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Hearing was held on May 28-30, 2013, in Los Angeles, California.

The parties were afforded full


opportunity for the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the introduction of relevant exhibits, and
for argument. Both parties filed post-hearing briefs on or about July 16, 2013, and reply briefs on or about July
30, 2013.
On December 13, 2013, I issued a Report recommending that the Board dismiss the Claims as untimely
filed. Claimants filed exceptions to the Report; Respondent filed a rebuttal to the exceptions. At a meeting
held on January 27, 2014, the Board voted to remand the matter to me for reconsideration of the question of
timeliness. On March 12, 2014, I issued a Supplementary Report again recommending that the Board dismiss
the Claims as untimely filed. On May 19, 2014, the Board voted to find the Claims timely and remanded the
matter to me for a report on the merits.
APPEARANCES
On behalf of the Claimants:
Anthony R. Segall, Esq.
Anthony Resnick, Esq.
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone
510 S Marengo Avenue
Pasadena, CA 91101-3115
On behalf of the Respondent:
Jennifer Handzlik, Esq.
Deputy City Attorney
Hugo S. Rossiter, Esq.
Deputy City Attorney
Mike Feuer, Esq.
City Attorney (on brief)
Zna Portlock Houston, Esq.
Senior Assistant City Attorney (on brief)
Labor Relations Division
Office of the City Administrative Officer
200 N Main Street, Room 1200
Los Angeles, CA 90012
INTRODUCTION
Claimants charge that Respondent violated the MMBA and ERO when it refused to meet and confer
over the decision to create a new retirement tier for future hires (LACERS II), and when it unilaterally imple-
mented that retirement tier. Respondent maintains that the Claims are untimely and that retirement benefits
for future hires are not a mandatory subject for bargaining.
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THE TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
My original Report in this matter summarized the pertinent testimony and documentary evidence.
Because the Board has found that the Claims were timely filed, this Report will address those elements of the
record that pertain to the merits.
1. Claimants, collectively known as the Coalition of Los Angeles City Unions (Coalition) are the
exclusive representatives of various collective bargaining units of employees employed by Respondent
City of Los Angeles. (HOX-5).
2. The City Administrative Officer (CAO) is Respondents designated representative in formal relation-
ships with Claimants representatives. (HOX -5).
3. Claimants and Respondent were parties to 19 separate Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs)
effective July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2012.(HOX-5).
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The MOUs all contain the following pertinent
provisions:
RECOGNITION
...
The term employee or employees as used herein shall refer only to employees in the
classifications listed in Appendices A through F, as well as such classes as may be added
hereafter to the Unit by the Employment Relations Board.
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
A. Benefits
For employees hired prior to January 1983, retirement benefits including the Beta
Retirement Formula and subsidies of: 1) one-half () of the employees
retirement contribution rates, and 2) an additional two percent (2%) of compensa-
tion earnable after the one-half year subsidy, shall be continued during the term
of this MOU. For employees hired after January 1, 1983, and thereafter, the Beta
Retirement Formula and a flat-rated employee retirement contribution of six
percent (6%) shall be continued.
B. Procedure for Benefits Modifications.
Proposals for major retirement benefit modifications will be negotiated in joint
meetings with the certified employee organizations whose memberships will be
directly affected. Agreements reached between Management and organizations
whereby a majority of the members in the LACERS are affected shall be recom-
1
For the sake of convenience, the MOU, and amendments thereto, between AFSCME Local 3090 and
Respondent is reproduced as HOX-2(a)-(e). The remaining MOUs are listed in HOX-1 and may be
accessed at http://cao.lacity.org/MOUs/.
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mended to the City Council by the City Administrative Officer as affecting the
membership of all employees in the LACERS. Such modifications need not be
included in the MOU in order to be considered appropriately negotiated. (HOX-
1, HOX-2)
4. Respondent has a charter form of government. Pursuant to the Charter, the City Council is empowered
to provide pension benefits and to establish a retirement plan for civilian employees known as the Los
Angeles City Employees Retirement System (LACERS). (Charter 1150). The Charter authorizes the
City Council to establish and/or modify pension benefits of the LACERS by ordinance in accordance
with procedures set forth in the Charter. (Charter 1168).
5. Employees in the bargaining units represented by Claimants participate in LACERS. (HOX-5).
2008-2009
6. To address a fiscal crisis, in September 2009, Respondent and Claimants, as well as all of the other
unions representing Respondents employees, agreed to an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP).
ERIP was designed to separate 2400 employees from City service as quickly as possible. The parties
knew that ERIP would result in an increase in the LACERS unfunded pension liability. (Tr 69-70) They
agreed to cover the anticipated cost of ERIP as follows:
LACERS members payment of the ERIP Cost Obligation shall commence on
July 1, 2011, and end on June 30, 2026, or when the ERIP Cost Obligation is fully
paid, which ever comes first. The payment shall consist of a 1% increase in the
LACERS active employee retirement contribution rate of 6% of which 0.5% is the
survivor contribution portion, so that the total LACERS active employee retire-
ment contribution rate shall be 7% for all LACERS members. After all ERIP
Eligible Filers actually retiring under the ERIP have retired, the LACERS actuary
shall re-calculate the ERIP Cost Obligation based on the number of ERIP Eligible
Filers actually retiring, using the same methodology used to determine the
preliminary ERIP Cost Obligation. However, the City reserves the right to
increase the LACERS active employee contribution rate for new City hires, in
accordance with all applicable laws and practices.(CX-1 at 8).
7. To further mitigate the effects of the financial crisis, Respondent and Claimants signed a Letter of
Agreement (LOA) on October 27, 2009. The LOA modified the parties MOUs by deferring em-
ployee cost-of-living wage increases and extending the term of the MOUs through June 30, 2014. (CX-
2). Pursuant to the LOA, the parties amended their MOUs. (HOX-2(c)).
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8. On October 30, 2009, the City Council passed Ordinance No. 180926 implementing the ERIP changes,
reading, in pertinent part, as follows:
(i) LACERS members payment of the ERIP Cost Obligation shall commence on
July 1, 2011, and end on June 30, 2026, or when the ERIP Cost Obligation is fully
paid, whichever comes first. The payment shall consist of a 1% increase in the
LACERS active employee retirement contribution rate of 6% (of which 0.5% is
the survivor contribution portion), so that the total LACERS active employee
retirement contribution rate shall be 7% for all LACERS members. After all
ERIP Eligible Filers actually retiring under the ERIP have retired, the LACERS
actuary shall re-calculate the ERIP Cost Obligation ... using the same methodology
used to determine the preliminary ERIP Cost Obligation. However, the City
reserves the right to increase the LACERS active employee contribution rate for
new City hires, in accordance with all applicable laws and practices.
(ii) The LACERS active employee retirement contribution rate for LACERS
members hired prior to 1983 (Defrayal Group) shall be adjusted to 6% (of which
0.5% is the survivor contribution portion) upon this ordinances effective date.
Commensurate with Section 4.1033(a)(9)(i) above, employees in the Defrayal
Group shall have their retirement contribution increased from 6% to 7% on July
1, 2011. All savings from the elimination of defrayal shall be credited towards the
payment of the ERIP Cost Obligation.
(iii) Once the City has recouped the ERIP Cost Obligation, the LACERS active
employee retirement contribution rate shall be adjusted to 6% (of which 0.5% is
the survivor contribution portion) for all City employees who were LACERS
members as of the ERIP Beginning Date (including those in the Defrayal Group).
However, the City reserves the right to increase the LACERS active employee
retirement contribution rate for new City hires, in accordance with all applicable
laws and practices. (Respondents Request for Official Notice, Exhibit 1 9)
2010
9. On January 8, 2010, Respondent held its first meeting with Claimants to discuss a proposed new
retirement tier for future hires. (CX-3) Respondent maintained that it was not obligated to meet and
confer over this proposed new retirement tier because it applied to new hires only and had no effect on
current employees. Claimants disagreed and demanded to meet and confer, arguing that any change
in retirement benefits was mandatory for bargaining. (RX-14).
10. Claimants followed up with their verbal demand by letter dated January 15, 2010, in which Claimants
counsel reiterated the position that any changes in pension benefits must be bargained (CX-4).
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11. Thereafter, the CAOs office provided information to Claimants about the proposed new LACERS
Tier. (RX-16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22).
12. By letter dated July 13, 2010, the CAO requested Claimants input on the new LACERS Tier II, to be
considered for actuarial study. The letter stated in relevant part:
As previously indicated, the new retirement tier is not intended for existing City employ-
ees and would be the only selection for new City employees hired after a future date in
time (to be determined). Your input is important, and while we have received some feed-
back ... from labor organizations, we are requesting your specific comments about the
new tier plan design [attached]. It is our intent to submit a plan design to the Citys actu-
ary that incorporates your input for an actual cost study by August 1, 2010. As a result,
if you have any recommendations to be considered for the actuarial study, please submit
them in writing to Thomas Simonovski of my staff by no later than Friday, July 23, 2010.
If no response is received by this date, we will conclude that you have no further
suggestions or input to provide to this process. We will then proceed in submitting the
attached new tier retirement plan design to the Citys actuary for a cost analysis. (CX-5).
13. Claimants did not respond by the July 23, 2010 deadline.
14. By letter dated August 2, 2010, Claimants counsel reiterated their position that Respondent was obli-
gated to meet and confer over the creation of a new LACERS Tier II. The letter further asserted that
Claimants participation in discussions over the scope of an upcoming actuarial study did not waive the
right to bargain over future retirement plan changes. (CX-6).
15. On August 3, 2010, the City Council passed a motion instructing the CAO to meet and discuss, but
not meet and confer on the proposal to establish a new LACERS Tier II for future hires, and to
develop an actuarial study to enable necessary amendments to the Citys Administrative Code to make
the proposed changes in LACERS. (RX-24)
16. Thereafter, Claimants submitted successive contingencies and recommendations regarding the actuarial
studies. (RX-4, 32)
17. By letter dated October 15, 2010, Claimants notified Respondents Mayor that any change to the
LACERS program was mandatory for bargaining. (RX-17)
18. On November 4, 2010, Respondent reiterated its intent to continue to set a new retirement tier and
again requested input from Claimants. (RX-11)
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19. On November 9, 2010, Respondent provided Claimants with the actuarial costs of the Claimants
proposals. (RX-12).
20. On November 11, 2010, Claimants made an initial proposal to Respondent for LACERS reform which
did not include a new LACERS tier. (RX-13)
2011
21. In 2011, it became apparent to both parties that a new LACERS tier alone would not generate immedi-
ate savings or alleviate Respondents financial problems. The parties began bargaining to amend the
current MOUs to address these problems. (Tr 90-91) Among the steps discussed in bargaining were
proposals for employees to contribute 4% of their salaries toward retiree medical benefits in return for
vested rights in annual increases in the subsidy for those benefits (Tr 93-94)
22. On March 7, 2011, Respondent informed Claimants of its intent to submit to the City Council the most
recent plan design for a new LACERS tier and a freeze on retiree medical subsidy. (CX-7)
23. On March 15, 2011, the CAO submitted a draft ordinance to the City Council which, if approved,
would establish a new LACERS tier for future hires. (CX-8).
24. On March 23, 2011, Respondent and Claimants reached a tentative agreement amending the pension
and retiree medical provisions of their current MOUs. (CX-10).
25. On May 15, 2011, Respondent and Claimants signed an agreement amending their MOUs and
extending the term of the MOUS until June 30, 2014. The amendments to the pension provisions did
not include a new LACERS tier. (CX-11).
26. In June 2011, the City Councils Personnel Committee approved the initial draft of the LACERS Tier
II Ordinance. The Personnel Committee instructed the City Attorney to make technical adjustments
to the draft ordinance and resubmit a revised ordinance for consideration by the full City Council. The
draft ordinance was not taken to the full City Council. (Tr - 197-199).
27. On or about October 27, 2011, the Governor of the State of California released a comprehensive pen-
sion reform plan intended to apply to public employers state- wide, including local municipalities such
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as Respondent. The plan would alter current and future employee retirement benefits. (RX-43). In
response, the Mayor instructed the CAO to report back to the EERC with an actuarial analysis of the
Governors plan and its potential impacts on Respondent, including a comparison with the current
LACERS plan benefits (RX-43).
2012
28. In March 2012, Respondent commissioned an actuarial study on a plan design for a LACERS Tier II
which included a risk sharing element.
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29. On April 20, 2012 the Mayor publicly released his proposed budget for fiscal year 2012-2013. The
budget included an eight point pension reform plan for new civilian employees that would increase the
retirement age, cap the maximum retirement allowance at 75%, reduce the retirement factor, restructure
final compensation calculations to prevent pension spiking, reduce pension cost-of-living adjustments,
control retiree health costs by lowering the monthly caps; ensure cost neutrality of the government buy
back program; and share the risk of future retirement cost increases with employees through various
mechanisms. (RX 47 , RX-48).
30. On May 30, 2012, the City Council approved Respondents adopted budget for fiscal year 2012-2013.
(RX 48).
31. By letter dated August 27, 2012, the CAO notified Claimants that Respondent was moving forward with
a new LACERS Tier II plan. That letter described the central elements of the new plan and took the
position that
implementation of a new tier for future employees is not subject to meet and
confer. However, the City is interested in providing labor with an overview and
to discuss the new LACERS tier for new hires. A meeting has been scheduled for
the employee organizations that represent City employees who are LACERS
members. ... (CX- 12).
2
The request for an actuarial study was delayed. Respondents contract with its previous actuarial had
expired and Respondent sought a new actuarial firm.
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32. On September 4 and 6, 2012, CAO staff met with Claimants to discuss the final plan design for the
LACERS Tier II. (Tr-213). At the September 6, 2012 meeting, Claimants reiterated their position that
Respondent had a statutory obligation to bargain over changes in pension benefits for future hires. In
response, CAO staff reiterated Respondents position that changes in pension benefits for future hires
was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. (CX-15).
33. On or about September 12, 2012, the CAO received the actuarial study required for the new LACERS
Tier II, as outlined in the 2012-2013 adopted budget. A copy was distributed to Claimants. (CX-13)
(Tr-213)
34. On September 14, 2012, the City Attorney transmitted to the City Council a draft ordinance, amending
the Los Angeles Administrative Code, to establish a new retirement tier under the LACERS for future
hires. (HOX-5).
35. By letter dated September 21, 2012, Claimants counsel addressed Respondents proposed Ordinance
amending LACERS. That letter alleged that any change to retirement benefits for future employees was
a mandatory subject of bargaining. It further argued that passage of the ordinance would violate the
parties current MOUs and the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). (CX-16)
36. On September 25, 2012, the City Council adopted a motion preliminarily approving Ordinance No.
182296, dated September 14, 2012, amending Respondents Administrative Code to provide a second
tier with different benefits and conditions of entitlement for new hires who become members of the Los
Angeles City Employees Retirement System on or after July 1, 2013, and to make other technical cor-
rections. (HOX-5). The City Council amended the initial motion to direct the CAO to continue
meeting with Respondents unions regarding LACERS II. (Tr-279-80)
37. CAO staff met with LACERS unions on October 2 and 18, 2012. (HOX-3(B); CX-17)
38. At the October 2 meeting, Claimants provided a letter to Respondent reiterating the position taken in
their September 21, 2012, letter, and denying that their participation in the meetings waived any rights.
The parties verbally reiterated their respective positions regarding meet and confer, with Claimants
9
asserting that Respondent was required to meet and confer over changes to LACERS and Respondent
asserting that it was not so required (HOX-3(C); (Tr-282-283))
39. On October 26, 2012, the City Council adopted Ordinance 182296. The Mayor approved the
Ordinance on November 8, 2012 and the Ordinance took effect November 12, 2012. (HOX-5).
40. On or about December 11, 2012, Claimants filed unfair employee relations practice claims against
Respondent alleging that :
By failing and refusing to meet and confer with the Coalition Unions, and each of
them, about the creation of a new LACERS tier, and by adopting the Ordinance
without engaging in the meet and confer process, the City has violated its duty to
negotiate in good faith with the Coalition Unions; interfered with and denied
Coalition Unions right and ability to represent employees; and interfered with a
denied the right of employees to be represented by employee organizations of
their choice, in violation of ERO 4.830(a) and 4.857. These actions constitute
unfair employee relations practices in violation of ERO 4.860(a)(1) and (3).
(HOX-3).
41. On or about February 7, 2013, Respondent denied the claims on the merits and argued that the claims
were untimely filed. (HOX-4).
POSITION OF CLAIMANTS ON THE MERITS
The Citys contention would undermine the fundamental process of collective bargaining. Once
selected as the exclusive bargaining representative, a union represents all present and future employees in the
relevant classifications. Employers could overturn the stability of labor relations if they could unilaterally
declare new terms and conditions of employment applicable to anyone hired after a certain date. Its argument
has been rejected by courts and administrative tribunals under both state and federal bargaining statutes.
The MMBA requires public employers to meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and
working conditions. That duty is the centerpiece of the MMBA. It goes beyond the earlier requirement under
the George Brown Act merely to listen and discuss unions demands. The MMBA defines the scope of repre-
sentation to include all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including,
but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .... The ERO incorporates
the MMBAs meet and confer requirements.
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The ERO must be construed to avoid conflict with the MMBA, and PERB decisions interpreting the
MMBA are highly persuasive in interpreting the ERO. Both PERB and the courts have also recognized that
NLRB decisions interpreting analogous federal law are persuasive.
Retirement benefits for bargaining unit members are within the scope of representation. In Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971),
the Supreme Court overturned the NLRBs holding that retirement benefits for retirees are within the scope
of representation, but noted that future retirement benefits of active workers were a mandatory subject. County
of Sacramento, PERB Dec. No. 2045-M (2009), explained that employees can establish preferences for
compensation, such as between increasing present income or greater certainty in retirement.
The duty to bargain encompasses the duty to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment of
future bargaining unit members. The retirees involved in Pittsburgh Plate Glass had severed their employment
relationship with the employer and would never again be members of the bargaining unit. They are not a useful
analogy for future employees whose employment relationship has not yet begun and who will, when hired, be
members of the bargaining unit subject to all negotiated terms and conditions of employment.
The Courts reasoning for excluding retirees from coverage under the NLRA undercuts the Citys argu-
ment. It noted prior NLRB decisions holding that applicants for employment and registrants at hiring halls,
as well as persons who have quit or whose employers have gone out of business, are employees. It distin-
guished such persons from retirees because they were members of the active work force available for hire.
It noted that mandatory subjects include only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the em-
ployer and employees. The new LACERS tier settle(s) an aspect of the relationship between the employer
and employees. If left in effect, it will be a crucial component of compensation of all civilian employees hired
after July 1, 2013, including employees represented by Claimants.
The NLRB in Utility Vault, 345 NLRB 79 (2005), recognized the same determining factor in defining
the scope of bargaining. It distinguished between hiring policies, like drug tests, that affect the non-yet-hired
only in their status as applicants, and employment policies, like the unilaterally-imposed Dispute Resolution
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Process (DRP) required of newly hired employees in that case, that will affect the not-yet-hired in their status
as employees throughout their employment. The employer in that case had unilaterally implemented the DRP
months before hiring new employees and requiring them to sign it. Utility Vault clearly stands for the proposi-
tion that an employer cannot evade its obligation to bargain over changes to matters within the scope of
representation by making those changes applicable only to not-yet-hired employees.
The NLRB has held that, while policies affecting applicants as applicants do not trigger the duty to bar-
gain, policies which affect terms and conditions of employment of new hires as employees are mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Star Tribune, 295 NLRB 543 (1989) held only that drug testing of applicants is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. It held that applicants are not employees because they perform no services
for the employer, are paid no wages, and are under no restrictions as to other employment or activities. This
reasoning is inapplicable to creation of a new LACERS tier. Any employee enrolled in the new LACERS tier
will perform services for the City, and be paid wages. Pension benefits represent a crucial component of that
persons wages. The NLRB recognized this distinction in Star Tribune, noting that drug testing of new hires,
as opposed to applicants, is a mandatory subject. Star Tribune thus undercuts, rather than supports,
Respondents argument. It only places policies affecting applicants as applicants outside the scope of repre-
sentation. That is made clear by Utility Vault, where the NLRB distinguished Star Tribune on the grounds that
the DRP agreement, unlike the drug testing in Star Tribune, affected employees after they were on the payroll
and continued to affect them throughout their employment. The new LACERS tier is more like the DRP
agreement in Utility Vault than the pre-employment drug testing in Star Tribune. If the new LACERS tier is
allowed to stand, new hires will be enrolled in it only after they become employees of the City, and it will be
part of their compensation package throughout their employment.
Like the DRP in Utility Vault, the new LACERS tier will impact bargaining unit members terms and
conditions of employment throughout their employment with the City. Regardless of whether they were
employed or members of the bargaining unit when the City created the new LACERS tier, they will be
impacted by it only due to their status as employees.
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The Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass found retirement benefits for active employees were within the
scope of representation because such benefits are a component of compensation. A line of NLRB cases has
held that an employer cannot unilaterally set starting wage rates for new hires. In Regency Heritage Nursing
and Rehabilitation Center, 2013 WL 2471968, NLRB Case No. 22-CA-074343 (2013), an ALJ identified the
flaw in the argument Respondent makes here. There, the employer argued it could unilaterally set wages for
employees hired after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement because they were applicants for
employment rather than employees. The ALJ found it would remove employees hired after the expiration
of the contract from the bargaining unit, and allow the employer to treat them as non-unit employees subject
to whatever terms and conditions the employer chose. The ALJ found that would eviscerate the Unions status
as exclusive bargaining representative for unit employees. In American National Red Cross, 2011 WL
1734505, NLRB Case No. 7-CA-52033 (2011), an ALJ held that a union did not waive its right to bargain about
the employers unilateral decision to close the pension plan to new hires.
In City of Santa Rosa, 2011 WL 7007183, 36 PERC 94 (2011), a PERB ALJ rejected the argument
Respondent offers here. There, the union alleged the employer engaged in unlawful conditional bargaining
by insisting on creation of a new pension tier for new hires, which the union claimed was outside the scope of
representation. The ALJ found no distinction in the negotiability of proposals regarding current and future
employees.
Because Respondents position here is novel, there is little authority directly addressing it. The parties
themselves have bargained over retirement benefits for future bargaining unit members. The Retirement
Benefits provision of the current MOUs contains different retirement formulas for employees hired before
and after January 1, 1983. This language was negotiated in 1982, meaning the retirement formula for employ-
ees hired after January 1, 1983, was negotiated to apply exclusively to future employees.
PERB cases have addressed the creation of pension tiers for new hires with the implicit assumption that
pension benefits of future employees are mandatory subjects. In San Diego Municipal Employees Assn v.
Superior Court, 206 Cal.App. 4
th
1447 (2012), the court held that PERB has exclusive initial jurisdiction over
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a challenge to a ballot initiative that would place new hires in a defined contribution rather than defined benefit
plan. In the subsequent PERB case, City of San Diego, 2013 WL 1087875, 37 PERC 173 (2013), an ALJ
held that the City of San Diego violated the MMBA when the mayor helped draft and promote the initiative
without meeting and conferring. San Diego argued that the mayors actions did not implicate the citys duty
to meet and confer, but never argued that the subject of retirement benefits for future employees was not within
the scope of representation.
Accepting Respondents argument would throw the entire system of collective bargaining into doubt.
State and federal statutes are premised on certified collective bargaining representatives representing not only
those employees who are in the unit at the time of certification, but any employees who will be hired into unit
positions. Respondents argument would allow employers to gut collective bargaining agreements and under-
mine a unions continuing viability by unilaterally announcing the following terms and conditions apply for any
employees hired after this date. It would throw into doubt the bedrock premise of labor relations that new
employees hired into unit classifications are bound by the collective bargaining agreement. If future employees
are not employees such that employers need not bargain over their terms and conditions of employment,
unions would have no authority to enter into binding agreements on behalf of future employees. Unions and
employers would be forced to negotiate new terms and conditions every time a new employee was hired into
the unit, and stability in labor relations would be unobtainable.
Respondent failed to articulate any limiting principle that would prevent this subversion of the collective
bargaining process. Although the Hearing Officer asked counsel whether its position was limited to pensions,
counsel deflected the question and claimed it would put on evidence on that issue; the evidence never materi-
alized. The closest it came was testimony that Respondent felt it had a duty to bargain over the ERIP agree-
ment but not the new LACERS tier because the ERIP agreement affected current employees while the new
LACERS tier did not. Respondent never explained why its theory would not apply to any employment terms
of employees hired after a future date. It has not explained how collective bargaining could function effectively
if employers could set unilaterally the terms and conditions of employees hired after a certain date. Its legal
14
position is unsupported by precedent and contradictory to the collective bargaining regime for public employees
enacted by the Legislature.
Respondent violated 4.860(a)(3) of the ERO by enacting the Ordinance without meeting and confer-
ring. It repeatedly took the position that it had no duty to meet and confer over creation of a new LACERS
tier and repeatedly rejected Claimants demands that it not enact a new LACERS tier without meeting and
conferring in good faith. It does not and cannot content that Claimants waived their right to meet and confer
over creation of a new LACERS tier. Claimants repeatedly stated that any changes to retirement benefits for
bargaining unit members, including a new LACERS tier, could only be the product of meeting and conferring
in good faith, and repeatedly stated that participation in discussions regarding the proposed new tier did not
waive that position. Creation of a new LACERS tier for new hires is within the scope of representation.
Enactment of the Ordinance without meeting and conferring in good faith violated the ERO.
POSITION OF RESPONDENT ON THE MERITS
There is no statutory obligation to meet and confer when the terms and conditions of employment are
not vitally affected. Claimants have failed to present any facts to show how a change in pension benefits for
future civilian hires significantly affects the wages, hours, or other conditions of employment of existing bargain-
ing unit employees. Claimants presented no specific or concrete evidence supporting this vital element.
No evidence supports Claimants contention that the new LACERS Tier II for future hires will poten-
tially increase the actuarial costs of providing retirement benefits for existing bargaining unit employees and is
a major retirement benefit modification to the MOU requiring the City to negotiate the new tier. The results
of actuarial studies disproved Claimants first theory.
Neither the MMBA nor the ERO expressly address the obligation to meet and confer over changes in
pension benefits affecting only future hires. No precedential case law directly on point has been found. Under
federal law, the Supreme Court held in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that employers are not obligated to collectively
bargain over changes to retirees benefits unless such benefit changes would vitally affect the terms and condi-
tions of active employees, even if the employer unilaterally modifies the collective bargaining agreement. The
15
Court rejected the NLRBs determination that changes in retiree benefits vitally affected the terms and condi-
tions of active unit employees. It made it clear that more than speculative or insubstantial effects must be shown
to conclude that a matter involving individuals outside the employment relationship constitutes a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The Court noted that retirees do not fall within the statutory definition of employee.
It noted that the obligation to bargain extended only to terms and conditions of employment of employees in
the bargaining unit. It noted that benefits active workers may reap by including retired employees under the
same health insurance plan were speculative and insubstantial. It rejected the argument that active bargaining
unit employees seek to represent retirees in order to protect their own future retirement benefits, finding that
any potential benefits was too remote to give rise to a bargaining obligation. As in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, any
benefits to active bargaining unit employees from including future hires under the same retirement are specu-
lative and insubstantial.
Following Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the NLRB in United Technologies Corp., 274 NLRB 1069(1985),
enfd. 789 F.2d 121 92d Cir. 1986), defined the vitally affects test to exclude indirect or incidental impact on
unit employees, and include only those matters that materially or significantly affect unit employees terms and
conditions of employment. In Star Tribune, 295 NLRB 543 (1989), it held that applicants for employment
are not employees, and thus the employer was not obligated to bargain over drug and alcohol testing of appli-
cants. It found that the potential adverse effect of applicant drug and alcohol testing on the composition of the
bargaining unit did not, standing alone, support a conclusion that it vitally affects the terms and conditions of
employment of current employees.
By analogy to Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Star Tribune, prospective employees are not employees for
purposes of bargaining obligations under the MMBA or the ERO. They do not fall within the statutory defini-
tion of public employee in the MMBA. They do not meet the EROs definition of regular employee.
Claimants failed to identify any concrete or specific evidence that adoption of a new tier of retirement
benefits under LACERS for future hires vitally affects the terms and conditions of employment of active
bargaining unit employees. Their unsubstantiated fear that the LACERS Tier II could potentially increase
16
retirement costs for existing bargaining units does not, standing alone, support the conclusion that such changes
would vitally affect terms and conditions of current employees. The actuarial studies dispelled this concern.
PERB cases cited by Claimants do not support its position that the City is obligated to meet and confer
over pension changes for new hires. Three involved modifications to retirement benefits for current
employees, and did not address whether modification of retirement benefits for future hires is also subject to
negotiation. City of Santa Rosa may not be cited as precedent because the ALJs decision was not expressly
adopted by the PERB itself. Two of the cases cited by that ALJ involved modifications to pension benefits for
active employees, not future hires. The third involved changes in work hours for three new librarian positions,
in an existing job classification represented by the union, which directly affected work load and scheduling of
existing bargaining unit employees. Here, there is no evidence of an impact, and pension benefits are not
specifically tied to a particular job classification.
Utility Vault involved current employees, albeit newly hired ones, as opposed to future hires. In that
case, the NLRB found the employer was obligated to bargain over its decision to require all newly hired em-
ployees to sign a Dispute Resolution Process (DRP) agreement that was significantly broader than the
negotiated arbitration provision. The NLRB found the DRP vitally affected terms and conditions of newly
hired unit employees already on the payroll, because it affected the terms and conditions of their employment
and had an ongoing impact on their relationship with the employer. Implicit in this decision is a finding of
specific and concrete evidence that changes to the arbitration process vitally affected the terms and conditions
of newly hired, active unit employees. Here, the impact that pension benefit changes for as yet unidentified
future hires may have on the pension benefits of active employees is too speculative and uncertain to give rise
to an obligation to meet and confer.
Utility Vault is distinguishable. The DRP in that case applied to employees throughout their employ-
ment. The pension benefits here are established pursuant to rules that govern before the commencement of
the employer-employee relationship and will not take effect until after the employee is no longer a member of
the bargaining unit. See California Association of Professional Scientists v. Schwartzenegger, 137 Cal.App.4th,
17
373, 383 (2006), citing Claypool v. Wilson, 4 Cal. App. 4th 646, 662 (1992) ([f]uture employees do not have
a vested right in any particular pension plan.).
The language of the MOU does not support Claimants assertion that the Retirement Benefits Article
establishes a contractual basis for negotiating changes in pension benefits for future employees. The Board may
interpret contract language if necessary to do so to decide an unfair practice charge. The Retirement Benefits
Article calls for negotiation of proposed major retirement benefit modifications with unions whose member-
ships will be directly affected. It does not suggest that membership extends to future hires, whose member-
ship in LACERS and a particular bargaining unit is remote and speculative. The MOUs recognition article
defines employee and employees as employees in classifications listed in the [MOU appendices], as well
as such classes as may be added hereafter to the Unit by the Employee Relations Board. No bargaining history
supports the assertion that the procedure applies to pension benefits changes for future hires absent a direct
impact on existing bargaining unit employees.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF MEYERS-MILIAS-BROWN ACT
3501. As used in this chapter:
...
(d) "Public employee" means any person employed by any public agency, including employees of the
fire departments and fire services of counties, cities, cities and counties, districts, and other political subdivisions
of the state, excepting those persons elected by popular vote or appointed to office by the Governor of this
state.
...
3504. The scope of representation shall include all matters relating to employment conditions and
employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, except, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits,
necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order.
...
3505. The governing body of a public agency, or such boards, commissions, administrative officers or other
representatives as may be properly designated by law or by such governing body, shall meet and confer in good
faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of such
recognized employee organizations, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 3501, and shall consider fully such
presentations as are made by the employee organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a
determination of policy or course of action.
"Meet and confer in good faith" means that a public agency, or such representatives as it may designate,
and representatives of recognized employee organizations, shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet
and confer promptly upon request by either party and continue for a reasonable period of time in order to
18
exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within
the scope of representation prior to the adoption by the public agency of its final budget for the ensuing year.
The process should include adequate time for the resolution of impasses where specific procedures for such
resolution are contained in local rule, regulation, or ordinance, or when such procedures are utilized by mutual
consent.
....
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ORDINANCE
Sec. 4.830. Meeting and Conferring and Consulting.
a. Meeting and Conferring.
(1) The scope of meeting and conferring in good faith between management representatives
and representatives of recognized employee organizations includes, but is not limited to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment within the employee representation unit.
(2) Meeting and conferring shall not be required on any matter preempted or specifically
provided for by Federal or State law or the City Charter, nor shall meeting and conferring be required
on the exercise of Employee Rights or City Management Rights as defined in Section 4.857 and 4.859
of this Code. Rules and regulations adopted pursuant to Government Code Sections 3504.5 and 3507
and Rules of the Employee Relations Board and proposed amendment thereto are excluded from the
scope of meeting and conferring but are subject to consultation as provided below.
...
b. Consultation.
(1) The scope of consultation between management representatives and representatives of
affected qualified employee organizations includes employee relations matters that are specifically
excluded from or otherwise not subject to the meet and confer process.
(2) Every reasonable effort shall be made to have such consultations prior to effecting basic
changes in any rule or procedure affecting employee relations.
...
Sec. 4.860. Unfair Employee Relations Practices.
a. It shall be an unfair employee relations practice for management:
...
(3) To refuse to meet and confer in good faith at reasonable times, places and frequencies
with representatives of recognized employee organizations or to refuse to consult upon request with
qualified employee organizations on matters which are properly within the scope of representation
where no recognized employee organization exists;
(4) To fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse procedures invoked under the provisions of this
chapter;
....
19
DISCUSSION
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
This case is governed by the ERO. The ERO requires management to meet and confer over "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment within the employee representation unit." Likewise, the
MMBA requires management to meet and confer over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. These matters are analogous to "mandatory subjects of bargaining" under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), on which both the ERO and MMBA are based. Both PERB and the Board have
drawn guidance from decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regarding the obligation to
bargain, or to meet and confer. That obligation is to meet and confer in good faith with the employee
representative regarding proposed changes on matters within the scope of representation.
The California Supreme Court articulated an analytical framework for the obligation to meet and confer,
in Claremont Police Officers Association v. City of Claremont, 39 Cal. 4th 623 (2006). In Claremont, the
Court called for a three-part test to determine whether and when an employer must meet and confer:
(1) Does the decision have a significant and adverse effect on bargaining unit employees wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of employment? If not, no meet and confer obligation arises. If so, the
Court would proceed to the next question.
(2) Does the significant and adverse effect arise from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or
policy decision? If not, the meet and confer obligation arises over the decision.
3
If so, the Court would
proceed to the next question.
(3) Is the employers need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations outweighed by
the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining over the effects of the decision? Answering
this question requires weighing the transactional cost of bargaining against its value.
3
The Board has also found an obligation to meet and confer over decisions that do not implicate funda-
mental managerial or policy interests. Dept. of Recreation and Parks (1993), Dec. No. U-97 [rotation
of employee assignments]; Fire Dept. (2001), Dec. No. U-145 [procedure for filling vacancies in new
class]. Respondent has not asserted that such fundamental interests are involved here.
20
Because Respondent has not proffered defenses based on the last two analytical steps in this case, it is
necessary to address only the first analytical step: i.e., the effect on bargaining unit employees wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment from unilateral implementation of LACERS II.
THE MERITS
Central to Respondents defense in this case is its assertion that future hires are not employees under
the ERO and MMBA. Neither the Board nor PERB has had occasion to address this argument. However,
the NLRB recently addressed it in Regency Heritage Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, 360 NLRB No. 98
(April 30, 2014). In that case, the employer did not pay the wages specified in the contract to employees who
were hired after the expiration of the contract. Among its defenses was the assertion that such employees were
applicants rather than employees. The ALJ rejected this particular defense, analyzing it as follows:
Respondents characterization of unit employees, who were not paid the contractually required
minimums as applicants for employment, is inaccurate. These individuals were hired by
Respondent and were, and are, part of the bargaining unit. Respondents failure to accord them
the contractually required minimum wage, which became part of the bargaining units terms of
employment by virtue of Section 8(a)(5) of the act cannot be changed without bargaining with the
Union to impasse or agreement of the Union. (360 NLRB No. 98. sl. op. at 12)
The NLRB went beyond adopting the ALJs conclusion on this point. At footnote 3, it found:
The Respondents defense that it had no duty to bargain over changes to the terms and condi-
tions of employment for individuals hired after the contract expired because such individuals
were applicants instead of employees is frivolous.
The NLRB declined to assess litigation expenses because the General Counsel had not requested that sanction
and the employer had asserted other defenses that were at least colorable, albeit without merit.
In this case, Respondent notes that applicants for employment are not employees under any definition
of that term. The legal status of an applicant is irrelevant to this case; a future hire will no longer be an
applicant once s/he becomes a hire. Respondent is inaccurate in characterizing future hires as prospective
employees. Upon being hired, future hires will no longer be prospective; the hiring decision will have been
made. At the moment of their hire, future hires will be public employees under the MMBA and regular
employees under the ERO. If hired into positions within the Coalitions certification, they will immediately
21
become members of the bargaining unit. Consistent with this status, the parties have bargained changes in pen-
sions for new hires in the past; the City was significantly cognizant of this at the time of the ERIP that it
negotiated a specific reservation of the right to increase the active employee contribution rate for new hires.
If an applicant or prospective employee is not hired into a bargaining unit position, it is self-evident
that s/he would not be subject to LACERS II nor, for that matter, to the wages, hours, or other terms or
conditions of employment in any Coalition MOU. Once hired into a bargaining unit position, however, the
negotiated wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment would apply for the remainder of
his/her employment within the bargaining unit, and upon retirement. Respondent would except pension
provisions from the general applicability of the MOUs, but has articulated no principle that would bar unilateral
changes to the remaining terms of the MOUs with every new hire. Such a result would be entirely at odds with
the status of its unions as representatives of their respective bargaining units in collective bargaining.
Respondent erroneously asserts that the impact of its announced pension changes for as yet unident-
ified future hires is too speculative and uncertain to require bargaining. The impact on the bargaining unit,
and on any newly-hired member of the bargaining unit, is obvious: the new hire will be working under different
terms from those negotiated in the MOU. While the names will be filled in as hiring goes on, the impact is
certain and foreseeable regardless of the names.
The NLRBs analysis of the same argument in Regency Heritage is persuasive. Respondents distinction
between future hires and employees has crossed the thin line between novel and frivolous. However,
because Respondent vigorously asserts that implementation of LACERS II would have no significant impact
on the bargaining unit, it may be useful to discuss the obvious impact on the bargaining unit.
If LACERS II were to be implemented, new hires would be subject to significantly different terms and
conditions of employment from their fellow bargaining unit members. The differences would include:
* Raising the retirement age to 67;
* Capping the maximum retirement allowance at 75% of salary (down from 100%);
* Reducing the retirement factor from 2.16% to 2% at age 67;
* Restructuring calculation of final compensation to prevent pension spiking;
* Reducing pension cost-of-living adjustments;
22
* Controlling retiree healthcare costs by lowering the monthly caps;
* Ensuring cost neutrality of the government service buyback program; and
* Sharing the risk of future retirement increases between the City and employees.
Under any logical reading of Paragraph B of the Retirement Benefits provisions of the MOU, such changes
are major retirement benefit modifications. They would have a significant and adverse effect on employees
terms and conditions of employment, by setting up a new class of employees within the bargaining unit who
were employed with less desirable pension benefits. In any future negotiations, Claimants would be starting
from a status quo that included two classes of employees, one class of which would be working under a
condition of employment that was never negotiated.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass is pertinent to this case, but largely by highlighting the significance of negotiated
pension benefits for new hires. That case involved changes in retirement benefits for already-retired employees,
who would not be returning to the bargaining unit, and who thus (the Court found) were not employees. The
Court distinguished prior NLRB decisions finding that personnel who were members of the active work force
available for hire e.g., applicants for employment or registrants at hiring halls, persons who had quit, or
persons whose employers had gone out of business were all employees. The case at hand involves changes
in benefits for future hires, who (unlike retirees) are in the work force and who, immediately upon being hired,
will join the bargaining units represented by the Coalition unions.
Star Tribune and Utility Vault highlight the difference between applicants and new hires. The NLRB
held in Star Tribune that there was no obligation to bargain with the union about testing of applicants. Its
conclusion that applicants were not employees for this purpose was distinguished from long-standing
precedent that deemed applicants for employment to be employees who were protected by the NLRA e.g.,
against discrimination based on protected activity. The NLRB also found an obligation to provide the union
with information it had requested about the testing of applicants, based on the unions right to enforce
negotiated anti-discrimination provisions. Utility Vault later made it clear that Star Tribune cannot be read to
apply beyond the very narrow issue of the procedures used to consider applications for employment.
23
Unlike the applicants who were subject to drug testing in Star Tribune, every future hire into a position
represented by a Coalition union will become a bargaining unit member at the instant of his/her hire. S/he will
be affected by the pension provisions upon the moment of becoming a bargaining unit member and for the
duration of employment with the City, as well as after retiring. Under the ERO and the MMBA, the only
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment under which any such future hire into a represented
bargaining unit may be employed are those in the negotiated terms of the MOUs. Any other conclusion would
permit an employer to erode any and all negotiated wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment simply by declaring them inapplicable to new hires.
As a final note, the proposition for which Respondent quotes California Assn. of Profl Scientists v.
Schwarzenegger takes that quote out of context. After addressing the contractual and constitutional issues
raised by CAPS, the Court specifically noted that the prior authorities did not speak to collectively bargained
pension provisions:
Here, the change in pension rights about which CAPS complains did not apply to persons who
were already employed by the state when SB No. 1105 took effect; rather, the change applied
only to prospective employees. At first glance, this distinction appears significant, because
generally "[t]he contractual basis of a pension right is the exchange of an employee's services for
the pension right offered by the statute" and thus "`[f]uture employees do not have a vested right
in any particular pension plan.'" (Claypool v. Wilson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 646, 662, 670, 6 Cal.
Rptr.2d 77.)
The foregoing authorities, however, do not speak to the situation where a collective bargaining
agreement exists. When a collective bargaining agreement purports to secure pension rights for
future employees, it may well be that the federal and state contract clauses protect the rights of
future employees as much as the rights of existing employees. We need not decide that issue,
however, because we conclude section 8.8(C) of the agreement did not promise to leave
unchanged the pension rights of future employees in bargaining unit 10. 137 Cal.App.4
th
at 383.
[emphasis added]
In denying PERBs application to intervene, the court found, The constitutional issue CAPS seeks to litigate
here is separate and distinct from any issue of whether the state violated its collective bargaining obligations
under the Dills Act. In the case at hand, whether Respondent was required by the ERO to meet and confer
regarding a proposed change to LACERS is the issue to be decided, and that issue is within the scope of the
Boards jurisdiction.
24
RECOMMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Claimants Coalition of Los Angeles City Unions: American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees District Council 36, Locals 741, 901, 2006, 2626, 3090, and 3672; Laborers Local 777; Los
Angeles and Orange County Building & Construction Trades Council; Municipal Construction
Inspectors Association; Service Employees International Union Local 721; and Teamsters Local 911
are the collective bargaining representatives of employees of Respondent within their respective
bargaining units.
2. Respondent implemented LACERS II without meeting and conferring with Claimants.
3. The unilateral decision to implement LACERS II has a significant and adverse effect on the terms and
conditions of employment of employees in the bargaining units represented by Claimants.
RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent City of Los Angeles violated Section 4.860(a)(3) of the Employee Relations Ordinance
when it implemented LACERS II without meeting and conferring with Claimants Coalition of Los
Angeles City Unions: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees District Council
36, Locals 741, 901, 2006, 2626, 3090, and 3672; Laborers Local 777; Los Angeles and Orange County
Building & Construction Trades Council; Municipal Construction Inspectors Association; Service
Employees International Union Local 721; and Teamsters Local 911.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
1. Respondent City of Los Angeles shall cease and desist from making changes in wages, hours, or terms
and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees within the scope of representation under
the Employee Relations Ordinance prior to offering to meet and confer with Claimants Coalition of Los
Angeles City Unions: American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees District Council
36, Locals 741, 901, 2006, 2626, 3090, and 3672; Laborers Local 777; Los Angeles and Orange County
Building & Construction Trades Council; Municipal Construction Inspectors Association; Service
Employees International Union Local 721; and Teamsters Local 911.
2. Respondent shall rescind the implementation of LACERS II and reinstate the status quo ante.
3. Respondent shall meet and confer in good faith with Claimants regarding any major retirement benefit
modifications to LACERS and the impact on the bargaining units from any such modifications.
LUELLA E. NELSON - Hearing Officer
25
WITNESSES
Cheryl Parisi, Executive Director, AFSCME District Council 36, called by Claimants
Julie Butcher, Regional Director, SEIU 721, called by Claimants
Thomas Simonovski, former Senior Labor Relations Specialist, called by Respondent
Maritta Aspen, Senior Labor Relations Specialist, called by Respondent
Irma Rodriguez Moisa, Consultant, called by Respondent
Steve Koffroth, Business Representative, AFSCME District Council 36, called by Claimants
EXHIBITS
Hearing Officer Exhibits:
1 Index of MOU for City Employees
2A MOU for Bargaining Unit #3 2007-12
2B Amendment 1 to MOU #3
2C Amendment 2 to MOU #3
2D Amendment 3 to MOU #3
2E Amendment 4 to MOU #3
3A Unfair Practice Claim filed by AFSCME, UERP 1898
3B Unfair Practice Claim filed by SEIU Local 721, UERP 1899
3C Unfair Practice Claim filed by MCIA, UERP 1900
3D Unfair Practice Claim filed by IUOE Local 501, UERP 1901
3E Unfair Practice Claim filed by LIUNA Local 777, UERP 1902
3F Unfair Practice Claim filed by LA/OC Building & Construction Trades Council, UERP 1903
3G Unfair Practice Claim filed by Teamsters Local 777, UERP 1904
4 Citys Consolidated Response
5 Stipulations of Fact
Claimant's Exhibits
1 9/30/2010 Letter of Agreement (ERIP funding Agreement 2009)
2 10/22/2009 Letter of Agreement (also part of HO-2D) [not moved into evidence]
3 1/11/10 letter to Hunter from Santana
4 1/15/10 letter to Santana from Coalition lawyers
5 7/30/10 letter from Santana to Parisi
6 8/2/10 letter to Santana from Coalition lawyers
7 3/7/11 letter to Pariso from Santana
8 3/15/11 Draft ordinance
9 8/21/11 Coalition Counter-proposal
10 3/24/11 press release regarding pension and healthcare reform agreement
11 5/5/11 Amendment to LOA, from tentative agreement reached 3/23
12 8/27/12 letter to Parisi from Santana
13 9/12/12 Actuarial analysis
14 9/14/12 City Attorney report regarding draft ordinance
15 9/19/12 letter to Parisi from Santana regarding proposed tier 2
16 9/21/12 letter from Segall to City regarding proposed ordinance
17 10/25/12 response to verbal motion re pension reform
18 10/19/12 Group grievance from IUOE 501
26
19 Ordinance No. 182296 (creating new LACERS tier)
20 5/23/13 Petition to compel arbitration
21 5/20/2013 draft ordinance
Respondent Exhibits
1 8/10/10 letter to Santana
2 9/27/2010 e-mail
3 9/29/2010 letter to Parisi with attachment
4 10/1/10 letter to Santana
5 10/8/10 letter to Parisi from Santana
6 10/12/10 e-mail from CAO ERD to Unions
7 10/15/10 letter to Villaraigosa
8 10/25/10 memos to Santana
9 10/27/10 press release with attachments
10 10/27/10 e-mail to Simonovski
11 11/5/10 e-mail to Parisi with attachments regarding information requests
12 11/9/10 e-mail from Simonovski to Unions with actuarial report
13 11/12/10 LACERS Unions Initial Proposal (from Coalition)
14 1/7/10 letter from Coalition to CAO
15 Sign-in sheet dated 1/8/10 Meeting to Discuss LACERS Tier for New Hires
16 5/28/10 email to Coalition with sign-up sheet from 6/2 mtg
17 CAO Handouts from 6/2/10 meeting, CoLA 0019-0025
18 6/4/10 email from Simonovski to Coalition
19 Sign-in sheet from 6/14/10 meeting
20 6/15/10 email from Simonovski to Coalition
21 CAO Handouts from 6/14/10 meeting, CoLA 0043-0105
22 Sign-in sheet from 6/30/10 meeting
23 8/3/10 City Retirement Systems powerpoint, CoLA 0215-0265
24 Notice and City Council action of 8/3/10, Council File 10-0048-S1
25 10/14/10 Actuarial Report Defined Contribution Plan/Hybrid Plan, CoLA 0289-0308
26 10/14/10 Actuarial Report Defined Benefit Plan, CoLA 0309-0326
27 Sign-in sheet from 10/10/10 meeting
28 Sign-in sheet from 10/21/10 meeting
29 10/22/10 memo from Santana to Council and Mayor
30 Notice and City Council action of 10/26/10, Council File 10-1621
31 Sign-in sheet from 10/29/10 meeting
32 10/25/10 memos to Santana from LACERS unions
33 Sign-in sheet from 11/12/10 meeting
34 1/10/11 Actuarial report Union Study #1", CoLA 0496-0511
35 1/10/11 Actuarial report 2.3% @ 65, 2.16% @ 65, 80% cap, 90% cap, CoLA 0512-0528
36 1/11/11 e-mail to Unions with 2-page attachment
37 1/11/11 e-mail from Simonovski to Yeung with 3-page attachment
38 2/14/11 e-mail from Simonovski to Coalition regarding 2/18/11 meeting
39 Sign-in sheet from 2/18/11 meeting
40 2/10/11 Actuarial Union Study #2, CoLA 0530-0544
41 Printout from www.smartvoter.org/ca/la regarding Charter Amendment LA-G, Official Results, 3/8/11
Election
27
42 6/28/11 City Council action adopting Ordinance No. 181778; approved by Mayor 7/5/11; effective
7/8/11
43 10/28/11 memo to Santana from Villaraigosa with Governors plan
44 3/30/12 Actuarial report regarding 2% @ 67, CoLA 0805-0831
45 3/30/12 Actuarial report regarding 2% @ 65, CoLA 0805-0831
46 4/20/12 press release from Mayor regarding proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2012-2013
47 Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Budget Summary
48 Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 2012-2013, CoLA 0942-1018
49 Invoices from actuarial firms, CoLA 1171-1196
50 ERB Administrative file on UERP 1799 filed by EAA
51 9/18/12 CAO report to Council with tier 2 ordinance
52 5/20/13 transmittal letter for draft ordinance to Council (with C-21)
53 12/10/10 management proposal to Coalition
28