Real simulation. The constitutive contingency of the diasporic, threatening to eventually cross it out.
The Ecology of Diaspora Ecology is what we in-habit. As habit, wearing us inside of itself. In order to grasp our situation as it is
actually taking shape, we may imagine ourselves inhabiting a constant slippage of space. A double slippage, in fact.
Does that entail some kind of nirvana, a terminal freedom from the root/route samskaras, from traces of the past selves and of the
paths traversed that coalesce to form habits? In one sense, space turns mobile and slippery in the new ecology of flows.[6] In
another, it slips outside of appearance, to form the spatial unconscious. The conjuncture of the two is the elusive myth of cyberspace,
the space which is the form of appearance of the disappearance of real space.[7] Non-space as the (ideological) delusion of space.
And precisely because it is delusory, non-space is not habitable howsoever hard it may grow in upon us as habit. Man
cannot belong in it, cannot be at home in it, can just not be in it.[8] In a very material way then, the continuing
expansion of cyberspace is in direct proportion to mans increasing homelessness. And if the expansion
continues, we may all be diasporans one day, perennially nomadic, absolutely contingent, and for ever
slithering to sneak through interstices into the warmth of home. But home will not be even a memory
then. As the founding referential axis of space, it will have lost any meaning whatsoever. For now, though, we inhabit a double
spatial ecology: of the space of flows and the space of places. The latter is what we understand as the real space: space as the
location of history, mortality and martyrdom. The space of flows is the space of instantaneity, of ahistory, of what Bill Gates
smugly calls friction-free capitalism (quoted in iek). Cyberspace is what we the embodied mortals can never get
inside of. It is without matter and time, and for that reason, ahuman. Cyberspace, as the disappearance of distances, has
no interspatialities. Absolute space. An oxymoron. When convergence technologies move enormous amounts of
data at the speed of light, the terrestrial space is not just vanquished. It effectively vanishes. And with space
vanishes time. And then the sky falls. The earth goes under. The gods keep away. For death comes no longer. Under the
disappearance of time, mortality vanishes. And with mortality dead, the mortals can be no more. The
fourfold, as Heidegger calls them, withdraw when man no longer builds for dwelling (Building). And light, the ground of all
phenomena, swallows all because the phenomena have begun to race at the speed of light. The docile and sedentary
inhabitant of the grey ecology of this omnipolis (Virilio 25; 58; 83) of networks and flows must compulsively refine
himself to the point where he becomes a pure conductor (Nirre 265). He must install connectivity in place of collectivity, a
status in place of a state (Thacker 167), and reconfigure the ontologies of home and community to fit into the ecology of networks
and flows. His redemption lies in enabling the flows and reducing resistance to the barest minimum that the ecology of flows
structurally requires in order to be what it is. Space and time being the last posts of resistance in the way of capital
must be conquered, but their total annihilation would cause capital to implode. The delicate game of violence can
be played out, thus, only on the turf of the human being adrift as a node on a chaotic sea of networks and flows. Man must
overcome himself but not in the way of Zarathustras bermensch (beyond-man), by exceeding what is human, all too
human. He must reduce himself to being a facilitating node in the ecology of flows, a structurally
indispensable point of critical resistance. He must become hyper-man. Towards Real-Virtual Nomadic
Monadism Hyper-man is the monad of the new ecology. Like the Leibnizian monad, he is indistinguishable from any
other monad, defined solely by his relative position vis--vis others (Russell 607-11). He is windowless and
thus radically closed to the other. And he is ontologically a mirror reflecting the uni-verse. What renders him
new is a slight historical displacement: he inhabits both non-space and space, the space of flows and the space of places,
has a dis-position to be homeless, and reflects the infinitely variable homogeneity of capital under
Baudrillards structural law of value (Butler 39). He is the diasporic monad of nomadic cyber-communities,
the nodal ghost of meaningful connectivity, of osmosis and semiosis between networks, the point and passage of discourse gone
hyper. A technologically induced bizarre revival of the archaic, the eternal wanderer reproduced for one last time for the eternity of
dead space. The diasporic condition, as the world-historical ontological condition of man at this juncture, paves the way for the
real-virtual nomadic monadism of hyper-man. The diasporic condition is the moment of twilight, between the
submergence of man and the emergence of hyper-man. And hence, there is yet hope. The hope before we mutate
irredeemably from our human being.

Alt Reject
Reject the aff to radically reinterpret technology and cyberculture the affs
neoliberal discourse of technology is totalitarianism guised in an illusion of
democratic peace
Armitage 99 (John Armitage, lectures in politics and media studies at the University of Northumbria
at Newcastle, UK. He is currently editing Paul Virilio, a special issue of the journal Theory Culture &
Society, and working on Virilio Live: Selected Interviews. Ctheory.net "Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse
of TechnologyThe Politics of Cyberculture in the Age of the Virtual Class"
www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=111)

Totalitarianism is latent in technology. It is not simply the virtual class that is totalitarian. Totalitarianism is always present
in technology itself. Virilio's acute observations on technology are therefore essentially correct: his theoretical analysis
indicates that while we are indeed in the midst of some kind of technological transition, it is improbable that
such a transition will usher in a new era of digital democracy.21 On this view, then, humanity is not on the
verge of the kind of technological and democratic revolution envisaged by the neoliberals. What separates
acritical interpretation of technology from that of global technological entrepreneurs and leading politicians is a determination to
forge a radical understanding of technology's consequences. The advantage of this kind of analysis is that it focuses on key aspects of
technology that are rarely, if ever, voiced by computer manufacturers and political pundits. Indeed, the general absence of a
critical understanding of technology is one of the chief reasons why so many people seem to be so baffled
by the "mysteries" of technology. Thus, it is vital to resist both the neoliberal discourse of technology and
the contemporary development of pan-capitalism. In the specific context of the political debates over the
discourse of cyberculture, then, it is important to question the uncritical and antidemocratic conception of
technology presently being elaborated and disseminated by the virtual class in its quest for actual wealth and
power. While technology is obviously an extremely important and determining force, it is crucial to remember that it is not
the only force or agent of change. The virtual class is not simply an assortment of technological and visual
representations. In fact, it is all too real. It is the class that at this moment is rewriting the history of virtual and other
technologies while simultaneously controlling their organized production, distribution and consumption. As a result of it's
monopolistic control of technology, the virtual class is presently being courted by the newly ascendant
virtual political class (of which Newt Gingrich in the US and Tony Blair in the UK are examples). This class opposes all
those who resist the neoliberal discourse of technology in whatever form it takes(e.g., anti-road building and
animal rights protests by young people). It is time, then, to radically rethink, redefine and reinterpret the very
meaning of technology, politics, and cyberculture in the age of the virtual class.

Aff Perm
The spread of internet technologies allows for more effective political
activism Zapatistas prove
Pitman and Taylor 7 (Dr. Thea Pitman, Senior Lecturer in Latin American Studies at the
University of Leeds, and Dr. Claire Taylor, Reader in Hispanic Studies at the University of Liverpool.
"Conclusion: Latin American Identity and Cyberspace" from Latin American Cyberculture and
Cyberliterature, 2007.
books.google.com/books?id=rLDPNkb1c3EC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) VP

Wright, quoting Mario Diani, also observes that the use of ICTs in activist organisations is often of an instrumental
order, in order to 'reinforce face-to-face acquaintances and exchanges' (Wright 2004: 82). Indeed, this tacking back and forth
between the real and the virtual is seen by many activists as essential if the advent of ICTs is not to be
detrimental to the concept of activism per se (see, for example. Escobar 1999: 46). And indeed, very quickly following the
basic communicative Zapatista web-presence mentioned above, instrumental use of the Internet for organisational
purposes became apparent. Both the ; Ya baster! and Accien Zapatista sites include(d) 'How you can help or similar
sections which recruit(ed) supporters for traditional activist activities as well as a few Internet-based ones such
as website maintenance (for a good overview of these sites in their heyday see iturriaga 1996 and Cleaver 1996-2003). Thus, with the
exception of the call for website maintenance, both communicative and instrumental uses of the Internet constitute
simply the transference of traditional activism to the new medium. But what, if anything, does the pro-Zapatista
web-presence do that pre-Internet-age forms of social networking and activism could not? Even if one concedes that the
Zapatistas"social netwar' in terms of the spread of information was successful in spontaneously attracting
people of all walks of life to defend them and in so doing, strengthening the role of civil society in Mexico. is
there anything specifically related to the new opportunities afforded by cyberspace in their online presence? Internet activism
proper is perhaps most evident in the Zapatistas' increasingly marked exploitation of the dialogic
potential the interac-tivity of the Internet. Anon claims that the really innovative aspect of the Zapatistas' use of
the Internet and the reason they have inspired other movements across the globe 'not only to act in solidarity
with each other, but to act together, publishing and protesting as networked -affinity groups"' is because
of their dialogic approach to the medium and to activism in general. He goes on to define this as 'an anarchist model
(if organising' (Alton 2004: 10). Deedee Halleck backs this up with her hands-on observation that (Halleck 1994: 32): A vital part
of any revolutionary movement is the degree of hope that is mobilized. Perhaps the most effective outcome of
Chiapas on-line has been the boosting of psychological morale of Latin American activists, anti-GATT cadre and
human rights workers. [...] [During the early days of the Uprising] there was a sense of direct connection, of an authentic 'interactive'
movement, as groups and individuals forwarded messages, excerpted passages, pinned up tear sheets and posted their own
comments on-line.

EU CP
a/t: relations DA
Relations are resilient
Budd 10 (Sir Colin Budd, a member of the LSE IDEAS advisory board and was a member of HM Dip
Service from 1967-2005, US-EU Relations after Lisbon: Reviving Transatlantic Cooperation
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR003/budd.pdf)

In the first place, there has been a welcome change of tone. As Philip Gordon (Assistant Secretary of the State Department) put it in
Brussels on 30 September, this US administration is well aware that it cant possibly deal with all the challenges on the global
agenda alone: As we look around the world and think about which partners can help us deal with challenges like Iran, Afghanistan,
climate change and the global financial crisis nowhere are there greater or more important partners than in Europe and the
European Union. Moreover: Its not just understanding that we need strong partners, but dealing with them in a way that we hope
shows some humility and respect for the positions of others We want to take the partnership with Europe in particular to a new
level. Secondly, while there is still (as usual) much transatlantic disagreement, many in Europe nonetheless warmly
welcome the fact that the US is now engaging with Iran, welcome the increased US commitment to tackling climate change, are
glad that there is now an EU-US Ministerial Energy Council, and are convinced that the EU still has a great deal
to gain from further improvement of the transatlantic dialogue. When President Obama received the EUs leaders at the
White House last November it was amply clear that both sides were determined to continue to give their relationship
a very high priority. Predictions of the demise of the transatlantic alliance are wildly off the mark. Quite
apart from the shared values it represents, the combined economic interests bound up in it are in themselves entirely
compelling. The two economies account for well over half the worlds GDP, and are hugely interdependent. Both US and
EU investors have more than $1 trillion invested across the Atlantic. If goods and services are combined, the EU and US form the
largest bilateral trade partnership in the world. So there is no lack of substance to the relationship. And the Lisbon
Treatys improvements in the European foreign policy architecture should somewhat facilitate its further development.