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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03

CHAIM PERELMAN,
THE NEW RHETORIC: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING (1970)
Perelman, Chaim. "The New Rhetoric: a Theory of Practical Reasoning." The Rhetorical
Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce
Herzberg. New York: Bedford, 2000. 1384-1409.
The Loss of a Humanistic Tradition
Perelman devoted this section to a brief overview of the history of rhetoric. He begins by
pointing out that rhetoric, concerned with the syllogism and . . . figures of style (1384)
formed part of the curriculum in Belgian schools when he was a youth. At university, logic
covered, among other things, the analysis of the syllogism (1384); he discovered at that
time that logic is a formal discipline that studies the structure of hypothetico-deductive
reasoning (1384). He was forced to wonder about the link a professor rhetoric could
possibly discover between the syllogism and the figures of style (1384). He then turns his
attention to an article on rhetoric in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which defines rhetoric
vaguely as the use of language as an art based on a body of organised knowledge (1384).
The article cites Cicero view that the orators purpose is to instruct, to move and to please
(1384), as well as Quintilians definition of rhetoric as the ars bene dicendi (1384), which
may refer either to the efficacy, or the morality, or the beauty of a speech (1384).
Rhetoric, he points out, has ceased to play an important role in education (1384) and is
accordingly associated with the term flowers of rhetoric the name used for the figures of
style with their learned and incomprehensible names (1384). He alludes to two important
French rhetoricians, Dumarsais and Fontanier who provided the basic texts for teaching
what was taken for rhetoric in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1384). The
formers main work was entitled Concerning Tropes or the Different Ways in Which One
Word Can be Taken in a Language (1730), while the latters were A Classical Manual for the
Study of Tropes (1821) and Figures Other than Tropes (1827), republished in one volume in
1968 under the title The Figures of Discourse. These works are the outcome of what might
be called the stylistic tradition of rhetoric (1384) started by Petrus Ramus friend Omer
Talon who is remembered for two books on rhetoric published in 1572" (1384). It was
Ramus, of course, who virtually destroyed the tradition of ancient rhetoric that had been
developed over the course of twenty centuries and with which are associated the names of
such writers as Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine (1384). In the ancient
world, rhetoric was the theory of persuasive discourse (1384) and was divided into five
parts: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio (1384-1385). Inventio, or
Invention, dealt with the art of finding the materials of discourse, especially arguments, by
using common or specific loci the topoi (1385) or what, after Aristotle, are called Topics
(1385). Dispositio, or Arrangement, addressed the purposive arrangement or order of
discourse (1385), what the Renaissance called method (1385). Elocutio, or Style, dealt
mainly with . . . the choice of terms and phrases (1385). Memoria, or Memory, considered
the art of memorising the speech (1385). Actio, or Delivery, concerned the art of
delivering it (1385).
Ramus, influenced by Rodolphus Agricolas De Inventione Dialectica (1479), worked
for the reform of logic and dialectic (1385) by rejecting the classical opposition between
science and opinion that had led Aristotle to draw a distinction between analytical and
dialectical reasoning (1385), the former dealing with necessary reasonings, the latter with
probable ones (1385). The former is addressed by Aristotles Prior Analytics and Posterior
Analytics, the latter by his Topics. Ramus maintains in his Dialectic (1576) that Aristotles
was wrong when he sought to distinguish between two arts of discussion and reasoning,
one applying to science and called Logic, the other dealing with opinion and called Dialectic
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
(qtd. in Perelman, 1385). They in fact, he argued, mean the very same thing, . . . that is,
dispute or reason (qtd. in Perelman, 1385). Although things known are either necessary
and scientific, or contingent and a matter of opinion, just as our sight can perceive all
colours, both unchanging and changeable, in the same way the art of knowing, that is,
Dialectic or Logic, is one and the same doctrine of reasoning well about anything
whatsoever (qtd. in Perelman, 1385). He accordingly divides his work into two parts, once
concerning invention, the other judgment (1385) and includes in dialectic parts that were
formerly regarded as belonging to rhetoric: the theory of invention or loci and that of
disposition, called method (1385). He relegated to rhetoric merely memory, delivery and,
most importantly, style, the art of speaking well, of eloquent and ornate language
(1385), including the study of tropes, of figures of style (1385). This gave rise to the
modern stylistic (1385) tradition of rhetoric devoted to the study of techniques of unusual
expression (1385). Rhetoric from this angle is essentially an art of expression and, more
especially, of literary conventionalised expression; it is an art of style (1385).
This was so, not just in France, but also in Italy where, during the Renaissance, the
humanists such as Lorenzo Valla, inspired by the Ciceronian ideal of the union of
philosophy with eloquence . . . sought to unite dialectic and rhetoric (1385). Mario
Nizolios De Principiis (1533) and, later, Francesco Patrizis Rhetoric continued the
philosophical onslaught on rhetoric, the latter being the most violent attack upon this
discipline, to which he denied any philosophical interest whatsoever (1385). Giambattista
Vicos reaction came late and produced no immediate result (1385), for which reason
rhetoric became a wholly formal discipline any living ideas that it contained being
included in Aesthetics (1385). Rhetoric continued to be studied in Germany in works such
as Handbook of Literary Rhetoric by Heinrich Lausberg, but even here it was largely
regarded only as the theory of literary prose (1386) and, as such, contributing to the
study of literary language and tradition (1386). In Great Britain, especially Scotland,
rhetoric has been kept longest . . . thanks to the importance of psychology in the
empiricism of Bacon, Locke, and Hume, and to the influence of the Scottish philosophy of
common sense (1386). In this tradition, epitomised by George Campbells The Philosophy
of Rhetoric (1776), Richard Whatelys Elements of Rhetoric (1828), John Henry Newmans
Grammar of Assent (1870), and I. A. Richards Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) and
The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) the theory of invention is reduced to a minimum and
interest is focused on the persuasive aspect of discourse (1386): rhetoric is considered a
useful means to an end, a tool to convince others (1386) of the truth of a proposition
(1386) previously established (1386) by logic. In Europe, in short, rhetoric has been
reduced to stylistics and literary criticism, becoming merely a part of the study of literature
(1386).
In the USA, however, it was affected beneficially by the creation of a new speech
profession, separate from the teaching of English and of English literature (1386) in
universities: Samuel Currys The Province of Expression (1891) emphasised spoken
discourse and its delivery rather than the composition of literary prose (1386) and claimed
autonomy for speech as opposed to written composition (1386). For Curry, expression
did not mean the way in which ideas and feeling are expressed in a literary form, but
instead the manner in which they are communicated by means of an art of delivery
(1386). James Winans Public Speaking (1915), influenced by the psychologist/philosopher
William James, firmly established a union between professors of speech and those of
psychology (1386). This work has been carried on by a whole host of successors, including
Richard McKeon, Wilbur Samuel Howell, Donald C. Bryant, Karl Wallace, Walter Ong, Lloyd
Bitzer, and Douglas Ehninger.
An Ornamental or a Practical Art?
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
Perelman contends that there is nothing of philosophical interest in a rhetoric that has
turned into an art of expression (1387). The term is accordingly missing from all
philosophical dictionaries. It has been identified with verbalism and an empty, unnatural,
stilted mode of expression (1387), that is, rhetoric qua declamation ostentatious and
artificial discourse (1387). This criticism can be noticed even in an earlier culture such as
the Roman Empire where once serious matters . . . had been withdrawn from its influence,
rhetoric became perforce limited to school exercises, to set speeches treating either a theme
of the past or an imaginary situation, but, in any case, one without any real bearing
(1387). Serious people, especially the Stoics, made fun of it (1387).
Aristotle did not view rhetoric as merely an ornamental art bearing the same
relation to prose as poetics does to verse (1387). For him, rhetoric is a practical discipline
that aims, not at producing a work of art, but at exerting through speech a persuasive
action on an audience (1387). He distinguishes three genres of oratory: deliberative,
forensic, and ceremonial (1387), i.e. put to political, legal and ceremonial uses. For many
subsequent thinkers, unfortunately, rhetoric has been conflated with the last category (e.g.
speeches delivered at the Olympic games or at a funeral), where the audience passes
judgments not about the matter of discourse, but about the orators skill (1387). On
such occasions, the only decision that the audience was called upon to make concerned the
talent of the orator, by awarding the crown to the victor (1387). Perelman argues,
however, that even in epideictic oratory, rhetoric brings about a consensus in the minds of
the audience regarding the values that are celebrated in the speech (1388). He cites both
La Bruyre and Bossuet, two important French essayists, who stress the beneficial impact of
the religious sermon (1388). Bossuet is influenced in this regard by St. Augustine Book IV
of whose On Christian Doctrine (396-426 CE) stresses that the goal is not merely to make
ones listener accept the truth nor praise his eloquence but to gain his full assent (1388).
The orators aim in the epideictic genre is not just to gain a passive adherence from his
audience but to provoke the action wished for or, at least, to awaken a disposition so to act
(1388) by forming a community of minds, which Kenneth Burke . . . calls identification
(1388). For Burke, rhetoric is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function
that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a means of
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols (qtd. in Perelman, 1388).
Any persuasive discourse seeks to have an effect on an audience (1388) whether the latter
consists of only one person and the discourse be an inward deliberation (1388).
Moreover, Mark Antonys famous speech in Julius Caesar, mixing funeral eulogy (1388)
with political diatribe, shows that the distinction of the different genres of oratory is highly
artificial (1388). The goal of any discourse is to intensify an adherence to values, to
create a disposition to act, and finally to bring people to act (1388), for which reason
rhetoric is in fact of great philosophical interest.
Thinking About Values
Here, Perelman explains how he came to be interested in and to write about rhetoric. He
admits his complete ignorance of rhetoric when he published his first study of justice
(1388), influenced by Logical Empiricism, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument
(1945). His thesis was that formal justice is a principle of action , according to which
beings of one and the same essential category must be treated in the same way (1389).
The application of this principle to actual situations (1389), however, necessitated a
recourse to judgments of value (1389), the foundation or justification (1389) of which
were not obtainable through positivistic methods (1389). Defending the view that one
cannot draw an ought from an is a judgment of value from a judgment of fact I was
led inevitably to the conclusion that if justice consists in the systematic implementation of
certain value judgments, it does not rest on any rational foundation (1389). His
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
philosophical inquiry, carried on within the limits of logical empiricism, could not provide an
ideal of practical reason, that is, the establishment of rules and models for reasonable
action (1389). Like Kant, he had to admit the soundness of Humes analysis (1389),
empiricism being unable to provide a basis for either science or morals (1389). Perelman
accordingly began to seek other techniques of reasoning (1389), a logic of value
judgments which makes it possible for us to reason about values instead of making them
depend solely on irrational choices, based on interest, passion, prejudice, and myth (1389),
something to be avoided given the recent history of Europe (not least Nazism). His scrutiny
of the available philosophical literature on the subject was fruitless, leading to either
subjectivism, which, . . . leads to skepticism for lack of an intersubjective criterion (1389)
(the positivist empiricism [1389] epitomised by A. J. Ayers Language, Truth and Logic) or
an absolutism founded on intuitionism (1389) (the rationalistic idealism [1389]
associated with G. E. Moores Principia Ethica). Both these works seem to give, Perelman
thought, a distorted notion of the actual process of deliberation that leads to decision
making in practical fields such as politics, law and morals (1389). The only way to solve
this dilemma, Perelman realised, was to abandon the goal of working out a priori possible
structures for a logic of value judgments (1389) in order to follow in the footsteps of
Gottlob Freges who sought analyse the reasoning used by mathematicians (1390) and
thereby cast new light on logic (1390). Perelman sought similarly to undertake . . . an
extensive inquiry into the manner in which the most diverse authors in all fields do in fact
reason about values (1390). By analysing political discourse, the reason given by judges,
the reasoning of moralists, the daily discussions carried on in deliberating about making a
choice or reaching a decision or nominating a person, we might be able to trace the actual
logic fo value judgments (1390). To this end, he was assisted by L. Olbrechts-Tyteca.
Together they obtained results that neither of us had ever expected (1390): unknowingly,
they rediscovered a part of Aristotelian logic that had been long forgotten or . . . ignored
and despised (1390), the part dealing with dialectical reasoning, as distinguished from
demonstrative reasoning called by Aristotle analytics (1390) and studies in the Topics
and Rhetoric. They called this new, or revived, branch of study, devoted to the analysis of
informal reasoning, The New Rhetoric (1390).
Argumentation and Demonstration
Perelman argues that the new rhetoric is a theory of argumentation (1390). The specific
part . . . played by argumentation could not be fully understood until the modern theory of
demonstration to which it is complementary has been developed (1390). In its
contemporary form, demonstration is a calculation made in accordance with rules that have
been laid down beforehand (1390) and no recourse is allowed to evidence or any other
intuition other than that of the senses (1390). The key is to perform operations according
to rules (1390) and a demonstration is deemed correct or incorrect according as it
conforms, or fails to conform, to the rules (1390). A conclusion is held to be
demonstrated if it can be reached by means of a series of correct operations starting from
premises accepted as axioms (1390); whether these axioms be considered as evident,
necessary, true or hypothetical (1390), the relationship between them and the
demonstrated theorems remains unchanged (1390). To pass from a correct inference to
the truth (1390) or to the computable probability of the conclusion (1390), one must
admit both the truth of the premises and the coherence of of the axiomatic system (1390).
Perelman is distinguishing between the foregoing, what he terms the classical
theory of demonstration (1390) most famously articulated by Aristotle in the Organon, and
what he terms pure formalism (1390). In the former, the validity of the deductive
method (1390) is guaranteed by intuition or evidence by the natural light of reason
(1390). To reject such a foundation (1390) is not necessarily to embrace formalism,
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
however, for the simple reason that we need good reasons to accept the premises from
which we start and these reasons can be good only for a mind capable of judging them
(1390). But once we accept the framework of a formal system and know that it is free
from ambiguity (1390), then the demonstrations . . . made within it are compelling and
impersonal (1390) because their validity is . . . controlled mechanically (1390). Hence,
formal demonstration (1390) is to be distinguished from dialectical reasoning founded on
opinion and concerned with contingent realities (1390).
Perelman contends that an argumentation is always addressed by a person called
the orator whether by speech or in writing to an audience of listeners or readers
(1391). Its goal is the obtaining or reinforcing [of] the adherence of the audience to some
thesis (1391). The new rhetoric, like the old, seeks to persuade or convince, to obtain an
adherence which may be theoretical to start with (1391) but may eventually be manifested
through a disposition to act, or practical, as provoking either immediate action, the making
of a decision, or a commitment to act (1391). Argumentation, accordingly, unlike
demonstration, presupposes a meeting of minds: the will on the part of the orator to
persuade and not to compel or command, and a disposition on the part of the audience to
listen (1391). This mutual goodwill must not only be general but must also apply to the
particular question at issue (1391). Perelman stresses that all argumentation aims
somehow at modifying an existing state of affairs (1391) to which end each society
possesses institutions to further discussion between competent persons and to prevent
others (1391): this is because not everybody can start debating about anything whatever,
no matter where. To be a man people listen to is a precious quality and is still more
necessary as a preliminary condition for an efficacious argumentation (1391). In some
cases, e.g. in the courts, there are detailled rules . . . for establishing this contact before a
question can be asked (1391), so-called procedure in civil and criminal law (1391)
designed to ensure a balanced unfolding of the judicial debate (1391). Even where there
are no such rules, there are still customs and habits that cannot be disregarded without
sufficient reason (1391). Argumentation also presupposes a means of communicating, a
common language (1391), the use of which may admit of variation according to the
position of the interlocutors (1391) because sometimes only certain persons are entitled to
ask questions or to conduct the debate (1391)
Accordingly, the limitations traditionally imposed upon ancient rhetoric (1391) are
not acceptable to the new rhetoric. Aristotle had stressed the similarity between rhetoric
and dialectic (1391): they differ only in that dialectic provides us with techniques of
discussion for a common search for truth, while rhetoric teaches how to conduct a debate in
which various points of view are expressed and the decision is left up to the audience
(1391). This underscores why the former is treated by philosophers as a serious matter
(1391) while the latter is regarded with contempt (1391): [t]ruth (1391), it was
thought, presided over a dialectical discussion (1391) and about which the interlocutors
had to reach agreement (1391) whereas rhetoric taught only how to present a point of
view that is to say, a partial aspect of a question and the decision of the issue was left
up to a third person (1391). Where, for Plato, dialectic alone does not attain to
metaphysical truth (1391) as the latter requires an intuition for which dialectic paves the
way by eliminating untenable hypotheses (1391), for Aristotle, truth is the keynote of
dialectic, which seeks to get as close to the truth as possible through the discursive method
(1391). By contrast, the rhetor merely tries to outdo his rivals in debate (1391). If his
audience is gross and ignorant, the triumph of the orator who shows the greatest skill in
flattery will by no means always be the victory of the best cause (1391). The demagogue,
to achieve victory, will not hesitate to use techniques unworthy of a philosopher (1391).
For the new rhetoric, however, according to Perelman, argumentation has a wider scope
(1392) as a form of nonformal reasoning that aims at obtaining or reinforcing the
adherence of an audience (1392). It forms part of discussion as well as . . . debate
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
(1392), whether the aim be the search for truth or the triumph of a cause (1392) and
whatever the audiences degree of competence (1392).
Rhetoric has long been deemed unworthy (1392) by philosophers not because
dialectic employs a technique of questions and answers while rhetoric proceeds by
speeches from opposing sides (1392), but rather because it ignores what philosophers have
seen as the unicity of truth (1392). Descartes puts it this way: whenever
two men come to opposite decisions about the same matter one of them at
least must certainly be in the wrong, and apparently there is not even one of
them who knows; for if the reasoning of the second was sound and clear he
would be able so to lay it before the other as finally to succeed in convincing
his understanding also. (Qtd. in Perelman, 1392)
Descartes, like Plato before him, rejects opinion, which is variable (1392) and adopts an
ideal of science based on the model of geometry and mathematical reasoning the very
model according to which the world was supposed to have been created (1392). Dum
Deus calculat, fit mundus (1392) is the conviction not only of Leibniz but of all rationalists
(1392).
Perelman contends that the tradition which follows a juridical, rather than a
mathematical, model (1392) sees things very differently. In the Talmudic tradition, for
example, opposed positions can be equally reasonable; one of them does not have to be
right (1392). For Plato, dialectic is used when men possess no techniques for reaching
agreement immediately (1392). When it can be reached by means of calculation,
measuring, or weighing, when a result can be either demonstrated or verified, nobody would
think of resorting to dialectical discussion (1392) which concerns only what cannot be so
decided (1392), not least disagreements about values (1392). The philosophers appeal
to reason gives no guarantee whatever that everyone will agree with his point of view
(1392) for the simple reason that [d]ifferent philosophies present different points of view
(1392) which can be regarded as antilogies or discourses on opposite sides, in that an
antithesis is opposed in each case to a thesis (1392). He wonders whether the Hegelian
dialectic did not have its origin, not in Platonic dialectic, but rather in the development of
philosophical systems that can be opposed as thesis to antithesis, followed by a synthesis of
the two (1393) much like a lawsuit in which the judge identifies the elements he regards
as valid in the claims of the opposed parties (1393). But for both Kant and Hegel,
opinions are supposed to be excluded from philosophy, which aims at rationality (1393).
To explain the divergencies that are systematically encountered in the history of
philosophy (1393), Kant terms these opinions the natural illusions of reason (1393) from
the perspective of the tribunal of critical reason (1393), while for Hegel, they are
successive moments in the progress of reason toward Absolute Spirit (1393).
Perelman advises that the appeal to reason (1393) should be viewed not as an
appeal to a single truth (1393) but rather as an appeal for the adherence of an audience
(1393) viewed as encompassing all reasonable and competent men (1393), that is, as an
ideal (1393) or universal audience whether embodied in God, in all reasonable and
competent men, in the man deliberating or in an elite (1393). He advocates that rather
than identifying philosophy with a science, which, on the positivist ideal, could make only
analytical judgments, both indisputable and empty (1393), we should abandon the ideal of
an apodictic philosophy (1393). At his disposal, the philosopher has only an
argumentation that he can endeavour to make as reasonable and systematic as possible
without ever being able to make it absolutely compelling or a demonstrative proof (1393).
He doubts whether any reasoning from which we could draw reasons for acting could be
conducted under the sign of truth (1393) not least because such reasons must enable us
to justify our actions and decisions (1393), views familiar in existentialism (1393). In
actuality, audiences are infinitely varied in both extension and competence: in extent, from
the audience consisting of a single subject engaged in inward deliberation up to the
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
universal audience; and in competence, from those who know only loci up to the specialists
who have acquired their knowledge only through a long and painstaking preparation
(1393). Responding to Platos view that rhetoric shows greater concern for success than
for the truth (1393), Perelman replies that the techniques suited for persuading a crowd in
a public place would not be convincing to a better educated and more critical audience
(1393). The worth of an argumentation is not measured solely by its efficacy but also by
the quality of the audience at which it is aimed (1393). In short, the idea of a rational
argumentation cannot be defined in abstracto, since it depends on the historically grounded
conception of the universal audience (1393). The part played by the audience in rhetoric
is crucially important, because all argumentation, in aiming to persuade, must be adapted
to the audience with such conviction that the rest of the discourse can be securely based
upon it (1393). If this is not possible, one must reinforce adherence to these starting
points by means of all available rhetorical techniques (1393). The orator who builds his
discourse on premises not accepted by the audience commits a classical fallacy . . . a
petitio principii (1393) which is not a mistake in formal logic (1393) but a classical
fallacy in argumentation, because the orator begs the question by presupposing the
existence of an adherence that does not exist and to the obtaining of which his efforts
should be directed (1393).
The Basis of Agreement
Perelman contends that the objects of agreement (1394) on which the rhetor can build his
argument are many: facts, truths, and presumptions (1394) as well as values,
hierarchies, and loci of the preferable (1394). Facts and truths (1394) are objects that
are already agreed to by the universal audience (1394) for which reason there is no need
to increase the intensity of adherence to them. If we presuppose the coherence of reality
and of our truth taken as a whole, there cannot be any conflict between facts and truths on
which we would be called to make a decision (1394). When such a conflict occurs, the
incompatible element loses its status and becomes either an illusory fact or an apparent
truth (1394) unless we can show that the two apparently incompatible truths apply to
different fields (1394). Presumptions are opinions which need not be proved, although
adherence can be either reinforced . . . or suppressed (1394) as necessary. Values are
appealed to in order to influence our choices of action (1394): they supply reasons for
preferring one type of behaviour to another (1394), though not everyone will necessarily
accept them as good reasons (1394) since most values are particular in that they are
accepted only by a particular group (1394). So-called universal values can be regarded
in so many different ways that their universality is better considered as only an aspiration
for agreement (1394). In argumentation, it is important to distinguish concrete values,
such as ones country, from abstract values, such as justice and truth (1394). Values can
become the centre of conflict without thereby ceasing to be values (1394). The effort to
reinforce adherence to values (1394) is important and undertaken in epideictic discourse
(1394) and, generally, all education (1394) and similar endeavours to make certain
values preferred to others (1394). [A]ccepted hierarchies (1394) also play a part in
argumentation, for example, the notion that men are superior to animals or adults to
children. In double hierarchies(1394), we rank behaviour in accordance with an accepted
ranking of the agents (1394) for which reason You are behaving like a beast is pejorative,
whereas an exhortation to act like a man calls for more laudable behaviour (1394).
Perelman then zeroes in on the loci studied by Aristotle in his Topics (1394),
especially those in Book III concerning loci of the preferable (1394) which are general
propositions (1394) that serve to justify values or hierarchies (1394) and evaluate
complementary aspects of reality (1394). These include loci of quantity (1394) (e.g. a
thing useful for a large number of persons is worth more than one useful for a smaller
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number [1394), loci of quality, which set value upon the unique, the irremediable, the
opportune, the rare that is, to what is exceptional instead of to what is normal (1394).
Though the new rhetoric establishes a framework for all nonformal reasoning, whatever its
nature, its subject, or audience (1394), it does not pretend to supply a list of all the loci
and common opinions which can serve as the starting points for argumentation (1394).
Rather, the orator must be aware of the opinion of his audience on all the questions he
intends to deal with, the type of arguments and reasons which seem relevant with regard to
both subject and audience, what they are likely to consider as strong or weak argument,
and what might arouse them, as well as . . . leave them indifferent (1394-1395). In short,
a preliminary initiation into the body of ideas to be discussed (1395) is indispensable for
holding an audience (1395). The size of the audience also matters since the
establishment of a starting point (1395) differs for an address to a single person or a
small group (1395) as opposed to a large group (1395). In the case of the former,
particular opinions and convictions . . . may have already been expressed (1395). Where
the orator is uncertain, he may engage in question and answer to set the premises of his
argument on firm ground (1395), something impossible when one is addressing a
numerous assembly (1395). In the latter case, the orator must build his discourse on
presumptions that the orator has learned the audience will accept (1395).
Creating Presence
What an audience accepts forms a body of opinion, convictions, and commitments that is
both vast and indeterminate (1395). From this the orator must select certain elements on
which he focuses attention by endowing them, as it were, with a presence (1395), the
other elements being pushed into the background (1395). In this way is placed a value
on some aspects of reality rather than others (1395). Things present, things near to us in
space and time, act directly on our sensibility (1395) but the orator often devotes much
energy to bringing to mind things that are not immediately present (1395). Alluding to
the views of Sir Francis Bacon on the importance of eloquence (1395) to philosophy,
Perelman argues that to make things future and remote appear as present, that is, to
create presence, calls for special efforts of presentation (1395). For this purpose all kinds
of literary techniques and a number of rhetorical figures have been developed (1395), such
as Hypotyposis or demonstratio (1395), that is, the figure which sets things out in such a
way that the matter seems to unfold . . . before our very eyes (1395). If their
argumentative role is disregarded, the study of figures is a useless pastime, a search for
strange names for rather farfetched and affected turns of speech (1395). Other figures
include repetition, anaphora, amplification, congerie, metabole, pseudo direct discourse,
enallage (1395), all of which are various means of increasing the feeling of presence in the
audience (1395).
In describing facts, truths and values, the orator must employ language that takes
into account the classifications and valuations implicit in the audiences acceptance of them
(1396). To adapt his discourse to his purpose (1396), he has at hand a whole arsenal of
linguistic categories substantives, adjectives, verbs, adverbs and a vocabulary and
phrasing that enable him, under the guise of a descriptive narrative, to stress the main
elements and indicate which are merely secondary (1396). In the selection (1396),
interpretation (1396) and presentation (1396) of data (1396), the orator may be
accused of partiality (1396). This is not true, however, as perfect objectivity (1396) is
only an ideal (1396). Even with the elimination of tendentious views and of errors, one
does not thereby reach a perfectly just decision (1396). Even in scientific or technical
discourse (1396), Perelman contends, value judgments are implicit, and their justification
resides in the theories, classifications, and methodology that gave birth to the technical
terminology (1396) which must be used and from which one cannot depart, without
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
special reason (1396). The idea that science consists of nothing but a body of timeless,
objective truths has been increasingly challenged in recent years (1396).
The Structure of Argument
Perelman contends that [n]onformal argument consists, not of a chain of ideas of which
some are derived from others according to accepted rules of inference, but rather of a web
formed from all the arguments and all the reasons that combine to achieve the desired
result (1396). The purpose of the discourse . . . is to bring the audience to the
conclusions offered by the orator, starting from the premises that they already accept
(1396). The argumentative process consists in establishing a link by which acceptance, or
adherence, is passed from one element to another (1396). This is achieved either by
leaving the various elements of the discourse unchanged and associated as they are
(1396), or by making a dissociation of ideas (1396). There are various types of
association and dissociation (1396) at the command (1396) of the orator which may be
grouped . . . into three classes: quasi-logical arguments, arguments based on the structure
of the real, and arguments that start from particular cases that are then either generalised
or transposed from one sphere of reality to another (1396).
Quasi-Logical Arguments
Quasi-logical arguments are similar to the formal structures of logic and mathematics
(1396). It is likely, Perelman argues, that men . . . first came to an understanding of
purely formal proof by submitting quasi-logical arguments, such as many of the loci listed in
Aristotles Topics, to an analysis that yielded precision and formalisation (1396). Perelman
stresses that there is a difference of paramount importance between an argument and a
formal proof (1396): instead of using a natural language in which the same word can be
used with different meanings, a logical calculus employs an artificial language so
constructed that one sign can have only one meaning (1396). In logic, the principle of
identity designates a tautology, an indisputable but empty truth, whatever its formulation
(1396), whereas in ordinary language (1396), when one says business is business, or
boys will be boys, or war is war, those hearing the words give preference, not to the
univocity of the statement, but to its significant character (1396-1397). Gesturing towards
heremeneutics, or the art of interpretation, Perelman contends that members of the
audience never take the statements as tautologies, which would make them meaningless,
but will look for different plausible interpretations of the same term that will render the
whole statement both meaningful and acceptable (1397). Likewise, when faced with a
statement that is formally a contradiction (1397), such as When two persons do the same
thing it is not the same thing (1397), we seek an interpretation that eliminates the
incoherence (1397). To understand an orator, we must make the effort required to render
his discourse coherent and meaningful (1397), which requires goodwill and respect for the
person who speaks and for what he says(1397). The techniques of formalisation make
calculation possible and, as a result, the correctness of reasoning is capable of mechanical
control (1397), but the price is a certain linguistic rigidity (1397) for which reason the
language of mathematics (1397) is unsuited to poetry or diplomacy. By contrast, the
adaptability (1397) of ordinary language (1397) allows one to avoid purely formal
contradictions (1397), though it is not free from incompatibilities (1397), for example,
when two norms are recommended which cannot both apply to the same situation (1397),
for example, telling a child not to lie and to obey his parent lays one open to ridicule if the
child asks, What must I do if my father orders me to lie? (1397). In such an antinomy
(1397), one seeks qualifications or amendments and recommends the primacy of one
norm over the other or points out that there are exceptions to the rule (1397). Another
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
example of incompatibility is Socratic irony (1397): by exposing the incompatibility of the
answers given to his insidious questions, Socrates compels his interlocutor to abandon
certain commonly accepted positions (1397). However, the most elegant way of
eliminating an incompatibility is to have recourse to a dissociation of concepts (1397), as
will be discussed later.
Definitions (1397), Perelman argues, play a very different role in argumentation
from the one they have in a formal system (1397) where they are mostly abbreviations
(1397). In the former, definitions proffered are a function of the choice of one particular
meaning over others sometimes by establishing a relation between an old term and a new
one (1397). Definition is a rhetorical figure (1397) when it aims, not at clarifying the
meaning of an idea, but at stressing aspects that will produce the persuasive effect . . .
sought (1397). It is all a question of choice (1397) or selectiveness in the presentation of
the definition in that there is a selection of facts brought to the fore (1397) designed to
secure a particular attitude on the part of the audience rather than merely giving the
meaning of a term (1397). Analysis that aims at dividing a concept into all its parts
(1397) as well as interpretation that aims at elucidating a text (1397) are also quasi-
logical arguments and call to mind the principle of identity (1397). This method can give
rise to figures of speech called aggregation and interpretation when they serve some
purpose other than clarification and trend to reinforce the feeling of presence (1397).
In the wake of the foregoing, Perelman states that expressions are called figures of
style when they display a fixed structure that is easily recognisable and are used for a
purpose different from their normal one (1397), this purpose being mainly one of
persuasion (1397). If it is so closely interwoven into the argumentation that it appears to
be an expression suited to the occasion, it is regarded as an argumentative figure, and its
unusual character will often escape notice (1397). Gesturing towards what Quintilian and
others like Kenneth Burke term metonymy, Perelman contends that some reasoning
processes unlike definition or analysis, which aim at complete identification are content
with a partial reduction, that is, with an identification of the main elements (1397), such as
in the rule of justice that equals should be treated equally (1397), where it remains to be
determined whether the agents and situations (1397) are identical (1397), or whether
differences are to be disregarded (1397). Arguments of reciprocity are those that claim
the same treatment for the antecedent as for the consequent of a relation buyers-sellers,
spectators-actors, etc. (1397-1398), based on the presupposition that the relation is
symetrical (1398). Other quasi-logical arguments take the transition of a relation for
granted (1397), even if it is only probable (1398), for example, My friends friends are
my friends (1398), while still others (synecdoche) apply to other relations such as that
between part and whole or between parts, relations of division, comparison, probability
(1398). These are all distinct from exact demonstration, since . . . complementary,
nonformal hypotheses are necessary to render the argument compelling (1398).
Appeal to the Real
Here, Perelman contends that arguments based on the structure of reality can be divided
into two groups according as they establish associations of succession or coexistence
(1398). He argues that causality (1398) plays an important role in the former, hence the
effort to find the cause of an effect, the means to an end, the consequences of a fact, or to
judge an action or a rule by the consequences that it has (1398). Perelman refers to this
last example as the pragmatic argument . . . typical of utilitarianism in morals (1398).
Arguments establishing relations of coexistence are based on the link that unites a person
to his actions (1398), the essence and the act, a relation of paramount importance in the
social sciences (1398). From this model have come the classification of periods in history
(Antiquity, the Middle Ages), all literary classifications (classicism, romanticism), styles
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
(Gothic, baroque), economic or political systems (feudalism, capitalism, fascism), and
institutions (marriage, the church) (1398).
Perelman contends that rhetoric, conceived as the theory of argumentation,
provides a guidance for the understanding both of the manner in which these categories
were constituted and of the reasons for doing so (1398), helps us to grasp the advantages
and disadvantages of using them (1398), provides insight into the value judgments . . .
present, explicitly or implicitly, when they took shape (1398). Understanding of the
relations of coexistence helps us to grasp, too, the argument from authority in all its
shapes (1398) as well as appreciate the persuasive role of ethos in argumentation, since
the discourse can be regarded as an act on the orators part (1398).
Establishing the Real
Here, Perelman gestures towards metaphor in arguing that arguments which seek to
establish the structure of reality (1398) consist of first arguments by example, illustration
and model; second, arguments by analogy (1398). The example leads to the formulation
of a rule through generalisation from a particular case or through putting a new case on the
same footing as the older one (1398). Illustration aims at achieving presence for a rule by
illustrating with a concrete case (1398). The argument from a model justifies an action by
showing that it conforms to a model (1398) or, even, an antimodel (1398). In various
religions, for example, God and all divine or quasi-divine persons are obviously preeminent
models for their believers (1398). The models that a culture proposes to its members for
imitation provide a convenient way of characterising it (1398).
The argument from analogy is, Perelman argues, extremely important in nonformal
reasoning. Starting from a relation between two terms A and B, which we call the theme
since it provides the proper subject matter of the discourse, we can by analogy present its
structure or establish its value by relating it to the terms C and D, which constitute the
phoros of the analogy, so that A is to B as C is to D (1399). Analogy derives its name
from the Greek word for proportion (1399) but is different from mathematical proportion
(1399), in the case of which the characteristic relation of equality is symmetrical (1399),
whereas in the case of the former the phoros called upon to clarify the structure or
establish the value of the theme must, as a rule, be better known than the theme (1399).
For example, when Heraclitus says that in the eyes of God man is as childish as a child is in
the eyes of an adult, it is impossible to change the phoros for the theme and vice versa
(1399). The natural sciences make a heuristic (1399) use of analogy, the intent (1399)
being ultimately to eliminate the analogy and replace it with a formula of a mathematical
type (1399). In philosophy and the social sciences, by contrast, the whole body of facts
under study only offers reasons for or against a particular analogical vision of things
(1399). This bears out Wilhelm Diltheys distinction between the natural and social
sciences, the former aim at explaining whereas the human sciences seek for
understanding (1399). The metaphor is the figure of style corresponding to the argument
from analogy (1399). It consists of a condensed analogy in which one term of the theme
is associated with one term of the phoros (1399): for example, the morning of life . . .
summarises the analogy: Morning is to day what youth is to life (1399). Often, of course,
the reconstruction of the complete analogy is neither easy nor unambiguous (1399), as
when Berkeley speaks of an ocean of false learning (1399), for which there are various
ways to supply the missing terms of the analogy (1399). The use of analogies and
metaphors best reveals the creative and literary aspects of argumentation (1399); for
some, their use should be avoided as much as possible, whereas for others the lack of them
may make the discourse appear too technical and too difficult to follow (1399). Though
[s]cientific popularisation makes extensive use of analogy (1399), [s]pecialists tend to
hold analogies in suspicion and use them only to initiate students into their discipline
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
(1399).
The Dissociation of Ideas
In addition to argumentative associations (1399), there is also the dissociation of ideas
(1399), the study of which is too often neglected by the rhetorical tradition (1399).
Dissociation is the classical solution for incompatibilities that call for an alteration of
conventional ways of thinking (1399). Some philosophers such as Parmenides use
dissociation to depart from common sense and form a vision of reality . . . free from the
contradictions of opinion (1399) and reality is opposed to appearance (1399) through a
succession of dissociations (1399). Normally, reality is perceived through appearances
that are taken as signs referring to it (1399), but when the appearances are incompatible
an oar in water looks but feels straight to the touch we must admit, if we are to have a
coherent picture of reality, that some appearances are illusory and may lead us to error
regarding the real (1399-1400) (Perelmans allusion to Plato should be clear here). One is
brought in this way to the construction of a conception of reality that at the same time is
capable of being used as a criterion of for judging appearances (1400): whatever is
conformable to it is given value, whereas whatever is opposed is denied value and is
considered a mere appearance (1400). Gesturing towards the idea of binary opposites,
Perelman contends that any idea can be subjected to dissociation. For example, to real
justice we can oppose apparent justice and with real democracy contrast apparent
democracy (1400). What is referred to as apparent is usually what the audience would
normally call justice, democracy, etc. (1400), but this only becomes apparent after the
criterion of real justice or real democracy has been applied to it and reveals the error
concealed under the name (1400). It results in depreciation of what had until then been
an accepted value and . . . its replacement by another conception to which is accorded the
original value (1400). Perelman terms philosophical pairs all sets of notions that are
formed on the model of the appearance-reality pair (1400): the use of such pairs makes
clear how philosophical ideas are developed and also shows how they cannot be dissociated
from the giving or denying value that is typical of all ontologies (1400).
Interaction of Arguments
An argumentation is ordinarily a spoken or written discourse, of variable length, that
combines a great number of arguments with the aim of winning the adherence of an
audience to one or more theses (1400). These arguments interact within the minds of the
audience, reinforcing or weakening each other (1400). They also interact with the
arguments of the opponents as well as with those that arise spontaneously in the minds of
the audience (1400). However, Perelman poses some key questions: are there limits to . .
. the number of arguments that can be usefully accumulated? (1400). Does the choice of
arguments and the scope of the argumentation raise special problems? (1400). What is a
weak or irrelevant argument? (1400). What is the effect of a weak argument on the whole
argumentation? (1400). Are there any criteria for assessing the strength or relevance of
an argument? (1400). Are such matters relative to the audience, or can they be
determined objectively? (1400). There is no general answer to such questions (1400).
Rather, it seems to depend on the field of study and on the philosophy that controls its
organisation (1400), for which reason detailled studies in the various disciplines, taking
account of the most varied audiences (1400) are necessitated.
Once our arguments have been formulated, does it make any difference what order
they are presented in? Should one start, or finish, with strong arguments, or do both by
putting the weaker arguments in the middle? (1400). This implies that the force of an
argument is independent of its place in the discourse (1400). But what appears as a weak
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
argument to one audience often appears as a strong argument to another, depending on
whether the presuppositions rejected by one audience are accepted by the other (1400).
Should we present our arguments then in the order that lends them the greatest force?
(1400). If so, there should be a special technique devoted to the organisation of a
discourse (1400) which would point out that the exordium is all-important in some cases,
while in others it is entirely superfluous (1400). In some cases one ought to anticipate and
refute the objections of ones opponent (1400) whereas in other cases it is better to let
the objections arise spontaneously lest one appear to be tearing down straw men (1400-
1401). No hard-and-fast rules can be laid down, since one must take account of the
particular character of the audience, of its evolution during the debate, and of the fact that
habits and procedures that prove good in one sphere are no good in another. A general
rhetoric cannot be fixed by precepts and rules laid down once for all (1401) but must be
able to adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, matters and audiences (1401).
Reason and Rhetoric
Perelman begins by arguing that the birth of a new period of culture is marked by an
eruption of original ideas (1401), a neglect of methodological concerns and of academic
classifications and divisions (1401), and that ideas are used with various meanings that
the future will distinguish and disentangle (1401). Greek philosophy offers a good
example of this process (1401), the term logos (1401) being one of the richest and most
confused of all (1401). It means among other things: word, reason, discourse, reasoning,
calculation, and all that was later to become the subject of logic and the expression of
reason (1401). Reason was opposed to desire and the passions (1401) and was
regarded as the faculty that ought to govern human behaviour in the name of truth and
wisdom (1401). The operation of logos takes effect through long speeches or through
questions and answers (1401), thereby giving rise to the distinction . . . between rhetoric
and dialectic, even before logic was established as an autonomous discipline (1401).
Perelman contends that Aristotles discovery of the syllogism and his development of
the theory of demonstrative science raised the problem of the relation of syllogistic the
first formal logic with dialectic and rhetoric (1401). But, he asks, can any and every
form of reasoning be expressed syllogistically? (1401). Aristotle is often thought to have
aimed at such a result, at least for deductive reasoning, since he was well aware that
inductive reasoning and argument by example are entirely different from deduction (1401).
He knew likewise that the dialectical reasoning characteristic of discussion, and essentially
critical in purpose, differed widely from demonstrative reasoning deducing from principles
the conclusions of a science (1401). He was, however, content to locate the difference in
the kind of premises used in the two cases (1401): in analytical, or demonstrative,
reasoning, the premises . . . are true and ultimate, or else derived from such premises,
whereas in dialectical reasoning the premises consist of generally accepted opinion (1401).
But the nature of reasoning in both cases was held to be the same, consisting in drawing
conclusions from propositions posited as premises (1401).
Rhetoric, on the other hand, was supposed to use syllogisms in a peculiar way, by
leaving some premises unexpressed and so transforming them into enthymemes (1401).
The orator could not be said to use regular syllogisms; hence, his reasoning was said to
consist of abbreviated syllogisms and of arguments from example, corresponding to
induction (1401). What this implies is a reduction to two forms of reasoning of all the
wide variety of arguments that men use in their discussions and in pleading a cause or
justifying an action (1401). Since Aristotle, logic has confined its study to deductive and
inductive reasoning, as though any argument differing from these was due to the variety of
its content and not to its form (1401). As a result, an argument that cannot be reduced to
canonical form is regarded as logically valueless (1401); accordingly, in using reasoning
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
from analogy (1401) and a fortiori argument (1401), one must always be able to
introduce a fictive unexpressed major premise, so as to make them conform to the
syllogism (1401). Perelman agrees that it can be shown that the practical reasoning
involved in choice or decision making can always be expressed in the form of theoretical
reasoning by introducing additional premises (1401), but wonders what is gained by such
a move? (1401). The reasoning by which new premises are introduced is merely
concealed (1401) and resort to these premises appears entirely arbitrary, although in
reality . . . the outcome of a decision that can be justified only in an argumentative, and not
in a demonstrative manner (1401).
At first sight, it appears that the main difference between rhetoric and dialectic,
according to Aristotle, is that the latter employs impersonal techniques of reasoning,
whereas rhetoric relies on the orators ethos (or character) and on the manner in which he
appeals to the passions of his audience (or pathos) (1402). For Aristotle, however,
Perelman points out, logos or use of reasoning is the main thing (1402) for which reason
he criticises those authors before him who laid the emphasis upon oratorical devices
designed to arouse the passions (1402). Immediately after a long discussion devoted to
the role of passion in oratorical art, he concludes: As a matter of fact, it (rhetoric) is a
branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset (1402). In summary,
Perelman insists, Aristotles conception, which is essentially empirical and bases on the
analysis of the material he had at his disposal, distinguishes rhetoric from dialectic only by
the type of audience and, especially, by the nature of the questions examined in practice
(1402). He was thinking primarily of the debates held before assemblies of citizens
gathered together to deliberate on political or legal matter or to celebrate some public
ceremony (1402). There is no reason, however, why we should not also consider
theoretical and, especially, philosophical questions expounded in unbroken discourse
(1402). Perelman believes that the techniques Aristotle would have recommended would
those he himself used (1402) and outlined in his Nichomachean Ethics, to be precise, that
the method used for the examination and exposition of each particular subject must
appropriate to the matter, whatever its manner of presentation (1402).
After Aristotle, Perelman contends, dialectic became identified with logic as a
technique of reasoning, due to the influence of the Stoics (1402), for which reason rhetoric
came to be regarded as concerned only with the irrational parts of our being, whether will,
the passions, imagination, or the faculty for aesthetic pleasure (1402). Philosophers like
Seneca and Epictetus were opposed to rhetoric, even when they used it, in the name of
philosophy (1402) because the they believed that the philosophers role was to bring man
to submit to reason (1402). Others like Cicero who thought that in order to induce man to
submit to reason one had to have recourse to rhetoric, recommended the union of
philosophy and eloquence (1402): later thinkers of the Renaissance . . . such as [Lorenzo]
Valla, and Bacon too, . . . expected rhetoric to act on the imagination to secure the triumph
of reason (1402). The more rationalist thinkers, like [Petrus] Ramus, . . . considered
rhetoric as merely an ornament and insisted on a separation of form and content, the latter
alone being thought worthy of a philosophers attention (1402). Descartes adopted the
same conception and reinforced it (1402), regarding the geometrical method as the only
method fit for the sciences as well as for philosophy (1402) and opposing rhetoric as
exerting an action upon the will contrary to reason (1402).
Perelman denies that reason possesses a monopoly of the approved way of
influencing the will (1402), citing the view of Blaise Pascal who while professing a
rationalism in a Cartesian manner, does not hesitate to declare that the truths that are most
significant to him that is, the truths of faith have to be received by the heart before they
can be accepted by reason (1402). For Pascal, in his On Geometrical Demonstration,
opinions are admitted into the soul through two entrances (qtd. in Perelman, 1403), the
understanding and will (qtd. in Perelman, 1403). The more natural entrance is the
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
understanding, for we should never agree to anything but demonstrated truths (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403), but the more usual entrance, although against nature, is the will (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403) because all men whatsoever are almost always led into belief not because
a thing is proved but because it is pleasing. This way is low, unworthy, and foreign to our
nature (qtd. in Perelman, 1403) for which reason everybody disavows it (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403). Pascal is not speaking here, he stresses, of divine truths, which I am far
from bringing under the art of persuasion, for they are infinitely above nature (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403). He insists that God alone can put them into the soul, and in whatever
way He pleases (qtd. in Perelman, 1403) and that he know[s] He was willed they should
enter into the mind from the heart and not into the heart from the mind (qtd. in Perelman,
1403). Why? So that He might make humble that proud power of reason (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403). Perelman comments that, for Pascal, to persuade about divine matter,
grace is necessary (1403) to which end he stresses the important role played by
eloquence (1403):
no matter what we wish to persuade of, we must consider the person
concerned, whose mind and heart we must know, what principles he admits,
what things he loves, and then observe in the thing in question what relations
it has to these admitted principles or to these objects of delight. So that the
art of persuasion consists as much in knowing how to please as in knowing
how to convince, so much more do men follow caprice than reason. (Qtd. in
Perelman, 1403)
Pascal seeks to confine (qtd. in Perelman, 1403) himself to the art of convincing (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403), especially in the case where the principles have been granted and held to
unwaveringly (qtd. in Perelman, 1403), rather than the art of pleasing (qtd. in Perelman,
1403) because otherwise I do not know whether there would be an art for adjusting the
proofs to the inconstancy of our caprices (qtd. in Perelman, 1403). On the other hand, the
art of pleasing is incomparably more difficult, more subtle, and more wonderful (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403): if Pascal does not deal with it, it is because I am not ab le. Indeed I feel
myself so unequal to its regulation that I believe it to be a thing impossible (qtd. in
Perelman, 1403). He posits the existence of as certain rules for pleasing as for
demonstrating, and that whoever should be able perfectly to know and to practise them
would be as certain to succeed in making himself loved by kings and by every kind of person
as in demonstrating the elements of geometry to those who have imagination to grasp the
hypotheses (qtd. in Perelman, 1403), but he fears that it is impossible to lay hold of the
rules (qtd. in Perelman, 1403).
Perelman contends that Pascals views here heralds romanticism with its reverence
for the great orators genius (1403) and, before that, associationist psychology (1403) in
the eighteenth century according to which feeling, not reason, determines mans
behaviour (1403). George Campbells The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) is one of many
books on rhetoric . . . written based on this psychology (1403). This was followed by
Richard Whatelys The Elements of Rhetoric (1828) which, following Bacon, differentiated
between logic and rhetoric as follows:
I remarked in treating of that Science [Logic], that Reasoning may be
considered as applicable to two purposes, which I ventured to designate
respectively by the terms Inferring and Proving, i.e., the ascertainment of
the truth by investigation and the establishment of it to the satisfaction of
another; . . . Bacon, in his Organon, has laid down the rules for the conduct of
the former of these processes, and that the latter belongs to the province of
Rhetoric; . . . to infer, is to be regarded as the proper office of the
Philosopher, or the Judge; to prove, of the Advocate. (Qtd. in Perelman,
1403)
This conception, while stressing the social importance of rhetoric, makes it a negligible
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Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
factor for the philosopher (1403), a tendency (1403) which increase under the influence
of Kant and of the German Idealists, who boasted of removing all matters of opinion from
philosophy, for which only apodictic truths are of any importance (1403). Perelman argues
that a closer examination of the relation between the idea that we form of reason and the
role assigned to rhetoric (1404) is called for with regard to a whole host of thinkers like
Bacon and Walter Ong who have said anything about the matter (1404).
Perelman seeks to conclude this section by sketching how the positivist climate of
logical empiricism makes possible a new, or renovated, conception of rhetoric (1404).
From the point of view of logical empiricism or neopositivism (1404), a group of
philosophers (not least Rudolph Carnap) prominent in the 1930s, 40s and 50s who
emphasised science as the sole avenue to objective knowledge, the rational is restricted to
what experience and formal logic enable us to verify and demonstrate (1404). The vast
sphere of all that is concerned with action . . . is turned over to the irrational (1404). The
notion of a reasonable decision (1404) is not even on the radar of this school of thought
except insofar as it concerns the choice of the most adequate means to reach a designated
end (1404). But why should one prefer one action to another? Only because it is more
efficacious? How can one choose between the various ends that one can aim at? (1404),
Perelman wonders. If quantitative measures are the only ones that can be taken into
account, the only reasonable decision would seem to be one that is in conformity with
utilitarian calculations. If so, all ends would be reduced to a single one of pleasure or utility,
and all conflict of values would be dismissed as based on futile ideologies (1404).
Perelman rejects such a limitation to a monism of values in the world of action (1404) in
favour of the view that the irreducibility of many values is the basis of our freedom and of
our spiritual life (1404). Moreover, when one considers how justification takes place in the
most varied spheres in politics, morals, law, the social sciences, and . . . philosophy
(1404), it becomes obvious that our intellectual tools cannot all be reduced to formal logic,
even when that is enlarged by a theory for the control of induction and the choice of the
most efficacious techniques (1404). In Perelmans view, we are compelled to develop a
theory of argumentation as an indispensable tool for practical reason (1404). From this
perspective, argumentation is made relative to the adherence of minds, that is, to an
audience, whether an individual deliberating or mankind as addressed by the philosopher in
his appeal to reason (1404). For this reason, Whatelys distinction between logic, as
supplying rules of reasoning for the judge, and rhetoric, providing precepts for the counsel
(1404) collapses as without foundation (1404) because the counsels speech that aims at
convincing the judge cannot rest on any different kind of reasoning than that which the
judge uses himself (1404), while the judge, having heard both parties, will be better
informed and able to compare the arguments on both sides, but his judgment will contain a
justification in no way different in kind from that of the counsels argumentation (1404).
Perelman concludes by arguing that if rhetoric is regarded as complementary to
formal logic and argumentation as complementary to demonstrative proof, it becomes of
paramount importance in philosophy, since no philosophic discourse can develop without
resorting to it (1404). He lambastes the influence of logical empiricism (1404) for which
all philosophy that cannot be reduced to calculation was considered as nonsense and of no
worth (1404). Perelman wants to change this situation by developing a philosophy and a
methodology of the reasonable (1404) in which the rational is not limited to the field of
calculation, measuring, and weighing (1404) and the reasonable left with the vast field of
all that is not amenable to quantitative and formal techniques (1404). This field, which
Plato and Aristotle began to explore by means of dialectical and rhetorical devices, lies open
for investigation (1404).
Further Developments
17
Richard L. W. Clarke LITS3301 Notes 03
Perelman ends this encyclopaedia article by sketching the potential academic impact of his
theory of argumentation.