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As Waynflete Professor of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford and as editor of the
journal Mind for nearly twenty-five years, Gilbert Ryle had an enormous influence on
the development of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. In "Systematically
Misleading Expressions" (1932) Ryle proposed a philosophical method of dissolving
problems by correctly analyzing the derivation of inappropriate abstract inferences
from ordinary uses of language. Applying this method more generally in "Categories"
(1938), Ryle showed how the misapplication of an ordinary term
can result in a category mistake by which philosophers may be
seriously misled.
Dealing with the traditional mind-body problem in The
Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle sharply criticized
Cartesian dualism, arguing that adequate descriptions of human
behavior need never refer to anything but the operations of
human bodies. This form of logical behaviorism became a
standard view among ordinary-language philosophers for several
decades. Ryle's Dilemmas (1954) and Collected Papers (1971) cover a wide range of
topics in philosophical logic and the history of philosophy.

Gilbert Ryle, (born August 19, 1900died Octover 6, 1976), British philosopher, leading
figure in theOxford philosophy, or ordinary language, movement.
Ryle gained first-class honours at Queens College, Oxford, and became a lecturer at Christ
Church College in 1924. Throughout his career, which remained centred at Oxford, he
attemptedas Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy (194568), in his writings,
and as editor (194871) of the journalMindto dissipate confusion arising from the
misapplication of language.
Ryles first book, The Concept of Mind (1949), is considered a modern classic. In it he
challenges the traditional distinction between body and mind as delineated by Ren
Descartes. Traditional Cartesian dualism, Ryle says, perpetrates a serious confusion when,
looking beyond the human body (which exists in space and is subject to mechanical laws), it
views the mind as an additional mysterious thing not subject to observation or to
mechanical laws, rather than as the form or organizing principle of the body. What Ryle
deems to be logically incoherent dogma of Cartesianism he labels as the doctrine of the
ghost-in-the-machine.
In Dilemmas (1954) Ryle analyzes propositions that appear irreconcilable, as when free
will is set in opposition to the fatalistic view that future specific events are inevitable. He
believed that the dilemmas posed by these seemingly contradictory propositions could be
resolved only by viewing them as the result of conceptual confusion between the language
of logic and the language of events.
Among his other well-known books are Philosophical Arguments (1945), A Rational
Animal (1962), Platos Progress (1966), and The Thinking of Thoughts (1968).