**NEG**

1NC Russia DA

A. Uniqueness US Russia relations are high now but increasingly fragile
Sudarev, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the European and American
Countries History and Politics Department of the MGIMO University, 12
(Vladimir, 2/20/12, Russian International Affairs Council, Is Russia returning to
Latin America? http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=252#top, 7/6/13, ND)
Latin American region has recently been often mentioned among new priority dimensions of
Russian foreign policy. Despite the difficulties of both objective and subjective nature, the comeback of Russia to Latin
America can provide it with new reliable partners and strengthen its position in a nascent multi-polar world. The nineties can be
regarded as lost years for Russian policy in Latin America. In fact, Russia didnt pursue any policy there. Traditionally, as in the Soviet
times, this region stood low on the national foreign policy agenda. Of course, there have been undertaken some successful actions
for example, in 1996-1997 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov paid visits to the region during which the whole package
of agreements on cooperation with Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and, most importantly,
with Brazil (about strategic partnership in the 21 century and creation of a greater Russia-Brazil committee) were signed. But
these actions were only sporadic, and the signed agreements turned out to be suspended. What is more, it was in the early 1990-s
after Russias withdrawal from Cuba, with abandoning the construction of about 500 major facilities and decreasing 30-fold trade
turnover with this country [1], when West-oriented Russia started to be perceived in Latin America as an unreliable partner. The U-
turn in Russian foreign policy after 9/11 contributed to it greatly. Having declared about the readiness of Russia to join the US-
sponsored anti-terrorist coalition, President Putin on October 17, 2001 announced the withdrawal of the country from the only
overseas strategic site - surveillance radar station in Lurdes on the outskirts of Havana without prior notification of the Cuban side
[2]. Make-or-break moment in the relationships with Latin America region countries occurred in the wake of the Yeltzin era. Latin
American countries themselves seem to have contributed a lot to it. Already in 1999 the Rio Group uniting the regions leading
states turned out to be, actually, the only grouping in the world which condemned the bombing of Yugoslavia and pointed out in its
declaration specific articles of the UN Charter violated by the NATO member- states [3]. In February 2003 Mexico and Chili as non-
permanent UN SC members, in fact, vetoed the second Anglo-American resolution authorizing Iraq intervention, despite their
economic dependence on the USA. These actions seem to have made the Kremlin look at the perspectives of cooperation with
Latin American countries at a new angle. Thus, in March 2003 President Putin received in Kremlin the delegation of the Rio Group
and held official talks with them. Both sides agreed not to confine themselves to regular contacts (launched in 1995) within the
framework of the UN General Assembly, but also conduct meetings in Russia and countries of the Group member-states. By mid-
decade the exchange of high level delegations between the sides had intensified. Only one example, in November 2008 President
Medvedev visited four countries during his tour of the region - Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. Commenting on his visit, President
Medvedev remarked: we visited the states which previous Russian leaders had never been
to It means only that we failed to pay due attention to these countries before, and, to a
certain extent, it is only now that we are starting a full-fledged and I hope mutually beneficial
cooperation with the heads of these states and between our economies. : We mustnt
be shy and timid and be afraid of competition. We must boldly engage in the battle. In order
to display its interest to the presence in the region Russia resorted to a number of un-common
and spectacular actions. In November 2008 a warship squadron with the fleet nuclear-powered cruiser Peter the Great
of the Russian Navy as a flagship entered the territorial waters of US-hostile Venezuela to participate in joint naval exercises of the
North Fleet of the Russian Federation Navy. Simultaneously, within the framework of the resumed patrolling of the Atlantic and the
Pacific oceans two Russian long-range strategic bombers landed at a Venezuelan naval base. The so-called comeback of
Russia to Latin America was to a great extent preconditioned by the leftist drift in the region
which resulted in the emergence of the group of states that viewed the expanding relations
with Russia as an important lever for strengthening their position in conflict relations with the
USA. Many of these countries perceived Russia as the successor of the former USSR might and influence, with the vision of a new
world order of both sides being practically identical it should be multilateral, not individually tailored to the interests of a single
superpower. This position was set out in numerous joint documents signed at the summits practically all the leaders of
the most prominent Latin American countries paid official visits to Moscow during the first
decade of the 21st century. The breakthrough happened also in the military and technical field. Starting from 2004
Venezuela has begun purchases of scale of the Russian arms to the amount of over $4bln. Russia established military and technical
cooperation with other countries of the region apart from Venezuela: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia also procured Russian
military hardware. Russia tried to establish closer economic ties with its major partners in the
region. At the end of the decade Russias oil and gas producing companies LUKOIL and GASPROM were
already operating in Venezuela. RUSAL made heavy investments in bauxite industry of Guyana. ROSNEFT got its
chunk for oil exploration in Cuban shelf of the Mexican Gulf. Trade between Russia and the
countries of the region has been roaring recently over the last decade trade turnover has
tripled and amounted to $15bln [4]. However, despite the qualitative changes in the structure of Russian export the
share of machinery and equipment has a little increased it still leaves much to be desired. Take Brazil, for example: mineral
fertilizers have made up 90% of Russian export, while Brazil has been exporting to Russia mostly meat and tropical goods. Largely,
Brazil has always been the weakest link of Russias regional policy despite its participation in the BRIC group. At any rate, the role of
Brazil in Russias foreign policy is much smaller than those of China and India. It should be recognized that Russia has failed so far to
establish strategic partnership with Brazil, which had been planned for as early as 1997. It can be largely attributed to the fact that
Russian leadership has no priority system in interacting with this country. The latter, from our perspective, is explained by poor
understanding of how much inter-complimentary could be the interests of the two resource-rich countries in the decades to come.
Unfortunately, China, and lately India have been much more economically active in the region than Russia, filling the niches in the
market that could have been well filled by Russia. Another question is why Brazilian dimension of Russian foreign policy is much
weaker than the Chinese one? Why do we transfer to China, the relationships with which in the 20th century were abundant with
conflicts including the armed ones, unique military aircraft building technologies, while denying this to Brazil with which we have
never had conflicts or clashes on the international arena? Perhaps, it is the residual principle inherent of the USSR leadership and
successfully inherited in 1990-s by the Russian leadership that is applied to this region. But, while the USSR used to have Cuba as a
strategic partner, the Russian Federation, having curtailed the ties with the Island of Freedom, didnt bother to start looking for new
partners and paid as little attention to the relations with Brazil as with any other Latin American country. If Russia is really
interested in serious and politically influential partners, then it is the Brazil dimension that should be prioritized as the major vector
of Russian policy in the region. It means establishing a special system of partnership which will include an overhaul of the current
system of trade and economic relations, an introduction of a new system of preferential terms of advanced know-how transfer and
exchange, particularly in aerospace field. For that sake its necessary to maximally intensify the relations with Brazils leadership and
take them to a higher level, with the head of state or the government taking control of it. However, the growing understanding of
the Russian upper echelons of power of the necessity to shift the focus of economic cooperation with the countries of the region on
to scientific and technical sphere arouses certain optimism. It is in the field of advanced technologies where Russia is most
competitive, and no wonder that the main emphasis during the April 2010 visit of President Medvedev to the countries of the region
was laid on this very issue. Low competitiveness of Russia vis--vis other countries undertaking huge efforts with a view to building
up their political and economic position in this region continues to persist. Besides, our investment capability is also much lower
than that of USA, China, EU and even India. Nonetheless, in spite of the difficulties, both objective and subjective, the trend of
Russias presence expansion in the region may gain further momentum in the forthcoming
decades, provided adequate efforts are taken. In this case Latin American dimension of
Russian foreign policy has all chances to make it a separate independent direction which can
win Russia new beneficial partners and enhance its position in a nascent multi-polar world.

B. Link Russia would hate the plan they perceive the United States
encroaching on its sphere of influence
Aron, Director of Russian Studies @ American Enterprise Institute, PhD from
Columbia University, 13
(Leon, American Enterprise Institute, 3/11/13, Structure and context in US-
Russian relations at the outset of Barack Obama's second term,
http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-
policy/regional/europe/structure-and-context-in-us-russian-relations-at-the-
outset-of-barack-obamas-second-term/, 7/6/13, PD)

After his election as president in 2000, Vladimir Putin effectively amended this national
agenda with an overarching metagoalthe recovery of economic, political, and geostrategic
assets lost by the Soviet state in the 1991 antitotalitarian revolution. Although never spelled
out formally, in retrospect this objectiveand the set of policies that stemmed from ithas
been prosecuted with enough determination, coherence, and consistency to fully earn it the
title of the Putin Doctrine. Domestically, the doctrine has guided the reclaiming of the
commanding heights of the economy (first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries)
and the reestablishing of control over politics, the courts, and national television, where most
Russian get their news. In foreign and security policy, the doctrine has amounted to a
reinterpretation of Russias three geostrategic imperatives, making their implementation and
maintenance considerably more assertive than many of those who originally articulated these
goals had intended. The Nuclear Superpower The imperative of preserving its nuclear
superpower status accounts for the enormous value Russia has assigned to maintaining
strategic parity with the only other nuclear superpower, the United States. Hence, Russias
eagerness to engage in strategic arms control negotiations. Conversely, Moscow vehemently
opposes anything it believes would weaken strategic parity with the United States. This
explains the Kremlins steadfast resistance to US/NATO missile defense in Europethe
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). As a result, countless protestations by top US and
NATO officials, including personal appeals by the last two American presidents to their Russian
counterparts affirming that the system poses no threat to Russias nuclear deterrent, have been
in vain. They could not have been otherwise: whatever other national security arguments
Russia puts forward in support of its hostility to missile defense, the key reason for this
implacable antagonism, as Vladimir Putin said in his speech at the Foreign Ministry this past
July, is the fact that missile defense allegedly upsets the strategic balance*2+that is,
weakens Russias status as a nuclear superpower. A secondary but symbolically important (and
financially rewarding) pillar of Russias nuclear superpower status is the export of nuclear
technologies. The state nuclear energy corporation, RosAtom, has been busily selling nuclear
technology and currently has contracts for the sale of nuclear reactors to China, Turkey, India,
Belarus, and Bangladesh. Iran has been a particularly attractive customer, with the
construction of the $1 billion Bushehr nuclear power plant completed against US wishes, not
only underscoring Russias nuclear technological capacity but also demonstrating Moscows
willingness to assert its policies in the face of Washingtons resistance. A Great Power This
assertion, along with an active recovery of former Soviet geostrategic assets, is a central
element of the great-power objective as the Putin Doctrine interprets it. Hence, Russia has
pursued former Soviet (and mostly anti-US) clients in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.
Emblematic of this policy have been the maintenance of a supply-and-repair facility in the Syrian
port of Tartus and Putins visit to Cuba in December 2000, the first by a Soviet or Russian leader
since Leonid Brezhnevs trip there in 1974. In the same vein, the Dmitry MedvedevHugo
Chvez summit in Caracas in 2008 was the first in Russian or Soviet history. With loans
extended by Russia, Venezuela became a major importer of Russian conventional arms and
equipment. The Putin Doctrine leaves little room for compromise with the United States when
the latter appears to Moscow to be encroaching onor belittling or challengingRussias
status as a great power. The Kremlins use of the UN Security Council to weaken or block US
initiatives has risen steadily: in the 1990s, Russia cast two vetoes in the Security Council, but
between 2000 and 2012, it wielded its veto eight times. The cultivation and protection of
former Soviet clients, who are also often current buyers of Russian technology and weapons,
have increased Russias visibility in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union used to enjoy a
great deal of influencemuch, if not most of it, as a counterbalance to the United States. For
example, Russia thrice has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions against
Syria, in effect protecting Bashar al-Assads murderous regime.

That creates disputes and collapses relations
Merry, a former State Department and Pentagon official, is a senior associate at
the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, 09
(E. Wayne 5/22/09 New York Times, A Reset Is Not Enough
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/opinion/23iht-edmerry.html?_r=0
7/6/13 MG)
The Obama administration has offered to reset relations with Russia. But what is really needed is a change of operating system. A
reset seeks to restore a previous relationship, which for former officials of the Clinton administration now back in office means the
Yeltsin years. This will fail because Moscow views that period as emblematic of Russian weakness and exploitation by the West, and
especially by the United States. Relations with Moscow deteriorated under both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The U.S.
neo-liberal project of the 90s not only failed but deeply alienated Russians. The bilateral nadir
was the Kosovo war, a worse episode than last years Georgia conflict. A new opportunity
after 9/11 was frankly squandered. Washington regarded Russia as a loser and treated it as
such. It forgot that Russia would not be weak forever, and would remember. Two structural
problems limit the relationship and its improvement. First, it is very narrow, with few
automatic stabilizers. Unlike Russian-European or U.S.-Chinese relations, the scant economic and human ties
between the U.S. and Russia provide inadequate ballast when problems arise. Relations are
highly vulnerable to outside events and defined more by disputes than cooperation. When malice
is added to the mix, the result is dangerous. Second, for Moscow the relationship is largely zero sum, in that
Russian diplomacy succeeds where Americas fails, as in Iran and Venezuela. This is the consequence both
of the huge asymmetry in real power and influence of the two countries and an asymmetry of geography in that almost anything the
United States does in Eurasia affects Russias interests, often adversely. Thus Moscow worries that a successful
Obama presidency will come at their expense with other countries. Russian commentators especially fear
this may be the case with Iran, seeing the potential for a shift comparable to Maos China or Sadats Egypt. The current Russian
leadership bears a disproportionate share of the blame for our poisonous relations. But Washington needs to adopt new rules of
engagement to not repeat mistakes of the previous 16 years: One, minimize deliberate challenges to Russian interests and know
that none will come free. If we push NATO, they will push back. When we sponsored an independent Kosovo, Moscow declared it
would do the same in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Reciprocity is real.

C. Impact US-Russia war would cause human extinction over 2000 nukes can
be instantly launched
Helfand, Co-founder of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Nobel Peace
Prize winning organization), 12
(Ira, 12/18/12, The Frightening Scenario of the Nuclear War,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/12/the-frightening-scenario-of-the-nuclear-war/, 7/6/13, ND)
A large-scale war between the U.S. and Russia would be even more catastrophic. Hundreds of millions
of people would be killed directly; the indirect climate effects would be even greater. Global
temperatures would drop an average of eight degrees Celsius, and more than 20 degrees Celsius in the interior of North
America and Eurasia. In the Northern Hemisphere, there would be three years without a single day free of
frost. Food production would stop and the vast majority of the human race would starve. Since
the end of the Cold War we have acted as though this kind of war simply cant happen. But it can: the two nuclear
superpowers still have nearly 20,000 nuclear warheads; more than two thousand of them are maintained
on missiles that can be fired in less than 15 minutes, destroying the cities of the other power 30 minutes later. As
long as the U.S. and Russia maintain these vast arsenals there remains the very real danger that
they will be used, either intentionally or by accident. We know of at least five occasions since 1979
when one or the other of the superpowers prepared to launch a nuclear attack on the other country in
the mistaken belief that they themselves were under attack. The most recent of these events was in January 1995.
The conditions that existed then, which brought us within minutes of a nuclear war, have not significantly
changed today. The next time an accident takes place, we may not be so lucky. Recognising this great danger, 35 nations joined
in a new call for the elimination of all nuclear weapons at the United Nations this October. The International Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement has also called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In March 2013, the Norwegian government will convene a meeting
of all state parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty to discuss the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. The U.S. and Russia
should embrace these initiatives and lead the way in negotiating a verifiable, enforceable treaty that eliminates nuclear weapons.
These negotiations will not be easy, but the alternative is unthinkable. We cannot count on good luck as the
basis of global security policy. If we do not abolish these weapons, someday our luck will run out, they will be used, and everything
that we cherish will be destroyed. The stakes could not be higher.

1NC Russia DA
Russian resurgence into Latin America is growing
Wells 4-26 (Miriam, Wells is a journalist who has previously worked for BBC Radio News and for Human Rights Watch. She has worked for InSight Crime since 2012,
specializes in Latin American Reporting, Should Russian Anti-Drug Aid to LatAm Worry the US? 2013 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/should-russian-drug-aid-
latam-worry-us)
Russian involvement in Latin America has been growing for several years, particularly in left-leaning countries, a
harkback to the Soviet era which has led some to suggest the alliances are more about geopolitics than
fighting drug trafficking. However, anti-drugs cooperation also has major economic benefits to
Russia, particularly in terms of arms sales, which have soared in the last 10 years. In 2009 Russia took the United
States' place as the main supplier of arms to Latin America for the first time, with sales totalling $5.4 billion. Russian
arms sales to Latin America grew 900 percent between 2004 and 2009, according to Russian newspaper Pravda.
"We are getting back forgotten, old Soviet markets, like Peru, for example," Russia's director of Military Sales
Services, Alexander Fomin, said last month. Ties between Latin America and Russia began to deepen in earnest in
2008 when then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev carried out a Latin American tour in his first year in office, visiting Peru,
Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. One Russian diplomat claimed that cooperation "could be broader than in the Soviet era," and
hinted at broader strategic motives by stating that "Latin America has already ceased to be
the United States' backyard." Since then, Moscow has signed far-reaching defense, energy and trade
agreements with countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil, and Russia-Brazil bilateral trade is predicted to increase to $10
billion annually in the next three years.
But US action in the region encroaches on Russias SOI
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin America:
Geopolitical Games in the US's Neighborhood. Ifri, Russia/NIS Center April, www.ifri.org/downloads/ifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09.pdf )
Unfortunately Moscows current foreign policyand that of supporters like president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, albeit for different reasons
aims to embroil the continent in a contest with Washington. Russia still covets a global or even
superpower status equal to that of the United States. Thus it wants to be a member of every
international organization that exists whether it has any real interests in the area. Accordingly Russia
expressed its interest in becoming an observer at the South American Defense Council that is part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Russia also wants to be an
observer in the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (ALCOPAZ).22 This craving for status lies at the heart of
Russian foreign policy.23 In 1997 at the nadir of Russian fortunes, Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies at the Russian
Academy of Sciences and an advisor to the government, wrote that: Moscow should seek to preserve the special character
of Russian-American relations. Washington should recognize the exceptional status of the
Russian Federation in the formation of a new system of international relations, a role different
from that which *+ any other center of power plays in the global arena.24 Consequently
Russian policy in Latin America is ultimately an American policy. It aims to instrumentalize the
region as a series of countries or even a weak but still discernible political bloc to support
Russian positions against US dominance in world affairs. Therefore Latin American states that
wish to challenge America need to rely on Moscow. Thus President Daniel Ortega pledged Nicaraguas opposition to a unipolar
world and welcomed Russias presence in Latin America.25 Moscows policy is part of its larger effort, to realize this so-
called multipolar world. Thus in November 2008 Lavrov stated that: We welcome Latin Americas role in the efforts to democratize international relations
in the context of the objectively growing multipolarity in the world. We believe that these processes are in the interests of the whole [of] mankind. Russia is interested in the
closest cooperation with our Latin American partners in reply to the reciprocal interest they are showing.26
Russia conducts its foreign policy in terms of zero sum influence these
conflicts spill over and destroy relations
Blank 2011 (Steven, Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Russias Second Wind in Latin
America, Perspectives on the Americas A Series of Opinion Pieces by Leading Commentators on the Region August 18 https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-
policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)
Indeed, Russian policy is not driven by Latin Americas views, but by classical desires for profit and
influence, mainly at the expense of the United States, and a visceral anti-Americanism. Analysts like
Fedor Lukyanov, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Leonid Radzhikhovky all attest to the virtually obsessive anti-Americanism that
drives much of Russian foreign policy.3 Indeed, powerful people like Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Premier Vladimir
Putins right-hand man, apparently want to conduct a Latin American policy of anti-Americanism and
destabilization regardless of the consequences. Sechin reportedly promoted economic deals
and arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the formation among these three of an
alliance as Moscow considers the formation of such a union a worthy response to U.S.
activity in the former Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in Poland and the
Czech Republic.4 Not surprisingly Sechin advised Putin that Moscow should upgrade its relations with
these countries in particular, and with Latin America in general.5 As Deputy Prime Minister, Sechin appears to have encouraged Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez
to develop a nuclear program and Sechin negotiated the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to Venezuela. In July 2009 he arranged a deal with Cuba that allowed
Russia to conduct deep-water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.6 Whereas in the previous thrust into Latin America, Moscow
focused primarily, though not exclusively, on reliable friends like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, to whom it
either sold a lot of arms or gave considerable economic and energy assistance, today Moscow fully appreciates Brazils dominant position in Latin America, has
cemented bilateral and multilateral ties with it through the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) organization, and
devotes its primary attention on Brazil, while not neglecting other targets of opportunity. Putin has called Brazil a strategic partner for Russia and cited bilateral cooperation in
the energy sector, as well as in nuclear energy, space, metals, biotechnologies and telecommunications.7 Beyond that, Russia has long sought entre into Brazils arms market
and it continues to do so vigorously. Whereas earlier Moscow wanted to show Washington that Moscow could
play in Latin America too, now Moscows broader primary objective is support for Russias
goal of a multipolar world that constrains U.S. power and forces Washington to heed
Moscows voice before acting. Thus Russias new activity builds upon previous policy statements by leading officials. Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov said that Latin America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin Americas
economic growth, but because of the congruence between Latin governments foreign policies
and Russias support of a multipolar world.8 Similarly Putin also stated that Latin America is becoming a
noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming we will pay more and
more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.9

Destruction of Russian relations causes nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, and
destroys hegemony.
Cohen 2011 Ph.D., professor of Russian studies at New York University and Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University (Stephen, Obama's Russia
'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity? http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity?page=full)
An enduring existential reality has been lost in Washingtons postcold war illusions and the fog of
subsequent US wars: the road to American national security still runs through Moscow. Despite the Soviet breakup twenty years
ago, only Russia still possesses devices of mass destruction capable of destroying the United States and
tempting international terrorists for years to come. Russia also remains the worlds largest territorial country, a crucial
Eurasian frontline in the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations, with a vastly
disproportionate share of the planets essential resources including oil, natural gas, iron ore,
nickel, gold, timber, fertile land and fresh water. In addition, Moscows military and diplomatic reach
can still thwart, or abet, vital US interests around the globe, from Afghanistan, Iran, China and
North Korea to Europe and Latin America. In short, without an expansive cooperative
relationship with Russia, there can be no real US national security. And yet, when President Obama took office in January 2009,
relations between Washington and Moscow were so bad that some close observers, myself included, characterized them as a new cold war. Almost all cooperation, even decades-long agreements regulating
nuclear weapons, had been displaced by increasingly acrimonious conflicts. Indeed, the relationship had led to a military confrontation potentially as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Georgian-
Russian War of August 2008 was also a proxy American-Russian war, the Georgian forces having been supplied and trained by Washington. What happened to the strategic partnership and friendship between
post-Soviet Moscow and Washington promised by leaders on both sides after 1991? For more than a decade, the American political and media establishments have maintained that such a relationship was
achieved by President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s but destroyed by the antidemocratic and neo-imperialist agenda of Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000. In
reality, the historic opportunity for a postcold war partnership was lost in Washington, not
Moscow, when the Clinton administration, in the early 1990s, adopted an approach based on
the false premise that Russia, having lost the cold war, could be treated as a defeated
nation. (The cold war actually ended through negotiations sometime between 1988 and 1990, well before the end of Soviet Russia in December 1991, as all the leading participantsSoviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bushagreed.) The result was the Clinton administrations triumphalist, winner-take-all approach, including an intrusive crusade to
dictate Russias internal political and economic development; broken strategic promises, most importantly Bushs assurance to Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastward beyond a reunited
Germany; and double-standard policies impinging on Russia (along with sermons) that presumed Moscow no longer had any legitimate security concerns abroad apart from those of the United States, even in its
own neighborhood. The backlash came with Putin, but it would have come with any Kremlin leader more self-confident, more sober and less reliant on Washington than was Yeltsin. Nor did Washingtons
triumphalism end with Clinton or Yeltsin. Following the events of September 11, 2001, to take the most ramifying
example, Putins Kremlin gave the George W. Bush administration more assistance in its anti-
Taliban war in Afghanistan, including in intelligence and combat, than did any NATO ally. In
return, Putin expected the long-denied US-Russian partnership. Instead, the Bush White
House soon expanded NATO all the way to Russias borders and withdrew unilaterally from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the bedrock of its nuclear security. Those deceptions have not been forgotten in Moscow. Now
Russias political class, alarmed by the deterioration of the countrys essential infrastructures since 1991, is
locked in a struggle over the nations futureone with profound consequences for its foreign
policies. One side, associated with Putins handpicked successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, is calling for a
democratic transformation that would rely on modernizing alliances with the West. The
other side, which includes ultra-nationalists and neo-Stalinists, insists that only Russias traditional state-
imposed methods, or modernization without Westernization, are possible. As evidence, they point to
NATOs encirclement of Russia and other US perfidies. The choice of modernizing
alternatives will be made in Moscow, not, as US policy-makers once thought, in Washington, but American policy will be a
crucial factor. In the centuries-long struggle between reform and reaction in Russia, anti-
authoritarian forces have had a political chance only when relations with the West were
improving. In this regard, Washington still plays the leading Western role, for better or worse.



UQ Russia XPN Latin America
Russia has increased economic ties in Latin America and plans to increase ties
even more
Sudarev, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the European and American
Countries History and Politics Department of the MGIMO University, 12
(Vladimir, 2/20/12, Russian International Affairs Council, Is Russia returning to
Latin America? http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=252#top, 7/6/13, ND)
Latin American region has recently been often mentioned among new priority dimensions of
Russian foreign policy. Despite the difficulties of both objective and subjective nature, the comeback of Russia to Latin
America can provide it with new reliable partners and strengthen its position in a nascent multi-polar world. The nineties can be
regarded as lost years for Russian policy in Latin America. In fact, Russia didnt pursue any policy there. Traditionally, as in the Soviet
times, this region stood low on the national foreign policy agenda. Of course, there have been undertaken some successful actions
for example, in 1996-1997 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov paid visits to the region during which the whole package
of agreements on cooperation with Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and, most importantly,
with Brazil (about strategic partnership in the 21 century and creation of a greater Russia-Brazil committee) were signed. But
these actions were only sporadic, and the signed agreements turned out to be suspended. What is more, it was in the early 1990-s
after Russias withdrawal from Cuba, with abandoning the construction of about 500 major facilities and decreasing 30-fold trade
turnover with this country [1], when West-oriented Russia started to be perceived in Latin America as an unreliable partner. The U-
turn in Russian foreign policy after 9/11 contributed to it greatly. Having declared about the readiness of Russia to join the US-
sponsored anti-terrorist coalition, President Putin on October 17, 2001 announced the withdrawal of the country from the only
overseas strategic site - surveillance radar station in Lurdes on the outskirts of Havana without prior notification of the Cuban side
[2]. Make-or-break moment in the relationships with Latin America region countries occurred in the wake of the Yeltzin era. Latin
American countries themselves seem to have contributed a lot to it. Already in 1999 the Rio Group uniting the regions leading
states turned out to be, actually, the only grouping in the world which condemned the bombing of Yugoslavia and pointed out in its
declaration specific articles of the UN Charter violated by the NATO member- states [3]. In February 2003 Mexico and Chili as non-
permanent UN SC members, in fact, vetoed the second Anglo-American resolution authorizing Iraq intervention, despite their
economic dependence on the USA. These actions seem to have made the Kremlin look at the perspectives of cooperation with
Latin American countries at a new angle. Thus, in March 2003 President Putin received in Kremlin the delegation of the Rio Group
and held official talks with them. Both sides agreed not to confine themselves to regular contacts (launched in 1995) within the
framework of the UN General Assembly, but also conduct meetings in Russia and countries of the Group member-states. By mid-
decade the exchange of high level delegations between the sides had intensified. Only one example, in November 2008 President
Medvedev visited four countries during his tour of the region - Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. Commenting on his visit, President
Medvedev remarked: we visited the states which previous Russian leaders had never been
to It means only that we failed to pay due attention to these countries before, and, to a
certain extent, it is only now that we are starting a full-fledged and I hope mutually beneficial
cooperation with the heads of these states and between our economies. : We mustnt
be shy and timid and be afraid of competition. We must boldly engage in the battle. In order
to display its interest to the presence in the region Russia resorted to a number of un-common
and spectacular actions. In November 2008 a warship squadron with the fleet nuclear-powered cruiser Peter the Great
of the Russian Navy as a flagship entered the territorial waters of US-hostile Venezuela to participate in joint naval exercises of the
North Fleet of the Russian Federation Navy. Simultaneously, within the framework of the resumed patrolling of the Atlantic and the
Pacific oceans two Russian long-range strategic bombers landed at a Venezuelan naval base. The so-called comeback of
Russia to Latin America was to a great extent preconditioned by the leftist drift in the region
which resulted in the emergence of the group of states that viewed the expanding relations
with Russia as an important lever for strengthening their position in conflict relations with the
USA. Many of these countries perceived Russia as the successor of the former USSR might and influence, with the vision of a new
world order of both sides being practically identical it should be multilateral, not individually tailored to the interests of a single
superpower. This position was set out in numerous joint documents signed at the summits practically all the leaders of
the most prominent Latin American countries paid official visits to Moscow during the first
decade of the 21st century. The breakthrough happened also in the military and technical field. Starting from 2004
Venezuela has begun purchases of scale of the Russian arms to the amount of over $4bln. Russia established military and technical
cooperation with other countries of the region apart from Venezuela: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia also procured Russian
military hardware. Russia tried to establish closer economic ties with its major partners in the
region. At the end of the decade Russias oil and gas producing companies LUKOIL and GASPROM were
already operating in Venezuela. RUSAL made heavy investments in bauxite industry of Guyana. ROSNEFT got its
chunk for oil exploration in Cuban shelf of the Mexican Gulf. Trade between Russia and the
countries of the region has been roaring recently over the last decade trade turnover has
tripled and amounted to $15bln [4]. However, despite the qualitative changes in the structure of Russian export the
share of machinery and equipment has a little increased it still leaves much to be desired. Take Brazil, for example: mineral
fertilizers have made up 90% of Russian export, while Brazil has been exporting to Russia mostly meat and tropical goods. Largely,
Brazil has always been the weakest link of Russias regional policy despite its participation in the BRIC group. At any rate, the role of
Brazil in Russias foreign policy is much smaller than those of China and India. It should be recognized that Russia has failed so far to
establish strategic partnership with Brazil, which had been planned for as early as 1997. It can be largely attributed to the fact that
Russian leadership has no priority system in interacting with this country. The latter, from our perspective, is explained by poor
understanding of how much inter-complimentary could be the interests of the two resource-rich countries in the decades to come.
Unfortunately, China, and lately India have been much more economically active in the region than Russia, filling the niches in the
market that could have been well filled by Russia. Another question is why Brazilian dimension of Russian foreign policy is much
weaker than the Chinese one? Why do we transfer to China, the relationships with which in the 20th century were abundant with
conflicts including the armed ones, unique military aircraft building technologies, while denying this to Brazil with which we have
never had conflicts or clashes on the international arena? Perhaps, it is the residual principle inherent of the USSR leadership and
successfully inherited in 1990-s by the Russian leadership that is applied to this region. But, while the USSR used to have Cuba as a
strategic partner, the Russian Federation, having curtailed the ties with the Island of Freedom, didnt bother to start looking for new
partners and paid as little attention to the relations with Brazil as with any other Latin American country. If Russia is really
interested in serious and politically influential partners, then it is the Brazil dimension that should be prioritized as the major vector
of Russian policy in the region. It means establishing a special system of partnership which will include an overhaul of the current
system of trade and economic relations, an introduction of a new system of preferential terms of advanced know-how transfer and
exchange, particularly in aerospace field. For that sake its necessary to maximally intensify the relations with Brazils leadership and
take them to a higher level, with the head of state or the government taking control of it. However, the growing understanding of
the Russian upper echelons of power of the necessity to shift the focus of economic cooperation with the countries of the region on
to scientific and technical sphere arouses certain optimism. It is in the field of advanced technologies where Russia is most
competitive, and no wonder that the main emphasis during the April 2010 visit of President Medvedev to the countries of the region
was laid on this very issue. Low competitiveness of Russia vis--vis other countries undertaking huge efforts with a view to building
up their political and economic position in this region continues to persist. Besides, our investment capability is also much lower
than that of USA, China, EU and even India. Nonetheless, in spite of the difficulties, both objective and subjective, the trend of
Russias presence expansion in the region may gain further momentum in the forthcoming
decades, provided adequate efforts are taken. In this case Latin American dimension of
Russian foreign policy has all chances to make it a separate independent direction which can
win Russia new beneficial partners and enhance its position in a nascent multi-polar world.

UQ Russia XPN Mexico
Russia has become one of Mexicos top trade partners
RIA, Russian News Website, 11
(RIA Novosti, 12/14/11, Russia becomes main trade partner for Mexico in
Europe minister http://en.rian.ru/business/20111214/170226382.html?id=,
7/6/13, ND)
Russia became a main trade partner for Mexico in Europe over the recent years, Mexican Economy Secretary
Bruno Ferrari said. Mexican export to Russia in 2011 increased by 45 percent, which is twice as
higher comparing to an average trade growth with other Mexican trade partners, Ferrari said at a
session of the Russian and Mexican intergovernmental commission in Mexico. He added that an average growth in trade between
Russia and Mexico over the past 10 years totaled 17.2 percent annually. According to the Mexican Foreign Ministry, the trade
between Russia and Mexico in 2010 totaled $1.1 billion, which is a 115 percent increase
against 2009.

Tourism and trade between Russia and Mexico are increasing in the status quo
AMEXCID, Mexican Agency for International Cooperation and Development,
1/11
(1/11/13, AMEXCID ORGANIZES SEMINAR: "OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MEXICO-
RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP", http://amexcid.mx/index.php/en/press/press-
releases/1707-organiza-la-amexcid-seminario-oportunidades-en-la-relacion-
mexico-rusia, 7/6/13, ND)
Trade between the two countries has grown over 200 percent in the past two years and Russia
is now the third largest export market for Mexican meat. In addition, the economic
relationship between Mexico and the Russian Federation has grown significantly in matters of
tourism, trade and investment, in the last three years. In fact, the arrival of Russian tourists to
Mexico has increased from 27,000 in 2010 to 42,000 in 2011, and nearly 45,000 in the first half
of 2012. This increase has been favoured by the establishment of several direct flights
between the two countries.
UQ Russia XPN Cuba
Russia and Cuba are making a relationship now
Schwirtz, 9
(Michael, The New York Times, Russia and Cuba Take Steps to Revive a Bond, http://www.ny
times.com/2009/01/31/world/europe/31castro.html, Accessed 6/5/2013, EB)

Presidents of Russia and Cuba signed a strategic partnership and several other documents on
Friday aimed at rekindling an alliance that collapsed after the cold war. They pledged to
expand cooperation in agriculture, manufacturing, science and tourism, but studiously avoided
a public discussion of military ties. Maxim Shipenkov/European Pressphoto Agency President
Ral Castro of Cuba at a wreath-laying ceremony on Friday at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
in Moscow. It had been nearly a quarter century since a Cuban leader had set foot on Russian
soil. President Ral Castros visit to Moscow this week had little of the pomp and propaganda of
the cold war days, when he and his brother Fidel were greeted with parades in Red Square and
Soviet leaders affectionately referred to Cuba as the island of freedom. But almost two
decades after a crumbling Soviet Union hastily withdrew financial and ideological backing from
Cuba, Russia is seeking to expand economic ties with the island and possibly forge stronger
military relations in an echo, as yet still faint, of an alliance that lasted some 30 years. It is part
of a larger Russian push into Latin America to secure new markets, and also to swipe at the
United States for what Moscow considers Washingtons meddling in Russias historic sphere
of influence, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, former Soviet republics. Your visit opens a
new page in the history of Russian-Cuban relations, President Dmitri A. Medvedev said at a
meeting with Mr. Castro at the Kremlin on Friday. Russian officials promised the delivery of
25,000 tons of grain and a $20 million loan for the development of Cubas construction, energy
and agriculture sectors. Without a doubt, Mr. Castro said at the meeting, this is a historical
moment, an important milestone in the relations between Russia and Cuba. We have taken a
huge step to strengthen our relationship. High-ranking Russian officials have visited Cuba
several times in the past year, and Mr. Medvedev made a quick trip there in November as part
of a Latin American tour. Trade between the countries increased 26 percent in 2008, totaling
about $239 million, the Kremlin said. In the last few years, relations with the United States
have become strained, with the United States supporting Ukraine and Georgia in their anti-
Russian policies, said Igor S. Fesunenko, a Russian journalist and longtime commentator on
Latin American affairs. And were thinking, Oh, how unfortunate that we abandoned Cuba
sitting there under Americas nose. Like Venezuela, which last fall hosted two Russian
strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, Cuba has also had Russian military
visitors recently. In December, a contingent of Russias North Sea Fleet docked in Havana after
conducting exercises with Venezuelas navy. Neither Mr. Medvedev nor Mr. Castro spoke
publicly about possible military cooperation, perhaps out of a desire to avoid antagonizing the
new administration of President Obama, analysts said. Since Mr. Obamas election in
November, Russia and Cuba appear to have called a unilateral truce with Washington, and the
volume of anti-American sentiment, which reached a deafening pitch in Russia in recent years,
has been markedly toned down. Regardless of whether the policies of Washington will soften
or remain significantly hard-line, relations between Cuba and Russia will develop, said
Vladimir M. Davydov, director of the Latin American Institute at the Russian Academy of
Sciences. Nevertheless, the effects of the global economic crisis have forced Russia to scale back
its plans in Latin America, Mr. Davydov and other analysts said. Cuba has also reacted cautiously
to Russias overtures because of lingering animosities that emerged when Moscow all but
abandoned the country in the 1990s, leaving it impoverished and isolated. Yet, while Mr.
Castros visit clearly does not carry the ideological weight evident at the height of Russias cold
war relationship with Cuba, vestiges of those bygone days remain. In honor of Mr. Castros visit,
federal television channels showed documentaries about Cuba and the Castro brothers. In
Moscow, the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War, what Russians call the struggle with
Germany from 1941 to 1945 during World War II, opened an exhibition covering the history of
the Cuban revolution. And Mr. Medvedev congratulated the Cuban people on the revolutions
50th anniversary. At an informal gathering at Mr. Medvedevs country home on Thursday, Mr.
Castro waxed nostalgic, recounting the time he and Soviet comrades sat around a campfire in
the forest eating salo, the cured pig fat that is a staple chaser of Russian vodka. Ive desired
this for 25 years, he said through a Russian translator. I dont know if Ill get to eat any salo
with black bread, but Im here. A few hours later, Mr. Medvedev invited Mr. Castro to join him
by a campfire in the forest around the presidential residence, and the two dined on the Russian
delicacy.

UQ Russia XPN Venezuela
Russia- Venezuelan Relations Tight- Russia may be preparing to intrude into the U.S.
Forman and Flanagan, senior vice president and director of the International
Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 08,
(Johanna and Flanagan, 11/25/2008, CSIS, Russias Reengagement in the
Western Hemisphere, http://csis.org/publication/russias-reengagement-
western-hemis phere, 7/6/13) GM.
The deepening political, economic, and military relations between Russia and Venezuela are
somewhat opportunistic, but they do involve a strategic interest that the two governments
share: challenging U.S. hemispheric and global leadership. The arrival of a Russian naval
squadron and antisubmarine aircraft in the Caribbean for exercises with the Venezuelan Navy
this week marks Moscows first significant military deployment in the Western Hemisphere
since the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. However, this exercise presents a
political rather than a serious military challenge to the United States. Venezuelan president
Hugo Chvez and the Russian leadership see the exercise as a provocative way to challenge
U.S. influence in Latin America and what they describe as Washingtons unipolar vision. The
leaders of both countries have other agendas as well. The exercise allows Chvez to hype his
accusations of a growing U.S. threat to the region and the notion that Latin American leaders
should look elsewhere for security partners. In the aftermath of the Georgian war, Moscow
wants to put Washington on notice that if the United States continues to support countries
like Georgia, which Russia claims as part of an exclusive sphere of influence along its borders,
it is prepared to intrude in the United States backyard. The fact that the Russian squadron
could deploy far from its Barents Sea base is remarkable, given the poor state of the Russian
Navy, illustrated by yet another submarine disaster earlier this month. Although President
Dmitri Medvedev is committed to military modernization, Russia spends about one-tenth what
the United States does on defense. It will be years before Russia can sustain even such modest
long-distance operations. The Russian leadership finds Chvezs anti-American politics quite
useful. It is telling that Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, a staunchly anti-American member of
Prime Minister Vladimir Putins cabinet and who served in Soviet times as a senior KGB
operative in Africa, is managing the Chvez relationship. Chvez has been given a red carpet
reception in Moscow during four recent visits to Russia (July 2006, June 2007, July 2008, and
September 2008), and President Medvedev is stopping in Caracas, now conveniently coincident
with the rescheduled naval exercise, on the way home from the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit. This has paid Moscow some political dividends. During his August
visit, which included a reception at Putins Moscow home, Chvez usefully blamed the United
States for the Georgian war and lauded Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
honorable acts. Chvez and the Russians also signed energy deals between Gazprom and
PDVSA, the Venezuelan state-owned petroleum company, for gas exploration. During his visit to
Caracas this week, Medvedev is expected to announce plans to build Venezuelas first nuclear
reactor and possibly agree to additional arms transfers, including submarines. Finally, as
discussed below, Russia values Venezuela as a client for its arms that can readily pay cash.
Arms exports have been critical to sustaining Russias defense industrial base over the past
two decades of reduced procurement at home. As its relatively unsophisticated weapons
systems have become less attractive to longtime customers such as India and China, Russia
has been anxious to find new markets.

U.S. influence has diminished in Latin America- Russia may be settling in
Forman and Flanagan, senior vice president and director of the International
Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 08,
(Johanna and Flanagan, 11/25/2008, CSIS, Russias Reengagement in the
Western Hemisphere, http://csis.org/publication/russias-reengagement-
western-hemis phere, 7/6/13) GM.
President Medvedev has denied that his visit to Latin America is designed to challenge the U.S.
role in the hemisphere and has suggested that such zero-sum thinking is a relic from the Cold
War. Medvedev claims he is simply trying to revive ties with Latin America, which have
languished since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to pursue mutually beneficial economic
relations. However, it is clear that Medvedev is seeking to expand Russian influence in the
Western Hemisphere, hoping to take advantage of his countrys new energy-driven economic
clout and lingering negative sentiment toward Bush administration policies during the U.S.
political transition. However, Medvedevs hand is weaker than when he planned his trip.
Moreover, falling oil prices and the global financial crisis, which have hit Russia particularly hard,
have raised questions about Russias reliability as an economic partner. A recent
Latinobarmetro poll confirmed diminished U.S. influence, but it also revealed that most Latin
American countries strongly desire more cooperative relations with the United States. The
election of Barack Obama has raised hopes throughout the region that a new era in
hemispheric relations is dawning, and Latin American leaders want to be on the right side of
history. Medvedevs visit to Brazil was designed to advance cooperation on aerospace, energy
development, and nuclear propulsion projects and to promote sales of Russian military
equipment. However, Brazil has other suitors on the military sales, including France, with whom
it is expected to sign a strategic partnership agreement next month for licensed production of
French submarines and helicopters to modernize its defense forces and industry. Brazil is also
expected to drive a hard bargain with the Russians on Gazproms interest in a partnership to
develop Brazils newfound oil reserves. Moreover, advisers to Brazilian president Luiz Incio Lula
da Silva have made clear that he has no desire to foul relations with Washington at the outset of
the Obama administration. Medvedevs stop in Cuba marks the first trip by a Russian leader to
the island in eight years. The Kremlin announced earlier this month a loan of $335 million to
Cuba for purchasing Russian goods and services. That compares with $300 million in trade for all
of 2007. Moscow is also reportedly considering reestablishing Soviet-era intelligence
cooperation with Cuba and exploring offshore oil potential. This kind of engagement is
welcomed by the Cuban leadership, but it is unclear what kind of assistance Moscow can
sustain. Moreover, U.S. relations with Cuba could undergo a dramatic transformation during
the Obama administration.

Venezuela purchased weapons from Russia- Fear of the FARC getting their
hands on them
Forman and Flanagan, senior vice president and director of the International
Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 08,
(Johanna and Flanagan, 11/25/2008, CSIS, Russias Reengagement in the
Western Hemisphere, http://csis.org/publication/russias-reengagement-
western-hemis phere, 7/6/13) GM.
Since 2005, Russia has found a ready client in Venezuela. President Chvez has already
purchased $4 billion worth of weapons, including 24 SU-30 multirole combat aircraft, dozens
of attack helicopters, and 100,000 assault rifles and ammunition. A Russian firm plans to build
two factories by 2010 for licensed production of AK-103 assault rifles and ammunition in
Venezuela. The new rifles will replace aging FAL rifles, but the concern is that the older ones,
and some of the AK-103s including ammunition, will fall into the hands of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency. The fear is well-founded given the FARCs
difficulty in getting ammunition for its AK-47 rifles, all of which use the 7.62X39 mm rounds.
(An agreement among Latin American militaries to standardize ammunition to 5.56X45mm was
made between 1998 and 2007. The Venezuelan decision to develop a different caliber
ammunition is troubling, given the limited demandexcept for older model rifles like the ones
carried by Colombian guerillas.) Nevertheless, 80 percent of Russias arms sales in the region
go to Venezuela, and sales are considered to be a business venture rather than an ideological
one. What is of concern, however, is that the volume of sales to Venezuela may trigger a
regional arms race, thus inviting many other weapons exporters into the trade.

Russia wants to cooperate with Latin America- U.S. no longer dominates the
region
Forman and Flanagan, senior vice president and director of the International
Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 08,
(Johanna and Flanagan, 11/25/2008, CSIS, Russias Reengagement in the
Western Hemisphere, http://csis.org/publication/russias-reengagement-
western-hemis phere, 7/6/13) GM.
Not surprisingly, the strongest reactions came from Colombia, where Russian foreign minister
Sergei Lavrov paid an official call on November 19. During the visit, Lavrov insisted that Russias
desire in Latin America was for cooperation and development. He emphasized Russias
interests in investments in the energy sector and also in infrastructure. Nevertheless, Senator
Maria Luca Ramrez, a former defense minister under President Alvaro Uribe, has asked that
the Unin de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) Defense Council take up the matter of
Russian-Venezuelan relations given the potential risks that such a relationship poses to
hemispheric security. Colombians are especially fearful of Russian weapons getting into the
hands of the guerrillas. An even stronger reaction came from Colombian foreign minister
Jaime Bermudez, who told his Russian counterpart that Russia and Venezuela must respect
the international boundaries between Colombia and Venezuela, a response to Lavrovs recent
denial of Russian complicity in selling arms to the FARC. In the Southern Cone, Argentine
defense minister Nilda Garre has taken a more cooperative approach with Russia, agreeing to
ask that Russia be given observer status at the Latin American Association for Training Centers in
Peace Operations (ALCOPAS). This was the outcome of a recent meeting between Russian
federal secretary of technical military cooperation Mijail Dmitriev and Garre. Argentina is
seeking some reciprocal training for an Argentine air force officer to participate in Russias
astronaut program. Brazil sees engagement with Russia as a partnership, but does not
consider any commercial or political relationship to be as important as the one Brazil wants to
have with the new Obama administration next year. Brazilian minister of strategic affairs
Roberto Mangabeira Unger noted that Brazil was not interested in some kind of balance of
power politics to contain the United States. Given the overall sense that the change in U.S.
leadership provides a window of opportunity to reengage in the region, most Latin American
countries are not treating this as anything but a one-off effort by President Chvez to use
Russias naval exercises to show Washington that this hemisphere is no longer dominated by
the United States.
UQ Relations High Now
Obama is fixing his relations with Russia the only reason for them to be down is because the
US and Russia have an inability to have lasting trust
Allison et al, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
Kennedy School, 11
(Graham, Dimitri K. Simes, Paul J. Saunders October 11 Center for the National Interest Russia and U.S. National Interests Why
Should Americans Care? http://www.cftni.org/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf 7/7/13 MG)
The Obama Administrations reset policy has contributed to significant improvements in the
U.S.- Russian relationship. Unfortunately, the reset is still fragile and what remains to be done is likely to be much
more difficult than what has been accomplished so far. Twice before, under the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations,
U.S.-Russian relations moved in the direction of a new and different relationshipyet both
times, the efforts stalled. In some respects, difficulty sustaining improvements in the U.S.-Russia
relationship has had less to do with specific differences and more to do with an inability to
break down lasting mutual distrust. This suspicion of one anothers motives may in fact be a greater obstacle to
cooperation than sometimes divergent national interests and values. Some of the most challenging problems,
like missile defense, are quite hard to manage without mutual confidence, but failure to
manage them only creates further doubt in the minds of leaders in both capitals. Addressing
these difficult issues requires a process of dialogue that works simultaneously toward building more trust and toward developing
practical policy solutions. Shared success in tackling hard problems can create its own momentum.

The reset is making relations better
Kurilla: Professor of History and Chair of the Department of International
Relations and Area Studies at Volgograd State University in Russia, Welt:
Associate Director of the George Washington Universitys Institute for
European, Russian and Eurasian Studies and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for
American Progress, 13
(Ivan and Cory 3/29/13 The National Interest, Don't Give Up on the U.S.-Russian Reset
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-give-the-us-russian-reset-8286?page=1 7/7/13 MG)
All is not lost, however. Moscow and Washington still agree on a global agenda they can tackle in
concert. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described his first meeting with new U.S. secretary of state John Kerry in Berlin
on February 26, discussing Syria and Russian orphans, as constructive. Following talks on nonproliferation cooperation last week,
Rose Gottemoeller, acting U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and Russian deputy foreign
minister Sergei Ryabkov were similarly upbeat. More significantly, while the Putin administration may have allowed itself a new
bout of anti-Americanism over the last year, the Russian people have not fallen in line. When it comes to Russian public opinion,
the reset is alive and well. The United States should seize the opportunity to react to
increased Russian receptivity to Western engagement. To be sure, the path forward remains murky. Moscow
has withdrawn its invitation to the U.S. Agency for International Development to support development work in Russia; did not renew
the 20-year-old Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, by which the United States helps Russia safeguard and
eliminate weapons of mass destruction; terminated a ten-year old agreement on law-enforcement and drug-control cooperation;
and banned U.S. citizens or organizations from financing Russian nongovernmental organizations engaged in political or vaguely
threatening activity. And, yes, Moscow also banned Americans from adopting Russian orphans. The Kremlin argues that it is
responding to the United States own retreat from the reset. Late last year, a bipartisan congressional consensus led the Obama
administration to introduce sanctions visa bans and asset freezes against a potentially open-ended list of Russian officials whom
Washington believes have been guilty of violating the rights of human-rights defenders and anti-government whistleblowers. But
Washington is not the primary target of the Kremlins recent bout of anti-Americanism. What might look like the start of a new U.S.-
Russian spat reflects the dynamics of an internal Russian political struggle. After unprecedented mass protests against election fraud
in December 2011, then prime minister Vladimir Putin decided that to regain the upper hand at home required a different sort of
reset with the United States. Playing on elements of anti-Americanism within Russian society, Putin reverted to the kind of rhetoric
he employed in his last (pre-2008) presidential term, portraying the United States as an unfriendly power seeking to harm Russia.
Further, he sought to taint the reputation of opposition forces by positing links to Washington, casting them as a treasonous and
illegitimate fifth column. The Russian parliament adopted laws aimed at ostracizing the opposition and foreign-funded NGOs,
including a law requiring NGOs that receive foreign funding to register as foreign agents. In recent weeks, the Ministry of Justice
and other state agencies have ramped up inspections of the relevant NGOs, like Memorial and Amnesty International. Despite
these efforts to drive a wedge between domestic critics and the broader Russian public, the popular response to Putins reset has
not been what the Kremlin anticipated. A December 2012 poll by the Moscow-based Levada Center reported that many more
Russians supported Washingtons new anti-Russian sanctions (39 percent) than not (14 percent), while nearly half of respondents
said it was difficult to say. The adoption ban met with considerable domestic opposition (31 percent nationwide, 50 percent in
Moscow), including signs of sympathy toward American families seeking to take in Russian orphans. Based on the latest major anti-
government rally in January, a large part of the Russian opposition seems to have shrugged off pro-American accusations as
harmless. Perhaps with good reason: Another Levada poll in January reported a 53 percent approval rating for the United States
(with only 34 percent expressing disapproval). The United Statesits government, foundations, nongovernmental organizations
and businessesshould respond to this trend. They do not need to abide by the Kremlins wishes and disengage from Russia at this
tempestuous time. New laws seek to stigmatize or restrict U.S. partnerships with Russias nongovernmental sector, but they do not
forbid them. Many individuals and organizations working to promote human rights and good governance in Russia still need support.
Considerable opportunities remain for closer people-to-people relations, scientific and educational collaborations (like that between
MIT and the new Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology), and tourism. Russias entry into the World Trade Organization last
year has the potential to facilitate increased investment and trade. Foreign organizations should not interfere in Russian politics, for
that is for the Russians to work out. But in the struggle for Russian hearts and minds, the West still has much to offer. Only by
cultivating relationsand shared valuesacross a range of stakeholders can the U.S.-Russia relationship have a shot
at becoming an abiding partnership.

U.S.-Russian relations are better than you think
Mankoff, deputy director and fellow with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies Russia and Eurasia Program, 13
(Jeffrey 6/6/13 CNN, U.S.-Russia ties: Better than you think http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/06/u-s-russia-ties-
better-than-you-think/ 7/7/13 MG)
Faced with an increasingly complex international environment, President Barack Obama is quietly re-emphasizing one
of the main priorities of his first term: trying to build a cooperative relationship with Russia.
This may come as a surprise after all, the atmosphere between the two countries has been decidedly frosty the past year. But
although the high-profile outreach of the first-term reset may have been set aside, the Obama administration has
been pursuing low key, concrete cooperation on issues ranging from Syria to Afghanistan to
counter-terrorism. And, freed from the political baggage surrounding the reset, such
cooperation is likely to prove more sustainable and more effective at advancing U.S.
interests. Obamas first term got off to a good start. Washington and Moscow agreed to cut their nuclear forces under the New
START agreement, and Russia also provided logistical support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, at the United Nations,
Russia supported Iran sanctions and ultimately acquiesced to U.S. requests for intervention in Libya. This cooperation was
symbolized by the bright red (but mistranslated) reset button that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented to her Russian
counterpart in Geneva in 2009. As several of Obamas other first term international initiatives fell by the wayside, the U.S.-
Russia reset became one of his highest profile foreign policy achievements. But this made the reset
vulnerable when the political winds in Moscow and Washington shifted. Disputed Russian parliamentary elections in December 2011
brought massive protests into the streets of Moscow. Russias presidential transition six months later saw Vladimir Putin replace
Dmitry Medvedev, with whom Obama had developed a close working relationship. Not only did Putins previous tenure in the
Kremlin coincide with a worsening of U.S.-Russian relations (culminating with the August 2008 war in Georgia), but the returning
president now turned to anti-American populism to shore up his tenuous legitimacy. This included unprecedented harassment of
new U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul, previously the architect of the reset at the White House. Putins new government also
cracked down on civil society groups, especially those with ties to the West. USAID was expelled, and NGOs receiving funds from
abroad were required under a new law to register as foreign agents. The U.S. Congress, meanwhile, was working to pass a bill
imposing visa and financial sanctions on Russian officials implicated in the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer investigating a tax
fraud scheme implicating several high-ranking figures when he was arrested and subsequently died in prison. Though the Obama
administration believed that the so-called Magnitsky Act was unwise (and duplicated steps it was already taking), its options were
constrained by the bills bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and election year politics, including Republican Party nominee Mitt
Romneys invocation of Russia as Washingtons number one geopolitical foe. Making matters worse was the escalating crisis in
Syria, where U.S. demands for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad ran headlong into Russian support for a strategic ally and
opposition to foreign intervention, despite a mounting humanitarian disaster. In the last few weeks, Russias very public expulsion of
an American diplomat accused of espionage has contributed further to the perception of crisis in U.S.-Russian relations. Behind the
scenes though, Obama has sought to boost cooperation, and early indications are that these
efforts are succeeding. He announced the cancellation of phase 4 of the planned U.S. missile defense system in Europe, and
limited the application of the Magnitsky law to a small number of fairly minor officials. U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon
then traveled to Moscow carrying a letter from Obama to Putin laying out new initiatives for cooperation, including heightened
transparency on U.S. missile defense plans, further nuclear reductions, a new communication channel between the U.S. vice
president and the Russian prime minister, and the creation of a secure video link for communications between the White House and
Kremlin. Putin and Secretary of State John Kerry then agreed to co-sponsor a conference seeking a negotiated end to the bloodshed
in Syria. Donilons counterpart Nikolay Patrushev was just in Washington, with a letter from Putin emphasizing the need to find an
agreement on missile defense. This diplomatic activity underscores Obamas recognition that Russian
cooperation is necessary on several issues that will shape his legacy. The Boston Marathon bombing
brought a renewed focus on the need for cooperation between intelligence services to counter terrorism. Russian
intelligence and logistical cooperation will be especially critical during and after the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. While prospects for Syrias future remain very uncertain, U.S.-Russian
cooperation represents the only plausible path to a negotiated end to the conflict (despite al-Assads statement implying that he had
received advanced S-300 air defense units from Moscow, Putin told European Union leaders this week that Russia had in fact
suspended their delivery). Unlike the reset, Obama is wisely keeping his outreach to Moscow low profile
this time. Yet if a more cooperative relationship with Moscow leads to stronger intelligence cooperation, a deal on missile
defense, and a viable Syrian peace process, it may come to stand as a key foreign policy achievement of Obamas second term too.
UQ Relations Brink
U.S. Russian relations are on the brink now
Horton, columnist at Harpers Magazine, 07
(Scott 7/6/07 Harpers Magazine, The Coming Cold Snap in U.S.-Russian Relations http://harpers.org/blog/2007/07/the-coming-
cold-snap-in-us-russian-relations/ 7/8/13 MG)
Presidents Bush and Putin just concluded a summit at the Kennebunkport compound owned by the former President Bush. It
included obligatory photographs of smiling presidents and their wives. It may cause some to think that all is well in dealings between
the U.S. and Russia. That would be a mistake. We are now poised on the brink of a new era in U.S.-Russian
relations, an era in which the role of Europe will likely be much more ambiguous than in the
past. The new era will have significant repercussions for commerce; it will be particularly
important for energy markets and for energy transportation questions. But it will also have
important ramifications for globalization efforts, for capital markets and for the general
movement of goods and services in the region. The new era is not likely to be a return to the
Cold War, but it is likely to be marked by a much more assertive and self-assured Russia, a
much more cautious United States, and major European powers on the sidelines increasingly
torn loose from historical relationships with the United States, and cautiously feeling out a
new and sometimes uncomfortable relationship with Russia. The U.S. will continue to be the
sole superpower, but the new dynamic will have something closer to a multipolar flavor to it.
Lets call it the coming cold snap. First a brief historical excursion. I dont intend here to give a fair and balanced
recounting of history. I want to pull out a few facts here and there which seem to me generally overlooked, but consequential. Facts
moreover which will have some weight in the short-term future development of U.S. and Russian relations. We tend foolishly
sometimes to anticipate things in straight-line linear development. But of course history rarely functions that way.

The U.S. and Russia are on fragile ground
Rogov, UPI Outside View Commentator, 06
(Sergie 3/9/06 UPI, U.S.-Russia ties now fragile http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/03/09/Outside-
View-US-Russia-ties-now-fragile/UPI-84921141929654/ 7/8/13 MG)
MOSCOW, March 9 (UPI) -- Paradoxically, while Russian President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart, President George W. Bush
are very friendly to each other, Russia-U.S. bilateral relations remain highly fragile. There are several reasons
for this situation. One of them is that since the end of the Cold War the United States has been trying to
assert itself as the only superpower in a uni-polar world. Building partnership in an
asymmetrical world is a difficult albeit not impossible task, especially if the two countries
have identical security and economic interests. Their security interests coincided with the emergence of the
common enemy -- terrorism -- after Sept. 11, 2001. But the mechanism of cooperation in the fight against it has not yet been
established. The Russia-U.S. partnership rests on declarations, on meetings and good relations of the two presidents, but there are
no joint institutions, which would be solving common problems day in and day out. Neither the American, nor Russian bureaucracy
displays much interest in this. There are also other factors, which stand in the way of bilateral partnership. Unfortunately, Russia
and America are still in the mutually assured destruction, or MAD, situation. Our nuclear
forces are designed for war against each other by 95 percent. But can the two countries be
allies, and even partners, if they are ready to destroy each other in a matter of 30 minutes?
Another obstacle to cooperation is a deep arms control crisis. Little is remaining of arms control due to the fact that it used to be a
unique feature of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. The two roughly equal enemies required special rules of the game, which were embodied in
arms control agreements. One more reason for the instability of our relations is that strategic partnership cannot be reliable unless
it rests on an economic foundation. Despite the budding investment process, the economy does not yet help stabilize Russia-U.S.
relations. Sino-American contacts are much more solid despite a host of ideological and military contradictions. Our bilateral
relations are doomed to remain fragile and vulnerable to political crises and regional conflicts until the two countries put them on a
sound economic foundation. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear arms above all, is another sphere where
America and Russia should be together, if only by virtue of common sense and egotism. Yet, America is not worried at all that Israel
has developed "the bomb in the basement", or that India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons as well. India is regarded as a certain
counterweight to China. But we will then have a trilateral arms race. This is a source of concern for Russia, because a U.S. ABM
challenge and Indian nuclear arms buildup may provoke China into a fast upgrading of its nuclear armaments. In some 10 to 15 years
China may match Russia in nuclear arms. This is not what the Kremlin wants, and it seems that the White House does not need it in a
long-term perspective, either. Or take another example -- Iran and North Korea, both of which make Washington very nervous.
Russia is much calmer in this respect. We do not welcome any violations of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but we are not
going to use the big stick. The Kremlin favors a completely different approach. The reason here is not nuclear weapons per se. What
matters is that the United States could not resist the temptation of a uni-polar world. This strategy has
no room for Iran or North Korea, like it did not have any for Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and so they became U.S. foes. If they go nuclear,
it will be hard to contain them. But today the situation in Iraq presents such horrendous problems that the United States' great
power momentum has almost run out. America simply cannot afford power confrontation with Iran or North Korea. How to break
this vicious circle of outstanding problems? Maybe it is time to discuss them in real earnest. Both Russia and the United States
should agree in principle on what they want, and where they can cooperate. We are witnessing Washington's failure to streamline
the uni-polar world. What comes next? Chaos? It does not look attractive in the least, all the more so near the Russian borders,
where the game without rules is being played. We need international rules of the game, which alone can provide the key to the
solution of emerging problems. But Moscow's continuous statements to this effect are not buttressed by effective action in this
direction. Does Russia lack political and economic influence to have such rules drafted and asserted? Or is it affected by the
consensus, which is taking shape in the West as regards its conduct? The West is unhappy about Russia on two grounds: first,
Moscow is allegedly resuming its neo-imperial policy, primarily, in the former Soviet republics;
second, it is alleged to be curtailing democratic reforms in favor of an authoritarian regime. Quite
often, when Russia tries to defend its economic interests, for instance, by establishing fair gas
prices, and refusing to subsidize its neighbors, there is a global outcry. The Western media and public
qualify such attempts as manifestations of imperial, authoritarian trends. This is a very dangerous approach, which is detrimental to
the West as well. It is being reflected in the current campaign to discredit Russia as the G8 rotating president. The Bush
administration has found itself in a huge predicament. The crusade for democracy in the Middle East bears out that when
authoritarian regimes grow feeble and allow elections, the race is won by Islamists with their anti-Western and anti-American views.
In effect, it is Washington's policy that provokes this anti-American wave. Events in Tehran 25 years ago were a prelude to the
current developments in a number of Muslim countries. It is clear that it does not make much sense for Bush to go for
confrontation with Russia. In this difficult situation the U.S. administration does not follow in the
wake of anti-Russian attitudes. Moreover, it is trying to neutralize them. Washington may change its position, but
chances are slim, because America is seriously worried about China, which can become its geopolitical rival in the 21st century. It is
not worth parting with old partners in the confrontation with a new rival.



UQ AT: Relations Resilient
The U.S. and Russia are on fragile ground
Rogov, UPI Outside View Commentator, 06
(Sergie 3/9/06 UPI, U.S.-Russia ties now fragile http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/03/09/Outside-
View-US-Russia-ties-now-fragile/UPI-84921141929654/ 7/8/13 MG)
MOSCOW, March 9 (UPI) -- Paradoxically, while Russian President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart, President George W. Bush
are very friendly to each other, Russia-U.S. bilateral relations remain highly fragile. There are several reasons
for this situation. One of them is that since the end of the Cold War the United States has been trying to
assert itself as the only superpower in a uni-polar world. Building partnership in an
asymmetrical world is a difficult albeit not impossible task, especially if the two countries
have identical security and economic interests. Their security interests coincided with the emergence of the
common enemy -- terrorism -- after Sept. 11, 2001. But the mechanism of cooperation in the fight against it has not yet been
established. The Russia-U.S. partnership rests on declarations, on meetings and good relations of the two presidents, but there are
no joint institutions, which would be solving common problems day in and day out. Neither the American, nor Russian bureaucracy
displays much interest in this. There are also other factors, which stand in the way of bilateral partnership. Unfortunately, Russia
and America are still in the mutually assured destruction, or MAD, situation. Our nuclear
forces are designed for war against each other by 95 percent. But can the two countries be
allies, and even partners, if they are ready to destroy each other in a matter of 30 minutes?
Another obstacle to cooperation is a deep arms control crisis. Little is remaining of arms control due to the fact that it used to be a
unique feature of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. The two roughly equal enemies required special rules of the game, which were embodied in
arms control agreements. One more reason for the instability of our relations is that strategic partnership cannot be reliable unless
it rests on an economic foundation. Despite the budding investment process, the economy does not yet help stabilize Russia-U.S.
relations. Sino-American contacts are much more solid despite a host of ideological and military contradictions. Our bilateral
relations are doomed to remain fragile and vulnerable to political crises and regional conflicts until the two countries put them on a
sound economic foundation. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear arms above all, is another sphere where
America and Russia should be together, if only by virtue of common sense and egotism. Yet, America is not worried at all that Israel
has developed "the bomb in the basement", or that India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons as well. India is regarded as a certain
counterweight to China. But we will then have a trilateral arms race. This is a source of concern for Russia, because a U.S. ABM
challenge and Indian nuclear arms buildup may provoke China into a fast upgrading of its nuclear armaments. In some 10 to 15 years
China may match Russia in nuclear arms. This is not what the Kremlin wants, and it seems that the White House does not need it in a
long-term perspective, either. Or take another example -- Iran and North Korea, both of which make Washington very nervous.
Russia is much calmer in this respect. We do not welcome any violations of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but we are not
going to use the big stick. The Kremlin favors a completely different approach. The reason here is not nuclear weapons per se. What
matters is that the United States could not resist the temptation of a uni-polar world. This strategy has
no room for Iran or North Korea, like it did not have any for Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and so they became U.S. foes. If they go nuclear,
it will be hard to contain them. But today the situation in Iraq presents such horrendous problems that the United States' great
power momentum has almost run out. America simply cannot afford power confrontation with Iran or North Korea. How to break
this vicious circle of outstanding problems? Maybe it is time to discuss them in real earnest. Both Russia and the United States
should agree in principle on what they want, and where they can cooperate. We are witnessing Washington's failure to streamline
the uni-polar world. What comes next? Chaos? It does not look attractive in the least, all the more so near the Russian borders,
where the game without rules is being played. We need international rules of the game, which alone can provide the key to the
solution of emerging problems. But Moscow's continuous statements to this effect are not buttressed by effective action in this
direction. Does Russia lack political and economic influence to have such rules drafted and asserted? Or is it affected by the
consensus, which is taking shape in the West as regards its conduct? The West is unhappy about Russia on two grounds: first,
Moscow is allegedly resuming its neo-imperial policy, primarily, in the former Soviet republics;
second, it is alleged to be curtailing democratic reforms in favor of an authoritarian regime. Quite
often, when Russia tries to defend its economic interests, for instance, by establishing fair gas
prices, and refusing to subsidize its neighbors, there is a global outcry. The Western media and public
qualify such attempts as manifestations of imperial, authoritarian trends. This is a very dangerous approach, which is detrimental to
the West as well. It is being reflected in the current campaign to discredit Russia as the G8 rotating president. The Bush
administration has found itself in a huge predicament. The crusade for democracy in the Middle East bears out that when
authoritarian regimes grow feeble and allow elections, the race is won by Islamists with their anti-Western and anti-American views.
In effect, it is Washington's policy that provokes this anti-American wave. Events in Tehran 25 years ago were a prelude to the
current developments in a number of Muslim countries. It is clear that it does not make much sense for Bush to go for
confrontation with Russia. In this difficult situation the U.S. administration does not follow in the
wake of anti-Russian attitudes. Moreover, it is trying to neutralize them. Washington may change its position, but
chances are slim, because America is seriously worried about China, which can become its geopolitical rival in the 21st century. It is
not worth parting with old partners in the confrontation with a new rival.

US Russia relations are fragile the reset is very shaky
Fenenko, Leading Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences and an associate
professor at Moscow State University with a Doctorate in History, 11
(Alexei , The cyclical nature of Russian-American relations,
http://valdaiclub.com/usa/27102.html, Accessed 7/10/13, AZ)

The negotiations conducted over 8 - 9 June on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) issues as part of
NATO-Russia Council can not be called successful. The parties involved did not come to a
compromise about the format for Russias participation in the European missile defense
project. This gave rise to a plethora of comments in the Russian and American media about
the end of the reset policy. Russian-American dialogue, of course, will continue. But no one
can deny that this is an alarming sign for Moscow-Washington relations. The June setback
The reset policy crisis has been discussed in the Russian and U.S. media for nearly a year. Both
the Kremlin and the White House reported progress: from START-III entering into force to
expanded economic contacts. But after the Washington summit that brought presidents
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev together on 24 June 2010, there has been an
increasingly dominant sense that the reset process is, somehow, going very wrong. The U.S.
refusal to compromise over its ABM system, ongoing tensions over Iran, Libya and Georgia,
Washingtons support for Japan in its territorial disputes with Russia, the U.S. medias
infatuation with the Khodorkovsky case -- all these are symptoms of a deeper problem.
Now, the situation is different. The preamble to START-III focuses on the balance between
strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Both parties, however, interpret this differently: the
USA views it as an aspiration for the future, whereas Russia sees in it the need to reach
agreement on ABM. Over the past year, Moscow has offered the United States two options for a
potential compromise: either signing a special protocol to START-III or implementing the
European missile defense project. Washingtons refusal to compromise on missile defense
casts doubt over the idea that START-III (the main achievement of the two-year reset policy)
stands any real chance of being implemented. Moscow and Washington, of course, will try to
reach a compromise on ABM. But the purpose of the reset policy, i.e. building new
partnerships and reviving relations between Russia and the United States, seems to be fading.
Russian-American relations appear to have reverted to the traditional type, with issues relating
to arms control comprising 80% of their agenda. Over the past two years the parties have failed
to bring them to a new level.


U.S. Russia Relations at the Brink nowLaundry List
Cohen, Professor, Russian Studies at New York University; Author, 'Soviet Fates
and Lost Alternatives', 12
(Stephen, 2/28/12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-f-cohen/us-
russia-policy_b_1307727.html, 7/10/13, ARH)
The United States and Russia are at a potentially fateful crossroads in their relations. Twenty
years after the end of the Soviet Union, the relationship features more elements of cold-war
conflict than of stable cooperation. Still more, recent developments, including presidential campaigns and other
political changes under way in both countries, may soon make relations even worse. And yet, in the United States, there is virtually
no critical discussion, certainly no debate, about American policy toward Russia. This failure of our own democratic process --
particularly of our political and media establishments -- is in sharp contrast to fierce debates over Russia policy that took place in
Congress, the national media, academia, think tanks and even at grassroots levels in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, serious
criticism of Washington's policies toward Moscow that should be stated publicly -- by Americans, not Russians -- is not being
expressed in our mainstream politics or media. I will state that kind of criticism here today -- very briefly and bluntly. I do so as a
scholar who has studied Russia's history and politics for fifty years -- and as an American patriot. Most of what I have to say is not a
matter of personal opinion but of historical and political fact. It can be summarized in five major points. First: Today, as before,
the road to America's national security runs through Moscow. No other U.S. bilateral
relationship is more vital. The reasons should be known to every policymaker, though they
seem not to be: - Russia's enormous stockpiles of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction make it the only country capable of destroying the United States as well as the
only other government, along with our own, essential for preventing the proliferation of such
weapons. - There is also Russia's disproportionate share of the world's essential resources,
not only oil and natural gas but metals, fertile land, timber, fresh water and more, which give
Moscow critical importance in the global economy. - In addition, Russia remains the world's
largest territorial country. In particular, the geopolitical significance of its location on the Eurasian frontier of today's
mounting conflicts between Western and Eastern civilizations, as well as its own millions of Islamic people, can hardly be
overstated. - Not to be forgotten are Russia's talented and nationalistic people, even in bad times, and their state's traditions in
international affairs. This too means that Russia will play a major role in the world. - And, largely as a
result of these circumstances, there is Moscow's special capacity to abet or to thwart U.S.
interests in many regions of the world, from Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea and China to
Europe, the entire Middle East and Latin America.


U.S. Russia Relations FragileEmpirics Prove
Strokan, member of Union of Russian Writers and operator weekly analytical
program broadcast by The Voice of Russia in New York City, 5/14
(Sergey, 5/14/13, http://rt.com/op-edge/us-russia-relations-fogle-274/,
7/10/13, ARH)
However, the rosy picture of patching up wounds of the past seems too good to be true. There
is also an alternative string of events and news breaking stories, which can be interpreted as a
manifestation of quite an opposite tendency - a fresh sign of stalemate, if not growing unease
and frustration in the already troubled US-Russia partnership. The best illustration of the dubious nature
of US-Russia relations at this point is probably a new scandal with CIA spy Ryan Christopher Fogle, detained in Moscow this Tuesday,
who was working in the capacity of the third secretary of the Political Section of the American embassy. The story of Mr. Fogle who
allegedly failed to recruit an FSB officer while using spy equipment, packs of dollars and items designed to change a persons
appearance resembles the plots of the masters of international intrigue and espionage - Le Carre and Daniel Silva with his recent
bestseller Moscow Rules, describing current uneasy relations between former global arch-foes. No doubt, that the new spy
scandal has broken out at an extremely inappropriate moment for both sides just four weeks before Obama-Putin meet in
Northern Ireland and only a month after President Obamas national security advisor Tom Donylons visit to Moscow with a personal
letter from Barack Obama to Vladimir Putin. As a follow-up to Obamas initiative, it is reported that Nikolay Patryshev, Secretary of
Russias Security Council is due to visit Washington early next week to deliver President Putins personal letter to Mr. Obama.
According to media leaks, the text of Putins letter is not yet approved with last-minute changes still being made to catch up with the
most recent developments, some of them quite dramatic. So, all in all, it looks like the pendulum in US-Russia
relations is moving wildly from one side to another. No surprise, that flicking through morning
news channels you never know whether you'll learn of a new breakthrough or a new
break-up. The diplomatic merry-go-round is accelerating and who stands to win most of all is
the army of political pundits and fast pens both in Moscow and Washington. Everyone is free
to build their own theories out of the conflicting events, interpreting them the way they wish (
or the way they're expected to interpret it to please meticulous diplomats and vigilant policy-
makers). US-Russia relations remain that notorious glass which is half-full. So, it is up to
presidents Obama and Putin either to fill the glass to make it full or to empty it, if basic
misunderstandings and scandals like a spy story and disagreements on ABM (missile systems)
and Syria cripple the efforts to spell out a positive agenda and translate it into reality. To the
utter disappointment of the global auditorium of America-haters, President Putin has not
written off his strategic partnership with President Obama. But Obama will have to do more
homework to ease Russias deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion. And finally, both sides have
to remember that the glass is not only half-full, it is also fragile and easily broken. So it has to
be carried with care.

U.S. Russian Relations Fragile
Charap, columnist for the National Interest and Fellow in the National Security
and International Policy Program at the Center for American Progress, 6/25
(Samuel, 6/25/13, http://nationalinterest.org/article/beyond-the-russian-reset-
8645, 7/10/13, ARH)
WITH THE recent downturn in U.S.-Russian relations, observers in both Washington and
Moscow have remarked upon the cyclical nature of this key bilateral relationship. As Fyodor
Lukyanov, a leading Russian commentator, noted in late 2012, If we look at the relationship
since 1991, its the same cycle all the time, between kind words and inspiration and deep
crisis. Yeltsin, Clinton, Bush, Putin, Obama, its the same pattern. Indeed, the phases of high
hopes and expectations in the years 19911994, 20002003 and 20092011followed by
deep disappointment in the intervening and subsequent yearsdo seem to represent a
cyclical pattern. But viewing U.S.-Russian relations in terms of cycles or patterns is
misleading. It implies that the relationship is governed by immutable forces beyond the
control of policy makerslike the laws of physics or the business cycle. But the problems in
U.S.-Russian relations are man-made, and therefore their resolution lies in the hands of the
respective political establishments in Washington and Moscow. That is not to say it would be
easy to fix them, or that such a fix is likely anytime soon. In fact, the opposite seems true.
However, since agency, not structure, is the key determinant, policy makers bear the
responsibility for improving this state of affairs and have it within their power to do so.




Link Booster Zero-Sum

The US and Russia are currently in a zero-sum game
Troitskiy: adjunct professor at the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations and Charap: Director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for
American Progress, 11
(Mikhail and Samuel 9/19/11 U.S.-Russia Relations in Post-
Soviet Eurasia: Transcending the Zero-Sum Game http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/working%20group%20paper.pdf 7/5/13 MG)
As a result of these factors, Russia and the United States have become prone to viewing their
interaction in post-Soviet Eurasia as a zero-sum game. Over the past twenty years, there have been
instances in almost all the post-Soviet Eurasian states where the United States and Russia have sought to balance each others
influence rather than find outcomes acceptable to themselves and the state in question. Indeed, actions based on
perceived U.S.-Russia competition have at times set back the political and economic
development of the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia and contributed to the ossification of
unresolved conflicts. Washington and Moscow now face a choice: they can pursue a maximalist vision of victory over
each another in the region (and expect a return to the near-confrontation of 2008), or they can seek win-win-win outcomes for
the United States, Russia and the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia. The oft-invoked grand
bargains to demarcate spheres of influenceenthusiastically endorsed by some,
vehemently denounced by othersare figures of speech, not feasible policy options. We
propose six measures to facilitate positive-sum outcomes:

Russia feels as if it is in a zero-sum game with the U.S.
Felgenhauer, an independent Moscow-based defense analyst, 13
(Pavel 6/13/13 The Jamestown Collection, Putin Believes US-Russian Relations Are Dominated by Zero-Sum Game
http://www.jamestown.org/regions/russia/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41015&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=48&cHash=a753
1e039c0e2316741ee4a99491cf21#.UdiKGvkS5e8 7/6/13 MG)
Putin clearly believes a zero-sum game dominates US-Russian relations: If we do not get to
them, then they will get to us. Differences with the US are not ideological per se, but
fundamental, based on national history and the illusive national soul, making them
practically irreconcilable. Sometimes cooperation is possible, but the US is still the eternal enemy and nuclear ICBMs must
be constantly modernized, armed and aimed at the US, or they get us with nuclear weapons like the Japanese in 1945 or worse.
According to Putin, Washingtons international, imperialistic, aggressive plans aimed at Iran and Syria must be resisted. Putin
repeats the staple Soviet propaganda clich about ugly American individualism as opposed to the altruistic Russian collectivism. In
fact, Russians help others or offer aid less than Westerners: 35 percent of Russians say they helped a stranger last month, while for
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the average is 47 percent (Interfax, May 23,
2012). Some 50 percent of Russians approved legislation forbidding the adoption of Russian children by Americans, enacted last
December, but only 4 percent are ready to adopt a Russian orphan themselves; 16 percent say maybe in the future; and 75
percent say they are not ready to adopt an orphan ever (Kommersant, January 31).
Russia thinks of relations as zero sum
Campsi, 05
(Anthony, The Daily Pennsylvanian, Official: Russia still sees zero sum game. http://www.
thedp.com/article/2005/11/official_russia_still_sees_zerosum_game, Accessed 7/7/2013, EB)

One of the State Department's top advisers on Russia believes the former Soviet state still
sees everything as a "zero-sum game." In the midst of a reappraisal of U.S.-Russian relations,
Allen Greenberg gave an insider's view of the changes taking place in the world's largest country
to a small group of Penn students yesterday afternoon. Greenberg is the senior political officer
for the State Department's Office of Russian Affairs. He characterized the relationship between
the United States and Russia as strong. However, there are "four key areas where we have ...
unfulfilled potential," he said. These four areas are Russia's stance on weapons of mass
destruction, the relationship between Russia and its neighbors, the U.S.-Russian economic
relationship and Russia's standpoint on democracy and human rights. Underlying these
difficulties is the Russian perception that its relationships with the outside world are
dominated by a "zero-sum mentality," Greenberg said, meaning that as the United States gains
power, Russia loses it, and vice versa. This, he said, has lead Russian President Vladimir Putin
to centralize power in his hands, undermining the developments Russia made toward
democracy and a free-market economy following the fall of the Soviet Union. Greenberg
supported his argument by drawing on recent events relating to the Kremlin's prosecution of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Khodorkovsky -- an oil magnate and prominent Russian businessman --
was arrested in 2003 for tax evasion in a move widely considered by Western analysts to have
been motivated by a desire to stop potential political opponents of Putin. "Democracy in
Russia matters not only for its own sake, but in the context" of its relationship with the United
States, Greenberg said. He added, however, that Russia's economy is currently growing at a
fast pace and that Russia is "on par with China as an attractive place to do business."
Greenberg's audience consisted of about 25 students and professors, the vast majority of whom
were affiliated with Wharton. Potential MBA student Slaba Breusov -- a native Russian -- was
not impressed with the event and called it "superficial" after having asked Greenberg about the
reasons behind an American ban on Russian caviar imports. However, Wharton junior Mariya
Cherches walked away with a positive impression. Though she called Greenberg's presentation
overly diplomatic, she found the topic intriguing. Greenberg appeared at the behest of the
Huntsman Program in International Studies and Business and Wharton's Lauder Institute.


US and Russia tensions are up now in Latin America
Meyer, 08
(Henry, Russia invades Latin America While Condi Talks Trash. http://www.democrats
.com/russia-invades-latin-america-while-condi-talks-trash, Accessed 7/7/2013, EB)

Russia is in talks to build a space center in Cuba as it forges closer ties with Latin American
countries opposed to the U.S. in the wake of Cold War-era tensions sparked by the Georgia
conflict. The head of the Russian Federal Space Agency, or Roscosmos, Anatoly Perminov, who
visited Havana with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin earlier this week, made the
announcement in a statement posted today on the agency's Web Site. After Cuba, Sechin
traveled to Venezuela, whose President Hugo Chavez heads to Moscow next week, and
Nicaragua. Russia is playing its most active role in the region since the Soviet era, in a
challenge to the U.S. in its traditional backyard. ``We're increasing our presence in Latin
America -- the countries in the region themselves want this,'' said Russian Foreign Ministry
spokesman Igor Lyakin-Frolov. ``There's a big power in the north. They need a counterweight,''
he said by telephone from Moscow today, referring to the U.S. Russia has sold billions of dollars
of weapons to oil-rich Venezuela in recent years. Since the August war with U.S.-backed
Georgia provoked a rift with the West, Russia has stepped up efforts to bolster its influence in
Latin America. ``The worse Russia's ties with the West become, the more it will look for allies
elsewhere,'' said Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute in Moscow.
``Russia can play the role of a great power; it can sell oil, weapons and nuclear technology.''
Ties With Nicaragua Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, whose revolutionary Sandinista
government was supported by military aid from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, said yesterday
after talks with Sechin that he planned to strengthen ties with Russia. Sechin said Russia will
study plans to fund energy projects and boost trade. Nicaragua was the only country to follow
Russia in recognizing the independence of Georgia's two breakaway regions. Bolivia, South
America's poorest country, will turn to Russia to replace U.S. funding for its anti-drugs program,
the Bolivian government said yesterday. Bolivia will send representatives to Russia to wrap up
an agreement to provide it with helicopters, logistical support and military training to help the
fight against drug trafficking, La Razon reported today, citing Felipe Caceres, Bolivia's vice
minister of social defense. Strained Ties Relations between the U.S. and Bolivia have soured in
the past week after President Evo Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador for allegedly helping
foment violence in the opposition stronghold of eastern Bolivia. Russia's Foreign Ministry
yesterday criticized what it termed efforts to undercut Bolivia's territorial integrity and ``all
forms of outside interference in the affairs of this sovereign Latin American nation.'' Morales,
Ortega and Chavez are close allies who oppose the historic U.S. influence in Latin America. By
courting Russia, ``Latin American states can demonstrate to the U.S. that if it doesn't treat
them with respect, they have other countries they can turn to,'' Kremenyuk said. Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev will be in Peru in late November for the summit of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation group and plans a weeklong regional trip, his office said today. Sechin's
visit to Cuba followed one he made in July to the Cold War-era ally. Russian newspaper reports
of plans to station nuclear bombers on the Caribbean island prompted warnings from the U.S.
not to cross ``a red line'' and were later denied by Russia. U.S. Missile System. Russia opposes
proposed U.S. missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic, former Communist-era
satellites. It's also resisting further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization into the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Ukraine, accusing the U.S. of
threatening its security by moving militarily up to Russia's borders. Chavez last week
welcomed two Russian TU 160 bombers, which flew from Venezuela to conduct training flights
over neutral waters. Venezuela is planning a joint naval exercise in the Caribbean later this year
with Russian warships, including the atomic-powered Peter the Great cruiser. The Venezuelan
leader will be in Moscow for the second time in two months next week. Three Russian oil
companies signed exploration deals for Venezuela during Chavez's last visit to Russia in July.
Russia is currently in talks to sell air defense systems, armored personnel carriers and new-
generation Su-35 fighter jets to Venezuela, the Kommersant newspaper reported, citing state
industrial holding company Russian Technologies chief Sergei Chemezov. So how is our Russia
expert-in-chief responding? With typical Bushevik denial and trash talk. Rice says West must
resist Russian "bullying" Reuters/Susan Cornwell Thu Sep 18, 6:17 PM ET The West must stand
up to "bullying" by Moscow, which is becoming increasingly authoritarian and aggressive, U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a speech highly critical of Russia on Thursday. In her
first major address on Russia since its incursion into Georgia last month, Rice said Moscow had
taken a "dark turn" that left its global standing worse than at any time since 1991, when it
emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union. Rice, a former Soviet expert who has presided over a
steady deterioration of relations with Russia, said Moscow's invasion of Georgia was part of a
pattern that included its use of oil and natural gas as a political weapon, the suspension of a
treaty on conventional forces in Europe and a threat to target peaceful nations with nuclear
weapons. "The picture emerging from this pattern of behavior is that of a Russia increasingly
authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad," Rice said in the speech to the German Marshall
Fund. The United States and Europe must not allow Russian actions in Georgia to achieve any
benefit, she said. "Not in Georgia. Not anywhere," she said. "Our strategic goal now is to make
it clear to Russia's leaders that their choices are putting Russia on a one-way path to self-
imposed isolation and international irrelevance." Umm Condi, Russia isn't facing isolation, it's
expanding throughout Latin America! Moscow was internationally condemned for sending
troops to Georgia to stop Tbilisi's attempt to reassert control over the pro-Russian, separatist
region of South Ossetia. Moscow later recognized South Ossetia and another rebel region,
Abkhazia, as independent states, and on Wednesday signed treaties to protect them from
Georgian attack. The Kremlin said it had a moral duty to defend the regions against what it
called "genocide" by Georgia's military. But some political analysts have said Russia's actions
heighten the risk of Moscow attempting to exert more influence over other former Soviet
territories, particularly Ukraine. 'SPHERE OF INFLUENCE' Rice rejected a Russian "sphere of
influence" over its neighbors and hoped Russia leaders would "overcome their nostalgia for
another time." Umm Condi, you've squandered the American "sphere of influence" over Latin
America, which dates back to another time - the presidency of James Monroe. "We cannot
afford to validate the prejudices that some Russian leaders seem to have: that if you pressure
free nations enough -- if you bully, and threaten, and lash out -- we will cave in, and forget, and
eventually concede," Rice said. "The United States and Europe must stand up to this kind of
behavior, and all who champion it." She also scoffed at Moscow's recent dispatch of "Blackjack"
bombers to U.S. foe Venezuela. Rice said Russia's behavior threatened its participation in a
number of global diplomatic, economic and security bodies, including the Group of Eight
industrialized nations, and jeopardized Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organization and
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. But she said Washington would
continue to pursue areas of common concern with Russia, from denuclearizing the Korean
peninsula to stopping Iran's rulers from acquiring nuclear weapons and combating terrorism,
underscoring Washington's need for Moscow to play a role in international negotiations. Rice,
who called Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to tell him she was giving the speech, said the
door remained open for Georgia and Ukraine to eventually join the NATO alliance. But some
European governments have misgivings about allowing those states to take the first step toward
joining NATO, and successfully blocked the move earlier this year. In London, Pentagon chief
Robert Gates used a less critical tone when asked whether NATO should change its operational
posture toward Russia as a result of events in Georgia. "I think we need to proceed with some
caution because there clearly is a range of views in the alliance about how to respond, from
some of our friends in eastern Europe and the Baltic states, to some of the countries in western
Europe," Gates said. One U.S. analyst said he did not see the point of Rice's speech. "It didn't lay
out a framework that showed American leadership for where do we go from here," said Robert
Hunter, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO now with the RAND corporation.

US relations with Russia are really bad now
Yalowitz, Courtney, Corboy, US ambassador to Georgia, Diplomat, 4/18
(Kennethy, William, Denis, NY times, Rising Tensions With Russia, http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/04/19/opinion/global/rising-tensions-with-russia.html, Accessed 7/7/2013, EB)


Russias relations with the West are again plunging. This time the cause is repression in Russia
and the Western reaction to it. Last time it was the invasion of Georgia in 2008, and before that
NATO expansion to the east. Unless the West develops an enduring and resilient strategy
toward Russia, the deterioration in ties may be prolonged. Popular support for President
Vladimir Putin and his semi-authoritarian rule is ebbing. In late 2011 he began facing large
demonstrations against his government. Polls by the respected Levada Center show that
although 64 percent of respondents support Putin, 55 percent want him to leave office in 2018
when his third term ends. The head of the National Anti-Corruption Committee says corruption
amounts to $300 billion annually. Seemingly unnerved by the opposition, Putin is responding
with repression. Last May the police beat participants in a Moscow demonstration. Fearing a
democratic color revolution as Georgia and Ukraine experienced in the mid-2000s Putin
arranged for a law that requires civil society groups to register as foreign agents. The
authorities are raiding their offices. In December, a U.S. law provided for sanctions on those
responsible for the punishment and death in prison of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who
was investigating official corruption, and for other gross violations of human rights in Russia.
Putin then banned U.S. adoptions of Russian children, leaving thousands of orphans stranded.
Political show trials, a Soviet relic, seem to be resuming. This week Alexei Navalny, an opposition
leader, went on trial on trumped-up charges of embezzling timber from a state company.
Demonstrators from last May 6 are being threatened with years in prison or psychiatric
confinement, another Soviet-era punishment. Putins retrograde steps mask deeper troubles.
Educated elites are alienated by the turn toward authoritarian rule, even if they have yet to
organize an effective democratic opposition. Discrimination against Muslim and ethnic
minorities is a cancer. Putin adds to concerns by tacking closer to the Russian Orthodox Church.
With the prospect of a declining population, the economy needs increasing numbers of migrant
laborers from Central Asia and the Caucasus, yet they face frequent mistreatment. Last year,
according to the Sova Center in Moscow, the level of xenophobia and radical nationalism in
Russia remained high: Hate attacks left 19 people dead and injured 187. Putins nationalization
of certain key industries combined with his anti-American posturing erodes the investment
climate. The economy is at risk because of high dependence on oil and gas exports, earnings
from which may drop as productivity declines in older West Siberian oil fields and competition
for gas export markets sharpens amid rising world production. Western trade and investment is
needed. Russias difficulties with the West are spreading. Last week hundreds demonstrated
during Putins visit to Germany, and Chancellor Angela Merkel had sharp words on human
rights. In the Cyprus banking crisis, the West was unwilling to ease difficulties for Russian
depositors, many of whom were suspected of laundering ill-gotten gains. How can relations
with Russia be put on a more stable footing? The answer lies in implementing consistent and
sustainable policies. Pragmatic cooperation must continue. Examples are lessening nuclear
dangers, operating the International Space Station and developing the Arctic. In Moscow this
week the U.S. national security adviser, Thomas Donilon, registered dismay over human rights
abuses while encouraging progress on common interests. Western support for the security of
Russias neighbors reduces risks of the destabilizing effects of overreach by the Kremlin. After
a Russian cyberattack on Estonia in 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization placed a major
cyberdefense center there. Last year, when Moscow warned that putting NATO missile defenses
in Poland would cause Russia to base new nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad, the West objected and
reassured Poland of its support. Consistent Western support for human rights and political
freedoms is critical. The West should expose political show trials, find creative ways to aid
besieged civil society groups, and help Internet users circumnavigate censorship. The West
ought to continue backing Russias international economic engagement, such as its new World
Trade Organization membership, but on the same basis as it does for other nations. Holding
Russia to accepted standards while providing technical assistance will send the right signal.
Link Booster Latin America Key

Latin America is key to US Russia fight for sphere of influence
Astrada and Martn, Astrada received his PhD in International Relations from
Florida International University, and Martn is Associate Professor of
International Relations at Florida International University, 13
(Marvin L., and Flix E. April 2013 Palgrave Pivot, Russia and Latin America From Nation-State to Society of States
http://books.google.com/books?id=abi_Zzdgvt4C&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=Cuba+%22sphere+of+influence%22+US+Russia+-
china&source=bl&ots=o1r7kotRvP&sig=vpE3YiH98oZQUYbl9LIH7-
fGVr4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hMPcUabOK8SiiQLPp4DwBA&ved=0CFoQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=Cuba%20%22sphere%20of%20influence%
22%20US%20Russia%20-china&f=false 7/9/13 MG)
Latin America has historically played an important role in the struggle for sphere of influence
between the U.S. and Russia. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Unionpaid special
attention to intensifying relations with countries in the U.S.s backyard as a response, [among
other considerations], to U.S. interference in regions commonly known to be under Soviet influence.
In sum, engagement was premised on military considerations and effectuating a change in the
global balance of power in favor of the Soviet state. Two fundamental goals of Soviet foreign policy remained
constant throughout the Cold War: first, strategic considerations rooted in superpower politics enmeshed in an ideological and
militarized contest, and, second, placed primary emphasis on leveraging US global and regional powerthe US being perceived as
the most serious threat to the USSRs national security and aspirations for regional hegemony and global superpower status.
Additionally, as reported in the US Library of Congresss Country Study: Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, among its remaining
foreign policy goals, highly prioritized its relations with Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and it gave very little priority to Latin
America and the Caribbean, except, insofar as the region either provided opportunities for strategic basing or bordered on strategic
naval straits or sea lanes. In the initial phases of the USSRs development during the first-half of the twentieth century, Latin
America, generally speaking, had ranked quite low on the list of Soviet foreign policy priorities. Yet, from the late 1950s
on, a Soviet presence in Latin America had grown steadily but slowly, in large part due to anti-
US ideological movements and anti-US sentiments from Latin America. Until the Khrushchev period and
the forging of relations with communist Cuba, Latin America was generally regarded as being well within US
sphere of influence, or as its backyard. Up until the early 1960s the USSR had little interest in importing Latin
American raw materials or commodities, and most Latin American governments, traditionally anti-communist, had long resisted the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. A major event that initiated a turning point in USSRLatin America
relations was the Cuban Revolution of 1959, in which opposition forces led by Fidel Castro toppled the US-backed government of
Fulgencio Batista. Fidel Castro proceeded to gradually define revolutionary Cuba as a communist state, and developed close ties with
the USSR to the point that Cuba became the recipient of massive Soviet military and financial aid in exchange for a Soviet strategic
presence on the island in the form of a listening post at Lourdes and as a resupply base for Soviet strategic and long-range bombers
and naval vessels engaged in some sort of off-shore balancing. Further, by 1965, revolutionary Cuba was well entrenched in the
Soviet camp, and provided the USSR with something unprecedented, i.e., an ideological and military foothold in the Americas.

Link Expansion
US expansion into formerly Soviet areas like Cuba angers Moscow
Smith, Professor of Political Science of University of Washington, 09
(Mark A., August 2009, Russia & Latin America: Competition in Washington's
"Near Abroad, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=104344, 7/6/13, PD)

Russian policy towards Latin America in the 1990s aroused little interest in Washington. The
Russian Federation became a permanent observer of the Organisation of American States (OAS)
in April 1992, and Moscow lost all interest in supporting anti-American regimes in the region.
Moscows attitudes changed in the late Putin period. The contemporary Russian leadership
sees Latin America as playing a role in enhancing the trend towards the development of a
multipolar international system. This is welcome to Moscow as the emergence of a multipolar
system is a process which will result in the diminution of US influence. In September 2008,
Vladimir Putin said that "Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the
multipolar world that is formingWe will pay more and more attention to this vector of our
economic and foreign policy."6 In November 2008, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said: We
welcome Latin America's role in the efforts to democratize international relations in the
context of the objectively forming multipolarity in the world. We believe that these processes
are in the interests of the whole of mankind. Russia is interested in the closest cooperation
with our Latin American partners in reply to the reciprocal interest they are showing.7 It is
considered that Russias increased interest in Latin America is a response to the strong US
interest in extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. The extension of US influence
into various parts of the former Soviet Union is immensely irritating to Moscow, as was the
Bush Administrations decision to station ballistic missile defence systems in Poland and the
Czech Republic, as these countries were members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact.8 By seeking
to expand Russias relations with various countries in Latin America (particularly with anti-
American regimes), Moscow is demonstrating to Washington that it can extend its influence
into the USAs near abroad.
Moscow opposes any U.S. engagement in formerly Soviet areas- the Putin
Doctrine proves
Aron, Director of Russian Studies @ American Enterprise Institute, PhD from
Columbia University, 13
(Leon, American Enterprise Institute, 3/11/13, Structure and context in US-
Russian relations at the outset of Barack Obama's second term,
http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-
policy/regional/europe/structure-and-context-in-us-russian-relations-at-the-
outset-of-barack-obamas-second-term/, 7/6/13, PD)

After his election as president in 2000, Vladimir Putin effectively amended this national
agenda with an overarching metagoalthe recovery of economic, political, and geostrategic
assets lost by the Soviet state in the 1991 antitotalitarian revolution. Although never spelled
out formally, in retrospect this objectiveand the set of policies that stemmed from ithas
been prosecuted with enough determination, coherence, and consistency to fully earn it the
title of the Putin Doctrine. Domestically, the doctrine has guided the reclaiming of the
commanding heights of the economy (first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries)
and the reestablishing of control over politics, the courts, and national television, where most
Russian get their news. In foreign and security policy, the doctrine has amounted to a
reinterpretation of Russias three geostrategic imperatives, making their implementation and
maintenance considerably more assertive than many of those who originally articulated these
goals had intended. The Nuclear Superpower The imperative of preserving its nuclear
superpower status accounts for the enormous value Russia has assigned to maintaining
strategic parity with the only other nuclear superpower, the United States. Hence, Russias
eagerness to engage in strategic arms control negotiations. Conversely, Moscow vehemently
opposes anything it believes would weaken strategic parity with the United States. This
explains the Kremlins steadfast resistance to US/NATO missile defense in Europethe
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). As a result, countless protestations by top US and
NATO officials, including personal appeals by the last two American presidents to their Russian
counterparts affirming that the system poses no threat to Russias nuclear deterrent, have been
in vain. They could not have been otherwise: whatever other national security arguments
Russia puts forward in support of its hostility to missile defense, the key reason for this
implacable antagonism, as Vladimir Putin said in his speech at the Foreign Ministry this past
July, is the fact that missile defense allegedly upsets the strategic balance*2+that is,
weakens Russias status as a nuclear superpower. A secondary but symbolically important (and
financially rewarding) pillar of Russias nuclear superpower status is the export of nuclear
technologies. The state nuclear energy corporation, RosAtom, has been busily selling nuclear
technology and currently has contracts for the sale of nuclear reactors to China, Turkey, India,
Belarus, and Bangladesh. Iran has been a particularly attractive customer, with the
construction of the $1 billion Bushehr nuclear power plant completed against US wishes, not
only underscoring Russias nuclear technological capacity but also demonstrating Moscows
willingness to assert its policies in the face of Washingtons resistance. A Great Power This
assertion, along with an active recovery of former Soviet geostrategic assets, is a central
element of the great-power objective as the Putin Doctrine interprets it. Hence, Russia has
pursued former Soviet (and mostly anti-US) clients in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.
Emblematic of this policy have been the maintenance of a supply-and-repair facility in the Syrian
port of Tartus and Putins visit to Cuba in December 2000, the first by a Soviet or Russian leader
since Leonid Brezhnevs trip there in 1974. In the same vein, the Dmitry MedvedevHugo
Chvez summit in Caracas in 2008 was the first in Russian or Soviet history. With loans
extended by Russia, Venezuela became a major importer of Russian conventional arms and
equipment. The Putin Doctrine leaves little room for compromise with the United States when
the latter appears to Moscow to be encroaching onor belittling or challengingRussias
status as a great power. The Kremlins use of the UN Security Council to weaken or block US
initiatives has risen steadily: in the 1990s, Russia cast two vetoes in the Security Council, but
between 2000 and 2012, it wielded its veto eight times. The cultivation and protection of
former Soviet clients, who are also often current buyers of Russian technology and weapons,
have increased Russias visibility in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union used to enjoy a
great deal of influencemuch, if not most of it, as a counterbalance to the United States. For
example, Russia thrice has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions against
Syria, in effect protecting Bashar al-Assads murderous regime.

US policy dictates Russian competition
Zeihan, geopolitical strategist and forecaster, 08
(Peter, 9/15/08,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915_russian_resurgence_and_new_old
_front, 7/9/13, ARH)
Geography dictates that U.S. strength involves coalition building based on mutual interest and
long-range force projection, and internal U.S. harmony is such that America's intelligence and
security agencies have no need to shine. Unlike Russia, the United States does not have large,
unruly, resentful, conquered populations to keep in line. In contrast, recall that the multiethnic
nature of the Russian state requires a powerful security and intelligence apparatus. No place
better reflects Russia's intelligence strengths and America's intelligence weakness than Latin
America. The United States faces no traditional security threats in its backyard. South America
is in essence a hollow continent, populated only on the edges and thus lacking a deep enough
hinterland to ever coalesce into a single hegemonic power. Central America and southern
Mexico are similarly fractured, primarily due to rugged terrain. Northern Mexico (like Canada) is
too economically dependent upon the United States to seriously consider anything more vibrant
than ideological hostility toward Washington. Faced with this kind of local competition, the
United States simply does not worry too much about the rest of the Western Hemisphere --
except when someone comes to visit. Stretching back to the time of the Monroe Doctrine,
Washington's Latin American policy has been very simple. The United States does not feel
threatened by any local power, but it feels inordinately threatened by any Eastern
Hemispheric power that could ally with a local entity. Latin American entities cannot greatly
harm American interests themselves, but they can be used as fulcrums by hostile states
further abroad to strike at the core of the United States' power: its undisputed command of
North America.

Link Soft Power
Soft power is zero-sum Russia becomes angry when the west invades its soft
power and in turn tries to expand its own power into Latin America
Bugajski, policy analyst and chairs the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of
State, 13
(Janusz, Russias Soft Power Wars,http://ukrainianweek.com/World/71849, Accessed 7/7/13,
AZ)

The stark contrast between Western and Russian understanding of soft power has become
evident during President Vladimir Putins third presidency. For the Kremlin, soft power is
part of its arsenal of foreign policy tools designed to re-integrate Russias neighbors around a
Moscow orbit. Western soft power influences are therefore viewed as a form of
geostrategic competition that must be curtailed and eventually eliminated. As a result, in
recent months Moscow has mounted a campaign to sever links between Russian NGOs and
Western institutions and is encouraging its neighbors to do likewise. Simultaneously to its
anti-Western offensive, Moscow deploys its own soft power weaponry to achieve specific
regional integrationist ambitions. These have ranged from diplomatic offensives and
informational warfare to energy blackmail and the exploitation of ethnic disputes. President
Putin is also injecting a new form of soft power pressure by pursuing claims that Russian
culture, language, history, and values should all predominate among the post-Soviet states.
SOFT POWER BATTLEGROUND In Moscows calculations, Russia and the West are embroiled in
a long-term competition over zones of dominance in the wider Europe and in Central Asia,
despite the fact that the US and its European allies have refused to acknowledge or legitimize
such a great game. Russias drive for its own sphere in a "multipolar" world contributes to
retarding the formation of stable democratic states along its borders. Governments in these
countries turn to authoritarianism to maintain the integrity and stability of the state or simply
to cling to power. Such a process is invariably supported by Moscow as it contributes to
disqualifying these countries from the process of Western integration. Moscow opposes any
encroachment by outside powers in its self-proclaimed privileged zone of interests or the
further expansion of NATO, EU, and US influence. Russia views itself as a regional integrator,
expecting neighbors to coalesce around its leadership, rather than a country to be integrated in
multi-national institutions in which its own sovereignty is diminished. In this context, Russian
soft power in all its manifestations is understood as a means for supplementing Russias
foreign policy objectives and enhancing regional integration under Moscows tutelage. In
marked contrast, the Wests soft power approach is intended to generate reform, internal
stability, external security, democratic development, and open markets to make targeted states
compatible with Western systems and institutions. In the case of the EU, the prospect of
membership itself has been the primary soft power tool as it entices governments to meet the
necessary legal, economic, and regulatory standards to qualify for Union accession. However, EU
or NATO membership remain voluntary and are not pressured by inducements and threats, as is
the case with Moscow-centered organizations. While the West promotes the pooling of
sovereignty among independent states, Russia pushes for the surrender of sovereignty within
assorted Eurasian organizations. To advance its strategic goals, the Kremlin needs to
demonstrate that it is in competition with the West and that Washington and Brussels are
seeking to impose their political structures and value system on the gullible Eurasian
countries. This is a classic form of psycho-political projection, with Russias leaders acting as if
Western objectives were similar to their own in undermining national independence and
eliminating countervailing foreign influences. Putin launched a blistering attack on Western
soft power in an article in Moskovskiye Novosti (Moscow News) in February 2012. He claimed
that this weapon was being increasingly used as a means for achieving foreign policy goals
without the use of force, but by exerting informational and other levers of influence.
According to Putin, Western "soft power" is deployed to develop and provoke extremist,
separatist, and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct
interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries. Evidently, for the Kremlin,
democratic pluralism is a form of extremism, national independence is a form of separatism,
and state sovereignty is a form of nationalism. Putin contends that there must be a clear
division between normal political activity and illegal instruments of soft power." Hence, he
engages in scathing attacks on "pseudo-NGOs" inside Russia and among the post-Soviet
neighbors that receive resources from Western governments and institutions, viewing this as a
form of subversion. In reality, the Kremlin is envious that Western values are often more
appealing to educated and ambitious segments of the population than traditional Russian
values. The global human rights agenda is berated by Putin as a Western plot, because the US
and other Western states allegedly politicize human rights and use them as a means for exerting
pressure on Russia and its neighbors. Human rights campaigns are depicted as a powerful form
of soft power diplomacy intended to discredit governments that are more easily influenced by
Moscow. Russia supposedly offers a legitimate political alternative to these countries - a quasi-
authoritarian sovereign democracy and a statist-capitalist form of economic development.
Sovereign democracy is presented as a viable option to the alleged Western export of
democratic revolutions. Russias support for strong-arm governments is intended to entice these
countries under its political and security umbrella and delegitimize the West for its criticisms of
autocratic politics. MOSCOWS SOFT POWER INSTRUMENTS In Putins version of soft power,"
an assortment of tools can be deployed to achieve strategic goals. These include culture,
education, media, language, minority protection, Christian Orthodoxy, pan-Slavism, and Russo-
focused assimilation. All these elements can supplement institutional instruments, economic
incentives, energy dependence, military threats, and the political pressures applied by the
Kremlin. In a landmark article on 23 January 2012 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent
Newspaper) Putin promoted his plan for uniting Russias multi-ethnic society and stressed the
central importance of Russian culture for all former Soviet states. In sum, for Eastern Slavs
Russia is supposed to be the model older brother, while for non-Slavs it is evidently the
enlightened father figure. The stress is on uniting various ethnic communities in the Russian
Federation and former USSR under the banner of Russian culture and values. Putin criticizes
multiculturalism as a destabilizing force and instead supports integration through assimilation, a
veiled term for Russification. According to Putin, Russian people and culture are the binding
fabric of this unique civilization. He extolls the virtues of "cultural dominance," where Russia is
depicted as a poly-ethnic civilization held together by a Russian cultural core. The President
notes with satisfaction that many former citizens of the Soviet Union, who found themselves
abroad, are calling themselves Russian, regardless of their ethnicity. Russian people are
evidently nation-forming as the great mission of Russians is to unite and bind civilization
through language and culture. According to such ethno-racist thinking, Ukrainians, Belarusians,
Georgians, and other nationalities simply do not match the historical importance of the Great
Russian nation. For Putin, the Russian state has a key role to play in forming a worldview that
binds the nation. He has called for enhancing education, language use, and national history to
buttress Russias tradition of cultural dominance and lists numerous tools for promoting Russian
culture, including television, cinema, the Internet, social media, and popular culture. All these
outlets must evidently shape public opinion and set behavioral norms. An additional important
soft power instrument for the Kremlin is the campaign to defend human and minority rights in
neighboring states - a ploy designed to increase Moscows political leverage. Russian leaders
claim the inalienable right to defend their compatriots abroad regardless of their status and
citizenship. This has involved promoting Russian as a second state language or a regional
language in all former Soviet republics, including Ukraine and the Baltic countries. Issuing
passports to citizens of neighboring states has been a favored way of developing pro-Russian
sectors of the population, influencing local politics, and providing a potential pretext for
intervention in case of internal conflict. Some observers have dubbed the policy as re-
occupation through passportization. Georgia is believed to have about 179,000 Russian
passport holders, the Transnistria enclave in Moldova about 100,000, Azerbaijan 160,000,
Armenia 114,00, and up to 100,000 reside in Ukraines Crimea out of approximately half a
million Russian citizens in Ukraine. In September 2008, the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs,
attached to the Russian foreign ministry and answerable directly to the President, began its
operations. It was designed to project Russias soft security tools toward former satellites and to
assist Russian citizens in neighboring countries, thereby indicating more systematic intervention
by Moscow. Other organizations, such as the Institute of CIS Countries, have been created to
channel funds to Moscow-friendly political parties and NGOs in the region. Russian media
supportive of the Kremlin is also beamed throughout the CIS or has established joint ventures
with local media. In Putin's estimation, Moscow must expand Russia's educational and cultural
presence in the world, especially in those countries where a substantial part of the population
understands Russian. Support for compatriots and Russian culture abroad involves expanding
the rights of co-ethnics and co-linguists in all nearby states so they gain increasing political
influence. Hence, we have witnessed persistent attacks on Latvian and Estonian authorities for
supposedly abusing the Russian minority as both countries have linguistic stipulations for
citizenship. Meanwhile, a high percentage of post-World War Two Russian colonists view their
language as superior and have not made sufficient effort to learn Estonian or Latvian.
CONFLICTING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES In assessing the context of soft power projection,
analysts often overlook some important differences between American and Russian spheres
of influence. In order to grasp Moscows objectives and understand how its soft power
instruments fit into grand strategy it is useful to consider four significant contrasts with
Washington's approach. First, US administrations accept the right of each state to choose its
alliances, while Russian officials endeavor to impose security arrangements on neighbors.
Countries enter the Western sphere and the NATO alliance voluntarily as this contributes to
their security and is not seen as a threat to their sovereignty. States invariably join the Russian
sphere as a result of inducement, threat, or outright pressure. Oftentimes, there are no viable
alternatives to the Russian-centered alliance because of energy dependence, trade links, and
other forms of entrapment. Governments seek to avoid potential destabilization from Moscow
by partially acquiescing to Kremlin demands. Nonetheless, disputes continue to simmer as
various capitals from Belarus to Uzbekistan resist surrendering the most important elements of
their sovereignty to Russia. Second, NATO and the EU have not created spheres of influence
orbiting around one power center but voluntary alliances operating on a consensual basis and in
the case of the EU pooling elements of their sovereignty. By contrast, Russia has developed a
post-Soviet version of the Brezhnev doctrine, whereby countries within Russian-sponsored
institutions have serious limitations on their sovereignty, particularly in their foreign policy and
security orientations. Third, while the US promotes cordial relations between its own allies
and Russia, Moscow remains fixated on its own primacy or exclusivity. For instance,
Washington supports closer bilateral relations between Poland or other Central-East European
countries and Russia as it believes this generates regional stability and lessens the need for U.S.
security guarantees. In stark contrast, the Kremlin does not support closer relations between
Ukraine or the CIS states and the US, calculating that this deprives Moscow of its political
leverage, undermines its privileged interests, and could be the harbinger of a political and
military alliance. Fourth, the Kremlin actually promotes conflicts between its allies and the US
to weaken Americas influence or seeks to capitalize on disputes between Washington and third
parties. For example, Moscow has endeavored to buttress the Hugo Chavez government in
Venezuela into a more assertive regional player in Latin America that can create security
headaches for the US. By contrast, Washington actively discourages disputes between Moscow
and its former satellites. Moreover, it is not obsessed with alleged Russian encirclement when
Moscow sends military vessels to Cuba or Venezuela. However, when a U.S ship sails into the
Black Sea or Washington sells military equipment to Georgia, the Kremlin claims that
Washington is launching a new Cold War. For Russian officials, alliances and partnerships are
in themselves zero sum calculations in a constant struggle for influence and advantage with
the United States. Soft power is thereby understood by Moscow as an arm of Russian state
influence and a valuable tactical tool employed to achieve specific geostrategic ambitions.
Impacts

Russia Relations Good War
US-Russian Relations are essential to prevent nuclear war
Elliot 1995 (Michael Elliott, News Week, Why Russia still matters to America, May 15)
"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got
a lot left -- a highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for
different reasons than Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast
resources without the additional strain of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a
devastating nuclear attack on the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling.
Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too
much to "dismantling Russian military might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is
self-defeating. "We have to reorient Russian power," says Sestanovich, "not eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A
Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land grab of its Far East without resorting to nuclear weapons is a
2lst-century nightmare. All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship stretching into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one,
recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security
issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to the European Union about everything
else-trade, economic development and the rest.

A US-Russian war is the only scenario for extinction. Such existential risks outweigh
diseases, world wars, and smaller nuclear wars.
Bostrom 02
(Dr. Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at YALE, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 3-8-02,
http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved
mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping
strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes,
poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II,
epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural
attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in
the big picture of things from the perspective of humankind as a whole even the worst of these
catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They havent significantly
affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our
species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no
significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our
power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that t he explosion might
start a runaway chain-reaction by igniting the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was
present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there
is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there
was no chance of something bad happening. If we dont know whether something is objectively risky
or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our
decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater
existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out
nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might
have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those
best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and
that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the
US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or
deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear
exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not
destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be
targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existent ial risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.
The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot
be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach see what happens, limit
damages, and learn from experience is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take
decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national
security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as
seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat.
Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for
everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a
legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take
into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied
by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].


Russia Relations Good- Economy
Cooperation is key to global economic recovery
Hamilton 2003 (Lee, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Former Chairman of the House Committee on International
Relations, The International Economy, June 22)
While it has proven premature to speak of a positive transformation in U.S.-Russian relations, the breadth of our common interests
suggests that partnership is preferable to confrontation. The United States and Russia each
have an interest in strengthening Russia's economy. The United States should forgive some Soviet-era Russian debt, repeal the
outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment, and support Russian accession into the World Trade Organization, in return for greater transparency and market reform within Russia. A
Russian economy tied more to the West would strengthen the global economic recovery,
reduce Russia's interest in dealing in nuclear technology with countries like Iran, and enable
the full development of Russia's oil and gas reserves. The United States and Russia also have
overlapping security concerns. While we should speak out vigorously against Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, the United
States must continue working with Russia in the war on terror and the stabilization of Central
Asia. We should also bring Russia closer to NATO, as cooperation reduces the likelihood of a
return to Russian expansionism.

Extinction
Kemp 10 [Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security
affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010,
The East Moves West: India, China, and Asias Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4]
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong.
The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a
major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the
price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically
on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups,
including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more
failed states. Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim
extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war
between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and
weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases,
and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to
a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario,
major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planets population .


Russia Relation