Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
DRAFT
August 2004
Gebreselassie Tesfamichael
Nicole Ball
Julie Nenon
1 Introduction......................................................................................................................1
2 The Operating Environment.............................................................................................2
2.1 DDR and the Root Causes of War ..........................................................................2
2.2 DDR and the Regional Dimension...........................................................................6
2.3 DDR and the Peace Process...................................................................................7
3 Evolution of the DDR Process .........................................................................................9
3.1 Before 1998.............................................................................................................9
3.2 1998–2004 ............................................................................................................10 Deleted: 9
4 The Challenge of National Ownership ...........................................................................22 Deleted: 21
4.1 Government of Sierra Leone .................................................................................22 Deleted: 21
4.2 Donors...................................................................................................................23 Deleted: 22
4.3 RUF/GOSL ............................................................................................................24 Deleted: 23
5 Core Issues ...................................................................................................................25 Deleted: 24
5.1 Institutional Framework .........................................................................................26
Deleted: 25
5.2 Process Management ...........................................................................................32
Deleted: 31
5.3 Program Design ....................................................................................................33
5.4 Program Implementation .......................................................................................53 Deleted: 32
Annex 1. Levels of Disarmament, Demobilization and Discharge by Program Phases ....88 Deleted: 84
Annex 2. Ex-Combatants Participating in Reintegration Services ....................................89 Deleted: 85
Annex 3. Target Ex-combatant Beneficiary Groups and Current Program Participation ..90 Deleted: 86
Annex 4. DDR Institutional Framework.............................................................................91 Deleted: 87
Annex 5. UNICEF Programs for Child Combatants..........................................................92 Deleted: 88
Annex 6. People Interviewed............................................................................................96 Deleted: 89
Annex 7. Documents Reviewed .....................................................................................101
Deleted: 93
Annex 8. Methodology....................................................................................................105
Deleted: 98
Annex 9. Timeline of Key DDR Related Events..............................................................109
Deleted: 102
Annex 10. Terms of Reference.........................................................................................113
Deleted: 106
Boxes
Box 1. Variable Participation in the DDR Process ..............................................................15
Box 2. NCDDR Mandate and Main Reintegration Objectives.............................................35 Deleted: 34
Box 3. Weapons Possession: Appropriate Criteria or Discriminating Factor? ....................39 Deleted: 38
Box 4. Potential Support to Ex-Combatants Undergoing DDR...........................................41 Deleted: 39
Box 6. TEP: Sierra Leone’s Approach to Reintegration......................................................57 Deleted: 55
Box 7. Capacity Constraints on Implementing Reintegration Programs .............................60 Deleted: 58
Box 8. Value of Ex-Combatant Training .............................................................................62 Deleted: 60
The Final Evaluation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 iii
Acronyms
The Final Evaluation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 iv
The Final Evaluation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Introduction
In spring 2004, Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII) was commissioned to carry out
the final evaluation of the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Program (DDRP) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund supporting the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. After a decade of war, and several failed
attempts to achieve sustainable peace, combatants from the main fighting forces, the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), were successfully disarmed, demobilized, and
reintegrated into society by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (NCDDR) and its partners. The CAII team finds that the DDR process, led by
NCDDR, achieved a high degree of success as a peace-building and conflict mitigation
mechanism. Despite a difficult working environment, the NCDDR managed to disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants to the extent that a foundation was built for a
durable peace process.
A successful DDR process, such as Sierra Leone’s, helps to create an environment in which
fundamental issues related to the root causes of conflict can be addressed. DDR processes
are not, however, intended to deal directly with issues such as long-term economic and
social rehabilitation and poverty reduction. While some 72,000 ex-combatants were
disarmed and demobilized, and 56,000 participated in NCDDR’s reintegration activities,
these former fighters now face the same problems as citizens of Sierra Leone who did not
take up arms. These problems include lack of full-time, long-term employment
opportunities, particularly for youth; a weak social and economic infrastructure; serious
questions of governmental accountability at all levels; and an uncertain regional
environment. The NCDDR managed a successful transition away from war. As a conflict
resolution mechanism, however, it was never empowered, to address the many problems
that led to the conflict in the first place.
In simple terms, the root causes of the conflict was poverty, poor governance and weak rule
of law, lack of access to services, absence of personal security, and inadequate
employment opportunities. The causes go back to the early 1970s, when then-president
Siaka Stevens gained economic and political dominance by controlling the diamond
industry, exploiting the system of patronage, destroying many political institutions, and ruling
with an autocratic approach. The 1980s were marked by a widening gap between the
political elite, who had access to diamond revenue, and the rest of the population, who
struggled to survive in a collapsed economy and under a corrupt government that provided
few basic services. Years of mismanaged resources, poverty, and corruption had a
particularly significant impact on youth, who grew increasingly frustrated by the lack of
opportunities and felt that the future held very little promise for them. This became a critical
factor in the war.
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It was against this backdrop, in the late 1980s, that Foday Sankoh went to a military training
camp in Libya, where he met Charles Taylor. The two agreed to support each other in
overthrowing their respective governments using the diamond mines in Sierra Leone to
finance their efforts. Disillusioned and unemployed youth filled the ranks of the rebel army
needed to ignite the conflict, which began in 1991.
The effort to end the civil war in Sierra Leone went through a number of stages. Starting in
1996, there was a series of efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the combatants.
The evaluation team looked at what came to be known as Phase I, Phase II, the Interim
Phase, and Phase III of these efforts (1998 – 2004). Prior to 2000–2001, DDR was
subsumed within the greater strategy of achieving a military solution to the conflict. The
military solution was not only an option for both sides, but in practical terms, it was the
preferred option. Thus, peace efforts collapsed in 1997, 1999, and 2000. These failures did
more than interrupt work to disarm and demobilize soldiers; they led to the re-arming of
some fighters who had previously been disarmed.
The third and final phase of the DDR process, which got underway in May 2001, was
successful largely because the parties to the conflict had all realized that, for a variety of
reasons, military victory was not within their grasp. The Government of Sierra Leone
(GOSL) came to fully understand it could not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on
the allegiance of its own army. For their part, the rebels factored in British military
intervention and regional developments, particularly the embargo on Liberia and the
precarious position of the government there. These considerations, together with the
change in the leadership of the RUF, resulted in a more robust commitment to the peaceful
resolution of the conflict. The commitment of all parties to the peace process deepened,
and DDR became a means to achieving peace, rather than a tactical maneuver aimed at
buying time.
To understand fully the NCDDR program and its strengths and weaknesses, it is important
to look at the following aspects of the DDRP.
The institutional framework within which the DDR process operated in Sierra Leone
evolved. With time, it became an effective partnership between the GOSL and its
international and domestic partners. The major actors involved in this partnership are
introduced below.
the peace process in general. It provided a forum for key national stakeholders to come
together and discuss issues.
As a committee, the NCDDR enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from the rest of
government, which help insulate it from political pressures and bureaucratic constraints. By
Phase III, it gained the confidence not only of the major parties to the peace process but
also of the individual ex-combatants it was set up to serve. The NCDDR became the focal
institution to which ex-combatants could bring their grievances, seek support, and even vent
their frustrations. The fact that it was viewed as an independent civilian institution, staffed
by civilians, assiduously projecting a high level of neutrality in its treatment of the
combatants, also contributed to its success.
The Committee met frequently prior to the breakdown of the peace process in May 2000.
But when it became clear to the GOSL that the RUF was not committed to the peace
process, it significantly reduced the role of the NCDDR.
The government then began to rely more on the NCDDR’s Executive Secretariat as the
implementer of the DDRP, and Technical Coordinating Committees (TCCs), both of which
the government found to be particularly effective in moving the process forward. The TCCs
were made up of representatives from the government, the RUF, the CDF, and the UN.
They deliberated on current issues and problems. They also considered next steps in DDR
program implementation and submitted proposals to a newly-created Joint Committee on
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (the Tripartite Committee) for
consideration and decision
Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU). DDR is costly, and the
amount of money involved can expose the process to corruption. In Sierra Leone,
the FMPU was created as a mechanism to provide fiduciary safeguards and
technical capacity not available in-country when the peace process began. Along
with a multi-donor trust fund, coordinated by the World Bank, the FMPU was critical
in reassuring everyone involved that money allocated to DDR would be used for
purposes intended. The FMPU protected the Executive Secretariat from political and
personal pressures. By minimizing the opportunities for fraud and leakages, it
enabled Secretariat staff to operate in a transparent and accountable manner.
Key International Partners. The Sierra Leone peace process benefited greatly from the
support of the international community, including regional partners. The nature and scope
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The United Nations played an important political and security role in Sierra Leone, which
evolved over time. UNAMSIL, in particular, was key in implementing the DDRP. The
mission, initially limited to monitoring, was later assigned small-scale operations. Over time,
it became progressively more proactive, while its support for DDR grew more constructive.
Beginning in 1998, the World Food Programme provided much-needed food for the ex-
combatants. UNICEF assumed crucial responsibility for reintegrating child soldiers,
reducing the burden on the NCDDR. Finally, the UN Resident Coordinator was appointed
deputy to the special representative to the secretary general (SRSG). This unusual
appointment promoted collaboration between the UN’s political and security interests, on
the one hand, and its development work, on the other. The UN’s impact in Sierra Leone
increased significantly as a result.
The UN‘s role was not without its shortcomings. Its initial mandate was weak and
interpreted conservatively by UN officials. Other problems included the varying quality of
UN troops, the overly-liberal interpretation of criteria for people being disarmed, and
misinformation provided on program benefits to lure combatants into disarmament process.
During the end of Phase II, weapons collected were not properly disposed of leading to
some being used in the renewed fighting of 2000. The rapid turnover rate of UN troops and
military observers was also a problem, as there was little institutional memory and
relationships constantly had to be recreated.
The United Kingdom’s contribution has been characterized as “crucial but inconsistent
leadership.”1 The UK began support for DDR in Sierra Leone in 1996, providing technical
and financial assistance for disarmament and demobilization activities. It continued to
provide critical political and military support for the GOLS throughout the peace process.
This was especially true during the negotiations for the Lomé agreement and after Lomé
broke down in 2000. Great Britain’s contributions to Sierra Leone are numerous. It assisted
the UN in strengthening UNAMSIL’s operational capacity. It enhanced security through an
active military role in 2000. It provided support for various aspects of the Security Sector
Reform Programme, including strengthening and restructuring the police and developing the
new Sierra Leone Army. Throughout, the UK provided critical political support for the DDR
process in Sierra Leone and in international fora. At the same time, the removal of support
at a critical moment in the DDR process, particularly the precipitous withdrawal of the UK
Emergency Response Team (ERT) in 2000, created problems for the NCDDR.
The World Bank’s contribution was vital throughout the process. The Bank consistently
supported the idea of GOSL ownership of the DDR process. It reinforced this by
1
Ted Morse and Mark Knight, “Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone Disarmament and Demobilization of
Combatants,” prepared for the Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, Final Draft, April 2002, pp.
40-42.
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strengthening capacity for the NCDDR. The Bank also provided critical financial and
technical support through its Project Preparation Facility (PPF), at which the DDR program
was designed. Despite high risk, due to the uncertainty of the peace process in 1998, the
World Bank accepted responsibility of setting up the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for DDR. The
fund unified donor support around one set of program objectives. It also unified support for
one set of procurement, financial, management, disbursement, and reporting arrangements.
Furthermore, the Bank’s mobilization capacity, and its fiduciary oversight, encouraged
donors to support the DDR process. Support even came from countries without a presence
in Sierra Leone. The World Bank’s part in the establishment of the FMPU provided the level
of comfort necessary for the international community to devote adequate resources to the
DDR process, in an environment otherwise characterized by a high level of corruption. In
addition to administering the MDTF, the World Bank fielded personnel who were highly
committed and contributed to the success of the DDR program. The Bank also provided
technical support to UNAMSIL for weapons disposal.
Design of Sierra Leone’s DDR program poised a number of questions that will be faced in
the development of new DDR programs in Africa and elsewhere. The evaluation considers
these in detail; six are highlighted below.
Should There be One Organization or Two? One of the major lessons of previous
DDR processes is that organizationally de-linking disarmament and demobilization from
the planning and delivery of reinsertion and reintegration support creates institutional
rivalries that undermine the effective delivery of DDR programs. The GOSL wisely
chose to create the NCDDR and its Executive Secretariat as an autonomous body, with
a mandate to provide and promote the reintegration of the former warring parties. It also
chose to vest the responsibility for assistance to war-affected populations in NCRRR.
This allowed both ex-combatants and non-combatants to be served, striking a balance
that strengthened the peace process.
Which Approach to Gender is best? There are two ways of incorporating women and
girls into DDR programs: by adopting a gender-neutral approach or a gender-sensitive
one. NCDDR adopted a gender-neutral approach, and it is widely agreed that females
did not fully benefit for this. This was in part due to the multiple roles females played;
traditional gender norms, which deterred access; and the narrow focus of the DDRP’s
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objectives. Where the process had a positive impact was in the area of sensitization.
This had an impact on overall perceptions of women and the roles that they can play.
Which Approach to Child Soldiers is Best? It is now widely recognized not only that
children are often present in conflicts in significant numbers, but also that they should
not go through the same demobilization process as adults. In Sierra Leone, UNICEF
was given responsibility for running the child-soldier demobilization program as well as
for raising funds for it. The partnership between UNCEF, on the one hand, and the
NCDDR and Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, on the other, was
exemplary.
Which Funding Mechanisms are Appropriate? The DDR program was financed
through multiple channels, with the MDTF as the main vehicle for support to the DDR
process. The MDTF defined the shape and content of the process. One of the MDTF’s
key benefits is its ability to focus donor contributions on the government’s program and
enhance national ownership and leadership. It also promotes resource mobilization and
reduces the administrative and financial costs of managing external resources.
Despite the important role of the MDTF, other funding mechanisms were established,
which proved crucial in implementation success. For example, the UK provided
financing outside the MDTF that gave the NCDDR and its partners needed flexibility
when urgent, unforeseen needs arose that could not be financed rapidly through the
trust fund. [From an evaluators point of view, I believe, the conclusion and
recommendation should be to improve the responsibility of a unified funding mechanism,
and not to justify a parallel mechanism. The main text provides a more nuanced picture]
The disarmament and demobilization components of Sierra Leone’s DDR program are
generally considered more successful than the reintegration component. A major objective
of DDR processes was to break the command structure of the RUF and AFRC units.
Managed first by the British Emergency Response Team, and later by NCDDR and
UNAMSIL, by all accounts the disarmament and demobilization appears to have sufficiently
broken the command structure of the rebel forces to lay a solid foundation for peace.
It is generally agreed that NCDDR’s reintegration program did succeed in its primary
objective of providing ex-combatants with a cooling off period that helped them to readjust
to civilian life, thereby buying time for peace to be consolidated. However, there is debate
about its overall success. A close analysis provides a wealth of lessons learned and
information that can be used in other DDR programs. A number of these lessons are
highlighted below.
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program and those who did not—with DDR program participants demonstrating a
greater degree of coping skills.
Pace of Demobilization. While military observers might have better managed the flow
of combatants waiting to be disarmed, a fast-track disarmament and demobilization
process, which developed in Sierra Leone by 2001, meant that the number of
demobilized soldiers was always going to outstrip the ability of the reintegration
component to provide training programs in a timely fashion. Simply stated, the political
imperatives were at odds with optimal program implementation, and political imperatives
carried the day. It is important for those engaged in designing and implementing DDR
programs to understand this fact.
The DDRP was financed through multiple channels: (1) government resources; (2) grants
to the MDTF; (3) the World Bank (IDA credit delivered through the Community Reintegration
and Rehabilitation Program and PPF); (4) peacekeeping support to disarmament and
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demobilization; (5) UNICEF support for child soldiers; (6) UK government support through
ERT; and (7) parallel programs (CRP, HSF and GTZ).
Mobilizing and disbursing resources. The NCDDR initially estimated that it would require
some $33.6 million to demobilize 33,000 combatants. This sum did not include costs
incurred by ECOMOG or UN forces in support of DDR activities. When the DDRP
concluded, senior United Nations officials estimated total program costs at approximately
$100 million 2
The $100 million estimated cost incorporates the MDTF funds, resources channeled
through the parallel programs, and the costs directly contributed by UN. By far the largest
financial input, $39.5 million, was channeled through the MDTF. The main trust fund was
divided into two smaller trust funds: the first a government-executed fund, which became
the major receptacle for most of the financial resources, and the other, a World Bank-
administered fund with about $2 million. This split execution of the trust fund was an
innovation. This special arrangement was optimal as speed was of the essence, particularly
at the initial stage. The World Bank facilitated the fast procurement of critical services, such
as the provision of four core consultants for the Executive Secretariat. The World Bank-
administered fund also financed the studies, reviews, and evaluations that were
commissioned at various stages of the program, as well as the donor meetings and
pledging sessions that were organized outside of the country..
One of the positive characteristics of the MDTF, which simplified the management task and
enhanced effectiveness, was the condition that there should be no earmarking of funds by
the contributing donors. The World Bank, when faced with the possibility of losing U.S
.funding or allowing the U.S. Government to finance only one part of the program, set up, a
separate trust fund that was used exclusively for a U.S. contribution for the payment of
reinsertion benefits.
4. Lessons Learned
Sierra Leone’s road to peace produced numerous lessons learned. Below is a summary of
the lessons:
• A post-conflict DDR process is aimed first and foremost at achieving political and
security objectives.
2
Authors’ interview, May 2004.
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• Collaboration between key actors can be pivotal to the success of a DDR program.
• Splitting the institutional responsibility for disarmament and demobilization from that
for reintegration will hamper the ability of a DDR process to achieve its main
objectives.
• Coordination between the DDR process and the rehabilitation and recovery process
is essential to start addressing the root causes of conflict.
• Monitoring at the community level for social trends during the DDR process is
essential to promote the linkage between DDR and longer term rehabilitation and
recovery.
• It is important to invest in reconciliation efforts and to prepare the community for the
reintegration of ex-combatants.
• Establishing eligibility criteria involves trade-offs among different security and political
objectives.
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• Options for retaining capacity developed to deliver DDR training should be actively
pursued.
• It is equally important that the government’s key partners deploy personnel with a
high level of commitment, understanding, familiarity with post-conflict situations, and
expertise with respect to their own rules and regulations.
• The DDR database serves a multiplicity of needs, and it may require redesign as the
program moves from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. It also
increases the importance of exploiting technological advances wherever possible.
• Training programs, even if not structured optimally, can produce a semi- skilled labor
force.
• The DDR programs can help ex-combatants to make the psychological transition to
peace.
• Populations that are excluded from the DDR process still require assistance.
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It is imperative that all stakeholders make a serious effort to learn from past
experiences so that future DDR processes can benefit from the wealth of knowledge
generated by the Sierra Leone DDR process.
Many of the lessons discussed above have been observed time and again over the last
fifteen years in post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes.
They are repeated here, however, because they have not yet been fully incorporated into
programming. The international community, which provides most of the financing for DDR
processes and has a significant impact on their design and implementation, has a special
responsibility to absorb and implement these lessons.
The Final Evaluation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
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1 Introduction
The strategic objective of the evaluation is to learn lessons from Sierra Leone’s
experience with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of male/female
and child ex-combatants, and apply these to national poverty and conflict
mitigation strategies, as well as to increase the conflict management capacity of
regional organizations.3
Accordingly, this evaluation report focuses on the DDR process and seeks to
understand how the main institutional actors and stakeholders interacted and
collaborated to create an effective partnership. The report examines different facets of
the complex process of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants. It
demonstrates the linkages between DDR and the peace process (or conflict
mitigation), as well as between DDR and long-term economic and social rehabilitation
and poverty reduction. Its findings are particularly relevant for countries that have
undergone similar types of conflicts to that which occurred in Sierra Leone between
1991 and 2002.
The report does not, however, explore in detail the multitude of issues that are related
to the DDR process but were not actually part of the formal NCDDR program. As the
DDRP is only one aspect of the peace process, it is possible to have a successful
3
See annex 10 for the complete Evaluation Terms of Reference.
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The roots of conflict go back to the early 1970s when then-President Siaka Stevens
gained economic and political dominance by controlling the diamond industry,
exploiting the system of patronage, destroying many political institutions, and ruling
4
These issues are highlighted in several reports reviewed by the evaluation team, including Paul
Richards, Steven Archibald, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent, Where Have All the Young People Gone?
Transitioning Ex-combatants Towards Community Reconstruction After the War in Sierra Leone,
November 30, 2003; Stelios Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the
Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration, November 8, 2002; and Sierra Leone DDRP Review, October 5, 2000.
5
Approximately 72,000 individuals were disarmed and demobilized. Not all of these chose to
participate in the reintegration programs. Additionally, some of those who were disarmed were killed in
subsequent flare-ups.
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with an autocratic approach. The 1980s were marked by a widening gap between the
political elite, who had access to diamond revenue, and the rest of the population, who
struggled to survive in a collapsed economy and under a corrupt government that
provided few basic services. Years of mismanaged resources, poverty, and corruption
had a particularly significant impact on youth, who grew increasingly frustrated by the
lack of opportunities and deeply disenchanted by a future which held very little
promise. This became a critical factor in the war.
It was against this backdrop that, in the late 1980s, Foday Sankoh went to a military
training camp in Libya, where he met Charles Taylor. The two agreed to support each
other in overthrowing their respective governments using the diamond mines in Sierra
Leone to finance their efforts. Disillusioned and unemployed youth became the rebel
army needed to start the conflict.
To address the root causes of the conflict, the GOSL must take into two factors: the
regional element and internal social, political, and economic inequalities. Regional
issues are dealt with in the following section. One of the major tools the government is
using to address internal factors is its poverty reduction strategy. In view of the
prevailing conditions in Sierra Leone, the government has adopted a phased approach
to poverty reduction. Addressing the immediate challenges of the transition from war
to peace (“the transitional phase”) was the core objective of the Interim Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP).6 The long-term development and poverty
reduction agenda will be fully defined during the production of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP). The transitional phase was expected to run from 2001–2002,
but the process of developing the PRSP was in fact still ongoing when this evaluation
took place in mid-2004.7
The IPRSP was not formally integrated into the peace process because both the Lomé
Peace Agreement and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement were concluded before the
IPRSP was developed. It would have been better, both from the perspective of
contributing to peace-building and in order to be true to the participatory nature of the
IPRSP process, if the warring parties had been given the opportunity to contribute to
6
The IPRSP was to be implemented 2000–2002, a period when the country was initially still at war, and
after May 2001 slowly emerging from conflict. See Republic of Sierra Leone, “Interim Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper [hereafter IPRSP],” Freetown, June 2001,
http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/Sierra_Leone_IPRSP.pdf.
7
The full PRSP was intended to run from 2003–2005.
8
IPRSP, p. 26.
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its formulation. Nonetheless, the government recognized that the resolution of the
conflict and the attainment of peace and security were necessary conditions for the
success of any poverty reduction strategy. Consequently, the IPRSP notes that “the
Government remains committed to the principle provisions of the Lomé Peace
Agreement and to subsequent recent agreements signed in Abuja and Freetown.”9 In
particular, the IPRSP states:
The IPRSP integrated DDR as a core program. In programmatic terms, DDR was an
explicit objective, a strategy, and an indicator of the success of the IPRSP (table 1).
The government viewed DDR as advancing the cause of poverty reduction by helping
to achieve an environment of peace and security. Through the provision of social
safety nets to former combatants, DDR helped to jumpstart the economy in war-
affected areas. Training and education provided through the DDR program to the ex-
combatants as a vulnerable group enhanced their capacity to support themselves and
their families, as well as to make contributions to the welfare of their communities.
Finally, the pre-discharge orientation helped sensitize former combatants to the modes
of behavior appropriate during peacetime, which further contributed to the peaceful
environment necessary for poverty reduction.
The DDR process was also essential to the implementation of Sierra Leone’s National
Recovery Strategy. Until an area had been declared safe, it was impossible to begin
large-scale rehabilitation efforts. The government viewed the National Recovery
Strategy as laying the foundations for the PRSP and as a means of engaging “Sierra
Leonean society in the reconciliation and democratization process.”11 The National
Recovery Strategy had four main objectives: (1) consolidation of state authority; (2) the
rebuilding of communities; (3) peace-building and human rights; and (4) restoration of
the economy. “Youth” was a crosscutting issue. The National Recovery Strategy
recognized that “disenfranchisement of youth was one of the primary factors that led to
the war, creating resentment and a sense of hopelessness in the first place, and
ensuring the existence of a willing pool of recruits for the fighting factions … As a result
[of their wartime experiences], they are now more politically aware and carry greater
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Sierra Leone Government, National Recovery Strategy, 2002-2003, p. 9.
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Policy Area Objectives Strategies and Broad Indicators 2000 Base Level
Measures
• Improved • Disarm and • Physical security • 1.9 (Max. 4 on
National Security
personal safety demobilize all (popular Smiley Scale)
and Good
Governance • Improved combatants except benchmark)
safety of the national army • Percentage of • 59
Transitional Period personal • Engage in combatants
property peaceful political disarmed and
dialogue demobilized
• Restructure and • Percentage of • 29
retrain the Sierra ex-combatants
Leone Army and reintegrated into
prison officials civilian life
• Implement • Percentage of • 47
immigration chiefdoms under
program government
• Provide Social control
Safety Nets Funds
(RRR, NGOs)
• Retrain the police
• Initiate community
policing on a pilot
basis
Source: Republic of Sierra Leone, IPRSP, annex 3.1a.
Note: The percentages of combatants disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated are based on an anticipated
caseload of 45,000 adults and children.
Taking that larger context into consideration, a DDR process can provide space to only
begin to address the root causes of war. As many of those interviewed for this
evaluation have noted, the DDR process played an important role in the peace
process but could not be expected to resolve most, if any, of the problems that led to
the initial conflict. This is equally true for the internal and regional aspects of the
conflict. As far as the internal factors were concerned, youth, both combatants and
non-combatants, faced a similar situation—few economic opportunities, a stratified
society where paramount chiefs hold almost unlimited power, and little government
accountability.13 The issues of government accountability are particularly important.
The youth problem can be resolved only in the context of greatly strengthened
12
Ibid, pp. 14-15. At the same time, it is important to note that the National Recovery Strategy was not
published until 2002, at which point many decisions about reintegration of ex-combatants had already
been made. It was of course not possible to develop a sense of needs in areas formerly held by the
rebels until after they were disarmed and demobilized.
13
The advent of local government introduces the possibility of more participatory systems of
governance at the local level. Time will tell, however, to what extent the power of the paramount chiefs
will be eroded and whether the concentration of power at the central level will be reproduced at the local
level.
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Regional actors and institutions played an active role in supporting and exacerbating
the conflict. Subregional animosities and alliances contributed significantly to the
intensity and duration of the conflict. At the same time, institutions, subregional
governments, and individuals from the subregion played a critical role in advancing the
peace process and conflict resolution in Sierra Leone. The Government of Nigeria, for
example, strongly supported the Government of Sierra Leone both diplomatically and
through the deployment of Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOMOG) troops against the rebels, and it pressed the parties to the
Sierra Leone conflict to reach the compromises necessary for peace at Lomé and
Abuja.
Despite this, there was no concerted regional approach to DDR, probably reflecting the
different stages at which individual states joined the peace process. However, at this
juncture a regional approach is essential to consolidate the gains of DDR in Sierra
Leone as well as to provide a more conducive environment for the success of DDR in
neighboring countries. The widespread proliferation of arms throughout the region
requires a concerted regional approach, which only began to get underway in mid-
2004.
Nonetheless, lessons were drawn by those developing the Sierra Leone DDR program
from earlier efforts at DDR in the subregion. For example, the failed attempt at DDR in
Liberia in the mid-1990s was based on a social justice approach to DDR, which
focused assistance on war-affected communities. Key Sierra Leone DDR planners
drew from this the need to provide targeted assistance to ex-combatants. Additional
lessons were drawn from other parts of Africa as well, notably Mozambique (where the
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RUF was turned into a political party) and Uganda (particularly the initial structure of its
DDR program).14
Although there are many political, economic, and socio-cultural similarities among the
states in the subregion, and there is a high degree of interdependence in economic
and security matters, there is also a need to factor in the unique features of each
country in designing DDR programs. Nonetheless, one lesson does seem clear: It is
possible to have a truly successful, government-owned DDR process.
The effort to end the civil war in Sierra Leone that began in 1991 went through a
number of stages. Starting in 1996, there were several corresponding phases in the
effort to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants. Prior to 2000–2001, DDR
was subsumed within the greater strategy of achieving a military solution to the
conflict. The military solution was not only an option for both sides, but in practical
terms, it was the preferred option. Thus, peace efforts collapsed in 1997, 1999, and
2000. Not only did these breakdowns interrupt efforts to disarm and demobilize
soldiers, they also led to the re-arming of some fighters who had previously been
disarmed. [Since this was really minimal, I believe it should be mentioned: 1580 were
“lost” in phase I, and 1447 were “lost” in phase II, i.e. a total of 3027 (4.1% of the total
of 72490). Of these, in all likelihood a certain percentage were killed, and another
percentage self reintegrated. As an issue, it’s important, I only believe it should be
quantified]
14
Because Uganda experienced essentially a peacetime demobilization, some individuals interviewed
for this evaluation expressed doubts about the transferability of lessons to countries that have
undergone extensive periods of civil war.
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The final phase of the DDR process, which got underway in May 2001, was successful
largely because the parties to the conflict had all realized that, for a variety of reasons,
military victory was not within their grasp. The government came to fully understand it
could not eliminate the insurgency and could not rely on the allegiance of the army.
For their part, the rebels factored in British military intervention and regional
developments, particularly the embargo on Liberia and the precarious position of that
government. These, together with the change in the leadership of the RUF, resulted in
a more robust commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The commitment of
all parties to the peace process consequently deepened and DDR became a means to
achieving peace, rather than a tactical maneuver aimed at buying time.
While the experience in Sierra Leone confirms that the existence of a disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration process is not sufficient to create the political will
necessary to end civil strife, it also confirms that the DDR process is a necessary
component of achieving and sustaining peace. As long as a large number of people
have access to weapons and command structures remain intact, the peace process
will be held hostage to their demands. As one UN official interviewed for this
evaluation noted, “Peace and DDR are inextricably linked. Peacekeeping missions
and peace treaties are important steps toward peace. To unlock the door to peace,
disarmament and demobilization are key.”15 In sum, DDR in conflict-affected countries
has essentially security and political objectives.
While political and security objectives are paramount, DDR programs in conflict-
affected countries also have important social and economic objectives. A DDR
process is the first step in attitudinal change on the part of former combatants that
must take place if they are to return to civilian life. It provides opportunities for former
combatants to interact with non-combatants and to acquire skills that will help them
become productive members of society once again. There are also benefits, such as
cash payments and toolkits, which can have a positive economic impact. Cash
payments can jump start local economies and toolkits can make ex-combatants more
marketable, providing much needed income.
At the same time, it is important to underscore that the political and security objectives
that can be achieved by DDR processes are themselves limited. A DDR process
provides the mechanism for the separation of combatants from their weapons and the
break up of command structures. In particular, it provides rebel groups with a way of
laying down weapons without being seen as having surrendered. It also helps to build
confidence among the former warring parties. In Sierra Leone, the DDR process
achieved these objectives. But achieving these objectives does not guarantee the
consolidation of peace. In consequence, it is important to underscore that the
evaluation team agrees with those who argue that if the broader peace process were
to break down again, it would not be because the DDR process made the wrong
15
Interview with authors, Freetown, May 2004.
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In his first speech, President Kabbah had announced the creation of an administrative
mechanism for DDR in the Ministry for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and
Resettlement. The Abidjan Agreement committed the GOSL and the RUF to “a well-
planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization, and
resettlement linked to national development objectives.”17 The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) provided technical assistance and the British
government provided seed money to jumpstart the DDR process. The responsibility to
develop this program was essentially subcontracted to international non-governmental
organizations. This effort had not advanced far, however, when the Kabbah
government was overthrown by an army mutiny, led by Johnny Paul Koromah, on May
25, 1997.
16
While the DDR process in Sierra Leone can be considered successful, choices were made in its
design and implementation that remain the source of some discussion. In view of UNAMSIL’s role in
providing security, its departure will be a test of the degree to which peace has been consolidated.
17
“Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996,” Article 6,
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_10301996.html.
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3.2 1998–2004
In February 1998, ECOMOG forces liberated Freetown. With the return to democratic
civil rule, the government developed a comprehensive policy agenda to end the
conflict and pursue peace and reconciliation. This policy framework was based on the
1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement and included a DDR program. In April 1998 [trust you
checked the date, can’t check that], the World Bank inaugurated technical assistance
for the DDR process, making its $2 million Project Preparation Facility (PPF) available
to hire consultants to assist the government in developing its DDR program. The
government’s framework was endorsed by the United Nations and other international
donors at a special UN meeting in July 1998.
The DDR process begun in July 1998 was implemented in three phases that reflected
the stops and starts of the peace process. These three phases took on distinct
characteristics based on the political and security situation, lessons learned from
earlier phases, and the amount of funds available. The Ministry for Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation, and Resettlement was transformed into the National Commission for
Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (NCRRR), in order to focus attention
and resources on the critically important tasks of reconstruction and recovery.19 The
NCRRR Commissioner held Cabinet rank.
It was recognized from the outset that the support offered through the DDR program
would not suffice for long-term socio-economic reintegration, but would provide ex-
combatants with short-term support while they began the process of readjusting to
civilian life. The original plans foresaw a close linkage with ongoing activities
supported through the NCDDR, donor agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
18
Mark Malan, Phenyo Rakate, and Angela McIntyre, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL Hits the
Home Straight, (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2002),
http://www.iss.co.ca/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Content.html. See in particular chapter 2, “Overview of
Pre-UNAMSIL Interventions.”
19
NCRRR was later renamed the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA).
20
Details on donor support for the DDR process are found in section 4.2.
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The degree of political commitment to the peace process as a whole influenced the
time frame required to implement DDR as well as the success that could be achieved
at each stage. Although one of the central aspects of the DDR process was group
disarmament, the DDR program initially focused on individual combatants in order to
entice them to surrender. The main fighting groups were not, at that point, sufficiently
committed to the peace process to allow large-scale, group disarmament to proceed.
Thus, prior to 2001, each person presenting him/herself for disarmament had to bring
in either a functional weapon or ammunition and demonstrate participation in combat.
As political will to implement the peace process strengthened during Phase III, the
program moved to group disarmament, with each commander bringing in both
combatants and weapons.
Annex 1 provides the numbers disarmed, demobilized, and discharged during each of
the phases of the DDR process. Annex 2 provides numbers for reintegration. In
Phase I, the potential caseload for demobilization and reintegration assistance was
estimated at 33,000 people. This was raised to 45,000 by the time Phase II got
underway.21 Eventually, by January 2002 an estimated 72,000 men, women, and
children were disarmed and an estimated 56,000 took part in reintegration
opportunities.22
3.2.2 Phase I
Phase I of the post-1998 DDR program was inaugurated in July 1998 with the
assistance of the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development
(DFID), the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOMOG), the UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), and other UN
agencies. The bulk of the caseload during Phase I of the program was Sierra Leone
Army (SLA) soldiers who had surrendered to ECOMOG forces in 1998. However,
because political conditions did not permit group disarmament, the focus of the DDR
program was on encouraging individual combatants to surrender. [I believe it was a
little more complicated: the main focus of the program was on the disarmament, Formatted
demobilization and reintegration of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, encamped at
Lungi. At the same time, the program was offering an opportunity to the RUF, and
only the latter was targeted at individual combatants]
The DDR process was designed and overseen by the newly created NCDDR, which
benefited from strong World Bank support. Field support for disarmament and
demobilization was provided by ECOMOG and, to a lesser extent, UNOMSIL.23 It also
21
For the 33,000 figure, see the Government of Sierra Leone, National Committee on Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration [hereafter NCDDR], “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme,” July 15, 1998, p. 3. The 33,000 figure includes 7,000 Armed Forces of Sierra Leone
(AFSL) ex-combatants and 1,000 RUF ex-combatants detained by ECOMOG in 1998 plus an estimated
25,000 members of the CDF. The 45,000 figure appears in the Government of Sierra Leone, National
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, Revised Programme Budget (subsequent
to the Lomé Peace Agreement), September 1999 and is broken down by groups in annex 2.
22
Annex 2 gives a figure of 48,000, as it does not include those still undergoing training at the time of
the report.
23
NCDDR, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.”
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benefited from UK financial and technical support through the Emergency Response
Team (ERT) to the Lungi demobilization center which housed the surrendered
soldiers. The DFID-funded ERT took over the management for the camps from
ECOMOG. They were responsible for provision of water, food, shelter, and health
care.24 ECOMOG was in charge of security at the sites, disarming the ex-combatants,
and disposing of collected weapons as monitored by UNOMSIL.
It was felt that former RUF and AFRC combatants in particular would require extensive
support to transition into civilian life. Additionally, it was unclear in mid-1998 how the
civilian population would react to the release of RUF and AFRC combatants. What is
more, the surrendered SLA soldiers refused to demobilize and rejoin society. They
were deeply concerned about the possibility of reprisals after committing atrocities
during the war. [What is missing in the analysis of phases I & II, I believe, is the
absence of security sector reform which impacted negatively on the veterans’
willingness to demobilize. Veterans were looking for employment opportunity and
refused to disarm. My memory is that we had been urging the UK to expedite security
sector reform and increase collaboration, we had good working level contacts, but it
simply didn’t happen, only in phase III. This was the primary reason for the SLA
soldiers’ refusal to demobilize, and not reprisals. It is also one of the most important
lessons for other countries emerging from civil war, that DDR efforts need to be
accompanied by security sector reform and that these efforts need to be timed and
sequenced right] In general, the commitment to DDR was very fragile during phase I,
which led to a lengthy period of encampment for these combatants. CDF combatants
were expected to be encamped for a shorter period of time, as they were assumed to
be operating close to their homes in southern Sierra Leone where they were also
extremely popular with the local population.
24
“Report on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration”, UN Integrated Regional Information
Network (IRIN), January 31, 2000.
25
See box 6 for capacity restraints on reintegration programs.
26
Government of Sierra Leone, NCDDR, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme,”
July 15, 1998, p. 11.
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Thus, flexibility in program design was essential to deal with concrete differences
among beneficiaries. At the same time, it was recognized that benefits provided to all
groups had to be perceived as equivalent. All groups were to receive the TSA and be
eligible for reintegration opportunities.
Renewed fighting in late 1998 and the rebel invasion of Freetown in January 1999
brought Phase I of the DDR program to a halt. At that point, nearly 3,200 combatants
had been disarmed and demobilized, although only 1,600 of those were ultimately
discharged. The remainder were unaccounted for following the January 1999
resumption of hostilities.27
3.2.2 Phase II
Phase II of the DDR program began in July 1999, following the signing of the Lomé
Peace Agreement.28 The Lomé Agreement committed the government to
“immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the
necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension
of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other
emoluments due to former members of the SLA.” The time frame specified for
disarmament in the Lomé agreement—90 days—was highly unrealistic because of the
absence of full political commitment to the peace process on the part of the warring
parties. [That seems an understatement. The 90 days deadline was not only
unrealistic but simply not feasible, even with political commitment. I doubt the UN
even managed to get a single additional soldier on the ground within that time {figure
to be checked} and the Government and partners (not the Bank) attempted to address
the political vacuum that was created by not having the UN peacekeeping force on the
ground by pushing the DDR Program forward in the place of progress with
peacekeeping and despite the obvious lack of political will. If I could do things again, I
would have cried “foul” earlier…that’s another lessen which you correctly mention later
in the review, that DDR cannot replace political will…another lesson for the future
would be, and I don’t think you mention that, to include technical expertise in support
of peace negotiations]
Although based on Phase I, the program was subsequently amended to take into
account the changed political and security environment and was to cover all
combatants irrespective of their affiliation who surrendered prior to the conclusion of a
new peace agreement, including the newly-formed Civil Defense Forces in the
northern and eastern parts of Sierra Leone.29
27
It is presumed that the unaccounted for ex-combatants either fled or were killed.
28
“Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone,” Lomé, July 7, 1999, Article XVIII.
29
Details of the review of the Phase I program can be found in Government of Sierra Leone, NCDDR,
“Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme: Addendum,” April 9, 1999.
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The instability of the political situation and unwillingness of the different groups to fully
conform to Lomé overshadowed the DDR program and caused NCDDR staff to
repeatedly plan and re-plan as they tried to respond to the shifting realities on the
ground. The DDR process was also affected by internal constraints and design
issues, which are discussed in more detail below and in section 3.2.3
During the nine months that Phase II was operational, nearly 19,000 combatants were
disarmed, and approximately 17,500 were ultimately demobilized and discharged.
This was no small accomplishment given the environment in which the DDR program
was operating. (A number of ex-combatants were unaccounted for following the
resumption of hostilities. See box 1. Figures are shown in annex 1.) A high priority
was attached to sensitization campaigns aimed at the encamped ex-combatants, the
communities in the vicinity of demobilization camps, and the communities to which the
ex-combatants would eventually return. It was assumed that with the exception of
CDF fighters, combatants were to be encamped for a period of time. CDF fighters
were to be discharged from transit camps as soon as they met the discharge criteria.
The most significant aspect of the disarmament process was that it achieved the
central goal of the entire peace process, which was to separate combatants from their
weapons and to destroy as many of those “Phase II, however, was implemented in a
weapons as possible. During Phase II, hostile environment of comprehensive
disarmament and entry into the breaches of the cease-fire agreement,
demobilization and reintegration including movement of forces, assault on
components was still based on individuals UN forces, hostage taking, destruction of
voluntarily turning in weapons, since the DDRP camps and the renewed fighting in
political conditions for group disarmament May 2000.”
still did not exist. The requirement to —Sierra Leone DDRP Review, Final Draft,
present a weapon was primarily to separate October 5, 2000
combatants from their arms, and
secondarily to discourage fraud, since lists of combatants had not been submitted as
required under Article XIX of the Lomé Peace Agreement. However, as will be seen
with Phase III disarmament, the weapons requirement was not without its problems.
An unknown number of combatants did not enter the DDR process because they
either lacked weapons entirely or used communal weapons which were unavailable to
them for disarmament purposes.
The weapons collected were registered and stored. However, there were some
problems with their disposal. According to the Joint Operations Plan of November
1999, all weapons were to be immediately disabled by United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops upon registration. Some places did not have the
necessary technical equipment and expertise to do this. Indeed, the World Bank
financed technical assistance on weapons registration, storage, and destruction
because this expertise was not available at this time to UNAMSIL or to the UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Additionally, weapons were not
always destroyed immediately for public relations reasons—the preference was to
have large ceremonies. The result was that collected arms were eventually looted by
the RUF and others in the days leading up to the May 2000 breakdown of the peace
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process. The number of arms available also increased following the looting of
UNAMSIL weapons by the RUF and the issuance of approximately 10,000 new
weapons each to the SLA and the CDF by the British.30
TSAs also proved problematic because they attracted non-combatants who wanted to
benefit from the allowances. Unfortunately, not all disarmament centers had a
sufficient peacekeeping presence to ensure security and enforcement of regulations,
so non-combatants who did not fully meet the criteria were able to enter the program.31
Eventually, TSAs were suspended when the peace process broke down and ex-
combatants were rearmed.32
30
Sierra Leone DDRP Review, Final Draft, 5 October, 2000, p. 18.
31
Ibid., p. 20.
32
As described above, the first tranche of TSA payments was to be made at the end of encampment,
when ex-combatants were demobilized. However, RUF ex-combatants were unable to return to their
home communities during Phase II of the DDR process. As encamped combatants began to riot, the
UK recommended providing TSA payments in demobilization camps prior to discharge. This led to the
perception among ex-combatants and others that money was being exchanged for guns. Resumption
of hostilities and pressure from British public opinion eventually caused the UK to suspend subsequent
disbursements to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, while focusing on other, complementary programs such
as the Commonwealth Police Task Force (CPTF) and rebuilding the national army. Britain also
continued to provide bilateral support to the DDRP through the Community Reintegration Programme
(CRP).
As TSAs were financed through the Trust Fund, resources already committed to the fund continued to
finance DDRP costs, including the TSAs. When peace broke down, the World Bank instructed the
government to stop paying TSAs, although the Bank concurred with the government’s decision to
continue expanding reintegration opportunities in an effort to stabilize the situation. This encouraged
the Government of Sierra Leone to reassess the TSA program. For Phase III, TSAs were transformed
into Reinsertion Benefit Payments, payable when ex-combatants registered with the NCDDR on return
to the communities where they proposed to settle. This helped mitigate the perception that guns were
being exchanged for money. Authors’ interviews. See also, Ted Morse and Mark Knight, “Lessons
Learned from Sierra Leone Disarmament and Demobilization of Combatants,” prepared for the
Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank, Final Draft, April 2002, pp. 41, 94-96.
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There were also approximately 16,000 ex-combatants who were disarmed and demobilized but did not
participate in the reintegration portion of the program. Reasons for this range from the complications
that arose from the reintegration process (discussed in section 6.4) to lack of interest or need. Some
combatants, for example, were able to self-reintegrate because of previous connections with
communities and employers, education level, or the possession of specific marketable skills. Others
died in the flare-ups in Sierra Leone in 1999 and 2000, as well as in some of the regional conflicts.
Although the figures are not known, it appears that the number of non-participants is not sufficiently
large to pose a serious threat to peace and security at this point. The low crime rate in Sierra Leone to
date, unusual for a post-conflict society, suggests that these individuals have either self-reintegrated or
have left the country to fight in other regional conflicts. In fact, in late 2003 and early 2004, some 4,500
former combatants returned from Liberia. They were registered by the NCDDR and became eligible for
a $200 one-time cash payment.
Phase II was suspended in May 2000 as the security situation again deteriorated.
Some 60 percent of the country became inaccessible to the government, and the UN
peacekeeping mission nearly collapsed. The peace process broke down because the
political will necessary for full implementation of the peace agreement simply did not
exist. This was manifested, for example, in resistance to establishing demobilization
centers in areas held by the RUF in April; refusal to submit nominal rolls of combatants
to the Joint Monitoring Commission as stipulated in the Lomé Agreement; training of
new SLA battalions; and the taking hostage of 500 UN peacekeepers in April, shortly
after ECOMOG troops had handed over responsibility for security to UNAMSIL.
With the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, the UK abruptly withdrew its ERT.
Despite the loss of this critical support, the NCDDR was able to continue the DDR
process, underscoring the importance of national ownership. The NCDDR ran the
camps itself, with support from UNAMSIL, the World Food Programme (WFP), the
International Medical Corps (IMC), and local contractors who continued to provide
services to combatants in demobilization centers.33 Additionally, the NCDDR initiated
some training programs for ex-combatants during Phase II.34
33
IMC was originally contracted by the ERT [not only contracted but brought into the country because
none, repeat none, of the existing INGOs such as MSF, Medicin du Monde, etc was willing to provide
service to disarmed (!) ex-combatants]. to provide medical services in the camps as part of the ERT’s
responsibility for camp management. IMC did not withdraw from Sierra Leone after May 2000, and
continued to provide services until its contract expired in November 2000. NCDDR subsequently
contracted for medical services from the Ministry of Public Health. According to Morse and Knight, the
quality of medical care declined as a result. See Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 56-58.
34
The World Bank, “The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra
Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Reports #2 and #3,” March
31, 2000 and June 30, 2000.
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due to the resumption of fighting, its departure created a vacuum as crucial camp
leadership left virtually overnight. NCDDR could not step in—virtually overnight—and
fill this gap on its own. UNAMSIL assisted with the immediate need and increasingly
began to take responsibility for camp management. In addition to its support for
UNAMSIL, the UK continued military support to the GOSL, including reform of the
Armed Forces and support to civilian police. With the UK providing key support for the
peace process, and therefore DDRP, and UNAMSIL’s willingness to react to
emergencies, NCDDR was able to respond to many of the problems that arose during
the encampment stage. The fact that NCDDR was faced with an abrupt departure of
camp management did speak to the need for greater national ownership of the
process, something that was rectified in the Interim Phase and Phase III. (See results
from the Interim Phase assessment as listed below.) [Yes, one can see it that way. At
the same time, one could also say that the degree of ownership that existed only
enabled NCDDR to further step-up to the plate and fill the gap left by the sudden
departure of the ERT. It is however correct, that ownership, or at least the conscious
awareness of it, further increased following the ERT’s departure. One of my criticisms
of the ERT concept was less the technical expertise, but the way it was
provided/structured, accountable more to DfID than to the Executive Secretary,
NCDDR. This was a fundamental difference to the FMPU. Government had
negotiated the contract with PWC and “owned” the FMPU, so to speak. It is for that
reason that I am quite ambivalent to the evaluation team’s praise of the ERT support
and its alleged flexibility at several occasions in the evaluation. From my point of view
it only is a second best option with clear disadvantages, as we have seen. The much
better option would have been a contract of the same expertise through the MDTF. By
the way, just prior to the collapse of the peace process, Government had started to
negotiate the extension of the ERT contract with Crown Agents, this time to be
financed through the MDTF. The price came tumbling down… but the negotiations
were not concluded due to the collapse of the peace process]
Between May 2000 and the resumption of the peace process in April 2001, the
disarmament and demobilization components of the DDRP operated at a very low
level, since only 2,600 people chose to enter the DDR process. (See annex 1.)
During this period, NCDDR continued to expand its capacity to provide reintegration
assistance to those who had already been demobilized and discharged. Of necessity,
the reintegration opportunities developed during this period were located in
government-held areas in the western and southern parts of the country. Some
11,500 former combatants registered for reintegration assistance by March 31, 2001,
and training places were created for just over 11,000 of them. An additional 3,000
training places were being developed by the end of the Interim Phase.35
NCDDR used this period as an opportunity to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses
35
The World Bank, “The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra
Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #6,” March 31, 2001,
p. 5.
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There were also internal factors that affected the implementation of the DDRP. The
assessment team stressed the following concerns:
36
Sierra Leone DDRP Review, Final Draft, October 5, 2000, p. 6.
37
Ibid.
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NCDDR and key partners used this period to adapt programs to better respond to the
constraints. Some of changes made as a result were as follows:
The third and final phase of the Sierra Leone DDRP began on May 18, 2001, in
Kambia and Port Loko. As explained above, all aspects of the DDR process had
undergone some important adjustments in response to the altered political
environment. In addition, the change of RUF leadership and the deployment of British
paratroopers to shore up the security situation created a climate in which serious
disarmament could take place.
38
Ibid., p. ii
39
The JOP was revised to include greater collaboration with the UN. See section 5.6.1 for details.
40
The World Bank, “The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra
Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #5,” December 31,
2000, and authors’ interviews, 2004.
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During Phase III, the flexibility of the program came into full play. This showed both
the importance of having a plan and the ability and willingness to adjust that plan to
changing realities. For example, in order to capitalize on the improved political
climate, disarmament and demobilization were fast-tracked. During Phase III, nearly
47,800 men, women, and children were demobilized in groups. This was more than
the total number of ex-combatants anticipated at the beginning of Phase II
demobilization. Rather than concentrating combatants in a few demobilization centers,
disarmament and demobilization took place two districts at a time (one each from RUF
and CDF-controlled areas). Encampment for all combatants lasted three weeks or
less, and in some cases considerably less. The TSA was transformed into the
Reinsertion Benefit. Benefits were paid once ex-combatants registered for
reintegration assistance with a regional NCDDR office. The first tranche was paid on
registration; the second was paid three months later.
Phase III also demonstrated the importance of political will. Commitment to the peace
process enabled a shift to group disarmament. This had important consequences.
Commanders were required, for example, to bring in two weapons for every three
individuals demobilized.
Additionally, the greatly increased number of ex-combatants and the speed with which
they were demobilized outstripped the capacity of implementing partners to provide
training opportunities in parts of the country that had been under RUF control for much
41
Initially, the value of the agricultural package was assessed by ex-combatants to be less than the
Le60,000 per month training stipend; the amount of rice provided was eventually doubled.
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of the past decade and had little of the necessary infrastructure. This meant that ex-
combatants in the potentially most volatile parts of the country had to wait months
before entering training programs. In order to provide some means of mitigating
resultant discontent, to win the confidence of communities in newly-disarmed areas,
and as a cooling-off measure for former combatants, UNAMSIL designed stop-gap
programs. These were not part of the DDRP, but sought to complement it.
The projects were funded by a combination of UNDP and DFID resources and run by
United Nations Volunteers (UNVs), who lived in the relevant communities and worked
with the communities to identify projects. [I am very skeptical. Do you know how long
it takes to get a UNV? And then, they were living in the communities…. DDR must
have been long, long completed in these districts!!!] According to UN sources, UNVs
found working with female community members most rewarding. [you are joking?, are
you? … needs rephrasing as this could be understood as an unintended joke] They
identified the best projects, did not abscond with project money, and saw projects
through to completion.
Opinions on the significance of the stop-gap programs are mixed. Some individuals
interviewed for this evaluation suggested that, while such quick impact programs can
theoretically be useful, the stop-gap programs were not implemented as rapidly as
they could or should have been, and their actual value has been exaggerated. In
contrast, others interviewed for this evaluation, including senior NCDDR staff, felt that,
overall, stop-gap programs had a positive impact. While the number of stop-gaps was
not large, NCDDR, as a member of the approvals committee, was able to ensure that
projects with the greatest potential impact on newly-disarmed and demobilized soldiers
were given priority. Stop-gaps were considered helpful in reducing tensions among
ex-combatants who were unable to access training programs rapidly and for whom
other employment options were unavailable. They also assisted reconciliation
because they provided the first opportunity for ex-combatants and non-combatants to
work together at community level.43
42
UNAMSIL, DDR Co-ordination Section, “Aide Memoir on the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Sierra
Leone,” March 6, 2003, p. 8,; and authors’ interviews, 2004.
43
According to UNAMSIL, the stop-gap programs also brought members of different fighting forces
together in constructive daily activities.
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44
UNAMSIL reported spending $900,000 on 5,000 beneficiaries. [beneficiaries, not ex-combatants??
i.e. $180 per beneficiary?]
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By Phase III, national ownership was solidified since the government could claim
ownership of the design of the DDRP, the institutional framework established to
implement the program, and the funding mechanism created to support the
government program.
There appear to be several reasons why the Government of Sierra Leone was able to
exert its ownership. First, it understood that, although Sierra Leone received
significant support from international partners, the international community would
eventually leave, and it would be up to Sierra Leone nationals to continue the process
of consolidating peace. This created a strong incentive to ensure that peace-related
processes such as DDR reflected Sierra Leone’s priorities and vision. Second, the
government had been elected in free and fair elections in 1996, elections that had
been demanded by many ordinary Sierra Leoneans as a first step toward achieving
peace. The government therefore had a degree of legitimacy that is often lacking in
other post-conflict environments. Third, there was a core group of government
officials, led by President Kabbah, who were wholly committed to the peace process
and worked extremely hard to make the DDR program and other key elements of the
peace process successful. Finally, the government made good decisions about how to
supplement its capacity to design and implement a DDR process in key areas.
Nonetheless, as the DDR process was implemented there were tensions between the
GOSL and donors. As one Sierra Leone official observed, although the key donors
were present when the DDR process was created and in principle signed on to it, in
practice, a number of them went their own way when it came to implementation.
Another participant from the government noted, “Everyone came with their own
institutional culture and their own models.”
4.2 Donors
Not all donors agreed that the government actually controlled the process. This
disagreement stemmed from various beliefs about the role the national government
should assume vis-à-vis international organizations, as well as from differing opinions
about the impact of financial inequities. As one UN official stated, “How do you define
45
Ibid.
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While the UK provided important political, financial, and technical support to the entire
DDR process, it also made some choices that created problems for the government.
Having provided crucial logistic and administrative support to the disarmament and
demobilization phases, the UK abruptly withdrew the ERT following the resumption of
hostilities in April 2000. Additionally, while it had provided the initial funding for the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund and supported the concept of the Transitional Safety Net
Allowances, the UK did not fulfill its pledge to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)
following the breakdown of the peace process in May 2000. It also raised serious
questions about the TSAs.
Along with other donors, the UK also supported parallel reintegration programs that did
not go through the NCDDR, but were designed by donors and implemented by NGOs
or international consulting firms chosen by the donors. This limited the government’s
ability to locate reintegration programs in areas it deemed of highest priority. Some of
the parallel programs did not reduce the NCDDR caseload, as the implementing
partners did not punch, or mark, identity cards, or began to do so only after having
trained a sizeable number of ex-combatants.46 Donors also pressed the government
to enter into partnerships with international NGOs (INGOs) in order to more effectively
implement the reintegration portion of the DDRP, even when those INGOs were
philosophically opposed to key elements of the government’s DDR programs. While
the resulting parallel programs diluted government ownership, the government’s ability
to sign MOUs with major implementing partners ensured that it had a degree of
oversight over these activities.
4.3 RUF/GOSL
Important as government ownership of the DDR process is, it will be successful to the
extent that all parties involved feel ownership; that is, to the extent that ownership is
truly national. In Sierra Leone’s case, there was no RUF or AFRC participation in the
development of the 1998 DDRP, for obvious reasons. [Nice of the evaluation team not
to beat the program designers… but the Bank tried to obtain relevant knowledge. One
of the preparatory studies looked into the matter, focused on former RUF members,
tried to get resource persons involved, etc…But, perhaps that’s a little too sensitive to
write about, we certainly had to be very careful at that time….] However, some
observers of the Lomé negotiations feel that an opportunity to bring the RUF and
AFRC into the process was missed in mid-1999.47 The Lomé agreement merely
ratified the 1998 DDRP, without discussion with the armed opposition about the
46
Identify cards were issued to all demobilized combatants. These were punched upon receipt of
deliverables such as training and allowances.
47
Although there were RUF and AFRC liaison officers at the Executive Secretariat, it does not appear
that either the government or rebel organizations saw these officers as well-integrated into the process.
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The changes in RUF leadership in 2000 brought more pragmatic individuals into the
process, and the confidence-building measures that were put in place after the May
2000 breakdown in Phase II appear to have contributed to a sense of RUF ownership
of the process. In particular, the NCDDR Executive Secretariat staff was able to
maintain open channels to the RUF leadership, and continue the dialogue with all
fighting forces between May 2000 and April 2001, when the DDR process was
essentially in a holding pattern. This gave both the peace process and the Executive
Secretariat greater credibility in the eyes of the fighting forces, particularly the RUF,
when the DDR process resumed in 2001. Once the DDR process resumed, the
creation of the Tripartite Committee could be seen as a means of making sure that the
views of all fighting forces were represented at a high level. RUF representatives took
part in the meetings of the Tripartite Committee from that body’s inception. They also
participated in planning and implementing the DDRP through the NCDDR beginning in
August 2001. The RUF joined the government delegation at the June 2001 donor
meeting. Additionally, it pressured recalcitrant parties and was a means of helping to
reinforce political will and commitment to the peace process.
5 Core Issues
With every major undertaking, particularly one as important to the national destiny as
DDR, there are a number of core issues that largely determine the outcome of the
process. The Sierra Leone DDR process demonstrates quite clearly that this includes
a number of critical factors which are exogenous to the design and implementation of
the DDR process. This section focuses on issues that can be influenced or shaped by
those who are responsible for the DDR process, including:
48
This is a point that the external actors facilitating negotiations among warring parties in particular
need to take into account. There is a disturbing trend in peace negotiations since the Dayton
Agreement in the mid-1990s that seems to prioritize speed over taking the time to hammer out
compromises on key issues. Good point, see my earlier comment. This could be a point in its own
right, not only a footnote
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The NCDDR was a political and policymaking body. Reflecting the national ownership
of the GOSL and key stakeholders, the Committee was responsible for developing
policy on DDR and providing overall guidance to the Executive Secretariat.
Membership consisted of representatives of government, the RUF, the AFRC, the
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CDF, UN peace operations, and donors.49 The establishment of the NCDDR was a
clear demonstration of the government’s commitment to the DDR process specifically
and to the peace process generally. The NCDDR provided a forum for key national
stakeholders to meet and discuss issues. The Committee met frequently prior to the
breakdown of the peace process in May 2000. The resumption of hostilities and the
taking of UN hostages indicated to the government that the RUF was not committed to
the peace process, and it significantly reduced the role of the NCDDR.
The government accordingly began to rely more on the Executive Secretariat and the
TCCs, both of which it found to be particularly effective in moving the process forward.
The TCCs deliberated on current issues and problems and considered next steps in
DDRP implementation. The TCCs were made up of technical representatives of the
government, the RUF, the CDF, and the UN. They submitted proposals to the
Tripartite Committee for consideration and decision.
Once the NCDDR became less active, it became clear that it would be necessary to
create a body that could support the political and technical management of the DDR Deleted: focus on
Program, while the NCDDR remained the forum for discussing broader policy issues.
This led to the creation of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration when the demobilization process resumed in 2001. This committee was
chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and was
attended by representatives of the GOSL, the RUF, and the UN, with the Executive
Secretary representing the secretariat. [The ES was the secretary of the TCC, and
took responsibility for technical inputs to the TCC] The Tripartite Committee co-opted
the TCCs. The TCC for disarmament and development, for example, was chaired by
the Executive Secretariat of the NCDDR. Other ad hoc committees were also
established to monitor the overall implementation of the program.
The Tripartite Committee met regularly to discuss implementation of the DDR process.
It became quite effective in setting the pace of disarmament during Phase III, as well
as in tracking the implementation of the process and making necessary political
decisions. In doing so, it provided a parallel political mechanism that was very
important for the success of the peace process because other critical, non-DDR issues
were often raised in this forum, keeping the DDR process within the context of the
larger peace process.
The Joint Committee thereby provided a forum for building confidence that extended
49
Initially, the UK High Commissioner represented the donor community. He was later joined by the
U.S. Ambassador. According to Morse and Knight, although the international community was present in
advisory role, international community politics reportedly reduced NCDDR efficiency, because donors
were at times risk averse and/or had their domestic constituencies to consider. (“Lessons Learned,” p.
31.)
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beyond the DDR process itself.50 As a critical confidence building measure, this
committee provided an impartial venue for resolution of problems that arose in
implementing Phase III of DDR. A similar mechanism was tried in Angola during the
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III. It was less successful there
due to the absence of political will, demonstrating that such mechanisms can
strengthen, but not create, that will.
50
For example, issues discussed at the Tripartite meetings included cease-fire violations, release of
RUF prisoners held by the government, deployment of UNAMSIL troops, post-disarmament weapons
collection plans, and the RUF’s alleged links to Al Qaeda.
51
The first executive secretary was reported to be an able administrator but, as a Sierra Leone national
who had lived outside the country for some thirty years, he was less able to manage the political
aspects of the job.
52
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” p. 36.
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organizations. By and large, the institution came to gain the confidence not
only of the major actors but also of the individual ex-combatants it was set up to
serve. It ended up as the focal institution to which ex-combatants could bring
their problems and grievances, seek support, and even vent their anger or
frustration. The fact that it was viewed as an independent civilian institution
staffed by civilians, assiduously projecting a high level of neutrality and even-
handedness in its treatment of the combatants, also contributed to its success.
The Sierra Leone DDR experience points to the important role that informal contacts
and channels play in facilitating and moving a DDR process forward. In addition to the
formal structures established to develop and implement the DDR process, as well as
the general peace process, there were numerous contacts among key stakeholders
outside formal channels. These involved, for example, extended family networks and
relations, back-channel dialogues, and other informal discussions. All of these
contributed to the resolution of issues, building confidence among the key
stakeholders. Of particular note, there were informal conversations on the margins at
formal Tripartite Committee and NCDDR meetings.
The Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) was created as a condition
of the Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (CRRP.) It was a
mechanism to provide fiduciary safeguards and technical capacity not available locally.
Along with the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, coordinated by the World Bank, the FMPU was
critically important for reassuring donors, the ex-combatants, and the Sierra Leone
community at large, that money would be used for purposes intended. By minimizing
the opportunities for fraud and leakages, the FMPU protected the Executive
Secretariat from political and personal pressures and enabled Secretariat staff to
operate in a transparent and accountable manner. Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC),
which implemented the FMPU for the government, following an international
competitive bidding process, employed a combination of local and expatriate staff.
PWC initially assumed that the FMPU’s internal control unit would function primarily on
the basis of desk studies, but it rapidly became evident that effective internal control
required the enhanced field-presence of FMPU staff.53
One of the most important challenges facing nations mired in or emerging from war is
the lack of or debilitation of institutional memory. Staff knowledge is weak with regard
to the various mandate, regulatory, and statutory frameworks and requirements,
operational modalities, and organizational cultures of various donors. The importation
or creation in Sierra Leone of such capacity, in the ready-made shape of the FMPU,
53
According to the bidding document, “All staff of the [FMPU] will be based in Freetown, Sierra Leone,
however, some travel will be required to the provincial capitals and district headquarters in order to
assist in monitoring the regional financial officers and implementing partners. It is expected that middle
level FMPU technical staff will be required to travel up-country approximately 5 days per quarter.”
(“Description of Services” [Appendix A], n.d., p. 10.)
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was therefore essential to the success of the DDR process. Although the FMPU
served the NCRRR/ NaCSA, in addition to the NCDDR, it was essentially a stand-
alone venture separate from other public institutions. Moreover, the MDTF budget was
not integrated in the national budget. The FMPU’s procurement, disbursement,
reporting, and auditing modalities did provide a beneficial exposure to modern, above-
board business practices for the large number of implementation partners involved,
and the business community in general. The capacity-building element could have
been enhanced by designing opportunities for linkages, and knowledge and
experience transfers to line ministries, as well as other institutions entrusted with the
management and procurement of substantial public resources. [Only at additional
costs, and that should be stated!] That said, it is gratifying to note that NaCSA’s
Financial Directorate is benefiting from what the FMPU has left behind. Additionally,
PWC was able to help four Sierra Leone nationals qualify as certified accountants.
The Sierra Leone experience underscores the importance for the success of a DDR
process of the positions adopted by key international partners. The Sierra Leone
peace process, as well as the DDR process specifically, benefited enormously from
the support of the international community, including its regional partners. The nature
and scope of the support provided exceeded that of many previous international
undertakings of a similar nature. This can be illustrated by briefly examining the
policies and activities of three major international partners: the United Nations,
especially UNAMSIL, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF; the World Bank; and
the UK.54
The political and security role of the United Nations evolved over time, growing after
the ERT pulled out in May 2000. The peace operation’s mandate was increasingly
strengthened, and UNAMSIL benefited from operational support from the UK.
UNAMSIL, in particular, played an important role in supporting the implementation of Deleted: implementing
the DDRP. Initially limited to monitoring and then operating under a Chapter 6
mandate that was interpreted rather conservatively, the UN peacekeeping mission
became progressively more proactive and its support more constructive.55 UNAMSIL
provided key logistical and administrative support for the camps after May 2000.
54
Regional actors are examined in more detail in section 7.
55
The initial UNOMSIL mandate of July 1998 was limited to monitoring. The first UNAMSIL mandate
extended beyond monitoring but was under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. In February 2000,
UNAMSIL’s mandate was strengthened to Chapter 7, and the number of troops nearly doubled (from
6,000 to 11,000). After the UK withdrew logistical support for the demobilization process following the
resumption of hostilities in 2000, UNAMSIL, along with NCDDR, eventually picked up some of the slack.
UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL mandates are at S/RES/1181, July 13, 1998, http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement; S/RES/1270 (1999),
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdf?OpenElement; and S/RES/
1289 (2000), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/283/50/PDF/N0028350.pdf?OpenElement> in March 2001, authorized
troop size reached its highest level (17,500). See S/RES1346 (2001), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/312/19/PDF/N0131219.pdf?OpenElement.
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NCDDR would not have been able to administer the camps without UNAMSIL support.
The UN was also responsible for disarmament during Phases II and III, and it provided
the essential security for the DDR process. Also of note was the role that the
UNAMSIL Force Commander assumed after May 2000, developing personal
relationships with the fighting forces, especially the RUF, and building confidence and
trust. In addition, UNAMSIL provided support through its DDR unit, including stop-gap
programs and technical support through the TCCs and the NCDDR Operations
Centers.
The World Food Programme provided important support to the demobilization process
from 1998 onward by providing food for the ex-combatants. UNICEF also played a
crucial role, assuming responsibility for reintegrating the child soldiers, which reduced
the burden on the NCDDR.56 Finally, the fact that the UN Resident Coordinator
became the Deputy SRSG promoted collaboration between the political and security
wings of the UN, on the one hand, and the development wing, on the other. This
increased the overall impact of the UN’s role.
The UN’s role was not without its shortcomings. Some of the negative aspects of UN
involvement included the initial weak mandate, a conservative interpretation of the
mandate, the varying quality of UN troops, the overly-liberal interpretation of criteria for
people being disarmed, and misinformation provided on program benefits to lure
combatants into disarmament process.57 The rapid turnover rate of UN troops and
military observers was also a problem, as there was little institutional memory and
relationships constantly had to be re-formed. In fact, NCDDR, with support from its
partners, eventually had to request that key UNAMSIL staff collaborating with NCDDR
be rotated less frequently.58
The United Kingdom’s contribution has been characterized as “crucial but inconsistent
leadership.”59 The UK provided critical political and military support for the
government throughout the peace process, but especially during the negotiations for
the Lomé agreement and after Lomé broke down in 2000. Britain assisted the UN in
strengthening UNAMSIL’s operational capacity. It also enhanced security through its
active military role in 2000 and its support for other pillars of the peace process. This
support included the strengthening and restructuring of the police, the development of
the new Sierra Leone Army, and other aspects of the Sierra Leone Security Sector
Reform Programme. The UK supported the DDR process from 1996, and, in
particular, provided critical logistical, technical, and financial assistance for
disarmament and demobilization activities. It also provided critical political support for
56
More detail on UNICEF’s role and the program for child combatants is found in section 6.3.6.
57
Ex-combatants and NCDDR staff interviewed stated that UN peacekeepers would sometimes
exaggerate when discussing the benefits to be provided in order to entice combatants into the program.
This caused problems later, as frustration arose over the fact that initial expectations were not met.
58
After a while, NCDDR developed an information packet for incoming UNAMSIL personnel and
undertook regular briefings, in an additional attempt to overcome this problem.
59
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 40-42. Additional information on the UK role is found in
section 5.1.
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the DDR process in Sierra Leone and international fora. At the same time, Britain’s
withdrawal of support at a critical moment in the DDR process, particularly the
precipitous withdrawal of the ERT in 2000, created problems for the NCDDR.
The World Bank’s contribution was vital throughout the process. The World Bank’s
approach supported the government’s national ownership of the DDR process. At the
outset, the Bank provided critical financial and technical support through the PPF for
the design of the program. It reinforced national ownership, as well as national
management, by strengthening the capacity of the NCDDR at the headquarters,
regional, and district levels. Despite the high risk due to the uncertainty of the peace
process in 1998, the World Bank accepted responsibility of setting up the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund for DDR, which unified donor support on one set of program objectives. It
also unified support for one set of procurement, financial, management, disbursement,
and reporting arrangements. Furthermore, the Bank’s mobilization capacity, and its
fiduciary oversight, encouraged donors to support the DDR process, including several
countries without a presence in Sierra Leone. The World Bank’s part in the
establishment of the FMPU provided the level of comfort necessary for the
international community to devote adequate resources to the DDR process, in an
environment otherwise characterized by a high level of corruption. In addition to
administering the MDTF, the World Bank fielded personnel who were highly committed
and contributed to the success of the DDR program. The Bank even financed Deleted: also provided
technical support to UNAMSIL for weapons disposal. [We do not have the technical
expertise but drew up the TOR and recruited the firm]
More generally, through the Economic Recovery Support Fund and the CRRP, the
Bank assisted the rehabilitation of Sierra Leone’s economy and society. This provided
a conducive environment for the success of the DDR program. Furthermore, the Bank
supported the development of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP),
which provided the necessary linkage to address the root causes of the conflict.
However, the Bank’s role, vital as it has been, could have been strengthened if the
coverage of the MDTF had extended to include disarmament activities. Its role could Deleted: -related
also have been strengthened if the Trust Fund had come on track at the time the
DDRP got under way in 1998, and if there had been more robust support for capacity-
building among the implementing partners.
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The GOSL dealt with the political nature of the process at several levels. First, the
president took responsibility for making the DDR process work. He engaged both
formally and informally with key national and international stakeholders. Similarly, the
second Executive Secretary of the NCDDR developed important relationships, both
with the fighting forces and with key members of the international community. As a
group, the Executive Secretariat staff developed the capacity to manage a wide variety
of actors with vastly different agendas. It also developed mechanisms for helping to
shield the Executive Secretary from undue political pressures. [Who is “it”? I would
think that staff hardly protected the ES, rather the ES had to be protected from
pressure brought up through staff. I believe the Bank and enlightened partners, as
well as strong structures / institutions such as the FMPU, MDTF, regular meetings with
partners, etc.. helped protect the integrity of the ES and the DDR Program. By having
policies and guiding principles, NCDDR was able to avoid a certain degree of political
pressure. For example, pressure to provide additional benefits to one group versus
another was addressed based on the principle that all ex-combatants should have
access to the same set of allowances and opportunities. In general, NCDDR was able
to maintain a significant degree of impartiality and transparency, which was crucial for
implementation success.
The Executive Secretariat produced a series of policy papers, with options on a range
of issues relating directly and indirectly to DDR, including gender, child soldiers, the
TSAs, camp security, and program eligibility criteria. In developing its approach to the
many aspects of the DDR process, the Executive Secretariat considered: (1) the
principles on which the DDR process was to be constructed, and how those principles
might be applied; (2) the capacities of existing national and international actors to
undertake specific activities; and (3) which actor was best positioned to play a
particular role. This means that decisions about the shape and scope of the DDRP
were not taken on an ad hoc basis but were based on serious analysis and
consideration of options. It also means that the NCDDR had established principles to
rely on as events pushed implementation of the DDRP in unforeseen directions.
Equally important, the NCDDR secretariat was open to reassessing its position when
events did not work out as anticipated.
As far as acquiring adequate institutional and human capacity was concerned, the
NCDDR Secretariat benefited from having strong managers, who were able to develop
technical expertise in their areas of responsibility. They also developed institutional
partnerships with key actors such as the World Bank, UNAMSIL, the ERT, and
UNICEF, and hired short- and long-term consultants as required.
provide insights for individuals designing future DDR programs. These questions
include:
One of the major lessons of previous DDR processes is that organizationally de-linking
the process of disarming and demobilizing combatants from that of planning and
delivering reinsertion and reintegration support creates institutional rivalries that
undermine the effective and efficient delivery of DDR programs. The GOSL wisely
chose to create the NCDDR and its Executive Secretariat as an autonomous body,
with a mandate to provide and promote the reintegration of the former warring parties
(see box 2). It also chose to vest the responsibility for assistance to war-affected
populations in NCRRR. The expectation was that once combatants were demobilized
and returned to civilian life, they would also benefit from activities supported by
NCRRR. The assumption was also that NCRRR would address reintegration issues of
the general population.
Some of Sierra Leone’s external partners were of the opinion that disarmament and
demobilization should have been handled by one agency, while reintegration support
to ex-combatants should have been integrated into the work of NCRRR and its
successor, NaCSA.60 This view appears to reflect, at least in part, the fact that the
linkages between the short-term reinsertion program for ex-combatants, supported by
NCDDR, and the community-oriented reintegration, rehabilitation, and recovery
60
Authors’ interviews, Freetown, April-May 2004. See also, Simon Arthy, “Ex Combatant Reintegration:
Key Issues for Policy Makers and Practitioners, Based on Lessons from Sierra Leone,” consultant report
commissioned by DFID, August 2003, p. 4.
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Draft August 2004 35
Source: NCDDR, Draft Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants, p. 7, cited in Stelios Comninos,
Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the National Committee for
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, November 8, 2002, p. 21.
61
Authors’ interviews, April-May 2004.
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Draft August 2004 36
collaboration between NCRRR and NCDDR might have been brought about is found in
section 7.2.4.
Similarly, focus group interviews conducted for this evaluation demonstrated that
members of communities where ex-combatants have settled simultaneously resent the
targeted assistance to the perpetrators of violence and welcome the financial
“We are trying to buy something from
the rebels that only they can provide:
we must buy peace.”
62
NCDDR, Draft Framework of Reintegration Support for Ex-Combatants, pp. official,
—Sierra Leone 8-9, cited in SteliosMay 2004
Freetown,
Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, “Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes of the
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” November 8, 2002, p. 26.
NCDDR staff have reported that when the rational for targeted assistance was explained to paramount
chiefs, other community leaders, and community members, they understood its necessity.
63
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, “Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes,” pp. 26-27. This
point was confirmed in conversations with Government of Sierra Leone officials and staff of the
Executive Secretariat.
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The experience of Sierra Leone, therefore, demonstrates that targeted assistance for
ex-combatants is essential for the success of a DDR program, particularly in a
situation where the conflict is of a protracted nature. Nonetheless, although the
international community contributed to the MDTF, which supported the government’s
chosen approach to DDR, some also chose to finance parallel programs for ex-
combatants that targeted both ex-combatants and community members. Some of
these parallel programs initially did not have MOUs with NCDDR and, therefore, did
not directly support the NCDDR program.64 Two of these, DFID’s Community
Reintegration Program (CRP) and GTZ’s multi-sectoral training program, subsequently
did begin to certify that ex-combatants had received training that qualified as their
vocational training benefit under the DDR program.65 USAID’s Youth Reintegration
Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) never reduced the NCDDR
caseload, as an MOU was never signed and, therefore, YRTEP could not be
considered a true parallel partner.66
This meant that NCDDR had to raise additional funds to provide training for ex-
combatants who completed courses without NCDDR certification.67 Additionally, even
when parallel programs reduced the NCDDR caseload, they increased its
administrative burden, through the need to coordinate with them and to monitor the
expectations created by these programs. What is more, parallel partners sometimes
posed a serious challenge to the national program, as they either provided more or
less support to the ex-combatants than the national program did, creating frustration
on the part of ex-combatants.68
64
The relationship between the international NGO community and NCDDR was often problematic and
never reached its full capacity for a variety of complicated reasons that can most delicately be described
as different cultures coming together. The 2000 DDRP Review suggested that a neutral facilitator be
provided by the World Bank or DFID to “reconcile the clash of cultures.”
65
UNAMSIL, DDR Coordination Section, Human Security Fund: Internal Monitoring & Evaluation
Report, August 2003, pp. 6, 16. The UN’s Human Security Fund Program for Reintegration involved
“collaboration between [the] DDR Coordination Section of UNAMSIL and UNDP Sierra Leone, in
consultation with [the] National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration.” The HSF
program provided training opportunities for ex-combatants and war-affected youth. By the end of June
2003, it had reduced the NCDDR caseload by approximately 2,600.
66
YRTEP did not punch cards for NCDDR because it was not an official partner. It also operated in
communities before disarmament and demobilization had taken place. This contradicted the NCDDR
approach, which tied benefits to disarmament and demobilization. Approximately 16,000 ex-
combatant—not all of whom went through the NCDDR process—participated in the YRTEP program.
67
The fact that these programs failed to punch cards for some or all of their ex-combatant caseload
does not reflect on the quality of training provided. For an evaluation of the YTREP, see Art Hansen,
Julie Nenon, Joy Wolf, and Marc Sommers, Final Evaluation of the Office of Transition Initiatives’
Program in Sierra Leone, August 2002. The DRP, GTZ programs, and the YRTEP are also discussed
briefly in Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, “Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes,” pp. 101-
104.
68
What is more, even donors who supported parallel programs acknowledged that it would have been
too expensive to provide high-end programs to all ex-combatants. Authors’ interviews, 2004.
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From the government’s point of view, therefore, it is preferable for DDR-related funding
to be applied directly to the government’s program through the MDTF. From the
perspective of strengthening government, it is also preferable for DDR-related funding
to be managed by the government. From the perspective of providing the maximum
number of ex-combatants with training opportunities, it is preferable to have parallel
programs governed by MOUs with the government whenever possible. Donors,
therefore, need to consider the value they place on promoting national ownership.
Setting optimal eligibility criteria to meet the needs of a specific situation is a very
problematic issue in any DDR process. In the case of Sierra Leone, the fighting forces
were composed of regular, militia, and guerilla forces, made up of a mix of volunteers
and abductees, including women and children. This made the task doubly
challenging.
Eligibility criteria define who is or is not a combatant and have far broader ramifications
than determining who gets access to immediate benefits or support. The
multidimensional nature of war, incorporating political, economic, intelligence,
propaganda, and logistics tasks, in addition to military combat, may engulf a significant
section of the population. A large number of people could claim they have fought on
one side or the other, in one way or another. Making hard but politically prudent
choices and tradeoffs, setting limits to fit the resource envelope, and keeping focused
on the basic goals of the exercise, become critical.
In Sierra Leone, the eligibility criteria were set to respond to the core objective of
disarming the warring parties, although the principle of uniform and equitable treatment
of the parties, and the apparent need to have a prioritized and phased program of
arms collection, were also relevant. The criteria set to meet the conditions and
requirements of the different phases, and the process of individual and group
disarmament, were appropriate and quite effective in achieving their objective. This
was especially evident given the fact that the pace of disarmament was determined by
the overall political and security situation, the degree of commitment of the fighting
forces to the peace process, and an individual’s will to continue fighting, rather than
the efficacy of the criteria. Consequently, in Phase I, given the weak commitment to
peace, the program focused on enticing individuals to disarm. Similarly, in Phase II,
although the policies and guidelines were reviewed in consultation with ECOMOG and
UNOMSIL, in light of Lomé, the program still focused on the individual combatant.
In Phase III, with the signing of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and a clear
commitment of all the warring factions to a peaceful resolution, the necessary
conditions for group disarmament were created. The criteria for group disarmament
were essentially that units present themselves with all their members, weapons, and
ammunition. Moreover, eligibility depended on a standard of minimum acceptable
member-to-weapons ratio, which factored in the type and number of weapons handed
in, coupled with verification of combatant status. Group disarmament based on a
percentage of weapons presented provided commanders with the opportunity to
The Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 39
include in the program all people under their control, but it also enabled them to
determine who entered the program. As a result, certain combatants were excluded,
while individuals who had not been part of the fighting forces were included in the
program.
Therefore, in general the criteria were appropriate to the situation and effective in
achieving their objective, particularly with respect to drawing combatants into civilian
life. There are various estimates that indicate there may be significant quantities of
arms that have not been surrendered. The ongoing Community Arms Collection
Program may be able to address that. In the final analysis, what will matter is not the
availability of arms, but the mind-set of the people, particularly the youth, and
resolution of the root causes of the conflict.
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Draft August 2004 40
The degree to which it occurred is unknown. Estimates range from a small and insignificant amount to
over 50 percent. What is known is that it occurred, and that women especially were affected by this
practice because of social norms.
The second reason for exclusion is that the weapons criteria were problematic for those who fought with
traditional weapons, such as muskets, and, therefore, were not eligible. This disproportionately affected
the CDF, many of whom tended to fight with traditional weapons. Some sources suggest that the
majority of CDF was disqualified from the DDRP. At the same time, NCDDR was expected to remove
weapons used to promote the rebel war. It was not intended to focus on traditional weapons used by
communities to defend themselves.
From a practical standpoint, however, some tangible criteria had to be instituted or the government ran
the risk of being overwhelmed with people claiming to be ex-combatants.
Source: Richards, Archibald, Bah, and Vincent, “Where have all the Young People Gone?”. p. 16.
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As can be seen from box 5, the DDR package proposed at the outset of Phase I in
Sierra Leone fits comfortably within the framework of box 4. The value of the
TSA/Reinsertion Benefit was calculated on the basis of a basket of commodities and
services. It was intended to support the ex-combatant and approximately five
dependents for the first six to nine months of civilian life. Food and basic medical care
was provided in the demobilization camps. When the disarmament and demobilization
process was fast-tracked in Phase III, the pre-discharge orientation was significantly
reduced in duration.
69
Details of the DDR package offered to ex-combatants in Angola in 1997 are found in Nicole Ball and
Kathleen F. Campbell, Complex Crisis and Complex Emergency. Humanitarian Coordination in Angola,
(New York: OCHA, 1998), http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/angola/, pp 42-43. Packages offered in
Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda are detailed in Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer,
with the assistance of Emilio Mondo, Taimi Sitari, and Tadesse A. Woldu, Cases in War-to-Peace
Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda,
World Bank Discussion Paper no. 331, Africa Department Technical Series (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1996.)
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One major challenge was to ensure that the needs of combatants’ dependents were
adequately met during the encampment stage. It was assumed that the humanitarian
partners would attend to camp followers, as they would to IDPs or refugees. However,
this did not happen, as humanitarian actors were concerned with minimizing risk to
their staff and avoiding compromising their perceived neutrality. They also were highly
reluctant to deal with combatants or their dependents, a problem that was manifest in
all aspects of the DDR process. There were also considerations relating to the cost of
maintaining dependents. Donors would not have looked favorably on large budgets
for food and humanitarian assistance because they were already providing such
assistance to the population at large. Providing assistance to the dependents of
encamped RUF and AFRC combatants would likely have encouraged CDF
combatants to seek assistance for their dependents, which would have been extremely
costly.
This policy did cause some problems, particularly during Phase II, when RUF and
AFRC dependents were separated from the combatants and supported by
humanitarian NGOs and NCRRR. As Ted Morse and Mark Knight have observed,
“This was neither logical nor practical. The dependent populations in some
demobilization camps during Phase II greatly increased logistical and security
requirements and impeded the ability of ES/NCDDR and its partners to fully and
efficiently implement the program. But to try to exclude them causes social friction that
is inflammatory.”70 During Phase III, when the encampment period was significantly
shortened, WFP increased the food allocation to registered combatants, and
dependents were allowed to remain with the head of household.
70
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” p. 88.
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This demonstrates the importance of ensuring that the needs of dependents are taken
care of. It also demonstrates that needs vary according to the length of the
encampment period. What was feasible during Phase III of the Sierra Leone DDR
process was not feasible during Phases I and II, given the different lengths of the
encampment period. [Also, and perhaps more importantly, NGOs and the WFP were
initially not ready to support the DDR Program]
Until quite recently, DDR programs tended to “In sum, the experience of women
assume that all combatants were male. and girls in the fighting forces was
While the majority of combatants tend to be complex. They were captives and
male, wars that involve irregular forces dependents, but they were also
invariably have a not-insignificant number of involved in the planning and
females associated with the fighting forces in execution of the war.”
different capacities. This was clearly the —Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson,
From Combat to Community: Women and
case in Sierra Leone, where women and girls Girls of Sierra Leone, p. 2.
engaged in combat; served as porters, cooks,
assistants to the sick and wounded,
messengers, communications technicians, spies, and sexual partners; and worked in
the diamond fields.71
There are two ways of incorporating females into DDR programs: by adopting a
gender-neutral approach or a gender-sensitive one.72 NCDDR adopted a gender-
neutral approach, and it is widely agreed that females did not fully benefit for this. This
was in part due to the multiple roles females played; traditional gender norms, which
deterred access; and the narrow focus of the DDRP’s objectives. Regardless, the
original program document contained only one short paragraph about female ex-
combatants.73 There were no gender specialists involved in the design of the DDRP.
This is not to say that NCDDR set out to establish a gender-unfriendly process or that
there were not positive results. (See discussion on sensitization campaigns, below.)
However, with a few exceptions, any differences in access and needs between female
and male combatants, as well as the other roles females played, were not fully taken
into consideration.
Of the over 72,000 ex-combatants who were demobilized, 5,275 were women (7.4
71
Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, From Combat to
Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, Women Waging Peace Policy Commission, January
2004, p. 12, http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/SierraLeoneFullCaseStudy.pdf>.
72
Vanessa A. Farr, Gender-aware Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): A Checklist,
(New York: UNIFEM, n.d.), http://www.networklearning.org/books/gender-aware-disarmament.html.
73
Government of Sierra Leone, National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme,” July 15, 1998, p. 14.
While both child ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants rated their own annexes, describing the
types of assistance that should be provided to them, there was no similar annex for female ex-
combatants, and, as indicated above, combatants’ dependents—many of whom were female—were
similarly slighted.
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percent).74 Of the 6,787 children who went through the DDR process, 506 were girls
(9.4 percent).75 Although the exact numbers are not known, it is generally agreed that
these figures do not represent many females who served as fighters during the conflict
or those who played other roles. This is true both for the RUF, which was widely
known to have a large number of female fighters, as well as the CDF, which had
significantly fewer numbers but reportedly did have females serving as combatants.76
(See table 2 for details.)77
Source: Humphreys and Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-
August 2003.*
Note: The frequency and percentage is based on the male-to-female ratio for each faction.
The fact that females did not participate in the DDR process to the highest extent
possible demonstrates the complexity of designing and implementing DDR programs
that are female-friendly. Not only did females associated with the conflict face some of
the same fears that kept some men from entering the DDR process (fear of reprisals,
an unclear understanding of the purpose of the DDR program, and so on), they also
74
Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants
in Sierra Leone June-August 2003, Interim Report (Columbia University, Stanford University, and
PRIDE, July 2004), p. 14.
75
Mazurana and Carlson, From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, p.2.
76
There is debate over the role of women within the CDF. There are those who insist that women did
not serve as combatants for the CDF. Officially, there were no women in the CDF, so the number 303,
reflects a group who perhaps cheated their way into the process. However, this position contradicts
written and verbal reports the evaluation team received that state that a small number of women did
serve as fighters. See Mazurana and Carlson, From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra
Leone and Humphreys and Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra
Leone June-August 2003 for more details.
77
Humphreys and Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-
August 2003, p. 14. This information comes from a survey based on a random sample of 1,043 ex-
combatants. The figures from the survey, while helpful, most likely still do not fully represent the role
females played in the conflict, due to the multiplicity of their roles, and how females define themselves.
In a separate correspondence, one of the authors stated that it is believed the numbers are understated
because many CDF women do not identify themselves as ex-combatants.
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faced cultural dynamics and biases that prevented or discouraged their entrance.
Assuming that female were merely sex slaves or bush wives diminished the
understanding of the other roles that women and girls played in the conflict, including
that of combatants. Additionally, some females were ashamed to admit their
combatant role, and self-selected not to enter the DDR process.
Some women and girls also chose not to participate in the DDR process because they
did not want to be further associated with men who were responsible for their
abduction and who were taking part in the DDR process. The DDR process was not
designed to de-link women from their captors, and some women used peace as an
opportunity to get away from their bush husbands.78 This was primarily the case for
RUF ex-combatants, who represented the bulk of abducted females.
That said, the TSA design was based on an understanding that each combatant would
have dependents. Further, NCDDR did recognize the weakness of a gender-neutral
approach and, on two occasions, attempted to provide additional support that primarily
targeted women in non-combatant roles. On one occasion, micro-credit funds were
offered to the bush wives, and, in another instance, a separate camp was started for
dependents. However, in both instances, the solutions only created additional
problems and the activities were halted. In the case of the micro-credit scheme, there
were reports of increased domestic violence as male ex-combatants wanted access to
the funds.
78
Because many women did not participate in the DDR program, and because there is debate over
published statistics on females associated with conflict, it is difficult to determine how many women and
girls self-reintegrated, how many remained with their former command units, how many were primarily
fighters, and how many served primarily as support for fighting forces.
79
For CDF female fighters, it is reported that the women were ordered to turn in their weapons prior to
demobilization. Then they were not included in CDF groups that presented themselves for
disarmament. Because of the perception that the CDF did not have female fighters, little outreach was
conducted to inform women of their eligibility to participate in the DDR process. Mazurana and Carlson,
From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone, p. 3.
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Shame over the roles that they played during the conflict, and the sexual and physical
abuse they endured, has meant social stigma in addition to psychological trauma. The
lack of programming that directly targets this war-affected population has only further
diminished its status, as there are only a few alternatives available for these women.80
Some community members have tried to improve the victims’ lives by opening skills-
training centers but, because of the generally depressed economy, social and
economic gains remain limited. As a result, many females who were part of the
conflict eek out a subsistence-level income.
It should be noted that, from a pragmatic stance, the fact that the process was gender-
neutral was not necessarily negative, given the objectives of the DDRP. In order to
adequately disarm combatants and break the chain of command, a sufficient number
of ex-combatants needed to successfully go through the program. As the majority of
combatants were men, females did not necessarily need special consideration, as they
did not pose a sufficient threat to be considered a security issue. As one NCDDR
official stated, “Our real focus was on de-militarizing the situation, to create the space
for more humanitarian and gender-sensitive partners who were initially far away from
the front-line and refused to touch ex-combatants and their dependants.”81 As a result,
the program can be claimed successful regardless of the number of females involved.
From a social perspective, however, this overlooks the complexity of the issue
surrounding women and girls who were associated with the conflict, and it leaves them
as a vulnerable group. This speaks to the need for a stronger understanding of
gender and for gender programming that goes beyond the confines of a DDR program.
(See section 5.3.6 and 7.2.10 for more details.)
The process had a positive impact in the area of sensitization. Activities that
addressed violent behavior and social norms, as well as activities in which women
were prominently featured in leadership roles or on radio broadcasts, assisted in
raising the status of women. Sensitization was a product of many different
organizations, but it was often credited to NCDDR, the most prominent body. The
cumulative effect was that men began to modify violent behavior, which had a positive
impact on women, and women began to see themselves as capable of going beyond
the limited roles defined before and during the conflict.82 Female community members
credited NCDDR for changing the status of women, even though it is well known that
many female ex-combatants were left out of the process. In Kailahun, women
interviewed specifically cited NCDDR’s campaigns as one of the reasons there was an
increase in the number of women running for local office in the upcoming elections.
80
Based on the amount of available programming, war-affected women and girls do not appear to be a
priority for the government or the international community.
81
Correspondence with NCDDR staff.
82
During the conflict, women and girls were often abducted and treated as slaves.
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Until relatively recently, many fighting forces denied having children in their ranks.
Beginning with the demobilization process in Angola, under the Lusaka Protocol to the
Bicesse Agreement in the mid-1990s, fighting groups began to admit to having
combatants younger than 18 years of age (see table 3.) It is now widely recognized
within the international community that not only are children often present in conflicts in
significant numbers, but also that they should not go through the same demobilization
process as adults.
Adults Children
Source: Sierra Leone Government National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,
Executive Secretariat, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme—Statistical Report, February
2004, p. 12.
In contrast to female combatants, the need for a separate program to reintegrate child
soldiers was recognized from the outset in Sierra Leone. The 1998 DDR program
document outlined a program of assistance for child soldiers. It also specified that the
NCDDR would subcontract implementation of the program to “qualified agencies and
NGOs” while retaining monitoring and oversight responsibility. The Lomé Agreement
also included an article on child combatants that specified that the government was to
seek the support of the international community.
UNICEF was given responsibility for running the program as well as for raising funds
for it.83 The partnership between the NCDDR, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender
and Children’s Affairs, and UNICEF was exemplary and effective.
UNICEF found that having the issue of children addressed in the peace accord was an
83
Government of Sierra Leone and UNICEF, “Memorandum of Understanding between Executive
Secretariat, National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) and
UNICEF Freetown,” August 2002.
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One lesson that UNICEF learned from “The Government shall accord particular
these decisions was that there should have attention to the issue of child soldiers. It
been more follow up of child combatants shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both
who were with one or more of their parents within the country and from the International
or guardians. There is no guarantee that, Community, and especially through the
simply because a child is in the custody of Office of the UN Special Representative for
its family, it will be well taken care of or sent Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and
other agencies, to address the special needs
to school. A second lesson for UNICEF
of these children in the existing
was that future peace processes in disarmament, demobilization and
countries such as Sierra Leone should reintegration process.”
include children associated with the fighting
—“Peace Agreement between the Government of
forces rather than only child combatants Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
because the latter designation Sierra Leone,” Article XXX.
discriminated in favor of boys, who often
carried guns, and against girls, who carried bullets and food and were victims of sexual
abuse.85
The UNICEF reintegration program consisted of five main elements, which are
described in more detail in annex 4.
Children included in the UNICEF program were removed from demobilization camps,
ideally within 72 hours, and placed in interim care centers. They stayed at the ICCs for
approximately six weeks, at which time they were introduced to adult direction,
84
Separated Children are defined as children who find themselves without an adult care giver due to
reasons not directly related to war, abuse, abandonment and neglect by their parents.
85
UNICEF instituted a Girls Left Behind project that has found some 1,000 girls who were abducted by
the fighting forces and not officially included in the child combatant program. UNICEF estimates that
there may be another 2,000 girls, possibly more, who are eligible for this program.
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Draft August 2004 49
encouraged to drop their bush names, and motivated to pursue education. A major
objective of the first stage of the program was to terminate the child’s identification with
his or her fighting group.86
Efforts were made to trace children’s families and return children to their homes and
enroll them in school. School enrollment was viewed as particularly important for
children under the ages of 17, as many children had been told they were fighting for
the right to an education. Because of the devastation created by the war, families of
returning child combatants received support through the family and community
reintegration support component. Where families could not be traced, or where
children were unable to return to their families, alternative care was provided in the
form of a group home, another family, an apprenticeship program, or independent
living. UNICEF stressed the importance of follow-up to ensure that children in
alternative care were treated properly; for example, that stipends to the care providers
were actually used to feed and clothe the children. UNICEF found that it was also
important to encourage implementing partners responsible for alternative care
arrangements to continue efforts to reunite children with their families. There had
been an incorrect assumption on the part of some implementing partners that
UNICEF’s support for the children would continue into the future. In order to
encourage schools to accept child combatants, the CEIP provided school fees and in-
kind support, such as supplies and teacher training.
Children 16 to 17 years of age received formal skills training through NCDDR TEP
activities. UNICEF concluded that this was not the best strategy. With only six to nine
months of training, children were unable to become more than apprentices, but there
was no formal linkage to apprenticeships or job placement.87
While on the conceptual level there was a clear linkage between disarmament and
demobilization and long-term reintegration, the complementarity between NCDDR and
NCRRR/NaCSA programs was not fully realized. NCRRR/NaCSA and NCDDR had
different mandates, different implementation styles, and different timelines. Once DDR
was fast-tracked in 2001, completion of disarmament and demobilization became a
key criterion for entry of the NCRRR, government ministries, and most non-
governmental organizations into an area. As a result, NCDDR and NCRRR/NaCSA
were not always in the same area in time periods that would have encouraged
complementarity. Nor were they always conducting activities that would naturally
86
UNICEF acknowledged that interim care centers suffered from a number of shortcomings but felt
nonetheless that they played a very important role in the program. One of the problems identified was
that, if an interim care center was situated too close to a demobilization center, the children were subject
to frequent visits from fighters, which complicated the effort to remove children from the influence of
their fighting group. Girls were particularly likely to be subject to such visits. UNICEF–Sierra Leone,
“Protection of Children in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. Summary of
Lessons Learnt,” October 2003, pp. 5-6.
87
Authors’ interviews, Freetown, May 2004.
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support each other. This meant that in some cases, there was not even the
opportunity to overlap.
In the view of the evaluators, this was a lost opportunity in many respects, as the two
organizations did not build off of each other’s efforts. It also meant that individuals
who did not participate in the NCDDR program were even less likely to be covered by
NCRRR/NaCSA. For communities that resented the allowances received by the ex-
combatants, or who were dealing with issues of acceptance and forgiveness, the lack
of coordination meant they were less likely to see their own peace dividend or
understand the concept of the two-pronged approach.88
The DDR program was financed through multiple channels, including: (1) government
resources; (2) grants to the MDTF, executed by the GOSL and administered by the
World Bank; (3) the World Bank, specifically IDA credit, delivered through the
Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Program and PPF; (4) peacekeeping
support for disarmament and demobilization; (5) UNICEF support for child soldiers; (6)
UK government support through ERT; and (7) parallel programs (administered in
88
Issues relating to the Poverty-Reduction Strategy, under development at the time the evaluators were
producing this report, are dealt with in section 8. Issues relating to employment are dealt with in section
6.4.2. Possible methods for linking DDR with rehabilitation and recovery are proposed in section 9.2.4.
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particular by the British, the UN, and the Germans.)89 These funding sources will be
considered at greater length in section 5.6.
Two points need to be made here. First, the MDTF was the main vehicle for support to
the DDR process. It defined the shape and content of the process. The benefit of
maximizing resources channeled through the MDTF is that it helps focus donor
contributions on the government’s program and enhances national ownership and
leadership; it promotes resource mobilization; and it reduces the administrative and
financial costs of managing external resources. While a good deal of funding occurred
outside the MDTF, in the absence of the MDTF donor support would have been even
more diffuse and more difficult for the government to manage. The government is
convinced that, in the absence of the MDTF, the outcome of the DDR program—
especially the reinsertion and reintegration components—would have been less
successful. Where funding did not go through the MDTF, the government sought to
use MOUs to link parallel programs, as well as UNICEF support for child soldiers, and
to encourage major partners collaborate through the TCCs. It can therefore be
concluded that the MDTF was of critical importance to the overall success of the DDR
program.
89
The parallel programs considered here are (1) the UK’s Community Rehabilitation Programme, the
CRP, (2) the UN’s Human Security Fund (HSF) program financed by Japan, and (3) the German
government’s bilateral program, implemented by GTZ.
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establishing of peace and security, and for opening a new horizon for development,
donors should forego earmarking contributions. They should also overcome
reluctance to contribute to the common fund and preferences for stand-alone projects.
The database was designed based on the appropriate technology, given the significant
infrastructure and budget limitations.90 Given the importance of the database and the
vital role it played in DDRP implementation, these limitations are important to note. It
was housed in Freetown due to the sensitivity of the equipment and rough conditions
in the field, which included limited communication, electricity, and lack of adequate air
conditioning. However, this meant that information was not immediately accessible in
the field, and updates could not be made as quickly as changes occurred. Information
had to be collected at the field sites and transported to Freetown, where it was entered
into the database. The processing of top priority information happened within a few
days, such as the initial issuing of cards. However, other types of activities, such as
producing replacement cards or tracking an ex-combatant, took longer. Delays also
occurred because NCDDR, in order to prevent fraud and discourage ex-combatants
from registering for multiple trainings, instituted a waiting period that sometimes lasted
several months. (It was not feasible to set up a nation-wide system that could easily
and quickly check for fraud.)
In the reintegration phase, again, to prevent fraud and due to the sensitivity of the
equipment, all information was centralized and any changes in training selection or
location, reissuing of lost cards, and tracking of the distribution of benefits went
through Freetown. This was complicated by the fact that the monitoring and
evaluation component was apparently not designed to fully track beneficiaries. The
result was most likely [or by all accounts?] a low degree of fraud. However, ex-
combatants (how many, can this be quantified”] sometimes had to wait months for new
cards, to have benefit payments sorted out, or to get into a new training.91
International community, ex-combatants, implementing partners, community members,
and several NCDDR staff stated that the centralized database made their jobs more
difficult because there was not the flexibility to respond to immediate needs. This was
90
For example, when the identity cards were designed, the only technology available for printing
secured ID photos was not field deployable. An entire box of printing ribbons was rendered unusable
even in Freetown, due to the high temperatures. Field deployment of ID card printers based on dye
sublimation ribbons was not a possibility in 1999 without a major investment in infrastructure at the
demobilization centers (like air conditioning, safe storage, electricity, and so on.)
91
We do not have precise information on the level of fraud, but the general consensus was that it was
low for this type of activity and not considered consequential.
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especially true during the reintegration component, which has different database
needs than the DD portions.
It is important to assess a program against its own objectives. This point needs to be
underscored because the DDR process in Sierra Leone, and hence the NCDDR, has
raised expectations that go beyond what it was designed to deliver. In terms of the
program’s own objectives, it was a success. The reintegration component was
intentionally short-term and designed to meet political and security objectives first and
foremost. It removed weapons from the hands of ex-combatants, began their
reintegration into society, and contributed to the erosion of rebel command structures,
thereby helping to move Sierra Leone from war to peace.
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basic literacy instruction, but other components of the PDO, such as civic rights and
responsibilities, human rights training, and conflict management techniques, did not
receive adequate attention. Nonetheless, there is widespread agreement that this was
an appropriate trade-off.94
On balance, however, NCDDR staff does not think that the very limited periods of
encampment, particularly during the last phases of disarmament and demobilization,
are ideal. There is general agreement among NCDDR staff that, all things being
equal, an encampment period of three weeks would be appropriate to provide
combatants with adequate medical services and pre-discharge orientation, as well as
issue ID cards, and undertake other tasks required for discharge.
If a major objective of DDR processes was to break the command structure of the RUF
and AFRC units, several aspects of the disarmament and demobilization component
may have worked against this. First, during Phases I and II, when the ERT was
responsible for camp management, combatant commanders were given the
responsibility of organizing the camps and maintaining security. This undermined the
authority of the disarmament and demobilization administrators and helped keep
command structures intact. Subsequently, in Phase III, the shift to group disarmament
gave the commanders control over who was and was not present for disarmament. In
the RUF areas, where there were more group members than could enter the program
under the people-to-weapons ratio, those individuals who were included in the group
had every incentive to remain loyal to their commander.95
5.4.2 Reintegration
94
Despite the curtailing of many of the psycho-social reorientation activities, community mental health
workers, interviewed in a focus group, were in agreement that, in general, ex-combatants who went
through the DDR process have less psychological issues and have an easier time reintegrating than
those who did not participate.
95
Morse and Knight, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 58, 71, 95. Morse and Knight report that the shift from the
TSA, which was paid on discharge from encampment or even during encampment, to the Reinsertion
Benefit, which was paid when former combatants registered for reintegration assistance in their
communities, helped to break the ties between commanders and troops in the RUF areas, since it was
more difficult for commanders to demand partial payment of the Reinsertion Benefit. Because the CDF
were community-based, the same benefit was not registered in CDF areas.
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The reintegration component of the DDR process has benefited from a number of prior
assessments.96 This evaluation makes no attempt to reproduce all of the findings of
those reports. Rather, it highlights points that the evaluation team feels are particularly
important based on interviews conducted for this evaluation.
While the disarmament and demobilization component of the DDR process is widely
regarded as successful, assessments of the reintegration component have been
mixed. It is generally agreed that NCDDR’s reintegration program did succeed in its
primary objective of providing ex-combatants with a cooling-off period that helped them
to readjust to civilian life, thereby buying time for peace to be consolidated.97 There is
less agreement on how the cooling-off period was structured. Eight issues are
explored further below:
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benefits would have increased the cost of the program. It also might have reduced the
beneficial impact of the cash payments on local economies, for example, if items were
purchased in bulk and distributed through centers.100 In addition, because the majority
of the ex-combatants were demobilized during the 2001 rainy season, the logistics of
distributing in-kind benefits would have been extremely complicated. Under these
circumstances, the decision to provide monetized reinsertion benefits made good
sense. The eventual decision to de-couple the cash payments, geographically and
temporally, from the disarmament and demobilization sites had additional benefits.
The government felt so strongly that a cash payment was required that it was willing to
use its own funds to support the TSA/RB at certain moments, for example in early
2000 before the MDTF was fully operational [date correct?]. This was a clear
demonstration of government ownership.
One of the main principles behind the NCDDR reintegration program was that there is
a distinction between providing assistance to the target population, which enabled
individuals to return to civilian life and turning an individual into a productive member of
society. The NCDDR knew that it did not have enough resources to turn all ex-
combatants into productive members of society. It felt, however, that it had an
opportunity to help these individuals return to civilian life. A second principle was that
the length of time that an individual identified himself or herself as a combatant needed
to be limited as much as possible. This meant that targeted assistance had to be
terminated relatively quickly, and the NCDDR settled on a six-month training program.
There is no doubt that ex-combatants would have benefited from longer periods of
high-quality training. Had it been economically feasible to offer the type of training
some ex-combatants received from GTZ or ActionAid, for example, the NCDDR might
well have done so, but it did not have the level of resources to do that. Several people
outside NCDDR have argued that it is better to provide quality training to a few than
sub-standard training to all. If NCDDR had chosen to limit the number of participants,
in order to provide more substantial training, however, it would have violated a cardinal
rule of DDR programming: provide equal entitlements to all ex-combatants. It would
100
While community members interviewed did not like the fact that ex-combatants received cash
allowances, they nearly unanimously approved of the allowances anyway, because the funds offered a
much-needed cash infusion into a devastated economy. As one ex-combatant stated, “They did not like
the fact that we got money but they did not mind taking our money.”
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mechanics, carpentry, tailoring, gara tie dying, hairdressing, and driving. Courses generally lasted three
to six months, depending on the subject.
By 2003, the tracer study, which was a follow-up to the 2002 assessment, captured a
slightly different picture. According to the study, ex-combatants reported that they had
little trouble with other people and tended not to quarrel. In general, they felt that
people could be trusted, felt close to people in their neighborhood, and felt either
happy or moderately happy.102 The report goes on to say, “Contrary to expectations,
ex-combatants displayed few psycho-social difficulties…”103
The debate over mental health aside, reintegration has occurred. This suggests that
the counseling was sufficient enough to allow an adequate number of ex-combatants
to assimilate into civilian society. This assertion is supported by the comments of the
community mental-health workers, who say that, although the counseling was
inadequate, there is a noticeable difference between those who went through the DDR
program and those who did not—with DDR program participants demonstrating a
greater degree of coping skills.
Reintegration has not been a painless process, and there are still pressing psycho-
social issues that need to be addressed, particularly for rape and abuse victims.
Further, youth are not benefiting from the social cohesion offered through the many
youth groups. However, there has been a remarkable amount of forgiveness and
acceptance on the part of both the communities and the ex-combatants. All evidence
points to a country that is moving beyond conflict.
101
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes, p. 4.
102
Stavrou et al., Tracer Study and Follow Up Assessment, pp. 31, 32, 37 and 39.
103
Stavrou, Vincent, Peters, Burton, and Johnson, Tracer Study and Follow Up Assessment, p. 39.
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partners. Very few international NGOs with the capacity to provide high-quality
training to large numbers of people chose to participate in the DDR program. Many
did not want to work with ex-combatants, and many did not want to be constrained by
a government-led program. MOU negotiations with those INGOs that did participate in
the program took a long time to complete, in no small measure because of differences
in approach between the NCDDR and the implementing partners. Additionally, after
several failed-attempts at disarmament and demobilization, there was a psychological
barrier that had to be overcome on the part of potential implementing partners before
they were willing to become involved in Phase III reintegration. Lastly, there was a
general wariness on both sides, which did not help to facilitate a close working
relationship.104
As far as local organizations, the quality of local implementing partners varied. There
simply were not enough quality local partners to implement the program. Local
partners ranged from legitimate training organizations, usually with limited capacity to
expand their operations, to organizations that opened overnight with virtually no
capacity at all. In the case of the latter, NCDDR officials admitted that sometimes they
were misled by those who established centers with little to no intention of providing
training, but had considerable interest in receiving funding from NCDDR. Monitoring of
the training sites exposed the most egregious cases, such as implementing partners
that collected the first tranche of their grant and disappeared. When it proved possible
to identify these false training centers, some alternate means of training the ex-
combatants had to be found.
Even if INGOs or consulting firms had been used in greater numbers, many would still
have been reliant on local partners to actually carry out the training. The problem was
particularly serious in the north and east of the country and was exacerbated by the
rapid pace of demobilization during the second half of 2001. This is not to say that IP’s
should not have been used but to demonstrate the need for significant pre-planning
and incorporating more in-depth capacity building measures to better ensure
programmatic success.
5) Pace of Demobilization. While military observers might have better managed the
flow of combatants waiting to be disarmed, a fast-track disarmament and
demobilization process meant that the number of demobilized soldiers was always
going to outstrip the ability of the reintegration component to provide training programs
in a timely fashion. (See box 7.) Simply stated, the political imperatives were at odds
with optimal program implementation, and political imperatives carried the day. It is
important for those engaged in designing and implementing DDR programs to
understand this fact. Under these circumstances, it was regrettable that some parallel
partners initially did not punch cards for the training they provided ex-combatants,
thereby missing an opportunity to reduce the NCDDR’s caseload. At the same time,
the ability of UNAMSIL and several donors to create stop-gap programs helped
104
It was not uncommon to hear complaints from the INGOs that they were not properly included in the
NCDDR reintegration activities and for NCDDR that the INGOs were not overly responsive to its needs.
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The first, and probably most important, reason was that the NCDDR did not procure
toolkits until nearly the end of each training course. Advance procurement,
recommended by the World Bank and the FMPU, was resisted because of cash flow
problems caused by the late disbursement of donor pledges to the Trust Fund.
Additionally, NCDDR staff pointed out that the numbers of individuals registered for
courses and the numbers of individuals completing courses were invariably different.
NCDDR staff preferred to wait until the number likely to complete each course firmed
up. Consequently, the FMPU reported receiving requests for toolkit procurement three
to six weeks before the end of each training course. Under these circumstances, the
MDTF’s preference for international competitive bidding, and the difficulty in Deleted: requirement
establishing some sort of draw-down relationship with preferred suppliers, were
reported to lead to serious delays in toolkit procurement.106
While fiscal prudence dictates not overdrawing a trust fund account, subsequent DDR
programs that find themselves in the same position may want to proceed with
procurement if the pledges are firm. It may be desirable to review World Bank trust
fund regulations for their suitability to post-conflict environments. The rules governing
procurement are strict, however, because it is precisely in the area of procurement that
corruption is prone to occur. As Bank officials pointed out, toolkits could have been
procured based on the number of individuals registering for particular training courses,
and any extra toolkits could have been sold on the domestic market to recoup costs.
105
See section 4.4 and Box 2 for additional information on the stop-gap program.
106
Selective tendering is not impossible under Bank rules as of late 2003, and toolkit procurement was
expedited by inviting no fewer than five known firms with proven capacity to provide the necessary items
to tender for toolkit contracts. Selective tendering does not, however, appear to have been employed
on a regular basis in Sierra Leone prior to that point. Authors’ interviews. The MDTF itself is discussed
in more detail in section 5.6.1.
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A second reason cited for the delays in distributing toolkits related to stock. If, at the
end of a training program, there were not enough toolkits in stock to provide one to
every member of a training program, then the NCDDR would postpone delivering the
toolkits to all participants until enough became available. This problem was, of course,
compounded by the NCDDR’s reluctance to procure toolkits until it had a good sense
of the numbers it needed to procure. Had toolkits been stockpiled, this problem would
presumably have arisen less frequently, if at all.
It is estimated that almost 33 percent of the ex-combatants who went through the DDR
process considered themselves employed in 2003.108 Being employed is generally
defined as having a full-time job, as opposed to temporary work.109 About half of those
who considered themselves employed reported needing 18 months or longer to find
employment once they had completed a training program. According to the tracer
study, 71.6 percent of ex-combatants have had a job related to the skills trainings
received.110 Anecdotal evidence also supports this conclusion. Ex-combatants
interviewed in focus groups for this evaluation reported that the training programs
assisted with procuring short-term work, apprenticeships, full-time jobs, or starting their
own business, as well as with general reintegration. However, the training programs
were limited as far as securing permanent employment is concerned. Like other Sierra
Leoneans, the ex-combatants have had to struggle to find sufficient work. The
trainings were too short—in many cases, too weak—and the general economy was too
poor to have resulted in ex-combatants having stable employment opportunities.111
This is not to say that such training is not without merit. Experience in other war-torn
107
This is especially true for youth. Many ex-combatants are still considered youth and are unemployed
and underemployed just as they were when the war started.
108
Stavrou, et al., Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment, Appendix 1, p. 10.
109
There are variations in the figures regarding employment of ex-combatants. Some figures of
employed combined those who stated they were employed with those who did not but later admitted
they recently received income. The ex-combatants interviewed by the evaluation team considered
themselves unemployed when they had received income from short-term jobs. When pressed, all
except one had worked in some sort of capacity in recent months. The tracer study of 2003 does not
explain if the 48 percent who considered themselves unemployed were actually completely
unemployed, or, as with our focus groups, did a little work here and there but were never fully employed.
This is an important distinction to make as the training programs did help to increase the types of short-
term jobs available to the ex-combatants. The short-term implication is that people are able to get by
with an increased portfolio of skills. The long-term implication is that there are a sizable number of ex-
combatants who are chronically underemployed and very frustrated.
110
Stavrou et al., Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment, p. 25.
111
It should be noted that it employment creation was not a specific objective of the vocational training
program.
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African countries strongly suggests that it has multiple benefits (see box 8). However,
the training received by ex-combatants did not transform the Sierra Leonean economy
[how could it???] or ensure that the ex-combatants would have sufficient marketable
skills to ward off unemployment or underemployment. Because the training programs
did not prevent unemployment or underemployment, there was considerable debate
within Sierra Leone about the appropriateness and the role of trainings.
112
This expressed preference has other effects. It exacerbates the problem with implementing partners
and limits the degree to which ex-combatants and non-combatants can receive training simultaneously,
since public-works programs offer an excellent source of integrated training.
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Because many ex-combatants need to work multiple jobs in order to survive, it is hard
to determine the exact nature of their employment. Low crime rates and the general
poverty levels of most Sierra Leoneans (which call into question the degree to which
family members can support unemployed ex-combatants) as well as evaluation
interviews suggest that ex-combatants manage to survive despite the reported
unemployment rates. According to a 2002 report, 30.9 percent of ex-combatants said
they engaged in petty trading, 21 percent in carpentry, and 14 percent in tailoring.113
These were the three most popular types of work listed. Some ex-combatants have
gone into business for themselves, for example, forming biker associations in cities like
Bo to provide cheap transportation services. Given the frequency with which
community leaders cited local labor for rehabilitation as a positive outcome of the ex-
combatant training programs, it is presumed that small-scale construction must have
also provided a significant amount of short-term work.
The first is that the structure of the training programs encouraged ex-combatants to
enroll in vocational training programs, and it created disincentives for re-entry to the
agricultural sector. The agricultural package was initially assessed by ex-combatants
to be of lower value to the vocational training package. The number of ex-combatants
choosing agriculture rose somewhat when the number of bags of rice offered in the
agriculture package was increased from three to six.
There was also no serious attempt to promote commercial farming, which could have
meant attracting a greater number of ex-combatants. Training in commercial
agriculture might have helped to fill the gap that currently exists in the country’s labor
force. Of businesses interviewed for a 2002 study, one quarter noted the need for
agrarian and agri-business skills.115 It appears that NCDDR missed an opportunity to
begin transforming the agricultural sector, for example by introducing improved seeds
and farming methods, small agro-business skills, and the like. [seems a little beyond
the NCDDR’s core expertise!]
113
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programs of the National
Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, p. 46.
114
Stavrou et al., Tracer Study and Follow-Up Assessment, p. 17.
115
Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration Programmes, p. 29.
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While the reintegration portion of the DDRP clearly did operate under a number of
constraints, Comninos, Stavrou, and Stewart concluded that “measured against their
remit, it must therefore be said that the NCDDR have been successful in creating
economic opportunities for the ex-combatants.” Further, they said, “Even if ex-
combatants do not find employment opportunities related to their training, this is by no
means wasted. The obtained skills have practical value in terms of their usage during
the life-time of the ex-combatant and the technical skills process itself is an investment
into the life-skills process of the ex-combatant.116
5.4.3 Capacity. Whereas there was a high degree of capacity to implement the
disarmament and demobilization portion of the DDR process [true, but how come?
National staff competitively recruited, but also competitively remunerated. Then,
NCDDR staff were complemented by carefully tailored TA. , capacity was an issue
during the reintegration phase.
This was recognized by the World Bank implementation completion report of the
CRRP, which provided support both to the NCRRR and the NCDDR:
Capacity for local organizations is an issue in many conflict and post-conflict countries.
Unfortunately, many donors see capacity building for local organizations as either a
small component of another activity or as something to be addressed once the country
has made the transition from humanitarian relief to development. As a result, local
organizations rarely have the necessary capacity and expertise to fully respond to and
116
Ibid., pp. 66-67.
117
ibid, p. 6
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participate in transitional activities. In such cases, the expertise and capacity remains
almost entirely with the international community.
A partial explanation for why the capacity of local organizations was not considered
earlier is the fact that one of the original assumptions was that INGOs would act as
implementers of the DDRP. This did not work well because of the culture clash
between the INGOs and NCDDR. As a result, not many INGOs applied to participate.
INGOs had greater capacity than local organizations and more sophisticated
administrative and financial structures, and many were already working in areas
targeted for encampments and training centers. On the other hand, many INGOs were
geared towards humanitarian assistance and, therefore, could not quickly make the
change to training. In addition, some INGOs also relied on local organizations to
implement activities. This meant that NCDDR and INGOs were both competing for the
same group of qualified local implementing partners. That said, it should be noted that
international organizations like GTZ and ActionAid made a major contribution to the
reintegration process.
NCDDR attempted to compensate for the limited capacity of many local organizations
by providing some basic workshops and encouraging local organizations to outsource
financial management. The workshops did not have a noticeable impact on
performance, and many implementing partners used the funds allocated for
bookkeepers in other ways. This meant that some ex-combatants went through quality
training courses run by well-established implementing partners, and others received
minimal training. Still others had to wait months before training was even offered in
their area. This generated frustration among ex-combatants and hampered the
effectiveness of the reintegration component.
While there is a limit to which the problem of insufficient local capacity can be
overcome in war-affected countries such as Sierra Leone, the evaluation team concurs
with the Bank assessment that more could have been done. Projects like Catholic
Relief Service’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Training show that capacity
building can take place during emergency situations and that by providing such
training, local organizations can play a significant and necessary role in relief
activities.118 It also has shown that capacity building during emergency phases helps
to prepare the country for transition because it increases the number of credible local
actors who can respond to reintegration and development needs. In the future, those
118
See “EPRT II: Emergency Preparedness and Response Training in Angola, Catholic Relief Final
Evaluation, FALL 2003” by Julie Nenon and Ken Polsky.
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in charge of DDR processes may wish to consider how to make use of methods such
as this to bolster local capacity.
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The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the DDRP was strongest in its role as managing
information systems. Its effectiveness could be considered, in retrospect, as one of
the critical hallmarks of the DDRP and contributed in a significant way to the success
of the program. The flexibility that the program needed in order to meet changes in the
overall operational environment and in the narrow program arena would not have been
possible if a robust and effective system of monitoring and evaluation was not in place.
The importance of M&E, especially the MIS functions, were recognized from inception
and well integrated into the different stages of the process.
The systematic monitoring process started at the disarmament centers were MILOBS
filled out forms prepared by the M&E unit for each combatant. The forms were
designed to establish a detailed profile of each combatant. These forms were sent to
the M&E unit together with a photo of the individual to be inputted into the database
and further processed. The combatants, who were subsequently moved to
demobilization centers, were issued within a week a photo ID which enabled them to
access all programmed benefits. The integrity of the system was always a paramount
concern and they sought for ways and means to maintain a foolproof system within a
context of a program of an urgent nature. A laminated Polaroid photo ID system which
was used from 1998 was substituted by a much more secure digital card in 2000.
Introducing finger printing was considered but found to be untenable given the
operational environment.
The next tracking point was at the community level when ex-combatants came to
register for reintegration opportunities. At this stage the particulars of the individuals
were sent back to the M&E for validation. The validation process was also
complimented by the counseling activities of the DDR field officers. The training
opportunities on offer emanated from the Implementation Partners but were evaluated
and approved by the Project Approvals Committee which was composed of
representatives of many relevant institutions and included the Head of M&E. At this
stage, the M&E unit carried out the dual tasks of monitoring the attendance of the ex-
combatants enrolled and the performance of the IPs. Attendance was sometimes
problematic due to motivational factors and M&E personnel were expected to ensure
compliance by monitoring attendance sheets. A minimum attendance of 12 days per
month was a requirement for payment of the 60,000 Leone monthly support.
With respect to the IPs, the M&E staffs were expected to audit the expenditures for
training purposes incurred by the enterprises to ensure that allotted funds were
properly spent. Although more problematic, the staff also tracked and monitored the
quality of the training provided through onsite inspection and interviews and actual
tests of trainees. The monitoring activities of the staff were complimented by the
monthly financial and activity report which was required from the IPs and by the
auditing and inspection support provided by the FMPU. The payment for services to
IPs was apportioned into tranches and was conditioned on the submission of
acceptable regular periodic reports. According to the estimate of the M&E there were
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about 200 training opportunities that required their monitoring through the life of the
program.
The M&E had four field staff, one for each region, to do the onsite inspection. The low
number of staff in combination with the enormity of the tasks meant it was harder for
the M&E Unit to carry out the more qualitative aspects of their jobs. Reporting on
trends, weaknesses, and successes to determine impact was difficult under these
circumstances. The field staff, reportedly, could attend approximately one training per
activity.119 This allowed for an overview and helped to weed out the most egregious
cases of fraud. However, it did not allow the M&E Unit to report on the actual impact
of the activities and for managers to make necessary revisions. This combination was
reportedly and understandably overwhelming and meant that the M&E Unit focused on
activities necessary to ensure program implementation such as processing of
information for delivery of benefits, reporting information necessary to ensure
payments, confirming that trainings existed, issuing cards, etc.120 These functions
alone provided a wealth of information and did serve an important management tool.
Where more qualitative monitoring and evaluation did come into play was with larger
activities such as the assessment conducted during the Interim Phase. This allowed
senior policy makers and managers to review the impact to date and candidly discuss
what worked and what did not. As discussed above in the section on the Interim
Phase (see section 3.2.3), changes were made to the DDRP as a result of the
assessment. The MIS functions and the use of assessments combined meant that,
despite the enormity of the situation in comparison with the size of the M&E Unit, the
DDRP had an effective monitoring and evaluation system that served the program
well.
5.5 Reconciliation
While reconciliation is a process that occurs over a long period of time, effective DDR
is dependent on a certain level of reconciliation. If ordinary people are unwilling to
take steps toward reconciliation from the start of the peace process, all activities
necessary for implementing a peace agreement will be more difficult to achieve.
The people of Sierra Leone demonstrated early on a strong capacity for reconciliation,
based in large part on deep religious faith and war weariness. This grassroots
phenomenon was supported in a variety of ways by different players, including local
organizations such as the Inter-religious Council and women’s groups, local
authorities, the government, and INGOs such as Talking Drum Studio. Activities
included Track 2 diplomacy, sensitization campaigns, and healing rituals. All played
their part with different levels of impact. Combined, they contributed an atmosphere
conducive to reconciliation.
119
Authors’ Interview
120
Authors’ Interview
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This is not to say that complete reconciliation occurred. Evidence shows that many
RUF did not want to return to their original communities. There were various reasons
for this. Some had developed close ties, including new families, in the areas in which
they were demobilized, and some wished to remain close to the members of their
former fighting groups. However, others feared returning to their communities
because of their wartime conduct. Although there was extreme generosity among
Sierra Leoneans in general, not everyone welcomed ex-combatants back. In cases
where ex-combatants wished to return but communities did not wish to receive them,
more intensive interventions are needed to assist communities and ex-combatants in
dealing with very traumatic conditions. NCDDR conducted general sensitization
campaigns, but there never was a major effort to address the individual needs of all
ex-combatants who wanted to return.
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million.121 Although this remains an estimate, table 4 suggests that the estimate is
credible, if not low.
The GOSL established a peace and security fund from which it could draw Le1 billion
quarterly at its own discretion [and audited by the Bank].122 The existence of such a
fund proved critical to the government’s ability to carry out key activities at times when
international funding was not forthcoming. In some cases, these payments constituted
the government’s own contribution; in other cases, they were reimbursed from the
MDTF.123 The government’s decision to set up this fund was particularly important
121
Authors’ interview, May 2004.
122
This arrangement was acceptable to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
123
For example, the World Bank reported in September 2000: “The increase of almost $1.5 million in
the level of previously reported TSA payments [from the MDTF] during a period when TSAs had been
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The Multi-Donor Trust Fund was an important mechanism for several reasons. First,
the World Bank’s reputation for fiduciary accountability and its mobilizing capacity
helped the government raise funds. Second, the MDTF was a mechanism through
which donors that were otherwise not active in Sierra Leone were able to contribute to
the DDR process. Third, the MDTF simplified procedures for government and reduced
the burden of managing external resources by using one system that incorporated a
common set of financial management procedures and procurement, audit, and
reporting requirements. This increased efficiency and reduced costs.
Fourth, the MDTF helped to promote government ownership of and control over the
DDR process. Donations to Bank-administered trust funds are not subject to
earmarking.124 This made it harder, although not impossible, to set up parallel
projects, and it made the donors who did set up parallel projects somewhat more self-
critical and aware of how their projects related to the government’s program.
Additionally, the MDTF enhanced national ownership in several ways. First, the MDTF
supported a DDR program that manifested national objectives, priorities, policies, and
modalities. Second, it put extensive resources at the disposal of the national entity
entrusted with the implementation of the DDR program. Third, the MDTF, as well as
the World Bank PPF, contributed to creating national capacity that was necessary to
guarantee national ownership.
The MDTF also had shortcomings. First, there was a time lag. The World Bank-
administered trust fund did not come on line until March/April 2000, but the DDR
process had been under way since July 1998. Therefore, other sources of financing
had to be found. Second, there was a coverage gap. Bank-administered trust funds
are unable to finance disarmament activities. Third, donor disbursements to the MDTF Deleted: -related
were not always made in a timely manner. Bank quarterly reports constantly speak of
barely having enough to cover expenses, and they raise concerns about the demands
that rapid disarmament and demobilization could place on expenses. This, however,
is not a trust fund-related problem per se. It is a chronic problem facing governments
reliant on aid donors. It is possible that disbursements would have been even later
had the Bank not been involved in the trust fund. Nonetheless, it was a problem that
affected the MDTF.
World Bank funding through the PPF provided strong support for a range of activities
such as undertaking studies, preparing manuals, and assessing and building the
capacity of the NCDDR. It also provided technical assistance. Bank funding through
suspended is due to the fact that payments made from GOSL resources in the early part of the year
were reimbursed by the Multi-donor Trust Fund during the quarter under review.” The World Bank, The
World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the Sierra Leone Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #4, September 30, 2000, p. 5.
124
In contrast, trust funds administered by UNDP permit multiple earmarking. Many donors naturally
prefer this flexibility, but from the perspective of governments in post-conflict countries, such earmarking
can undermine their policies.
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the CRRP paid NCDDR operating costs and, through it, the full range of reintegration
activities. This support, along with the support provided through the MDTF, facilitated
the transition of 72,000 former combatants to civilian life, helping to change their mind-
set, providing them with resources, and enhancing their skills, which contributed
importantly to changing the environment in Sierra Leone from one of war to one of
peace.
Peacekeeping support for the DDR process through ECOMOG, UNOMSIL, and
UNAMSIL was never included in the budget, but the peacekeeping missions provided
critically important security, logistics, and technical support. If this component had to
be fully costed and money raised by voluntary contributions, it is likely that there would
be constant shortfalls in DDR budgets [that’s not really logic, is it? It’s tantamount to
saying that development partners who agreed to finance the DDR Program (and
UNAMSIL) would fail to do so if financing of one part would be shifted from UNAMSIL
to the MDTF?] . DDR programs have historically had problems obtaining the
necessary support from peacekeeping missions.125 The Joint Operations Plan
established in Sierra Leone helped to integrate UNAMSIL into the DDR process.126
UNICEF was given responsibility for financing the child soldiers program and did so
entirely to the satisfaction of the government. UNICEF’s willingness to take the lead
on developing, funding, and implementing this program reduced the burden on the
NCDDR. Nonetheless, even with the MOU between UNICEF and the government,
UNICEF felt it had considerable latitude in implementing the program. [what’s the
point?]
Great Britain provided the NCDDR with considerable support. It provided the
resources to jump-start the DDR process in 1996/97 and again, with the World Bank,
in 1998. The support provided in the 1998–1999 period was crucial for the
achievement of phases I and II of the DDR process before the MDTF came on line.
Moreover, the UK was the first donor to the MDTF. The UK also provided important
political support to the DDR process both in Sierra Leone and in international fora
throughout the life of the program. Although it subsequently opted out of the MDTF
and pursued bilateral activities, it continued to mobilize support for the MDTF.
Although UK support to the demobilization component through the ERT was very
important during phases I and II of the DDR process, Britain’s precipitous withdrawal
following the resumption of hostilities in 2000 created significant problems for the
government.
125
For example, see Ball and Campbell, Complex Crisis and Complex Peace, pp. 46-48.
126
Security Council Resolution 1346 of March 30, 2001, called for an enhanced management role by
UNAMSIL. It referenced the March 2000 SRSG report which states that “a consensus emerged with
regard to the contribution of UNAMSIL … UNAMSIL is expected to assume a broader responsibility.”
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undermined national ownership of the DDR process. Therefore, it is preferable for all
financial resources to be included in the trust fund. Additionally, while parallel
programs reduced the fundraising burden on the NCDDR, the vocational training
program offered various terms for participants, thereby damaging the principle of
uniform treatment of ex-combatants. Nonetheless, if the alternative is to forego those
funds entirely, governments may decide to accept the trade-off.
The $100 million estimated cost incorporates the MDTF funds, resources channeled
through the parallel programs, and the costs directly contributed by UN. By far the
largest financial input, $39.5 million, was channeled through the MDTF. The main trust
fund was divided into two smaller trust funds: the first a government-executed fund,
which became the major receptacle for most of the financial resources, and the other,
a World Bank-administered fund with about $2 million. This split execution of the trust
fund was an innovation. Previous DDR trust funds were either government- or World
Bank-executed but never a combination. This special arrangement was optimal as
speed was of the essence, particularly at the initial stage. The World Bank facilitated
the fast procurement of critical services, such as the provision of four core consultants
for the Executive Secretariat. The World Bank-administered fund also financed the
studies, reviews, and evaluations that were commissioned at various stages of the
program, as well as the donor meetings and pledging sessions that were organized
outside of the country.
One of the positive characteristics of the MDTF, which simplified the management task
and enhanced effectiveness, was the condition that there should be no earmarking of
funds by the contributing donors. The World Bank, when faced with the possibility of
losing U.S. funding or allowing the U.S. Government to finance only one part of the
program, set up, with GOSL approval, a separate trust fund that was used exclusively
for a U.S. contribution for the payment of reinsertion benefits.
The FMPU provided the financial management, procurement, auditing, and reporting
services for the Executive Secretariat. Given the suspicions and negative perceptions
of the public financial management and procurement system, the FMPU provided the
necessary environment and capability to gain the trust of the donors and, by and large,
the confidence of the beneficiaries and the Sierra Leonean community. The
transparent and uniform set of procurement rules and regulations not only simplified
financial management and enhanced probity, but also assured quality. There were
significant delays in the procurement of toolkits that could not be attributed solely to
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The FMPU was set up to serve not only the NCDDR but also the NCRRR. Table 5
shows the breakdown of the management cost of the MDTF, which totals 15.8 percent.
A closer look reveals, however, that the major part of the $4 million cost of the contract
for the FMPU was initially borne by the NCRRR. By some accounts, more than 65
percent of the cost was charged to the NCRRR. From this perspective, the $4 million
cost of the FMPU would be only about 5 percent of the combined funding of the DDR
and RRR. Factoring in DFID’s administrative and technical assistance inputs, CRP,
and others, the total management cost is about 13 percent. The 2 percent World Bank
charge for administering the fund is relatively low compared with the cost of similar
services. The overall management cost seems reasonable, particularly in view of the
fact that it was essential to employ an independent international organization and to
deploy a significant number of international consultants.
Source: World Bank, The World Bank-Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF 022604) for the Sierra Leone
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #13, September 30, 2003.
6 Post-NCDDR Activities
war and needed to cease to exist” at a certain stage in order to signal normalization of
national life and the transition from relief to development.127
Although the DDRP concluded as a resounding success on March 31, 2004, there are
still major issues and concerns that require sustained attention. Although a huge
cache of arms was collected from the warring factions during the disarmament
program, there are still significant amounts of weapons in the country. Disarmament
programs, including the Community Arms Collection and Development Program, need
to be continued and complemented with a relevant legal framework to reduce the
presence of lethal weapons in the country.128 It will be necessary to forge a regional
security arrangement and to design and implement effective programs that reduce the
availability of arms in the subregion.
The DDR process has, in the words of one GOSL minister, “given us a second chance.
That is why we should not lose the opportunity and time to address the root causes of
the conflict. There is one grave danger. We should never leave anyone, especially the
young, in a situation where they have nothing to lose.”129 The conducive environment
created by the peace process, the successful implementation of the DDR process, and
the heightened presence of the international community should be used to address the
political, economic, and social grievances that triggered the conflict. The DDR process
by itself cannot guarantee peace. The massive unemployment needs to be
significantly reduced. In Sierra Leone’s post-conflict economy, the immediate
opportunities for meaningful private-sector investment may be limited, necessitating
127
Authors’ Interviews
128
Through its Arms for Development Programme, UNDP is supporting the design and implementation
of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives legislation.
129
Authors’ interview, 2004.
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continued dependence on foreign assistance and loans to further stabilize the situation
and consolidate the peace. The draw-down of UNAMSIL, aside from its implication for
security, will also have a negative economic impact, exacerbating the employment
situation.
One minister interviewed for this evaluation characterized the traditional system as
follows: “Youth and women are never to be heard [from] and do not matter.” That
system must be changed. Persistent issues of mismanagement, governance, and
equity—perceived or real—should be addressed as a matter of great urgency. Party
politics need to conform to the requirements of building a national consensus and
inclusiveness and reducing marginalization. The comprehensive and complex set of
issues and requirements necessary for consolidating the achievements of the DDRP
demand a concerted effort. With the termination of targeted assistance, NaCSA needs
to integrate the ex-combatants into its programs in a systematic way, particularly in
areas lagging in services and opportunities. To this end, there should be an organized
hand-over of responsibilities and information.
The draft PRSP, as it stands, seems to target the root causes of the war and give due
focus to vulnerable groups. The following are its three pillars:
These pillars are in consonance with what is needed to address the root causes of the
war and advance the reintegration of the ex -combatants and Sierra Leonean society
in general.
7 Lessons Learned
All of the lessons discussed below are particularly relevant to West Africa in view of
the political, economic, and social similarities among the countries in the subregion
and the regional nature of conflicts taking place there. Critical elements of the Sierra
Leone experience that should inform other DDR processes in the subregion include:
• The recognition that DDR primarily has political and security objectives and
must be an integral part of moving the peace process forward;
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Irrespective of how successful it might be, a DDR process cannot eliminate the root
causes of conflict, which must be consciously addressed in all aspects of national
economic, social, and political life after the formal peace process concludes if future
conflicts are to be avoided. In Sierra Leone, for example, despite the successful
completion of a DDR process, issues of youth, unemployment, equitable development,
and governance need to be given high priority in the design and implementation of the
PRSP and other government policies. The DDR process provided the government
and the people of Sierra Leone with an opportunity to achieve an environment of
peace and security within which these more fundamental problems can be addressed.
7.1.3 Sufficient commitment to the peace process is crucial for the success of a
post-conflict DDR process.
The design and implementation of the Sierra Leone DDR process was crucial to its
success. However, even the best design would have failed in the absence of sufficient
political will on the part of all key stakeholders. President Kabbah’s commitment to the
peace process, civil society’s active role in promoting peace, and the decision by the
post-Foday Sankoh RUF leadership to a political resolution of the conflict were the
defining factors in the success of the DDR process.
The NCDDR also demonstrated its commitment to the peace process. Even when the
peace process broke down, channels for dialogue were kept open. DDR officials
remained receptive to informal discussions, keeping the door open and helping to build
trust. This was especially important once the decision was made to fast-track DDR in
2001.
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There are three aspects of national ownership that need to be given particular
attention.
Second, representatives of all fighting forces need to own the DDR process. Broad-
based ownership will be facilitated to the extent that genuine discussion takes place
between the government and the armed opposition about the structure and content of
the DDR program.
Third, there must be buy-in to the concept of national ownership on the part of the
members of international community who are supporting the DDR program. Buy-in
must consist of more than rhetorically accepting the government program. It must
include providing resources in a way that supports the government program and
promotes genuine national ownership.
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The objectives of reintegration are also to provide society at large with improved
security by
One of the lessons of DDR processes in the 1990s was that placing the responsibility
for disarmament and demobilization with one organization and reintegration with
another organization created program disconnects and institutional rivalries that
undermined the effectiveness of DDR programs. It would be unfortunate if this lesson
were not retained. While long-term reintegration of former combatants into civilian life
should be the responsibility of civil bodies, activities intended to begin the reintegration
process should remain the responsibility of a central DDR entity. The Sierra Leone
experience demonstrates once again that the challenge for those in charge of
designing and implementing DDR processes is to develop at the outset institutional
mechanisms that will link the reintegration component of DDR to long-term efforts to
promote rehabilitation and longer-term recovery.
7.2.4 Coordination between the DDR process and the rehabilitation and
recovery process is essential to start addressing the root causes of conflict.
Mechanisms must be developed to ensure tighter linkage between these two related
functions. There are a number of ways in which such linkages might be achieved:
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7.2.6 Monitoring at the community level for social trends during the DDR
process is essential to promote the linkage between DDR and long-term
rehabilitation and recovery.
Monitoring during the DDR process will help to ensure that demobilized combatants
receive all their benefits and have access to program opportunities. Because ex-
combatants can be a mobile population, and because they may change their minds
about which training opportunity they wish to pursue, monitoring can ensure that no
one falls through the cracks or is able to take more benefits than others.
Monitoring during the DDR process may also help identify combatants and other
individuals associated with the fighting forces who are not included in DDR programs
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for one reason or another. These people can then be targeted by other means, such
as the Girls Left Behind program established by UNICEF to provide support to girls
associated with the fighting forces who did not qualify for the DDR program.
Because addressing the root causes of conflict will require attention over an extended
period of time, and because the potential for ex-combatants to return to violence
remains, it is necessary to continue monitoring former fighters even after targeted
assistance has been terminated. This could serve as one element of an early warning
system of the potential for conflict both in Sierra Leone and other countries in the
region.
While this type of attitude greatly increases the chances of success for DDR
processes, it cannot be assumed that such attitudes will prevail in all circumstances.
Therefore, efforts to promote reconciliation need to be given a high priority in designing
and implementing reconciliation efforts.
In developing eligibility criteria, it will always be necessary to assess the trade-offs that
must be made in order to achieve the DDR process’ main political and security
objectives.
approaches is recommended to more fully address this complex issue. Some specific
recommendations based on the lessons learned in Sierra Leone are:
• Ensure early on that there is a firm understanding of the roles females played in
the conflict and the numbers of women and girls involved. This can serve as a
basis for more appropriate programming.
• Make DDR processes more gender friendly. There are not many concrete
examples; however, checklists such as Vanessa Farr’s or UNIFEM’s may prove
of use in designing and implementing a more gender appropriate approach.130
130
Vanessa Farr, “Gendering Demilitarization.” [This doesn’t seem to be her work previously cited, but
the title could be wrong here or above. Pls. check ] See also UNIFEM’s “Gender-aware Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): A Checklist.”
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Once combatants enter a DDR process, it is important that they have equal access to
the same entitlements and that the rules for accessing reintegration opportunities are
clear. Once established and communicated, these rules must be adhered to.
This is not to say that the body that develops and oversees the DDR program should
itself institute a capacity-building program. This is beyond the typical mandate and staff
capabilities of such organizations. Rather, the Sierra Leone experience demonstrates
that a strong understanding of the need for capacity building during conflict and post-
conflict situations and strong coordination between donors and the national body in
charge of the DDR process is crucial. Without adequate attention to capacity issues,
reintegration efforts in any sector that require implementing partners run the risk of
coming up against the same problems. This suggests that a broad-based effort to
assess and build capacity will improve the chances that key programs will succeed.
7.2.14 Options for retaining capacity developed to deliver DDR training should
be actively pursued.
In situations such as Sierra Leone, where significant capacity shortfalls exist at all
levels of the public and private sectors, it is desirable to make every effort to ensure
that investment in developing training capacity for DDR is not lost once the DDR
process terminates. It might, for example, be possible to transfer training facilities to
community-based organizations and to channel future training assistance through
these bodies.
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At present, costs associated with disarmament and with providing security for the DDR
process cannot be financed through World Bank trust funds. The main external
donors to post-conflict DDR processes tend, however, to prefer World Bank
involvement since that is seen as a guarantee of fiduciary responsibility. If the DDR
process takes place under the auspices of a UN peace operation, the security-related
costs will be provided through the assessed budget of the United Nations. In this
circumstance, the challenge becomes one of fully integrating the UN mission into the
DDR process. If the DDR process does not have access to UN-assessed
contributions to meet these security-related needs but is funded through a World Bank
trust fund, the challenge will be to identify alternative arrangements for financing these
security-related costs.
Similarly, World Bank trust funds are not nimble, and in post-conflict environments
problems frequently arise in financing unanticipated expenditures in a timely fashion.
The demobilization component of DDR typically requires highly flexible funding. In
Sierra Leone, the UK stepped in to meet this need, and the establishment of the
government’s own peace and security fund also provided a mechanism that enabled
rapid disbursement of funds. Even where governments are able to create their own
contingency funds, it is highly unlikely that they will have adequate resources to meet
all such needs, and it is therefore important that access to quick-disbursing, flexible
financing is anticipated from the beginning of every DDR process.
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the program to go forward. The debate over conceptual design was important, but it
was management leadership that allowed the design to be well implemented.
Management includes not only program design and delivery, but also relations with
other government departments and ministries, with the fighting forces, and with
international actors.
7.4.3 The DDR database serves a multiplicity of needs, and it may require
redesign as the program moves from disarmament and demobilization into
reintegration. The database also increases the importance of exploiting
technological advances wherever possible.
In Sierra Leone, the database was appropriate for the disarmament and demobilization
phases, given existing constraints such as limited consistent electricity supply, poor
communications infrastructure, and the need to secure information. These were the
realities within which the database was created and implemented. However, the fact
that it was centralized and that delayed response times were used as a major fraud
prevention tactic caused frustrations and, in general, hampered the effectiveness of
the reintegration component. For future DDR processes, advances in technology
should be examined to see how in-country constraints can be overcome. The
database should be designed with an understanding that the needs and demands for
the disarmament and demobilization phases differ from the reintegration phase.
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7.5.2 Training programs, even if not structured optimally, can produce a semi-
skilled labor force.
Evidence is accumulating that many of the ex-combatants who went through training
courses are using the skills acquired to earn a living. Additionally, because Sierra
Leone experienced such extensive devastation of infrastructure, the increase in semi-
skilled labor resulting from the DDR training has been a boon for local economies.
The fact that laborers could be found locally kept costs down and facilitated community
rehabilitation. Community members appreciated the fact that they could find
reasonably priced labor locally. For the ex-combatants, the fact that they had skills—
even at a minimal level—meant that they could cobble together some support through
a combination of short-term labor and farming.
7.5.3 The DDR programs can assist ex-combatants to make the psychological
transition to peace.
7.5.4 Populations excluded from the DDR process still require assistance.
DDR programs need to have eligibility criteria that are enforced. Otherwise, the
process can become too unwieldy as DDR tries to respond to all those who can claim
some association with a fighting force. Nonetheless, even well enforced eligibility
criteria can be manipulated, and people who are ineligible for DDR benefits may
nonetheless require some form of assistance. In Sierra Leone, soldiers who had their
weapon confiscated by their commanders, who used communal weapons and could
not produce a weapon at the time of disarmament, who used a non-modern weapon,
or who provided logistical and administrative support, as well as other camp followers,
did not directly benefit from DDR programs because they did not meet the criteria.
Unfortunately, such individuals often do not benefit from other programs targeting
vulnerable groups. The international community has been reluctant to work with such
excluded people because of their association with the fighting forces. Additionally,
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broad community initiatives rarely address the specific needs of these people, such as
the stigma and trauma suffered by women forced to become bush wives.
There is a need for a detailed understanding of the different sub-groups within the
general rubric of war-affected populations. Methods of adequately addressing the
needs of the vulnerable groups, including those excluded from the DDR process, then
need to be developed. It is essential to understand that that DDR programs address
only one segment of the population associated with fighting. A thorough analysis is
needed to determine whether individuals associated with the fighting forces who do
not receive DDR benefits will remain vulnerable and may pose a continuing threat, will
reintegrate by themselves with little difficulty, or will have their needs addressed by
other programs.
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INTERIM
PHASE I PHASE PHASE PHASE TOTAL
II III
DISARMAMENT *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 2,994 16,91 2,226 43,509 65,645
6
Sub-Total 3,183 18,89 2,628 47,781 72,490
8
DEMOBILIZATION *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 2,994 15,46 2,226 43,509 64,198
9
Sub-Total 3,183 17,45 2,628 47,781 71,043
1
DISCHARGE *
Children 189 1,982 402 4,272 6,845
Adults 1,414 15,469 2,226 43,509 62,618
Sub-Total 1,603 17,451 2,628 47,781 69,463
NOTE: Discrepancies between disarmament, demobilization and discharge numbers are the
result of “lost” combatants during the January 1999 Freetown attack and May 2000 resumption
of hostilities following RUF hostage-taking of UNAMSIL troops.
Source: The World Bank, The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604)
for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress
Report #13, June 30, 2003, p. 3.
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NOTE: Child combatants are not included in total as they are already counted in the estimates for
individual forces
Source: The World Bank, The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF022604) for the
Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program, Progress Report #11,
December 31, 2002, p. 3.
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NCDDR
H.E. The President
Tripartite Committee
GOSL/RUF/UNAMSIL Executive Secretariat
FMPU
Chair: SRSG Executive Secretary
Discuss political and
security issues which A&L
enhance implementation of
Operations
the DDR programme I&S
Co-ordinator
M&E
Technical Technical
Co-ordination Co-ordination
Committee Committee
(TCC) D&D Disarmament and Reinsertion and (TCC) R&R
Demobilisation Unit Reintegration Unit
Manager Manager/Advisor
Joint Operations
UNAMSIL DDR Centres (JOC)
Cell UNAMSIL/UNICEF/
Reintegration
WFP
Operations Centre
Demobilisation
Regional and District
centres
Disarmament Reintegration Offices
- Contractors
Centre - Contracted partners
- Suppliers
- MOUs
- Programme partners
Implementing Partners,
UN agencies, Private
Source: Stelios Comninos, Aki Stavrou, and Brian Stewart, Assessment of the Reintegration
Programmes of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, November
8, 2002, p. 33.
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Services: (Human • Structured follow-up to families – clarity of objectives, time limited and
Resource) geared to developing community links for sustainability
• Assessments by social workers to report to Regional Reintegration
Offices for payment to families of Family and Community Reintegration
Support
• Ongoing family and community mediation post – reunification through
social work visits – key staff training needs for tracing, mediation and
reunification
• Assessment of the capacities of local rites / cleansing ceremonies for
purification and acceptance
• General community sensitisation on the objectives of reunification,
constraints and types of family/ community support needed
• Assessment of community’s attitude towards the child and protection
concerns prior to reunification
• Development of referral services for health and psychological support
within community
• Assistance for children with special needs: clear assessment of child’s
psychological, educational and health needs from interim care to link
with assessments of family’s and community’s capacity - disabled,
young mothers etc.
• Engagement of communities in dialogue to assess likely difficulties for
children’s reintegration and ways of addressing these difficulties
• Technical support to families / communities on income generating /
small enterprise schemes via linkages to broader NCDDR
reintegration framework
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Services: (Supplies/ • Child returns with supplies from ICC / demobilisation - see above
Cash) • Cash for income generating activities - administered in the manner
described above
Time Frame • Minimum of one social work visit per month for first 3 months after
reunification
• 3 month review to plan support (and submit report to Regional
Reintegration Office for final installment of family support money) and
thereafter a minimum of 6 monthly monitoring within the first year and
12 monthly within the assistance period (3 years)
Services: (Human • Care by foster carers with adequate training programs and support
Resource) networks
• Resources for alternative care - placement in group homes,
Independent living programs
• Development of policies and procedures for foster care – follow up,
monitoring and evaluation
• Education in formal / non-formal sector
• Placement in vocational / skills training
• Mobilisation through sensitisation of communities and follow up
through NGO’s / MSWGCA
• Ongoing tracing for families pending security or family / community
context
• Establishment and support to foster care associations
• Separate programs including medical services for young mothers
having "rebel" babies, sexually abused women to include counselling /
training
Services: (Supplies/ • Basic supplies as per all children leaving interim care
Cash) • Provision of tools for workshops / learning materials for school (as per
strategies below)
• Identified additional assistance according to needs of child e.g. medical
• Support for income generation activity / revolving loans - through foster
care associations/ community networks
Comment • Children in foster care will be subject to monitoring and reviews under
the statutory responsibilities of the MSWGCA
• Children in group homes will be older youth (5-6 youth) attached to a
caregiver with a time limited program towards independent living. They
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Time Frame • Assistance will be framed over three years from children’s
demobilisation
• Assistance will be given to family, school and PTA (with well defined
assistance packages) at the point of re-unification to ensure child’s
entry to school.
• Continued assistance will be subject to review
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Services: (Human • Orientation in ICC / community towards marketable skills – life skills
Resource) and not just quick impact skills
• Linkages between follow-up social worker and workshop / trainer
• Contact between youth, workshop and social worker to set goals for
training
• Establish links with jobs and small enterprises before encouraging /
starting training programs
Time Frame • Support will be framed within three years of reintegration assistance
but will be staggered to fit within the time frame of skills / vocational
training and apprenticeships
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6. Ministry Of Finance
Mr. J. B. Dauda Minster
Dr. James O. C. Jonah Former Minster
Dr. Samura M. W. Kamara Financial Secretary
Mr. Gideon Gbappy Senior Economist,
Economic Policy and Research Unit
Mr. Almamy Bangura Senior Economist,
Economic Policy and Research Unit
Political Parties
International Organizations
23. GTZ
Mr. Ferdinand Takatsch Program Manager GTZ, Sierra Leone
Mr. Christian Smida Project Coordinator, Reintegration
Ms. Djanabu Mahonde Project Coordinator,
Gender and Child Protection
Dr. Andreas Konig Consultant in Vocational Training Policies
Civil Society
35. Bo
Mr. Jaward Sanuce Manager-Peleinahum Rural Development Project
(PRDP)
Pastor Sore E. S. Mansaray Student Services Coordinator
SLOIC / Bo Vocational Training Center
Mr. T.E.S. Lahai Carpentry Instructor SLOIC / BVTC
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36. Kailahun
Ms. Satta Bannard Luawa Skills Training Center
Mr. Morrison A. Guser Inter-Religious Women’s Training Centre
Mr. Philip S. James Community Agricultural and
Skills Training Centre
Mr. Mustapha A. Klerk Humanist Watch Salone
Mr. Junisa Kallon United Furniture Workshop
Community Members
37. Ex-combatants
Kailahun: Three men and two women from Kailahun and surrounding area
Bo: Nine men and two women from Bo and surrounding area
Makeni: Approximately forty ex-combatants, of which two women
Freetown: Thirteen men
40. Women
Kailahun: Twenty-six women from Kailahun and surrounding area
Bo: Five women from Bo and the surrounding area
41. Youth
Kailahun: Seven men and one woman from Kailahun and surrounding area
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Arthy, Simon. 2003. Ex Combatant Reintegration: Key Issues for Policy Makers and
Practitioners, Based on Lessons from Sierra Leone.
Burton, Patrick, Johnson, Samuel, Peters, Krijn, Stavrou, Aki, Vincent, James. 2003.
Tracer Study and Follow-up Assessment of the Reintegration Component of Sierra
Leone’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme.
Carlson, Kristopher & Mazurana, Dyan. 2004. From Combat to Community: Women
and Girls of Sierra Leone.
Economic Community of West African States. 2001. Final Report: Third Meeting of
the UN-ECOWAS Government of Sierra Leone Coordination Mechanism.
Jeremy Ginifer with Kaye Oliver, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sierra
Leone, Evaluation Report EV 647, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence and HM Treasury, 2004.
The Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Supporting DDR
Draft August 2004 102
Hansen, Art, Nenon, Julie, and Wolf, Joy. 2002. Final Evaluation of the Office of
Transition Initiatives’ Program in Sierra Leone.
Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy M., What the Fighters Say: A Survey of
Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-August 2003 Interim Report: July 2004
Malan, Mark, Rakate, Phenyo and McIntyre, Angela, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,
UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight, Chapter 2: Overview of Pre-UNAMSIL
Interventions, Published in Monograph No 68. Institute for Security Studies,
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Chap2.html.
Morse, Ted D and Knight, Mark. 2002. Lessons Learned from Sierra Leone
Disarmament & Demobilization of Combatants.
Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone. Lomé. 7 July, 1999.
Peace Agreement between the Sierra Leone Government and the RUF “Abidjan
Accord”. 30 November, 1996.
Paul Richards, Steven Archibald, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent, Where Have All
the Young People Gone? Transitioning Ex-combatants Towards Community
Reconstruction After the War in Sierra Leone, November 30, 2003
United Nations. “Supporting the Political and Security Aspects of the Lomé Peace
Process”.
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, DDR Coordination Section. “Human Security
Fund. Internal Monitoring & Evaluation Report.” August 2003.
World Bank. 2001 Summary Report of the: Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration Program and the Multi-donor Trust Fund. May.
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The World Bank. 1999-2003. The World Bank Administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(TF022604) for the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, Progress Reports #1-13.
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Annex 8. Methodology
I. Objectives
Due to contracting problems, the entire team was in the field for only two weeks and
did not enter the country until the beginning of May. (In March and April, the team
leader was in country for an additional three weeks while contract issues were being
sorted.) This was after the NCDDR office had closed and only two months before the
end date of the trust fund through which the evaluation was funded. The delay meant
that the team did not have as much field time as desired nor had access to many
NCDDR documents as most had been packed and stored. Trips outside of Freetown
were limited and the team only got to visit Bo, Makeni, and Kailahun. The team did
their best to compensate for the decrease amount of field time but this did impact their
ability to collect information first hand.
The team was managed by Ruth Ann Hudsen and Paola Bobadilla of Creative
Associates and assisted in the field by Allen Quee, who provided logistical and
administrative assistance as well as the perspective of a local NGO and IP. The team
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would like to thank Talking Drums Studio and IRC for their logistical and administrative
support for the field visits.
The evaluation team took into consideration the questions outlined below when
conducting the field and research portions of this evaluation. These came from the
ToR and in general, were broken out for four different groups: GOSL officials, donors
and the World Bank, NGOs and other Implementing Partners, and community
members – both ex-combatants and civilians.
How was the issue of child soldiers and women and girls affected by the conflict
addressed? Which explicit and implicit trade-offs were made between the duty of
Government and the international community to provide protection to these and
other vulnerable groups, and security priorities, including the extraction of weapons
from rebel groups and militia?
Which strategies and modalities were applied to ensure that protection issues were
addressed outside the DDRP per sé, but within a coherent national framework and
international response?
How was the initial program design organized and which design strategic choices
were made, including linkage of the TEP component to the CRRP and program
responsiveness to constraints and opportunities related to targeted assistance to
ex-combatants and addressing ex-combatant needs under community-based
programs?
What were the mechanisms applied in adjusting the program design to the
subsequent opportunities and constraints created by conflict and peace initiative
dynamics and regional and international engagement; including the evolution of the
DDRP from a government program to a negotiated program incorporated in the
Lomé peace agreement and adjustments made after May 2000?
How have issues such as political prioritization, public attention, and demand for
speed and visibility influenced the program design and implementation?
Were the program objectives clear and how were they translated into strategies,
actions and activities?
Did the DDRP staffing, including long-term and short-term technical assistance
adequately correspond to the tasks to be performed?
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At which point did the program address the need for an exit strategy and what
actions were taken?
Disarmament
How did procedures and criteria used in the eligibility and certification process, as
well as the extent to which these procedures were actually implemented and
adhered to, impact on the inclusion/exclusion of combatants as verified DDRP
beneficiaries?
How did the DDRP monitor the disarmament process and which venues and
mechanisms have been used to provide ECOMOG and UNAMSIL with feed-back?
Demobilisation/Reinsertion
How were the demobilization centers managed during the subsequent DDRP
phases?
How was the reception and orientation process, including the separation of adults
from children, designed, operationalized and implemented?
Reintegration
Assess the settling-in packages provided;
Assess the arrangements through which the NCDDR coordinated with UNICEF and
other child protection agencies to facilitate the reinsertion and reintegration of child
ex-combatants;
Assess the coordination between NCDDR and NCRRR on interaction with relevant
chiefdoms to encourage reconciliation and facilitation of access to land for ex-
combatants;
Assess the Training and Education Programme (TEP) in the context of a present
and future job market in a war torn country, and the degree in which vocational
skills acquired contributed to creative livelihood strategies other than the particular
vocation trained for;
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Assess TEP operation modalities, including its procedures for generating and
approving sub-projects and its use of a service provider/implementing partner
modality of operation;
Assess the contribution to the DDRP’s immediate objective of the NCDDR ex-
combatants components of NCDDR ‘parallel partners’ including the Community
Reintegration Programme, the GTZ program and activities initiated/managed by
UNAMSIL’s DDR Unit, including the Human Security Fund;
Funding
Assess the design, operational modalities, implementation and management of the
MDTF
Coordination/Programme coherence
Map and assess the key policy and implementation coordination and collaboration
mechanisms used at national and international level, including joint reviews, special
meetings, donor conferences, and Consultative Group
V. Reports
The team was originally supposed to turn in an inception report and notes from the
workshop as well as the evaluation report. However, as the inception workshop was
cut for budgetary reasons and the final workshop has yet to occur, the team is
submitting only the evaluation report.
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1991:
1992:
- In April, a military coup by the National Provisional Ruling Council ousts President
Joseph Momoh and places Valentine Strasser as head of state.
1993:
- In March, ECOMOG troops relocate from Liberia to Freetown to assist the NPRC
against the RUF.
1996:
- In November, President Kabbah and RUF head, Foday Sankoh, sign the Abidjan
Peace Agreement.
1997:
- In October, the Conakry Peace Plan was signed by the AFRC and ECOWAS
1998:
- In August, Phase I of the DDR process begins. The DDRP originally target 45,000
combatants of RUF, SLA (Sierra Leone Army) and Civil Defense Forces (CDF).
The immediate objective was to assist combatants to lay down their arms and
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reintegrate into their respective communities. The ultimate goal was to support
national strategy for peace that includes the consolidation of the political process
and security which form the basis for a viable post war national recovery program.
- The Government’s National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) was responsible for
overall policy and programme guidance. An independent Executive Secretariat
which reported to the NCDDR was established, headed by an Executive Secretary,
and was responsible for overall programme planning and implementation.
1999:
- In January, RUF/ex AFRC overran Freetown. ECOMOG regain control of the city
but more than 5000 people perished and thousands were abducted, many used as
sex slaves, forced labor, or compelled to join RUF ranks.
- In July, Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA) signed by President Kabbah and Foday
Sankoh.
- In October, the DDR process was reactivated, marking the beginning of Phase II.
The program was reviewed and adjusted according to the LPA. A Joint
Operational Plan (JOP) guided multi agency efforts inter alia involving Government,
ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF and WFP.
- In November, the National Unity government was formed with Kabbah, Foday
Sankoh (RUF) and Johnny Paul Koroma (AFRC). RUF register as political party
and disarmament began underway. Implementation of LPA proceeded under
ECOMOG. The first UNAMSIL troops arrive.
2000:
- In May and the immediate months following, RUF abducted UN peacekeepers and
advanced on Freetown while 1000 demobilized rearmed. Civil society
demonstrators were fired upon and some killed by Foday Sankoh’s guards. In
response to the incidents, Sankoh and other RUF leaders were eventually
imprisoned. British paratroopers repulsed the RUF advance and defeated
renegade AFRC fighters. RUF released UN peacekeepers and named field
commander, Issa Sesay, its interim leader. Government ratified a treaty to
establish a special court to try the most egregious violators of international human
rights and Sierra Leone laws.
- In May, the TSA’s were halted due to outbreak of hostilities among fighting forces.
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- The period of May ‘00 to May ‘01 is considered an interim phase for DDRP. It was
characterized by negotiations with RUF, mainly for release of UN hostages; a
ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja in November and another in April ‘01. The
latter agreement led to setting up of Joint (RUF, CDF, GOSL, UNAMSIL)
Committee on DDR deciding on political way forward including timing and
sequencing of districts.
- In June, the government and the World Bank arranged for a workshop to review the
status of the DDRP. All stakeholders to peace process (GOSL, UNAMSIL, Donors,
Civil Society, NGO, and ex combatants) were brought together to review DDR and
agree on way forward. This followed by comprehensive technical review of
program in November.
- In November, Government and RUF agreed to cease fire which was generally
observed for 6 months. However, few combatants disarmed and RUF and Liberian
elements effected incursions into Guinea. The ensuing fighting displaced 15,000
inhabitants and led to the premature repatriation of 1000 of Sierra Leonean
refugees residing in Guinea.
2001:
- The first meeting of the Joint Committee which marks the start of Phase III of the
DDR process.
2002:
2003:
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Any need to add the final points, such as Program closed on time, as planned, in Dec.
2003; MDTF closed on time in June 2004.
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TERMS OF REFERENCE
5.1.0. CONTEXT
5.1.1 Despite its abundant natural resource endowment, significant wealth of well-educated
people and freedom from marked religious and ethnic strife, post-independence Sierra
Leone has had a tragic history, marred by extremely poor governance, gross economic
mismanagement and war. After growing 4% annually in the 1960s, the economy
deteriorated sharply the next two decades as a result of rampant corruption, massive
state intervention, concentration of state spending on the non-poor, dismantling of
local government, and economic policies than held back overall economic activity and
heavily taxed agriculture and the rural population. Real GDP per capita peaked in 1970,
and during 1971-89, a period of poor governance, GDP per capita dropped by over a
third. By 1990, 82% of the population lived below the poverty line, and Sierra Leone had
one of the most skewed income distributions in the world (a Gini Index of 66).
5.1.2 Against this domestic backdrop, and also propelled by the drive of regional actors to
control diamond fields in Sierra Leone and the rest of the Mano River Basin, attacks
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Liberia started sporadically in 1991
but quickly spread throughout the countryside. In effect, the RUF, with backing of
armed elements and financial support from the sub-region and elsewhere, employed
terror tactics that gave them a power disproportionate to their numbers. The state,
moreover, did little to combat them, until they started to overrun cities, when the
Civil Defense Forces, mercenaries and Nigerian-led ECOWAS Military Observer
Group (ECOMOG) forces fought back.
5.1.3 A decade of predatory war killed 20,000 people, maimed thousands, and displaced
over 2 million people, 500,000 of whom fled to neighbouring countries. It prompted a
mass exodus of professionals and businessmen, doubled Freetown's population to
perhaps 2 million and wrecked most of the infrastructure, businesses and much of the
housing stock. GDP per capita halved during the course of the war. Thus, by 2000, GDP
per person was only one-third of the 1970 peak, and Sierra Leone had fallen to the
bottom of the UN Human Development Index. Moreover, the war has contributed to an
incipient HIV/AIDS epidemic.
5.1.4 In 1997, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, elected in 1996, was deposed by the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which governed until February 1998, when it
was ousted by ECOMOG and President Kabbah restored to power. In January 1999,
RUF/ex AFRC forces overran Freetown. ECOMOG regained control of the city but
more than 5000 people perished and thousands were abducted, many were used as sex
slaves, forced labor or compelled to join RUF ranks. In July 1999, efforts by ECOWAS
and the UN culminated in the Lomé Peace Agreement' (LPA), which galvanized
international backing to end the bloodshed and provided the framework for resumption of
donor support to Sierra Leone.
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5.1.6 Hopes for Peace Dashed. President Kabbah, Foday Sankoh (RUF) and Johnny Paul
Koroma (AFRC) participated in a National Unity Government from November 1999. The
RUF registered as a political party, and disarmament got underway. Implementation of
the LPA preceded until April 2000, when security support was transferred from
ECOMOG to UN peacekeepers--UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). That
month, the RUF abducted hundreds of UN peacekeepers, seized a large cache of
war materiel, and advanced on Freetown, while thousands of demobilized fighters
rearmed. In response, Foday Sankoh and other RUF leaders were imprisoned. British
paratroops repulsed the RUF advance, and defeated renegade AFRC fighters. The
UK committed its rapid deployment force to Sierra Leone to retrain the army and police.
The RUF released the UN peacekeepers, and named a field commander, Issa Sesay,
its interim leader. In addition, Government ratified a treaty to establish a Special
Court to try the most egregious violators of international human rights and Sierra
Leonean laws, and the international community and diamond companies adopted a
certification regime to curb world traffic in conflict diamonds.
5.1.7 Against this background, in November 2000, Government and RUF agreed to a cease
fire which was generally observed during lithe next six months. However, few
combatants disarmed, and RUF and Liberian elements effected incursions into
Guinea. The ensuing fighting displaced 15,000 inhabitants and led to the premature
repatriation of thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees residing in Guinea. In May
2001, the UN Security Council adopted sanctions against the Liberian Government
intended to deter it from fostering instability and violence in the Mano River region,
including its role in trafficking conflict diamonds.
5.1.8 On May 2, 2001, Government and RUF agreed to peace-building actions that
culminated in the demobilisation of all combatants in January 2002. On January 18,
2002, all parties to the conflict issued a Declaration of End of War. 10. Sub-Regional
Developments. Since the DDR program was resumed, cross-border fighting between
RUF and Guinean forces ceased. Liberia, however, remained under UN sanctions,
internal armed conflict in the northwest recommenced, resulting in the influx of
thousands of Liberian refugees into Sierra Leone, as well as the premature repatriation
of Sierra Leonean refugees. Following intensification of the internal conflict in Liberia,
in early February 2002 the Liberian Government declared a state of emergency.
5.1.9 Two opposition groups, controlling between 60 and 80 percent of the country, launched
attacks on Government of Liberia (GOL) forces in attempts to oust President Taylor
from power. President Taylor resigned on August 11, 2003 after transferring power to
Moses Blah, Taylor's former Vice President, and departed the country for exile in
Nigeria. On August 17, GOL, LORD, and MODEL participants at peace negotiations in
Accra, Ghana signed a peace agreement allowing for a transitional government to
assume power on October 14. The parties to the agreement chose Gyude Bryant as
Chairman and Wesley Johnson as Vice-Chairman of the country's transitional
government.
5.1.10 On August 4, the vanguard Nigerian troops of the Economic Community of West
Africa Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) peace-keeping force began to arrive in Liberia.
ECOMIL expanded to include contingents from Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana,
Senegal, Mali, Benin, Gambia, and Togo, for a total of 3,500 troops. On September
19, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council voted to establish a peace-keeping force
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for Liberia consisting of approximately 15,000 troops. The force will assist in
implementing the August cease-fire and peace agreement that aims to have
national elections by the end of 2005. The U.N. Mission in Liberia (IJNMIL) is
expected to reach its full strength of 15,000 troops within three months.
5.2.1 Immediately after President Kabbah was restored to power, the Government of Sierra
Leone (Government) in early 1998 took the initiative to design a comprehensive
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme (DDRP). Government
presented the DDR Program to the UN Special Conference in June 1998 and received
the backing of the international community to proceed.
5.2.2 The programme was originally designed to target an estimated 45,000 combatants,
comprising members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), former Sierra Leone
Army (SLA), and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The immediate objective of
the programme was to assist combatants to lay down their arms and reintegrate into their
respective communities. The ultimate goal was to support the national strategy for
peace that includes the consolidation of the political process and security, which form
the basis for a viable post war national recovery programme.
5.3.0 INSTITUTIONS
5.4.1 Considerable efforts were made to initiate Phase I of the DDRP in June 1998 mainly
focusing on elements of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, which had surrendered to
ECOMOG. However, the process was aborted due to the escalation of fighting in late
1998 and early 1999, culminating in an attack on Freetown and the subsequent signing
of the Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA) on July 7, 1999.
5.4.2 Phase II of the programme was reactivated and implemented within the framework of
the Lomé Peace Agreement from October 1999. The process of disarmament and
demobilisation commenced with the active participation of the International community
and support of the various stakeholders. The programme was reviewed and adjusted,
and a Joint Operation Plan (JOP) guided multi-agency efforts inter alia involving
Government, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF, and WFP. However, the programme was
halted in May 2000 by the outbreak of hostilities among the fighting forces. This situation
continued until two ceasefire agreements were negotiated a year later.
5.4.3 In June 2000, all stakeholders to the Peace Process (Government, UNAMSIL, Donors,
Civil Society, NGOs, and Ex-Combatants) were brought together in a Consultative
Meeting to review the DDR and agree on an acceptable way forward. This was
followed by a comprehensive technical review of the programme in November 2000 for
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the benefit of Government, UN, Donors and the domestic and international Community at
large.
5.4.4 The period from May 2000 to May 2001 was considered an Interim Phase for the
DDRP. It was characterised foremost by negotiations with the RUF, mainly for the
release of UN hostages, a ceasefire and discussion of a framework for resumption of the
disarmament process. A ceasefire agreement was signed in Abuja (Nigeria) in November
2000, and another agreement on the way forward signed later in April 2001. The latter
agreement led to the setting up a Joint RUF, CDF, Government and UNAMSIL
Committee on DDR. -deciding on political way forward including timing and
sequencing of districts. The first meeting of the committee was convened on 15 May
2001 in Freetown, Sierra Leone and this ushered in Phase III of the DDRP, which
started on 18 May 2001. On 18 January 2002, with Disarmament completed all over the
country, Government declared the eleven year rebel war officially over. The
demobilisation process was completed by February 2002.
5.5.1 In February 2001, a mini-CG was held in Freetown, on which occasion Government
and partners , inter alia, reviewed NCDDR's readiness to complete demobilisation. In
June 2001, the World Bank chaired a donors' meeting in Paris that marshalled funding to
conclude that process. A follow-up meeting on DDR was held in Freetown in February
2002, in conjunction with the 2002 UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP), on resources for
reintegration. At the November 2002 Consultative Group meeting in Paris, the
Government of Sierra Leone presented its strategy to complete its Disarmament,
demobilisation, and reintegration program to the international community.
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5.6.1 In February 2003 the NCDDR adopted a Work Plan to implement this strategy. This
Work Plan aims at: (i) closing down the DDR program and support structure by 31
December 2003; (ii) fulfilling the Government's commitment to ex-combatants by
completing ongoing reintegration support and offering short-term reintegration
opportunities to the remaining caseload of ex-combatants; (iii) addressing transitional
issues in order to harness the conflict mitigation achievements of the program by
ensuring the inclusion of ex-combatants in medium to long-term community recovery
and reintegration efforts.
5.6.2 Programme achievements will include the disarmament of about 72,500 ex-
combatants. NCDDR projections are that by December 2003 around 48,200, or
85% of the DDRP's reintegration caseload will have completed the training offered
against a total reintegration caseload of around 56,750 ex-combatants is (see table
below).
5.7.0 FUNDING
5.7.1 The DDRP has been funded from the World Bank administered Multi Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF), Government budgetary resources, funding from a World Bank credit, as well as
other bilateral support from, in particular, DFID. Through its Executive Secretariat the
NCDDR coordinates closely with other organizations, such as the UNAMSIL,
UNICEF, WFP, DFID, other bilateral partners, and NGOs, in the implementation of
specific DDR activities.
5.7.2 The MDTF for the Sierra Leone DDRIP was set up to facilitate broad donor support of
the DDRP. A consortium of eleven donors contributed US$ 35 million, estimated to cover
50% of the total programme costs.2 Support to the DDRP s disarmament component
was excluded. from the MDTF grant. Activities for which the Grant was given included:
• Screening, registration, and basic living provision for ex-combatants during their
transitional encampment period;
• Pre-discharge orientation, discharge and reinsertion of ex-combatants in to home
communities;
• Transitional social safety net allowances;
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The Reintegration component of the DDRP, included (i) provision of a monetised settling-
in package; (ii) coordination with UNICEF and other child protection agencies; (iii)
facilitation of access to land together with NCRRR; (iv) information, counselling, and
referral services; and, (v) an employment, vocational training and apprenticeship fund for
a Training and Education Programme (TEP). The TEF/TEP was spearheaded and
funded from an IDA credit under the Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project
(CRRP) implemented by the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and
Rehabilitation (NCRRR).
5.8.2 Based on an analysis of capacities within Government at the time, and an assessment
of alternative options, it was agreed between Government and the World Bank that a
capable firm would be contracted through international tendering procedures to operate
the Financial Management and Procurement Unit (FMPU) responsible for ensuring
that all contracting, procurement, disbursement and financial management function
required under the DDRP and the CRRP be carried out in accordance with standard and
accepted guidelines of the donor agencies supporting the two programmes; this
includes the MDTF funding.
5.8.3 The DDRP was designed to provide targeted assistance to ex-combatants, although as a
matter of policy the NCDDR has always encouraged DDRP beneficiaries (commonly
referred to as 'ex-combatants') to participate in community programmes. A number of
parallel community programmes, in particular the DFID funded Community
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Reintegration Programme (CRP), and project supported under the UN Human Security Fund
(UN-HSF), have incorporated 'NCDDR ex-combatants' under specific arrangements
with the NCDDR. From the outset, NCDDR and UNICEF negotiated a
Memorandum of Understanding (199?) under which child combatants were separated
from adult as early as possible, and were provided assistance in a parallel programme
under the auspices of UNICEF and its partners.
c. Identify "lessons learnt" and relate these to the above sequence of phases of Sierra
Leone's conflict with a view to contribute to improving the policy, strategy and
operational aspects of DDRPs, including design, organization and financial
management, and implementation of similar interventions in a peace
negotiation/peacekeeping context;
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5.1 1.2 Furthermore the development community at large, academics and the general public
interested in the area of transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development
are an important target audience in relation to the findings of the evaluation.
5.12.2 The main focus of the evaluation is on the processes involved in maintaining a
Government led, and regionally and internationally assisted, response to issues related
to demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants as a key conflict
management measure aiming at reconstituting an enabling social environment for early
recovery and development.
5.12.4 Summing up the focus of the evaluation will be describing and assessing the following:
a. The process of how the DDRP through national efforts and external assistance
evolved from the initial response to a mutinous army, to an instrument incorporated
in a formal peace agreement implemented in close coordination with what became
the then largest UN peace keeping operation, and eventual phase-out under
circumstances relatively conducive for government reform and community driven
development;
• The coordination and interplay between various actors;
• The plans, strategies and timing for the intervention;
• The administrative/logistical set-up;
• The impact of the assistance.
• Relevance of experience:, for regional capacity building
b. Actors who played important roles during the process include
• Government of Sierra Leone Agencies
• The World Bank
• DFID
• Other bilateral partners under the MDTF
• European Commission
• USAID
• UNICEF
• WFP
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• ECOMOG
• ECOWAS
• UNAMSIL
• National NGOs
• International NGOs
5.13. 1 The evaluation should cover but not be limited to key issues below
a. Overall programme design and implementation
• Which internal and external factors have determined the design, management and
results of the programme, including the transition from one phase to another,
and the programme's response to evolving needs?
• How was the issue of child soldiers and women and girls affected by the
conflict addressed? Which explicit and implicit trade-offs were made between
the duty of Government and the international community to provide protection to
these and other vulnerable groups, and security priorities, including the
extraction of weapons from rebel groups and militia?
• Which strategies and modalities were applied to ensure that protection issues
were addressed outside the DDRP per se, but within a coherent national
framework and international response;
• How was the initial programme design organised and which design strategic
choices were made, including linkage of the TEP component to the CRRP and
programme responsiveness to constraints and opportunities related to targeted
assistance to ex-combatants and addressing ex-combatant needs under community
based programmes?
• What were the mechanisms applied in adjusting the programme design to the
subsequent opportunities and constraints created by conflict and peace initiative
dynamics and regional and international engagement; including the evolution of
the DDRP from a government programme to a negotiated programme
incorporated in the Lomé peace agreement arid adjustments made after May 2000.
• How have issues such as political prioritisation, public attention, and demand for
speed and visibility influenced the programme design and implementation?
• Were the programme objectives clear and how were they translated into strategies,
actions and activities?
• Did the DDRP staffing, including long-term and short-term technical assistance
adequately correspond to the tasks to he performed?
• At which point did the programme address the need for an exit strategy and what
actions were taken.
b. Disarmament
• How did procedures and criteria used in the eligibility and certification process, as
well as the extent to which these procedures were actually implemented and
adhered to, impact on the inclusion/exclusion of combatants as verified DDRP
beneficiaries;
• Flow did the DDRP monitor the disarmament process and which venues and
mechanisms have been used to provide ECOMOG and UNAMSIL with feed-
back?
c. Demobilisation/Reinsertion
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• How were the demobilisation centres managed during the subsequent DDRP
phases?
• How was the reception and orientation process, including the separation of adults
from children, designed, operationalised and implemented?
• How did reintegration interviews conducted by NCDDR staff in the demobilisation
centres eventually facilitate the planning and coordination of reintegration
activities?
• How was Pre-Discharge Orientation (PDO) implemented during the subsequent
DDRP phases? What were the relevance, effect and impact of these exercises?
• Assess the Transitional Safety Net Allowance modality of the DDRP.
d. Reintegration
• Assess the settling-in packages provided;
• Assess the arrangements through which the NCDDR coordinated with UNICEF
and other child protection agencies to facilitate the reinsertion and reintegration of
child ex-combatants;
• Assess the coordination between NCDDR and NCRRR on interaction with
relevant chiefdoms to encourage reconciliation and facilitation of access to land for
ex-combatants;
• Assess the provision of reintegration related information, counselling and referral
services at national, regional and district level;
• Assess the Training and Education Programme (TEP) in the context of a present
and future job market in a war torn country, and the degree in which vocational
skills acquired contributed to creative livelihood strategies other than the particular
vocation trained for;
• Assess TEP operation modalities, including its procedures for generating and
approving sub-projects and its use of a service provider/implementing partner
modality of operation;
• Assess the contribution to the DDRP's immediate objective of the NCDDR ex
combatants components of NCDDR `parallel partners' including the Community
Reintegration Programme, the GTZ programme and activities initiated/managed by
UNAMSIL's DDR Unit, including the Human Security Fund;
f. Funding
• Assess the design, operational modalities, implementation and management of the M
DTF
• Assess the FMPU modality, including a cost-benefit analysis of this option
g. Coordination/Programme coherence
• Map and assess the key policy and implementation coordination and collaboration
mechanisms used at national and international level, including joint reviews,
special meetings, donor conferences, and Consultative Group meetings.
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5.14.0 APPROACH
5.14.1 The evaluation should be based on a stakeholder approach, where all groups and
individuals, who affect and/or are affected by the achievement of the programme
objectives, are involved in the analysis. Moreover, the evaluation will take into
consideration the social, political and economic context, which affect the overall
performance of the programs.
5.14.2 In general, the evaluation shall be undertaken following the five evaluation criteria:
relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability/connectedness.
5.14.3 Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the activities is in Iine with local
needs and priorities (as well as with donor policies). Humanitarian and transitional activities
have to be tailored to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost
effectiveness accordingly (Minear, 1994). `Relevance' refers to the overall goal and
purpose of a programme, whereas `appropriateness' is more focused on the activities
and inputs.
5.14.5 The analysis of effectiveness shall indicate to what extent objectives have been
achieved, or can he expected to be achieved. This includes assessing and analysing
coherence covering issues such as effective division of labour among actors, maximising
the comparative advantages of each and strengthening local capabilities.
5.14.6 An evaluation of impact includes an assessment of the positive and negative effects
of the programmes. Unlike effectiveness, which is a more narrow evaluation, the
concept of impact is a far broader one, as it includes both positive and negative
consequences, whether these are foreseen and expected, or not. A comprehensive impact
evaluation help answering the fundamental question: - do the positive effects of the
intervention outweigh the negative ones?
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term into account. This has been has referred to this as "connectedness"; the need "to
assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context
which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account" (Minear, 1994).
OECD (p.22).
5.14.8 The evaluation will be carried out in an objective, sensitive and perceptive manner
with varied and balanced consideration of both positive and negative aspects.
5.14.9 The evaluation will require extensive review of existing documentation with
particular attention to evaluations and evaluative studies, consultations with senior and
operational managers and field staff of involved agencies, as well as
consultations/interviews with a
sample of beneficiaries. This also includes comparative studies on reintegration
projects involving other donors, other geographic locations, and alternative
implementation strategies.
5.14.10 The approach of the evaluation shall be participatory, that is, be flexible in design and
implementation, ensure stakeholder participation and ownership, and facilitate learning
and feedback. Through active involvement, the evaluation should utilize the knowledge
and experiences of stakeholders, who played an important role during the process of
Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Program and the World
Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
b. Electronic and, possibly, teleconferencing interviews with key actors who have been
involved in at various stages will be organised concurrently with the inception and
fieldwork phases. The preliminary findings/selected statements shall serve as point of
departure for in-depth interviews with representatives of key stakeholders and selected
implementing organisations.
c. Fieldwork will be planned and organised in close collaboration with the agencies
concerned so as to get the optimal input from the stakeholders and also not duplicate
existing or ongoing surveys and studies. An inception workshop and a debriefing of
stakeholders will be organised at the outset and conclusion of the fieldwork, respectively.
5.14.12 Where data exists, impact assessment will be undertaken, but emphasis will also be
placed on identifying good practice in performance monitoring.
5.15.1 The Team Leader will visit Sierra Leone for initial consultations in January 2004
field work will be completed by late February 2003. A first daft report will be
ready for scrutiny by 31 March 2004. The final report shall be submitted not later
than two weeks after receiving consolidated comments in writing.
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5.18.1 The Team shall produce the following reports and submit to NCDDR Head Office -
(Executive Secretary):
a. Inception Report outlining the team's preliminary findings; (by second week of
operation)
d. Final report & Reporting- within 4 weeks after receiving NCDDR comments on
Final Draft Report.
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