HIZON et al. VS CA G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996
FACTS: HIZON et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUES: 1. W/N fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in evidence.
2. W/N Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
HELD: 1. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizures without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
2. Not Guilty. Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704 which provide as follows:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition."Muro ami", as what was reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute.
What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997
FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion
HELD: The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority. "Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
PEOPLE VS. VERGARA G.R. No. 110286. April 2, 1997
FACTS: On July 4, 1992, in Palo, Leyte, Vergara et. al., without any authority of law, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally catch, take and gather fish belonging to the anchovies species known locally as bolinao, with the use of explosives contained in a bottle and called in the vernacular as badil.
A badil contains ammonium nitrate which indiscriminately kills schools and various species of fish within a certain radius when ignited with a blasting cap.
All the accused were apprehended. The fishing boat and fishnets of bolinao were impounded.
Vergara alone was arraigned and brought to trial while his co-accused escaped and remained at large.
The trial court sentenced Vergara to a penalty of twenty (20) years to life imprisonment as punished under Sec. 2, of PD 1058. Vergara appealed.
ISSUE: WON Vergara et. al. are guilty of the offense charged.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 33 of PD 704, as amended by PD 1058, illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - it shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity x x x - - It was further concluded by an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture that explosives were indeed used, as manifested by the result of the fish samples, to wit: samples showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and crushed internal organs. The decision of the lower court was affirmed.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
FACTS: The City Government of Caloocan disposed of approximately 350 tons of garbage daily in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin against the wishes of local residents, who were concerned about the environmental and health impact of the dumpsite. In March 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish filed a complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA). The complaint sought to end the operation of the dumpsite, because of the dumpsites harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. An LLDA investigation found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining the dumpsite without a legally required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Subsequently, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order to the City Government of Caloocan, asking them, the Metropolitan Manila Authority, and any contractors or other entities to stop operating the Camarin dumpsite. The dumping stopped for a few months, but resumed again in August 1992. The LLDA filed another Cease and Desist Order that month, and in September went so far as to prohibit entry of all garbage dump trucks into Tala Estate. In September of 1992, The City Government of Caloocan filed a petition seeking to be declared the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. This order would render any LLDA Cease and Desist Orders against the City Government of Caloocan null and void. The trial court and the Court of Appeal granted the City Government of Caloocan this order and ruled that the Lake Laguna Development Authority had no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage. The LLDA appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan.
HELD: Yes. The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR. A Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the EMB of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of re-opening the open dumpsite.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY GR No. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
Facts: Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others: (1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152); (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); (4) The Water Code (PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856); (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); (8) Executive Order No. 192; (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and (12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
ISSUES: a) WON pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. b) WON the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
Held: The Court ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay. Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities. Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste. Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances. Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay. Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes. Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals. Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay. Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment. Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
The cleaning of Manila Bay is a ministerial act. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.
PHILIPPINE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1999 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8749
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS. NHA G.R. NO. 164527
FACTS: Solicitor General Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directy, among other things, access to all documents and information relating to the Smokey Montain Development and Reclamation Project including its underlying Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government body, and the R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI).
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
The SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES: 1. WON neither respondent NHA nor respondent R-II Builders may validly reclaim foreshore and submerged land. 2. WON respondent R-II Builders cannot acquire the reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas. 3. WON the Clean Air Act struck down the Phase-II of the Project.
HELD: 1. Yes, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
2. No, R-II Builders cannot acquire the land. When the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
3. The court find that the March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI and the SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent amendments to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed in relation to it, including, but not limited to, the September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as well as all other transactions which emanated from the Project, have been shown to be valid, legal, and constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean Air Act.
GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA (GMMSWMC VS JANCOM) G.R. No. 163663 June 30, 2006
FACTS: President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202 creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to- energy projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which subsequently entered into a partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name Jancom Environmental Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste Disposal Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract was submitted for approval to President Ramos who subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees.
JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending the approval by the President.
JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the parties. JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was challenged by GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE: WON contract is ineffective and unimplentable until and unless it is approved by the President
HELD: The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity. In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President.
SALALIMA vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SSS G.R. NO. 146360 MAY 20, 2004
FACTS: Juancho Salalima, was employed for twenty-nine years as a route helper and subsequently as route salesman for the Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Incorporated. He was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis and later lung cancer. Consequently, he underwent chemotherapy. Later, he was found to be suffering from pneumonia. He died on February 16, 1995 due to lung cancer. A claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife, Azucena Salalima, with the Social Security System (SSS). SSS denied the petition on the ground that lung cancer had no causal relationship with Juanchos job as a route salesman. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the decision of the SSS. Salalima elevated the case to the CA arguing that Juanchos route as a salesman exposed him to all kinds of pollutants, not to mention the daily hazards and fatigue that came with his tasks. She pointed out that the SSS and the ECC disregarded Juanchos medical history and the fact that the risk of contracting Juanchos ailment was increased by the nature of his work. Salalima cited the raison dtre for the passage of RA 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act. Petitioner stated that the Act provides for a comprehensive pollution control policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven deleterious effect on the health of individuals. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the ECC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to death benefits under PD 626 as amended.
HELD: According to medical experts, Adenocarcinoma of the lungs is one of the four major histologic varieties of bronchogenic carcinoma. Medical books list the etiology of lung cancers as follows: cigarette smoking, occupational exposure, air pollution, and other factors such as preexisting lung damage and genetic influences. In light of Juanchos continued exposure to detrimental work environment and constant fatigue, the possibility that Juanchos Adenocarcinoma of the lungs developed from the worsening of his pulmonary tuberculosis is not remote. The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. In Juanchos case, we believe that this probability exists. Juanchos job required long hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales calls. The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer of the lungs. The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Social Security System is ordered to pay petitioner Azucena Salalimas claim for death benefits under the Employees Compensation Act.
SJS V ATIENZA G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex. But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which only scaled down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003. Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.
ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and 2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
HELD: Yes to both, Petition granted
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances. On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
HILARION HENARES VS. LTFRB AND DOTC G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
FACTS: Petitioners challenge this court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB (Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board) and DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communication) to require public utility vehicles to use Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as alternative. Petitioners alleged that the particulate matters-Complex mixture of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and composition emitted into air from various engine combustions- have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners also allege that the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major source of harmful emissions and that an increasing number of victims of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD) was due to the emissions of PUVs. Petitioners upholds the decision from Oposa vs. Factoran , Sec. 16 of Art. II of 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 8749 otherwise known as Philippine air act of 1999. Solicitor General (SG) sought that the petition to issue a merit of mandamus be dismissed, alleging that mandamus is only available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Hence, reiterates by SG that LTFRB and DOTC are not in the position to compel PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. The SG explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in R.A. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as an alternative fuel.
ISSUES: 1. WON the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative fuel or requiring the PUVs to use CNG? 2. WON the respondent can be compelled to require PUVs to use CNG through a writ of mandamus?
HELD: The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for PUVs. The SC agrees with the findings of SG. Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
The Sovereignty of the Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters
LEASE BASIC RENTAL AGREEMENT or RESIDENTIAL LEASE This Rental Agreement or Residential Lease Shall Evidence the Complete Terms and Conditions Under Which the Parties Whose Signatures Appear Below Have Agreed