Mejia, Melanie

CRIMINAL LAW 1

A. PEOPLE V BOYLES 11 SCRA 88
FACTS: On November 28, 1959, around five in the morning, Felizardo Isoria was standing outside of
Bayos house, poised for attack. Before Bayo could warn his spouse Brigida Misona about the impending
danger, Isoria broke through the door and wrestled with Brigida. Brigida ran to the rescue of her
husband but Isorias two other companions, Pio Montes and Roberty Boyles (herein, accused), both
armed joined in the attack. In scuffle, Montes stabbed Bayo in the neck. Brigida then attempted to
escape by jumping off the window but the fall sprained her waist and broke her legs. Montes and
Boyles dragged her back to the house where the group demanded for money. Brigida gave their savings
of P 100.00. Not content with the money, the three took turns in raping her.

Upon the arrest of their arrest, Montes and Boyles immediately confessed to the crime but insisted on
two mitigating circumstances: admission of guilt and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed.

ISSUE: Whether the accused can invoke the lack of intention to commit a wrong so grave as that which
has been committed as a mitigating circumstance in lessening the penalty for said crime

HELD: Article 13 paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code states that: [that the offender had] no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The accused argument here lies in the notion
that their primary intention was to rob the Bayos; they never meant to kill. Said provision in the Revised
Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment of the execution of
the criminal act, not his intention during the planning stage. In the instant case, the original plan was to
rob the Bayos but the resistance offered by Bayo compounded the serious crime of robbery with
homicide. Based on the witness testimony, which was confirmed by the accused, the accused were
armed (Montes with a knife while Boyles held a gun), they ganged up on the victim, used deadly
weapons and stabbed him in the neck. At that precise moment, they did intend to kill the victim and
that was the moment which Article 13 (3) refers to.

It should also be noted that the weapon used, the force of the blow and the location of the wound and
the manner by which it was delivered, point to the fact that there was an intention to kill Eminiano
Bayo. As such, the extenuating circumstance mentioned in Article 13 (3) of the Revised Penal Code does
not apply.

B. PEOPLE V ALCONGA 78 PHIL 366
FACTS: On the morning of May 29, 1943, Silverio Barion passed by the guardhouse where Dioscoro
Alconga (herein the accused) and physically assaulted the latter. The assault was caused by a previous
altercation between the two. Alconga was able to avoid the blows by falling ground and crawled
outside of the guardhouse. The deceased followed him and while in the act of delivering a blow,
Alconga fired at him with his revolver stopping Barions blow in mid-air. He fell to the ground and upon
rising, drew a dagger. The accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and a hand-to-hand fight followed.
Sustaining several wounds from the fight, Barion took to his heels and fled.


Alconga ran after Barion and another fight occurred, which caused the mortal wound to the cranium of
the latter, causing his death. Then, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and placed Alconga under his custody
and surrendered him to the police.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
which preceded the killing of Barion

HELD: It should be noted that there were two stages of flight that led to the death of Silverio Barion.
The first stage was when he went to the guardhouse where the accused was working and tried to strike
him with a pingahan without sufficient provocation from Alconga. Alconga managed to have the upper
hand in the flight, inflicting several wounds upon the victim which caused from to escape. In this
instance, the deceased was the unlawful aggressor and the means employed by the accused can be
considered to be in self-defense since the first element of self-evidencepresence of unlawful
aggressionwas present.

The claim that there was a mitigating circumstance of provocation or threat on the part of the deceased
was not sufficiently proven by the defendant. It clear from the evidences presented that there was no
longer a provocation or threat on the life of the accused in the second stage of the fightwhere the
mortal wound was inflicted upon the victimsince the victim was already attempting to escape. The
fact that the victim was able to run about 200 meters from the scene of the incident is proof that he was
not mortally wounded during the first stage of the fight. It was the accused who ran after the deceased
so his plea of provocation or threat from Barion cannot be given any credit.

While it is true that in the case of US v Rivera (42 Phil 472) the court ruled that one may pursue his
adversary until he has secured himself from danger, the same cannot be applied in the present case.
The accused, being the bearer of stronger and deadlier weapons and the better fighter, cannot claim to
need to pursue his adversary to ensure his safety. He already defused the Barions initial attacks and
even inflicted enough wounds to make the latter attempt to escape.

C. PEOPLE V CANETE 410 SCRA 544
FACTS: On May 24, 1997, the victim Leonaldo Tumayao was on his way home after attending a wedding
party with Joel Quimod and Lilio Tundag. Tumayao walked ahead of the two; as the passed the houses
of the accuse, Quimod and Tundag heard successive gunshots at which they search the source of the
said shots. There they saw Ruben, Alfredo, Sergio, Sotero and Trinidad Canete shooting at Tumayao.
Defense: On May 23, 1997, Rubens wife, Teresita Caete, was in Barangay Lanipga, Consolacion, Cebu,
to help prepare food for the wedding of her husbands cousin. She stayed there overnight. At the
wedding reception the following morning, Leonaldo Tumayao, alias Eduardo or Edit, approached Ruben
who was then looking for a cold soft drink. Tumayao said Here is something cold, and suddenly
punched Ruben. Teresita summoned her husband and asked him to go home with her. The latter
acquiesced. Before they left, however, Teresita saw Tundag give Tumayao what looked like a .45 caliber
pistol.
On the same day, Tumayao, together with Quimod, Tundag and the latters son followed Ruben to his
house on a motorcycle or habal-habal. Tumayao alighted and thereafter shouted This is now a combat
while firing a gun.
Hearing the gunshots, Teresita brought her children to the safety of a neighbors house. As she went
back for her other child, Teresita saw her husband Ruben standing beside a coconut tree. Tumayao
stood in front of the house of Alfredo who was shouting at him not to throw stones as he might hit the
children. At that point, Ruben shot Tumayao with a pugakhang, an improvised shotgun. Tumayao
slumped to the ground.
Quimod ran away when Tumayao began firing his gun. Tundag and his son also sped away on board the
motorcycle. Tumayao was left alone.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused act of shooting can be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication
HELD: There was no proof that the appellants deliberately planned to liquidate the victim. On the
contrary, the killing of the victim was the immediate impulsive reaction of appellants to Tumayaos act
of punching Ruben. Moreover, the time that elapsed between the punching incident and the
commission of the crime was not sufficient for Ruben and the rest of the appellants to reflect upon the
consequences of their intended act. The elements of evident premeditation, namely: (1) the time when
the offender appeared determined to commit the crime; (2) the act evidently indicating that the
offender clung to his determination, and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to
commit the crime and the execution thereof during which the offender was able to reflect on the
consequences of his act, were wanting in this case.
It must be recalled that, immediately prior to the incident, Tumayao punched Ruben in the presence of
many people at the wedding party. Although the incident did not immediately precede the killing, its
impact, by reason of its seriousness and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, festered till the
commission of the crime. The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense must,
therefore, be appreciated in favor of the appellants.
D. PEOPLE V RABANILLO 307 SCRA 613
FACTS: In the afternoon of August 9, 1996, Vicente Rabanillo (accused-appellant), Raul Morales and
several other persons where drinking at the store of Narcisa Morales in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. A
playful banter ensued and both Rabanillo and Morales joined in the game. A heated argument between
the two followed and culminated into a fistfight. The two were eventually pacified and ushered to their
respective homes.

30 minutes after the fistfight, while Morales and others were having a conversation in Morales terrace,
Rabanillo went to Morales house wielding a samurai bolo. The accused immediately went after
Morales and hacked him. The victim evaded but the first blow but was hit on the right hand. As he was
running away, he tripped and fell on the ground. At this point, the accused proceeded in hacking
Morales, causing his death.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused can claim obfuscation and/or passion as a mitigating circumstance
in the death of Morales on the account of the an earlier altercation with the deceased
2. Whether Article 13 (7) or voluntary surrender can be credited as a mitigating circumstance in
the case of Rabanillo

HELD: Article 13 (6) states that: [that of having acted upon an] impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. For passion or and obfuscation to be mitigating, it must originatefrom
lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be
confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree
as to deprive him of his sanity and self control. The excitement which is inherent in all persons who
quarrel and engage in a fight does not constitute obfuscation.

For obfuscation to be invoked, the act which caused the obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by considerable length of time, during which the accused might have regained
his self-control. In the instant case, 30 minutes has lapsed between the fistfight and the killing of
Morales. The attack, then, cannot be considered to have been caused by a sudden impulse and
uncontrollable fury. It would seem, then, that Rabanillo acted more out of revenge or resentment for
having been humiliated in public by Morales, than the extenuating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.

Neither can Rabanillo claim to have acted out of a drunken state since in order for intoxication to be
mitigating, it must be proven with sufficient evidence. The accused must be able to prove that 1. At the
time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his
reason and deprive him of a certain degree of self-control and; 2. Such intoxication is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit to the plan to commit the felony.

Based on Rabanillos testimony, he joined his friends in a drinking session but only for a short time and
resumed his routine work thereafter. The fact that he was able to resume his work after the drinking
session contradicts his claim that he was heavily drunk at the time he attacked Morales. Testimonies
from the defense also point to the fact that Rabanillo was a regular drinker; this regularity of alcoholic
intake must have increased his alcohol tolerance to such an extent that he could not easily get drunk.

As to the claim of voluntary surrender, Rabanillo claimed that a few minutes after the incident, the
barangay captain came to his and told him they need to go to the Municipal Hall to which he agreed.
For voluntary surrender to be considered, it must have the following elements: 1. The offender was not
actually arrested; 2. He surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority and;
3. His surrender must be voluntary. A voluntary surrender must be spontaneous, showing the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities because he either acknowledges his
guilt or wishes to save them the trouble of having to search and capture him.

While it is true that Rabanillo submitted himself to the custody of the law even though there was no
warrant for his arrest does not necessarily denote voluntary surrender. The barangay captain went to
Rabanillos house to take the latter to the police station; he did not present himself voluntarily to the
latter and neither did he ask the barangay captain to fetch him so he can surrender to the police. What
can be credited to Rabanillos defense is the fact that he did not resist but went peacefully with the
barangay captain. Moreover, voluntary surrender presupposes repentance which was not present in
Rabanillos case since he claimed at the time he was taken to the police, he had a mental blackout and
also, he did not confess of his guilt but merely reported there was trouble in Amansabina. As such,
the extenuating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Rabanillo




E. PEOPLE V DELA CRUZ 63 PHIL 874
FACTS: On May 30, 1936, the accused Francisco Dela Cruz, Fernando Legaspi and three other persons
(whose identities were unknown) physically assaulted Yu Wan and forcefully and without consent from
the latter, took P26.00 in cash.

The accused is a habitual delinquent, having been previously convicted once of the crime of theft and
two of the crime of estafa and was last convicted on July 24, 1933.

The accused initially pleaded not guilty but later pleaded guilty of having committed the crime.

ISSUE: Whether the extenuating circumstance of a plea of guilt can be invoked by the accused given
that he initially pleaded not guilty of the crime of theft with physical assault

HELD: The appellants plea of guilt does not constitute as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13 (7)
since of the Revised Penal Code as the said provision states that: [that the offender] had voluntarily
surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt
before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is clear from the trial
proceedings that the appellant initially pleaded not guilty but only pleaded guilty after two witnesses
from the prosecution had already been presented. The confession of guilt although subsequent to the
consummation of the crime and entirely alien to its development, constitutes a cause for the mitigation
of the penalty not because it modifies criminal responsibility but it signifies an act of repentance and
respect for the law. Such admission then indicates a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his
reform. This is precisely the reason why the accused recantation does not constitute as an admission of
guilt.

F. PEOPLE V FORMIGONES
FACTS: On the afternoon of December 28, 1946, Abelardo Formigones (herein defendant-appellant),
without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of his house in
Sipocot, Camarines Sur and stabbed his wife, Julia in the back. The blade punctured the victims right
lung, causing her death. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground; after stabbing her,
Abelardo went downstairs and carried up house where he was found lying beside the dead body of her
wife.

According to the written testimony of the defendant, the motive behind the death of Julia was jealousy;
he used to have heated arguments with his wife because he often saw her with his brother Zacarias and
he suspected that they were having an illicit affair.

Based on the testimonies of two jail guards where Abelardo was confined, Abelardo acted very strange
and behaved like an insane person. However, according to the report of the physical who examined him,
the defendant was suffering only from feeblemindedness and that he could distinguish right from
wrong.

ISSUE: Whether the accused alleged feeble mindedness constitutes as a physical defect under Article
13 (8) of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: The SC held that Article 13 (8) or (9) can be applied as an extenuating circumstance in this case on
the account of his feeblemindedness. Article 13 (8) states: [that the offender is] deaf, mute, blind or
otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense or
communication with his fellow beings. Based on the testimonies of the two jail guards, he behaved like
a madman; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of others;
that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refuse to take a
bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison guards, etc. Such actions as examined by Dr.
Francisco Gomez do not constitute insanity nor imbecility but feeblemindedness. His action in picking
up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the
floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though
he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he
made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring
his conviction.
It is in this regard that the SC affirmed the decision of the lower court with modification that the
appellant be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment that he has undergone.
G. PEOPLE V MACBUL 74 PHIL 436
FACTS: The accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of theft for having stolen two sacks of papers
belonging to the Provincial Government of Sulu. Said sacks amounted to P10 and were allegedly stolen
on March 9, 1943. It is also being alleged that Macbul was a habitual delinquent, having been convicted
twice of the same crime on November 14, 1928 and August 20, 1942. The trial court sentenced accused
to suffer one month and one day of arresto mayor as principal penalty and two years, four months and
one day of prision correccional as additional penalty for habitual delinquency.

The trial court also found two mitigating circumstances in this case: plea of guilt under paragraph 7 and
extreme poverty and necessity under paragraph 10, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can invoke extreme poverty and necessity under Article 13 (10) of
the Revised Penal Code considering that the accused has been convicted twice for the same crime prior
to the present case

HELD: The accused cannot be considered to be a habitual delinquent since the last paragraph of Article
62 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: [a person] shall be deemed to be habitually delinquent, if
within a period of 10 years from m the date of his last release or conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto,
estafa or falsification he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener. Macbul was convicted
for the first time on November 14, 1928 and then on August 20, 1942, 14 years after the initial
conviction.

The SC also affirmed the trial courts decision in considering extreme poverty and necessity as mitigating
circumstance pursuant to Art 13 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The court takes note of the fact that
the accused pilfered said sacks of paper which he sold for P2.50 in order to be buy food for his family.
Such action can only be done at the face of extreme poverty. The SC held that in this case, the right to
life is more sacred than a mere property right. However, this does not, in any way, encourage or justify
theft but it merely attempts to soften the harsh realities of life.