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John Ekins
Professor John Lee
PWR 2: Apocalyptic Rhetoric
7 Dec 2009
Twenty Years Later: Are We Safe from Russia's Nuclear Arsenal?

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 symbolized the impending collapse of

the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War, a decade’s long conflict between the former

U.S.S.R. and the United States. The execution of a nuclear strike during this era would have

undoubtedly spawned retaliation leaving millions vaporized and the Earth barely habitable. The

threat of nuclear holocaust had acted as a deterrent that was ultimately the redeeming quality of

this confrontation. This dissolution of the Soviet Union created a lopsided balance of power and

worst case scenarios reared their heads in the former Soviet republics. The lack of security

regarding nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and fissile material had become more the

responsibility of the United States than the weak shell of a republic Russia now embodied. The

ability of the United States to trust these disparate governmental factions in light of revelations

of countless violations of missile treaties in the past with little or no consequence was less than

optimistic. Specifications with regard to precautions to be taken and actual time lines for nuclear

disarmament that would govern both sides were flaunted by the Russians.

Twenty years later, the current U.S. president, Barack Obama, has pushed the reset button

on foreign policy in hopes of creating a nuclear free world. Yet Russia, who has recently attained

relative economic and military stability with hopes of regaining clout as a world leader,

continues to build secret military bases that would allow for the ultimate survival of her people in

the wake of a nuclear conflict. Obama's ideas and seeming motivation to carry them to fruition

have won him a preemptive Nobel Peace Prize. Although his idealism may be laudable, there

are "red flag" issues that must be addressed before symbolic words and handshakes leading to a
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tenuous alliance with Russia can be taken seriously. Russia and the United States still control

more than 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear arsenal. The true intentions of Mother Russia in

regards to her nuclear arms cache are still unknown and fraught with vulnerability.

Consider Russia's incarnation of the ultimate revenge--Dead Hand, or мертвая рука

(mertvaya rooka), a Cold War nuclear control system that insured second strike capability. This

system, codenamed "Perimetr", became operational in 1984 at the climax of Reagan era tensions.

Russian leaders feared that a decapitating first strike from the U.S. would render them unable to

respond with a nuclear retaliation. Dead Hand was the answer. Switched off unless there was a

threat escalation perceived by Russian generals, this system monitored a network of seismic

activity, radiation detection, and air pressure for signs of nuclear explosions. If activity was

sensed and there was no response by the ranking general in the specified time, the decision

defaulted to a group of three soldiers sitting deep in the vault that housed “Perimetr”.

Bruce Blair, expert on U.S. and Russian security policies and first to discover the existence of

Dead Hand, described what happens if the apocalyptic button is pushed:

In a real nuclear crisis, communications rockets, launched automatically by radio

command, would relay fire orders to nuclear combat missiles in Russia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The doomsday machine provides for a massive salvo of

these forces without any participation by local crews. Weapons commanders in

the field may be completely bypassed. Even the mobile missiles on trucks would

fire automatically, triggered by commands from the communications rockets."

(Smith 458)

Those rockets would launch all of Russia's active nuclear missile stockpiles at predetermined

targets at the United States, signifying the end of the United States in its current configuration.
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Since measuring radioactivity from a blast is much more reliable than a flawed in-flight

detection technology, Dead Hand ensured that the tragic mistake of an accidental launch based

on flawed detection schemes was eliminated. It also worked to deter Russian military leaders

from promoting individual agendas and dissuaded personal nuclear tit for tat. The command

center is protected by about 1,000 feet of granite, enough to withstand multiple high impact

nuclear warhead strikes. The Kremlin has yet to admit its existence, yet there are reports that it is

being continually updated and is functionally "online", ready to be activated at a moment’s

notice (Thompson, "Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine").

It has been suggested that the plan proposed and passed by congress under the George W.

Bush administration to conduct research into nuclear bunker busters were specifically targeted at

the Dead Hand Mountain (Blair, "We Keep Building Nukes For All the Wrong Reasons"). These

weapons would penetrate deeply before detonating their nuclear load. That research was

scrapped when it was shown that the nuclear fallout from a theoretical "buster" would be inviable

considering the non-nuclear options with higher probabilities of success available to the U.S.

military for destroying Dead Hand (Jones, "House Rejects Move to Stop Nuclear 'Bunker Buster'

Weapon Research"). This gives credence to the likelihood that this horrific system has been in

the consciousness of the American president since it was discovered under Clinton. Why, then,

has it been ignored by Obama?

Mt. Yamantau is another indicator that Russia continues to plan for a fully committed

nuclear war with the United States. Built underground, it encompasses a gargantuan 400 square

miles, just smaller than the size of Silicon Valley. Intelligence estimates mark Yamantau as an

appendage of Dead Hand, maybe the command post where Russian leaders are to be stationed

and protected in times of war. An underground railroad system connects Moscow and Yamantau.

Enough food is believed to be stored at the site to sustain an estimated 60,000 people for months
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and an extensive ventilation system would provide adequate air in the event of a

nuclear, chemical, or biological holocaust. It is characterized as a "weapons sink," able to

withstand twelve consecutive modern high load atomic bombs repeatedly hitting the same part of

the mountain. ("Is Russia preparing for nuclear war?").

It appears that the construction of Yamantau is Russia’s answer to the annihilation that

would result if and when the easy button is “pushed” on the Dead Hand machine, and indicates

their willingness to implement a first strike on the United States. U.S. intelligence sources

believe the Russian government has spent more than $6 billion building this facility. The

Kremlin keeps the nature of activities at Yamantau so secret that not even the Russian Deputy

Interior Minister was aware of it when asked about its existence in the mid-1990s by a U.S.

Congressman ("What's Going On in The Yamantau Mountain Complex?"). There is no public

knowledge of a U.S. "Noah's Ark" equivalent for this doomsday shelter.

Certainly President Obama is aware of the implications and possible ramifications to the

United States of the doomsday Dead Hand and the survivor capabilities of a Mt. Yamantau.

Nonetheless, executive rhetoric continues to focus on unrelated geopolitical activity and ignores

the Kremlin's continued plan to emerge victorious in a nuclear quid pro quo.

For example, on November 27, 2009, Obama was able to secure the endorsement of both

Russia and China in a solidified cause towards tough sanctions against Iran regarding their

formerly secret site for uranium enrichment. "They said that they had begun working on a

sanctions package, which would be brought before the United Nations Security Council if Iran

did not meet the year-end deadline imposed by Mr. Obama to make progress on the issue"

(Cooper, "Russia and China Endorse Agency's Rebuke of Iran).

Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev also met earlier in2009 to discuss a new

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between Russia and the U.S., which expired
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December 5, 2009. It would have cut the number of deployable warheads for either side to

between 1,500 and 1,675, down from a total of about 2,200. The two heads of state and their

respective ambassadors conceded that they would fail to reach an agreement in time,

emphasizing they were "working incessantly but not looking at the time" (Dyomkin, "Russia,

U.S. likely to miss deadline on arms pact"). Thus, there are no longer nuclear inspectors that

were part of the START I treaty to "monitor compliance with the treaty," or keep Russia

honest (Barboza, "In China, Obama to Press for Tough Stance on Iran"). In other words, the last

time the START I treaty was not being enforced, the U.S.S.R. was still in existence. Obviously

inspections of Dead Hand were not carried out by the mandate of the 1991 START I since Dead

Hand was not uncovered until 1993.

Even though the White House and Kremlin showcased a unified "firm intention to ensure

that a new treaty on strategic arms enters into force at the earliest possible date" (Levy, "U.S. and

Russia Miss Treaty Deadline”), the first missile production facility was closed off to American

inspectors on December 5. “Russia had blocked any effort to keep it under the new one or to

provide for a temporary extension” (Levy, “U.S. and Russia Miss Treaty Deadline”).

Within the past few years Russia has openly tested a converted missile (RS-24) with

capabilities of holding multiple warheads (up to ten) that can be directed to different targets

(Vick, "RS-24 ICBM"). This modification was carried out in response to the defense missile

shield system the U.S. has been trying to implement during the past decade (defending Israel and

Europe), pursuing a defensive strategy to avoid nuclear war altogether (Blomfield, "Missile

shield tension brings Putin to U.S."). This refashioned missile will evasively avoid any kind of

targeting system, thus producing another technological one-up for U.S. military researchers to

satisfy. "When START I expires, Russia will put a regiment of RS-24 missiles into service,"

Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov said" (Rianovosti). Sounds like another beat to the sound of the
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Russian drum of manipulation and further evidence that the Cold War is not as "thawed" as some

might think.

Why is there this sense of obsequiousness on the part of Obama regarding the Russians?

Rather than addressing an issue that has been on the mind of the intelligence community since

the early 90's, he substitutes a substantive discussion of Dead Hand and the START Treaty for

the current hot topic of a nuclear capable Iran. Certainly an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is a

threat, but issues as critical as a Russian doomsday machine and continuation of nuclear

inspection made possible by a renewal of the START treaty must never take a back seat.

Obama's seeming inability to succeed in establishing foreign policy further diminishes his power

to negotiate with the Russians. Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state, describes Obama's

current status well, “'He reminds me of a chess grandmaster who has played his opening in six

simultaneous games, but he hasn’t completed a single game and I’d like to see him finish one'”

(Cohen, "Obama in His Labyrinth").

Perhaps President Obama needs a lesson on game theory, that branch of mathematics that

attempts to predict behavior in tactical situations ("Game Theory"). Decisions at each stage of

the geopolitical game are based on the guess of how his opponent, in this case the Russians, will

respond. The ultimate goal for him is to maneuver so that he, and thus the United States, emerges

the winner in each situation and attains the biggest pay off. The Russians could certainly realize

the upper hand, in such a game, by concealing such integral maneuvers as the ability to wipe the

United States from the planet or prevent the inspection of an entire Russian nuclear arsenal.

At this juncture in the U.S./Russian game, it is impossible to know what the Russians

have planned for their later moves, but be assured that the last one will be designed as

"checkmate" as far as the United States is concerned. After all, Dead Hand was in existence for

ten years before this information was leaked to the United States, and exactly what goes on at
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Mt. Yamantau still remains a mystery. As Harvard professors observed in the mid-1980s and this

holds true today, "The United States cannot predict Soviet behavior because it has too little

information about what goes on inside the Soviet Union; the Soviets cannot predict American

behavior because they have too much information" (Hoffman 17). Quasi-truths and evasive

Russian tactics continue to plague U.S. interactions.

Possibly more menacing is the knowledge that Russia is changing its military policy for

2010, adopting a “local conflict” clause which provides an option whereby nuclear arms can be

used for a preventative strike if deemed critical for national security (Mcdermott, "Patrushev

Signals a Shift in Russian Nuclear Doctrine"). The last local conflict, in 2008, was with Georgia

in South Ossetia. Georgia, who is a member of NATO, has ties to the United States, also a

member. This scenario produces all kinds of questions: how far is the United States willing to

go to defend members of allied international bodies, even when it means fighting against an

economic ally (like China) or a “frenemy” (like Russia). In the Ossetia conflict, the U.S. supplied

Georgia with equipment, but did not provide combat personnel. What could the U.S. do if a

nuclear bomb were detonated in a similar conflict? Put humankind at risk by engaging in nuclear

warfare? Russia would become the ultimate victor in this scenario with its post-nuclear refuge.

If major world governments harbored similar intentions regarding their citizens, Obama's

vision and capabilities could conceivably guide him through the political questions and morass

of the twenty-first century. The problem, particularly in Russia's case, is that it has not,

historically, had the same values or outlook on change, because of the possibility of creating a

political vacuum, extinguishing its chokehold on power and wealth. However, years behind the

Iron Curtain taught the Russians that an "us vs. them" mentality was a detriment to them

economically. If they were to ignore the lessons of their time behind the "curtain" and return to

that historical outlook, the door would open once again to violent overthrow and loss of life.
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Reagan demonized the Soviet leadership: "The only morality they recognize is what will further

their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime: to lie, to cheat,

in order to attain that" (Thompson 278). By maintaining the status quo at home and deception in

their dealings with the United States, they are able to sustain the duplicity with few

repercussions.

This deceit is evident in the incomplete negotiations of the START I treaty. The U.S.

must ask why Russia seemed so eager to agree to weapons numbers, in some cases, even lower

than the United States suggested. Could it be because a large number of Russian launchers will

be removed from service with or without a new arms-control agreement because they are

obsolete, while the United States is forced to remove a similar number from its arsenal that are

operable? With the introduction of the technologically superior RS-24, perhaps Russia has

determined that ultimately the Russians and the U.S. will have equal numbers of weapons if and

when any arms reduction treaty is ratified, but the Russians will have rid themselves of useless

ones and retained those that will have the greatest military advantage. Russian journalist Pavel

Felgengauer observed in Novaya Gazeta that Russian leaders "have demanded of the Americans

unilateral concessions on all points, offering practically nothing in exchange" (Payne, "Arms

Control Amnesia"). Sounds like an unassailable move and easy win in a game theorist's play

book.

While the Russian government continues its manipulation and pandering, major world

governments expect Obama to be a source of historic change. As the date for the expiration for

the START I has come and gone without the signing of an official treaty, the first domino is

falling in the Kremlin's plan to manipulate Obama, whose vision of a nuclear free world, and

subsequent lack of deterrence, would likely promote, rather than prevent, a doomsday scenario.

This could be the perfect storm of game theory gone wrong as Russia toys with the U.S.
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administration regarding its support for sanctions against Iran. Certainly it is possible, if not

likely, that the Kremlin's true intention is to escalate conflict in the Middle East with all of its

attendant ramifications, not the least of which would be the disruption of the world's oil supply

and an almost certain increase in revenues for the sale of Russian oil. Despite the distinct

possibility that a nuclear armed Iran would up the angst for security in Russia, Prime Minister

Vladimir Putin seems to be ignoring global consequences in his Machiavellian quest for ever

increasing influence and wealth and the restoration of his res publica to world power status.

Whatever the intention, Russia still has its enormous nuclear arsenal evidently at the ready and

appears willing to use it. George Kennan, ambassador to the Soviet Union early in the Cold War,

once commented about its use of atomic energy:

There is nothing--I repeat nothing--in the history of the Soviet regime which

could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia, or

even those who have chances of assuming power within the foreseeable future,

would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they

thought that they might materially improve their own power position in the

world." (Thompson 53)

Russian strategy will certainly depend on current political allies and enemies, strengths and

vulnerabilities, and upon its calculated ability and desire to bring the world to the brink.

In this setting of ever increasing nuclear capabilities, conflicts, and the emerging

renegade nuclear governments in North Korea and Iran, it is appropriate that the United States

and Russian sit down and discuss Dead Hand and its role in any talks about arms reduction.

Ultimately, Russia's motivation for reactivating "dead hand" must be delineated in this supreme

test of game theory. If the Russians really seek peace, as demonstrated by their "apparent"

willingness to reduce nuclear arms, an agreement to disassemble and disarm the doomsday
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machine would be a fitting and reasonable demand on the part of the U.S. president and a great

next move in a successful game theory quest.

Works Cited
Barboza, David, and Helene Cooper. "In China, Obama to Press for Tough Stance on
Iran." New York Times. New York Times, 15 November 2009. Web. 27 November
2009.
Blair, Bruce. "We Keep Building Nukes For All the Wrong Reasons." Bruce Blair's
Nuclear Column. Bruce Blair's Nuclear Column, 25 May 2003. Web. 15 November
2009.
Blomfield, Adrian. "Missile Shield Tension Brings Putin to U.S." Telegraph. Telegraph,
31 May 2007, Web. 27 November 2009.
Cohen, Roger. "Obama in His Labyrinth." New York Times. New York Times, 23
November 2009. Web. 27 November 2009.
Cooper, Helene, and William Broad. "Russia and China Endorse Agency's Rebuke of
Iran." New York Times. New York Times, 27 November 2009. Web. 27 November
2009.
Dyomkin, Denis, and Jeff Mason. "Russia, U.S. likely to miss deadline on arms pact."
Reuters. Yahoo! News, 27 November 2009. Web. 27 November 2009.
"Game Theory." Wikipedia. Wikipedia, 27 November 2009. Web. 28 November 2009.
Hoffman, David. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race
and its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009. Kindle.
"Is Russia preparing for nuclear war?" abovetopsecret.com. abovetopsecret.com, 23 Feb
2006. Web. 27 November 2009.
Jones, Richard. "House Rejects Move to Stop Nuclear 'Bunker Buster' Weapon
Research." American Institute of Physics. American Institute of Physics, 2 June 2004.
Web. 27 November 2009.
Levy, Clifford. "U.S. and Russia Miss Treaty Deadline." New York Times. New York
Times, 4 December 2009. Web. 4 December 2009.
Mcdermott, Roger. "Patrushev Signals a Shift in Russian Nuclear Doctrine". Eurasia
Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 197 (2009): n. pag. Web. 27 November 2009.
Payne, Keith. "Arms Control Amnesia." Wall Street Journal. Wall Street Journal, 8 July
2009. Web. 31 October 2009.
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Rianovosti. "Russia to put regiment of RS-24 missiles into service in Dec." Rianovosti
17 March 2009. Web. 27 November 2009.
Smith, P.D. Doomsday Men: The Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the
Superweapon. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007. Kindle.
Thompson, Nicholas. The Hawk and the Dove. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2009.
Kindle.
Thompson, Nicholas. "Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine."
Wired. Wired, 21 September 2009. Web. 28 September 2009.
Vick, Charles. "RS-24 ICBM." Global Security.org. GlobalSecurity.org, 11 June 2007.
Web. 27 November 2009.
"What's Going On in The Yamantau Mountain Complex?" Yamantau Mountain Complex
- A Future Armageddon. bibliotecapleyades.net, 4 March 1997. Web. 27 November 2009.