Romae omnia venalia esse.

Sallust's Development of a Thesis and the Prehistory of the

Jugurthine War
Author(s): Victor L. Parker
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 53, H. 4 (2004), pp. 408-423
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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ROMAE OMNIA VENALIA ESSE.
Sallust's Development of a Thesis and the Prehistory of the Jugurthine War*
For most of the material covered in Sallust's Bellum Iugurthinum' we have no
real
independent
control2
-
unlike the Coniuratio Catilinae, for which we do
have Cicero's speeches. With regard to that sordid episode of Roman history
Cicero and Sallust provide useful checks upon each other. For the Romans' war
upon Jugurtha we have nothing comparable as Livy's history survives only in the
form of the miserable periocha,3 while Diodorus (who copied out Poseidonius),
Cassius Dio, and Appian have but for a few fragments perished for the period in
question. Incidental snatches of information come from Cicero and others, but
nowhere do we find any detailed narrative. This is insofar unfortunate as the
conquest of Numidia does represent an important step in the expansion of Roman
*
For their comments on this paper I thank Prof. Fritz Gschnitzer and Dr. Wolfgang Blosel.
Simple numbers in both text and notes refer to the chapters of the Bellum lugurthinum.
I I have greatly profitted from the magisterial philological commentary of E. Koestermann,
Heidelberg 1971. In many cases his comments lie at the base of my translations and
paraphrases. - The most readable account of the period of history at issue here remains in
my opinion S. Gsell, Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord 7, Paris 1928. An exemplary
precis: M. Radnoti-Alfoldi, "Die Geschichte des numidischen Konigreiches und seiner
Nachfolger," in: Die Numider, Bonn 1979, 43-74.
2 As an elementary precaution, therefore, one should not write out Sallust's account as the
gospel truth (as does e.g. W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford
1979, 249-251, in an otherwise excellent work). On the other hand, it is not enough to
point out the tendentiousness of Sallust's constructions and on the basis of "Sachkritik" to
reconstruct the "real" situation (as does e.g. G. de Sanctis in his admittedly important
essay "Sallustio e la guerra di Giugurta," in: Problemi di storica antica, Bari 1932, 187-
214). The same, I feel, applies to another excellently argued article, this time by K. von
Fritz, "Sallust und das Verhalten der romischen Nobilitat zur Zeit der Kriege gegen
Jugurtha (112-105 v. Chr.)," in: V. Poschl (ed.), Sallust = Wege der Forschung 94,
Darmstadt 1970, 155-205 (first published as "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman
Nobility at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha," TAPA 74 [19431 143-168; as the later
translation [in the main presumably re-translation] is by the author himself, I cite accord-
ing to the German version). Too often von Fritz plays off details within Sallust against
each other, chooses which he prefers on the basis of "Sachkritik" and deftly reconstructs
the "real" version.
3 In the main the relevant sections of the epitome of Florus, Orosius' Aduersum paganos,
and Eutropius' Breuiarum are based on Livy. Owing to the brevity both of these and of
the Periocha we cannot judge the question of Sallust's possible influence on them,
whether direct or indirect. Their differing in some details from Sallust does not preclude
his influence in others. Cf. note 41.
Historia, Band LIII/4 (2004)
? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
Romae omnia uenalia esse 409
power. In addition to events in Numidia itself, Sallust in this work also provides
us with much information on politics in Rome during the critical years of Marius'
rise to power, information elsewhere unattested. Any historical assessment of this
period rests then squarely on an attempt to interpret Sallustium e Sallustio. This
first essay - of several the author hopes to set forth - proposes to undertake this
with regard to selected episodes from the first third of the Bellum lugurthinum.
1. The first Roman division of the Numidian Kingdom
We begin by examining the chain of events which leads to the division of the
Numidian Kingdom (16,5) into two halves between Jugurtha and Adherbal. The
background information which the reader along the way has received from
Sallust includes the following: Jugurtha, a member of the Numidian royal
family and a good soldier, has acquitted himself well under Scipio at Numantia
(7,4-7); unfortunately, Jugurtha has also fallen under the influence of unscrupu-
lous Romans there who have informed him that in Rome everything is for sale
(8,2). Since Sallust recurs again and again to this theme (Romae omnia uenalia
esse), we should note that its occurrence at this early stage hardly seems
coincidence - Sallust wants to put this flea into the reader's ear just as much as
he wants the reader to appreciate that unscrupulous Romans had put that same
flea into Jugurtha's ear right at the beginning of the latter's contact with them.
Now Jugurtha, because he outshines Hiempsal and Adherbal, the two legitimate
heirs to the Kingdom, has often aroused King Micipsa's4 distrust (6,2)
-
in fact,
Micipsa has sent Jugurtha to Numantia in the hope that he will there meet his
death Uriah-fashion in the fighting (7,2). However, when Jugurtha comes home
with Scipio's commendation (9,2), Micipsa changes tack and seeks to win
Jugurtha
over
by
favours and
flattery (9,3)
-
i.e. he
adopts Jugurtha
as his son5;
4 Micipsa to some extent is known from one of his own inscriptions (K[anaanaische und]
A[ramaischel
I[nschriften] 101) and from his epitaph (KAI 161). According to Appian,
Libyca, 106 (following Polybius; cf. Zonaras, IX 27) the rule of Numidia, on King
Massinissa's death, had first been divided amongst Micipsa and his brothers Mastanabal
and Gulussa. KAI 101 shows that by his tenth regnal year Micipsa was ruling alone. This
confirms the implication of Sallust's statement at 5,6. Micipsa's support of Roman
military undertakings is well-attested outside of Sallust: Appian, Libyca, 107; Iberica, 67;
89 (cf. Velleius Paterculus, 11 9); Plutarch, C. Gracchus, 2. Strabo, XVII 3,13, p. 831, and
Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 35, attest to Micipsa's interest in Hellenic culture. For his
relations with his sons and nephews we have no evidence other than Sallust.
5 The adoption appears also in Livy, Periocha, 62; Florus, I 36,3; and Orosius, Aduersum
paganos, V 15,3. Eutropius, IV 26,1, calls Hiempsal and Adherbal Jugurtha's "brothers"
without specifying "by adoption." The chronological mistake bound up with the adoption
is of no interest here - see G.M. Paul, A Historical Commentary on the Jugurthine War =
Arca 13, Liverpool 1984, 40-43.
410 VICTOR L. PARKER
on his deathbed King Micipsa exhorts his two sons and Jugurtha to keep the
Kingdom united (10).
Since we have no control over any of this information, let us simply take it
for granted - as indeed any reader coming to Sallust, whether ancient or
modern, would almost certainly have to do. This is what Sallust wants us to
know. Let us now follow closely Sallust's narration of the civil war which
breaks out shortly after Micipsa's death. In chapter 11 Micipsa's three heirs fall
out with one another. They soon decide to divide the Kingdom and treasure
amongst themselves (12,2).6 Only Jugurtha soon has Hiempsal murdered (12,3-
6).7 Thereupon the Numidians split into two factions - one supports Jugurtha,
the other Adherbal. Jugurtha defeats Adherbal easily enough, and Adherbal
flees to the province of Africa and thence to Rome.8 Although Jugurtha is now
master of all Numidia (omnis Numidiae potiebatur), he suddenly begins to fear
the consequences of what he has done. He sends his agents to Rome to counter
Adherbal's representations to Roman officialdom. Laden with silver and gold,
Jugurtha's agents proceed to dole out bribes with an open hand to various
senators and magistrates (13). Adherbal holds a speech before the senate, full of
pathos; all persecuted innocence and justice ( 14). Jugurtha's agents on the other
hand say very little, relying instead on their bribes (15). Much of the senate,
well-bribed, mocks Adherbal's words and praises Jugurtha (senatus magna
pars gratia deprauata Adherbalis dicta contemnere, Iugurthae uirtutem extol-
lere laudibus). Only a handful prefer justice to money. Naturally, they make up
a distinct minority, and the other side prevails (uicit tamen in senatu pars illa,
quae uero pretium aut gratiam anteferebat). So an embassy of ten is sent to
Numidia to divide it between Jugurtha and Adherbal (16,1-2); Lucius Opimius,9
6 This division amongst three rulers had precedent in Numidia (see n. 4), though we cannot
begin to answer the question as to what was customary for the succession in Numidia as
we have too few examples to judge from. For discussion see e.g. C. Saumagne, La
Numidie et Rome, Paris 1966, 99-117.
7 Jugurtha's killing of Hiempsal appears in Livy, Perioc ha, 62; Orosius, Aduersum paga-
nos, V 15,3; and Florus, I 36,4 whereby Livy speaks not of an assassination (as does
Sallust), but of an open battle.
8 The flight to Rome is mentioned by Florus, 1 36,4; Orosius, Aduersum paganos, V 15,3
speaks merely of an expulsion from Africa; Livy, Perioc ha, 62, only from Numidia.
9 Opimius' (even by the best accounts) bloody suppression of the supporters of C. Sempro-
nius Gracchus is well-attested in the sources, not so, however, a susceptibility to bribes,
which, frankly, seems out of character for someone who so single-mindedly and ruthless-
ly followed policies which he felt best served the interests of the state. Cicero was no
extremist, yet defended Opimius as praeclare uir de re public a meritus and seruator rei
publicae who domestico bello rem publicam liberarat (Pro Sextio, 140; Pro Planco, 69
and 70 respectively); cf. Pro Planco, 88, where Cicero places Opimius on the same level
as C. Marius in terms of fortes consules. This at least shows that we must take Sallust's
apodictic characterisations of his actors cum grano salis. Opimius was amongst those
convicted under the lex Mamilia (Cicero, Brutus, 128) - see below n. 47.
Romae omnia uenalia esse 411
its leader, quickly succumbs to Jugurtha's bribes; so do most of the remaining
nine (16,3-4). So when the embassy makes its division, naturally enough
Jugurtha receives that part - bordering Mauretania in the West - which is richer
in land and in people (agro uirisque opulentior). To Adherbal, however, that
part is given which is worth more in appearance than in actual use, having more
ports and being rather more decked out with buildings (16,5).10
On the surface, everything seems in order and rigorously logical. Micipsa
has always feared what Jugurtha might do to Hiempsal and Adherbal
-
on
Micipsa's death Jugurtha shortly has Hiempsal done away with and attacks
Adherbal. Jugurtha, whom we have seen as an excellent soldier at Numantia,
does defeat the inexperienced Adherbal in combat. Since Jugurtha has learnt at
Numantia that at Rome all is for sale, he naturally resorts to bribing senators
when Adherbal takes his case to Rome. We then see that Roman senators can be
bought, for Sallust tells us that the senators who preferred money to truth
carried the day. And when the commission arrives to divide up Numidia,
Jugurtha just buys the commissioners and ends up with the richer part.' 1
In contrast to almost everything which Sallust has told us, this very last
detail we can check: we can independently control the topography of Numidia.
Sallust has in fact told a blatant untruth when he says that Jugurtha received the
better portion.12 In fact Jugurtha received the more arid, less prosperous, less
populated regions, while Adherbal took possession of the far more fertile,
productive, and populous regions in the East. If Jugurtha did bribe Opimius and
the other commissioners, he certainly failed to get his money's worth. Either
Jugurtha did not bribe Opimius or Opimius was not for sale. For that matter, we
must ask ourselves, why was a commission even sent to Numidia to divide it
10 Florus, I 36,4 refers only to a division; Livy, Periocha, 62, phrases it that "Adherbal was
reinstated by the Senate" and mentions no division.
11 As K. Vretska, Studien zu Sallusts Bellum lugurthinum
=
SOAW 229,4 (1955) 40, notes,
"es wuirde die Geschlossenheit des bisherigen Aufbaus empfindlich storen, wenn nun
nicht bei der Teilung Numidiens der Vorteil Jugurthas gewahrt wurde, die Teilung wurde
ihren Sinn geradezu verlieren."
12 Many have pointed this out: from e.g. Gsell (n. 1) 146 to e.g. Paul (n. 5) 70-71. W.
Steidle, Sallusts historische Monographien
=
Historia Einzelschriften 3, Stuttgart 1958,
40, n. 2, attempts to justify Sallust's verdict. As indicated in the previous note, Sallust
must claim that Jugurtha got the better part thanks to his bribes. As de Sanctis (n. 2) 201
has put it: "Non c'e nessun dubbio che se egli [the Roman
delegation] avesse assegnato a
Giugurta la parte delle Numidia vicina alla provincia di Africa e ad Aderbale quella piui
lontana, Sallustio avrebbe detto egualmente che egli s'era lasciato corrompere. Aderbale
segregato dalla provincia sarebbe stato facile vittima dell'avversario senza che per la
distanza e la barbarie del sito i Romani potessero esserne informati se non troppo tardi, e
i commercianti italici di Cirta sarebbero stati consegnati ai barbari, e la parte piii ricca e
piu civile della Numidia sarebbe data (perche, se non perche egli aveva i mezzi di
corrompere?) all'avversario di Roma."
412 VICTOR L. PARKER
into two parts? Sallust has told us that Jugurtha has defeated Adherbal in battle;
Adherbal has fled the country; and Jugurtha is now master of all Numidia. If
Jugurtha did send his agents to Rome to buy the senate, they either failed
miserably; or again the senate was not for sale. If Jugurtha really had made
himself undisputed master of Numidia and had bought the senate, then surely
all the senate would have done was to confirm the status quo. Instead the senate
sends out a commission to divide Numidia between the two claimants of the
throne; and that commission even saddles Jugurtha with the worse half.
Sallust's account, divided against itself, cannot stand. Yet need we dispense
with all of it? Sallust tells us that ten commissioners were sent to Numidia; and
he tells us that Jugurtha received as his half territory which we can objectively
determine as the worse part of Numidia. These two details contradict the rest of
Sallust's narration - in particular they allow us to see that something is wrong
with the general account; because they show clearly that neither the Senate nor
the Commission was in Jugurtha's pocket. Yet this especially Sallust is trying
to make us believe. Already in 8,1 he has told us Romae omnia uenalia esse. 13
He will tell us this again and again throughout this section of the work (20,1;
28,1; 31,25; 35,10). Why then does Sallust include in his argumentation two
details which give the lie to his thesis in this particular case? We can hardly
avoid the answer that he included them because they really did happen and
because his immediate readers might ascertain these two facts for themselves.
We have in actuality traced a simple rhetorical trick for dealing with
inconvenient facts. The author suggests to the reader a thesis first (Romae
omnia uenalia esse) and only then proceeds to give the reader the details of a
"test case." The reader naturally enough views the "test case" through the lens
of the thesis already insinuated. The inconvenient fact is then presented and
interpreted so that it fits the thesis (in this case: Jugurtha gets the western half of
Numidia; the western half is the richer). If the reader cannot check it for himself
-
which part of Numidia is richer -, so much the better. If the reader does know
a little bit about Numidia and assumes that the eastern part was richer, then
Sallust tells him that this may have been true, but only with regard to appear-
ance rather than actual practice (specie quam usu). Let us recall that Sallust was
writing as the former Governor of Africa Nova,14 the province which the old
Numidian Kingdom would eventually become when incorporated into the
Roman Empire. Surely he could deliver such an opinion
ex cathedra and have it
stand unchallenged?
15
13 On the literary purpose of placing this statement here see e.g. E. Koestermann (n. 1) 51
and K. Vretska (n. I1) 26-27.
14 On Sallust's career see Sir Ronald Syme, Sallust, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1964, 29-42.
15 We may as well note here that Sallust often displays a shocking ignorance of the
topography of Numidia. The siege of Cirta (see n. 18) represents an important case.
Romae omnia uenalia esse 413
II. The diplomatic negotiations concerning the siege of Cirta
We proceed to the diplomatic negotiations to which Sallust introduces us on the
occasion of the siege of Cirta: Jugurtha has attacked the hapless Adherbal16
(whom only the quick thinking of Italian traders in Cirta has saved) and trapped
him in that city (21,1-2).17 When the Senate learns of this, it sends three young
men (tres adulescentes) to speak with both kings. Jugurtha appeases the youths
with words, sees them off, and then begins to besiege Cirta (21,3-23,1).18
Thence Adherbal sends a pathetic letter to the Roman senate (24).19 Jugurtha's
partisans at Rome immediately spring into action and, as is customary, private
interest defeats the public good (ita bonum publicum, uti in plerisque negotiis
solet, priuata gratia deuictum). (Again, this is what Sallust wants us to believe
and has led us to expect will happen.) All the same (tamen), another embassy is
sent. This time it consists of maiores natu nobiles (in direct contrast to the tres
adulescentes of the previous mission).20 We are thereby led into first assuming
that this time the Senate does mean Jugurtha to take it seriously. Sallust then
raises the stakes yet further - the nobiles are amplis honoribus usi - and then
adds the piece de re'sistance: in quis fuit M. [Aemilius] Scaurus, the princeps
16 Livy, Periocha, 64, also has Adherbal attacked by Jugurtha; Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV
31, however, writes
xapataIagvov
6XXiXot TC;rV ,BaotX&ov, "when the Kings drew up
battle-lines against each other." The fragmentary nature of Diodorus' account, however,
forbids concluding that Poseidonius did not depict the war between Jugurtha and Adherb-
al as an attack by the former against the latter.
17 Adherbal's entrapment in Cirta is confirmed by Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, and also
appears in Livy, Periocha, 64. Strabo, XVII 3,12, p. 831, places it (by accident) in Utica
instead.
18 In 21 Sallust casually tells us that haud longe a mari prope Cirtam oppidum. The
information is
totally irrelevant to the context
-
Cirta's
propinquity
or otherwise to the
sea has no bearing whatsoever on what follows. That said, Cirta lies some forty miles
from the sea as the crow flies; and rather more if one follows the windings of the River
Ampsaga through the hilly country which separates Cirta from the Sea. Nor does Sallust
have any real appreciation of the position of Cirta on a 650 foot high cliff surrounded on
three sides by a bend of the Ampsaga (see e.g. the picture on p. XVI of Die Numider [n.
1]). The narrowness of the approach to the city gives the lie to Sallust's entire narrative of
Jugurtha's alleged siege. As the commentators point out, Caesar had handed over this
particular city to P. Sittius (Appian, Bellum ciuile, IV 54) when Sallust became Governor
of Africa Nova, so Sallust does have an excuse for never having seen it. We must however
go one step farther: Sallust's never having seen this city did not prevent him from writing
up a conventional siege narrative. A priori then we cannot necessarily accept as accurate
any battle description of Sallust's without substantiating argumentation. Nor can we
accept any geographical statement of Sallust's at face value: we must check every single
one.
-
On the problems surrounding Cirta see Paul (n. 5) pp. 80-81 with literature.
19 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, confirms that Adherbal sent envoys to Rome.
20 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, also refers to two embassies, the second having
d4icoga
Ait
ov.
414 VICTOR L. PARKER
senatus.21 Sallust has told us that private interest has won again, but then we see
the Senate throwing all its authority into the balance it would appear against
Jugurtha. Soon however we see behind the
faqade:
Sallust reminds us of what
sort a person M. Aemilius Scaurus really is (de quo supra memorauimus). At
the indicated passage (15,4) Sallust has told us that Scaurus is energetic;
partisan; and greedy for power, office, and riches; but nonetheless knows well
to hide his vices.22 That description Sallust now recalls to our minds when
mentioning Scaurus' presence on the embassy. We immediately suspect that
behind the grand show and accumulated honours foul intentions are being
hidden
-
in other words, Sallust has puffed the embassy up, only to deflate it.23
Now we see how it is that private greed is winning. The embassy then sets sail
for Africa within three days (25,5); but instead of commenting on its haste,
Sallust tells us that the ambassadors left so soon because the affair was arousing
outrage and the Numidians kept urging them on. Naturally, the embassy has no
effect on Jugurtha - exactly what we expect.
We have traced the development of the story and have carefully noted how
Sallust's narration continually suggests interpretations to us or even forces them
upon us before the story is told: e.g. we hear that private greed has won before
Sallust even tells us what happened. We have that flea in our ear as we read the
description of the second embassy
-
wondering how private greed has won/will
win; then Scaurus' name drops, the cross-reference falls, and we understand.
Let us now strip away from this passage every Sallustian interpretative
comment and rhetorical trick and let stand only the bare facts as Sallust tells
them. Upon first hearing of the situation in Numidia:
1.) a minor delegation is sent to Numidia to no effect;
2.) more disturbing news arrives from Numidia;
3.) the princeps senatus heads a second delegation;
4.) the delegation leaves on the third day after its constitution.
Having abstracted those four facts, we might incline to conclusions completely
different from Sallust's, uidelicet, that the Senate was responding quickly,
2 1 On the rhetorical effect of ever raising the stakes see Koestermann (n. 1 ) 1 10.
22 Cicero on the other hand held generally favourable views on Scaurus (e.g. princeps et
senatus et ciuitatis or pater tuus [= Scaurusi ... qui a C. Graccho usque ad Q. Varium
seditiosis omnibus restitit, quem numquam ulla uis, ullae minae. ulla inuidia labefecit -
Pro Sextio, 39 and 101 respectively). Scaurus is, however, even outside of Sallust,
accused of improperly enriching himself: Cicero, De oratore, II 283 (acquisition of a
wealthy man's property without testament upon the latter's decease - though this accusa-
tion is actually made by none other than C. Memmius - see below n. 29 - when Scaurus
defended Calpurnius Bestia against Memmius) and Pliny, Naturalis historia, XXXVI 1 16
(helping himself to goods plundered by Marian partisans in the provinces). Of course,
none of this need even imply susceptibility to bribes.
23 This point none of the commentators whom I have been able to check has appreciated.
Romae omnia uenalia esse 415
frequently, and with increasing alarm at the developing situation; and certainly
the second embassy went beyond any token gesture. The senate was in deadly
earnest.
That any unbiassed person would draw only that conclusion from those
bare facts emerges from the elaborate precautions which Sallust takes to make
sure no reader will draw them. The first delegation of the unnamed "three
youths" is easily enough dismissed. But with the second, Sallust must contrive
to undermine our confidence in it. Again, the facts Sallust mentions fly in the
face of his interpretation; and Sallust has taken great care in how he introduces
them, so that we get the "right" impression of them. Surely, then, we can accept
the basic facts; we will, however, again have to draw the exact opposite
conclusion to the one Sallust wishes to foist on us.24
III. Preparations for war at Rome
On to the aftermath of the embassy's activity in Numidia: According to Sallust
a meeting between the embassy and Jugurtha does take place, but it accomplish-
es nothing. The embassy returns to Rome (25). Meanwhile, in Numidia Jugurtha
finally gets his hands on Adherbal. Sallust gives us an explanation - the Italians
in Cirta persuaded Adherbal to surrender in reliance on the respect in which
Rome was held -, but we can probably disregard this completely for several
reasons: the other accounts of Adherbal's surrender make no mention of it25;
Sallust could not possibly have any genuine information on what motivated
Adherbal to hand himself over to Jugurtha; and, finally, the explanation given
fits too neatly with Sallust's melodramatic casting of Adherbal as someone
doomed to being constantly let down by the Roman Senate.26 One may as well
suggest that if the Italian traders did hand Adherbal over to Jugurtha, they did so
because the civil strife detracted from business and they saw little advantage in
protecting Adherbal from the more powerful Jugurtha. Whatever they may have
thought, Jugurtha had them killed too (26).27
24 D.C. Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," Latomus 24 (1965) 532-536, has
discussed these negotiations (which he views to be traditional policy) and has emphasised
Sallust's extreme bias against leading "anti-Gracchan" politicians involved in them.
25 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31 (with a far more dramatic story of Adherbal's surrender);
Strabo, XVII 3,12, p. 831.
26 The first time: 14-16; the second: 24-25. Steidle (n. 12) 54, n. 6 fails to appreciate how
much of Sallust's work is literary construction: "Sallust ist nun einmal kein Dichter,
sondern Historiker; als solcher muf er analysiert und gewertet werden." These are
modem words with modem meanings attached which for us differentiate "Dichtung"
from "Geschichte."
27 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, confirms the slaying of the Italians.
416 VICTOR L. PARKER
In Rome, however, the Senate was laying the groundwork for a war in
Numidia.28 We skip ahead to the fact with which Sallust at the end of the next
chapter (27) makes us acquainted: in accordance with the lex Sempronia the
Senate arranges which provincial commands the incoming consuls will receive
after their term in office, in this case Numidia and Italy. Now an unbiassed
reader might wish to connect this with the report which the returning embassy
must at some point have made. Lest we come to such thoughts, Sallust, first,
omits any mention of the embassy's report. Instead he refers to Jugurtha's
agents' springing into action yet again. If we have been faithfully following
Sallust's interpretation of events in his narrative, we now have to expect that
once again private greed will triumph. Sallust, however, again has an inconven-
ient fact to deal with: he knows that the Senate will take an action that shows it
is about to undertake war. That step is somewhat too drastic for him to obfus-
cate or to undermine with the means he has previously used. The venal Senate
cannot
-
on the basis of everything Sallust has led us to believe - of its own
accord prepare war against Jugurtha. So Sallust brings someone else onto the
stage, the in-coming tribunus plebis C. Memmius.29 The Senate would yet
again have given way to Jugurtha's agents, had not Memmius held a series of
spirited speeches before the Roman people, the fear of which forced the Senate
to determine Numidia as one of the provincial commands. Again, we are
dealing with a simple dramatic trick: what we expect (the embassy's report)
fails to materialise, instead someone new and unexpected enters from stage left;
we focus on him and forget what we just had in mind.
Now Sallust is aware that readers will be surprised by the Senate's actions
which directly contradict his thesis - those actions again we may accept as
28 Sallust, incidentally, omits to mention the actual declaration of war: Livy, Periocha, 64,
just mentions it; Orosius, Aduersum paganos, V 15,1 and Valerius Maximus, VII 5,2, date
it to Ill. On the legal principles involved at this time see S.I. Oost, "The Fetial Law and
the Outbreak of the Jugurthine War," AJP 75 (1954) 147-159.
29 We know very little about Memmius' politics besides what Sallust tells us. In Cicero's
opinion (Brutus, 136) he was an aggressive prosecutor, but a mediocre speaker (differing
starkly from Sallust's judgement: Memmifacundia clara pollensque). Cicero does tell us
that Memmius at some point prosecuted the first Roman commander in the Jugurthine
War, L. Capurnius Bestia, whom M. Aemilius Scaurus defended (de Oratore, II 283), so
we can at least confirmn that Memmius was a political enemy of some of the nobiles
involved in Numidian affairs. According to Cicero, Pro Fonteio, 24 (cf. Valerius Max-
imus, VIII 5,2) Scaurus testified against Memmius when the latter was accused of
extortion (presumably after his praetorship which, at the latest, fell into the year 102 as
Memmius was a candidate for the consulship in 100 when Saturninus had him killed
(Cicero, In Catilinam IV 4; Livy, Periocha, 69; Florus, Epitoma, II 4,4; Orosius, V 17,5;
Appian, 1 142-143). - I will simply render my opinion that Memmius' interventions in
the Bellum lugurthinum are almost entirely literary constructs designed by Sallust for
argumentative purposes.
Romae omnia uenalia esse 417
historical. For despite the elaborate care taken to displace the credit for this
action from the Senate to C. Memmius, Sallust still feels he must do something
to settle the reader's awakened suspicions that perhaps all was not for sale at
Rome. We read (28,1):
At Jugurtha contra spem nuntio accepto, quippe quoi Romae omnia uenire
in animo haeserat, filium et cum eo duos familiaris ad senatum legatos
mittit iisque uti illis, quos Hiempsale interfecto miserat, praecipit, omnis
mortalis pecunia adgrediantur.
"But when Jugurtha received this news, contrary to his expectation [and the
reader's!], since it had stuck in his [and the reader's!] mind that everything
at Rome was for sale, he dispatched his son and with him two close
associates to the Senate as ambassadors. He enjoined them, as he had those
whom he had sent after the death of Hiempsal, to make an attempt on every
soul with money."
Yet even this attempt fails when the Senate refuses even to hear the embassy.
Jugurtha and the reader are by now scratching their heads: why this time is the
Senate incorruptible?30 Sallust does not bring Memmius into play; but perhaps
we are to remember his influence on affairs? At any rate, at the beginning of
28,4 the "truth" as Sallust gives us to see the "truth" suddenly dawns on us:
Interim Calpurnius3l parato exercitu legat sibi homines nobilis factiosos,
quorum auctoritate quae deliquisset munita fore sperabat. In quis fuit
Scaurus, quoius de natura et habitu supra memorauimus.
"In the meantime [L.] Calpurnius [Bestia], having outfitted an arny, chose
as his officers partisan nobles with whose reputation he was hoping to cover
up his misdeeds. Among them was [M. Aemilius] Scaurus, concerning
whose character and bearing I have spoken above."
Now the reader grasps the situation. Once again, all has been for show. The
rhetorical trick is the same as in the account of Scaurus' mission. Forced into
action, the venal nobles only pretend to do the right thing, for behind the scenes
they prepare to sell Rome again. Calpurnius appoints as officers nobles behind
whose reputation he can hide; amongst them is Scaurus of whom we know that
he understands to conceal his vices (and once again Sallust will not omit the
cross-reference in case we have forgotten).32 It comes then as no surprise that
30 Vretska (n. 1 1) 48, rightly summarises this interpretation with the rhetorical question,
"Hat sich Rom gewandelt?"
31 Calpurnius Bestia is the first commander in the so-called "Livian" tradition also: Livy,
Periocha, 64; Orosius, V 15,4; Florus, I 36,7; Eutropius, IV 26,1.
32 We have already seen Sallust use this trick (above to nn. 21-24). We should now note that
at 15,4 Sallust, on introducing Scaurus, tells us that Scaurus publicly opposed Jugurtha's
418 VICTOR L. PARKER
Jugurtha, as soon as a Roman army arrives in Numidia, once again resorts to
bribery; that in short order Calpumius and then Scaurus succumb to the lavish
bribes (29,1-2)33; and that Jugurtha again assumes that he will be able to effect
some arrangement at Rome through bribes or favours (existumans sese aliquid
interim Romae pretio aut gratia
effecturum).
And sure enough Sallust soon
shows us the war in Numidia grinding to a halt (29,3-7). That practical reasons
and other considerations may have dictated the halt, Sallust will not even deign
to consider.34
IV. Jugurtha at Rome: the urbs uenalis35
Sallust has now almost finished preparing us for the great culminating scene,
the depiction of the urbs uenalis. Jugurtha, having by means of bribery achieved
a delay in the war and thereafter favourable conditions of peace from Bestia,
offers deditio (formal unconditional surrender)36 and has it accepted (in dedi-
tionem accipitur). Peace breaks out in Numidia (29).37 Shortly thereafter Jugur-
designs in Numidia when Jugurtha became master of Numidia for the first time. Sallust's
explanation of Scaurus' public (and known) behaviour turns on Scaurus' private (and
hidden) vices. In other words, Sallust simply interprets a known fact so that it conforms to
his thesis (another trick that we have already seen - above to nn. 12-14).
33 It must be admitted that much of the "Livian" tradition accuses Calpurnius of having
accepted bribes as well: Orosius, V 15,4; Eutropius, IV 26,1; Florus, I 36,7. We cannot
judge whether this be due to Sallustian influence on Livy. Certainly, Bestia's known
conviction under the lex Mamilia may have played a r6le as well (Cicero, Brutus, 128 -
see below n. 47). Plutarch, Marius, 9,3, on the other hand, lets Marius speak only of
Bestia's inexperience and unwarlike nature. The Greek Plutarch is far less likely than the
Roman historians to have bent to Sallust's influence and far more likely than they to have
followed Poseidonius (whom he cites at Marius 1,2 and 45,3 = FGrHist 87, Frr. 60 and 37
respectively). If this be so, then Plutarch represents an entirely independent tradition, one
which had no recourse to explaining Bestia's performance in other than military terms.
34 Simply put, Bestia and Scaurus may have preferred "peace with honour" (cf. de Sanctis,
p. 206) to a long, costly, and draining guerilla war (which in the end Metellus and Marius
did have to wage). But we have no way of reconstructing what really happened. On the
topographical difficulties of fighting in Numidia see e.g. Paul (n. 5) 94-95.
35 On the phrase urbs uenalis itself and its pejorative connotation(s) see J. Hellegouarc'h,
"Vrbem uenalem ... (Sall., (<lug.)) 35,10)," Bulletin Bude 1990, 163-174.
36 On deditio see now D. Norr, Aspekte des romischen Volkerrec hts = ABAW 101, Munchen
1989; also E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, Oxford 1958, 4-7. For discussion with regard
to Jugurtha's specific case: von Fritz (n. 2) 174-188; Steidle (n. 12) 45-47 (against von
Fritz); H.W. Ritter, Rom und Numidien. Untersuc hungen zur rechtlichen Stellung abhan-
giger Konige, Luneburg 1987, 93-101.
37 For discussion of the phrase pax agitabatur see Paul (n. 5) 96. Orosius, Aduersum
paganos, V 15,4, speaks of "conditions of peace"; cf. Eutropius, IV 26,1.
Romae omnia uenalia esse 419
tha travels to Rome under a safe passage,38 arranged by the tribune Memmius
who wants Jugurtha to give evidence against Scaurus (32,1). Jugurtha appears
without any royal insignia and miserably dressed. He promptly proceeds to
bribe another tribune, G. Baebius,39 to ensure his safety (32,1-2). The Roman
people, incensed at Jugurtha, demand his head, and it is
only through the
energetic speech of Memmius in a contio40 that Jugurtha's safe passage remains
intact (33,3-4). But Memmius also demands that Jugurtha speak at the contio:
here the bribing of Baebius comes into play when Baebius stops Jugurtha from
speaking (34,1). Once again, then, depravity triumphed (uicit tamen impuden-
tia), Sallust says. Or did it?
We have seen Sallust play this game already on several occasions. Sallust
has stage-managed the contio so that we must assume that Jugurtha does not
wish to speak. Through his bribery, then, he avoids it. We can be fairly certain
that Sallust had no real evidence that Baebius had accepted a bribe from
Jugurtha; but Sallust can have known, since the contio was a highly public
event, that the tribunus plebis G. Baebius had silenced Jugurtha as the latter
opened his mouth. That fact allows at least one other interpretation than
Sallust's: Jugurtha attempted to speak in his own defense, but was hushed. On
the face of it, being silenced in public scarcely approximates to a pleasant affair
-
surely, if Jugurtha had been bribing tribunes, he might have gotten a little
more for his money.
But let us continue. When Baebius forbids Jugurtha to speak, the latter as
well as Calpurnius and others disturbed by Memmius' investigations breathe
more easily (34,2). Then Jugurtha has a member of the Numidian royal house,
who has been living for some time as an exile in Rome, assassinated when that
member, Massiva, stakes his own claim to the throne.41 The authorities, howev-
er, apprehend the assassin; the thread leads back to one of Jugurtha's party,
Bomilcar; and a new scandal erupts (35,1-7). Considering the brevity of his
work and his tightly compressed style, Sallust spends a surprising amount of
time on this tawdry affair. On the surface he surely means us to see Jugurtha
abusing his safe conduct by committing a murder under the very nose of the
Roman people. His success at bribing everyone has encouraged him to believe
that he can truly get away with anything. Still, by now we have seen enough of
Sallust to suspect that he is quite possibly diverting our attention (perhaps from
asking questions about the affair at the contio). At any rate, for 26 lines in the
Teubner text we have a chance to be shocked at the Numidian King's effrontery
and cold-bloodedness.
38 The safe passage appears in Livy, Periocha 64, and Florus, I 36,8.
39 Otherwise unknown: for a possible identification see Paul (n. 5) 105.
40 On contiones see now F. Pina Polo, Las contiones civiles y militares en Roma, Zaragoza
1989, esp. 71 and 126 with reference to our example (nr. 202 in Pina Polo's catalogue).
41 The assassination appears in Livy, Periocha 64, and Florus, I 36,8.
420 VICTOR L. PARKER
Thereafter the pace of the narrative picks up and in just nine brief lines
(35,8-9) we learn the following: this time the outrage reaches such a pitch, that
Jugurtha cannot bribe his way free. So he sends Bomilcar back to Numidia in
secret, and leaves himself a few days later when the Senate demands his
departure.42 Then (35,10) on the return journey from Rome the Numidian King
pauses several times to look back at Rome in silence. Finally he renders his
verdict: urbem uenalem et mature perituram, si emptorem inuenerit.43
It is amazing how commentators have failed to understand how totally inapt
this sentence is at this point.44 First, Jugurtha has just been ejected from Rome
by the Senate; second, he has failed to get his way through bribery in the affair
concerning Bomilcar; third, he has aroused an enormous amount of hatred
against himself; fourth, the war against him continues. We could add that he has
been officially and publicly silenced by a tribune into the bargain. Whom has
Jugurtha bought? What has he gotten for his money? What has happened to
make him think that the city is for sale? The famous saying makes no sense at
all in its immediate context (Jugurtha's trip to Rome) if we look closely at
Sallust's arrangement of events.
It may, however, be held to work in the broader context of the first 35
chapters in which on five separate occasions Sallust has shown us how Jugurtha
got his way by bribery (15-16 [bis], 29-30 [bis], 33). By the final scene we are
meant to be so used to Jugurtha's buying senators and stacking them like
cordwood that we will probably concentrate on the lovingly detailed political
assassination rather than on the perfunctory and quick sentences which inform
us that Jugurtha's bribes did not work this time. Besides, the five previous
occasions are ringing in our ears as it is. Only, if we look closely at those five
occasions, we can see that on two of them Sallust can be shown to have falsified
events to prove his point45; on three others, as we have seen, events can
plausibly be reconstructed so that they give the lie to Sallust's views.46 This
42 Appian, Numidica, 1, also refers to Bomilcar's and Jugurtha's subsequent departure from
Rome.
43 This statement appears either in identical or in only slightly altered form in the Periocha,
64; Florus, I 36,18; Orosius, V 15,5; and Appian, Numidica, 1. It evidently rapidly
became part of the tradition of the war against Jugurtha, and may well be due to Sallust.
44 Paul (n. 5) 108 has this to say: "The famous taunt, accepted as genuine by other ancient
writers ..., is pointless if no bribery had occurred at Rome" with reference to the
arguments of Steidle (n. 12) for the historicity of Jugurtha's large-scale bribery (Paul's
reference to Steidle is not in order, by the way - he means pp. 47-51, not 51-54 which
have nothing to do with the bribery). Koestermann (n. 1) 150: "Der Abschied Jugurthas
von Rom, das er nur als dem Tode geweihter Gefangener wiedersehen sollte, ist von
Sallust mit bewundemswerter Kunst zu einem Bilde von mitreilender Gewalt gestaltet
worden."
45 5-16 (bis): see above, section 1.
46 29-30 (bis): see above, section Il; 33: see above, section III.
Romae omnia uenalia esse 421
being so, Sallust's cleverly argued thesis concerning the urbs uenalis comes
apart completely.47 Above all, we must acknowledge that Sallust is arguing a
thesis cum ira et studio.
V. Conclusion
Throughout this section we have seen, however, that certain events are clearly
historical in that Sallust expends a great deal of effort in minimising their
importance or in re-interpreting them or in explaining them away so that his
thesis may stand.48 In brief:
47 It will not do to make, as Steidle (n. 12) 47-51, does, a circumstantial case that some
Roman officers and senators may have accepted "bribes" or "gifts" from Jugurtha. (For
Roman politicians' habit of accepting gifts from client states see Badian [n. 36] 161-163;
Florus, I
36,3, for what it is worth, does refer to Numidia as a "Kingdom in the faith and
clientage of the Senate and People of Rome.") The Numidian King almost certainly
sought to gain support for his cause at Rome (as all clients who made gifts surely did; and
this alone may account for the topos of Jugurtha's bribery in the so-called "Livian"
tradition [see nn. 33 and 43]), but the hard fact is, as we have seen, that by and large
Jugurtha repeatedly failed (on Sallust's presentation of actual events) to get his way. It is
one thing for a Roman senator to accept a "gift," quite another to be corrupted by it. Nor
can one argue (as does Steidle, loc. cit.) on the basis that some of the Roman commanders
were tried (and convicted) of acting against the public interest (allegedly because of
bribes) under the lex Mamilia (Cicero, Brutus, 128, confirming Sallust, 40)
-
the history of
the Republic does not evince any lack of politically motivated prosecutions and convic-
tions. Hostility owing to perhaps only perceived mismanagement of the war will account
for both prosecution and convictions as easily as actual guilt. Nor need we have recourse
to e.g. the apologetic argument advanced by Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late
Republic, Oxford 1968, 25, that "what Sallust describes as venality was, in the main,
merely the natural unwillingness to think ill of an old friend ... we may call this
gullibility; it is at least a vice common to oligarchies ...
-
and one due to what is basically
an amiable human trait." As we have seen, the Senate can hardly be seen to be favouring
Jugurtha at any point and rather frequently renders judgements unfavourable to him.
48 Here, at the end of this essay, a word may be said about why Sallust could not just pass
over these events. Various authors (now mostly lost) had written about this period, some
of whom had been principals in the affair. M. Aemilius Scaurus
(H[istoricoruml
Rlomanorum] R[eliquiae] 1, 185-186), P. Rutilius Rufus (HRR 1, 187-190), and L.
Cornelius Sulla (HRR 1, 195-204) all composed memoirs. At least three other Roman
writers had covered the period: Sempronius Asellio (HRR 1, 178-184), Q. Claudius
Quadrigarius (HRR 1, 205-236), and Valerius Antias (HRR 1, 237-276). The Greek
continuator of Polybius, Poseidonius of Apamea, FGrHist 87, had also dealt with the
events involved. Sallust had to reckon with senatorial readers (cf. von Fritz [n. 21 188)
who knew of these works (especially those of fellow senators) and could, in case of doubt,
check. See further below note 50.
422 VICTOR L. PARKER
1.) when Rome intervened in the civil war between Jugurtha and Adherbal, it
favoured Adherbal in its division of Numidia (carried out by ten commis-
sioners sent to this end);
2.) when civil war again broke out and Jugurtha trapped Adherbal in Cirta, the
Senate sent at least two embassies to Numidia, the last headed by the
princeps senatus, M. Aemilius Scaurus;
3.) after the embassy returned to Rome, the Senate arranged for Numidia to be
one of the provincial commands for the incoming consuls and prepared for
war in Numidia;
4.) a Roman army arrived in Numidia under the command of L. Calpurnius
Bestia with M. Aemilius Scaurus as a legate;
5.) Jugurtha went to Rome under a safe passage, but was not allowed to speak
at a contio where various accusations were being made;
6.) Jugurtha left Rome and the war resumed.
Anyone writing the prehistory of the Jugurthine War on the basis of these facts
would produce an account very different from Sallust's. Instead of a senate
which favours Jugurtha, we now see a senate which continually opposes and
frustrates his intentions: it intervenes in a civil war (which it might very well
have stayed out of49) to his detriment just when he has managed to unite
Numidia under his control; when he has again united Numidia, Rome interferes
again and sends an army against him; he attempts to negotiate a settlement, but
fails; and the war continues. We cannot here and now follow other strands of
this investigation - e.g. on what practical considerations and on what legal or
ethical basis Rome wished to intervene in Numidia and what this means for our
views on Roman Imperialism. We have merely attempted to see how Sallust
arranged his arguments50 and to distil from this what facts we could. We trust
49 As we have seen (n. 5) Micipsa too brought the originally divided government of the
Kingdom again under one man's hand - yet Rome did not intervene. The Numidians had
loyally supported Rome's endeavours for a long time (see above n. 5), so Rome might just
have let Jugurtha be for the nonce until it knew him by his deeds - or did it feel it already
knew his deeds well enough?
50 It should be clear that I disagree completely with von Fritz (n. 2) 189, n. 72, who claims
(following an oral communication from E. Kapp), "daB bei einem Politiker wie Sallust die
Auslegung und Anordnung der Fakten in solcher Weise, daB der von ihm gewunschte
Eindruck erzielt werde, wahrscheinlich zum grofen Teil unbewuBt vor sich gehe." In
particular the investigations of literary scholars such as Koestermann, Vretska, or Karl
BUchner, Der Aufbau von Sallusts Bellum Jugurthinum = Historia Einzelschriften 9,
Wiesbaden 1953, have made very clear how carefully Sallust structured his work and how
little of anything in it is due to chance. One thing Steidle has seen very clearly (p. 53):
"Die modeme Forschung neigt gerade bei der Vorgeschichte des jug. Kriegs dazu, das
meiste Sallust zuzuschreiben, obwohl es doch aus der Tacitusforschung langst bekannt
ist, daB die wesentlichen Fakten bereits in der vortaciteischen Tradition feststehen und
daB dessen Leistung so gut wie ganz in der besonderen Art der Gestaltung und gedankli-
Romae omnia uenalia esse 423
that these facts will help us to construct a securer basis for the presentation of
Roman-Numidian relations in the years leading up to the outbreak of the
Jugurthine War.
University of Heidelberg -
University of Canterbury,
Christchurch, New Zealand Victor L. Parker
chen Durchdringung des Stoffes liegt." Although Steidle does not take his own point, this
summarises the situation of the Bellum lugurthinum exactly; in my view recognising this
allows us to extract some of the "wesentliche Fakten."