Conflicts of Interest CSP

ESTABLISHING AUTHORITIES TO
MANAGE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:

COMPARATIVE STATE PRACTICE

Legal Memorandum

August 2013

ESTABLISHING AUTHORITIES TO MANAGE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:

Executive Summary

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify, through comparative state
practice, the structure, functions, and powers of authorities responsible for
managing conflicts of interests in the government. The United Nations emphasizes
the need for strong national capacities to prevent and manage conflicts of interest
and recommends establishing specific authorities to carry out those functions
Moreover, the UNCAC mandates that states provide sufficient resources for the
authorities to accomplish those duties.

The institutional design of authorities for managing conflicts of interest
varies by state. Frequently, states have a one or more authority that oversees the
legislative branch and executive branch or civil service. These authorities are
usually separate and guided by unique frameworks. The authorities in the
legislatures are often completely internal, although sometimes legislatures may
also appoint an independent commissioner. The authorities monitoring the civil
service, however, are more often independent and positioned within the executive
branch. The primary function of these authorities is usually to monitor established
codes of conduct, under which conflicts of interest fall. In some cases, the
authorities may amend or recommend amendments to the codes or other
regulations of conflicts of interest. They may also conduct trainings, receive
complaints, or consult with public officials on the application of the codes. In
many states, these authorities also launch investigations of potential violations. If
the authorities determine a violation occurred, they either have the power to
enforce penalties or recommend penalties to the government entity that can
enforce.

In addition, most states have a separate authority that is responsible for
maintaining a register of public officials interests. The responsibility of these
authorities is usually limited to collecting, auditing, and publishing the disclosed
interests of public officials under their jurisdiction. States may assign other
authorities functions and powers to handle conflicts of interest as well. These may
consist of special courts, investigative agencies, or authorities with more localized
jurisdictions. To ensure that the monitoring authorities are effective, states often
grant them some level of independence and provide sufficient resources to function
in a timely, thorough, and transparent manner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of Purpose 1

Introduction 1

United Nations Guidelines 1

Brazil 2
Structure 3
Functions and Powers 4
Effectiveness 5

South Africa 6
Structure 6
Effectiveness 9

United Kingdom 9
Structure 10
Effectiveness 12

India 13
Structure 13
Effectiveness 14

Conclusion 15

Authorities on Conflicts of Interest, August 2013
1
ESTABLISHING AUTHORITIES TO MANAGE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify, through comparative state
practice, the structure, functions, and powers of authorities responsible for
managing conflicts of interests in the government.

Introduction

According to the United Nations guidelines, states need to establish and
strengthen authorities to deal with monitoring and enforcing regulations on
conflicts of interest.
1
Many states establish authorities to manage conflicts of
interest, whether large commissions, independent individuals, or committees
housed in one branch or department of government.
2
While the particular
institutional models vary, most states delegate responsibilities for monitoring,
interpreting, enforcing, and training officials on the rules of conduct and keeping a
register of public officials interests.
3
These responsibilities may be assigned to the
one central authority, or carried out by multiple authorities at the different levels of
government.
4

United Nations Guidelines

International standards provide general guidelines for establishing
authorities to deal with issues of corruption and ethical conduct, which are
umbrella categories that include conflicts of interest. To support the monitoring
and regulation of conflicts of interest, the United Nations resolution on the
International Code of Conduct for Public Servants recognizes the need for the
development of the establishment or strengthening of national capacities to
prevent and control corruption, as well as in training and upgrading skills of
relevant personnel.
5

1
Legislative Ethics: A Comparative Analysis, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 18
(1999), available at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/026_ww_legethics.pdf.
2
(1999).
3
(1999).
4
(1999).
5
General Assembly Resolution 51/59, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/59 (Dec. 12, 1996).
2

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) provides
more specific guidelines on what those national capacities might look like.
6
Article
six describes the need to establish authorities focused specifically on corruption,
under which conflict of interest issues often fall.
7
The authorities primary role is to
implement the legislative and administrative measures in place to ensure ethical
conduct.
8
The UN advocates that these authorities also have the responsibility to
increas[e] and disseminat[e] knowledge on how to prevent and handle breaches
in the rules on conduct.
9
To that end, the UN Convention against Corruption
recommends training programs that address effective measures to prevent, detect,
investigate, punish and control corruption; capacity building, strategic planning,
and evaluation mechanisms to improve institutions; and preparation for officials
responsible for handling these procedures.
10

Furthermore, the UN Convention against Corruption seeks to ensure that
states endow the authorities with tools to accomplish these functions.
11
UNCAC
mandates that states provide adequate staffing and resources.
12
In addition, states
are required to ensure the authorities independence to carry out its or their
functions effectively and free from any undue influence.
13

Brazil

In Brazil, the Public Ethics Commission (PEC) an authority established
within the executive branch handles most conflicts of interest.
14
The PEC is
primarily responsible for monitoring and enforcing rules related to the Federal
Code of Conduct of the High Administration.
15

6
United Nations Convention against Corruption (Oct. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
7
United Nations Convention against Corruption art. 6, (Oct. 31, 2003).
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Joo Geraldo Piquet Carneiro, The Experiences, Developments, and Challenges of the Public Ethics Committee,
PUBLIC ETHICS COMMITTEE, 3 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/20/2674660.pdf.
15
PUBLIC ETHICS COMMITTEE, 5 (2002).
3
Structure
A presidential decree established the Public Ethics Commission (PEC) in
1999 as the main authority responsible for managing conflicts of interest within the
executive branch.
16
Although the six-member PEC falls under the executive
branch, it is considered a separate entity and its members have no links to the
government and are appointed by representatives of civil society.
17
The
government may not interfere in the PECs decision-making, but the PEC is still
dependent upon the government for its budget.
18
Brazils Public Ethics
Commission has only a few employees due to its narrow focus, but over one
hundred representatives in positions throughout the various government entities
liaise with the PEC to support its work.
19
The PEC is also increasingly utilizing
technology, including a website where complaints can be submitted, to further its
objectives.
20

Besides the Public Ethics Commission, there are many authorities that bear
some responsibility for preventing and handling conflicts of interest.
21
For
instance, the PEC does not have jurisdiction over elected officials.
22
Instead,
elected officials publish their disclosure forms in Brazils national gazette, but they
are not audited.
23
Most Brazilian government authorities deal with their own
employees ethical violations, but few have monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.
24
As a result, Brazilian law has institutionalized rules to streamline

16
17
Eric Raile, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Americas: A Comparative Review, FORUM ON IMPLEMENTING
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 16 (May 5-6, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/47/31571390.pdf; Joo Geraldo Piquet Carneiro, The Experiences, Developments,
and Challenges of the Public Ethics Committee, PUBLIC ETHICS COMMITTEE, 5 (2002).
18
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 25 (May 5-6, 2004).
19
20
Roger Hamilton, May I Persuade You to Be Honest? INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (April 2002),
available at http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?&thisid=365&; Joo Geraldo Piquet Carneiro, The
Experiences, Developments, and Challenges of the Public Ethics Committee, PUBLIC ETHICS COMMITTEE, 6 (2002).
21
22
23
Brazil: Integrity Indicators Scorecard, GLOBAL INTEGRITY REPORT (2009),
http://report.globalintegrity.org/Brazil/2009/scorecard/34.
24
4
communication between all authorities and ensure standards for managing issues
of conflict of interest.
25

Functions and Powers

The Public Ethics Commissions primary task is to monitor whether officials
adhere to the Federal Code of Conduct of the High Administration, which applies
to employees in all 193 entities of the executive branch.
26
To carry out that
function, the PEC has the power to conduct audits, inspections, and surveillance
of officials under its jurisdiction.
27
If breaches may have occurred, the PEC
coordinates suits to investigate and enforce the regulations and can request
inquiries by ministries or the police.
28
If the PEC has evidence of a violation, it has
the power to apply sanctions and other consequences on individuals.
29
However,
the PEC can only investigate infra-legal ethics cases, or questions that deal with
ethics rules within the government.
30
Government agencies outside the PECs
purview may conduct their own investigation into ethical issues involving their
employees.
31

Furthermore, the Public Ethics Commission often focuses on moments of
potential conflict, rather than waiting for them to occur. For instance, it
sometimes monitors acquisition projects as they are carried out.
32
In addition, the
PEC is expected to conduct trainings and provide resources to ensure officials
and the public are aware of the rules.
33
The PEC may also consult with public
officials on questions about conflicts of interest and other ethical concerns.
34

25
26
PUBLIC ETHICS COMMITTEE, 5 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/20/2674660.pdf.
27
28
29
30
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 19 (May 5-6, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/47/31571390.pdf.
31
32
available at http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?&thisid=365&.
33
34
5

Another major function of the Public Ethics Committee is to manage the
Confidential Declarations of Information (CDI) that every public official submits
to them on a yearly basis.
35
The PEC also receives and maintains additional
disclosures on any new potential or actual conflicts of interest that develop over the
course of the year.
36
Each year, it receives an estimated 200,000 reports, about half
of which are publicly available.
37
Brazil delegates some of the CDI monitoring
functions to other authorities.
38
For instance, the Tribunal of Accounts and Internal
Control audits the disclosures for any financial misconduct, and the Tax
Administration reviews them for tax compliance.
39

Effectiveness

Brazils Public Ethics Commission has been described as an emblematic
group with a high degree of public exposure and visibility.
40
When the PEC first
began enforcing rules against accepting gifts and other common practices among
government officials, newspapers reported that 98 percent of Brazilians
approved.
41
Much of the PECs early success was also due to strong support from
the president who established it.
42
The PECs good relationship with top leadership
lent it greater authority, but at the same time, its close proximity to top leadership
could call into question the PECs independence.
43
Another criticism is that there
are too many rules in the codes of conduct and they are not well understood by
officials, perhaps due to the lack of sufficient trainings.
44
The mechanisms for
public servants to consult when they are unsure of the application of a rule are also

35
36
PUBLIC ETHICS COMMITTEE, 6 (2002); Eric Raile, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Americas: A Comparative
Review, FORUM ON IMPLEMENTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 32 (May 5-6, 2004).
37
38
39
40
41
available at http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?&thisid=365&.
42
Roger Hamilton, May I Persuade You to Be Honest? INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (April 2002).
43
44
6
ineffective.
45
In addition, the lack of infrastructure in some of the government
entities prohibits accurate investigations of violations.
46

South Africa

There are several authorities in South Africa that are responsible for
monitoring conflicts of interest. The Joint Committee on Ethics and Members
Interests is a committee of parliament members that oversees conduct in
parliament. A Registrar also monitors conflicts of interest in Parliament through
the maintenance of a register of members interests. In addition, a Public Service
Commission oversees issues of conflicts of interest in the civil service.

Structure

In South Africa, a committee of parliamentarians, called the Joint
Committee on Ethics and Members Interests, is responsible for handling conflicts
of interests in Parliament.
47
The Joint Committee on Ethics and Members Interests
consists of twenty-seven members of the Lok Sabha (the lower house of
parliament) and thirteen permanent members of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house
of parliament).
48
Whatever party has the majority in Parliament is granted one
more member than the total number of members from other parties.
49
The
Committee elects a chairperson and deputy chairperson, one from each house.
50

Decisions can be made in the Joint Committee on Ethics and Members Interests
when at least half of the members are present and agree by a simple majority.
51

The Registrar, a senior official on the staff of Parliament appointed by the
heads of both houses of Parliament, is another authority with responsibility to

45
46
47
Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members art. 1 (South Africa, 1988), available at
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=235; Joint Committee on Ethics and Members Interests,
PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (2012), available at
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=215&CommitteeID=64.
48
Sections of the Joint Rules Pertaining to the Committee on Ethics and Members Interests art. 122 (South Africa,
2011), available at http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=234.
49
2011).
50
2011).
51
2011).
7
monitor conflicts of interest within Parliament.
52
The Secretary assigns staff to
work with the Registrar and the Registrar works closely with the Joint Committee
on Ethics and Members Interests.
53
The Registrars decisions are made in
consultation with political party leaders in Parliament.
54

A separate authority called the Public Service Commission (PSC), is
established by the Constitution with a mandate to investigate, monitor and
evaluate the organization and administration, and the personnel practices, of the
public service.
55
The PSC is required to promote and maintain a high standard of
professional ethics amongst civil servants.
56
The PSC is supposed to be
independent and impartial, but it reports directly to the parliament.
57
Additionally,
the President appoints the PSCs fourteen members, five based on
recommendations from the Parliament and nine on recommendations by each of
the regional legislatures.
58


Parliaments Joint Committee on Members Interests interprets the
parliamentary code of conduct and advises members on its application.
59
The
Committee also enforces the code of conduct.
60
The Committee can initiate
investigations of Parliament members based on its own suspicions, complaints
submitted to the Office of the Registrar, or allegations in the press.
61
While the
Committee sets its own procedures, its procedures for the investigation of
complaints require the Committee to hear both the complainant and the Parliament
member in question.
62
Moreover, proceedings may be held in closed session if

52
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=235.
53
Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members arts. 2 and 3 (South Africa, 1998).
54
55
SOUTH AFRICA CONST. art 196 (1996) available at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm.
56
57
58
59
60
2011), available at http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=234.
61
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=235; Procedure for the investigation of complaints art 4,
available at http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=1469.
62
Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members art. 16 (South Africa, 1998).
8
necessary, but the Committee is required to publicly announce the results.
63
The
Committee cannot impose penalties when violations occur, but instead makes
recommendations to Parliament.
64
In some cases, Parliament members who wish to
clear their names after accusations of integrity violations may request a tribunal of
appointed judges to investigate.
65

The Registrar, on the other hand, has one primary function, which is to
maintain the Register of Members Interests, including both the public and
confidential sections.
66
Parliamentarians submit disclosures of their interests to the
Register of Members Interests on a yearly basis.
67
The Joint Committee on
Members Interests determines what information members of parliament are
required to disclose.
68
Anyone can also submit complaints regarding potential
violations of Parliaments code of conduct to the Registrar.
69
In some cases, the
Joint Committee on Members Interests can also request that the Registrar perform
additional duties related to the implementation of the code of conduct.
70

The Public Service Commission (PSC) monitors and enforces the code of
conduct that governs civil servants.
71
The PSC keeps the Register of Designated
Employees Interests, which is similar to the Register of Members Interests for
parliament.
72
In addition, the PSC also verifies potential or actual conflicts of
interest and refers the conflicts to the employees supervisors.
73
The supervisors in
the employees department or agency then investigate the issue, and may impose
disciplinary actions or grant a waiver.
74
Within 30 days of the Public Service
Commissions referral, the supervisors are required to report back what, if any,
steps they took.
75

63
64
65
(1999).
66
67
Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members art 4 (South Africa, 1998).
68
Code of Conduct for Assembly and Permanent Council Members art 4 (South Africa, 1998).
69
Procedure for the Investigation of Complaints art 4 (South Africa, 2011), available at
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=1469; Code of Conduct art. 16 (South Africa, 1998);
70
71
Government Notice No. R. 1: Public Service Regulations, art. 3, (South Africa, Jan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/legislation_32.pdf.
72
73
74
Government Notice No. R. 1: Public Service Regulations, art. 3, (South Africa, Jan. 5, 2001).
75
Government Notice No. R. 1: Public Service Regulations, art. 3, (South Africa, Jan. 5, 2001).
9
Effectiveness

The institutional authorities established in South Africa to handle conflicts
of interest are regarded as sound in theory, but their practices could be improved.
76

For instance, the Joint Committee on Members Interests is completely internally
controlled. Partly as a lack of effective oversight, conflicts of interest continue to
be prevalent.
77
For instance, a 2008 survey by the Public Service Commission
revealed that South Africans still perceive nepotism and cronyism as major
problems amongst public officials.
78
The separate codes of conduct that govern
members of parliament and the civil service, moreover, are sometimes confusing
and inaccessible.
79
One instance is the section that explains that receiving of gifts
and benefits is prohibited, but waivers to the rule may be granted.
80
In addition,
sanctions on officials convicted of misconduct are sometimes light, with written
warnings and discharge from service among the most prevalent consequences.
81

While the majority of officials disclose their interests each year, much of the
information remains confidential and is not sufficiently audited.
82

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has delegated the oversight responsibilities for
conflicts of interest to a parliamentary committee, an independent parliamentary
commissioner, and civil service commission.
83
Together, they create an effective
set of mechanisms to manage conflicts of interest.

Structure

In the United Kingdom, there are three primary authorities responsible for
managing conflicts of interest.
84
The Committee on Standards and Privileges is a
ten-member select committee of Parliament with a mandate to enforce the official

76
South Africa: Integrity Indicators Scorecard, GLOBAL INTEGRITY (2008), available at
http://report.globalintegrity.org/South%20Africa/2008/scorecard/54.
77
South Africa: Integrity Indicators Scorecard, GLOBAL INTEGRITY (2008).
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
(1999).
10
code of conduct for members of Parliament.
85
The Committee may appoint sub-
committees of seven or fewer members to deal with specific issues.
86
If they so
choose, the Attorney General, Advocate General, and Solicitor General may
participate in the Committees deliberations, but these individuals have no power
to vote or amend documents.
87

Another authority, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, is a
single, independent officer appointed by parliament to monitor and enforce ethical
compliance of members of parliament.
88
To ensure the Commissioners neutrality,
the Commissioner may not be a member of the parliament.
89
However, the
Committee on Standards and Privileges oversees the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Standards.
90

To regulate civil service employees, the Queen appoints six to twelve
individuals from the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, and the Welsh
National Assembly.
91
These individuals are called Civil Service Commissioners.
92


The Committee on Standards and Privileges considers matters relating to
privileges referred to it by the House.
93
Among its functions, the Committee
reviews and recommends modifications to the Parliaments code of conduct.
94

Another primary duty is to consider complaints regarding conflicts of interest.
95

The Committee on Standards and Privileges and its sub-committees have the

85
Standing Order 149, ADDENDUM TO THE STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 4-5 (United Kingdom,
June, 3 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmstords/add/add030609.pdf.
86
Standing Order 149, ADDENDUM TO THE STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 5 (United Kingdom,
June 3, 2009).
87
June 3, 2009).
88
June 3, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmstords/add/add030609.pdf.
89
(1999).
90
June 3, 2009).
91
Civil Service Bill art. 2 (United Kingdom, 2004), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/050/2004050.pdf.
92
Civil Service Bill art. 2 (United Kingdom, 2004).
93
94
June 3, 2009).
95
June 3, 2009).
11
power to subpoena persons, papers, and records, as well as members of
Parliament. The Committee may also appoint legal and specialist advisers to
consult on complex matters.
96
After an investigation, the Committee presents its
recommendations to the Parliament, which has the power to impose disciplinary
measures.
97

The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards also receives and
investigates complaints from members of parliament or individuals regarding
members conduct or disclosure of interests.
98
The Commissioner may establish an
Investigatory Panel consisting of the Commissioner, a legally qualified person
appointed by the Commissioner, and a member of Parliament chosen by the
Speaker who does not serve on the Committee on Standards and Privileges.
99
The
Commissioner cannot impose penalties, but rather submits its findings to the
Committee on Standards and Privileges or one of its sub-committees, which may
then pass along its recommendations to the Parliament.
100
The Commissioner is not
obligated to report cases where an official rectifies a mistake or incomplete
disclosure of interests, an official reimburses the appropriate authority, or the
offense is deemed to be minor.
101

The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards maintains the Register of
Members Financial Interests by compiling the register and balancing making
public information accessible and ensuring the confidentiality of Parliament
members private interests.
102
The Commissioner publishes the Register of
Members Interests annually and may also supply individual entries at his or her
discretion.
103
The Commissioner also advises the Committee on Standards and
Privileges on the interpretation and application of the code of conduct, and makes

96
June 3, 2009).
97
98
99
June 3, 2009).
100
Legislative Ethics: A Comparative Analysis, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
44 (1999); Standing Order 150, ADDENDUM TO THE STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 8 (United
Kingdom, June 3, 2009).
101
June 3, 2009).
102
June 3 2009).
103
37 (1999), available at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/files/026_ww_legethics.pdf.
12
recommendations for improvements to the code.
104
The Commissioner provides the
additional service of giving confidential advice on conflicts of interest to
members.
105

Civil Service Commissioners audit and handle complaints regarding the
Civil Service Code.
106
The Civil Service Commissioners other functions include
monitoring civil servant appointments, publishing the recruitment code, and
auditing recruitment systems.
107
After studies revealed public officials were not
aware of ethical standards, the role of the Civil Service Commission expanded to
include greater cooperation with representatives in departments throughout the
government to promote and consult on the code of conduct.
108

Effectiveness

The United Kingdoms institutional model for managing conflicts of interest
is highly effective.
109
Regulations for disclosure of interests for both members of
parliament and civil servants are enforced and the submitted data is audited and
made public.
110
One aspect of potential concern is that, from 1996 to 2006, the
Civil Service Commissioners reported only six formal appeals.
111
While the low
number may indicate the mechanism for submitting complaints is not working, the
commissioners frequently assist cases informally as well.
112

India

India has established ethics committees in both houses of parliament and
effectively incorporates other mechanisms, including special judiciary procedures
and investigative agencies, to assist in handling conflicts of interest.
113

104
Standing Order 150, ADDENDUM TO THE STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 7 (June 3 2009).
105
22 (1999).
106
Civil Service Bill art. 3 (United Kingdom, 2004), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/050/2004050.pdf.
107
Civil Service Bill art. 3 (United Kingdom, 2004).
108
Oonagh Gay, SN/PC/3924: The Civil Service Code, PARLIAMENT AND CONSTITUTION CENTRE, 4 (2006),
available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03924.pdf.
109
Global Integrity Scorecard: United Kingdom, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, 33 (2007), available at
http://report.globalintegrity.org/reportPDFS/2007/United%20Kingdom.pdf.
110
Global Integrity Scorecard: United Kingdom, GLOBAL INTEGRITY, 33 (2007).
111
Oonagh Gay, SN/PC/3924: The Civil Service Code, PARLIAMENT AND CONSTITUTION CENTRE, 4 (2006).
112
Oonagh Gay, SN/PC/3924: The Civil Service Code, PARLIAMENT AND CONSTITUTION CENTRE, 4 (2006).
113
13
Structure

In India, conflicts of interest in the Rajya Sabha, one of the legislative
houses, are handled by a ten-person Committee on Ethics, which is nominated by
the Chairman of the Council of States.
114
A similar Committee on Ethics exists in
the other legislative house, the Lok Sabha.
115
The quorum for the Committees is
five members.
116
In certain corruption cases, the state may establish special judges
to try offences.
117
Additionally, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), a
multidisciplinary investigation agency, plays a role in investigating conflicts of
interest of any public official through its Anti-Corruption Division.
118
The Central
Vigilance Commissions, an independent federal anti-corruption commission,
oversees the functioning of the CBI (established by virtue of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act).
119


The functions of both the Committees on Ethics include preparing and
suggesting amendments to the codes of conduct, investigating complaints of
breaches to the codes of conduct and other unethical behavior, and providing
advice to members.
120
The Committees on Ethics can receive complaints from
anyone regarding the conduct of a house member and may also carry out inquiries
based on its own suspicions.
121
The Committees also have the power to require
individuals to appear and to take evidence or call for papers, records, or
documents.
122
If a Committee finds that there has been misconduct, it may
recommend sanctions to the Council of States, including censure, reprimand,
suspension, or other penalties.
123

The Council of States maintains a publicly available Register of Members
Interests, but the Committees on Ethics determine what information members must

114
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) art. 286 (India, 2010),
available at http://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/rs_rule/rules7th.pdf.
115
Conflict of Interest Issues in Parliament, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, 2 (Nov. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Conference%20note/Conference%20note%20on%20Conflict%20of%20Inte
rest.pdf.
116
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) art. 289 (India, 2010).
117
Prevention of Corruption Act art. 4 (India, 1988), available at http://cbi.nic.in/rt_infoact/pcact.pdf.
118
CBI and Its Roles, CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, available at http://cbi.nic.in/aboutus/cbiroles.php.
119
The Central Vigilance Commission Act art. 8(1)(a), (India, 2003).
120
121
122
123
14
submit to the register.
124
The Chairman of the Council of States may refer
questions of conduct to the Committees for examination, investigation, and
report.
125

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) takes on cases that fall under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This includes a broader group of government
employees, defined as public officials and the employees of Central Government,
Public Sector Undertakings, [and] Corporations or Bodies owned or controlled by
the Government of India.
126
Likewise, issues determined to be outside the Ethics
Committees purview are sent into the judicial system.
127
Either high-ranking
police officials or the Central Bureau of Investigation carry out investigations in
these cases.
128
When CBI determines conflicts of interest regulations have been
violated, the resulting sanctions can span from six months to five years in jail.
129

Effectiveness

The establishment of Ethics Committees and investigative agencies to
manage conflicts of interest has resulted in significant improvements in India, but
misconduct still occurs frequently.
130
A recent article reported widespread
violations of conflict of interest, including up to 50 members of the Council of
States simultaneously holding paid consultancy positions and many others
receiving additional salaries while in office or controlling large shares in private
companies.
131
Although the Central Bureau of Investigation began as a way to
combat small instances of corruption, it began taking on high-level and high-
profile cases in the 1990s.
132
The Central Bureau of Investigation has targeted
many members of the political elite, including prime ministers.
133

124
125
126
CBI and Its Roles, CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, available at http://cbi.nic.in/aboutus/cbiroles.php.
127
128
129
18 (1999).
130
18 (1999).
131
Minhaz Merchant, India Needs Institutional Arrangements to Rule Out Conflict of Interest Among Those Holding
Public Office, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, (Feb. 11, 2012), available at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-02-11/news/31050009_1_remunerative-directorships-lok-sabha-
mps-bmc.
132
133
18 (1999).
15

Conclusion

In order to comply with the United Nations recommendations to maintain
strong, capable authorities to manage conflicts of interest, states employ a variety
of institutional models.
134
Sometimes there is one central authority with broad
jurisdiction and powers over conflict of interest (and ethical and other issues), and
other times there are several authorities responsible for different aspects of
managing conflicts of interest or based in different governmental divisions.
135
In
general, the frameworks and authorities that deal with the legislature are separate
from those dealing with the civil service. Frequently, the authorities overseeing
the legislatures are internal, or regulated by members of the legislature themselves.
In a few instances, however, an independent commissioner may assist in
monitoring the legislature. The authorities monitoring the civil service are usually
independent and positioned within the executive branch. Almost all states delegate
responsibility to a registrar or commissioners to collect, audit, and otherwise
maintain a register of public officials interests.
136
Many states invest the
authorities that oversee the legislature and civil service with powers to monitor,
interpret, enforce, and train officials on the established codes of conduct.
137

Effective authorities often have independence from undue government influence
and have sufficient resources to carry out their functions in a timely, thorough, and
transparent manner.
138

134
18 (1999).
135
18 (1999).
136
18 (1999).
137
18 (1999).
138
United Nations Convention against Corruption art. 6, (Oct. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.

Conflicts of Interest CSP

Cargado por

Información del documento

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

Conflicts of Interest CSP

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

ESTABLISHING AUTHORITIES TO

MANAGE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:

También podría gustarte