ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR

COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
automatically considered for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does
not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that
had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to
Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political
pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is
whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of
the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd
to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.






FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list
organization, from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system through its resolution,
denying also the latters motion for reconsideration, in
accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941
(RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of
the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the
2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in
the ruling ofMINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for
lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill
No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting
of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was
violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent
applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application
of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system. First, the law is in the
plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to
the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly
show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to
due process was not violated for [it] was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of
[COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process,
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is]
obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that
PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of
the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow
the rule established in a decision of its Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by [SCs]
judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the
Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did
unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the
intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous
ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike
it out from [the] ruling case law.