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Australasian Journal of
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Testimony, induction and
folk psychology
Jack Lyons
a
a
University of Arizona
Published online: 02 Jun 2006.
To cite this article: Jack Lyons (1997) Testimony, induction and folk psychology,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75:2, 163-178
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409712347771
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 75, No. 2; June 1997
TESTI MONY, I NDUCTI ON AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
Jack Lyons
I. Introduction
Ther e is wi des pr ead agr eement among epi s t emol ogi s t s that our t est i moni al bel i ef s
(beliefs held on the basis of t est i mony) are general l y justified. Most also agree that testi-
mony is responsi bl e for a vast port i on of what we know. The cont roversy concerns how
or why t est i moni al bel i efs are justified. Is the j ust i fi cat i on of testimonial bel i ef in some
sense basic, or is this j ust i fi cat i on parasitic on more fundamental j ust i fi cat i onal princi-
ples regarding, e.g., percept i on and i nduct i on?
Al t hough the latter position has an intuitive pull and has traditionally been the domi-
nant theory, it has come under a good deal of attack lately. I want to argue here that at
least some of this attack is unsuccessful. In C. A. J. Coady' s important recent book on tes-
t i mony [2], he argues at l engt h agai nst t he i dea that our j us t i f i cat i on f or bel i evi ng
t est i mony can be reduced to i nduct i ve justification. Accor di ng to an inductivist theory of
t est i moni al j ust i f i cat i on (hencefort h si mpl y ' i nduct i vi sm' ) , t est i moni al j ust i fi cat i on is
just a special case of i nduct i ve j ust i fi cat i on; testimonial beliefs are j ust i fi ed because first-
hand exper i ence gi ves us i nduct i ve evi dence f or the cl ai m that peopl e are general l y
accurate in their reports. ~ Coady takes Hume to be the classical advocate of this position
(which he calls ' r educt i vi sm' , since it attempts to reduce testimonial j ust i fi cat i on to a
kind or kinds of j ust i fi cat i on more basic), and he insists that the i nduct i vi st t heory is
doomed to failure for a number of reasons.
My goal here is to show that Coady' s arguments against this roughl y Humean project
fail, and that whi l e the particular inductivist t heory advocat ed by Hume has some short-
comi ngs, cert ai n modi f i cat i ons of this t heory pr oduce a far mor e t enabl e ver si on of
inductivism. In sections II-IV I wi l l address three main arguments that Coady offers to
show that i nduct i on cannot j ust i fy our t est i moni al beliefs. Not onl y do I think that there
are serious probl ems with each of these arguments, but I think that the nature of these
problems suggests a way in whi ch an i nduct i vi st mi ght go about maki ng a posi t i ve pro-
posal. In the remai nder of the paper I offer a rough sketch of how that proposal mi ght
look and argue that our natural fol k psychol ogi cal abilities can and should be taken into
consideration in an expl anat i on of how our testimonial bel i efs are justified. In the end, I
will argue that at least one theory concerni ng the nature of our fol k psychol ogi cal beliefs
provides a strong argument in favour of i nduct i vi sm.
I should begi n with an important procedural point. I take the project at hand to be one
of expl ai ni ng how it is that normal peopl e are j ust i fi ed in their testimonial beliefs. 2 This
' By ' inductive' , I simply mean to capture all those cases of reasoning that are not deductive.
Thus, unlike, e.g., Elliot Sober [ 11 ], I will consider abduction (i.e., inference to the best explana-
tion) to be a species of induction.
2 I do not take the present project to be one of endorsing either internalism or externalism. A relia-
bilist, for example, might very well be interested in reducing the reliability of testimony to the
more basic reliability of induction.
163
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164 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
means (i) that I will be presupposi ng that peopl e are general l y j ust i fi ed in their testimoni-
al beliefs and that they are j ust i fi ed in roughl y those beliefs that they think they are, and
(ii) that the proj ect at hand is not to convi nce the reader that t est i mony (often) produces
j ust i fi ed beliefs, but to explain why agents who form beliefs on the basis of t est i mony are
(often) justified. For this sort of epi st emol ogi cal project, the reasonings or other psycho-
l ogi cal pr oces s es t hat r ender r el i ance on t es t i mony j us t i f i ed must be t he ki nds of
processes that normal peopl e actually empl oy or at least approxi mat e? Furthermore, I
take it that the issue concerns onl y the original j ust i fi cat i on of such beliefs, thus avoi di ng
cont ent i on about whet her memor y produces or merel y preserves justification.
Coady has three mai n arguments against the roughl y Humean proj ect of inductivism:
(1) The individual simply doesn' t have enough non-t est i moni al i nformat i on at her
disposal to j ust i fy the rel evant i nduct i ve inferences - very little of what we (hear-
ers) have hear d t est i f i ed have we had t he oppor t uni t y or even t he abi l i t y to
personal l y corroborate. [2, pp. 82-85]
(2) The whol e inductivist approach is deepl y flawed, because i f testimony were not
to some extent reliable, there woul d be no such thing as testimony. [2, pp. 85 ff]
(3) We cannot learn or understand a language without supposing that the speakers
of the language are t el l i ng the truth much of the time. [2, ch. 9]
Each of these argument s wi l l requi re a consi derabl e amount of unpacking; I wi l l deal
with t hem in reverse order.
II. Truth and Language Acqui si t i on
Thomas Rei d was, as far as I know, the first to cl ai m that we coul d not learn a l anguage
i f we did not bel i eve that others usually spoke the truth [10, p. 196]. Si nce we do in fact
learn languages, Rei d concl udes that we must have some sort of innate bias that causes
us to bel i eve that peopl e are t el l i ng the truth, a psychol ogi cal t endency whi ch he calls a
' Pri nci pl e of Cr edul i t y' . Coady' s argument (3) i nvokes a Davi dsoni an versi on of this
claim: a hearer cannot interpret others without presumi ng that much of what they say is
true, i.e., radical interpretation requires a presumpt i on of speakers' veracity. This argu-
ment is not ai med di r ect l y at what I am cal l i ng i nduct i vi sm, si nce Coady t akes the
argument to be general enough to cut against any theory that takes a basically reductivist
tack. In the next section I wi l l address the uses to whi ch Coady wants to put this and the
related argument (2) against i nduct i vi sm in particular, but first I woul d like to make a
preempt i ve case for the cl ai m that the Principle of Credul i t y and si mi l ar principles have
nothing to say directly on the subject of whet her testimonial beliefs are i nduct i vel y justi-
fied.
The notion of approximation is far less clear than many authors seem to think. However, I take it
that there is an intuitive sense in which people instantiate or approximate the statistical syllo-
gism, for example, while there is no such sense in which people approximate certain rules of
probability, like believing all necessary truths to the degree of 1. This rough, intuitive notion
will have to suffice for the present paper.
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Jack Lyons 165
Suppose children are born with the Principle of Credulity. What should we expect
this to tell us about the justifications of our linguistic beliefs (beliefs about the meani ngs
of words and so forth)? There are two ways to go here. The first is to cl ai m that i f Rei d' s
' Pri nci pl e' is really innate, t hen it is responsible for j ust i fyi ng the beliefs that it produces.
The second (and more interesting because less often noticed) approach is to cl ai m that
the principle is onl y essential in that it gives u s a n i nnat e bias, without which we simply
would not have the inferential power to learn a language. The standard view in l anguage
acquisition has it that in l earni ng language, children (at least tacitly) formulate and test
hypot heses, and cert ai n i nnat e bi ases serve to const r ai n the numbe r and nat ur e of
hypot heses t hat can be f or mul at ed. What is r esponsi bl e for the f or mul at i on of the
hypotheses, however, need not be what is responsible for the later justification in accept-
ing or ret ai ni ng any gi ven hypothesis. It is quite reasonable to cl ai m that what justifies
this acceptance is the ability of the hypothesis to survive potentially falsifying evidence
and to account for the rel evant data.
So there are two distinct procedures at issue here, hypothesis formulation and hypoth-
esis testing. Al t hough the former may be a sine qua non for language learning, it may
still be the latter that justifies my beliefs about my language. The bias toward bel i evi ng
what peopl e say is causally necessary for my j ust i fi ed bel i ef about what their words
mean, but this causal responsi bi l i t y does not i mpl y justificational responsi bi l i t y - the
principle is required for the existence, but not the justification, of the relevant beliefs. In
the same vein, the chi l d' s i nnat e assumptions about the possible syntactic structures of
natural languages are required for underst andi ng a language, but these assumptions play
no interesting role i n j ust i fyi ng any beliefs about the language.
I f the precedi ng account is right, then nat i vi sm about a Principle of Credulity and
i nduct i vi sm about t est i moni al j ust i fi cat i on are orthogonal. The hypothesis of general
veracity combi ned with hypotheses about the meani ngs of utterances general l y wi t h-
stands falsification (people do not usual l y say something that I think means or implies
that the dog is i n the room when I t hi nk that the dog is not in the room), provides useful
predictions (when people say something that I think means that the dog is in the other
room, and I go to fi nd the dog, it is usual l y there), and i n a general way, accounts for
why these people are maki ng these incessant noises. So much for the preemptive argu-
ment about the irrelevance of the Principle of Credulity to whether testimony is justified
inductively or not. The general moral is that the i nnat eness of a faculty without which we
could not have certain beliefs, still allows for the possibility that the beliefs produced by
that faculty are j ust i fi ed i nduct i vel y (abductively, to be more precise about the current
case). I will next deal with the more specific arguments that Coady levels against i nduc-
tivism.
III. Reliability Presupposed?
Coady' s ar gument (2), like his (3), mai nt ai ns that there is a f undament al flaw in the
Humean project of rel yi ng on merel y first-hand experience to check the reliability of tes-
timony, for we coul d not check the reliability of testimony i f we were not able to first
detect instances of testimony. But the very detection of testimony presupposes the relia-
bility of testimony.
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166 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
Thi s di f f i cul t y cons i s t s i n t he f act t hat t he whol e e nt e r pr i s e of [ i nduct i vi s m]
requi res t hat we under st and what t est i mony is i ndependent l y of knowi ng t hat i t is,
i n any degree, a r el i abl e f or m of evi dence about t he way t he wor l d is. Thi s is, of
course, t he poi nt of Hu me ' s sayi ng: ' The r eason why we pl ace any cr edi t i n wi t -
nesses and hi st or i ans, is not der i ved f r om any connexion, whi ch we per cei ve a
priori, bet ween t es t i mony and real i t y, but becaus e we are accus t omed to f i nd a
conf or mi t y bet ween t hem. ' It is a cl ear i mpl i cat i on f r om t hi s t hat we mi ght have
di scover ed ( t hough i n fact we di d not ) t hat t here was no conf or mi t y at al l bet ween
t est i mony and real i t y. [2, p. 85]
Coady t hen goes on t o ar gue t hat t hi s ' cl ear i mpl i cat i on' of Hu me ' s t heor y is, i n fact,
fal se; we coul d not possi bl y have di scover ed a t ot al l ack of conf or mi t y bet ween t r ut h and
t est i mony. In such a case, he cl ai ms, t here woul d be no such t hi ng as t he speech- act of
t est i fyi ng, and no ut t er ances woul d have any di scer ni bl e cont ent . So, by modus tollens,
Hu me ' s t heor y is false.
Ther e are a numbe r of pr obl ems wi t h t hi s l i ne of ar gument at i on. For t he moment , l et
us gr ant t o Coady t hat t here is some sort of a necessar y connect i on bet ween t r ut h and t es-
t i mony (qua t es t i mony) - i.e., t hat i t is i mpos s i bl e t hat t her e be t e s t i mony yet i t be
compl et el y i naccurat e. 4 Does Hu me ' s t heor y i mpl y t he negat i on of t hi s cl ai m? No. Hume
is careful not to cl ai m t hat t her e i s no necessar y connect i on bet ween t r ut h and t est i mony,
onl y t hat i t is not t he case t hat we bel i eve wi t nesses because of such a connect i on, si nce
we are not aware of any such c onne c t i on: Not onl y is Hu me ' s cl ai m ver y l i kel y true,
gi ven t hat mos t peopl e have ne ve r consi der ed t he issue, but t he f act t hat we do not rea-
son on t he basi s of a per cei ved necessar y connect i on does not even begi n t o i mpl y t hat
t here is no necessar y connect i on. And even i f Hume had made t he st r onger cl ai m, t here
is no r eason to t hi nk t hat t hi s woul d be a cent r al t enet of t he i nduct i vi st posi t i on. It mi ght
ver y wel l be t he case t hat t es t i mony has all sort s of i nt er est i ng pr oper t i es t hat have not h-
i ng to do wi t h its rol e i n t he j ust i f i cat i on of bel i efs.
Per haps Coady t hi nks t hat havi ng i nduct i ve evi dence f or p i mpl i es t hat p is cont i n-
gent . But s ur el y i t i s pos s i bl e t o me a s ur e a n u mb e r of r i ght t r i a ngl e s and acqui r e
i nduct i ve evi dence for t he t r ut h of t he Pyt hagor ean t heor em, or t o gat her empi r i cal ( and
si mi l ar l y i nduct i ve) evi dence f or an appr oxi mat i on of n. Hence, it cannot be a gener al
rul e t hat i nduct i on i mpl i es cont i ngency.
Does t he i nduct i vi st pr oj ect pr esuppose t he rel i abi l i t y of t est i mony? In t he pr evi ous
sect i on, I descr i bed how an i nduct i vi st t heory mi ght expl ai n chi l dr en' s l ear ni ng of a l an-
guage. Thi s, I t ake it, is par t of t he i nduct i vi st proj ect , t o descr i be how chi l dr en acqui re
j ust i f i ed bel i ef s about t he noi ses t hat t hey hear peopl e maki ng. As ar gued i n t he l ast sec-
t i on, abduct i on can expl ai n how l i st eners come to have j ust i f i ed bel i ef s t hat t he noi ses
This claim cannot be that there is a necessary connection between the way the world is and the
noises we hear people make (at least not any interesting one).
Hume' s caution, of course, is not the result of his having noticed any sort of necessary connec-
tion. It is more likely a simple consequence of his general tendency to refrain from making
explicit met aphysi cal claims and to focus instead on psychol ogi cal and epistemic ones.
Similarly, in his famous discussion of causation, Hume is careful never to deny the existence of
any necessary connection between cause and effect; he merely denies awareness of such a con-
nection.
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Jack Lyons 167
other peopl e are maki ng are both meani ngful and (often) true. There is no l egi t i mat e rea-
son to insist that these t wo be handl ed serially, that first we di scover the meani ng then
the reliability. The inferential process I am offeri ng here is abduction after all, and there
is nothing strange about havi ng a set of hypotheses be the unit of testing where abduction
is concerned, since it is normal l y onl y sets of hypotheses that make clear predictions.
Thus, it is entirely possi bl e that children acquire some evi dence for the reliability of tes-
t i mony at t he ver y same t i me that t hey l earn t he l anguage. Thi s, however , is qui t e
different from presupposi ng the reliability of testimony.
Thus, I think that this phase of Coady' s attack against the Humean project is unsuc-
cessful. It is probabl y true that i f there were no correlation at all bet ween t est i mony and
the way the worl d is, then we woul d not be j ust i fi ed in our testimonial beliefs - that is,
we woul d not be j ust i fi ed in thinking that there were such a correlation. But I presume
likewise that i f it were not the case that most peopl e do not have three legs, we woul d not
be j ust i fi ed in our bel i ef that they do not. Such counterfactuals are not indications of
what is i nduct i vel y j ust i fi ed and what is not.
IV. Induct i on and the Pauci t y of Evi dence Argument s
There is one more argument that Coady briefly mentions, and although he leans on this
one the least, we wi l l see that it is really the hardest to reckon with. In addition to the
l anguage-ori ent ed arguments dealt with above, Coady argues that in order for induction
to j ust i fy our testimonial beliefs, we woul d need a much greater fund of direct, non-testi-
monial evi dence about the worl d than we have:
. . [I]t seems absurd to suggest that, individually, we have done anything like the
amount of f i el d- wor k that [inductivism] requires. As ment i oned earlier, many of
us have never seen a baby born, nor have most of us exami ned the circulation of
the bl ood nor the actual geography of the wo r l d . . . This list [is] supposed to be
typical in that it indicate[s] areas in whi ch we rightly accept testimony without
ever havi ng engaged in the sort of checki ng of reports against personal observa-
tion that [inductivism] demands. [2, pp. 82-83, emphasi s in original]
The very fact that we rely on t est i mony for so much of what we bel i eve indicates that we
have not done a lot of i ndependent solitary observation. This provides what I wi l l call the
Weak Paucity of Evi dence Argument :
WPA: Most peopl e have personal l y veri fi ed precious few reports, and this little bit
of first-hand observat i on is not enough to i nduct i vel y det ermi ne the general relia-
bility of testimony. Any i nduct i ve argument for the reliability of t est i mony woul d
be an argument from too small a sample.
Al t hough I want to return to this argument later, Coady considers a versi on of induc-
tivism that takes into account various kinds of reports, and against this theory he offers
two argument s that col l ect i vel y I wi l l call the St rong Pauci t y of Evi dence Argument ,
SPA:
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168 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
( SPA i) For mos t of us, t here are onl y a f ew ki nds of r epor t s t hat we mi ght have
been abl e t o veri fy personal l y. The rest wi l l be compl et el y wi t hout i nduct i ve sup-
port.
( SPA ii) Any gi ven r epor t can be cl assi fi ed i n ma ny di f f er ent ways, onl y some of
whi ch wi l l yi el d i nduct i ve j ust i fi cat i on. But i t is a pr obl em for i nduct i vi sm t hat
t here is no pr i nci pl ed l evel of gener al i t y at whi ch to speci fy t he di f f er ent ki nds of
report s.
The t r oubl e wi t h SPA, as I see it, is t hat it is t oo st rong; I wi l l argue t hat t he assumpt i ons
i mpl i ci t i n t hi s t wo- pr onged ar gument are suf f i ci ent t o under mi ne i nduct i on i n general .
I nduct i ve i nf er ence has t wo mai n component s: first, t her e is i nduct i ve gener al i zat i on,
t he pr ocess by whi ch we come t o f or m bel i ef s i n st at i st i cal or uni ver sal general i zat i ons. 6
In order, however , to appl y t he knowl edge encoded i n t hese gener al i zat i ons to any par-
t i cul ar case, we wi l l have to engage i n di rect i nf er ence, t he pr ocess by whi ch we i nf er
def i ni t e (i.e., si ngl e- case) pr obabi l i t i es f r om t he i ndef i ni t e pr obabi l i t i es t hat we have
i nduced. (Defi ni t e pr obabi l i t i es are t hi ngs l i ke t he pr obabi l i t y t hat Br own is over six feet
tall, or t he pr obabi l i t y t hat my doi ng A at t i me t wi l l l ead to out come 0. 7) Now t he di ffer-
ence bet ween WPA and SPA, i n a r ough and r eady way, is t hat t he fi rst is concer ned
wi t h t he si ze of t he sampl e, whi l e t he l at t er is concer ned wi t h t he represent at i veness of
t he sampl e. But t he pr obl em t hat Coady rai ses i n SPA is an ext r emel y gener al one, for i t
is t he pr obl em of t he r ef er ence cl ass for di rect i nf er ence, not t he pr obl em of t he r ef er ence
cl ass f or di r ect - i nf er ence- f or - t es t i mony. The r e i s not hi ng i n Co a d y ' s a r gume nt t hat
al l ows us t o rest ri ct t he ar gument t o t est i mony- r el at ed r ef er ence cl asses. Thus, i f SPA
shows t hat i nduct i on is i nsuf f i ci ent f or j ust i f yi ng t est i moni al bel i efs, it shows t hat i nduc-
t i on i s i ns uf f i c i e nt f or j us t i f yi ng any bel i ef s. Coa dy t hi nks i t is a ' pe r ha ps dubi ous
as s umpt i on' t hat t hi s pr obl em of t he r ef er ence cl ass can be sol ved, but t he gener al i t y of
t hi s pr obl em i ndi cat es t hat it can be sol ved, i f i nduct i on i n gener al is any good. The solu-
t i on is wor t h l ooki ng into.
The cl assi cal and i nt ui t i ve sol ut i on to t he pr obl em of t he r ef er ence cl ass was gi ven by
Rei chenbach [9]: when t r yi ng to fi gure out t he pr obabi l i t y of some par t i cul ar event , we
are to e mbe d t hat event i n t he nar r owes t r ef er ence cl ass f or whi ch we have adequat e
pr obabi l i s t i c i nf or mat i on. 8 Re i c h e n b a c h ' s pr i nci pl e ser ves an i l l ust r at i ve pur pos e; t he
exact f or mul at i on of a t heor y of di r ect i nf er ence is not i mpor t ant here, but t he assump-
t i ons under l yi ng t hi s epi st emi c pr i nci pl e are cruci al t o t he cur r ent di scussi on. The fi rst of
t hese assumpt i ons is t hat we need not consi der ever y r ef er ence cl ass to whi ch our t arget
6 Exactly what inductive generalization produces is somewhat controversial, but it will be irrele-
vant to the present discussion whether it produces beliefs in precise probabilities, beliefs in
ranges of probabilities, partial beliefs, degrees of belief, or what have you.
7 This terminology, which I borrow from John Pollock [8], helps to pinpoint a certain tension in
this argument: the first part of the argument (SPA i) assumes that there is a principled method of
classification for inductive generalization (such that we can have inductively justified beliefs
about the reliability of some, but only some, kinds of reports), and then (SPA ii) proceeds to
deny that there is any such principled method of classification available for direct inference. It is
hard to see how they could both be true.
8 A more precise formulation of this view is found in [8], which endorses something very much
like this and to which I owe much of the ensuing discussion.
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Jack Lyons 169
bel ongs . Th e s e c o n d i s t hat e v e n s o me r e f e r e n c e c l a s s e s t hat we do c ons i de r can r e a s on-
abl y be i gnor e d; my k n o wi n g t hat t hi s obj ect , c, i s a C and t hat mo s t Cs ar e Ds gi ve s me
a r e a s on t o b e l i e v e t hat c i s ( pr oba bl y) a D. Thi s sor t o f i nf e r e nc e , o f cour s e, is e mi n e n t l y
def eas i bl e, but t he k n o wl e d g e t hat c i s al s o an F doe s not , by i t sel f , de f e a t my or i gi nal
i nf er ence. Ce r t a i nl y C &F i s a n a r r o we r r e f e r e n c e cl as s t han C, but i f I do not k n o w any-
t hi ng about h o w ma n y C&F s ar e Ds, t he n I a m j us t i f i e d i n i gnor i ng t he f act t hat c i s al so
an F. Of c our s e , i f I do k n o w s o me t h i n g about t hat pr obabi l i t y, t he n I n e e d t o c ons i de r it,
but o t h e r wi s e I do n o t ?
No w i t mi g h t b e t hought t hat we ne e d s o me pos i t i ve r e a s on f or t hi nki ng t hat any nar -
r ower cl as s i s i r r el evant i n t he s e ns e t hat be i ng an F, t o c ont i nue wi t h t he a b o v e e xa mpl e ,
does not c h a n g e t he pr oba bi l i t y o f be i ng a D gi ve n t hat it is a C. Ho we v e r , t hi s r equi r e-
me nt i s t oo s t r ong. Fi r s t o f al l , s i nc e any obj e c t f al l s i nt o i nde f i ni t e l y ma n y r e f e r e n c e
cl as s es n a r r o we r t han t he one we t ake t o be r el evant , we wo u l d ha ve t o ha ve i ndef i ni t el y
ma ny j us t i f i e d be l i e f s i n or de r e ve r t o b e j us t i f i e d i n an i nduc t i ve i nf e r e nc e o f t hi s nat ur e.
Second, c o n s i d e r a r e pr e s e nt a t i ve case: my i ns ur a nc e a ge nt k n o ws t he st at i st i cs f or dr i -
ver s o f my age, ge nde r , a nd dr i vi ng r e c o r d i n t hi s st at e. Ye t my agent al s o k n o ws my
addr es s , a l t hough s he doe s not ha ve any st at i st i cs f or dr i ver s o f my age, ge nde r a nd dr i -
vi ng r e c o r d who l i ve at my address. He n c e my i n s u r a n c e a g e n t l a c k s a n y p o s i t i v e
e vi de nc e t hat my s t r e e t c or ne r i s not a par t i cul ar l y da nge r ous one. Nor , I wi l l a s s ume , i s
she s o dul l as t o a s s u me t hat t hi s i s i r r el evant i nf or ma t i on. So me c or ne r s ar e mo r e dan-
ger ous t ha n ot her s . Do e s t hi s me a n t hat h e r b e l i e f about t he a ppr oxi ma t e l i ke l i hood o f
my ge t t i ng i nt o an a c c i de nt i s unj us t i f i ed, s i nc e s he has not t aken i nt o c ons i de r a t i on my
st r eet c o me r ? Pr e s u ma b l y not . Cer t ai nl y, s he wo u l d be mo r e j us t i f i e d i f he r b e l i e f we r e
f ounde d on a gr e a t e r a mo u n t o f e v i d e n c e ( and h e n c e wo u l d b e j us t i f i e d i n hol di ng a l ess
t enuous b e l i e f a nd/ or one t hat ma k e s a mo r e pr e c i s e e s t i ma t e o f t he r e l e va nt pr obabi l i t y) ,
but t hi s doe s not i mp l y t hat t he l es s t han f ul l y i n f o r me d b e l i e f i s unj us t i f i ed. I f j us t i f i c a -
t i on r e qui r e d us t o b e f ul l y i nf or me d, we wo u l d not need i nduct i on.
Th e Re i c h e n b a c h i a n pr i nc i pl e i s not i di os ync r a t i c t o t e s t i mony, nor is i t l i mi t e d t o
di r ect i n f e r e n c e . I n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n mu s t r el y f or i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n on s o me t h i n g
qui t e si mi l ar ; i t s e e ms c l e a r t hat i f all t he s wa n s I ha ve e ve r s e e n ar e whi t e , a nd all I
know about Aus t r a l i a n s wa n s i s t hat t her e ar e s o me and t hat I ha ve not s e e n t he m, I a m
still j us t i f i e d i n my b e l i e f t hat all s wa ns ar e whi t e , de s pi t e t he ( u n k n o wn t o me ) f act t hat
Aus t r al i an s wa n s ar e bl ack. Wh a t j us t i f i e s t hi s i nf e r e nc e appear s t o be t he f act t hat t her e
is no n a r r o we r r e f e r e n c e cl as s about wh i c h I ha ve any j us t i f i e d be l i e f s a nd wh i c h of f er s
me a ny r e a s on f or r et r act i ng my i nf e r e nc e . Si mi l ar l y, i f I ha ve s o me i nduc t i ve e v i d e n c e
f or t he r el i abi l i t y o f t e s t i mo n y i n gener al , t he n I a m j us t i f i e d i n t hi nki ng t hat you ar e
t el l i ng me t he t r ut h unl e s s your p r e s e n t r e por t f al l s i nt o a na r r owe r r e f e r e nc e cl as s f o r
whi ch I have some pos i t i ve reason to bel i eve your t est i mony is unreliable. Th e f act t hat
There are cases that this sort of theory will not address. For example, suppose I know that c is a
C and that c is an F, but I do not know the probability of c being a D given that it is a C&F, and
I know that the probability of c being a D given that it is a C is different from the probability of
it bei ng a D given that it is an F. It is unclear what I should infer here, and as far as I know, no
one has a neat solution to this problem. However, it should be somewhat clear by this point and
more clear shortly, that this is everybody's probl em, and to believe that induction is generally a
justification-conferring procedure is to assume that there is some solution to this problem, even
if no one has yet articulated it.
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170 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
you have dark hair is i rrel evant to whet her I am j ust i fi ed in accept i ng your testimony,
because I do not have any i nf ormat i on concerni ng the reliability of dark-haired peopl e' s
testimony. Nor do I have any reason to rej ect your cl ai m that, say, ulcers are caused by
bacteria rather than by excess st omach acid, until and unless I have some (positive) rea-
son to bel i eve that you mi ght be lying or that you j ust are not in a position to know about
such things. Certainly we need to have some posi t i ve evi dence for the general reliability
of t est i mony (i.e., we need to have inductive evi dence for some rel evant i nduct i ve gener-
alization in order for direct i nference to even get of f the ground); yet we cannot, on pain
of general skept i ci sm about induction, require that the agent have posi t i ve reasons for
thinking that probabilities will not change for narrower reference classes. This approach
yields a principled reference class for inductive generalization and for direct inference:
the narrowest one for whi ch the agent has adequate probabilistic information. This, then,
provi des a solution to both (SPA i) and (SPA ii).
The consequence of all this is that i f Coady wants to maintain this argument against
the Humean theory of testimony, he is goi ng to have to vi ew al l induction as suspect.
Wi t hout somet hi ng like the Rei chenbachi an principle, we are simply faced with the (old)
pr obl em of induction. Coady' s phi l osophy may be closer to Hume' s than we had been
led to believe.
V. Test i mony and Fol k Psychol ogy
So far, I have argued that none of Coady' s criticisms of the inductivist theory of testimo-
ny actually work. In particular, I argued that the necessary connect i ons that may obtain
bet ween truth and t est i mony and bet ween truth and the learning of l anguage are irrele-
vant to the question of whet her our testimonial beliefs are j ust i fi ed via induction. I have
also argued that t he St rong Pauci t y of Evi dence Ar gument that Coady offers is t oo
strong, in that i f it works against induction of testimony, it works against induction in
general. Yet this latter cl ai m does not serve to refut e the Weak Pauci t y of Evi dence
Argument. This argument, I think, is the argument against an i nduct i ve theory of the j us-
tification of testimonial belief.
The central cl ai m of WPA is that the number of reports that we have actually checked
is too small to j ust i fy us in our testimonial beliefs. The fact that so much of what we
bel i eve we bel i eve on the basis of testimony shows that correspondi ngl y little of what we
bel i eve coul d even possibly serve to j ust i fy induction. This argument, that any inductive
evi dence for the reliability of testimony must be an argument from a small sample, can
nei t her be rendered a deci si ve argument against i nduct i vi sm, nor can it be deci si vel y
refuted until someone figures out how large a sample must be and how large of a sample
we actually are able to bring to bear in our inductive argument for the reliability of testi-
mony. I will not take this route. Instead, I want to lessen the force of WPA by showi ng
how we, as epi st emi c agents, mi ght acquire additional bases of evi dence for our bel i ef in
the general reliability of testimony, bases that are overl ooked by WPA. That is, I want to
try to show that the i nduct i ve sample may not be as small as WPA assumes it is.
The central weakness in WPA, I will argue, is that it presumes that what ever induc-
tive evi dence we mi ght have for the general reliability of t est i mony must be acquired by
checki ng reports against facts (e.g., percei vi ng that S says that p and percei vi ng that p).
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Jack Lyons 171
In what fol l ows, I wi l l try to enl arge the i nduct i ve base by argui ng that we can also
acquire inductive evi dence for the reliability of testimony by inferring it from (non-testi-
monially) j ust i fi ed folk psychological beliefs. This, of course, raises the question of how
we acquire our folk psychological beliefs, since this is obviously relevant to how such
beliefs are j ust i fi ed and whether they can play the role I want to assign them. To illus-
trate the rel evance of our folk psychol ogi cal beliefs to t est i moni al j ust i fi cat i on, I will
examine i n some detail one particular psychological and philosophical theory about the
origins of our folk psychological beliefs. I will then try to show how this theory, the sim-
ulation theory, i mproves the argument for an i nduct i vi st theory of the j ust i fi cat i on of
testimonial beliefs.
The probl em with Hume' s treatment of testimonial bel i ef is that it assumes that our
evidence for the reliability of t est i mony must come in the form of personally experienc-
ing a correlation bet ween reports and facts (or at least things that are taken by the agent
to be facts). This is what Coady has in mi nd when he speaks of ' veri fyi ng reports' ; we
hear someone say that p and we find i ndependent , non-t est i moni al evi dence for p. Al l
that is sought here is a simple correlation bet ween utterances and the world, without any
attempt to get inside the mi nds of the testifiers.
However, the folk, whose t est i moni al beliefs are i n quest i on here, are not behav-
iourists, and they (we) do not reason like behavi ouri st s; i n expl ai ni ng and predicting
human behaviour, the folk do not appeal onl y to lawlike uniformities that obtain bet ween
peopl e' s envi ronment s and their behavi our (between the facts and the reports), but also
to peopl e' s i nt ernal ment al states. Our folk psychol ogy is an explicitly mentatistic one. I
explain your droppi ng your car off at the brake shop in terms of your desire to have your
brakes repaired and your bel i ef that the shop in question will repair them. Not onl y do
my folk psychological beliefs enter i nt o an expl anat i on for me of your behaviour, how-
ever; these same beliefs also account for a lot of my behaviour. My beliefs about your
beliefs and desires constrain the ways i n which I am wi l l i ng to behave around you.
Thus, in account i ng for the j ust i fi cat i on for our bel i ef i n the general reliability of tes-
timony, it is i mpl ausi bl e to t hi nk that simple fact-report correlations are the onl y ki nds of
evidence we bri ng to bear on the issue. We, as epistemic agents, also have at our disposal
a wide range of folk psychological beliefs that we can use to support statistical general-
izations that are rel evant to our bel i ef in the reliability of testimony. Furthermore, our
folk psychological beliefs are clearly relevant to our r el i ance on testimony in that they
account for the way in which we engage in direct inference. When trying to figure out
whether to bel i eve a particular report, we consi der not onl y (not even primarily) the sort
of report bei ng gi ven; we also take into account the ment al states of the person doi ng the
reporting (e.g., the speaker' s possible motives for lying, the speaker' s background expe-
rience, etc.). The folk psychological beliefs that are most relevant to the present topic are
(i) that people general l y try to tell the truth (unless they have some mot i ve to lie), and (ii)
that people are generally compet ent with respect to bel i evi ng the truth. Cal l these beliefs
the Sincerity Pri nci pl e and the Compet ence Principle, respectively. What needs to be
shown is that it is possible to have i nduct i ve justification for these two principles, evi-
dence that is (a) not itself based on t est i mony (b) not justified by fact-report correlation
checking, and (c) derivable from j ust i fi ed folk psychological beliefs or the mechani sms
that produce these j ust i fi ed beliefs.
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172 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
I think it is fairly obvi ous how the Sincerity Pri nci pl e and the Compet ence Principle,
i f j ust i fi ed non-t est i moni al l y, provi de evi dence for the general reliability of testimony.
What needs to be shown is that t hese beliefs are susceptible to inductive, non-t est i moni al
justification. In the fol l owi ng section, I wi l l focus on a particular psychol ogi cal theory
about the ori gi ns of our f ol k psychol ogi cal bel i efs and how it coul d account for our
i nduct i ve evi dence for our testimonial beliefs. I will try to show that this t heory provi des
some evi dence for the cl ai m that the Sincerity Pri nci pl e and the Compet ence Principle
are j ust i fi ed vi a i nduct i ve generalization. Then I will show how this theory al l ows us to
use and modi fy these principles in direct inference.
VI. Si mul at i on and Induction
Ther e are numer ous e xa mpl e s of f ol k ps yc hol ogi c a l be l i e f s t hat , i nt ui t i vel y, ar e
justified, l Here are a f ew of mine: ' Fr ed bought that car because he want ed to have i t ' ,
or ' Al l the peopl e in the r oom wi t h me right now woul d say that they bel i eve that the
lights are on i f they were asked. ' And a bit more to the point, ' Peopl e generally form
bel i efs about the vi sual properties of their envi r onment s by usi ng their eyes. ' ' Ever y
Amer i can knows a toilet when she sees one and, for that matter, knows what the word
"t oi l et " means. ' ' Peopl e do not generally lie unless they have some reason to do so. ' I
classify all of t hese as fol k psychol ogi cal beliefs because they i nvol ve the ascription of
ment al states to others, and it is beliefs like these by whi ch the fol k predict and explain
the behavi our of others. It is not only the content that makes these bel i efs fol k psycho-
l ogi cal bel i ef s; t he pr evi ous bel i ef s count in part becaus e I di d not engage in any
empi ri cal studies or rely on professional psychol ogy to arrive at them. Furthermore, even
though reliability, for example, is not a ment al state, to ascribe rel i abl e bel i ef formi ng
mechani sms is to make a cl ai m about that per son' s psychol ogi cal states. Thus I t ake
cl ai ms made by the fol k about the truth and the j ust i fi cat i on of other peopl e' s bel i efs to
fall under the rubric of fol k psychology. This will be made more clear when I discuss the
details of the si mul at i on theory.
To det ermi ne the source of the j ust i fi cat i on of these beliefs, we should l ook into the
source of the bel i efs t hemsel ves. There are a number of psychol ogi cal theories about the
or i gi n of our f ol k ps yc hol ogi c a l bel i ef s , and t hey f al l i nt o t wo mai n cat egor i es .
Accordi ng to the simulation theory (see, e.g., [4], [5] and [7]), we form beliefs about the
ment al states of others by using the mechani sms by whi ch we form the corresponding
states in ourselves. We simply i magi ne oursel ves in the ot her ' s position, and see what
states are produced; that is, we take our own mental state production mechani sms ' off-
l i ne ' , f eed in t he r el evant per cept ual and ot her i nput s, and s i mpl y i nt r os pect t he
appropriate output. Bei ng hit by an i magi nary rock causes i magi nary anger when I run
that input through my off-l i ne ment al state product i on mechani sms, so I predict of some-
one who has j ust been hit by a rock that she wi l l be angry) 1
~0 Even if you think that belief-desire psychology is badly enough mistaken that it will not end up
in a finished science of the mind, this does not at all preclude you from thinking that ordinary
people are justified in their folk psychological beliefs (at least to some ordinary, non-scientific
degree of justification).
" I am, of course, glossing over a number of subtleties that make the view more attractive. None
of these subtleties will be relevant to the present discussion, however.
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Jack Lyons 173
How, then, woul d the simulation t heory help i nduct i vi sm? In section II, I cl ai med that
learning a l anguage and l earni ng that peopl e' s reports are general l y accurate can take
place concurrently, and the consequent beliefs can be j ust i fi ed i nduct i vel y (viz., abduc-
tively) even i f Rei d' s pri nci pl e of credul i t y is true. This woul d i ndi cat e that we have
done s ome first hand report checki ng, but what simulation can do is to gi ve us further
evi dence and expand on the i nduct i ve sample that WPA insists is too small by gi vi ng us
additional evi dence for the Sincerity Pri nci pl e and the Compet ence Principle. The role of
simulation is to provi de the agent wi t h a host of (justified) bel i efs about single cases,
from whi ch the agent can then i nduce the appropriate generalizations.
For instance, say I want to know whet her Smi t h bel i eves that there is a rhinoceros in
my l i vi ng room. Accor di ng to the si mul at i on theory, I si mpl y i magi ne mys el f in Smi t h' s
position (sitting on my l i vi ng r oom couch), f eed the rel evant perceptual inputs into my
(now off-line) ment al state product i on mechani sms, and introspect whet her these mecha-
nisms produce an ersatz bel i ef that there is a rhinoceros in the room. Si nce they do not, I
concl ude that Smi t h woul d not have this belief. Then I ask Smith to consi der the proposi-
tion that there is a r hi nocer os in my l i vi ng r oom and si mul at e her underst andi ng my
request and formi ng the bel i ef that there is not one in the room. I concl ude that Smith
believes that there is not a rhi noceros in the room. Here is one fol k psychol ogi cal bel i ef
of mi ne (it i nvol ves a ment al state ascription) that (I presume) is j ust i fi ed and that is cer-
tainly not i ndebt ed to t est i mony for its justification. Now since I am j ust i fi ed in bel i evi ng
that Smi t h bel i eves there is not a rhinoceros in the r oom (on the basis of simulation), and
I am j ust i fi ed in thinking that it is t rue that there is not one in the r oom (on the basis of
perception), I am j ust i fi ed in bel i evi ng that at least one person has at least one true belief.
I perform many such simulations wi t h di fferent peopl e, and end up with a number of
beliefs that support the i nduct i ve general i zat i on that peopl e are generally compet ent in
formi ng beliefs.
Even t hough the above exampl e i nvol ves my ' checki ng' Smi t h' s bel i ef in that I have
a j ust i fi ed bel i ef that she bel i eves p and an independent, j ust i fi ed bel i ef that p, this still
constitutes an enl argement of the i nduct i ve sample ment i oned in WPA, for Smith has not
sai d anything. Si mul at i on offers a wi der i nduct i ve sample than WPA assumes, because it
does not require us to check reports, since it does not require the e x i s t e nc e of reports.
Simulation al l ows for bel i ef checki ng wi t hout report checking. But si mul at i on can do
more than this, for I do not even have to check each particular bel i ef to be j ust i fi ed in
thinking it is true. Gi ven that I am j ust i fi ed in thinking that I am generally compet ent in
my ability to form true beliefs, then the bel i efs that I ascribe to peopl e will be beliefs that
I woul d ascri be to mys e l f i f my si t uat i on wer e si mi l ar to theirs, most of whi ch, by
hypothesis, I am j ust i fi ed in thinking are true. Gi ven the ubi qui t y of such fol k psychol og-
ical beliefs, it seems clear that the i nduct i ve sample, at least for the r el i abi l i t y o f bel i ef s,
must be a great deal larger than WPA supposes.
A similar story goes for the bel i ef that peopl e are general l y sincere. I f I am general l y
sincere, then, c e t e r i s par i bus , I wi l l make many i ndi vi dual ascriptions of sincerity to var-
ious people. And gi ven that most of my fol k psychol ogi cal beliefs are justified, I wi l l
have a wi de sampl e of j ust i f i ed bel i ef s in the si nceri t y of peopl e, f r om whi ch I can
induce that peopl e are general l y sincere. So pr ovi ded that I am general l y sincere, and
provided that I j u s t i f i a b l y be l i e v e that I am general l y competent, simulation combi ned
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174 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
with i nduct i ve general i zat i on will provi de me wi t h i nduct i vel y j ust i fi ed beliefs that peo-
pl e ar e g e n e r a l l y c o mp e t e n t and g e n e r a l l y s i ncer e. Eve n i f I a m e p i s t e mi c a l l y
incompetent, this i ncompet ence is goi ng to infect my third-person bel i ef ascriptions in
j ust the way that it infects my own beliefs, thus gi vi ng me evi dence that peopl e form the
correct (by my own di m lights) bel i efs? z
This is j ust a sketch, but i f what I am cl ai mi ng is right and i f the simulation theory is
true, then the evi dence that we have for the compet ence and sincerity of others is, indeed,
j ust i f i ed vi a i nduct i on, si nce it is i nduct i ve gener al i zat i on that pr oduces the gener al
beliefs in the first place. The way simulation works is by produci ng first a bel i ef in me
about your ment al states, then one about my si st er' s ment al states, and so on. Si mul at i on
thus produces onl y particular beliefs, not general ones, so the generalizations cannot be
the direct output of the simulation mechaflism. Apparently, i f the simulation theory is
right, then what ever generalizations we bel i eve must be i nduct i vel y j ust i fi ed i f they are
j ust i fi ed at all. Thus, what ever j ust i fi ed particular testimonial beliefs we come to have by
rel yi ng on these general bel i efs wi l l be i nduct i vel y justified. In virtue of what are the par-
t i cul ar s i mul at ed be l i e f s j us t i f i e d? It does not mat t er ver y muc h f or t he pr e s e nt
discussion; so l ong as they are in fact justified, it is i rrel evant whet her you want to say
that this is because the facul t y that produces t hem is rel i abl e or innate, or whet her you
think that simulation onl y provi des hypotheses to await abductive testing. '3 In more para-
di gmat i c cases of induction, the particular beliefs from whi ch the statistical or universal
generalizations are inferred are typically j ust i fi ed on the basis of sense perception, hut
we need not commi t oursel ves to a theory of percept ual j ust i fi cat i on in order to cl ai m
that these generalizations are i nduct i vel y justified. Al l that is rel evant here is whether,
not how, the particular beliefs are j ust i fi ed (so long, in the present case, as they are not
j ust i fi ed vi a testimony, which they pretty obvi ousl y are not). So all that matters here is
that the bel i efs we form on the basis of si mul at i on are general l y j ust i fi ed, and I doubt
that anyone wants to deny this, at least not that they are j ust i fi ed in some ordinary, every-
day sense, whi ch is all that is at issue here.
Thus we see t wo very different ways in whi ch an agent can come to be j ust i fi ed in the
cl ai m that most peopl e are reliable in their reports. The first is the way that Hume and
Coady recognise: I see that S says that p and p, and I see that R says that q and q, and so
forth. Event ual l y, I acquire some i nduct i ve evi dence for the cl ai m that peopl e are gener-
ally rel i abl e from this procedure of checki ng reports against facts. When we take into
consideration our body of j ust i fi ed fol k psychol ogi cal beliefs, however, we find an addi-
tional, i ndependent source of j ust i fi cat i on for the bel i ef that peopl e are generally reliable
in their reports, for bel i ef is a straightforward inference from the (inductively justified)
Si nceri t y Pri nci pl e and Compet ence Principle. This is the sense in whi ch I have been
cl ai mi ng that the i nduct i ve base is broader than what WPA is wi l l i ng to admit; the cen-
tral cl ai m of WPA is that checki ng r epor t s agai nst fact s does not pr ovi de enough
,2 This argument only flies if the epistemic agent in question is justified in believing herself to be
generally competent and is generally sincere. So all bets are off when it comes to pathological
liars and people who are not justified in thinking they are competent. This does not strike me as
a problem for the present theory, since it is not at all obvious that such people are justified in
their testimonial beliefs.
,3 The view that reliability justifies the particular beliefs is suggested in [4]. The abductive story, I
presume, will simply be an analogue of the one I sketched in section II.
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Jack Lyons 175
evi dence t o j ust i f y our r el i ance on t est i mony. The cl ai m her e i s t hat even i f WPA i s r i ght
on t hat count , it does not mat t er , si nce t here are additional sour ces of j ust i f i cat i on for our
bel i ef t hat peopl e are gener al l y accur at e i n t hei r report s. TM
In addi t i on t o ser vi ng as t he basi s for i nduct i ve gener al i zat i on, si mul at i on can hel p
wi t h di r ect i nf er ence. It can do t hi s by expl ai ni ng how we come to have posi t i ve r easons
for movi ng t o a nar r ower r ef er ence class. As t he di scussi on i n sect i on I V i ndi cat es, i f we
do not have a posi t i ve r eason t o t hi nk t hat t he par t i cul ar i nst ance at hand devi at es f r om
the gener al case, we are j ust i f i ed i n i nf er r i ng t hat t he def i ni t e pr obabi l i t y is pret t y muc h
the same as t he i ndef i ni t e pr obabi l i t y. Di r ect i nf er ence, t hen, i nvol ves sear chi ng for rea-
sons t o t hi nk t ha t t he cas e at h a n d i s s i gni f i c a nt l y di f f er ent f r om t he gener al case.
Suppose, f or exampl e, t hat Jones t el l s me t hat p. As s umi ng t hat I am j ust i f i ed i n t hi nki ng
t hat peopl e gener al l y do not lie, t hen I am j ust i f i ed i n bel i evi ng p unl ess si mul at i on i ndi -
cates t hat Jones ma y be l yi ng ( as s umi ng I have no ot her i nf or mat i on concer ni ng p). I
si mpl y i magi ne mys e l f i n J ones ' si t uat i on and i nt r ospect whet her I woul d be t empt ed t o
lie. I f I t hi nk I woul d be, t hen I shoul d not bel i eve p on t he basi s of J ones ' sayi ng so.
Si mi l ar l y, suppose t hat you t el l me t hat q, and I do not have any r eason t o t hi nk t hat
you are l yi ng. Even t hough I am j ust i f i ed i n t hi nki ng t hat you are si ncere, you may not
be compet ent wi t h r espect t o q. I f I am j ust i f i ed i n t hi nki ng t hat peopl e are gener al l y
compet ent , t hen I am j ust i f i ed i n bel i evi ng t hat you are, too, unl ess si mul at i on i ndi cat es
ot herwi se. I i magi ne t hat q is true, I i magi ne mys e l f i n your si t uat i on, and I i nt r ospect
whet her q woul d be obvi ous t o me i n your si t uat i on, and I r epeat t he process, onl y t hi s
t i me i magi ni ng t hat p is false. I f I cannot t el l t he di fference, I wi l t doubt t hat you can.
Thi s shoul d wor k whet her pr oj ect i ng mys el f i nt o your si t uat i on means i magi ni ng t hat I
am st andi ng i n t he ot her r oom or i magi ni ng t hat I have j us t spent a year and a hal f st udy-
ing t he gr oomi ng habi t s of t he Yel l ow- Foot ed Al bat r oss. Whi l e t hi s is not hi ng l i ke a
compl et e t heor y of di r ect i nf er ence, i t does i ndi cat e t he rol e t hat si mul at i on is capabl e of
playing.
Thi s concl udes my sket ch of how t he i nduct i vi st mi ght resort t o t he si mul at i on t heory
in order to avoi d t he We a k Pauci t y of Evi dence Ar gument . The si mul at i on t heory is par-
ticularly wel l - sui t ed t o an i nduct i vi st t heor y of t est i mony, as t he rol e of si mul at i on is to
provi de t o t he agent who is doi ng t he si mul at i ng a r ange of (i nt ui t i vel y, j ust i f i ed) part i cu-
lar bel i ef s about t he ment al st at es of ot hers, f r om whi ch can be i nduced gener al i zat i ons
about peopl e' s bel i ef - f or mi ng mechani s ms and t hei r rel i abi l i t y as wel l as gener al i zat i ons
One anonymous referee has suggested that there is a sense in which the inductive base provided
by simulation is really as small as WPA suggests and that what the simulation theory does is to
explain how such a small base can do so much justificational work. According to this referee,
simulation ' gives us a very narrow "base" but enables us to recursively generate a huge expanse
of conclusions from that narrow base' . We are justified in trusting our simulator, and this justifi-
cation allows us to generate justified folk psychological beliefs. In the end, however, all of this
higher-level justification (for our particular beliefs about people) rests on the lower-level justifi-
cation for the principle ' t rust your simulator' , and it is in this sense that our higher-level
justification rests on a surprisingly narrow base. This is a very interesting point, and it may be
right, but this is not how I intend my claim that simulation broadens the inductive base. For the
present purposes, I am merely trying to show that our folk psychological beliefs, whatever the
ultimate source and structure of their justification, can and most likely do supplement the justifi-
cation we obtain by checking reports against facts. So at least at this higher level, simulation
does provide a broader inductive base from which to justify our reliance on testimony. This
claim is all that is really needed to undermine WPA.
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176 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
about peopl e' s mot i ves and consequent l y about their sincerity. In fact, i f the simulation
t heory is true, it seems quite obvi ous that our beliefs in statistical generalizations about
fol k psychol ogi cal matters must be the product of i nduct i ve generalization over a range
of simulation outputs? ~ And i f I am right in insisting that our fol k psychol ogi cal beliefs
enter into bel i ef in the general reliability of testimony, then it seems very reasonable to
hol d an inductivist t heory of testimony.
Most importantly, i f simulation produces j ust i fi ed beliefs about the ment al states of
others (as presumabl y it does i f the si mul at i on t heory i s true), then we can gat her an
i nduct i ve sample (i.e., a set of j ust i fi ed particular beliefs from whi ch to infer statistical
generalizations) wi t hout havi ng to check i ndi vi dual reports. In this way, the inductivist
can avoi d t he WPA by expandi ng the agent ' s fund of first-hand experi ence of checki ng
reports, adding to it a pool of simulated experi ence.
VII. Concl udi ng Comment s
The goal of this paper has not been to show that i nduct i vi sm is inevitable, but to show
that one set of arguments against it is unconvi nci ng. One of the more interesting flaws in
the arguments against i nduct i vi sm, I have tried to show, is a failure to appreciate the role
of our fol k psychol ogi cal bel i efs in the j ust i fi cat i on of our t est i moni al beliefs. I have
argued that the simulation t heory supports an inductivist position concerni ng the j ust i fi -
cation of our testimonial beliefs. I have focused on the simulation theory party because it
is a plausible theory, partly because it is fri endl y to i nduct i vi sm, and partly because I
needed some theory to focus on for the sake of illustration. I f nothing else, I hope it has
become cl ear that the nature of our folk psychol ogi cal bel i efs is rel evant to the debate
concerni ng the nature of testimonial justification. Still, it is worth not i ng that the alterna-
t i ves to t he si mul at i on t heor y do not necessar i l y cut agai nst an i nduct i vi st vi ew of
testimony.
The onl y goi ng compet i t or to the simulation vi ew is what is cal l ed in cogni t i ve scien-
tific circles the ' t heory t heory' (see, e.g., [6] and [12]), which, as I wi l l use the term, is
merel y the cl ai m that our fol k psychol ogi cal beliefs are deri ved from a tacit theory we
possess concerni ng human psychol ogy. The theory theorist must cl ai m that our beliefs in
the sincerity and the compet ence of others are either learned or innate parts of this theo-
ry.~6 1 argued in section II that innateness does not speak to the issue of justification; it is
quite possible for the bel i efs to be innate and still abduct i vel y justified. If, on the other
hand, the Si nceri t y Principle and the Compet ence Principle are learned, then presumabl y
they are ei t her induced or are l earned via testimony. Surprisingly, even in this case, the
i nduct i vi st need not concede defeat , f or what is at issue is t he j us t i f i c at i on of t hese
beliefs, not merel y their origin, and it is hard to see how t est i mony coul d j ust i fy me in
~5 Contra Stich and Nichols [12], the debate between the simulation theorist and the theory theorist
is not about whether people possess folk psychological theories. The generalizations I am rely-
ing on constitute a theory, insofar as any set of generalizations does. What is at issue is the
nature of that theory and the role it plays in mental state ascription. The simulation theory must
admit that we do have folk theories; it is just that we do not (always) use these theories to make
third-person mental state ascriptions.
~6 According to Fodor [3], the whole theory is innate, afortiori these beliefs must be innate. Paul
Churchland, on the other hand [1], claims that the theory is learned, these two beliefs included,
presumably.
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Jack Lyons 177
bel i evi ng these t wo principles. The fact that you tell me that you .are sincere is not suffi-
cient to j ust i fy my bel i ef in your sincerity. Perhaps your saying so makes me consi der the
hypothesis and subsequently subject it to test, but in that case, it is no l onger really a tes-
timonial belief. Any genui nel y t est i moni al support for the Compet ence Principle or the
Sincerity Pri nci pl e woul d be hopel essl y circular. I f these beliefs are justified, then they
must be i nduct i vel y j ust i fi ed on this versi on of the theory theory, so the theory theory is
at least compat i bl e wi t h inductivism.
This does not i mpl y that our position concerni ng testimonial j ust i fi cat i on is indepen-
dent of our posi t i on concerni ng simulation and the theory theory. On the contrary, the
simulation t heory offers a strong argument against WPA in virtue of enl argi ng the induc-
tive sample and a strong posi t i ve argument in favour of i nduct i vi sm in that simulation
only gi ves us part i cul ar beliefs, so that the formul at i on of general bel i efs wi l l requi re
inductive generalization. The t heory theories gi ve us neither of these arguments, at least
not as obvi ousl y as the simulation theory does. Thus the cogni t i ve scientific debate con-
cerni ng t he mechani sms under l yi ng t hi rd-person ment al state ascri pt i on is ext r emel y
relevant to the phi l osophi cal debate concerni ng the status of testimony.
I hope that the general approach embodi ed here, combi ned with a number of the par-
ticular claims, suggests that the proj ect of account i ng for our j ust i fi ed testimonial beliefs
is better pursued by l eani ng on psychol ogy than by leaning on the phi l osophy of lan-
guage - I have tried to show that the arguments that Coady borrows from the phi l osophy
of l anguage are unsuccessful and that the out come of a cogni t i ve scientific debate will
have an effect on the plausibility of i nduct i vi sm. The basis on whi ch we bel i eve testimo-
ny is at least partly an empi ri cal issue; it woul d be odd i f we coul d resol ve this issue by
the use of a priori arguments. It is not yet clear whet her the simulation theory or some
versi on of the t heory theory is goi ng to turn out to be right (or perhaps somet hi ng not yet
thought of). Cert ai nl y there are important theoretical considerations that bear directly on
these vi ews, but there is also a lot of empi ri cal work in cogni t i ve devel opment yet to be
done that wi l l be ver y rel evant to this project. Yet, despite this present uncertainty, I
think that the f or egoi ng offers some reasons to be optimistic about an inductivist theory
of t est i moni al justification.~7
University of Arizona Recei ved March 1996
Revi sed August 1996
'~ Thanks to Alvin Goldman, the University of Arizona Epistemology Reading Group, and three
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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178 Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology
REFERENCES
1. P.M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
2. C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992).
3. J.A. Fodor, Psychosemantics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
4. A.I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', Mind and Language 4 (1989) pp. 161-185.
5. A.I. Goldman, 'In Defense of the Simulation Theory', Mind and Language 7 (1992) pp. 104-
119.
6. A. Gopnik, ' How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of
Intentionality', Brain and Behavioral Sciences 16 (1993) pp. 1-14.
7. R.M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986) pp. 158-171.
8. J.L. Pollock, Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990).
9. H. Reichenbach, A Theory of Probability (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).
10. T. Reid, Phi l os ophi c al Works (ed.) William Hamilton (Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967 [1764]).
11. E. Sober, Core Questions in Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).
12. S. Stich and S. Nichols, 'Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?', Mind and Language 7
(t992) pp. 35-71.
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