FACTS:

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al
contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional as it violates the regalian
doctrine.
RULINGS:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7
vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no
majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.











Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A.
No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes
their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and
Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No.
7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March
30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of
land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s.
1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-
40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has
yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RA No. 7942 the regalian doctrine embodied in Sec 2 Art.
VII of the Phil. Constitution.
RULINGS:
Foreigners, not Filipinos, became the beneficiaries of Philippine natural resources. This
arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of
natural resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and on a broader perspective, with
Philippine sovereignty.
Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical agreements" in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service
contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.







































Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the
Amish religion. Wisconsins compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause
their children to attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents
declined to send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade.
Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondents rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.
The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in
marked variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an
environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a
crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr.
Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in not only great
psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order
Amish church community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to
the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system.
The States power is subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights
such as those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State
does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a
state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the Free Exercise Clause. This Court determines that the Amish objection to the
attendance is rooted in religious beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school
attendance law.


Cabanas V. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94

In case of conflict on who shall hold the insurance proceeds for the minor child:
whether it should be the uncle by virtue of the insurance contract entered into by
the late father or the mother, the courts would come in to act as parenspatriae
to determine what is best for the interests of the child.

FlorentinoPilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his
child will be his beneficiary.He also indicated that if upon his death the child is
still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother
Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and
Francisco then took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child. On the other hand, the
mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the
sum of money to be placed in favor of her and for her to be the childs trustee and
the childs benefits.Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parenspatriae to the terms
of the insurance policy?

HELD: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social
unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not
be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor
child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the
uncle will. The application of parenspatriae here is in consonance with this countrys
tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent
(mother) is observed.






Pierce v. Society of Sisters


Facts.

Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain
academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization
conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of
the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be
destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools,
but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate
preparation for their children.

While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the
mode in which their children are educated.











U.S. Supreme Court MEYER
V.S.
STATE OF NEBRASKA

FACTS:
Plaintiff is a teacher in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska. He was tried and convicted
in the district court for Hamilton country, Nebraska on the ground that he unlawfully
taught the subject of reading in German language to Raymond Parpart, a 10-year-old
child who had not yet attained and successfully passed the 8
th
grade. This conviction
was based on an act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of
Nebraska (approved April 9, 1919). The said act prohibited the teaching of foreign
languages to students that had not yet completed the 8
th
grade. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed the decision of the trial court.
However, Plaintiff claimed that education was a fundamental liberty interest that must
be protected. He further claimed that the statute infringed the liberty guaranteed to the
plaintiff by the 14
th
amendment.
Hence, this appeal to the US Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statute, as construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the liberty
guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that 'No
state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'
HELD:
The statute that prohibits the teaching of foreign languages to students who have not
yet passed the 8
th
grade is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests
of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the
state. The 14
th
Amendment protects individuals from arbitrary or unreasonable state
action impairing life, liberty, or property interests. The right to practice the profession of
the plaintiff is a right protected by the amendment. The stated purpose of restriction on
the right to teach such foreign languages was that children who know only English
through grade eight will be better citizens of the US. However, because there is no clear
danger to the state that stems from younger children studying foreign languages, the
reason given for the restriction is unreasonable and arbitrary, therefore, insufficient to
support the limitation on the right to teach. Nonetheless, the protection of the
Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental
liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language
cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.






















CHAVEZ VS PEA AND AMARI
Facts:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to
the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects
under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain.
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.
ISSUE: whether or not the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part
of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULINGS:
The provision of the joint venture agreement for transfer of title to AMARI of some of
the submerged land which had been reclaimed were unconstitutional. The Court held
that such lands were alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which could
be disposed of by PEA under certain conditions (such as public bidding). However such
lands could only be disposed of by means of an absolute transfer to private individuals
who were Philippine citizens, Under Sec.3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution a disposal to
a corporation could only be by way of a lease, not a sale. Accordingly the JVA was
declared null and void ab initio.







The Court held that while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national
economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community