Modern Asian Studies 34, 1 (2000), Pp. 181-221. © 2000

Modern Asian Studies 34, 1 (2000), pp. 181–221.
 2000 Cambridge University Press

Printed in the United Kingdom
Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: The

Lopez Family, 1945–1989
MINA ROCES
The University of New South Wales, Sydney
On being awarded the Legion of Honor by President Corazon

Aquino, Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces, publisher of The Manila Times,
pleaded with the president:
Please allow me to remind you, first. That our people brought a new
government to power because our people felt an urgent need for change.
That change was nothing more and nothing less than that of moving quickly
into a new moral order. The people believed, and many of them still do,
that when we said we would be the exact opposite of Marcos, we would be
just that. Because of that promise which the people believed, our triumph
over Marcos was anchored on a principle of morality . . . . To our people, I
dare propose that new moral order is best appreciated in terms of our
response to graft and corruption in public service. We cannot afford a gov-
ernment of thieves unless we can tolerate a nation of highwaymen.1
Roces’ statement summarized a persistent theme in Philippine post-
war political history: charges of graft and corruption are continuously
levied against an administration, foreshadowing its demise at the
next election contest, only to be replaced by a similarly-disposed
regime. The 1986 ‘revolution’ which brought Corazon Aquino to
power found many supporters among those who believed that the
corruption and excesses of the Marcos regime had gone too far. How-
ever, as the Roces speech poignantly illustrated, the Aquino regime
which replaced it was itself guilty of similar crimes formerly attrib-
uted to the Marcos years preceding it. The irony of it all was that it
was Roces who first sought the two million signatures that convinced
Corazon Aquino to run for president in the first place.
Such fluctuations in Philippine politics have been an established
pattern since independence was granted in 1946. In the republican
period, 1945–1972, (with the exception of President Ferdinand
Marcos), presidential administrations exposed for blatant graft and
1
Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces, ‘A Call for New Moral Order’, The Manila Chronicle, 27
July 1988, p. 3.
0026–749X/00/$7.50+$0.10
181
182 MINA ROCES
corruption, were summarily voted out of office by an outraged public,

only to be replaced by an administration that eventually committed
the same sins as its predecessor. And then in 1972, President Marcos
declared martial law and launched an authoritarian regime which
lasted until 1986. The excessive corruption of this regime has been
much documented, the first family and its ‘cronies’ becoming the
sole beneficiaries of political and economic rewards.2 Such corruption
which reached hitherto unprecedented heights gave Corazon Aquino
the public support, the ‘people power’ which legitimized her ascend-
ancy to the presidential office. But as the above quotation from Roces
revealed, President Aquino was criticized for her lack of moral lead-
ership, and for allowing her family (the Cojuangcos) to acquire some
of the wealth previously associated with the Marcos clique.3 The
media lamented that ‘cronyism’ has been replaced by ‘Coryism’.4
How can one explain such ‘cycles’ in Philippine post-war history?
This paper proposes a framework for analysis. It argues that a con-
flict between traditional social values embodied in politica de familia or
kinship politics and western values inculcated in the colonial period
accounts for these cyclical trends. Traditional, or pre-European,
political organization is seen as being based on politica de familia or
kinship politics. This concept is used here to mean a political process
wherein the kinship groups operate for their own interests inter-
acting with other kinship groups as rivals or allies. Politica de familia
thrives in a setting where elite family groups and their supporters
compete with each other for political power. Once political power is
gained by one family alliance, it is used relentlessly to accumulate
family wealth and prominence, pragmatically bending the rules of
the law to gain access to special privileges.
The colonial period introduced a number of western values (the
term western values or western institutions is used for lack of a
2
See Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of
American Policy (New York, 1987); Filemon Rodriguez, The Marcos Regime Rape of the
Nation (Quezon City, 1986); Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty (New York,
1988); Charles McDougald, The Marcos File (San Francisco, 1987); ‘Some are
Smarter than Others’, article published clandestinely by a group of Filipino busi-
nessmen (Manila, 1979); and John Doherty, ‘Who Controls the Philippine Economy:
Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others’, in Belinda Aquino (ed.), Cronies and Enemies:
The Current Philippine Scene, Philippine Studies Occasional Paper No. 5 (Honolulu,
1982).
3
‘Moral Disorder’, Time, 22 Aug. 1988, p. 22, and Antonio C. Abaya, ‘Et Tu
Chino?’, ‘On the Other Hand’ column, Business World, 29 July 1988, p. 2.
4
Lisa Beyer, ‘An Outcry Over Politics as Usual’, Time, 10 Oct. 1988, p. 29.
KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 183
better term to refer to non-indigenous influences introduced into
the society), which eventually became incorporated into the cultural
milieu of political behavior. Some of these values were in direct con-
flict with the traditional elements of kinship politics. The set of west-
ern values which penetrated and influenced Philippine political cul-
ture may be classified into three categories. First, a new set of ethics
and morals, introduced in the Spanish period through the vehicle of
Catholicism, provided a novel standard with which to conduct and
judge behavior, often intruding into the established methods of
comport. Secondly, bureaucratic professionalism inculcated in the
American colonial period, emphasized a different method of particip-
ating in politics and business—that of utilizing impersonal norms,
the assessment of people on the basis of achievement, and main-
taining objectivity in major decisions involving personalities. Finally,
the concept of loyalty to a nation-state, an entity far surpassing the
specific confines of the family or village, began to emerge as national-
ist ideas spread throughout the archipelago from the revolutionary
days to the movement for independence in the twentieth century.
Once independence was granted and Filipinos assumed the mantle
of full political leadership, tensions between these two opposing sets
of values surfaced. This unreconciled tension explains the peculiar
behavior of post-war politics where there was a cyclical rise and fall
of governments as each administration was voted out of office for
graft and corruption. Families who operated in the traditional style
found themselves exposed and criticized in the free press by rivals
who used the rhetoric of western values to attack the families in
power. Having been shown to have neglected the national interest
in favor of the familial one, these families failed to retain their power
beyond one administration. In this framework, the Marcos regime
(1972–1986), represents the epitome of pure kinship politics as one
family alliance alone had monopoly of political power and owned
most of the country’s major corporations.
This paper argues that the unresolved tension was responsible for
the ambivalent behavior exhibited by Filipino families who have used
political power for familial ends. On the one hand, they sincerely
believed from their education at school, that corruption was bad,
that the western values of professionalism, ethics and morals and
the concern for the national interest should override the familial
interests in the political sphere. They used the yardstick of western
values to criticize other families who had in their eyes used political
power to build a business empire. At the same time they were blind
184 MINA ROCES
to their own faults—almost oblivious to their own practice of kinship

politics. In this manner they continued to apply one set of values
(western values) to their rival families, and one set of values (kinship
politics) to themselves. I do not stipulate however that western
values are ‘good’ and kinship politics is ‘bad’ (or vice-versa), merely
that the tension between these conflicting values explains post-war
Philippine political behavior.
Kinship politics and western values are merely idioms used in the
dynamics of political and social action; that is, a form of rhetoric.
To suggest this, however, is not to deny that Filipinos also utilize
such norms as a reflection of sincerely held beliefs. In short, kinship
politics and western values are not fixed, immutable laws. Both kin-
ship politics and western values are the symbolic messages, dis-
courses, used by individuals in the ideological context of political
relations and political actions.
For example, Marcos claimed that martial law was the method
through which he could implement the reforms necessary to restore
civil order and transform the ‘precarious democracy’ into a true
democracy. Obviously, Marcos was using western values as mere
rhetoric to justify the declaration of martial law. On the other hand,
one cannot doubt the sincerity of those individuals who chose to risk
their lives for the restoration of democratic values during the 1986
‘people power revolution’. In the realm of kinship politics, President
Corazon Aquino’s refusal to investigate the charges of corruption
made against her family might be interpreted as depicting to all
Filipinos her staunch but superficial adherence to family values. But
alternatively, she may have strongly felt compelled to protect her
relatives, feeling trapped by the utang ng loob relationships inscribed
in traditional values.
* * *
Factionalism and patron–client ties have been isolated as the main
structures of Philippine politics.5 In this model, scholars have rightly
5
For an analysis of personal ties and factionalism in Philippine politics see Carl
Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Yale University
Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 6 (New Haven, 1965). Alfred
McCoy, ‘Yloilo: Factional Conflict in a Colonial Economy, Iloilo Province Philip-
pines, 1937–1955’, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1977; and Mary
Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality (Quezon City, 1963).
(Lande’s work is the classic model of factionalism in Philippine politics.) For an
analysis of patronage politics or patron–client ties and Philippine political behavior,
see Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion (Quezon City, 1979); Willem Wolters,
observed that the two major national parties are identical in com-
position and policy. Furthermore, intraparty solidarity is minimal
and party switching is common. The explanation given for this phe-
nomenon is the fact that the parties are composed of dyadic ties
(patron–client ties). These patron–client ties which are built into
larger rival political factions are inherently unstable personalized
alliances, and are the building blocks of Philippine political behavior.
These models, however, content to describe and isolate fac-
tionalism as a characteristic of Philippine behavior, do not probe
deeper into what factors provoked factionalism in the first place.
Although it is admitted that these dyadic ties are ‘a reflection of
behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship system’,6 further
investigation into these ‘behavioral patterns’ which gave birth to fac-
tionalism is not attempted. Hence, these models describe merely the
effects but do not diagnose the causes of Philippine political
behavior. What compels individuals and families to coalesce into
tenuous factional alliances? Why is personalism a trademark of Phil-
ippine political behavior? If ideology is not a contending factor in
national politics, what is?
This paper argues that politica de familia (or the traditional values
of Philippine society which compel individuals to think in terms of
family solidarity to the detriment of any other socio-political unit
outside the family), is what motivated political and economic
behavior in post-war Philippines. It is politica de familia that motivates
families to ally into temporary factions to fulfill familial economic
ambitions. Traditional values ensure that the Filipino is more
inclined to perceive the world in terms of how outside resources
could be used to improve the status of the family in socio-economic
terms. Examined through this prism, factionalism and patron–client
ties, elements that the above scholars have isolated as the main
Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon (Institute of Social Studies, The
Hague, The Netherlands, Research Project Series No. 14, 1983); and Amando
Doronila, ‘The Rise of the Patron State in the Philippines, a Study of the Trans-
formation of Patron–Client Relations and its Political Consequences’, M.A. thesis,
Monash University, 1982. These studies acknowledge the importance of families as
the basic building blocks of factionalism and patron–client ties, but the treatment
of family dynamics remains peripheral to the main concerns of their work. Lande,
Hollnsteiner and McCoy are more concerned with the dynamics of factionalism;
Kerkvliet and Wolters with patron–client ties and the erosion of landlord–tenant
relations, and Amando Doronila on showing how patronage politics later evolved
into the creation of a patron state under Marcos.
6
Lande, Leaders, p. 1.
186 MINA ROCES
structures of Philippine politics, are reduced to mere symptoms of

kinship politics or politica de familia. Kinship politics is what motiv-
ated individuals and families to run for office, make or break political
alliances, to legislate on behalf of the family, and to expose the graft
and corruption of those outside their family group in the press. The
Filipino’s primary allegiance is undisputably still to the family,
dwarfing any sentiments that emphasized loyalty or consideration
for the national interest. And the family’s desire to wrest political
power in order to promote its economic wealth, using kinship connec-
tions and the interlocking network of social obligations, is the ‘stuff ’
behind Philippine political behavior.
The use of cultural conflict as a framework for interpreting Philip-
pine post-war history has not been attempted by historians. Although
a sufficient body of literature exists on the structure and nature of
Philippine politics in the post-war years,7 there are only two studies
which make the connections between the conflict of kinship politics
versus western values, and the fluctuations in administrations. Jean
Grossholtz’s study on Philippine politics first observes the conflict in
her analysis of Philippine political culture. In this conflict she cor-
rectly perceived the dominance of traditional values over the more
recent values which opt for universalistic codes. For Grossholtz the
explanation for this dominance is rooted in the kinship structure
and system of obligations: ‘The dominance of the older attitudes
toward dependence on others in an alliance system conditioned by
kinship and social obligations has prevented complete transition to
a more complex set of quid pro quos that would hold politicians
responsible for policy decisions more universal in scope.’8
In a 1987 article, political scientist Justin Green has studied the
inconsistencies between personal values and institutional values
(really politica de familia and western values respectively) in order to
predict the likely success of democratic values in post-martial-law
Philippines. He has observed that the strong hold of personal values
7
Lande, Leaders; McCoy, ‘Yloilo’; Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics; Kerkvliet, The Huk
Rebellion; Wolters, Politics; Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines (Boston, 1964);
Doronila, ‘The Rise’; Dante Simbulan, ‘A Study of the Socio-Economic Elite in Phil-
ippine Politics and Government, 1946–1963’, Ph.D. dissertation, Australian
National University, 1965; Remigio Agpalo, The Political Elite and the People A Study
of Politics in Occidental Mindoro (Manila, 1972), and David Wurfel, Filipino Politics,
Development and Decay (Quezon City, 1988).
8
Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, pp. 215–16.
9
makes it difficult for democratic values to take root. Green and
Grossholtz were the only scholars who looked at the conflict of values
as an important framework for analyzing the idiosyncracies of Philip-
pine political culture in the post-war period.10
This argument, however, does not deny the importance of patron-
age politics, the main stranglehold of the factional model. At the
same time it does not endorse the view that a call to a more rigid
application of western values was only mere rhetoric. The fact that
politicians feel compelled to declare that they are upholding the
western values of democracy and are anti-graft and corruption
reveals that these values are prestigious in the public mind. But as
the general argument postulates, two sets of values exist side by
side and are responsible for the ambivalent behavior exhibited by
Filipinos. While patronage is a factor (patronage is an offshoot of
kinship politics), it appears that in major turning points in Philippine
post-war history, western values have made the difference. In the
republican period, no administration could get re-elected. Had pat-
ronage politics been the sole determining factor, then we would find
the incumbent administration winning re-election almost consist-
ently since it has more patronage sources in its power. Another
example is the 1986 ‘revolution’ where people risked their lives for
the restoration of democracy—patronage politics was not operating
there, instead western values was the motivation.
The factional model stressing patronage politics as the sole deter-
minant of political behavior leaves no room for ideology or issues as
another contending factor in political culture. (In fact, the model
argues that ideology is not a factor at all.) In a 1991 book, scholars
have questioned the applicability of the factional model in post-1972
Philippines. The scholars concluding from their own research on
local elections revised the factional model by emphasizing that pat-
ronage politics was not the only factor determining political
behavior:
9
Justin J. Green, ‘Political Socialization, Filipino Values, and Prospects for
Democracy’, in Carl H. Lande (ed.), Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and
American Policy (Washington D.C., 1987), pp. 261–78.
10
Studies on bureaucratic corruption in Asia have also focused on the conflict
between traditional norms and legal norms as an explanation for the persistence
and tolerance of bureaucratic corruption in these societies. See Rance P. Lee, ‘Bur-
eaucratic Corruption in Asia: The Problem of Incongruence between Legal Norms
and Folk Norms’, in Ledivina Cariño (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia (Manila,
1986), pp. 69–108.
188 MINA ROCES
What we conclude is that factionalism—and its corollary personalism—is

but one factor among many as people weigh their options. Issues—such as
perceived benefits from Marcos-style land reform, peace and stability, or the
qualities most important for holding public office—do figure significantly in
people’s calculations.11
While those revising the factional model make a small qualification
that applies to post-1972 Philippine local politics, the conflict hypo-
thesis grapples with both the factional model and the role of ideo-
logy, and offers a more lucid explanation for the ambivalence of Phil-
ippine political behavior, and for the ‘cycles’ of political
administrations that span the three eras of post-independence
history.
The conflict hypothesis enables us to make two important inter-
pretations—the first suggests an explanation for the endless cycles,
as well as the ambivalence of familial political behavior, and the
other involves the nature of traditional kinship politics itself, a phe-
nomenon which, though very basic to an understanding of Philippine
political behavior, has remained hitherto largely unexamined in
scholarly literature on the Philippines (and Asia generally). Both
these interpretations challenge, or at least modify, previous models
on Philippine politics. Empirical evidence for the hypothesis and for
the mechanics of kinship politics will be provided through the case
study of one of the most prominent families of the era—the Lopez
family.
The term family is used here to mean the family alliance group.
This group refers to the bilateral extended family, the wider circle
of ritual kin, and the close friends, employees, workers, clients and
allies of the family who are personally loyal to the family patriarch.
For example, a journalist who works for the Lopez-owned newspaper
The Manila Chronicle is considered by all as a Lopez man and is per-
sonally loyal to the Chronicle publisher Eugenio Lopez. The employees
of The Manila Times called the late publisher Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces,
‘tatay’ (father) and his sister Isabel ‘Bebeng’ Roces, ‘nanay’
(mother). The elite family’s allies are directly loyal to their employer
(the family patriarch) and not the family-owned company in which
they work.
But although the family network ostensibly included the alliance
group, the allies themselves were constantly shifting their allegiance.
11
Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares, ‘Themes in the Transition from
Marcos to Aquino: An Introduction’, in Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares
Thomas Kiefer used the adjective ‘fluid’ when he described the rela-
tionship between Tausug leaders and their allies because individuals
constantly changed sides in situations of political violence. And since
in the Tausug world view whoever is not one’s friend is undisputably
one’s enemy, such fluidity accounts for extremely unstable alliances.
The characteristics of politica de familia are markedly similar to that
of Tausug behavior in conflict.12 Politica de familia presupposes a con-
test for power between rival elite family alliances and allies are free
to switch loyalties from one family group to the other.13 Thus, it
must be stressed that the family alliance group is composed of mem-
bers both kin and non-kin who are temporarily allied with a family
leader or patriarch.
Case Study of the Lopez Family
Although by the 1960s the Lopez family had become the most prom-
inent family in national politics, it was a family with a very young
history—its origins made it barely a hundred and fifty years old at
the height of its power. Family genealogist and historian Oscar
Lopez, traced the family’s ancestry to Basilio Lopez (a Chinese
mestizo), and Sabina Jalandoni of Jaro, in the Visayan province of
Iloilo, around 1834.14 One son Eugenio Lopez was responsible for
acquiring the vast amount of sugar lands that became the foundation
for the Lopez family wealth and subsequent prominence in the west-
ern Visayas.15
His son Benito Lopez catapulted the family into the mainstream
of the regional politics of the western Visayas when he became gov-
ernor of Iloilo at the turn of the twentieth century. His political
career, however, was abruptly ended when, upon re-election he fell
(eds), From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines
(Manila, 1991), pp. 9–10.
12
The definition of family alliance has been influenced by Thomas Kiefer’s study
on the Tausug. See Thomas Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine
Moslem Society (New York, 1972), especially pp. 8, 59–75.
13
Scholars who have studied the structure of Philippine politics argued that this
fluidity has resulted in the formation of unstable political factions composed of elite
family groups. See Lande, Leaders; McCoy, ‘Yloilo’; and Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics.
14
Oscar Lopez, The Lopez Family, Vol. 1 (Metro-Manila, 1982), pp. xxiii–xxxvii.
15
Ibid., pp. xliv–xlvi. Also Oscar M. Lopez, ‘Man for All Seasons’, in First Lopez
Family Reunion, Descendants of Basilio Lopez-Sabina Jalandoni, in Jaro, Iloilo City,
Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1982, Lopez Memorial Museum, Manila.
190 MINA ROCES
16
victim to assassination. When Benito Lopez died he left behind
two young sons, Eugenio and Fernando. These two brothers were to
transform the Lopez family from a regional power to kingmakers in
Philippine national politics, and in the process simultaneously build
a formidable financial empire.
Eugenio Hofileña Lopez was born in Jaro, Iloilo, but was educated
in Manila at the Ateneo for his bachelor’s degree, and the University
of the Philippines for a law degree; followed by a post-graduate
degree from Harvard University in the United States. On his return
from America, he practiced law in the firm of the most renowned
lawyer at that time—Vicente J. Francisco.17 Fernando, in turn, also
received his education in Manila at the Letran College, and then at
the University of Santo Tomas for law school.
Immediately after his marriage in 1928, Eugenio decided to
return to the sugar plantation the brothers had inherited in Isabela,
Negros Occidental. He gave up his law practice and began to estab-
lish businesses in Iloilo-Negros together with his brother Fernando.
(The company with the name E & F Lopez as co-owners started in
1926.) He revived his father’s newspaper the El Tiempo (1929) and
its corresponding English daily, The Iloilo Times. In 1932 he founded
Iloilo Shipping Company providing a ferryboat service between Iloilo
and Negros Occidental. He then expanded his transportation invest-
ments to include Iloilo Transportation Company (1932), an urban
bus company (Panay Autobus), Iloilo Taxicab Company (1937) and
an airline (1933), the Iloilo-Negros Air Express Company (INAEC).
He dabbled in real estate under the name Lopez, Inc. (1935) and
built a chain of cinema houses in the City of Iloilo. He was also in
16
Not much is known about Benito Lopez (Oscar Lopez’ official history of the
family stops with the first Eugenio Lopez). A couple of documents found in the
Worcester Papers charged the governor with countenancing and protecting corrupt
officials, and of buying votes at election time. See ‘Gives the Result of Investigation
of Joaquin Gil, Benito Lopez, Governor of Iloilo, and of Political Situation Generally
in Iloilo, Particularly the Testimony of Quintin Salas’, Manila, P.I., November 26,
1907, and ‘Report of the Chief of the Law Division in the Matter of Certain Charges
Preferred by Joaquin Gil’, found in the Worcester Philippine Collection, Documents,
Vol. 1, Item No. 27, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Harlan
Hatcher Library, The University of Michigan.
17
Eugenio Lopez Sr, ‘Biographical Data Focused on Highlights of His Business
Career’, Attachment No. 7-C Eugenio Lopez, Deceased SSAN 556–25–3321, IT-2
Question 12, file, Lopez Memorial Museum, Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Manila,
Philippines. Interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988, and
interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, wife of Eugenio Lopez Sr, 17 May 1988.
18
the food business with the formation of Velvet Ice Cream. All these
investments made the Lopez brothers’ commercial interests the larg-
est in Iloilo City by 1940.19 In the political arena the family was
linked to the Zulueta family political faction, one of the two domin-
ant factions of Iloilo at the time (the other being the Confesor-
Caram alliance).20
The Second World War put a temporary halt on many profitable
business ventures. The Lopez-owned El Tiempo was taken over and
used by the Japanese for their propaganda purposes. The Panay
Autobus buses were first appropriated by the Japanese and then util-
ized by the USAFFE. Eugenio Lopez and his immediate family left
for safety in the hills of Baguio and Luzon. Fernando Lopez and his
family however, stayed in the vicinity of Negros Occidental and Iloilo
province.
After the war the Lopez family moved to Manila and began to
expand their business interests increasingly on a national scale. The
move to Manila became a watershed in Lopez family history as it
symbolized the family’s transition from regional elite to major prot-
agonist in national politics. Business ties to Iloilo gradually
weakened, although the western Visayas would always remain the
major political foothold in electoral politics. It was inevitable that
Eugenio would move to Manila, Iloilo had become too small for his
corporate plans.21 At this time, Fernando Lopez made his political
debut. On September 29, 1945, President Sergio Osmeña appointed
him mayor of Iloilo city.22
The political debut of Fernando Lopez which began with a mayor’s
appointment in 1945 launched a political career that lasted 25 years
(put to an untimely end only by the declaration of martial law by
President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972) reaching the post of vice-
presidency and the choicest cabinet position (Secretary of Agricul-
ture and Natural Resources) for three terms. Thus began a symbiotic
18
Interview with Pacifico Villaluz (who has worked as treasurer for the Lopez
interests since the pre-war days, and was manager of Iloilo Transportation
Company), Manila, 5 July 1988, and Eugenio Lopez, ‘Biographical Data’, pp. 1–2.
19
McCoy, ‘Yloilo’, pp. 124 and 165.
20
Alfred W. McCoy, ‘ ‘‘Politics by Other Means’’: World War II in the Western
Visayas, Philippines’, in Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupa-
tion, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No. 22, 1980, pp.
158–203.
21
Interview with Oscar M. Lopez, son of Eugenio Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988.
22
The Times, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 1.
192 MINA ROCES
relationship between politics and business that thrived on the

closeness of the two brothers. With one brother in politics the Lopez
family had the passkey to the realm of special privileges that gave
them access to the credit and franchises sealed off to families
deprived of political power. While one brother made political connec-
tions, the other was the shrewd and ruthless businessman who util-
ized these special privileges for the family business corporations.23
The unusual closeness of the brothers further guaranteed family
unity and financial success. The brothers trusted each other and
never fought. In this partnership Eugenio made all the business
decisions and all businesses he fathered were shared equally with
Fernando.24 The extent of their trust was manifested in the fact that
at least one bank account was in the name of Fernando and Eugenio
Lopez with the stipulation that either of them could withdraw any
amount.25
Fernando Lopez’ rapid rise in national politics could only be
described as meteoric. In 1945, President Sergio Osmeña appointed
23
This paper only presents the highlights of the Lopez family history; for a more
comprehensive account see Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship Politics in Post-War
Phliippines: The Lopez Family, 1945–1989’, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of
Michigan, 1990, ch. 4.
24
Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; interview with Mariquit
(Maria Salvacion) Javellana Lopez, Bacolod, 16 April 1988; interview with Oscar
M. Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988; interview with the Eugenio Lopez family and
their spouses during their Sunday dinner reunion, Manila, 27 March 1988
(Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Oscar M. Lopez, Manuel M. Lopez, Roberto M.
Lopez, Steve Psinakis, Connie Rufino Lopez, and Marites Lagdameo Lopez); inter-
view with Pacita Moreno Lopez, 17 May 1988; interview with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez
Jr, Manila, 2 May 1988; interview with Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July 1988; inter-
view with Marcelo Fernando, Lopez family lawyer in the 1960s, Manila, 12 April
1988; interview with Alfredo Montelibano Sr, close associate of Eugenio Lopez in
the sugar bloc and cumpadre of Fernando Lopez since his son married Fernando’s
daughter Mita, Manila, 20 April 1988; and interview with Lydia M. Fullon, cashier
of the Lopez family (BISCOM and PASUMIL sugar centrals) who worked with them
from 1937 to the present, Manila, 18 March 1988.
25
The wife of Eugenio Lopez, Pacita Moreno Lopez, and his children, Presenta-
cion Lopez-Psinakis and Oscar M. Lopez deny this. Interview with Pacita Moreno
Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988; interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila,
26 May 1988; and interview with Oscar M. Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988. How-
ever, Hilarion Henares Jr, who was close to the Lopezes, claimed that he had seen
this account. Interview with Hilarion Henares Jr, godchild of Fernando Lopez, eco-
nomist, former vice-president of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and col-
umnist of The Philippine Daily Inquirer responsible for exposing the Lopez family
scandal involving the Manila Electric Company in August 1988, Manila, 30 June
1988. This observation was confirmed by Pacifico Villaluz who said both brothers
could sign any amount they wanted. Interview with Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July
1988. (Also confirmed by one Lopez employee who wishes to remain anonymous.)
him mayor of Iloilo. A year later his successor, President Manuel
Roxas re-appointed him mayor of Iloilo.26 Roxas then invited Fer-
nando to join the Liberal Party (Fernando supported Osmeña’s can-
didacy and ran with his Nacionalista Party), and worked for his nom-
ination as senatorial candidate two years later.27 Typical of most
politicians Lopez switched political parties as the family alliance
shifted. At the end of July, 1947, Lopez launched his campaign for
senator in his home province of Iloilo, and resigned as Iloilo mayor
a month later in order to concentrate on the senatorial campaign.28
At this critical point in the political career of Fernando Lopez,
brother Eugenio acquired a major national newspaper based in
Manila, The Manila Chronicle on September 27, 1947.29 This newspa-
per then became the major political weapon of the Lopez family,
aptly described by Lopez critics later as the ‘mouthpiece’ of Eugenio
Lopez. The most salient point to make about The Manila Chronicle as
a Lopez investment was that it never made any money.30 Why did
Eugenio Lopez, a hard businessman, then keep it running at a loss
for twenty-four years?
Media was a powerful weapon that could be used to attack all
political and business enemies, even the president of the Philippines.
Applying the values of politica de familia the Lopezes consistently used
the newspaper to serve their familial interests. The paper was notori-
ous for biassed reporting. It continuously endorsed Lopez political
candidates and censured Lopez enemies. The paper was also used to
pressure political and business rivals (including the president of the
Philippines) to capitulate to demands in the interests of the Lopez
family. During the campaigns of Fernando Lopez, every activity and
26
The Times, 3 May 1947, p. 1, and The Manila Chronicle, 4 May 1947, p. 2.
27
Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; and The Times, 24 July
1947, p. 1.
28
The Times, 31 July 1947, p. 1; The Manila Times, 30 July 1947, pp. 1 and 24;
and The Manila Times, 1 Aug. 1947, pp. 1 and 28. In fact the entire Liberal Party
senatorial slate embarked on their campaign in Iloilo upon the invitation of Fer-
nando Lopez. Lopez resigned as Iloilo mayor on 29 Aug. 1947. See The Manila Times,
29 Aug. 1947, p. 5.
29
The Times, 27 Sept. 1947, p. 1.
30
Interview with Conrado Sanchez Jr, economist, former governor of the Bureau
of Investments, now with the UNCTAD, Manila, 5 June 1988, and interview with
Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July 1988. This observation is also made by former Lopez
man (who worked with Eugenio Lopez at the Meralco), Rafael Salas who later
became President Marcos’ Executive Secretary. See Nick Joaquin, The World of Rafael
Salas (Metro-Manila, 1987), p. 83. ‘The Chronicle had been losing money for several
years. It was known as a Lopez mouthpiece and therefore biased in favor of its
owners. Other businesses of the Lopez empire had been subsidizing the Chronicle.’
194 MINA ROCES
every speech no matter how trivial, was reported in The Manila Chron-
icle. Furthermore, the Lopez businesses were always highly praised
in The Manila Chronicle supplements.
In just two years Fernando Lopez rose from mayor of Iloilo to
senator on December 30, 1947.31 Then, another mere two years
later, the sugar barons groomed Lopez to be their vice-presidential
candidate with Elpidio Quirino for president.32 Quirino himself pre-
ferred to have Jose Yulo or Mariano Cuenco as his running mate.
But the Visayan delegates, determined to have their way, threatened
to bolt the Liberal Party unless Lopez was selected vice-presidential
candidate.33
The sugar barons were not only extremely wealthy but also very
well organized, complete with their own association, the National
Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP) which held yearly conferences.
The enormous wealth and power of this elite group was predicated
on the fact that the sugar industry was undoubtedly the highest
dollar earning product in the Philippine economy even before the
second world war. The government derived no less than 43% of its
annual revenue from taxes paid by the sugar barons. The ten banks
and three companies engaged in agricultural financing loaned 47%
of its capital to sugar.34
After the war, priority was also given to reviving the sugar indus-
try. The planters and millers were given war damage payments to
compensate for their crops, to replant sugar, and to rebuild the sugar
centrals. Credit was extended to the planters on easy repayment
terms. The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) which was
founded to create credit facilities for the rehabilitation of agriculture
and industry damaged by the war, advanced substantial sums to
sugar, and the province of Negros Occidental benefitted the most
from the financial aid provided by the RFC.35 The RFC which later
31
The Manila Times, 30 Dec. 1947, p. 1.
32
The Sunday Times Magazine, 24 April 1949, p. 35.
33
For the account of the ‘battle for the vice-presidential slot’ see The Manila
Times, 1 June 1949, pp. 1 and 10; The Manila Times, 4 June 1949, pp. 1 and 12; The
Manila Times, 7 June 1949, pp. 1 and 3; The Manila Times, 8 June 1949, pp. 1 and
4; The Manila Times, 10 June 1949, pp. 1 and 16; Philippines Free Press, 11 June 1949,
p. 1; The Manila Times, 11 June 1949, pp. 1 and 14; The Manila Chronicle, 11 June
1949, pp. 1 and 4; and Philippines Free Press, 18 June 1949, p. 4.
34
E. J. C. Montilla (First Vice-President, Philippine Sugar Association), ‘The
Past, Present and Future of Our Sugar Industry’, Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila,
1950), p. 12.
35
Ibid., p. 13, Eduardo Romualdez (chairman RFC Board of Directors), ‘The RFC
in Philippine Rehabilitation and Reconstruction’, Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila,
1955), pp. 104–6; Delfin Buencamino, ‘The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in
became the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was the
only government banking institution which granted long-term loans
to the sugar industry.36 The Philippine National Bank (PNB) pro-
vided short-term crop loans which were supposed to be liquidated
after every crop. Nonetheless the PNB was (and still is) the biggest
commercial banking institution in the Philippines and if one was in
political power it was easier to borrow money from the PNB. The
importance accrued to the sugar industry was such that the PNB was
usually headed by a Negrense (one from Negros in the Visayas, the
backbone of the sugar industry).37
Eugenio Lopez’ influence emanated from his leadership of the
organization of sugar barons. Two of his closest friends (Oscar
Ledesma and Alfredo Montelibano Sr.) served as presidents of the
NFSP at some point in their careers. The group was a potentially
formidable political force in post-war politics, so much so that presid-
ential aspirants courted the planters by promising aid to the sugar
industry—beginning with the first post-war president Manuel Roxas
who in a campaign speech promised to aid the sugar industry ‘to the
limit’ if elected.38 The sugar barons’ endorsement of Fernando Lopez
for vice-president was nearly a command thrust into the lap of Quir-
ino, and at the same time it carried with it the wealth and resources
of the planters—practically a recipe for success at the polls. In the
end, during the tight elections, Quirino would have no reason to
regret relenting to the sugar bloc, for in the hectic campaign months
that followed, The Manila Chronicle not only published full-page
advertisements for Quirino–Lopez, but also repeatedly made clear
the Visayan endorsement of the pair.39 Exercising its prerogative as
an instrument of kinship politics, the newspaper did not run any
advertisements for the opposition—the Laurel/Briones or Avelino/
Francisco tickets. Such a vigorous campaign supported by the most
powerful agricultural and industrial barons was crucial in later
obtaining the victory of Quirino and Lopez who were proclaimed
president and vice-president on December 14, 1949.40
the Philippine Economic Blueprint’, Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila, 1950), pp. 43–
4 and 57; and The Manila Chronicle, 26 Nov. 1949, pp. 7 and 10.
36
Manuel Elizalde, ‘The Philippine Sugar Industry in 1959’, Fookien Times Year-
book (Manila, 1959), p. 182.
37
Interview with Conrado Sanchez Jr, Manila, 5 June 1988.
38
The Manila Times, 7 Feb. 1946, p. 1.
39
The Manila Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1949, p. 17; The Manila Chronicle, 30 Oct. 1949,
pp. 1 and 4; The Manila Chronicle, 5 Nov. 1949, pp. 1 and 5; The Manila Chronicle, 9
Nov. 1949, p. 1; and The Manila Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1949, p. 1.
40
The Manila Times, 14 Dec. 1949, p. 1.
196 MINA ROCES
During Fernando Lopez’ term as vice-president and Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources,41 brother Eugenio purchased, on
February 19, 1951, the largest sugar central in Southeast Asia, the
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) in Negros. The pro-
curement of the sugar central transformed the major sugar planters
headed by Lopez into millers as well. In 1956, Eugenio Lopez bought
a second sugar central, this time in Luzon—the Pampanga Sugar
Mill (PASUMIL). His investments included Philippine Portland
Cement, The Manila Chronicle, Industrial Company (which made jute
bags for the sugar), in 1957, the ABS–CBN broadcasting Corpora-
tion, and finally in 1961, the jewel of his financial empire—the
Manila Electric Company (Meralco).
Although all these corporations were acquired during Fernando
Lopez’ political career, he consistently stressed that he was in public
office to serve the people. His defense rested on the premise that
prior to his entrance into politics, he was a successful businessman
and was capable of earning four or five times more than his vice-
president’s salary of P15,000 a year, had he chosen to stay in private
practice.42 In public, and also in his own mind, he saw no conflict of
interests between his presence in politics and the business corpora-
tions his brother was purchasing and enlarging. As far as he was
concerned, he himself was no longer in business and therefore
‘Nobody could tell us that I am taking advantage of my position as
senator, as vice-president to enhance our business—nobody’.43 Up
until the late 1980s when asked questions about his family’s battle
with Philippine presidents and other politicians, Fernando would
41
Fernando Lopez was also awarded the choicest cabinet position—Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources by Quirino who was pressured by the Lopez
alliance to make the appointment. See The Manila Times, 30 April 1950, pp. 1 and
5; and interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; Telegram, Mayor
Jalandoni to Malacañan, 12 Sept. 1950; Iloilo City, Quirino Papers, General Corres-
pondence, Iloilo; The Manila Times, 25 May 1950, pp. 1 and 12; The Manila Times,
26 May 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 27 May 1950, pp. 1 and 14; The Manila Times,
2 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 12 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 13 June
1950, pp. 1 and 12; Philippines Free Press, 3 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Chronicle, 19
Aug. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 10 Sept. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 14
Oct. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 21 Oct. 1950, p. 4; Teodoro M. Locsin, ‘The
Strange Case of Vice-President Lopez vs. President Quirino’, Philippines Free Press,
29 April 1950, pp. 2–3; ‘Lopez Pleads for Moral Austerity’, Philippines Free Press, 29
April 1950, p. 37; Leon O. Ty, ‘Parting of the Ways?’, Philippines Free Press, 20 May
1950, p. 4; The Manila Times, 5 Sept. 1950, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 14 Sept.
1950, p. 1.
42
The Sunday Times, 16 April 1950, p. 2.
43
Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988.
simply dismiss this with the statement that all quarrels with the
presidents were with his brother, he himself oblivious to the reasons
for the dissent.44 Fernando’s statement was confirmed by other Lopez
allies and rivals—Don Fernando was the naive, charming ‘Mr Nice
Guy’ who could not hurt a fly—the quintessential politician, the man
whom no one intentionally challenged, while Don Eugenio was the
shrewd businessman who controlled the family business from behind
the scenes.45
Fernando Lopez’ reactions reflected the ambivalent behavior of
families who expressed endorsement of western values stressing the
importance of the national interest over the family, and yet continu-
ing to practice kinship politics in day-to-day life. In his mind, the
contradiction was ‘resolved’ by the ‘separate’ roles that distinguished
him from his elder brother. And yet in reality, the brothers’ interests
and identities were practically fused. The family felt compelled to
advocate western values despite the fact that in actual practice they
continued to abide by the values of politica de familia.
That the Lopez corporations were built from the special privileges
gained through the practice of kinship politics was an undisputed
fact exposed by President Diosdado Macapagal. At the very start of
his administration President Diosdado Macapagal launched a major
attack on the Lopez family, as part of his ‘moral regeneration’ drive.
Beginning with a speech warning the sugar bloc against engaging in
organized power politics as a means to promote its interests,46 he
then proceeded to show how this bloc, which he labelled the ‘Lopez
sugar bloc’, used their influence to secure special bank loans. Maca-
pagal’s attempt to criticize the practice of kinship politics was funda-
mentally sincere—he sought to implement the western values of
ethics, professionalism, and the concern for the national interest.
(He did not build a family business empire though he himself
emerged a wealthy man.) The battle had raged for the entire four
years of his presidency and cost Macapagal his re-election, since the
elite families practicing kinship politics decided to, in the words of
Montelibano, ‘go for broke’ to ensure his defeat. Such a prolonged
44
Ibid.
45
Interview with Hilarion Henares Jr, Manila, 30 June 1988; interview with Con-
rado Sanchez Jr, Manila, 5 June 1988; interview with Marcelo Fernando, former
lawyer of the Lopez family, Manila, 8 April 1988; and interview with President
Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988.
46
The Manila Times, 14 Feb. 1962, pp. 1 and 12-A; and Philippines Free Press, 3
March 1962, p. 1.
198 MINA ROCES
and systematic exposure and condemnation of the sugar bloc and

the Lopez family (some other families were also included like the
Yulos)47 hitherto unprecedented, would only result in the withdrawal
of their financial support at election time, and Macapagal, ‘the poor
boy from Lubao’ with no personal ‘family’ behind him, must have
been aware of the risk he was taking.
Macapagal’s aim was to impose the western values of free enter-
prise ‘which should make available to all businessmen and to all
citizens equal and fair opportunity to advance not through unfair
tactics but according to the merits of everyone’.48 To enforce this it
became necessary to put an end to what the president himself called
‘the era of special privileges’.49 Among Macapagal’s targets were
first: ‘those who have utilized organized political power to build busi-
ness empires and vice-versa, to which category the Lopez brothers
pertain’.50
In the four years of his tenure, Macapagal unleashed a continuous
series of attacks against the Lopezes. To substantiate the main
theme of the attacks, that of using political power to build a business
47
Macapagal also attacked the Yulos and exposed that Jose Yulo had acquired his
vast Canlubang sugar estate with loans obtained from the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) when he was chairman of the RFC. Macapagal rightly pointed
out that it was both unethical and unconstitutional to be involved in a business
transaction of this nature when one was in the government service. The case was
brought out in the press and there were threats to oust the plantation from Yulo.
A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna where there was a
move to expropriate the estate. Complaint, Republic of the Philippines, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Biñan branch, Republic of the Philippines versus Jose
Yulo, Tomas Yulo, CJ Yulo & Sons, Inc, Vicente Madrigal, Bank of the Philippine
Islands, China Banking Corporation, Commercial Bank and Trust Company, Philip-
pine Bank of Communications, Development Bank of the Philippines, Luis Yulo,
Teresa Jugo, Maria Elena Y. Quiros del Rio, Jose Yulo Jr, Regina Abreu, Ramon
Yulo, Carmen de Vera, Jesus Miguel Yulo, Maria Cecilia Yulo and Leandro Locsin,
Civil Case No. B-362, document given to the author by President Diosdado Macapa-
gal. The case was also heard in the Supreme Court. See also The Manila Chronicle,
25 Aug. 1962, pp. 1 and 9; The Manila Chronicle, 25 Jan. 1963, p. 1; The Manila
Chronicle, 1 Feb. 1963, p. 12; The Manila Chronicle, 13 Feb. 1963, p. 1; The Manila
Times, 21 Sept. 1962, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 25 Sept. 1962, p. 1.
48
Diosdado Macapagal, ‘The Big Drive’, Radio-TV Address, 28 Aug. 1962, in
Diosdado Macapagal, New Hope for the Common Man, speeches and statements of
President Diosdado Macapagal, Vol. 2, Research and Special Projects, Malacañang
Press Office, June 1963, pp. 97 and 102; Diosdado Macapagal, ‘The Big Drive’,
Radio-TV Address, published in The Manila Chronicle, 29 Aug. 1962, pp. 1, 7 and 9.
49
Napoleon G. Rama, ‘The Era of Special Privileges is Over!’, Philippines Free
Press, 3 March 1962, pp. 6 and 75.
50
Diosdado Macapagal, ‘The Big Drive’, p. 102, and interview with President
Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, 2 June 1988.
empire, Macapagal argued that during the period of their political
activities, the Lopez brothers and their associates in the sugar bloc
acquired the following choice businesses: the BISCOM, the PASU-
MIL, The Manila Chronicle, the ABS and the CBN television network,
and the Meralco.51 Furthermore, their political connections enabled
them to receive special loans and credits from government banking
and financial institutions, loans which enabled them to buy the huge
businesses in the first place. Macapagal published a presumed total
breakdown of Lopez credits to state institutions:
1. Development Bank of the Philippines:

a. Binalbagan Central P32,490,000
b. Pampanga Central 4,788,000
c. Philippine Portland Cement 2,355,000
d. Industrial Company 1,450,000
e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 600,000
f. CBN Broadcasting 2,275,000
g. Southern Lines (Shipping company) 1,730,000
Total P45,688,000
2. Philippine National Bank:

a. Meralco P35,000,000
b. Chronicle 2,000,000
c. Binalbagan Sugar Central 3,500,000
d. Pampanga Sugar Mill 1,200,000
e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 485,000
Total P42,185,000
3. Government Service Insurance System:

a. Alto-CBN (building construction) P500,000
All of these totalled P88,373,000.52
Second: Macapagal denounced the Lopezes for their political

influence in the legislature, and the judiciary. Macapagal, for
example, accused what he nicknamed the ‘Lopez sugar bloc’
(composed of 36-strong men in the House with an undisclosed
number of senators under the leadership of Senate President Pro
Tempore Fernando Lopez), of controlling the political and economic
51
The Manila Times, 24 Feb. 1962, pp. 1 and 12A.
52
‘Palace Versus the Lopezes’, Philippines Free Press, 19 Jan. 1963, p. 60; The
Manila Times, 1 March 1962, pp. 1 and 2-A; and The Manila Chronicle, 1 March 1962,
p. 15.
200 MINA ROCES
life of the nation. The Lopezes had succeeded in obtaining these

politicians as allies through their practice of giving them retainer
fees as ‘legal counsel’ or ‘sinecure positions’ in their business estab-
lishments.53 According to the president, the Lopezes were attempting
to control both the senate (if Fernando Lopez succeeded in becoming
senate president) and the congress, through the election of Daniel
Romualdez as House Speaker.54 Due to their political influence the
Lopez bloc had also succeeded in appointing their men to top-
ranking and key positions in the government, especially the financial
institutions like the Philippine National Bank and the Development
Bank of the Philippines as well as the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank. Their patronage extended to the judiciary where they had a
hand in the appointment of key officials in the Supreme Court down
to the justices of the peace and even some Manila fiscals.55
The president’s campaign was not content to limit itself to a mere
catalogue of Lopez family wrongs. Two cases actually reached the
courts. One case was tax evasion (the Lopezes faced criminal charges
for a P10 million tax evasion suit).56 The other case was a constitu-
tional violation where the family purchased a lot from the Philippine
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), (a lot reserved for the
53
Leoncio R. Paruñgao (Macapagal’s Press Secretary), ‘The Power of the Lopez
Brothers’, Philippines Free Press, 17 Nov. 1962, p. 2.
54
The Manila Times, 3 March 1962, pp. 1 and 2-A; The Manila Times, 10 March
1962, pp. 1 and 16-A. For general comments made by the president about Lopez
attempts to control the senate and congress see, The Manila Times, 26 Feb. 1962,
pp. 1–2; and The Manila Times, 27 Feb. 1962, p. 1.
55
Leoncio R. Paruñgao, ‘The Power of the Lopez Brothers’, p. 2.
56
The Lopezes were accused of falsifying their tax census, by inflating their liabil-
ities in order to pay a smaller amount in taxes. The Justice Department said that
the Lopez brothers falsified their tax census returns for 1961 by making it appear
that the total liabilities of the brothers to the Philippine Planters Investment Com-
pany Inc. was P32,261,380.25 when in the same period the corporation had a total
of only P16,377,276.56 in receivables. Therefore the Justice Department concluded
that the Lopez brothers overstated their liabilities by P15,844,103.69. The Manila
Times, 20 Aug. 1962, p. 12-A. The Philippine Planters Co. was threatened with
seizure because it neglected to pay its broker’s tax. The Manila Times, 28 Aug. 1962,
pp. 1 and 2-A. Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) commissioner Jose B. Lingad
charged a P1,286,039 broker’s tax on Philippine Planters Investment Corporation, a
tax it failed to pay from 1954–61. In 1963, the court of tax appeals had temporarily
restrained the BIR from executing the warrant. See The Manila Times, 3 Jan. 1963,
pp. 1 and 10-A. For reportage on the P10 million tax evasion suit see The Manila
Times, 3 Jan. 1963, pp. 1 and 10-A; The Manila Times, 7 March 1963, p. 1; The
Manila Times, 9 March 1963, p. 5-A. The Lopez brothers, however, were asking the
Supreme Court to restrain the City Fiscal from investigating this suit, in The Manila
Times, 7 March 1963, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 9 March 1963, p. 5A.
residence of the underprivileged), and built their television towers
there.57 The lot was bought during Fernando Lopez’ term as senator
and was against the constitutional provision which emphasized that
no senator shall be directly interested in any contract with the gov-
ernment during his term of office.58
Don Eugenio Lopez was well-known for his tremendous fighting
spirit. In fact he fought with every single Philippine president
(except Carlos Garcia) and many family opponents found themselves
satirized, criticized and exposed vehemently in the pages of the
Chronicle. The primary strategy this time, however, was to concen-
trate their efforts in a presidential campaign (for 1965) that would
defeat Macapagal at the polls. A statement attributed to Eugenio
Lopez summed up succinctly the psychology behind such a course of
conduct: ‘We will not give in to Macapagal because we will be still
around when the time comes that he will no longer be President.’59
The first full-blown relentless Chronicle attacks against Macapagal’s
administration began once Fernando Lopez announced his intention
to seek the Nacionalista Party’s presidential nomination for the 1965
elections. From here on, the Chronicle persistently reproached the
presidential administration, particularly in the speeches of Fernando
Lopez who had begun an arduous campaign with NP ward leaders
all over the country. From July to November 1964, Lopez conducted
an aggressive campaign, traveling all over the country meeting with
Nacionalista leaders, giving numerous speeches hoping to entice sup-
port for the NP nomination. True to family political behavior, the
Chronicle followed the senator throughout all his sojourns.
Despite such an aggressive campaign (complete with the tradi-
tional posture that he would not settle for the vice-presidential post
and instead retire from politics if not nominated), Lopez lost to Ferd-
inand Marcos in the NP convention.60 Just as it seemed that Don
Fernando would retire from politics greatly disappointed, Mrs
Imelda Marcos approached him in his Manila Hotel suite and in
57
For information on the PHHC lot case see The Manila Times, 20 Aug. 1962,
pp. 1 and 12-A; The Manila Times, 21 Aug. 1962, pp. 1 and 14-A; The Manila Times,
5 Jan. 1963, pp. 1 and 8-A; Teodoro M. Locsin, ‘The Mills of the Gods’, Philippines
Free Press, 12 Jan. 1963, p. 6; Edward R. Kiunisala, ‘The Boom’, Philippines Free Press,
2 Feb. 1963, pp. 66–7.
58
The constitutional reference is to section 17, article 6 of the constitution.
59
Interviews with President Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988, and 2
June 1988.
60
The Manila Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1964, pp. 1 and 15; The Manila Chronicle, 23 Nov.
1964, pp. 1 and 15; The Manila Times, 23 Nov. 1964, p. 1.
202 MINA ROCES
tears, begged him to run as Marcos’ vice-presidential mate.61 From

the point of view of Mrs Marcos the support of the Lopez political
machine would be absolutely crucial in facilitating a victory for her
husband. From the Lopez side it seemed that if they could not cap-
ture the presidency, they would settle for the role of kingmaker and
the power behind the throne. Furthermore, given the fact that Maca-
pagal’s assaults had them constantly on the defensive and blunted
their efforts to succeed in business, they believed they had no other
recourse but to defeat him and place a ‘Lopez man’ in Malacañang.
(In fact the Macapagal tirades against the family pressured them to
sell the two sugar mills BISCOM and PASUMIL, and along with
these, two other corporations, Philippine Portland Cement and
Industrial Company.)
To the Lopez family, the Macapagal drive to put an end to the
era of special privileges enjoyed by families with political power, and
replace these with western-style free enterprise, professionalism and
democracy, only succeeded in confirming Eugenio Lopez’ axiom that
‘to succeed in business, one must engage in politics’.62 Eugenio Lopez
Jr summed up his father’s sentiments aptly:
Like dad—he always backs a candidate and he backed the wrong horse
this time so Macapagal won and Macapagal named the two brothers Filip-
ino Stonehills and went after them hammer and glove, stuck the BIR on
them, many many things and then—Ah—its things like you know that give
weight to his desire to say that you need some political clout to stay in
business because you see—you get guys like this, they go after you and you
are completely helpless.63
Ironically, the president’s desire to enforce western values elicited
the opposite reaction from the elite families, who interpreted the
loss of their privileges as a product of their lapse in political power,
their decline in powerful status, driving them to be even more deter-
mined than ever to resume power in order to perpetuate politica de
familia.
The Marcos–Lopez campaign was launched on January 6, 1965.
During the entire year of 1965 The Manila Chronicle had almost daily
reports on the activities and the speeches of both candidates, while
61
Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; Bonner, Waltzing with a
Dictator, p. 24 , and Carmen Navarro Pedrosa, Imelda Marcos (London, 1987), p. 101.
62
The Manila Chronicle, 16 Sept. 1965, p. 1. This axiom was confirmed in inter-
views with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988, and President Diosdado
Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988.
63
Interview with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988.
the Macapagal administration was continuously and ruthlessly
attacked.64 The entire Lopez family was mobilized for the very first
time to instigate an ‘all out’ effort to defeat Macapagal at the polls.
The wives of the Lopez clan, in particular, Pacita Moreno Lopez (wife
of Eugenio Lopez Sr) and daughter Presy (Presentacion) joined the
Blue Ladies of Mrs Marcos and accompanied her, attired in their
blue uniforms, to the campaign sorties all over the Philippines.65 No
expense nor effort was spared; the Lopez multi-media complex was
exploited, and the Meralco company planes were borrowed for the
provincial travels.66 At the end of the campaign (dubbed the longest
campaign in Philippine history) the Lopezes had spent a total of P14
million.67 As Lopez ally Alfredo Montelibano was supposed to have
said, the strategy was to ‘go for broke’ against Macapagal. And
indeed, the crusade was fruitful: Ferdinand Marcos and Fernando
Lopez took their oaths as president and vice-president respectively
on December 30, 1965.68
The beginning of the year 1966 heralded the peak of the Lopez
family history in terms of political power and economic empire. The
family was in control of Meralco, which was an extremely profitable
monopoly,69 it controlled a good segment of the media via The Manila
Chronicle, two television stations (ABS–CBN) and twenty-two radio
stations all over the country (all under the umbrella of the holding
company—Alto Broadcasting—formerly Bolinao Electronics). By this
time the family had bought also the controlling shares of the Philip-
pine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and was making plans
to establish the Philippine Petroleum Company which would have
the monopoly of the lubricating oil industry in the Philippines.
Although the family had left the sugar milling business when the
BISCOM and PASUMIL sugar centrals were sold in 1962, (along
with Philippine Portland Cement and Industrial Company which
manufactured the jute bags for the sugar), the family still owned the
sugar lands and other real estate items managed under the family
64
See The Manila Chronicle, 9 Jan.–15 Dec. 1965.
65
Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez (wife of Eugenio Lopez), Manila, 17 May
1988, and interview with Presentacion Lopez Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988.
66
Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988.
67
Interview with Lopez campaign manager and cousin, Vicente ‘Tiking’ Lopez
Jr, Manila, 18 May 1988.
68
The Manila Times, 30 Dec. 1965, p. 1, and The Manila Chronicle, 30 Dec. 1965,
p. 1. The Manila Chronicle also put out a special supplement on the inauguration.
69
Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988.
204 MINA ROCES
corporation BENPRES (this stood for Benito and Presentacion, the

parents of Eugenio and Fernando Lopez).
At the same time the major companies like Meralco had subsidiary
companies like Philippine Engineering Company which handled the
engineering sector of the Meralco, and Meralco Securities Industrial
Corporation (MSIC) which built a pipeline to channel fuel from Bat-
angas province to the various Meralco generating stations. A subsidi-
ary company of the ABS–CBN broadcasting corporation, was SCAN,
engaged in the business of preparing television and cinema commer-
cials. Other ‘sideline’ investments included: the Agricultural Fire
Insurance and Surety Company Incorporated (AFISCO), founded in
1956 and as a typical business expansion for a family corporation
(since the companies needed to be insured, so they might as well
insure with a family-owned insurance company), and The Manila
Sheraton Hotel, renamed the Hyatt Regency Manila in 1961 (this
investment was relinquished later). A completely cultural investment
was the Lopez Memorial Museum, founded by Don Eugenio in 1960
in memory of his parents, today it holds one of the best collections
of Filipiniana as well as valuable paintings. All these projects were
the creations of Eugenio and not Fernando although both brothers
owned equal shares of all these corporations. The only project that
was associated with Fernando Lopez was Iloilo University which was
inaugurated in March 1968 with Fernando Lopez as president.
Not surprisingly, in 1966 too, the Lopezes were at the height of
their political power. Fernando Lopez was not only vice-president
but also immediately appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. President Marcos also named him Rice and Corn Coord-
inator. Lopez’ position was very powerful since he was in charge of
dispensing lumber, timber, and logging licenses. In September 1966
The San Francisco Chronicle reported that Eugenio Lopez, ‘the richest
man in Manila,’ gave a grandiose party for President Marcos. Lopez
was described as ‘the most powerful man in the Philippines’ and ‘the
power behind the throne’.70
The Marcos–Lopez alliance survived one term and was viable
enough to win a re-election (the first time a presidential administra-
tion was re-elected in post-war history) in 1969. The tenuous alli-
ance, however, broke down after a year (January 1971) when Marcos
announced his intention to destroy the ‘oligarchy’ and the ‘vested
interests’ and began a savage attack against the Lopez family.
70
San Francisco Chronicle, 26 Sept. 1966, clipping from the scrapbook of Eugenio
Lopez, Lopez Memorial Museum, Manila.
Although Marcos claimed that his campaign was against the
‘oppressive oligarchs’ in an overall crusade to destroy the oligarchy,71
it was patently obvious that he was particularly interested in des-
troying the Lopez family; an intention verified in the subsequent
martial law period. From the start, the press echoed the public con-
sensus that Marcos was fundamentally insincere, and many were just
curious to sit back and watch the joust from the wings, aware that
the consequences of the tournament would not affect them at all
since it was, after all, merely a personal and familial fight.72
The details of this quarrel are more explicitly discussed else-
where73 but suffice it to say that Ferdinand Marcos argued the case
from the standpoint of western values; that his crusade was aimed
at eliminating familism (kinship politics) by preventing the Lopez
family from its next move—the possession of the monopoly on oil in
the Philippines. Marcos continued this vendetta with ruthless vigor
in the subsequent martial law period which followed twenty months
after his first tirade against the Lopez family.
Martial Law
In his book, Today’s Revolution: Democracy (appropriately dubbed the

Marcos blue-print for the New Society even by Marcos himself74),
Marcos published the first and most comprehensive rationale for the
71
Teodoro L. Locsin Jr, ‘A Fairy Tale’, Philippines Free Press, 13 Feb. 1971, p. 7.
72
These articles were all taken from the personal scrapbook of Eugenio Lopez
entitled ‘Clash of Titans’, which compiled all the articles about the Lopez family’s
battle with President Marcos in 1971: Greg M. Datuin, ‘Battle to Death’, Malacañ-
ang Profile column, Daily Mirror, 12 Jan. 1971; Ricarte M. Baliao, ‘Blackout Spawned
Naughty Speculations’, in Passing Column, The Evenings News, 14 Jan. 1971, p. 13;
Willie Ng, Column 8, Philippines Herald, 15 Jan. 1971; Amando E. Doronila, ‘A Study
of FM-DM Tactics, Fair or Foul’, Check and Balance Column, Daily Mirror, 16 Jan.
1971; Amelita Reysio-Cruz, Merry-Go-Round Column, Manila Daily Bulletin, 18 Jan.
1971; ‘Lopez Taxes Get Palace Attention’, Evening News, 18 Jan. 1971; Charlie T.
Castañeda, ‘FM Concentrates Fire on Meralco’, Evening News, 18 Jan. 1971; David
Bidan, ‘Government Maps Moves on Meralco’, Philippines Herald, 19 Jan. 1971; Luis
Beltran, ‘After Five Years of Trying, Marcos May Yet Succeed’, A Place in the Sun
Column, The Sun, 9 Jan. 1971; Amelito R. Mutuc, ‘Battle of the Century’, Weekly
Nation, 25 Jan. 1971; Guillermo ‘Willie’ Jurado, ‘The Battle of Titans’, a series of
six articles in the Weekly Nation, 25 Jan., 1 Feb., 8 Feb., 15 Feb., 22 Feb., and 1
March 1971. The Republic Weekly ran a series of 8 articles on the Lopezes under the
heading ‘Case Studies of our Oligarchs’, found also in the scrapbook but was not
dated.
73
See Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’, pp. 152–9.
74
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Notes on the New Society of the Philippines (Manila, 1973),
p. vii.
206 MINA ROCES
declaration of martial law in 1972. Here Marcos revealed his exigesis

on the evils of Philippine politics and society and proposed a remedy
through what he termed the ‘democratic revolution’ (later he dubbed
it ‘revolution from the center’). Of primary relevance to this study
was his focus on the oligarchy as the major reason for the sickness
of a society characterized by a wide gap between the rich and the
poor. Marcos was perceptive enough to observe that although each
administration fell because of its record of graft and corruption, the
pattern seemed to perpetuate itself indefinitely. He argued that all
this was the result of the fact that the oligarchs were not interested
in political power as such but in the pursuit of economic gain and
social privilege.75 Marcos laid the sole blame on the oligarchy for the
presence of social corruption.76
Martial law was the method Marcos chose to destroy the oligarchy
and transform the Philippine ‘precarious democracy’ into a true
democracy. Since Marcos had pointed out that the previous repub-
lican system did not work, as it merely unleashed an endless cycle of
administrations guilty of graft and corruption, martial law would
release Filipino society from this endless quagmire. It was significant
that Marcos expressed the entire rationale in the language of west-
ern values. He condemned the ‘old society’ for its rampant practice
of kinship politics. The so-called ‘democratic revolution’, one without
violence and unleashed ‘from above’ was the best method to initiate
changes in Philippine social structure and bring equality to the
majority of the Filipinos suffering from poverty. In his treatises77
Marcos was unequivocally championing western values over that of
kinship politics as the dogma for the ‘new society’. And indeed, his
criticism of traditional family values was very apt from the standard
of western values.
Martial law equipped Marcos with unlimited powers with which to
carry out his vendetta against the oligarchic families, put a halt to
the practice of kinship politics, and thus break the endless cycles of
corrupt administrations. Instead the reverse occurred. Whereas,
prior to martial law many families competed at election time for the
75
Ferdinand Marcos, Today’s Revolution: Democracy (Manila, 1971), pp. 71–2.
76
According to Marcos, ‘In the institutional sense, the oligarchs, for being privil-
eged, are guilty of bringing about this state of affairs’ (social corruption), ibid., p.
74.
77
See Ferdinand Marcos, Today’s Revolution; and the following: Ferdinand Marcos,
Notes, Ferdinand Marcos, Revolution from the Center (Hongkong, 1978), and Ferdinand
Marcos, Progress and Martial Law (Manila, 1981).
political power that would grant them access to the special privileges
with which to build financial empires, after martial law only one
family alliance had this unique opportunity. Since Marcos assumed
dictatorial powers and elections were abolished, the Marcos family
alliance had the monopoly over the practice of kinship politics for an
indefinite period. The corruption of the Marcos family alliance
termed ‘crony capitalism’ revealed that Marcos, although bran-
dishing western values at the start of martial law, had fully intended
to practice kinship politics for the benefit of his own familial alliance.
In this case Marcos’ call to western values was mere rhetoric, fully
aware of the prestige these values held in the public mind.
Nevertheless, the martial law powers had enabled him to destroy
a number of elite families and in particular his main rival—the
Lopez family. When Marcos declared martial law, Eugenio Lopez
was at that time vacationing abroad and his brother Fernando called
him from Manila and advised him to remain in exile. In lieu of the
family patriarch, Marcos imprisoned instead Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez
Jr allegedly for his involvement in an assassination plot against the
president.78 With Geny as hostage, Marcos was able to pressure Eug-
enio Lopez to relinquish his family interests in the Meralco and the
media. With the declaration of martial law, the Lopez family’s for-
tunes plummeted. Believing Marcos’ promise that his son would be
released if he agreed to sell Meralco to the Meralco Foundation Inc.
(MFI—the Marcoses), Eugenio Lopez signed away his biggest com-
pany for a mere pittance (P133,337,511.24), with only P10,000 paid
initially. In the agreement, signed on December 27, 1973 at Honol-
ulu, Hawaii, the Lopez family corporation BENPRES, sold all its
Meralco Securities Corporation shares to the Foundation. The
foundation was to pay BENPRES in sixteen annual installments if
and when the buyer can afford to pay.79
Marcos also appropriated the Lopez media interests—The Manila
Chronicle and the television stations—ABS–CBN, and PT & T, a tele-
communications subsidiary of ABS–CBN. By 1974, Lopez had con-
ceded all his multimillion-properties, and Geny was still in jail. In
March of 1974, Eugenio was told that his terminal illness would only
78
Bagumbayan, Oct. 1977, p. 2.
79
Stock Purchase Agreement, Annex ‘C’, Agreement between BENPRES Cor-
poration and Meralco Foundation Inc., document provided by Oscar M. Lopez, and
Agreement, Annex ‘E’, Agreement between BENPRES Corporation and Meralco
Foundation Inc., document provided by Oscar M. Lopez. See also Steve Psinakis,
Two Terrorists Meet (San Francisco, 1981), p. 228.
208 MINA ROCES
permit him a few more months of life. His last wish was to see his
son freed before he died. The dying Don Eugenio himself made the
trip to Manila to plead with the president in a humiliating act of
surrender, but he returned empty handed.80
How did the Lopez family respond to the most brutal attempt
to destroy their family empire and persecute its members? Geny’s
imprisonment restrained them from openly attacking Marcos with
the usual ferocity attributed to Don Eugenio’s fighting style. But
once Geny, convinced that his father had suffered enough humili-
ation, decided to put his life on the line, the family began to show
signs of standing up to the Marcos onslaught.
In November 1974, Geny decided to go on hunger strike because
it was ‘the only way open to me to obtain justice’ and focus attention
on all the ‘thousands of detainees like me who have languished in jail
for months and years without being informed of the charges against
them’.81 Although a major reason for the hunger strike was to extric-
ate his father from the humiliation and blackmail caused by his
detention, Geny had linked his plight with the cause of political
prisoners in the Philippines, who were imprisoned unjustly because
one man aspired to dictatorial power. On the tenth day of the hunger
strike, Marcos promised to concede their demands but as soon as
both prisoners recuperated (Geny Lopez was joined by his cell mate
Sergio ‘Serge’ Osmeña III), they were returned to jail. At this point
now fully aware that Marcos would never release his son Geny, and
faced with Marcos’ demands for a statement from the family endors-
ing martial law, Eugenio decided to fight back openly at last.
In the American press, Eugenio exposed how Marcos swindled the
Lopez family of their corporations, while son-in-law Psinakis tried to
lobby in the US congress for attention to the family’s plight, pointing
to Marcos’ corruption and blackmail.82 Unfortunately, the exposure
of Marcos’ treatment of the Lopezes fell on deaf ears, at least among
the powers that be in the United States who chose to support the
80
Harvey Stockwin, ‘Amnesty, But Hardly a Ceasefire’, Far Eastern Economic
Review, 29 Nov. 1974, p. 11, interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May
1988, and interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988.
81
Harvey Stockwin, ‘Amnesty, But Hardly a Ceasefire’, p. 11, and Steve Psinakis,
Two Terrorists Meet, pp. 146–7. The latter is a book written by Lopez in-law (he
married Eugenio Lopez’ daughter Presentacion) about his meeting with Imelda
Marcos and discusses the Marcos extortion of the Lopez family.
82
Joseph Lelyveld, ‘Rich Family Loses Power in Bitter Feud with Marcos’, The
New York Times, 22 April 1975, p. 2, and interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15
July 1988. See also Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet.
Marcos dictatorship and ignore its victims. Dispossessed and humili-
ated, the dying Eugenio Lopez requested presidential permission to
see his two sons Oscar and Manolo in Manila. These petitions were
ignored and the most powerful man in the Philippines prior to mar-
tial law died a broken man in 1975, without all his children with
whom he had been so close, at his deathbed.83 He had lost the great-
est battle of his life.
Shortly afterwards, Geny and his immediate family, with the help
of sister Presy Lopez-Psinakis and her husband Steve Psinakis (a
Greek national with American citizenship living in the US), suc-
ceeded in engineering a sensational escape from prison. The cost of
the escape, which was entirely a family affair, amounted to around
$100,000 involving the purchase of a plane and ending in the grant-
ing of political asylum in the United States.84 Subsequently, Geny
joined the anti-Marcos movement in the US, but his role was con-
spicuously minimal. This was not surprising since the motivations
for the escape were not ideological but personal and familial, despite
all the publicity emphasizing the ideological reasons for Geny’s
‘struggle’. Besides, the family still left behind vulnerable members,
younger brothers Oscar and Manolo and their mother had to be
protected. It was brother-in-law Steve Psinakis who was more vigor-
ously involved in the anti-Marcos crusade. He wrote a regular column
for the two Filipino community newspapers: The Philippine News and
The Philippine Times. He also wrote letters and petitions to American
congressmen exposing Marcos’ extortion of the Lopezes and other
families as well as the torture of political prisoners. He joined Raul
Manglapus’ Movement for the Free Philippines. When Benigno
83
Interview with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988; interview with
Pacita Moreno Lopez, 17 May 1988; interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis,
Manila, 26 May 1988; interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15 July 1988; The
Washington Post, 19 July 1975, p. B7; the Philippines Free Press, 3 May 1986, p. 23;
and Bernard Wideman, ‘Goodbye to the Maker of Dollars and Men’, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 25 July 1975, p. 25.
84
For a detailed account of the escape based on the notes of Augusto Almeda
Lopez (Geny’s close friend who was involved in the escape) see Augusto Almeda
Lopez, ‘An Exclusive Account of the Lopez–Osmeña Escape: Prison Break from Fort
Bonifacio’, serialized in Who, 6 March 1982, pp. 10–12, and 13 March 1982, pp.
10–12. The author also has a copy of the handwritten notes of Augusto Almeda
‘Jake’ Lopez on the escape. See also ‘The Great Escape’, Time, 17 Oct. 1977, p. 35;
Newsweek, 17 Oct. 1977, p. 12; and Bagumbayan, Oct. 1977. There is also an account
of the escape in the book by Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet, pp. 158–67, a reprint
of the account published in The Boston Phoenix, 8 Nov. 1977, by Stu Cohen entitled
‘The Great Escape’.
210 MINA ROCES
‘Ninoy’ Aquino Jr, Marcos’ star prisoner and primary opponent went
to exile in the United States, he and Psinakis also became very close
friends. Psinakis convinced Geny to file a suit against Marcos in the
United States which forced Marcos to make payments according to
the ‘purchase agreement’.85 In the end it may be surmised that the
Lopez family was not above dealing with the Marcos alliance however
minimal, while simultaneously involved in criticizing the kinship pol-
itics of his regime.86
Apart from the activities of the Psinakis couple, the rest of the
Lopez family in Manila remained quiet. The society’s acceptance of
the rules of kinship politics may be gauged by the fact that no one,
at least in the initial ten years of martial law, expressed outrage at
the methods with which Marcos extorted the Lopez fortune. The
family itself was ostracized: Manolo Lopez’ wife Marites Lagdameo
observed that ‘Many snubbed us!’87 and Presy Lopez-Psinakis con-
fessed that many friends later treated them like lepers.88 In the Filip-
ino mind the family had fallen from power; it was now another fam-
ily’s turn to benefit from the opportunities of public office. Such were
the vicissitudes of politica de familia; the elite family contest for power
provoked the rise and fall of families.
Shortly after the assassination of Benigno ‘Ninoy’ Aquino Jr which
unleashed the pent up resentment of the public against the massive-
scale corruption and oppression of the regime, the Lopez family
holed up in Manila at last spoke up. Ninoy’s assassination sparked
protest rallies as the publication of anti-Marcos newspapers mush-
roomed. In January and February 1985, Mr. and Ms. publications ran
a series on how the Marcoses expropriated Meralco and ABS–CBN
from the Lopez family.89 Oscar Lopez gave a press conference at the
Club Filipino where he outlined the procedure in which the ABS–
85
Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet, p. 230.
86
There was some tension within the Lopez family in this period since the mem-
bers in Manila continued to appeal to the Psinakis couple to ‘stop rocking the boat’.
Interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15 July 1988; interview with Presentacion
Lopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988; and interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez,
Manila, 17 May 1988.
87
Interview with the Lopez family in their Sunday dinner reunion, Manila, 27
March 1988.
88
Ruby Villavicencio, ‘Growing Pains for Don Eugenio’s Only Girl’, Features,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 June 1989, p. 7.
89
Bernardo V. Lopez, ‘Why Lopez had to Sell Meralco’, Mr. and Ms., 8–14 Feb.
1985, pp. 20–3; Augusto Almeda Lopez, ‘How Benedicto and Partners Took Over
ABS–CBN Without Paying a Single Centavo’, serialized in Mr. and Ms., 11–17 Jan.,
pp. 9–15, and 18–24 Jan. 1985, pp. 20–5.
CBN television stations were taken from them. Here he criticized
Marcos ‘crony capitalism’ of which the seizure of the ABS–CBN was
a classic example. As he denounced the ‘cronies and scoundrels’ for
their ‘dastardly actuations’,90 Oscar was applying the yardstick of
western values to judge the behavior of the Marcos family whose
excessive corruption was merely kinship politics in its purest form.
The Lopezes were echoing the general public clamor for a stop to
Marcos’ excessive endorsement of kinship politics. A snap election
held in January 1986 illustrated to the international press the extent
of Marcos’ cheating and in February 1986, the people took to the
streets to defend the army faction that initiated a coup against the
regime. The Lopez family supported the EDSA revolution (the Feb-
ruary Revolution is fondly called EDSA revolution since EDSA is the
shortened form of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue where the people
defended the army rebels from Marcos’ retaliation) from its incep-
tion, with the public press release:
Inasmuch as the Marcos martial law government illegally and forcibly
seized the 5 television and 21 radio broadcasting facilities of the ABS–CBN
Broadcasting Corporation scattered around the country in 1972, and since
the Marcos government and cronies operated them to their benefit and
profit without any compensation whatsoever, the rightful owners—Lopez
Family announce that they are offering the use of these facilities including
Channel 4 at Broadcasting Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, to the new
government for the duration of the crisis.91
In this move the Lopez family declared their support of the coup
d’état-turned-people-power-revolution, that demanded a return to
democratic values and a shunning of the excessive kinship politics
practiced by President Marcos.
Although their anti-Marcos campaign, if it can be called that, was
very limited and indulged in short spurts, the Lopez family, one of
the prime victims of martial law, criticized Marcos in the language
of western values. Marcos was exposed for his corruption and extor-
tion of rival elite families, and his detention of political prisoners as
hostage for the dispossession of these families. In all their state-
ments against the Marcos regime the Lopez family was making a
stand against the Marcos practice of kinship politics.
90
Oscar M. Lopez, Statement Given at Press Conference on ABS–CBN on 10
Jan. 1985 at the Club Filipino, document provided the author by Oscar Lopez.
91
Press Statement, ABS–CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Fernando Lopez,
Chairman, Oscar M. Lopez, President, 24 Feb. 1986, in the ABS–CBN file, Lopez
Memorial Museum, Manila.
212 MINA ROCES
After Febrev
When the ‘people power revolution’ of February 1986 deposed Pres-

ident Marcos and ushered in a new regime that was committed to a
restoration of the pre-martial law democratic system, the Lopez
family members overseas ended their years in exile and returned to
the Philippines. Eugenio Lopez had four sons and one daughter: Eug-
enio Lopez Jr (Geny), Oscar (Oskie), Manuel (Manolo), Roberto
(Robie), and Presentacion (Presy) married to Steve Psinakis. In
1986, Geny, Robie and the Psinakis’s returned to the Philippines,
and like the other families who were victims of martial law,
attempted to regain the family enterprises surrendered to the
Marcos family. The family was primarily interested in the Meralco,
the two television stations channels 2 (ABS) and 4 (CBN) and the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) now renamed
the Philippine Commercial and International Bank. This time the
family was once again close to the powers that be—the new president
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino (Cory) was the widow of Benigno Aquino,
a close friend of Psinakis from the anti-Marcos crusade overseas.
Family friend Jake Lopez approached presidential adviser and then
cabinet minister Joker P. Arroyo asking three favors on behalf of the
Lopez family: that Geny would take over the ABS–CBN and the
PCIB, that Oscar Lopez oversee the First Philippine Holdings Cor-
poration (FPHC), the holding company of the Meralco, and that
Manolo head the Meralco.92
These favors were granted, the most controversial ones being
Cory’s nomination of Oscar as head of FPHC and Manolo as presid-
ent of Meralco. The nominations were supposed to be transitory;
that is, the men were in their positions as officers-in-charge (OIC)
only until such time as ownership and management of these compan-
ies were settled. The appointment of Manolo, for example, was criti-
cized in the press which argued that he gained his position only
because he was a Lopez and not because he was competent and quali-
fied for it. One journalist emphasized that Manolo was a graduate
from University of the East, bypassing many government technocrats
with Harvard or Wharton business degrees.93 Minister Arroyo also
reorganized the MFI board, and in turn MFI itself reorganized the
92
Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Recapturing the Glorious Days of Empire’, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1988, p. 1.
93
Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Lopez out of Meralco, Monsod Sneaks In’, Make My Day
Column, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 Sept. 1988, p. 5.
FPHC board to include Christian Monsod, Augusto Almeda Lopez,
C. D. Quiazon, Stephen Psinakis and Finance Secretary Vicente
Jayme, mostly Lopez men.94 (Jake Lopez was a close friend of the
Lopez family, while Quiazon was the family lawyer, and Psinakis was
married to a Lopez.)
The initial emotional euphoria that was unleashed by the 1986
‘People Power’ revolution was accompanied by an aversion for the
kinship politics that dominated political and economic practice for
fourteen years.95 The 1986 constitution ratified a few months after
Mrs Aquino took office, had distinct provisions inserted precisely to
prevent the resurgence of tendencies towards the practice of kinship
politics. For example, it stated that no family should be allowed to
have the monopoly over media and industry. Also, certain provisions
were made against the establishment of political dynasties where
several family members served in political office simultaneously as
senators, congressmen, governors, and mayors.96 In their attempt to
prevent another resurgence of Marcos’ style kinship politics, the new
constitution therefore was declaring the official adherence to western
values.
The constitutional delegates were not the only ones antipathetic
to the possible reincarnation of kinship politics à la Marcos. Soon
after Febrev (as the 1986 revolution was fondly called) journalists
expressed paranoia over the return to ‘oligarchy and cronyism’.97
Confronted with this public general apprehension the Lopez family
published a clarification of its demands:
1. Members of the family seek to redress an injustice perpetrated upon
them by the martial law regime. We want nothing more than a reasonable
94
Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Meralco Deal Lopezes Air Their Side’, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 16 July 1988, p. 8.
95
This aversion to family monopolies in business was manifested in the 1986
constitution although subsequent events (post-1988) revealed that kinship politics
has become the status quo again.
96
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines The
Constitutional Commission of 1986, Quezon City, 15 Oct. 1986. See provisions on
pp. 6, 15–16, 29, 39, 43, 55, 59, 65, and 85.
97
‘Oligarchy Redux’, Philippines Free Press, 15 July 1987, pp. 15 and 38; ‘The
Return of the ‘‘Old Oligarchs’’ ’, Philippines Free Press, 3 May 1986, pp. 16, 17, 23,
and 39; Luis R. Mauricio, ‘The Return of Oligarchy’, Malaya, 27 June 1987, p. 4;
Luis Mauricio, ‘Defiance of the Constitution’, Malaya, 30 June 1987, p. 4; ‘The Case
of Channel 4’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 July 1987, p. 4; Luis R. Mauricio, ‘Another
Attempt at Deception’, Malaya, 2 July 1987, p. 4; Emil P. Jurado, ‘The KBP
‘‘Pawns’’ ’, Manila Standard, 7 July 1987, p. 4; ‘Back to Oligarchy’, The Manila Times,
9 July 1987, p. 4.
214 MINA ROCES
settlement of our claims or the family-owned assets that were either forcibly
seized or clearly underpaid by the Marcos government and its cronies. . . .
3. In pursuing its objectives, the Lopez family has always sought and will
continue to seek to identify its aspirations with those of the national inter-
est, being fully aware of the urgent need for the country not only to create
new wealth but to promote a more equitable distribution of that wealth as
a means of achieving a stable, democratic and just society.98
In a public statement therefore, the Lopez family was formally
declaring its endorsement of the western values which place the
national interest above the familial one. In fact it stated unequivoc-
ally that the family ‘has always’ tried to converge its interests with
that of the nation. But viewed with hindsight, subsequent actions of
the Lopez family betrayed ambivalent attitudes as the family, blind
to its own faults, practised kinship politics in their strategy to regain
their former business corporations lost to the Marcos alliance
(group).
One example will illustrate the Lopez family’s reliance on the
methods of kinship politics. Unfortunately for them, the rekindling
of the aggressive familial behavior which in an earlier era had won
for them the ownership of major Philippine corporations, would be
partially blocked in the new era that was initially somewhat less toler-
ant of behavior that was so reminiscent of the Marcos regime. The
manner in which the Lopezes sought to reclaim the Manila Electric
Company cannot be described other than as the aggressive applica-
tion of kinship politics.
The ‘reclaiming’ of Meralco proved to be an extremely complic-
ated issue because in this case the Lopezes received compensation
for it from the Marcoses (after Psinakis filed a suit in the United
States), albeit minuscule. At the same time the company itself had
expanded its operations since 1972 with funds outside of the Lopez
family. It would be very difficult, then, to determine just how much
of the company was still rightfully owned by them. The company
itself was heavily indebted to the Development Bank of the Philip-
pines (DBP) and was unable to repay its loans. The DBP then held
the Meralco shares mortgaged as collateral for the loans. Further-
more, the new government’s attitude that no family be allowed the
monopoly of major industries and businesses predicated that at least
in theory, the Lopez family would not be granted the ‘special franch-
ise’ to turn such a major public utility into a family company. Presid-
98
‘Lopez Family States Position’, Philippines Daily Express, 11 June 1986, p. 5.
ent Aquino herself, ‘in a bid to dispel fears of an underhand deal
with the Lopezes’, insisted that plans for the privatization of Meralco
should ensure that not a single business group or family would
receive outright control.99 Meralco was perceived to be too strategic
a company to be in the hands of a dynasty or oligarchy.100
Nonetheless, in July 1988 a columnist, Hilarion ‘Larry’ Henares
Jr, exposed a major scandal involving the family’s attempts to regain
control of the Meralco. In a series of articles for the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Henares brought to public attention the ‘Meralco Deal’
wherein the Lopez family acquired control of 51% of Meralco without
putting up the capital for it.101 In a convoluted arrangement, one
which Henares confessed was so complex that it required five hours
with a computer to figure out and which still left many puzzles, the
deal transferred 16.5 million Meralco shares (65.12% of outstanding
shares) from the DBP to two Lopez companies for only P690 million,
or P41.73 per share when the market value then was P190 per share.
The money for the shares would not come from the Lopez coffers
but the J. P. Morgan bank and the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) which would buy 11.8 million shares (46.45% outstanding) at
P58.50 per share. The rest of the shares would be transferred to the
Lopezes ‘with absolutely no cash outlay’.102 The furtiveness in which
the deal was concocted also violated Cory’s policy of transparency in
major government transactions. In the national context, the hand-
ling of Meralco was significant because it was to be the ‘model’ for
the privatization of the other government-owned and controlled cor-
porations such as the Philippine Air Lines, the Philippine National
Oil Corporation, the Manila Hotel, Cocobank, Oriental Petroleum
and the San Miguel Brewery.103
The Lopez family had criticized the Marcoses for appropriating
their company without just compensation. And yet once they them-
selves were back in power, they would not hesitate to acquire major-
ity stock without putting up the collateral. Such behavior is evidence
for the conflict between kinship politics and western values: the
99
The Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July 1988, p. 92.
100
Jesus P. Estanislao, ‘A Rejoinder: The Meralco Share Dispersal Program’, Phil-
ippine Daily Inquirer, 24 July 1988, p. 9.
101
See Philippine Daily Inquirer from 11 July to 17 July 1988.
102
Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Are the Oligarchs Back?’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11
July 1988, p. 1.
103
Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Lopez–Meralco Deal From the Beginning was Lutong
Makaw’, Philippine Free Press, 20 Aug. 1988, p. 8.
216 MINA ROCES
family perceived the faults of other families who practiced politica de

familia and criticized them in the language of western cultural values,
but did not apply those same values to itself. Strong family ties,
clever social dynamics, and top-level political connections always
motivated it to behave in the manner that would benefit the family
first. For not unlike the previous methods used by the Lopezes in
the past, the Meralco deal was negotiated through personal connec-
tions with key individuals in the government and in the banking
institutions. The family’s closeness to President Aquino also gave
them the confidence that the arrangement would receive her bless-
ing and support. Despite the president’s initial support of the family,
the government decided to abort the transaction, and in the later
compromise agreement that followed, the Lopez family and the bank
syndicate were compelled to share a good portion of their profits
with the government.104 The signing of the compromise deal did not
close the chapter on the Meralco story. The Sandiganbayan105 first
had to resolve whether the sale of Meralco shares by the government
was legal.106 It took four years for the Supreme Court to lift the
sequestration on the FPHC Meralco shares, and it was only on Janu-
ary 9, 1992 that the shares were listed on the stock exchange for
the public market. The immediate (and predictable) result of the
selling of the FPHC’s Meralco shares meant that by December 31,
1992, FPHC profits rose by 74%.107
Thus although initially the general response after the 1986 coup
d’état-turned-revolution was antipathy towards kinship politics of the
crony capitalist mode, kinship politics has succeeded in reasserting
itself. For despite the attempts made to block the Lopez family’s
skillful use of kinship politics to recapture and expand their business
empire,108 the latest developments seem to indicate a swing towards
the resurgence of kinship politics.109
104
For more details on the Meralco scandal see Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’,
pp. 188–9.
105
The Sandiganbayan is the court established to try public officials.
106
The Business Star, 29 Aug. 1989, pp. 1 and 3.
107
Maria Teresa Colayco, The Cornerstone, The Story of First Philippine Holdings Cor-
poration (Pasig, 1992), p. 117. This is a book commissioned for the thirty-year anni-
versary of FPHC and published by FPHC, following the Philippine tradition of pub-
lishing books and hagiographies that would give prestige to family corporations.
108
The Lopez family’s attempts to reclaim channels 2 and 4 were blocked. They
received channel 2 but not channel 4 which became a government channel. The
family’s attempts for the franchise on the telecommunications satellite was blocked
in 1989. See Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’, pp. 190–203.
109
Corruption in the Aquino regime revealed evidence of the constitution being
ignored as corruption à la crony capitalism continued to flourish at a pace similar
to that of the Marcos regime.
* * *
Even more than Karl Marx, Filipino businessmen have always been
acutely aware that politics and business are inextricably related. The
Lopez family’s strategies for success mirrored this symbiotic relation-
ship between political power and the special privileges that facilit-
ated the rise of an economic conglomerate: family members in the
political arena provided the means through which the family could
build up a business empire. As long as Fernando Lopez was in power,
whether as senator, or vice-president, brother Eugenio was able to
acquire the special privileges, particularly the preferential bank
loans that generated the capital for business investments. Given this
symbiotic relationship between political power and the connections
necessary for business success, it was not surprising that the family’s
height of political power (vice-president for two successive terms
1965–1971) coincided with the summit of their economic wealth.
Once political power was completely lost in the martial law years,
the family was stripped of its business corporations overnight.
While the techniques of politica de familia practically ensured the
family’s success, it inevitably courted criticism. In crucial points of
post-war history, such criticism caused a fall from power and sub-
sequently a loss of economic wealth. The continuing rise and fall of
the family paralleled the cycles of administrations in the post-war
period up to contemporary times. At the same time the family’s
ambivalence towards kinship politics and western values was typical
of many political families of the era who continued to use kinship
politics to build social prominence, while criticizing their rivals whom
they perceived as immoral, precisely because they were advocates of
kinship politics.
Conclusion
The conflict hypothesis explains the recurring cycles of political

administrations in post-war Philippines and provides a meaningful
framework with which to analyze patterns within specific periods and
across different eras—the republican period, the martial law period,
and the Aquino administration. Political administrations are com-
posed of family alliances in power. The conflict between the two sets
of values triggers the rise and fall of family alliances, and con-
sequently, these endless cycles. The conflict hypothesis also explains
the ambivalent behavior of families who apply the yardstick of west-
218 MINA ROCES
ern values when criticizing their rivals but who themselves practice
kinship politics. Such ambivalence was an important factor that pre-
vented resolution of the conflict.
A steady deterioration of Philippine economy and politics has
occurred at the end of each successive cycle. Instead of a linear devel-
opment, a downhill trend is observed, as the Philippines declines
in prosperity and institutions reveal signs of breaking down. The
republican period (1945–1972) witnessed the marginal prosperity of
the Philippine economy being siphoned off by politicians and families
who were later criticized for graft and corruption. The period experi-
enced the classic oscillations wherein families entered politics,
carved business empires, were criticized for such immoral behavior,
then were voted out and replaced by other families who not long
after became guilty of the same sins. President Macapagal’s attempts
to end the era of special privileges only met with staunch resistance
from the elite families who became more determined to deny him
another term of office and replace him with a president more predis-
posed to the practice of kinship politics. With American support,
Marcos as the first president to gain a second term of office, broke
these seemingly never ending political cycles by escalating the pat-
ronage system, and crippling the country’s finances in an extravagant
re-election campaign. This break was further made apparent by his
assuming dictatorial powers under martial law. But the crony capital-
ism that characterized the Marcos regime merely escalated the mag-
nitude of graft and corruption to unprecedented heights. The Aquino
administration riding on a popular ‘revolution’ against crony capital-
ism failed to check the magnitude of crony corruption and instead
increased the rate at which fortunes could be amassed; the Coju-
angco family (Mrs Aquino is a Cojuangco) alliance has been accused
of acquiring crony assets in less time than it took the crony capital-
ists to accumulate them.110 Thus, despite the ratification of the 1986
constitution which championed western values, and whose provisions
specifically sought to bar the family alliance from excessive kinship
politics, kinship politics is still dominant in contemporary Philip-
pines. Apparently, deteriorating economic conditions have increased
the needs of families, thereby worsening the magnitude of corrup-
tion;—and the cycle continues.
110
Due to spatial constraints material on the Marcos and Cojuangco families is
not included here. See Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’, chapter five, for data on
these families.
The case study of the Lopez family presents the conflict in tangible
form. The family’s rapid rise to national prominence after the war
was largely due to its aggressiveness in applying the techniques of
politica de familia. Their actions were exposed and censured particu-
larly by Presidents Diosdado Macapagal and Ferdinand Marcos.
Throughout the period Fernando Lopez in his political speeches con-
tinually reiterated his commitment to western values. Marcos in
1972 declared martial law ostensibly to destroy the oligarchy and
put an end to the practice of kinship politics and herald a new era
of democratic western values. Although he succeeded in vanquishing
his rivals, including the Lopez family, Marcos instead institutional-
ized kinship politics as the only form of political behavior viable, with
his own family alliance becoming the only possible practitioners of
the art. The Lopez family, clear victims of the Marcos vendetta
against the rival family alliances, when finally roused to challenge
the Marcos regime, and applying the standard of western values,
accused it of kinship politics. But when in 1986 the Aquino adminis-
tration replaced the Marcos regime and the Lopez family was once
more close to the powers that be, despite their public statements
declaring the family’s loyalty to the national interest, the next gen-
eration of Lopezes utilized kinship politics to regain former corpora-
tions lost to President Marcos.
The history of the Lopez family is also a microscopic view of the
life cycle of kinship politics. The Lopez family built its entire empire
through the use of kinship politics; by utilizing political power to
acquire special privileges. The saga of the family’s rise and fall mir-
rors its success and failures in implementing the techniques of pol-
itica de familia. Kinship politics was the vehicle used by families to
build a successful economic empire. Coupled with family unity and
talent it became a formidable force in the national political arena.
In fact, comparatively speaking it seemed almost necessary for a
family to operate using politica de familia if it wanted to achieve suc-
cess, albeit temporary. Nevertheless these families did not perceive
themselves to be champions of the precepts of kinship politics.
Instead, they saw themselves as dutiful family members fulfilling
their obligations to their family by aiding in the prosperous growth
of their family’s prominence. At the same time, because they had
also been imbued with western cultural values they insisted (and
perhaps really believed) that their actions were purely altruistic, and
that they had not neglected to consider the national interest.
The case study of the Lopez family demonstrates that success
220 MINA ROCES
engineered by politica de familia by its very nature was temporary and

ephemeral. It was political power that gave the family access to spe-
cial privileges used for the expansion of the family business corpora-
tion: loans from government banks and financial institutions, dollar
allocations, special business franchises, quotas, and tax incentives or
exemptions. But eventually, the family was criticized for its neglect
of the national interest and faced with a total loss of political power.
Once political power was lost, the family empire, so dependent on
this artificial and arbitrary special treatment, disintegrated.
As the Lopez family history patently illustrates, kinship politics is
the underlying formidable force that propels political behavior and
decision making in Philippine political culture. For example, kinship
politics subverts United States-style democratic elections. Since the
democratic system in the Philippines postulates that there must be
two parties, family rival alliances have permeated the democratic
structure and placed themselves in opposition so that the result is
that both parties are not ideologically different—merely a venue
through which kinship politics could play itself out in the political
arena, merely a method through which family rivals can battle each
other for malakas (strong) status in the public arena, making assump-
tion to power at least legally and openly justifiable. Kinship politics
turns the democratic system into a machine for its own ends. The
behavior of the family alliance itself is more consistently driven by
kinship politics despite its sporadic attempts to heed to western
values. Thus the outside world is perceived in terms of the family—
for instance, The Manila Chronicle, the Lopez-owned newspaper, is
operated not as a profitable business but as a mouthpiece or weapon
of the Lopez family interests. Similarly, the management of family
corporations is conducted according to the primary interest of the
family, and political office is seen as the method with which to build
an economic empire for the family.
Finally, by diagnosing kinship politics as the root cause of political
and economic behavior, and by examining the ambivalence resulting
from the conflict between two opposing values, the approach is not
a ‘history from below’, neither is it a view only from the ‘top’ or the
elite point of view,111 nor is it a western interpretation of Philippine
111
This approach does not limit itself to elite family behavior alone, but the
behavior of all Filipino families. In fact, poorer families can become elite by allying
with a politically powerful or malakas family. For example, many of the Marcos cro-
nies were not originally of the elite until they allied with the Marcoses. Further-
more, because of the vertical structure, the family alliance includes up to poorer
politics, but an attempt at a ‘history from within’. Philippine history
is interpreted according to Filipino cultural values and experiences
which incorporate both the traditional ethos and the western values
brought in by the colonial experience. Finally, the analysis of kinship
politics may even provide a new theoretical springboard from which
to undertake similar studies in other countries of Southeast Asia.
Family dynamics was present for example in Ngo Dinh Diem’s South
Vietnam, Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang regime, Suharto’s Indone-
sia and even Nicaragua under Somoza.112 The conflict hypothesis
itself could be used to explain not only the ambivalent behavior of
family alliances and the cycles of administrations, but one could
speculate, quite possibly the dramatic oscillations between demo-
cracy and authoritarianism that pepper the experience of post-war
Southeast Asia; Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines in
particular.
members of the alliance, all of whom identify with the elite family. Since the elite
families are inveterate rivals, the alliances are between the elite families and their
poorer clients who identify with them. The Lopez employee thinks of himself as
part of the Lopez family network and the Lopez family members consider their
employees as part of ‘family’.
112
Latin America would provide an excellent point of comparison. For example,
Nicaragua under Somoza would be very similar to the Philippine case. In fact, the
term politica de familia was taken from the Latin American literature which boasts
of a sophisticated body of literature on family studies. The Latin American scholars
used this term to refer to the phenomenon wherein prominent families occupied
several political posts, or family-based politics and kin networks, and sometimes to
the patterns wherein regional elites controlled the politics and economic activities
of the region. Though I used the term to refer to kinship politics and the family’s
use of political power to build a business empire, the Latin American studies are
excellent models of the idiosyncracies involving the actual practice of kinship polit-
ics. See Diane Balmori, ‘Family and Politics: Three Generations (1790–1890)’,
Journal of Family History, Vol. 10, No. 3; Linda Lewin, ‘Some Historical Implications
of Kinship Organization for Family-Based Politics in the Brazilian Northeast’, Com-
parative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1979; Linda Lewin, Politics
and Parentela in Paraiba. A Case Study of Family-Based Oligarchy in Brazil (Princeton,
1987); Billy Jaynes Chandler, The Feitosas and the Sertao dos Inhamuns. The History of
a Family and a Community in Northeast Brazil, 1700–1930 (Gainsville, 1972); Mark
Wasserman, Capitalists, Caciques and Revolution. The Native Elite and Foreign Enterprise
in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1854–1911 (London, 1984).

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 2000 Cambridge University Press

Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: The

The University of New South Wales, Sydney

On being awarded the Legion of Honor by President Corazon

corruption, were summarily voted out of office by an outraged public,

to their own faults—almost oblivious to their own practice of kinship

structures of Philippine politics, are reduced to mere symptoms of

What we conclude is that factionalism—and its corollary personalism—is

Case Study of the Lopez Family

relationship between politics and business that thrived on the

During Fernando Lopez’ term as vice-president and Secretary of

and systematic exposure and condemnation of the sugar bloc and

1. Development Bank of the Philippines:

2. Philippine National Bank:

3. Government Service Insurance System:

All of these totalled P88,373,000.52

Second: Macapagal denounced the Lopezes for their political

life of the nation. The Lopezes had succeeded in obtaining these

tears, begged him to run as Marcos’ vice-presidential mate.61 From

corporation BENPRES (this stood for Benito and Presentacion, the

In his book, Today’s Revolution: Democracy (appropriately dubbed the

declaration of martial law in 1972. Here Marcos revealed his exigesis

When the ‘people power revolution’ of February 1986 deposed Pres-

family perceived the faults of other families who practiced politica de

The conflict hypothesis explains the recurring cycles of political

engineered by politica de familia by its very nature was temporary and

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