G.R. No.

L-21033 December 28, 1970

TESTATE ESTATE OF ALEJANDRO GONZALES y TOLENTINO, deceased, LORETO ESGUERRA (GONZALES)
MANGALIMAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. MANUEL I. GONZALES, respondent-appellee.
ZALDIVAR, J .:
Appeal, on a question of law, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Special Proceedings No. 42412. This case is one of
the many incidents in the testamentary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the late Alejandro Gonzales y Tolentino.
Petitioner-appellant Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman, an illegitimate daughter of Alejandro Gonzales y Tolentino, was given a legacy
of one-eighth (1/8) undivided portion of the Hacienda Evangelista located at Umingan, Pangasinan, having an area of 137 hectares Because
she was a minor when her father died, petitioner's share was placed under the guardianship of her half-brother, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., a
legitimate son of the testator.
Respondent-appellee Manuel I. Gonzales is a legitimate son of the testator, and was for some time the administrator of the estate. For the
payment of the services of said respondent as administrator, it was agreed on November 5, 1943 among the testator's widow and legitimate
children that he would be paid the sum of P11,000 00. This agreement was approved by the probate court on December 2, 1943. Alleging that
he had not been paid his fee of P11,000 00, as provided in the compromise agreement, respondent filed before the probate court a motion for
execution on July 28, 1948, which motion was granted in an order issued by the court on August 23, 1948. Eventually, on July 27, 1950 the
Hacienda Evangelista, which had previously been levied on execution, was sold by the sheriff to respondent for the sum of P2,307 46. The
one-year redemption period having elapsed without petitioner's guardian having taken any step to redeem her undivided share of the
hacienda, the sheriff executed, on October 31, 1951, a final deed of sale in favor of respondent.
After coming of age, petitioner sought to recover her legacy by filing a motion in the probate court to set aside the sale of the Hacienda
Evangelista. Having found, however, that her guardian was duly notified of such sale, the court a quo denied her motion on October 15, 1954.
Petitioner did not appeal from this order, instead she filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against her former guardian for
damages for the loss of her share in the hacienda (Civil Case No. 25986).
1

Much later, or in April 1962, petitioner allegedly learned that before the sale to respondent of the Hacienda Evangelista, including her one-
eighth undivided share thereof, said respondent had actually been paid for his services as administrator an amount more than the P11,000 00,
claimed by him. Contending that respondent, through fraud and misrepresentations had obtained the order of payment for his services and the
subsequent writs of execution which ultimately led to his acquistion of the property, thereby enriching himself at her expense, petitioner, on
April 21, 1962, filed a petition before the same probate court for the reconveyance to her of her one-eighth undivided share in the Hacienda
Evangelista by the respondent. After the filing by respondent of his opposition, and the respective memorandum of the parties herein, the
probate court, on November 12, 1962, issued an order, as follows:
After considering the petition for reconveyance of Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman, dated April 21, 1962, and the
opposition thereto, dated May 14, 1962, of Manuel Gonzales in support of which opposition said Manuel Gonzales filed his
memorandum on September 12, of this year, and in reply to which Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman filed hers on
October 24, same year, the Court is of the opinion that inasmuch as the question of title or ownership is involved, said
Manuel Gonzales may not be divested of his title within these probate proceedings but in an independent suit filed with a
competent court.
Hence the present appeal by the petitioner.
The only question to be resolved in this appeal is, whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila, as a probate court, has jurisdiction to
entertain petitioner's petition for reconveyance.
We hold that the probate court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for reconveyance, in question. The remedy sought by
petitioner for the reconveyance to her of her share in the Hacienda Evangelista upon the ground that the same was acquired by respondent
through fraud or misrepresentation cannot be obtained by a mere petition in the probate proceedings. The court of first instance, acting as a
probate court, has limited jurisdiction and can take cognizance only of "matters of probate, both testate and intestate estates, ... and all such
special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for "
2
The jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special, and this should be
understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers specified in the law, and can not extend to the adjucation of collateral matters.
The petition filed by petitioner before the probate court which seemingly seeks merely the reconveyance to her of her undivided share in a
parcel of land which originally formed part of the estate of her father in fact calls for the nullification, of the order of execution issued by the
probate court which is already final, and of the subsequent sale of a property to respondent, upon the alleged ground of fraud. The defense
interposed by respondent is that petitioner's action to recover the property is already barred by prescription, laches, and res judicata. The
petition for reconveyance has given rise to a controversy involving rights over a real property which would require the presentation of evidence
and the determination of legal questions that should be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction.
We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner-appellant's filing an action in the proper court. No
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987
PEDRO E. BAYBAYAN, CIPRIANO EVANGELISTA, and SPOUSES BARTOLOME and CONSUELO BAYBAYAN,petitioners, vs. HON.
NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge CFI Pangasinan Branch XIV; Deputy Sheriff CONSTANCIO PAGADUAN; EULALIA
EVANGELISTA, NORBERTO, PAULINA, FELIZA, all surnamed PADUA; DIONISIA, LAUREANO, JOSEFINA, LEONARDO, ANASTACIA,
VALENTINA, all surnamed ORPIANO; SERVILLANO, GERTRUDES, PASTORA, LORENZO, FAUSTA, all surnamed DELFIN; and
DIONISIO, FAUSTINA, AMADO BENJAMIN, all surnamed ORIA, respondents.
PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the respondent Judge on 4 December 1975, which dismissed, without
prejudice, the petitioners' complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, as well as the Order,
dated 24 December 1975, which denied petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of said order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano,
Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano, Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin, Fausta Delfin,
Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died
intestate sometime in 1945 in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's estate, the value of which
did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was docketed
therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to
submit a project of partition.
2
Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to the Resales Branch of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective
shares of her co-heirs; to make an accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs or pay its
equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto.
3

A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents were placed in possession of their respective
shares.
4
However, when a representative of the private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private respondents, he
was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof, the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and
Cipriano Evangelista in contempt of court.
5

As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists, and the spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to
be the registered owners of the lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales Branch docketed therein
as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to
restrain said defendants from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
6

Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, the question of the Identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc.
No. 24-R, was brought up, so that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic engineer to undertake said
survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the Court a report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by the
Deputy Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the probate court, are registered in the names of herein
petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No. 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
7

By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano
Evangelists. However, the same court ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is necessary that
an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine whether or not the property in question is part of the property under
Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269."
8

Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, to which was attached an amended complaint
wherein some defendants were dropped.
9
The respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply with his order
of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without prejudice on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269." 10
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but the motion was denied on 24 December 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court. The Court treated the petition as a special civil action for
certiorari. 13
Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent Judge had no authority under the law, both substantive and
procedural, to issue the questioned orders because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec. Proc. No.
24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.
The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was
issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in said special proceedings, it
appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus
Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, wherein they prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the order of the probate court of 30
October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial
Judge to whom they submitted their cause voluntarily. 14
We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the
complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the respondent Judge
found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo
Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not
justify the order to amend the complaint since the determination of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a court
exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of
ownership in a proper action. 15
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long fine of decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the
courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance." 16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what the amendments should be or how the complaint
should be amended so that the petitioners should not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by them in Civil Case No. 231-R
does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would want to appear therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the Orders issued by the respondent Judge on 7 December 1975 and
24 December 1975, in Civil Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Without costs. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124320. March 2, 1999]
HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY, NAMELY: LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, EMILIO ENCISO, AURORA
ENCISO, AND NORBERTO ENCISO, REPRESENTED BY LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners, vs. HON.
ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS, CAVITE; THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR TRECE MARTIRES
CITY, GEORGE T. CHUA, SPS. ALFONSO NG AND ANNABELLE CHUA, SPS. ROSENDO L. DY AND DIANA DY, SPS. ALEXANDER NG
AND CRISTINA NG, SPS. SAMUEL MADRID AND BELEN MADRID, SPS. JOSE MADRID AND BERNARDA MADRID, SPS. DAVID
MADRID AND VIOLETA MADRID, JONATHAN NG, SPS. VICTORIANO CHAN, JR. AND CARMELITA CHAN, SPS. MARIE TES C. LEE
AND GREGORIE W.C. LEE, JACINTO C. NG, JR., SPS. ADELAIDO S. DE GUZMAN AND ROSITA C. DE GUZMAN, SPS. RICARDO G.
ONG AND JULIE LIM-IT, SPS. MISAEL ADELAIDA P. SOLIMAN AND FERDINAND SOLIMAN, SPS. MYLENE T. LIM AND ARTHUR LIM,
EVELYN K. CHUA, GOLDEN BAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
PURISIMA, J .:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Orders dated October 25, 1995 and February
23, 1996, respectively, of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite (RTC).
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area
of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent
Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation (Golden Bay) under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (TCT) 225254 and 225255. With
the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of
the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint to
implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the RTC in an
Order
[1]
dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint,
[2]
which they promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss
[3]
on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different
from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in
its Order
[4]
dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that
they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration
[5]
but to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC in its Order
[6]
of February 23,
1996.
Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent courts Orders under attack.
Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be
determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial
and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
To begin with, petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an
appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject of certiorari
[7]
. Where
appeal is available as a remedy, certiorariwill not lie
[8]
.
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of
it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance (Elena C.
Monzon, et. al., v. Angelita Taligato, CA-G-R No. 33355, August 12, 1992).
In Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera
[9]
, this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not
in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals
[10]
where the court held:
"In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the i ntestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of
the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to
Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in
question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that
such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071,it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, which stated no cause of
action. In Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals
[11]
, it was ruled that:
xxx If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE
FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J .:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner,"
the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,
1
granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners
Report
2
and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides
that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.
3

By Order of November 22, 1999s,
4
the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to
Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13,
2000,
5
it filed a Petition for Certiorari
6
before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,
7
the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed
Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal].
Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead,
likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the
records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed
order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial
court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or
decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No.
124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente
Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand
of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding
involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on
appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included
in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,
8
this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution
9
requiring respondent to file her
comment on the petition was returned unserved with postmasters notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served
upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be,
as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal,
provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse
declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a
"summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter
alia:
x x x
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all casesprovided for in this Codes
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and alllaws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the
appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not
necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the
appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the
appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition
10
filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely
having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be
REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183965
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner, vs JOSE NGO CHUA,Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.

Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition
[1]
for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation
against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.

Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa
(Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was
giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with the following names: ALFREDO F.
SURPOSA as father and IRENE DUCAY as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irenes father, and Ducay was the
maiden surname of Irenes mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given
petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent
required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch
through respondents efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as
respondents illegitimate children. During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and
it was the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondents relatives even attended the baptism of petitioners daughter.
[2]


In his Answer
[3]
to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that
petitioner was his daughter.
[4]
Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he
took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also
presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence
[5]
on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been
barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.

It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar
Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision
[6]
dated 21 February 2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000, praying that judgment be rendered in
accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:
1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between
petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or
acknowledgement is concurred with petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signat ure to this
pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but
without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby
acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands
against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors
and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty
Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to the subject matter of the
present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned
petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.

Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same. Judgment is
rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with their
respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.
[7]


With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was
declared final and executory.

Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition
[8]
to respondents Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding No. 12562-
CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting
respondents Demurrer.

RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and Opposition, respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this Court; the Opposition
thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
x x x x
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there was a judgment entered based on the Compromise
Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court, branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or alteration by another Regional Trial
Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioners pleadings to the effect that there is no blood relationship between petitioner
and respondent, which is a declaration against interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioners father is Alfredo Surposa is a public document which is the evidence
of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by judicial order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise agreement, she is estopped from refuting on the
effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein respondent].

The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief against the same defendant.
[9]


Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are tied. Unless the Court of Appeals strikes
down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to vacate, much
more annul, that Judgment issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and in fact executed.
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in patent abuse of judicial discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the
Answer.

This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving same parties to re-litigate on the same issues
already closed.
[10]


In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due course, as the herein
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
[11]



RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
[12]
in a Resolution
[13]
dated 29 July 2008.

Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases enumerated in
Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City
effectively bars the filing of the present case.
[14]


At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondents Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to
this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized
by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.

Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of
law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact
exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed;
the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.
[15]


The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved
by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.
[16]


For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
[17]


It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB,
presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against
respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However, the question
arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.

The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.
[18]
In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,
[19]
the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.

It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318
of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and
vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.
[20]


In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in
its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and
filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they
are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future l egitime as an
illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

Advincula v. Advincula
[21]
has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of
both parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for
acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar
the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that
there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
[22]
Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
[23]


Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is
void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
[24]


Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-
Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary
to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be
competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool
to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote inFrancisco v. Zandueta
[25]
is relevant herein:

It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by
the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it,
but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is
want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality
which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to
pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)

A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final,
and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight,
or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
[26]


In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no
jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondents Compromise
Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been
considered a judgment on the merits.

Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for
being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively
establish the lack of filiation.
[27]


Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on
Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondents presentation of evidence.

Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of res judicata.

Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full below:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence.

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as
he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.
[28]


The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the
plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery
against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the
plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation
necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.
[29]


The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been able to show that she is entitled to her
claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-
Branch 24 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did not take into consideration any
of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res
judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having
dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an adjudication on the merits of respondents demurrer
to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be
allowed to present evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.

It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of
Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses
it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering
real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
[30]


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183965 JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner, - versus - JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,
[1]
filed by petitioner spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio (petitioners), assailing
the August 26, 2002 Decision
[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389, as well as its March 17, 2003 Resolution
[3]
denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision and Resolution affirmed in toto the October 1, 1993 Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City, Branch 75, which issued an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
(respondent).
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
The backgrounds facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.
The petitioners obtained a loan amounting to P400,000.00 from the respondent. To secure the loan, the petitioners executed onMay 8,
1980, a real estate mortgage over Lot 1224-B-1 LRC Psd-15436, covered by TCT No. T-191117 (now 13554) of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan, in favor of the respondent. The petitioners failed to pay the loan, prompting the respondent to file a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, pursuant to Act No. 3135. To satisfy the obligation, the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, onNovember 8, 1982, sold the
mortgaged property at public auction, where the respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Accordingly, a Certification of Sale was issued in
favor of the respondent and registered with the Registry of Deeds.
[4]

On May 26, 1983, the respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession
[5]
over the mortgaged property before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City (RTC). In an Order
[6]
dated December 12, 1983, the RTC granted the petition, conditioned
on the posting of a P100,000.00 bond. Upon posting of the required bond, the RTC issued, on February 16, 1984, a writ of possession,
commanding the sheriff to place the respondent in possession of the property.
The writ of possession was not implemented
[7]
because, on February 27, 1984, the petitioners, filed with the RTC, a petition to set
aside the auction sale and the writ of possession (with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction).
[8]
In an
Order dated February 28, 1984, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent and the Deputy Sheriff from
implementing the writ of possession it previously issued.
[9]
After hearing, the RTC, issued on March 13, 1984, a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering the respondent and the Provincial Sheriff to desist from implementing the writ of possession and to refrain from interfering with and
disrupting the possession of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
[10]

Sometime in April 1984, the respondent filed with the RTC its Motion to Admit Answer with Opposition to the Petition to Set Aside
Auction Sale and Writ of Possession with Motion to Dissolve or Lift Preliminary Injunction (Answer) which was granted onApril 26,
1984.
[11]
On May 21, 1984, the petitioners filed their Reply thereto, praying that the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued be
maintained.
[12]

More than two years after the filing of the Answer and the Reply, and after a series of postponements at the instance of both parties,
then Presiding Judge Teresita D. Capulong issued an Order dated December 16, 1986, dismissing the respondents petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession on the ground of failure to prosecute.
[13]
The Order reads in full:
When this case was called for hearing, counsel for the oppositors [now petitioners], Atty. Constancio R. Gallamos, was
present. Atty. Francisco Rivera [counsel for the respondent] was absent despite notice. Upon petition of the counsel for the
oppositors, this case is hereby ordered dismissed for failure to prosecute.SO ORDERED.
No copy of the above Order was served on the respondent
[14]
whose operations the Monetary Board (Central Bank of thePhilippines)
shut down on January 25, 1985, for reasons not relevant to the present case.
[15]

Nearly six (6) years later (after the Court ordered the reorganization and resumption of the respondents operations in G.R. No.
70054)
[16]
or on August 19, 1992, the respondent filed a Motion to Clarify the Order of December 16, 1986. In the same motion, the
respondent likewise moved for the issuance of an alias writ of possession.
[17]

In an Order
[18]
dated September 18, 1992, the RTC made a clarification that the Order of Dismissal of December 16, 1986refers to the
dismissal of the main case for issuance of a writ of possession. In that same Order, the RTC denied the respondents motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of possession.
On May 18, 1993, the respondent moved for the reconsideration
[19]
of the September 18, 1992 Order. In an Order
[20]
datedJune 2, 1993,
the RTC, this time presided by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., reconsidered and set aside the Order of December 16, 1986and granted the
respondents prayer for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the June 2, 1993 Order and
prayed that the implementation of the alias writ of possession be held in abeyance.
The RTC Ruling
On October 1, 1993, the RTC, now presided by Judge Jaime F. Bautista, issued the assailed Order
[21]
which denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order for the issuance of an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent. The assailed RTC
Order is summarized below.
First, the RTC ruled that the Order of Dismissal was granted on a technicality and that [t]he ground of failure to prosecute is
manifestly unfounded.
[22]
The RTC held that the power of the trial court to dismiss an action on the ground of non prosequitur is not
unbounded. The real test x x x is whether under the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in [failing] to
proceed with reasonable promptitude.
[23]
In the present case, the RTC noted that the records show that the case dragged on for years
because of several postponements at the request of both parties, particularly petitioner Ernesto Topacio who went abroad for a long time
during the pendency of the case.
[24]


Second, the RTC held that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be considered a dismissal on the merits as it was founded
not on a substantial ground but on a technical one; it does not amount to a declaration of the law [on] the respective rights and duties of the
parties, based upon the ultimate x x x facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.
[25]

Third, the RTC ruled that the revival by a motion for reconsideration (filed on May 18, 1993) of the February 16, 1984 Order, granting
the writ of possession, was seasonably filed by the respondent, pursuant to the period allowed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Citing National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[26]
the RTC held that [i]n computing the time [limit] for suing out an execution, x
x x the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite
time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. The
RTC noted that the running of the five-year period under Section 6 of the Rules of Court had been interrupted by the erroneous issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction; the February 16, 1984 Order never attained finality and was overtaken by the issuance of the Order dated June 2,
1993, granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution.
[27]

Finally, the RTC held that the respondent, as the winning bidder, has an absolute right to a writ of possession,
[28]
considering that: (1)
a writ of possession had been issued on February 16, 1984 and the corresponding bond had already been posted, although the writ was not
enforced because of the erroneous injunction issued by Judge Capulong; and (2) there was no redemption by the petitioners.
[29]

On October 20, 1993, the petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (petition), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32389.
[30]
Before the CA, the petitioners argued that
the RTC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it: (1) reinstated the respondents case more than seven (7) years
after the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order became final and executory, and (2) issued an alias writ of execution upon a mere motion for
reconsideration and not by an independent action pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The CA Ruling
On August 26, 2002, the CA denied the petitioners petition and affirmed in toto the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders of the
RTC. The CA found that the December 16, 1986 Order of the RTC does not amount to a dismissal on the merits as it was based on purely
technical grounds. It noted that the records show that the respondent was not furnished a copy of the Dismissal Order; hence, the case cannot
be deemed to be final with respect to the respondent. The CA also agreed with the RTCs conclusion that the delay in the resolution of the
case cannot be solely attributed to the respondent and did not warrant its outright dismissal.
[31]

The CA held that an independent action for the revival of the writ of possession need not be filed in order to enforce the writ of
possession issued on December 12, 1983 since Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies only to civil actions and not to special
proceedings,
[32]
citing Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar.
[33]

The Petition
In the present petition,
[34]
the petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the October 1, 1993 Order of the RTC considering that:
1) the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order constitutes an adjudication on the merits which has already attained finality, and
2) a writ of possession may not be enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after the lapse of more than five (5) years from the time
of its issuance.
On the first assignment of error, the petitioners submit that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order for failure to prosecute constitutes
adjudication upon the merits, considering that the RTC did not declare otherwise, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioners further contend that the Dismissal Order has become final and executory since the respondent belatedly filed the Motion to Clarify
the Order of December 16, 1986 on August 19, 1992 or almost six years later. On these premises, the petitioners argue that res judicata has
set in and consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant the motion for reconsideration and to issue an alias writ of possession in favor of
the respondent.
[35]

On the second assignment of error, the petitioners contend that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
possession issued on February 16, 1984 may no longer be enforced by a mere motion but by a separate action, considering that more than
five years had elapsed from its issuance. The petitioners also argue that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies to the present case
since a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is neither a special proceeding nor a land registration case.
[36]

In their Memorandum, the petitioners additionally submit that they do not dispute that the CA made a finding that the December 16, 1986
Dismissal Order was not properly served. They, however, point out that the CA made no such finding with respect to theSeptember 18,
1992 Order of the RTC. The petitioners contend that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed on May 18, 1993 or eight months later from
the September 18, 1992 Order by the respondent, was filed out of time. Thus, they conclude that any subsequent ruling of the RTC, including
the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, is barred by res judicata.
[37]

OUR RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
A. Preliminary Considerations
Our review of the records, particularly the CA decision, indicates that the CA did not determine the presence or absence of grave abuse
of discretion in the RTC decision before it. Given that the petition before the CA was a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, it appears that the CA instead incorrectly reviewed the case on the basis of whether the RTC decision on the merits was
correct.
To put the case in its proper perspective, the task before us is to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the RTC decision before it. Stated otherwise, did the CA correctly
determine whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling on the case?
As discussed below, our review of the records and the CA decision shows that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent.
B. Applicability of Res J udicata
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a matter
adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.
[38]
The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter,
and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in
time.
[39]


The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by prior judgment" under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47
of the Rules of Court, and the second is "conclusiveness of judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. Res judicata applies in the concept of
"bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must
be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.
[40]


The petitioners claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because all of the elements thereof are
present. In response, the respondent argues that res judicata did not set in as the first element is lacking.

We agree with the respondent.

The December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order never attained finality as it was not properly served
The following provisions under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of judgments:
[41]

SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined. x x x
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. x x x
SEC. 5. Modes of service. Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either
personally or by mail.
SEC. 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by
leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not
known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys
or counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.
SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly
addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the
locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.
SEC. 8. Substituted service. If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under
the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by
delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at
the time of such delivery.
SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or
by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions
against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered mail to the counsel of record, or
by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor
made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality.
[42]

In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez,
[43]
the Court ruled that the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission, denying the respondents motion for reconsideration, cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as there is no
conclusive proof of service of the said resolution. In the words of the Court, there was no proof of actual receipt of the notice of the registered
mail by the respondents counsel.
[44]
Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the CA properly acquired jurisdiction over the
respondents petition for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by law for the filing of the petition,
the Court could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.
Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang,
[45]
the Court held that the decision of the Regional Trial Court did not become final and
executory where, from the records, the respondent had not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration.
[46]
The
Court also noted that there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the said Order or that she indeed received a
first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid basis for the issuance of the writ of execution as the decision never attained
finality.
In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final and executory in
view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally or via registered mail, on the respondents counsel. We note in this regard that the
petitioners do not dispute the CA finding that the records failed to show that the private respondent was furnished with a copy of the said order
of dismissal[.]
[47]
Accordingly, the Dismissal Order never attained finality.
The petitioners now claim that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by the respondent on May 18, 1993 from the September 18,
1992 Order of the RTC, was filed out of time. The petitioners make this claim to justify their contention that the subsequent rulings of the RTC,
including the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, are barred by res judicata.
We reject this belated claim as the petitioners raised this only for the first time on appeal, particularly, in their Memorandum. In fact,
the petitioners never raised this issue in the proceedings before the court a quo or in the present petition for review.
As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be
permitted to change the theory on appeal.
[48]
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need
not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be
unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had
it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
[49]
Thus, to permit the petitioners in this case to change their theory on appeal
would thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
[50]


C. Applicability of the Rule on Execution by Motion or by Independent Action
The petitioners finally submit that the writ of possession, issued by the RTC on February 16, 1984, may no longer be enforced by a
mere motion, but by a separate action, considering that more than five years had elapsed from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil actions
In rejecting a similar argument, the Court held in Paderes v. Court of Appeals
[51]
that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds
application only to civil actions and not to special proceedings. Citing Sta. Ana v. Menla,
[52]
which extensively discussed therationale behind
the rule, the Court held:
In a later case [Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 (1961)], the Court also ruled that the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within five years by motion, and after five years but within ten
years by an action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as
land registration cases. x x x x
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the
effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule
39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Subsequently, the Court, in Republic v. Nillas,
[53]
affirmed the dictum in Sta. Ana and clarified that Rule 39 x x x applies only to
ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other
specific law or legal modality, viz:
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not
expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish
ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a
status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate
the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue,
the decree of registration.

In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action
[54]
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately
by Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. The provision states:
Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may
petition the [Regional Trial Court] where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this
Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex partemotion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one
hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the
office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such
petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond,
order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall
execute said order immediately.
The above-cited provision lays down the procedure that commences from the filing of a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by the Court, and finally to the execution of the order by the sheriff of the province in
which the property is located. Based on the text of the law, we have also consistently ruled that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of
possession is ministerial; the writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond.
[55]
In fact, the issuance and the immediate implementation of the writ are declared ministerial and mandatory under the law.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank v. Adil,
[56]
we emphatically ruled that once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court
has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is
summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title. The trial court does not exercise discretion
in the issuance thereof;
[57]
it must grant the issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the provincial
sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately.
Clearly, the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from the moment of the issuance of the writ of possession, leaves no room
for the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta. Ana, to be applicable only to
civil actions. From another perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the
purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
[58]


D. Conclusion
In sum, based on these considerations, we find that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of
possession in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The August 26, 2002 Decision and the March 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976, VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA
B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976, VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
MARTIN, J .:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court,
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a speci al
administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular admi nistrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor
of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that
her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule.
This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2)
the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio,
who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular
administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to
confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition
was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that
the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea
Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special
administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B.
Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court,
1
subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of
the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and
certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon
Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garci a all
certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to
reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to al lege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special
and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view
of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the
resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the
special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an
inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973,
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and
papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and
final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to
deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court
all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado
Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar,
2
Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate
of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule
also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated
March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions
on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the
special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix
upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She
manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings
before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the
final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still
pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the
validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued
on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter
stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all
the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy,
where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact
of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the
state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.
3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons.Venue and Processes.
4
It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began."
That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully
and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties.
5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independentl y of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is
merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue."
6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at
the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.
7
In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant."
8
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
9
Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile.
10
No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garci a at the time
of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate
and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed
the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is,
according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G.
Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdi vision,
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death.
12
As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's
residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12,
1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.;
the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B.
Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to
improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a
motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as survi ving spouse, while
insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granti ng letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint
a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.
13
Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or
disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed
when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves.
14
Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court.
15
That, however, is no authority
for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator.
16
Nothing is
wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After
all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent.
17
Under
the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other
next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property.
18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B.
Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter,
incapable of any successional rights.
19
On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed,
20
the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled
to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship
of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution.
21
The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a
Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that
he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia.
22
In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First
District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse.
23
Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.
24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals,
25
this Court under its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the
interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of
First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar
Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973, ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD
DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO
REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J .:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its
subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in
Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)
1
respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25
February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and
Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact
that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued
stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the
consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication
of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in
the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a
petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed
as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and
Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964.
On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."
3
Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was
neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will and
assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent
prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate
proceeding over an intestate proceeding."
4
The said court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his
death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent
Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco
on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court
...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City,
because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City
Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as
proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will
shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party
has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which
appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of
the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.
5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration
dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at
half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m.
with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate
under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his
benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs
had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely
Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the
said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of
donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon
City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily
executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following
the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as
case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner,
holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and
intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which
first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a
valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco
(Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of
invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R,
stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from
the moment a petition is filed, but only to theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is
conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding
Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and
respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition
for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate
court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming
exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of
the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court
respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed
without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack
of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its
due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of
the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
express wish, for the following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act
7
concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and
intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule
indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule
specifies that "the courtfirst taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran inSy Oa vs. Co Ho
9
as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a
question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance,
a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely
finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the
first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will
have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is ofmischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942)
Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190,
10
providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had
last resided, couldnot have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is
one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction Act No. 136,
11
Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently
of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely ofvenue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules
of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition isfirst filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the
court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to
the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and
hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order
holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the peti tion
for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then
it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave
the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to
the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residenceat the time of his death was in Quezon
City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would
decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative
finding as to theprobate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the
probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizanceover the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
12
with facts analogous to the present case
13
is
authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It
is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue
as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain
considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose fi led in the already
pending Special Proceeding No. 6344,"
15
thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for
the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider
said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y
Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had
therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will
to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower
court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other
court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
16

5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from said
court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had
such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the
Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is
a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan
17
that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this
case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the
deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary
course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu
and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing
in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27,
1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to
the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent
and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon
City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu
court thatQuezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would
seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held
applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City
court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously
questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual
residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the
corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the
petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo
18
" are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is
sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by
publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment
of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its
due execution and validity."
19
The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was
not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should notbe set aside by a writ of prohibition for
supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where
the Court, in dismissing the certioraripetition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the
estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to
require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of
the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude
different courts which may properly assume jurisdictionfrom doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration
of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be
converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo
presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his surviving
widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with
public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the
Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March
1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February
25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the
administration of her husband's estate,
20
would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew
the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into
a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testateproceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed
by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with
the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2,
21
since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved
with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings
of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of
the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to
continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal
estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and
motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that
respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise
jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the
settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long
since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts,
22
it may properly
determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by andtransferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment
of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate
proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the
same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact,
as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the
conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-3751 February 21, 1908, EDUARDA BENEDICTO, administratrix of the estate of Maximino Jalandoni, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JULIO JAVELLANA, defendant-appellant.
TORRES, J .:
For the purpose of enforcing the terms of the will made on the 26th of June, 1903, by Maximo Jalandoni, resident of Jaro, the brother of the
testator, Maximino Jalandoni, petitioned by a writing dated August 20, 1906, that the administrator or executor, Julio Javellana, be directed to
pay him the sum of P985 which he held in lieu of the land donated to petitioner. To this end he alleged that according to the said will, one-half
of the hacienda "Lantad", situated in the pueblo of Silay, Occidental Negros, had been bequeathed to him, which gift was subject to the
payment of certain debts and expenses of the estate, with respect to the products of the years 1903 and 1904 only, and which had already
been applied to that object by the administrator, Javellana; that one-half of said hacienda was sold with the consent of the administrator, the
sum P985 remaining in the possession of the latter, from the entire proceeds of the sale, to meet any just or lawful claim which might arise
against the gift made to him, or until such time as the court should confirm the legacy; that, as the administrator had already received the
products of the hacienda, he is no longer entitled to retain any portion of the legacy, nor demand that he should respond for other debts or
expenses of the estate, because with the value of the portion inherited by the heirs Francisco Jalandoni and Sofia Jalandoni, there was more
than would be required to pay the other debts of the estate, and the expenses.
Owing to the death of the plaintiff, Eduarda Benedicto, the administratrix of his estate, represented him.
The administrator of the estate, Julio Javellana, in answer to the above motion, alleged that it was not proper to ask, by means of a motion, for
the relief that Maximino Jalandoni claimed, but that a complaint should have been filed and action brought against the other legatees, or rather
against all the parties concerned in the estate, and not against the administrator alone; that Francisco Jalandoni and Sofia Jalandoni should
not be considered as heirs but simply as the legatees of the testator, and that they are in the same position as the petitioner, Maximino
Jalandoni, with respect to the charges against the estate; that the obligation to pay all the debts of the same was imposed on the entire
inheritance, and not any particular property, nor on any determined party in interest named in the will; and that the amount in deposit with the
administrator was not P985 but P949.29, voluntarily deposited not only to pay certain debts but also to meet all the charges against the estate
and proportionately by the share allotted to Maximino Jalandoni, as had been done by applying the said sum toward the payment of debts, and
for other reasons appearing therein.
The pertinent clauses or paragraphs of the will above referred to are as follows:
The hacienda "Malogo," owned by me and situated in the pueblo of Eustaquio Lopez, Province of Occidental Negros, P.I., and one parcel of
land situated in the pueblo of Mandurriao, Province of Iloilo, P.I., I bequeath to Jose Jalbuena, the son of Benito Jalbuena, to whom I profess
particular affection, having taken care of him in my own house from his most tender age.
I institute Francisco Jalandoni and Sofia Jalandoni, the children of my late brother Nicolas Jalandoni, whose memory is so dear to me for the
favors I have received of him, as heirs to all the property real and personal, which I own in the Province of Iloilo, P.I., with the exception of
the parcel of land previously assigned to Jose Jalbuena, which property shall be divided between the above-mentioned heirs in equal parts.
It is my will that my hacienda denominated "Lantad" shall be divided one half to my brother, Maximino Jalandoni, and the other half to the
sisters Maria, Felisa, and Felicidad Jalandoni, daughters of Nazaria Hojilla.
On my entire estate I impose the obligation that out of the products thereof, all my debts shall be paid, the same being about 2,300 pesos
which I owe Francisco Villanueva, without interest, and 2,550 pesos which I received on loan from Julio Javellana, with interest thereon at
the rate of 10 percent per annum, provided, however, that one-half of the products which each parcel of land pertaining to the estate may
yield this year shall be devoted to the payment of said debts, and should the said one-half not prove sufficient to meet the liabilities, two-
thirds of the said products, or the total amount thereof, shall be applied; and provided, further, that in any case, the balance of such products
shall remain in charge of the administrator for the settlement of such other charges as the estate may be subjected to.
And further on Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni I particularly impose the obligation to pay Teodora Berola, for a period of ten years, an annuity
of 300 pesos, Mexican currency, or the equivalent thereof in Philippine currency; said obligation becoming extinguished by the death of the
said Teodora, in case of her demise before the expiration of the said period of ten years.
The judge in view of the result of the proceedings issued an order on the 27th of October, 1906, granting the motion filed by the legatee
Maximino Jalandoni, as stated therein, from which order the opponent appealed to this court.
From the printed and certified copy of the proceedings, and from the will inserted therein, it appears that the testator, Maximo Jalandoni, on his
death, left no lawful ascendants or descendants having any direct claim as hereditary successors.
It also appears, by the will in question, that the testator has distributed all his property in legacies, and that, notwithstanding the manner in
which he designates his nephews Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni in paragraph 3 of the same, in order to leave in their favor al l the real and
personal property that he owned in Iloilo, with the exception of the parcel of land situated in Mandurriao, bequeathed to Jose Jalbuena, the
truth is that such nephews of the testator are likewise legatees the same as the last beneficiary under paragraph two of the said will.
Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law
prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words and provisions therein written must be plainly construed in
order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real purpose.
The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties in interest.
such is the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of Spain, constantly maintained in a great number of decisions, among which are those
of March 24, 1863, April 28, 1882, and December 16, 1903.
The testator, under clause 5 of his will, has imposed on his entire estate the obligation to pay his debts with the products of the same, and has
prescribed the manner in which the same shall be done until all obligations are extinguished.
Such a testamentary disposition is not contrary to law, and as a matter of fact article 1027 of the Civil Code provides that
The administrator can not pay the legacies until he has paid all the creditors.
Section 728 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of his debts and the expenses of
administration or family expenses, they shall be paid according to the provisions of the will. But if the provision made by the will or the estate
appropriated is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of the estate of the testator, real or personal, as is not disposed of by will, if any shall
be appropriated for that purpose.
Therefore, in accordance with the above legal provisions and with the doctrine established by the courts, the aforesaid will of the late Maximo
Jalandoni must be complied with and carried into execution; and, considering that all those who are benefited thereby have not received from
the testator a universal succession to his estate, but certain property expressly stated in his will, they should, under the law be considered
merely as legatees, without the right to received their share of the property of the deceased until after his debts have been paid. (Secs. 729,
731 and 754, Code of Civil Procedure).
None of the parties interested in the will of Maximo Jalandoni is invested with the character of heir designated by law, and consequently, the
provisions he has incorporated in his last will do not injure any of the rights covered by the law which protects the legitimate portions of such
heirs. Article 858 of the Civil Code reads:
A testator may charge with legacies and bequests not only his heir, but also the legatees.
The latter shall not be liable for the charge except to the extent of the value of the legacy.
Article 859, following provides:
When the testator charges one of the heirs with a legacy the latter only shall be obliged to fulfill the same.
Should he not charge any one in particular, all shall be liable in the same proportion in which they may be heirs.
It is to be noticed that in the present case, where the whole of the inheritance was distributed by legacies, the parties in interest are
indiscriminately designated as heirs or legatees.
As to specific devices, section 729 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides exemption from the payment of debts and expenses if there is
sufficient other property and if it appears to the court necessary to carry into effect the intention of the testator; and, as the legacies stated in
the aforesaid will consist of specific property, less the annuity provided for by clause 6, which is made a special lien upon the property for by
clause 6, which is made a special lien upon the property bequeathed to Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni, it is unquestionable that in this case the
debts and expenses of the estate must be paid pro rata by the legatees in the manner provided in the will, or in accordance with the provisions
of sections 753 and 754 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to
the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee, or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may
make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings not in a separate action and the same judge having jurisdiction in
the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be call ed upon to make
distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties, as may be seen in part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, from section 551
forward.
By the foregoing it has been shown that the judgment appealed from is not in accordance with the law, therefore it is our opinion that the same
should be reversed, and that the request of the representative of Maximino Jalandoni, now sustained by Eduarda Benedicto, the administratrix
of his estate, should be dismissed without any special ruling as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977, TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-
appellants vs. FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees. FERNANDEZ, J .:
This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176
dismissing the petition for the probate of a will.
1

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto,
and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4,
1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate
proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of
Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for
each.
2
The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he diamond partition on March approve
extrajudicial on March 21, 1964.
3

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk
of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo.
4
It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named
as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said with which are bigger, different and more valuable than what
they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom
being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2)
annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto.
5
The Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana
Maloto.
6

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.
The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November 16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen
the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied.
Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating
as additional ground that the appeal is improper was issued.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the
petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:
L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for
certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of
respondent Judge was made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question.
7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art issued a resolution dated July 15, 1969 which reads:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio
V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter of
whether or not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order of November 16, 1968 constitute res adjudicata
may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in question indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein
such matter will be more appropriately determined.
8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged
last will and testament of Adriana Maloto.
9

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.
II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).
III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD
ALREADY ARRESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES OF THEIR ASSIGNS.
IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE
REMEDY TENDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES.
10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the with on the basis of the fi nding of said court in
Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to be Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court
sustained the oppositors' contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate estate
proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736.
11

The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA
MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR PROBATE SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN
REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER CONCERNED IS NOW RES
ADJUDICATA
III
THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE COURSE.
12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No.
1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an
intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736
stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will."
13
And this court stated
in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to
initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question."
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of
the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.
WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside
and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the
respondents. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51291 May 29, 1984, FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICATION C. GUIDO married to TEODORO GUIDO, and
JUAN ARCHE, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III,
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA and SEGUNDO ZAMBO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the
inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.
For a clearer understanding of the present case, the background facts may be appreciated. As far back as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for
the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City then covered by certificates of Tax Declaration in Land Registration
Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene consisted
largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject of this controversy.
On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of the
petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that time, Francisco and Rosita were minors and assisted by their
mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime
usufructuary rights of Irene.
Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1962, the decree of registration No. N-161246 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. The latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the decedent including the
property in question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation, Rufina thereafter,
executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 executed by the late Irene
and renounced and waived whatever rights, interest, and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The
deed was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds and annotated at the back of TCT No. 10477. Subsequently, TCT No. 12665 was issued
in favor of the petitioners.
On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administrator was filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 3864-R) by
respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene numbering seventeen (17) in all to act as administrator of the estate of
the decedent. The petition was granted.
Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory the property in question which was
being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June 27, 1979, respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to
sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator. The motion was granted and
respondent court issued the following order:
The administrator, thru this motion, informs the Court that the estate owns some beds and fish pond located in Opao, Mandaue City
that these salt beds are producing salt which are now in the warehouse in Mandaue City, under the custody of Juan Arche that the
value of the salt in the warehouse is estimated to be worth P5,000.00 are beginning to melt and, unless they are sold as soon as
possible, they may depreciate in value. It is likewise prayed in this motion that Juan Arche be ordered to deliver the salt in question to
the administrator such other products of the land now in his (Juan Arche) possession.
xxx xxx xxx
Let this motion be, as it is hereby GRANTED. The administrator is hereby authorized to sell the salt now in the custody of Juan Arche
and the latter (Juan Arche) is hereby ordered to deliver the salt in question to the administrator in order to effect the sale thereof and
he is likewise directed to deliver such other products of the land to the administrator.
Subsequently, on three different occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with the aid of several men, sought to enforce the order of the
respondent court, compelling the petitioners to come to us on certiorari. On September 14, 1979, we issued a restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the above order of the respondent court and from further interfering with the petitioners in their peaceful
possession and cultivation of the property in question.
The thrust of the petitioners' argument is that the respondent court, as a court handling only the intestate proceedings, had neither the authority
to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the same to
the administrator. Petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the respondent administrator is to file a separate civil action to recover
the same.
On the other hand, the respondent administrator banked on the failure of the petitioners to first apply for relief in the court of origin before filing
the present petition. According to him this was a fatal defect. In addition, the administrator stated that the deed of sale of December 29, 1971
lost its efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon.
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally (claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari,
92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. CA., (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
or should not be included in the inventory the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate a petition regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473: Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).
In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it, was sold seven years before the death of the decedent
and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. InBolisay vs. Alcid, (85 SCRA 213), this Court was
confronted with a similar situation. The petitioners therein sought to annul the order of the respondent court in a special proceeding which in
effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the administratrix of the intestate estate
involved in said proceeding had the right to collect the rentals of said property over the objection of the titled owners just because it was
included in the inventory of said estate and there was an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership thereof and the estate was one
of the parties therein. This Court viewed the petition as one seeking for a prima facie determination and not a final resolution of the claim of
ownership.
We held that:
... Considering that as aforestated the said property is titled under the Torrens System in the names of the petitioners, it does appear
strange, in the light of the probate court's own ruling that it has no jurisdiction to pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court deemed
the same as part of the estate under administration just because the administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the estate and has in fact listed
it in the inventory submitted by her to the court.
It does not matter that respondent - administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In other words, in Our considered view, the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the
property of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that
court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized in the above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the
probate court should resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not even
matter that the issue is raised after approval of the inventory because "apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory and appraisal be
approved by the Court." (Francisco on the Rules of Court Vol. V-B, p. 99, citing Siy Chong Keng vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil.
494)
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27,
1979. Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.
Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under suspicious
circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these
issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the respondent court's order dated June 27, 1979 is hereby set aside and declared
void as issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Our restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the June 27, 1979 order and the respondents
from further interfering, through the intestate proceedings, in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land in question by the petitioners
is hereby made PERMANENT.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963, DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO
CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET
AL., respondents. BARRERA, J .:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to
pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958,
disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo,
Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo,
executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos,
Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted
to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and
submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on
the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for
hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased
Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half
share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the
donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate
proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the
original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the
donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly
dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making
any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first
category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under
the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code,
there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file
another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the
deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena
Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor
filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of
Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which
it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdi ction,
had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or
intestate proceedings,"
1
except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which
case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
2
However, we
have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as
to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac
v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken
cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholdi ng the power of the
probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the
conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court
had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind
even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to
an action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But
as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination
of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which i s distinct from
jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly
speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs
of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate
courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.
3
Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action
of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take
part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents
necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.
4

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to
the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all
parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted
upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that
the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property.
And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir
to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow,
represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the
determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed
that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The
respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of
Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the
petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that
their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by
presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband),
petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the probate court
and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the
court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion.
5
They can not be
permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.
6

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the
widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased
husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to
constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting
estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel.
7
In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the
deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as
it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 119777 March 26, 1998, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO ESCANLAR, FRANCISCO HOLGADO and the SPOUSES DR. EDWIN A.
JAYME and ELISA TAN-JAYME, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENEROSA MARTINEZ, CARMEN CARI-AN,
RODOLFO CARI-AN, NELLY CHUA CARI-AN, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor son, LEONELL C. CARI-AN,
FREDISMINDA CARI-AN, the SPOUSES PAQUITO CHUA and NEY SARROSA-CHUA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 120690 March 26, 1998, FRANCISCO HOLGADO and HRS. OF PEDRO ESCANLAR, namely BERNARDO, FELY, SONIA, LILY,
DYESEBEL and NOEMI all surnamed ESCANLAR, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENEROSA MARTINEZ, CARMEN
CARI-AN, RODOLFO CARI-AN, NELLY CHUA CARI-AN, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor son, LEONELL C. CARI-AN
and FREDISMINDA CARI-AN, and SP. PAQUITO CHUA and NEY SARROSA CHUA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
ROMERO, J .:
Before this Court are the following motions: (a) [First] Motion
1
dated November 29, 1997, filed by petitioners heirs of Pedro Escanlar and
Francisco Holgado; (b) Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification
2
dated February 9, 1998; and
(c) Second Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Clarification
3
of even date, the latter two motions having been filed by petitioners Edwin and
Elisa Jayme (the "Jaymes"). These motions all pertain to this Court's decision
4
promulgated on October 23, 1997, the decretal portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 61 for petitioners and private respondents Cari-
an or their successors-in-interest to determine exactly which 1/2 portion of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 will be owned by each party, at the
option of petitioners. The trial court is DIRECTED to order the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title in the name of the respective
parties and to resolve the matter of rental payments of the land not delivered to the Chua spouses subject to the rates specified above with
legal interest from date of demand.

wherein we ruled, inter alia, that the first sale to petitioners Francisco Holgado and the late Pedro Escanlar by the Cari-an heirs (the "Cari-
ans") of the one-half portions of Lots 1616 and 1617 pertaining to the share in the conjugal estate of their predecessor Victoriana Cari-an
was valid while the subsequent conveyance of the same to respondents Paquito Chua and Ney Sarrosa-Chua (the "Chuas") was not.
In particular, petitioners are seeking clarification of that part of the decision which states:
5. Recapitulating, we have held that the September 15, 1978 deed of sale of rights, interests and participations is valid and that the sellers-
private respondents Cari-an were fully paid the contract price. However, it must be emphasized that what was sold was only the Cari-an's
hereditary shares in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 being held pro indiviso by them and is thus a valid conveyance only of said ideal shares.
Specific or designated portions of land were not involved.
Consequently, the subsequent sale of 8 parcels of land, including Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617, to the spouses Chua is valid except to the extent
of what was sold to petitioners in the September 15, 1978 conveyance. It must be noted, however, that the probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 7-7279 desisted from awarding the individual shares of each heir because all the properties belonging to the estate had
already been sold. Thus it is not certain how much private respondents Cari-an were entitled to with respect to the two lots, or if they were
even going to be awarded shares in said lots.
The proceedings surrounding the estate of Nombre and Cari-an having attained finality for nearly a decade now, the same cannot be re-
opened. The protracted proceedings which have undoubtedly left the property under a cloud and the parties involved in a state of uncertainty
compels us to resolve it definitively.
The decision of the probate court declares private respondents Cari-an as the sole heirs by representation of Victoriana Cari-an who was
indisputably entitled to half of the estate. There being no exact apportionment of the shares of each heir and no competent proof that the
heirs received unequal shares in the disposition of the estate, it can be assumed that the heirs of Victoriana Cari-an collectively are entitled
to half of each property in the estate. More particularly, private respondents Cari-an are entitled to half of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617, i.e.
14,675 square meters of Lot No. 1616 and 230,474 square meters of Lot No. 1617. Consequently, petitioners, as their successors-in-
interest, own said half of the subject lots and ought to deliver the possession of the other half, as well as pay rents thereon, to the private
respondents Ney Sarrosa Chua and Paquito Chua but only if the former (petitioners) remained in possession thereof .
The rate of rental payments to be made were given in evidence by Ney Sarrosa Chua in her unrebutted testimony on July 24, 1989: For the
fishpond (Lot No. 1617) From 1982 up to 1986, rental payment of P3,000.00 per hectare; from 1986-1989 (and succeeding years), rental
payment of P10,000.00 per hectare. For the riceland (Lot No. 1616) - 15 cavans per hectare per year; from 1982-1986, P125.00 per cavan,
1987 -1988, P175.00 per cavan; and 1989 and succeeding years, P200.00 per cavan. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners would have this Court take a second look at its supposed automatic award to the Chuas of the other halves representing the late
Guillermo Nombre's shares in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 on the grounds that: (a) these other halves have never been the subject of the present
litigation or the double sale complained of by petitioners; and (b) there are certain undivided interests in these other halves which have been
conveyed by some Nombre heirs to Escanlar who in turn sold the same to the Jaymes. In other words, the Jaymes, according to petitioners,
are actually entitled to the one-half portions of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 previously sold by the Cari-ans to Escanlar and Holgado and the
validity of which have been upheld by this Court plus certain portions of the other halves of the same lots sold this time by some Nombre heirs
to Escanlar. For these reasons, petitioners argue that there is no basis at all in fact and in law for the Court to award the entire one-half
portions of the said lots to the Chuas, as well as to charge the Jaymes rental payments thereon.
Upon closer scrutiny and re-examination of the records, the Court is convinced that there is merit in the above contentions. It is a fact that the
other ideal one-half shares of the late Guillermo Nombre in Lot Mos. 1616 and 1617 have never been entirely sold to the Chuas because some
of the Nombre heirs who are composed of the descendants of Guillermo Nombre's brothers and
sisters
5
likewise sold their undivided shares to Escanlar who in turn conveyed them to the Jaymes. All these transactions are duly evi denced
by several deeds of sale
6
and a Memorandum of Agreement
7
dated August 31, 1984, whose validity and authenticity have not been impugned
by any party. As a matter of fact, there were also some shares which were not conveyed at all to either Chuas or Jaymes. In any event, these
sales by the Nombre heirs to Escanlar whose interests were eventually acquired by the Jaymes had the effect of increasing the latter's
ownership beyond the one-half portions of the subject lots originally sold by the Cari-ans. Correspondingly, the Chuas are entitled only to those
portions as have been conveyed to them which actually amount to less than the one-half participation of Guillermo Nombre in each of said lots.
Mole particularly, these are the ideal shares which they have acquired from Lazaro Nombre, Victorio Madalag, Domingo Campillanos, and
Sofronio Campillanos by virtue of the September 21, 1982 deed of sale, as well as from Felicidad Nombre, Potencia Brillas, and Enrique
Campillanos, through instruments other than said deed.
In view of the foregoing findings, it necessarily follows that there is no justification for the Jaymes to be compelled to turn over one-half of Lot
No. 1616 and one-half of Lot No. 1617, and be held liable to pay the Chuas rentals with respect to those portions. On the contrary, we find it
equitable instead to hold the Chuas answerable for reasonable rentals to the extent of their possession of portions of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617
which now properly belong to the Jaymes by virtue of the above findings.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolves to GRANT the above motions of petitioners heirs of Pedro Escanlar and Francisco Holgado, as
well as that of the spouses Edwin A. Jayme and Elisa T. Jayme. The decision of this Court dated October 23, 1997, insofar as it awarded one-
half of Lot No. 1616 and one-half of Lot No. 1617 to the spouses Paquito and Ney Sarrosa-Chua, and which made the spouses Jayme liable
for rental payments thereon, is VACATED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new one is entered to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 61, for petitioners and private
respondents or their successors-in-interest to determine exactly the portions which will be owned by each party in accordance with
the foregoing resolution, at the option of petitioners. The trial court is likewise DIRECTED to order the issuance of the corresponding
certificates of title in the name of the respective parties and to determine how much rentals the Chuas have to pay the Jaymes from
the time the former possessed, if they did at all, the portions pertaining to the latter up to the time the same are restored.SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46521 October 14, 1939, In the matter of the will of the deceased Paulino Diancin.
TEOPISTA DOLAR, administratrix-appellant, OLIMPIA, RITA, JOSEFINA and ROSARIO DIANCIN, appellants, vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J .:
Paulino Diancin's first wife was Margarita Doctura and Teopista Dolar his second.
By his first marriage he had five children, named Lucas, Guadalupe, Bibiana, Fidel and Tiburcio. Lucas died leaving three chi ldren,
named Natividad, Jose and Demetria. Guadalupe also died leaving three children also, named Natalia, Jesus and Sulpicio Palma. Bibiana,
Fidel and Tiburcio still living.
By his second marriage, he had four children named Olimpia, Rita, Josefina and Rosario.lwphi1.nt
He acquired certain properties during his first marriage and still others during his second. He left a will before he died wherein he sets
out all his properties and distributes them among his widow Teopista Dolar and his heirs by both marriages. He also left a legacy of P8,000 to
be spent for the altar of the church under construction in the Municipality of Dumangas, ordering that this be taken from the fruits of all the
properties before they are partitioned among his heirs.
After the commencement of the testamentary proceedings and the appointment therein of Teopista Dolar as judicial administratrix, the
latter first filed a project of partition which was not approved because of the opposition of certain heirs, and thereafter, on November 30, 1936,
filed another project of partition which was not also approved because of the opposition of the representative of the Church of Dumangas, the
Bishop of Jaro. In disapproving this last project of partition, the Court ordered the administratrix to take immediate possession of all the
properties of the estate and pay from the products thereof the legacy of P8,000 in favor of the Bishop of Jaro and, upon payment of this legacy,
to submit another new project of partition for its approval. From this resolution the administratrix Teopista Dolar and the heirs of the deceased
by his second marriage, appealed.
We note, first of all, that the last project of partition submitted by the administratrix is not concurred in by the heirs of the deceased by his
first marriage to whom have been allotted their shares of the estate corresponding to them.
In the light of the foregoing facts and the allegations of the parties in this instance, we hold that, unless the widow Teopista Dolar, the
heirs of the deceased by his two marriages, the representative of the legacy for P8,00, and the creditors of the estate, otherwise come to an
agreement, the partition should be made with the intervention of all the interested parties according to law. All the debts and administration
expenses shall first be paid. (Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The conjugal properties of the first marriage shall be liquidated so as
to determine those corresponding to the children had with the deceased Margarita Doctura, as her heirs, and those corresponding to the
deceased. Likewise, the conjugal properties of the second marriage shall be liquidated, so as to determine the half corresponding to the widow
Teopista Dolar and the] other half corresponding to the deceased (article 1426 of the Civil Code). The properties corresponding to the
deceased, acquired during his first and second marriages, constitute his estate, which should be partitioned among his widow Teopista Dolar
(articles 931 and 834 of the Civil Code).
There being forced heirs, the legacy of P8,000 should be taken from the free third only, without touching the obligatory legitime, and the
other the free third, so as to determine the properties from which the legacy being by way of usufruct, the heirs may comply therewith or deliver
to the legatee properties equivalent to the free third (article 820, paragraph 3, of the Civil Code). The fruits of the properties already received or
to be received shall answer for the legacy with respect to one-third thereof only, the remaining two-thirds being those of the heirs (article 813 of
the Civil Code). The legal usufruct of the widow should be taken from the third available for betterment (article 835 of the Civil Code).
After the partition is made in accordance with the foregoing, there should be delivered to the heirs the properties corresponding to them
as legitime. As to the free third, the testator not having disposed of its ownership, is shall belong to all the forced heirs, in equal parts, subject
to the legacy as to its fruits.
The appealed resolution is modified in accordance with the foregoing, without special pronouncement as to the cost. So ordered.

G.R. No. 141634 February 5, 2001, Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. -- ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN R. SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, and
heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R. SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented
by ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval. The transaction remains bindi ng on the seller-heir,
but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent
while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to
file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue such course of
action before the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the
suit.1wphi1.nt
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision
1
dated April 16, 1999 and
the Resolution
2
dated January 12, 2000, both promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 49491. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
3

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby MODIFY the [O]rder of the lower court dated January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of
Earnest Money With Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7, 1982, only to the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the disputed lots covering the share
of [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the property. The intervenor is hereby directed to pay appellant the balance of the purchase
price of the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property within thirty (30) days from receipt of this [O]rder and x x x the administrator [is directed] to
execute the necessary and proper deeds of conveyance in favor of appellee within thirty (30) days thereafter."
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration of the foregoing disposition.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as follows:
4

"On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that
letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17,
1955. On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration [were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the
estate of the late Remedios Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16). Likewise on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took
his oath as administrator (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 17). x x x.
"On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of Branch XI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result, [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a [M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the
case on February 9, 1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On February 16, 1983, the lower court in its [O]rder granted the said
motion (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
"On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging
among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself,
his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the
estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
1. 'A parcel of land (Lot No.22 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21121, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the "Municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13465;
2. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13464;'
3. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13468;'
4. 'A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, with TCT No. 13468;'
"The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to [B]uy is hereunder quoted, to wit:
'Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Chec[k] No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00, x x x as additional earnest money for the following:
xxx xxx xxx
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the [P]rovince of Rizal (Makati Branch Office) in the name of SELLER 'EL!ODORO
SANDEJAS, Filipino Citizen, of legal age, married to Remedios Reyes de Sandejas;' and which undersigned, as SELLER, binds and
obligates himself, his heirs, administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely in their entirety (all of the four (4) parcels of land
above described, which are contiguous to each other as to form one big lot) to said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy all of them,
also binding on his heirs, administrators and assigns, for the consideration of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, upon such reasonable terms of payment as may be agreed upon by them. The parties have, however, agreed on the following
terms and conditions:
'1. The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition to the P70,000.00 earnest money already received by SELLER from BUYER, all of
which shall form part of, and shall be deducted from, the purchase price of P1,000,000.00, once the deed of absolute [sale] shall be
executed;
'2. As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, undersigned SELLER also acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex A. Lina of the sum
of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Check No. 319912 dated
today and payable to SELLER for P1,000.00;
'3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already deceased and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for the settlement
of her estate (Spec. Proc. No.138393, Manila CFI, Branch XI), wherein SELLER was appointed as administrator of said Estate, and
as SELLER, in his capacity as administrator of said Estate, has informed BUYER that he (SELLER) already filed a [M]otion with the
Court for authority to sell the above parcels of land to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due to the burning of the records of
said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which records are presently under reconstitution, the parties shall have at least ninety (90) days from
receipt of the Order authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as administrator, to sell all THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND
TO HEREIN BUYER (but extendible for another period of ninety (90) days upon the request of either of the parties upon the other),
within which to execute the deed of absolute sale covering all above parcels of land;
'4. In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proceed or not be executed for causes either due to SELLER'S fault, or for causes of which
the BUYER is innocent, SELLER binds himself to personally return to Mr. Alex A. Lina the entire ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THOUSAND ([P]170,000.00) PESOS In earnest money received from said Mr. Lina by SELLER, plus fourteen (14%) percentum
interest per annum, all of which shall be considered as liens of said parcels of land, or at least on the share therein of herein SELLER;
'5. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and conditions shall be binding on the heirs, administrators, and assigns of both the SELLER
(undersigned MR. ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR.) and BUYER (MR. ALEX A. LINA).' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 52-
54)
"On July 17, 1984, the lower court issued an [O]rder granting the intervention of Alex A. Lina (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 167).
"On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a [M]anifestation alleging among others that the administrator,
Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November 1984 in Canada and said counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the
death of the administrator. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be
filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 220). On February 15, 1985, the, lower court
issued an [O]rder directing, among others, that the counsel for the four (4) heirs and other heirs of Teresita R. Sandejas to move for the
appointment of [a] new administrator within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this [O]rder (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 227). In the
same manner, on November 4, 1985, the lower court again issued an order, the content of which reads:
'On October 2, 1985, all the heirs, Sixto, Roberto, Antonio, Benjamin all surnamed Sandejas were ordered to move for the appointment of [a]
new administrator. On October 16, 1985, the same heirs were given a period of fifteen (15) days from said date within which to move for the
appointment of the new administrator. Compliance was set for October 30, 1985, no appearance for the aforenamed heirs. The aforenamed
heirs are hereby ordered to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order why this Petition for Settlement of Estate should not
be dismissed for lack of interest and failure to comply with a lawful order of this Court.'SO ORDERED.' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p.
273).
"On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for letters
of administration [and] (2) to consolidate instant case with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 RTC-Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP. Proc.
No. 85- 33707 entitled 'IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR., ALEX A. LINA PETITIONER", [for letters of
administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No.85-33707, pp. 1-7). On November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued
an [O]rder consolidating SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, p. 13). Likewise, on
December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued an [O]rder stating that 'this Court has no objection to the
consolidation of Special proceedings No. 85-331707, now pending before Branch XXXVI of this Court, with the present proceedings now
pending before this Branch' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83- 15601, p. 279).
"On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios
R. Sandejas on the following reasons:
'5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not received any motion on the part of the heirs Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and Benjami n, all
surnamed Sandejas, for the appointment of anew [a]dministrator in place of their father, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.;
'5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, wherein the [p]etitioner is herein Intervenor Alex A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, in
effect are already consolidated, then the appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in
instant Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be beneficial to the heirs and also to the Intervenor;
'5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would be willing to give way at anytime to any [a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs of
the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, so long as such [a]dministrator is qualified.' (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281-283)
"On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion of Alex A. Lina as the new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate
of Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 288- 290)
"On August 281 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all surnamed Sandejas, and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration and the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejasl in lieu of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stati ng among
others that it [was] only lately that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir, expressed his willingness to act as a new administrator of the
intestate estate of his mother, Remedios R. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2, 1986, Intervenor Alex
A. Lina filed his [M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion alleging that he ha[d] no objection to the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as
[a]dministrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his mother Remedios R. Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No.85-15601), provided that Sixto Sandejas be
also appointed as administrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father, Eliodoro P . Sandejas, Sr. (Spec. Proc. No. 85-33707), which two
(2) cases have been consolidated (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 34-36). On March 30, 1987, the lower court granted the said
[M]otion and substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said [P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, p. 52). After
the payment of the administrator's bond (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349) and approval thereof by the court (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361), Administrator Sixto Sandejas on January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise issued Letters of
Administration on the same day (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
"On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Plai ntiff-in-
lntervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982; (b) to compel the heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. thru their administrator, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional
deed of sale (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 554-561) to which the administrator filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to
said omnibus motion on December 13, 1993 (Record, SP. Proc. No.83-15601, pp. 591-603).
"On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned order granting intervenor's [M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of
Earnest Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-lntervention Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record,
SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 652-654 ). x x x."
The Order of the intestate courts disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenor's motion for the approval of the Receipt Of Earnest Money With Promise To Sell And To Buy dated June 7,
1982, is granted. The [i]ntervenor is directed to pay the balance of the purchase price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Order and the Administrator is directed to execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the necessary and proper deeds of
conveyancing."
6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the
approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. That approval was a positive suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which was
not tantamount to a breach. It was simply an event that prevented the obligation from maturing or becoming effective. If the condition did not
happen, the obligation would not arise or come into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89
7
of the Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the lack of written notice to the other heirs showed the
lack of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoyed
a claim arising from ones own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual
commitments as an owner and heir. When he entered into the agreement with respondent, he bound his conjugal and successional shares in
the property.
Hence, this Petition.
8

Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our resolution:
"a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to the property referred to in the subject document which was
found to be in the nature of a contract to sell - where the suspensive condition set forth therein [i.e.] court approval, was not complied with;
"b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondent [bore]
the burden of proving that a motion for authority to sell ha[d] been filed in court;
"c) Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the subject property is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the
latter should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty days from receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent;
and
"d) Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was converted to a money claim and whether the [trial court] acting as a probate
court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas
Sr."
9

In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred in modifying the trial court's Decision and in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5
of the disputed properties to respondent, even if the suspensive condition had not been fulfilled. It also raises the followi ng collateral issues: (1)
the settlement court's jurisdiction; (2) respondent-intervenor's standing to file an application for the approval of the sale of realty in the
settlement case, (3) the decedent's bad faith, and (4) the computation of the decedent's share in the realty under administration.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is partially meritorious.
Main Issue:
Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonful fillment of the
suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also
referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert that because this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed
parcels of land was converted into a money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to sell. Not
exactly. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. The vendor's obligation to convey the title
does not become effective in case of failure to pay.
10

On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of a court
approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners
were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could do upon the court's approval, even before full payment. Hence,
their contract was a conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens or is
fulfilled.
11
Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute
the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were
bound to fulfil what they had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judici al approval,
however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-
ownership.
12
In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken
out ofcustodia legis, but only with the court's permission.
13
It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was
imposed only for this reason.
Thus, we are not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the obligation was converted into a mere monetary claim. Paragraph 4 of the
Receipt, which petitioners rely on, refers to a situation wherein the sale has not materialized. In such a case," the seller is bound to return to
the buyer the earnest money paid plus interest at fourteen percent per annum. But the sale was approved by the intestate court; hence, the
proviso does not apply.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to the
pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate court's ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the
transaction.
First Collateral Issue:
J urisdiction of Settlement Court
Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to
compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 all ows the executor or
administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property under administration.
Citing Gil v. Cancio
14
and Acebedo v. Abesamis,
15
petitioners contend that the CA erred in clothing the settlement court with the jurisdiction to
approve the sale and to compel petitioners to execute the Deed of Sale. They allege factual differences between these cases and the instant
case, as follows: in Gil, the sale of the realty in administration was a clear and an unequivocal agreement for the support of the widow and the
adopted child of the decedent; and in Acebedo, a clear sale had been made, and all the heirs consented to the disposition of their shares in the
realty in administration.
We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no
bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to
the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the
removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's
recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are
intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the
heirs and the beneficiaries.
16

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls
under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to
Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was "not a definite, clear and
absolute document of sale," as contended by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally
demandable obligation that is binding upon the parties.
17
That Acebedo also involved a conditional sale of real property
18
proves that the
existence of the suspensive condition did not remove that property from the jurisdiction of the intestate court.
Second Collateral Issue:
Intervenor's Standing
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under
administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.1wphi1.nt
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased
was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on
application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such
modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or
administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. x x x."
This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file
the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
(Section 2);
19
or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although
such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).
20
Section 8 mentions only an application to
authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should
file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be
entitled to the avails of the suit.
21

Third Collateral Issue:
Bad Faith
Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he informed respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the
sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the approval.
We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as his own properties to which he alone had a title in fee simple. The fact
that he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional sale did not automatically imply bad faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only
for the purpose of binding him to the conditional sale. This was unnecessary because his being bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.
Fourth Collateral Issue:
Computation of Eliodoro's Share
Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal
partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs.
Hence, Eliodoro's share should be 11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.
22

On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of
Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in
administration.
23

Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It should be based only
on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.
24

The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -
- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.
25
After the settlement of
the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however,
that this preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in
this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, The Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision and Resolution areAFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 of the disputed lots.SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.], In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G. LUKBAN,Petitioner-
Appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that Petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who
is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law. After Petitioner had presented her evidence,
the court sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church,
Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard from despite
diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She
has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because
he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order
that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243,
wherein it was held that a petition for judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is
not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to the present, much less can t he court
determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court
can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case
above-cited. Thus, we there said that A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass cralaw. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that
a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present proceedings because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus,
42 Phil., 880, it was declared that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the
husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the
court would not certainly deny a declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas Szartraw, supra.
Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides
that a person commits that crime if he contracts a second marriage before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings and, it is claimed, the present petition comes within the purview of this legal
provision. The argument is untenable for the words proper proceedings used in said article can only refer to those authorized by law such as
those which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil Code). That such is
the correct interpretation of the provision in question finds support in the case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phi l., 179, wherein this Court made
the following comment:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires t hat the former spouse
has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.