G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, n !"#$ %a&a%!y a' A'%#ndan!' o( A)a&!o
E*%ano, d#%#a'#d,plaintifs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD +ILL, ,no$, and MAR-IN +ILL, a' (a!"#$ and Na!.$a* G.a$dan o( 'ad
,no$, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
/ARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 2, !"# in Civil
Case $o. Q-%!&2, 'edro (lcano et al. vs. )e*inald +ill et al. dismissin*, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintifs for recovery of dama*es from defendant )e*inald +ill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant ,arvin +ill, -ith
-hom he -as livin* and *ettin* su.sistence, for the /illin* .y )e*inald of the son of the
plaintifs, named A*apito (lcano, of -hich, -hen criminally prosecuted, the said accused -as
ac0uitted on the *round that his act -as not criminal, .ecause of 1lac/ of intent to /ill, coupled
-ith mista/e.1
Actually, the motion to dismiss .ased on the follo-in* *rounds2
!. 3he present action is not only a*ainst .ut a violation of section !, )ule !&4, -hich
is no- )ule III, of the )evised )ules of Court5
2. 3he action is .arred .y a prior 6ud*ment -hich is no- 7nal and or in res-
adjudicata5
8. 3he complaint had no cause of action a*ainst defendant ,arvin +ill, .ecause he
-as relieved as *uardian of the other defendant throu*h emancipation .y marria*e.
9'. 28, )ecord :p. ;, )ecord on Appeal.<=
-as 7rst denied .y the trial court. It -as only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants
of such denial, reiteratin* the a.ove *rounds that the follo-in* order -as issued2
Considerin* the motion for reconsideration 7led .y the defendants on January !;,
!"# and after thorou*hly e>aminin* the ar*uments therein contained, the Court
7nds the same to .e meritorious and -ell-founded.
?+()(F@)(, the @rder of this Court on Aecem.er %, !"; is here.y reconsidered
.y orderin* the dismissal of the a.ove entitled case.
B@ @)A()(A.
Quezon City, 'hilippines, January 2, !"#. 9p. ;&, )ecord :p. 2!, )ecord on Appeal.=
+ence, this appeal -here plaintifs-appellants, the spouses (lcano, are presentin* for @ur
resolution the follo-in* assi*nment of errors2
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It appears that for the /illin* of the son, A*apito, of plaintifs-appellants, defendant- appellee
)e*inald +ill -as prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case $o. #!&2 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he -as ac0uitted on the *round that his act -as not criminal
.ecause of 1lac/ of intent to /ill, coupled -ith mista/e.1 'arenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Ds -ith a copy of the decision of ac0uittal, presuma.ly .ecause appellants do not
dispute that such indeed -as the .asis stated in the courtIs decision. And so, -hen appellants
7led their complaint a*ainst appellees )e*inald and his father, Atty. ,arvin +ill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees 7led the motion to dismiss a.ove-referred to.
As ?e vie- the fore*oin* .ac/*round of this case, the t-o decisive issues presented for @ur
resolution are2
!. Is the present civil action for dama*es .arred .y the ac0uittal of )e*inald in the criminal case
-herein the action for civil lia.ility, -as not reversedJ
2. ,ay Article 2!%& 92nd and last para*raphs= of the Civil Code he applied a*ainst Atty. +ill,
not-ithstandin* the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. )e*inald,
thou*h a minor, livin* -ith and *ettin* su.sistenee from his father, -as already le*ally marriedJ
3he 7rst issue presents no more pro.lem than the need for a reiteration and further clari7cation
of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or ne*li*ence as a source of o.li*ation -hich -as
7rmly esta.lished in this 6urisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 48 'hil. "&4. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the .asis of a scholarly dissertation .y Justice Foco.o on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, -ith pertinent citation of
decisions of the Bupreme Court of Bpain, the -or/s of reco*nized civilians, and earlier
6urisprudence of our o-n, that the same *iven act can result in civil lia.ility not only under the
'enal Code .ut also under the Civil Code. 3hus, the opinion holds2
3he, a.ove case is pertinent .ecause it sho-s that the same act machinist. come
under .oth the 'enal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the a*ent
/illeth un6usti7ed and fraudulent and therefore could have .een the su.6ect of a
criminal action. And yet, it -as held to .e also a proper su.6ect of a civil action
under article !&2 of the Civil Code. It is also to .e noted that it -as the employer
and not the employee -ho -as .ein* sued. 9pp. "!#-"!", 48 'hil.=.
1
It -ill .e noticed that the defendant in the a.ove case could have .een prosecuted
in a criminal case .ecause his ne*li*ence causin* the death of the child -as
punisha.le .y the 'enal Code. +ere is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
ne*li*ence .ein* a proper su.6ect matter either of a criminal action -ith its
conse0uent civil lia.ility arisin* from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or ne*li*ence under article !&2 of the Civil Code.
3hus, in this 6urisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has .een fully and clearly reco*nized, even -ith
re*ard to a ne*li*ent act for -hich the -ron*doer could have .een prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for -hich, after such a conviction, he could have
.een sued for this civil lia.ility arisin* from his crime. 9p. "!4, 48 'hil.=
2
It is most si*ni7cant that in the case 6ust cited, this Court speci7cally applied article
!&2 of the Civil Code. It is thus that althou*h J. H. +ouse could have .een
criminally prosecuted for rec/less or simple ne*li*ence and not only punished .ut
also made civilly lia.le .ecause of his criminal ne*li*ence, nevertheless this Court
a-arded dama*es in an independent civil action for fault or ne*li*ence under article
!&2 of the Civil Code. 9p. "!%, 48 'hil.=
3
3he le*al provisions, authors, and cases already invo/ed should ordinarily .e
suKcient to dispose of this case. Fut inasmuch as -e are announcin* doctrines that
have .een little understood, in the past, it mi*ht not he inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.
Firstly, the )evised 'enal Code in articles 8"# punishes not only rec/less .ut also
simple ne*li*ence. If -e -ere to hold that articles !&2 to !!& of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or ne*li*ence not punished .y la-, accordin*ly to the literal
import of article !&8 of the Civil Code, the le*al institution of culpa aquiliana -ould
have very little scope and application in actual life. Aeath or in6ury to persons and
dama*e to property- throu*h any de*ree of ne*li*ence - even the sli*htest - -ould
have to .e Idemni7ed only throu*h the principle of civil lia.ility arisin* from a crime.
In such a state of afairs, -hat sphere -ould remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquilianaJ ?e are loath to impute to the la-ma/er any intention to .rin* a.out a
situation so a.surd and anomalous. $or are -e, in the interpretation of the la-s,
disposed to uphold the letter that /illeth rather than the spirit that *iveth life. ?e
-ill not use the literal meanin* of the la- to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient ori*in and such full-*ro-n development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, -hich is conserved and made endurin* in articles !&2 to
!!& of the Bpanish Civil Code.
Becondary, to 7nd the accused *uilty in a criminal case, proof of *uilt .eyond
reasona.le dou.t is re0uired, -hile in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
suKcient to ma/e the defendant pay in dama*es. 3here are numerous cases of
criminal ne*li*ence -hich can not .e sho-n .eyond reasona.le dou.t, .ut can .e
proved .y a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should .e made responsi.le in a civil action under articles !&2 to !!& of the Civil
Code. @ther-ise. there -ould .e many instances of unvindicated civil -ron*s. 1Ui
jus !demni"ed remedium.1 9p. "2&,48 'hil.=
Fourthly, .ecause of the .road s-eep of the provisions of .oth the 'enal Code and
the Civil Code on this su.6ect, -hich has *iven rise to the overlappin* or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lac/ of understandin* of the
character and eKcacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has *ro-n up a
common practice to see/ dama*es only .y virtue of the civil responsi.ility arisin*
from a crime, for*ettin* that there is another remedy, -hich is .y invo/in* articles
!&2-!!& of the Civil Code. Althou*h this ha.itual method is allo-ed .y, our la-s,
it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nu*atory the more e>peditious
and efective remedy .ased on culpa aquiliana or culpa e#tra-contractual. In the
present case, -e are as/ed to help perpetuate this usual course. Fut -e .elieve it is
hi*h time -e pointed out to the harms done .y such practice and to restore the
principle of responsi.ility for fault or ne*li*ence under articles !&2 et se0. of the
Civil Code to its full ri*or. It is hi*h time -e caused the stream of 0uasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to Lo- on its o-n natural channel, so that its -aters may no
lon*er .e diverted into that of a crime under the 'enal Code. 3his -ill, it is .elieved,
ma/e for the .etter safe*uardin* or private ri*hts .ecause it realtor, an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
dependin* on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed .y the party -ron*ed or his counsel, is more li/ely to secure
ade0uate and eKcacious redress. 9p. "2!, 48 'hil.=
Contrary to an immediate impression one mi*ht *et upon a readin* of the fore*oin* e>cerpts
from the opinion in Earcia that the concurrence of the 'enal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of ne*li*ence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reLection -ould reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, .ut that
in fact it actually e>tends to fault or culpa. 3his can .e seen in the reference made therein to the
Bentence of the Bupreme Court of Bpain of Fe.ruary !;, !!, supra, -hich involved a case of
fraud or estafa, not a ne*li*ent act. Indeed, Article !&8 of the Civil Code of Bpain, in force here
at the time of Earcia, provided te>tually that o.li*ations 1-hich are derived from acts or
omissions in -hich fault or ne*li*ence, not punis$ale % la&, intervene shall .e the su.6ect of
Chapter II, 3itle MH of this .oo/ 9-hich refers to 0uasi-delicts.=1 And it is precisely the underline
0uali7cation, 1not punisha.le .y la-1, that Justice Foco.o emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the la- that 1/illeth, rather than the spirit that
*iveth lift- hence, the rulin* that 19?=e -ill not use the literal meanin* of the la- to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient ori*in and such full-*ro-n development
as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, -hich is conserved and made endurin* in articles !&2 to !!&
of the Bpanish Civil Code.1 And so, .ecause Justice Faco.o -as Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the ori*inal te>t of the ne- Civil Code, it is to .e noted that the said
Code, -hich -as enacted after the Earcia doctrine, no lon*er uses the term, !! not punisha.le
.y la-,1 there.y ma/in* it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts -hich are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal la-, -hether voluntary or matter. 3hus, the
correspondin* provisions to said Article !&8 in the ne- code, -hich is Article !!"2, simply says,
1@.li*ations derived from quasi-delicto shall .e *overned .y the provisions of Chapter 2, 3itle
MHII of this Foo/, 9on quasi-delicts= and .y special la-s.1 ,ore precisely, a ne- provision, Article
2!44 of the ne- code provides2
A)3. 2!44. )esponsi.ility for fault or ne*li*ence under the precedin* article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil lia.ility arisin* from ne*li*ence under
the 'enal Code. Fut the plaintif cannot recover dama*es t-ice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Accordin* to the Code Commission2 13he fore*oin* provision 9Article 2!44= throu*h at 7rst si*ht
startlin*, is not so novel or e>traordinary -hen -e consider the e>act nature of criminal and civil
ne*li*ence. 3he former is a violation of the criminal la-, -hile the latter is a 1culpa a0uiliana1 or
0uasi-delict, of ancient ori*in, havin* al-ays had its o-n foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal ne*li*ence. Buch distinction .et-een criminal ne*li*ence and 1culpa
e>tracontractual1 or 1cuasi-delito1 has .een sustained .y decision of the Bupreme Court of Bpain
and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tena.le .y ,aura, an outstandin* Bpanish 6urist.
3herefore, under the proposed Article 2!44, ac0uittal from an accusation of criminal ne*li*ence,
-hether on reasona.le dou.t or not, shall not .e a .ar to a su.se0uent civil action, not for civil
lia.ility arisin* from criminal ne*li*ence, .ut for dama*es due to a 0uasi-delict or Iculpa
a0uilianaI. Fut said article forestalls a dou.le recovery.1, 9)eport of the Code= Commission, p.
!"2.=
Althou*h, a*ain, this Article 2!44 does seem to literally refer to only acts of ne*li*ence, the
same ar*ument of Justice Faco.o a.out construction that upholds 1the spirit that *iveth lift-
rather than that -hich is literal that /illeth the intent of the la-ma/er should .e o.served in
applyin* the same. And considerin* that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the ne-
Civil Code de7nitely esta.lishes the separa.ility and independence of lia.ility in a civil action for
acts criminal in character 9under Articles 2 to 82= from the civil responsi.ility arisin* from crime
7>ed .y Article !&& of the )evised 'enal Code, and, in a sense, the )ules of Court, under
Bections 2 and 8 9c=, )ule !!!, contemplate also the same separa.ility, it is 1more con*ruent
-ith the spirit of la-, e0uity and 6ustice, and more in harmony -ith modern pro*ress1- to .orro-
the felicitous relevant lan*ua*e in Ra'es vs. Atlantic. Gulf and (aci"c Co., 4 'hil. 8#, to hold, as
?e do hold, that Article 2!4", -here it refers to 1fault or ne*li*encia covers not only acts 1not
punisha.le .y la-1 .ut also acts criminal in character, -hether intentional and voluntary or
ne*li*ent. Conse0uently, a separate civil action lies a*ainst the ofender in a criminal act,
-hether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found *uilty or ac0uitted, provided that the
ofended party is not allo-ed, if he is actually char*ed also criminally, to recover dama*es on
.oth scores, and -ould .e entitled in such eventuality only to the .i**er a-ard of the t-o,
assumin* the a-ards made in the t-o cases vary. In other -ords, the e>tinction of civil lia.ility
referred to in 'ar. 9e= of Bection 8, )ule !!!, refers e>clusively to civil lia.ility founded on Article
!&& of the )evised 'enal Code, -hereas the civil lia.ility for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estin*uished even .y a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act char*ed has not happened or has not .een committed .y the accused. FrieLy
stated, ?e here hold, in reiteration of Earcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
ne*li*ent acts -hich may .e punisha.le .y la-.
4
It results, therefore, that the ac0uittal of )e*inal +ill in the criminal case has not e>tin*uished his
lia.ility for quasi-delict, hence that ac0uittal is not a .ar to the instant action a*ainst him.
Comin* no- to the second issue a.out the efect of )e*inaldIs emancipation .y marria*e on the
possi.le civil lia.ility of Atty. +ill, his father, it is also @ur considered opinion that the conclusion
of appellees that Atty. +ill is already free from responsi.ility cannot .e upheld.
?hile it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child 9Article 824,
Civil Code=, and under Article 84, emancipation ta/es place 1.y the marria*e of the minor
9child=1, it is, ho-ever, also clear that pursuant to Article 8, emancipation .y marria*e of the
minor is not really full or a.solute. 3hus 19(=mancipation .y marria*e or .y voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the childIs person. It shall ena.le the minor to administer
his property as thou*h he -ere of a*e, .ut he cannot .orro- money or alienate or encum.er real
property -ithout the consent of his father or mother, or *uardian. +e can sue and .e sued in
court only -ith the assistance of his father, mother or *uardian.1
$o- under Article 2!%&, 193=he o.li*ation imposed .y article 2!4" is demanda.le not only for
oneIs o-n acts or omissions, .ut also for those of persons for -hom one is responsi.le. 3he
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsi.le. 3he father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsi.le for the dama*es caused .y the minor
children -ho live in their company.1 In the instant case, it is not controverted that )e*inald,
althou*h married, -as livin* -ith his father and *ettin* su.sistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in 0uestion. Factually, therefore, )e*inald -as still su.servient to and dependent on
his father, a situation -hich is not unusual.
It must .e .orne in mind that, accordin* to ,anresa, the reason .ehind the 6oint and solidary
lia.ility of presuncion -ith their ofendin* child under Article 2!%& is that is the o.li*ation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causin* dama*e to third
persons.
0
@n the other hand, the clear implication of Article 8, in providin* that a minor
emancipated .y marria*e may not, nevertheless, sue or .e sued -ithout the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry -ith it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can *ive rise to 6udicial liti*ation. 9Bee ,anresa, Id., Hol. II, pp. 4""-4"4, 44".= And
surely, /illin* someone else invites 6udicial action. @ther-ise stated, the marria*e of a minor
child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, -hile still a minor, does
not *ive ans-era.le for the .orro-in*s of money and alienation or encum.erin* of real property
-hich cannot .e done .y their minor married child -ithout their consent. 9Art. 85
,anresa, supra.=
Accordin*ly, in @ur considered vie-, Article 2!%& applies to Atty. +ill not-ithstandin* the
emancipation .y marria*e of )e*inald. +o-ever, inasmuch as it is evident that )e*inald is no-
of a*e, as a matter of e0uity, the lia.ility of Atty. +ill has .ecome millin*, su.sidiary to that of his
son.
?+()(F@)(, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance -ith the fore*oin* opinion. Costs a*ainst appellees.
)ernando *C$airman+, Antonio, and Martin, --., concur.
Concepcion -r., -, is on leave.
Martin, -, &as desi.nated to sit in t$e /econd 0ivision.


1#&a$a!# O&non'

A23INO, J, concurrin*2
Article 2!4" of the Civil Code comprehends any culpa.le act, -hich is .lame-orthy, -hen 6ud*ed
.y accepted le*al standards. 13he Idea thus e>pressed is undou.tedly .oard enou*h to include
any rational conception of lia.ility for the tortious acts li/ely to .e developed in any society.1
9Btreet, J. in Aay-alt vs. Corporacion de ''. A*ustinos )ecoletos, 8 'hil. #%4, "&&=. Bee article
8%, Civil Code and the rulin* that 1the infant tortfeasor is lia.le in a civil action to the in6ured
person in the same manner and to the same e>tent as an adult1 924 Am. Jur. %!2 cited .y
Foco.o, J., in ,a*ti.ay vs. 3ian*co, 4; 'hil. #4", #4=.


1#&a$a!# O&non'
A23INO, J, concurrin*2
Article 2!4" of the Civil Code comprehends any culpa.le act, -hich is .lame-orthy, -hen 6ud*ed
.y accepted le*al standards. 13he Idea thus e>pressed is undou.tedly .oard enou*h to include
any rational conception of lia.ility for the tortious acts li/ely to .e developed in any society.1
9Btreet, J. in Aay-alt vs. Corporacion de ''. A*ustinos )ecoletos, 8 'hil. #%4, "&&=. Bee article
8%, Civil Code and the rulin* that 1the infant tortfeasor is lia.le in a civil action to the in6ured
person in the same manner and to the same e>tent as an adult1 924 Am. Jur. %!2 cited .y
Foco.o, J., in ,a*ti.ay vs. 3ian*co, 4; 'hil. #4", #4=.
4oo!no!#'
! )eferrin* to Bentence of the Bupreme Court of Bpain of Fe.ruary !;, !!.
2 )eferrin* to ,anzanares vs. ,oreta, 8% 'hil. %2!.
8 )eferrin* to Fernal et al, vs. +ouse et al., #; 'hil. 824.
; 'arenthetically, ,anresa seemin*ly holds. the contrary vie- thus2
1Bin em.ar*o, para no ineurrir en error hay 0ue tener en cuenta 0ue los linea*e. del
precepts contenido en el presente articulo son .astante mas reducidos, pues no se
hallan comprendidos en el todos los datios 0ue pues tener por causa la culpa o la
ne*li*encia.
1(n efecto, e>aminando detenidamente la terminos *eneral de la culpa y de la
ne*li*encia. se o.serve 0ue, tanto en una como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres
*eneroso o tres especies distintas, a sa.er2
!. Ca 0ue represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la 0ue results incumplida
una o.li*acion anteriormente constituida.
2. Ca 0ue sin e>istencia de una o.li*acion anterior produce un dano o per6uicio 0ue,
teniendo su ori*en en un hecho ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o falta5 y
8. Ca 0ue teniendo por ori*en un hecho 0ue constituya delito o falta produce una
responsa.ilidad civil como accesoria de la responsa.ilidad criminal.
1Ca primera de estas tres especies de culpa o ne*li*encia es siempre accesoria de
una o.li*acion principal, cuyo incumplimiento da ori*en a la terminos especial de la
culpa en materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta de.e harms al e>aminar cada
contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi, analizando entoces los peculiares efectos
de dicha culpa en cada uno de ellos.
1Ca tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tam.ien, pues no puede conce.irse
su e>istencia sin la de un delicto o falts 0ue la produzca. (s decir, 0ue solo al lado
de la responsa.ilidad criminal puede supuesto esa responsa.ilidad civil y la
o.li*acion proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una consecuencia de la
responsa.ilidad criminal, y, por consi*uente, su e>amen y re*ulacion perusal. al
Aerecho penal.
1Como consecuencia de ello, results 0ue la unica especie de culpa y omisiones o
ne*li*encia 0ue puede ser y es mean-hile.I del presente capitulo, es la separa.ility,
o sea la 0ue sin la e>istencia de una o.li*acion anterior, y sin nin*un antecedents
contractual, produce un dano o per6uico 0ue tiene su ori*en en una accion u
omision culpa.le solo civilmente5 as decir, 0ue siendo ilicita, no reviste sin em.ar*o,
los caracteres de un delito o falta por no estar penada por la ley. G aun dentro de
estos linea*e hay 0ue restrin*ir aun mas los terminos o la materia propria de este
articulo, el cual se re7ere unicamente a la culpa o ne*li*encia personates del
o.li*ado, pero no a las 0ue prudencia de actos o de omisiones de persons., distintas
de este.1 9pp. ";2-";8, Hol. MII, ,anresa, Codi*o Civil (spanol.=
# 1$uestro Codi*o no ha se*uido la escuela italiana, sino 0ue mas .ien se ha
instantaneous, en el criterio de la doctrina full-*ro-n puesto 0ue impone la
o.li*acion de reparar, el dano causado en virtud de una presuncion 6uris tecum de
culpa por parte del 0ue tiene .a6o su autoridad o dependecia al causante del daho,
derivada del hicimos de no ha.er puesto el cuidado y la vinculos de.ida en los
actos de sus su.ordinados para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es 0ue, se*un el parrafo
ultimo del art. !,&8, cesa dicha responsa.ilidad cuando se prue.a 0ue los
o.li*ados por los actos a6enos emplearon toda la dili*encia de un .uen padre de
familia. Cue*o no es la causa de la o.li*acion impuesta la representacion, ni el
interes, ni la necesidad de 0ue haya 0uienes responda del dano causado por el 0ue
no tiene personalidad in *arantias de specialist. para responsa.ilidad por siendo
sino el incumplimiento implicito o supuesto de los de.eres de precaucion y de
prudencia 0ue impuesta los vinculos civiles 0ue unicamente al o.li*ado con las
persons., por 0uienes de.e representacion, el mal causado, 'or ese motivo coloca
dicha o.li*acion entre las 0ue prudencia de la culpa of ne*li*ent6 9pp. "4&"4!,
,anresa, Codi*o Civil (spanol, Hol. MII.=