CONTINUATION

ESTAFA
NG V. PEOPLE
business of building and fabricating telecommunication towers under the trade name "Capitol
Blacksmith and Builders," applied for a credit line of PhP 3,000,000 with Asiatrust Development Bank,
Inc. (Asiatrust). Asiatrust approved petitioners loan application. . Though the Promissory Notes matured
on September 18, 1997, the two (2) aforementioned Trust Receipt Agreements did not bear any
maturity dates as they were left unfilled or in blank by Asiatrust. As petitioner realized difficulty in
collecting from his client Islacom, he failed to pay his loan to Asiatrust. an Information for Estafa, as
defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3, PD 115 or the Trust
Receipts Law, One of the requirements of the Compromise Agreement was for petitioner to issue six (6)
postdated checks. Petitioner, in good faith, tried to comply by issuing two or three checks, which were
deposited and made good. The remaining checks, however, were not deposited as the Compromise
Agreement did not push through.
petitioner argued that: (1) the loan was granted as his working capital and that the Trust Receipt
Agreements he signed with Asiatrust were merely preconditions for the grant and approval of his loan
RTC and CA- guilty of Estafa
whether or not petitioner is liable for Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC
essential elements of Estafa are: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return it; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender
n other words, a trust receipt transaction is one where the entrustee has the obligation to deliver to the
entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the merchandise to the
entruster. A thorough examination of the facts obtaining in the instant case, however, reveals that the
transaction between petitioner and Asiatrust is not a trust receipt transaction but one of simple loan.
No Misappropriation of Goods or Proceeds

The second element of Estafa requires that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt.

This is the very essence of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b). The words "convert" and "misappropriated"
connote an act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for ones own use includes not only
conversion to ones personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without a right
Petitioner argues that there was no misappropriation or conversion on his part, because his liability for
the amount of the goods subject of the trust receipts arises and becomes due only upon receipt of the
proceeds of the sale and not prior to the receipt of the full price of the goods.Petitioner is correct.
Acquitted
Illegal Possession of Bank Notes
Illegal Possession of Bank notes
Clemente v. People
F:
The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The
petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City
Jail bakery but was refused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the
matter to jail officers. Consequently , the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23
more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. The defense of the accused was frame up. After trial,
the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were
discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the
counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of
pieces involved. As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found
in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash
Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime
which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz
did not take the witness stand.
I: WON the accused is guilty of art 168
H:
The petition is meritorious. RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to warrant
a reversal of its factual assessments.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or
certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or
other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the
offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.2
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake
P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only
informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail
bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that
petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.23 Their account, however, is hearsay and not
based on the personal knowledge.ACQUITTED
Falsification of commercial documents/estafa
Chua v. People 2012
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired
Richard Chua as a general clerk in its International Banking Division Specifically, Chua was tasked to
process trust receipts, accept trust receipt payments and issue the corresponding receipts for these
payments. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine (29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus
foreign remittances were discovered. The audit led to a finding that these remittances were not
supported by the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign bank concerned.
the CA modified the RTCs judgment of conviction by holding Chua liable for falsification of commercial
documents only. The CA reasoned out that Chua, being a mere general clerk of the bank, did not acquire
both material and juridical possession of the subject amounts.
WON guilty of the crime of falsification of commercial documents.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
, appellant did not acquire juridical possession over the subject payments which were made by two of
Allied Banks clients, i.e., Unidex Garments and ATL Plastic Manufacturing Industries. It must be borne in
mind that appellant is a mere general clerk of Allied Bank. As part of his duties, he received payments
from clients. His position therefor may be likened to the position of a bank teller whose possession over
the money received by him is possession by the bank itself.
Applying this to the present case, all three elements are undeniably present (i) Chua is a private
individual; (ii) he used fictitious "inward foreign remittance advice of credit" to cause the funneling or
transfer of the two named bank clients payments into his own account,23 squarely falling under
paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code24; and (iii) the falsification was committed in two
commercial documents, namely, "inward foreign remittance advice of credit" and the "debit tickets."25
Without doubt, his subsequent conviction to a lesser crime was not unfounded.
Chua v. People sep 2013
Appellant Melissa Chua was charged on May 6, 2003, with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
The court a quo likewise found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa for misrepresenting
herself as having the power and capacity to recruit and place private complainants as factory workers in
Taiwan. Such misrepresentation, the trial court stressed, induced private complainants to part with their
money. The RTC brushed aside appellants defense that she was merely a cashier of Golden Gate and
that the same is owned by Marilen Callueng.
GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND FOUR (4) COUNTS OF ESTAFA
DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits any
of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.23 All
three elements are present in the case at bar.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In this case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded the complaining witnesses by
leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them to Taiwan for work, even as she does not
have a license or authority for the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants
delivered P 80,000 as placement fee to appellant. Clearly, private complainants would not have parted
with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant. As a consequence of appellants false
pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the money they paid were never recovered.
he failure of the prosecution to discharge this burden concerning the estafa allegedly committed against
Ursulum warrants the acquittal of appellant on the said charge. a conviction for estafa requires a clear
showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the offenders false pretenses,
and suffered damage thereby. ACQUITTED of one count of estafa
BIGAMY
People v. Odtuhan
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent
married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his
marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondents
petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On
November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8
charging respondent with Bigamy pati CA.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
The petition is meritorious.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in
Antone and Montaez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do
not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of
the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for
certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.40 If we allow respondents line of defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a
complaint against him.41
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent
only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion
to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the
information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidenc
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Capili v. People
petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an
Information which reads:On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been
legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second ma
Montaez v. Cipriano
n April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San
Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch petitioner Merlinda
Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed
against respondent.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was
declared only in 2003. The question now is
whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it
had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the
second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
RA 10158 Decriminalization of Vagrancy
ARTICLE 202. Vagrants and prostitutes Penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work
and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be
found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes;
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both,
in the discretion of the court.
Article 202 now reads as follows:
Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. For the purposes of this article, women who, or money or proflt,
habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 peso, or both, in the
discretion of the court.They just passed a law which is highly discriminatory against women. We were
singled out, targeted as criminals, while the pimps are decriminalized. Originally, pimps were identified
as belonging to the class of vagrants under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, with vagrants dropped
from the Code under the new law, pimps have also been excluded from being criminally liable.
Kidnapping
People v. Tadah
convicted the appellant3 of five counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention4 committed against
Gina Yang y Bersaez, 3-year old Princess Jane "Cha-Cha" Yang, Joy Sagubay, Yang Wang Tao Chiu, and
Nicomedes Santa Ana. It gave credence to the straightforward testimonies of the kidnap victims. . It
sentenced the appellant to the death penalty for each count of kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
appreciating that the accused committed the kidnapping to extort ransom, and that the accused used a
motorized vehicle and motorized watercrafts to facilitate the commission of the crimes. It also ordered
him to pay Bien Yang the amount of P2,000,000.00 for the ransom paid.
WON guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
Since the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired to kidnap the
victims for ransom, and kidnapped and illegally detained them until they were released by the accused
after the latter received the P2,000,000.00 ransom. Appellant Yusop Tadah is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 5 counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole
People v. Anticamara
the victim Jomarie Rosales (Jomarie), then seven (7) years of age, female, residing at No. 142 Mabuhay
Street, Las Pias City and a grade 1 pupil, attended her classes at the CAA Elementary School in Las Pias
from 8:00 to 10:00 in the morning.5 While on her way home, Jomarie noticed that appellant was
following her. She ran, but appellant eventually caught up with her.6 Appellant told her that she should
go with him, but Jomarie refused and told him that her mother would be angry.7 Jomarie held on to a
post, but appellant dragged and forced her to go to his house at Patola Street which is 100 to 150
meters away.
appellant went inside the house then returned with a piece of rope.10 He used the rope in tying the
hands of Jomarie. Jomarie pleaded that she be released because her mother would be worried, but
appellant refused.
After more or less one hour, appellant untied Jomaries hands and instructed her to walk straight toward
the road. He even told her not to turn left, otherwise, she would not be able to reach home. Appellant
also threatened her not to tell anybody of what happened or else he would kill her
WON guilty of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
We do not find any reason to depart from the conclusions of the trial and appellate courts. Time and
again, we have ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.
It is undisputed that appellant is a private individual. As to the second, third and fourth elements, we
agree with the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that Jomaries and Marissas testimonies adequately
showed that indeed, appellant kidnapped Jomarie, a minor, and detained her for more or less an hour.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it.
irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held that if
the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.42 This notwithstanding the fact also
that appellant, after more or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go
home.
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
Madsali v. People
Badong", did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one AAA, a girl of
16 years of age, against her will and consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the
said accused by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, and while armed with a knife, accused
Sahiron Lajim, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said AAA, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE IMPLICATION OF THE 5-MONTH
INACTION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED ADBUCTION AND
ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HER DAUGHTER
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility of the
complainant, nor can it be taken against her.
Neither is the Court convinced of the "sweetheart theory," the defense of the accused, by alleging that
AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and marriage. If there were
indeed romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal reaction would
have been to cover up for the man she supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting
the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation,21 right after she was rescued by the authorities.
In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the
"sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself
and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before
the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that
the latter never lived in their house
Although the information does not specifically allege the term "kidnap or detain," the information
specifically used the terms "take" and "carry away." To "kidnap" is to carry away by unlawful force or
fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away.31 Whereas, to "take" is to get into
one's hand or into one's possession, power, or control by force or strategem.32 Thus, the word take,
plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the
accused that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a
minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists
not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of
his liberty.36 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.37
Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent
of the accused to effect such deprivation.38 In the present case, although AAA was not actually confined
in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and
her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest
away from her home.
In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to prevent AAA from resisting her
abduction by tying her hands behind her back and putting a piece of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched
and stood guard to make sure that no one would interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his
son against AAA
, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape
Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995. There was no showing
that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations with other men. Further, Dr. Ma.
Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, testified that since AAA gave birth on
April 8, 1995, the baby must have been conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or about the
time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it can be logically deduced that Sajiron is the father of
the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code,65 he is civilly liable for the support of his offspring.
Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape, subject to the amount
and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in accordance with Art.
201 of the Family Code
Abduction w/ Rape
People v. Cayanan 2013
. The RTC decision convicted Cayanan of the crimes of Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1)
and Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1498-M-200 I), and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime without eligibility for parole.
It turned out to be Cayanan. He then started kissing her and told her to remove her shorts. When she
refused, Cayanan forcibly took it off and after the latter took off his own under garment, he inserted his
organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and
informed anybody of the incident. Cayanan then pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but
he covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop in,
Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of clothes as she was in her school uniform and
later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his sisters house in x x x where he raped her inside a
bedroom. Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape. Forcible abduction
is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim.
Malversation
Manuel v. People 2012
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc.
(MPI). illa represented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation,
which was engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property therein
located. Lopez verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati and confirmed that the property was indeed
registered under the names of Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was convinced by Millas authority, MPI
purchased the property for P2 million, issuing Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) Check No. 154670 in
the amount of P1.6 million
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to Acosta, but did not furnish the latter with the receipts for the
transfer taxes and other costs incurred in the transfer of the property. This failure to turn over the
receipts prompted Lopez to check with the Register of Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the
Certificate of Title given to them by Milla could not be found therein; (2) there was no transfer of the
property from Sps. Handog to MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in the name of a certain
Matilde M. Tolentino
Milla was accused of having committed estafa through the falsification of the notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale
The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial courts finding of guilt.
Milla was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa through falsification of public
documents. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime charged.
The relevant provisions of the Revised Penal Code read:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented himself to have the authority to sell the subject
property, and it was precisely this misrepresentation that prompted MPI to purchase it.
Cantos v. People 2013
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code sappropriate and convert to
his personal use and benefit the amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,270,000.00), Philippine Currency, from such public funds received by him by reason of his Office to
the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforestated amount.
The Sandiganbayan sustained the ruling of the RTC. It held that in the crime of malversation, all that is
necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did
not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made.
Did the Sandiganbayan err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation of public funds?
The petition must fail.
The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in its decision convicting petitioner of
malversation of public funds, which is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall suffer
Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused
cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.21 To our mind, the evidence in this case is
thoroughly inconsistent with petitioner's claim of innocence. Thus, we sustain the Sandiganbayan's
finding that petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Hazing Reckless imprudence
Villareal v. People 2012

The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa the victim in this case on 10 February
1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. This widespread condemnation prompted
Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). The latter were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation
rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites
included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of
their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows
on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given
the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation
for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
hey removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. The night before
the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would
be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. It
is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing.
Court is constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual
background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
eckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an
act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
THREATS
PAERA V. PEOPLE 2011
PAERA VS. PEOPLE
(GRAVE THREATS, ART. 282)

Facts:

As Punong barangay, PAERA allocated his constituents use of communal water coming from a
communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents. The tank is sits on the land owned by VICENTE,
father of INDALENCIO.

Despite Paeras scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. Paera reminded Indalecio
of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.

The following day, Paera inspected the tank after the people complained of water supply interruption.
Paera discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected.

To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, Paera, using a bolo fashioned a wooden plug. It was
at this point when Indalencio arrived.

Paera, without any warning picked up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting I WILL KILL
YOU! Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea.

Upon seeing Paera, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "I
don't spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!". Diosetea similarly scampered and sought
refuge in the nearby house of a relative.

Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased
Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him,
shouting "Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!"

The MCTC & RTC found petitioner guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for
each of the THREE COUNTS OF GRAVE THREATS

HENCE THIS APPEAL

Petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the "continued complex crime" of
Grave Threats

ISSUE:

whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats

HELD:
Petitioner is liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to the
concept of "continued crime" which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising
from one criminal intent or resolution. petitioner invokes the rule for complex crime under Article 48 of
the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum period.

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and
complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner's theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime." This felony is
consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner's threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack
open Vicente's skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious
physical injuries as penalized under the RPC.

These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his
threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals,
albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

Similarly, petitioner's intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose only
when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Having disposed of petitioner's theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to extensively pass
upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty scheme.

It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass either:
(1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; or

(2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another[19] and petitioner neither performed
a single act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as a means of consummating
another.

PETITION DENIED. RTC's ruling AFFIRMED.
Mala in se/ mala prohibita
Sy v. People
Appellant accompanied Corazon and went to corazons sister (Felicidad) to convince her to work abroad.
Appellant assured Felicidad of good salary and that she will take care of the necessary processing of the
documents. Felicidad agreed and thereat gave 60k. in the 3rd week of marh 97. Felicidad paid another
60k. in both instatnces no receipt was issued by appellant.
On felicidads 3rd trip. Appellant accompanied her and a male person showed to them the birth
certificate (armida lim) that felicidad would use in applying for taiwanese passport. Felicidad was
instructed on how to write Armida Lims Chinese name. she submitted all the documents introduced to
her by the appellant but the Taiwanese authorities rejected them.

WON the accused can be charged with estafa and at the same time illegal recruitment?

Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for
illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Sy's acquittal in the illegal
recruitment case does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are
entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A
person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.ca In the same manner, a person acquitted of illegal recruitment may be held
liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of
which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.tu

Libel
Yambot c. Sec DOJ
PDI printed an articleheadlined Judge mauled me, says court employee, carrying the byline of
petitioner Contreras. The article reported an alleged mauling incident that took place between RTC
Judge Cruz, Jr. and Robert Mendoza, an administrative officer assigned at the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Makati RTC.
Reckoning the article to be false and malicious, Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint for libel with the City
Prosecutor of Makati.
Judge Cruz alleged that there was no suit for sexual harassment pending against him before this Court
(as written in the article), and attached a certification of theDeputy Court Administrator attesting to the
pendency of only two administrative cases against him.
Contreras filed a counter-affidavit with the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, explaining the supposed
factual basis for his article.
It appeared that Atty. Paredes-Garcia had filed with this Court a Petition for Review to question a
contempt order issued against her by Judge Cruz. Inconnection with said Petition for Review, Paredes-
Garcia filed a Reply asking this Court to look deeply into allegations of one Talag-Pascual that JudgeCruz
made sexual advances to her while she was a member of his staff at the MeTC of Manila. Paredes-Garcia
claimed that she suffered similar indignities from Judge Cruz, and prayed that her Petition be treated as
an administrative case against said judge. Paredes-Garcia appended anaffidavit executed by Talag-
Pascual to purportedly show the proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who became objects of his
fancy.
In the meantime, this Court rendered its Decision on the Petition of Paredes-Garcia, granting her prayer
to set aside Judge Cruz's contempt order. The prayer inParedes-Garcia's Reply that the Petition be
treated as an administrative case against Judge Cruz was not passed upon by the Court.
Subsequently, the City Prosecutor approved Resolution finding probable cause against Mendoza and six
PDI employees, namely: Contreras, Isagani Yambot, LettyJimenez-Magsanoc, Jose Ma. Nolasco, Artemio
Engracia, Jr. and Carlos Hidalgo (the PDI Staff).
City Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against Mendoza and the PDI Staff. Thereafter, the PDI Staff
filed a Motion with the trial court for the deferment of thearraignment to allow them to appeal to the
Secretary of the Department of Justice.
Then Secretary of Justice Tuquero dismissed the PDI Staffs Petition for Review of the Resolution of the
City Prosecutor.
Tuquero rejected the argument of petitioners that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
lack of supporting affidavits from thirdpersons. According to Tuquero, affidavits of third persons are not
essential for a libel complaint to prosper, as it is enough that the person defamedcan be identified. As
regards the factual basis presented by Contreras, Secretary Tuquero noted it cannot be said that Judge
Cruz was indeed facinga sexual harassment suit in this Court.
The PDI Staff with the exception of Hidalgo (herein petitioners) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
to challenge the aforementioned Resolutions of SecretaryTuquero.
CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Since the Information had already been filed with the trial court,
the primary determination of probable cause is now withthe latter.
ISSUE:
WON the privileged nature of a publication is a ground for dismissal and that the respondent need not
wait until trial to raise the issue of privilege
DECISION
: YES. Petition GRANTED.
HELD:
Under exceptional circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice (involving an appeal of the prosecutor's ruling onprobable cause) may be allowed,
notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court.
In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court held that the acts of a quasi-judicial officer
may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petitionfor certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the
orderly
administration of justice; (c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lustfor vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly
no prima facie case against the accused.
The Investigating Prosecutor acts without or in excess of his authority under the Rule if the Information
is filed against the respondent despite absenceof evidence showing probable cause therefor. If the
Secretary of Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who found noprobable cause
to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information despite the absence
of probable cause, the Secretaryof Justice acts contrary to law, without authority and/or in excess of
authority. Such resolution may likewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In light of the particular factual context of the present controversy, the Court finds that the need to
uphold the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press andcrystal clear absence of a prima facie
case against the PDI staff justify the resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstancetending to discredit or cause the dishonor or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Consequently,
the followingelements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d)existence of malice. The
glaring absence of maliciousness in the news article subject of this case negates the existence of
probable cause that libel has beencommitted by the PDI staff.
The article merely reported the statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual
harassment against Judge Cruz and that saidarticle did not report the existence of the alleged sexual
harassment suit as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, thatMendoza did not
utter such statement. Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part of the PDI
Staff by asserting that theydid not check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong,
pointing to a certification from the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to thependency of only two
administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions not mentioning sexual harassment.
A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or
imperfection in the choice of words. While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate sexual advances in an
appeal of a contempt ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual harassment, the Court agrees
with petitioners'proposition that the subject news article's author, not having any legal training, cannot
be expected, to make the fine distinction between a sexual harassment suitand a suit where there was
an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three other newspapers reporting the same incident
committed the same mistake: (ManilaTimes, Philippine Star, Manila Standard).
The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza's allegation of a sexual
harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of the article: itwas a straightforward narration,
without any comment from the reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving Judge Cruz. The
subject article was, in fact,replete with other allegations by Mendoza of purported misconduct on the
part of Judge Cruz.
In Borjal v. CA, the Court held that "[a] newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should
be free to report on events and developments in which thepublic has a legitimate interest with
minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so
long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within
the general community."
Like fair commentaries on matters of public interest, fair reports on the same should thus be included
under the protective mantle of privilegedcommunications, and should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. The concept of privilegedcommunication is implicit
in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press, which would be threatened when criminal suits
are unscrupulouslyleveled by persons wishing to silence the media on account of unfounded claims of
inaccuracies in news reports
Continuing crime
People v. de leon