Philosophy, freedom and praxis in Epictetus Stoicism

Introduction:
In this paper I am going to focus on Stoic philosophy in general, but especially in Epictetus
writings. As we know, the late Stoicism was far more pragmatist, so to say, than theoretical
and the epistemological problems played second fiddle while the applied ethics, or, more
precisely, the applied doctrine of Stoicism became the most important part of teaching the
doctrine. It is clear that for Stoics, physics, logic and ethic were on the same side, the
world was not divided in three ontological forms but that three forms are the ones to
address the problem of knowing the world and are absolutely connected. As Epictetus
followed the inheritance of Chrysippus and other Stoic philosophers here is not going to be
discussed properly the theoretical background that underlie Epictectus work nor the
connection among physics, logic and ethic but I will start from the psychological space
where the rational decision is done.
The path of freedom is knowledge of ourselves:
The relation between the practice of philosophy and freedom has been always one of the
main underlying goals in philosophy especially when concerning moral philosophy. e
should be reminded that the breaking point with not only !odern philosophy but also the
voluble and steady teleological line which linked Ancient philosophy and !odern thought
until "ant was the connection within knowledge of the nature and knowledge of what is
good for human beings as part of the nature. To sum up closer to the starting point from
where the Stoics cogitated we can say# Logos and physis and its correlation always had a
predominant role when $ustifying morality on a fair basis for everyone. %or the Stoics the
problematic level was the relationship between the interdependence of all e&isting and
forging a will that is free in the sense of dealing only with what we can handle, it is to say,
to know our limits as rational beings, which means knowing our nature and find out which
things befit our nature.
ith the emergence of Christianity that correlation became softer and softer to the point
that Logos and physis were separated or at least mediated by 'od speech, the (ible. In
that sense Stoics were alike typical Ancient philosophers, in some matters even
e&aggerating some of their characteristics. The role of the divinity was yet not personal
and although the divine forces were omnipresent and passing all through the nature and
time in the form of pneuma or generative fire, its pantheistic nature was a premise or a
blind spot as it seems to be in Spino)a philosophy. This means that the role of divinity in
Stoic philosophy and Epictetus too is, ironically, $ust as *iet)sche wanted to see the
becoming, free, blameless and a guarantor of its intrinsic goodness. %or Stoics nature and
divinity were united by Logos the rational link that is present throughout the cosmos. So
we can say that where the main difference between Stoics and Spino)a ontological base
and *iet)sche one is that the latter philosopher left 'od and divinity out of the limelight but
deifying nature as did the Stoics and Spino)a. To Epictetus and the Stoics act according to
+ogos and find our nature is to act according to the physis and divinity. %reedom for the
Stoics is to know which is the proper place and attitude of everything and respect those
limitations so that everything happens in the best of ways, according to fate, listening as
best we can the laws that fate entails. The main goal is to re$ect things that do not befit our
nature and to assent to the ones that befits. It is important to consider that although the
Stoics concept of human nature depends in great measure on the concept of human, ie
what the name brings with its definition, late Stoicism wants to show that freedom depends
also and chiefly on our particular surroundings and how we react to them. ,egarding what
depends on us, we are completely free to choose good and evil and that means acting in
accordance with our nature or act incorrectly, ie we are free to act rightly or wrongly, what
is good is in some way predefined but is not so easy to know because is not written
anywhere so we should find the best way by knowing the +ogos, through knowledge of
philosophy. That is probably the hardest point which the Stoics had to face but they solved
it focusing on what we should do to be purely effective in our concerns, worrying about
what actually can change in a similar manner to what (uddhists propose. It is very difficult
to affirm that the ethics of Stoicism suggest a moral of resignation because Stoics do not
aim to paraly)e the will or personal ambitions as (uddhists do but they ask for care,
patience, passionless to face what is not under our control, what does not depend on us.
So then, the resignation would not be about not taking account the happenings that we
can strive to change or to act within but about the ones that we can not handle or manage
at all. That is e&actly how we can do to be free and do not e&pect or hope anything beyond
our individual reach. Should this mean that Stoicism represents one of the first samples of
individualistic thought- e can say that according to their means does but not in its final
ob$ectives. Stoics claim for everyone who knew the doctrine to participate in politics and to
help the people who needs it but as it is said nowadays# before changing the world change
yourself. That would have been a good motto for Epictetus philosophy. hat happens with
this matter is that while you are caring about yourself and your self.knowledge you need to
leave aside the e&terior opinions and what the others may do because it would be too
much to focus on that. In addition we $ust can not try to convince or to teach anyone who
has not reached to the principles and precepts by themselves. That creates a dimension in
Stoic philosophy where empathy and interpersonal communication has some
insurmountable barriers which are those that do not allow the Stoic doctrine to be
developed directly in social and political terms but rather psychological and individual.
Thus, the Stoics advised to fulfill our role well, that we did not choose but we develop, in
order to contribute to a better society.
/n the other hand the representation that you create behaving on one way or another is
worth to be a significant issue only as long as it shows and represents an internal attitude
or intention because then it would be part of your nature, the nature of your reactions. (ut
it is better to seem stupid, evil or clumsy to spectators than to fail on the duty of being
serene against representations that can snatch our will and twist the path of our moral
rectitude. That is another task if we want to become free, to not worry about the opinion of
people that surround us and to not worry about how we affect the opinions of others even
if we try to do it the best that we can in order to achieve our goals. *obody is their material
attributes, ie nobody is their representations but rather the inner impulse which builds the
e&ternal representations and affects the bodies, and which is always prior to their
achievements or failures. Therefore our intention at every turn is the only thing that has
measurable and valuable moral 0uality and will be our first ob$ective and if we do not get it
we can not consider it a fail. %reedom will be then to be invincible in the sense of not lose
any battle on the basis of avoid getting into battles in which does not depend on us to win.
Then we will find only three main battles# the battle of knowing the world properly, the
battle of knowing ourselves and our nature and the battle of enforcements of precepts and
moral rules that should be done. hat we can do is to use properly the representations
and chiefly our opinions about the world and events that happens to us because are
typically these opinions that make us assent or re$ect what e&ists and not the facts
themselves, which are indifferent to the Stoics, without any intrinsic moral 0uality because
the Logos has arranged everything so that all make sense together and we are not able to
$udge without taking into account the order of the whole. This conception is very similar to
how *iet)sche orientated this matter too.
It is characteristic of a philosopher want to achieve freedom and what differentiates it from
the profane is to foster the inner resources by developing the governing principle, which is
the rationality that through the whole reality instead of fostering the e&terior that could also
lead us to unhappiness and restlessness. Above all would make us slaves, deprived of
liberty for tie ourselves to unnecessary things instead of living in accordance with nature.
That also implies that human nature does not need to be completed with a lot of things and
in fact is better for Stoics to die poor and serene than rich and troubled. (ut the limits are
always inner limits, limits within the attitude, that we need to discover to know what befits
us. It is an e&aggeration the common opinion that the Stoics re$ected almost everything
and wanted to live with as little as possible. The reality is that the Stoics did not consider
good or bad to have more or less goods but as they believed impossible to control all the
factors that could make you rich or famous they focused on a moral sense of right as
freedom, passionless, pure self control and personal growth to deal with any circumstance
and against all odds.
It is a common mistake to understand the concept of fate in Ancient philosophy as a hard
causal determinism that will block will to act freely. In fact the determinism in Stoicism is
more close to +eibni) conception than the materialistic or mechanical determinism that we
pose nowadays. Everything is connected for Stoics but this connection is much more
organic than mechanical, probably Epicure did a harder effort to solve the problem of free
agency. Then, we need to replace our thought to know what kind of free agency the Stoics
accepted. %reedom for Stoics is to act with all the reasons recogni)ed, it is to say,
recogni)ing that the world is itself rational and we are the only being who can grasp these
reasons, we $ust need to know why we act like we do in order to be free, and in any case,
we are inside the becoming and not mechanically coded so the ties that bind us to the fate
is $ust the Logos and the fate itself, we are free to think, to act and to decide freely all
within the reasons that the surroundings will bring us. So it is not a complete determinism,
it should be defined as an anomalous determinism, where the power to assent and re$ect
link us with the Logos via government principle, therefore, the ability to choose and decide
between reasons and opinions involves a certain handling of the causes.
The way to behave socially is not fully described by Epictetus but he says something
crucial about it when talking about the dialogue between profanes and philosopher, they
should not show their superiority in any way and they should not talk about the principles
even if the profanes start talking about it. The only fair way to talk of these matters is that
is regarding actions or e&amples in which the principles have been used. It is also
compared with the digestion process that, when digesting the principles has been carried
out in actions, then we can talk about it and teach them. This is a good e&ample of the
practical spirit of Stoicism and especially of Epictetus, for whom philosophy had to have a
very practical teaching component, to make well known the good and evil above all. The
result of this effort will be to be faultless and a model, although not perfect, close to the
character of divinity in regard to wisdom. To e&plicit this with Epictetus words#
1This is the situation and the character of the profane, never expects of himself the benefit
or damage, but from the outside. This is the situation and the character of the
philosopher: any benefit or damage is expected only from himself. These are the signs of
who is progressing: does not praises nobody, does not reproaches, to nobody claims, he
says nothing about himself bragging of what he is or what he knows when something puts
obstructions or bothers him, he complains only to himself. And if someone praises him, he
mocks in its interior who praises him.