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Anguluan vs.

Taguba, 93 SCRA 179
The withdrawal of the case by the complainant, or the filing of an affidavit of desistance or the complainant’s loss of interest
does not necessarily cause the dismissal thereof. Reason: To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant who for
one reason or another, condones a detestable act is to strip the Supreme Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of
the judiciary.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 1402-MJ September 14, 1979
HERMOGENES ANGULUAN and ANGEL ANGULUAN, complainants,
vs.
HON. HENRY C. TAGUBA, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a joint affidavit subscribed and sworn to at Tuguegarao. Cagayan on September 10, 1976,
1
Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan
charged the respondent Municipal Judge Henry C. Taguba of Rizal, Cagayan with (1) conniving with Mayor Venture Baloran of Rizal,
Cagayan in the filing of "an imaginary, fabricated, baseless and unfounded criminal case of Qualified Trespass" against the complainant
Hermogenes Anguluan and other persons as a consequence of which the persons charged were imprisoned for three (3) days at the
municipal jail of Rizal on August 3, 4 and 5, 1976, and (2) advising the complainants and Aleco Anguluan, Diosdado Gundan and Jose de la
Cruz, to sign an affidavit in the presence of Mayor Baloran on August 12, 1976 without allowing them to read the affidavit wherein the
affiants admitted having entered upon "the area presently occupied and belonging to VENTURA B. BALORAN, a resident of Barrio
Cambabangan, Rizal, Cagayan."
2

This affidavit-complaint was referred to the respondent for comment.
3

In his comment filed on November 19, 1976, the respondent denied the alleged connivance between himself and Mayor Ventura Baloran
but admitted that Criminal Case No. 216 for Qualified Trespass was filed before him by Acting Chief of Police David G. Duruin on June 18,
1974 and alleged that he (conducted the requisite preliminary investigation of the case on August 29, 1974 but issued the warrant of
arrest only on August 3, 1976; and that respondent's inability to promptly rule on the existence of probable cause was due to his belief
that the dispute was more or less civil in nature and "there were sincere efforts on the part of both parties to settle the case."
4

On the charge that the respondent failed to read and explain to the affiants the averments of the affidavit, the respondent said:
The Affidavit of Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan was prepared by somebody else. All what I could recall
was the Municipal Secretary in the morning whom I trusted to serve as a bridge between the Mayor and accused
approached me and asked accommodation to mediate the differences of the parties. Since this was the first time that a
respectable and responsible person made a request which request could not be turned down considering his stature, I
acceded believing that it could terminate once and for all their squabble. So that in the afternoon when the Mayor
brought in the supposed affiants of the affidavit in question, I thought that was the work of the Secretary. I instructed
my clerk to supervise the signing and unaware of the legal effects of the document, he assured me that everything was
alright. I did that because at the time I was helpless without eyeglasses.
5

On the alleged detention of the complainants for three days, the respondent said:
It is alleged in the Joint Affidavit of Hermogenes Anguluan and Angel Anguluan that they were detained. May I ask if a
Court after conducting the requisite preliminary investigation prior to arrest is devoid of any power to issue a
Warrant of Arrest. The new lawyer who instigated this case against me should study his law. The law is clear on the
matter that after a Judge has asked searching questions of the complainant and his witnesses, a Warrant of Arrest
could be issued there being findings of probable cause, which is present in the case. As to the allegation that when I
subscribed their affidavit, I did not explain to them what was then being subscribed, I know clearly my law on the
matter and if there was mistake committed, I was probably laboring under the impression that everything was in
order and since my Court and/or office was overcrowded doing plenty of work and forgot my eyeglasses then at home
I mislooked and overlooked important items that should at the first place given close scrutiny. But while I admit slight
oversight on minor matters, I deny vigorously that I connived with certain parties. I cannot sacrifice the immense
prestige of a judge in a small municipality for the sake of temporary friendship and narrow convenience. My oath as
such has always served as my guidepost for discipline, excellence and fairness.
6

In a Resolution dated June 19, 1978, this Court referred the case to Executive Judge Alberto Gampona of the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan at Tuao, Cagayan for investigation, report and recommendation.
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Judge Gampona submitted his Report and
Recommendation
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to this Court on February 15, 1979.
During the investigation on September 14, 1978 conducted by Judge Gampona the complainant, Hermogenes Anguluan, appeared
without counsel and manifested his intention to withdraw his complaint against the respondent.
9

On October 16, 1978, complainants' counsel appeared on the scheduled hearing without the complainants. Said counsel informed the
investigating judge about his clients' desire to withdraw the complaint.
10

On October 30, 1978, a motion to withdraw the complaint was filed by complainants' lawyer, Atty. Nelson C. Villaflor To said motion was
attached the affidavit of complainant, Hermogenes Anguluan, explaining the non-appearance of the other complainant, Angel A.
Anguluan, whose whereabouts are not known to him and alleging that the administrative matter was being withdrawn because the
affidavit-complaint "does not in any way substantiate a good cause of action" and the complainants' evidence on hand win not suffice our
charge. ... "
11

Notwithstanding the above-stated motion to withdraw, Alberto Gampona examined the records of the case. He found that the respondent
judge had committed gross negligence in the performance of his judicial functions in that the respondent gave due course to the
complaint for Qualified Trespass in Criminal Case No. 216 filed on June 18, 1974; that it was clear from the complaint and the supporting
affidavits that the crime charged therein had already prescribed; that moreover, although the preliminary examination was conducted on
August 29, 1974, the warrant of arrest was issued only on August 3, 1976, after the lapse of more than two (2) years from date the
complaint was filed; and that finally, the respondent admitted that he failed to explain the contents of the affidavit which was subscribed
and sworn to on August 12, 1976 before him by complainant Hermogenes Anguluan and four other persons, the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 216 being based on said affidavit.
The findings of Judge Alberto Gampona are supported by the facts of record.
The criminal complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police., David G. Duruin, in Criminal Case No. 216 before the Municipal Court of Rizal,
Cagayan, presided by the respondent judge reads as follows:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned Acting Chief of Police, Rizal, Cagayan, under oath accuses HERMOGENES ANGULUAN, DIOSDADO
GUNDAN, ALEJO ANGULUAN, ANGEL ANGULUAN, JOSE DE LA CRUZ AND ERNESTO ANGULUAN, for the crime of
'QUALIFIED TRESPASS' defined and penalized under Art. 280 in relation to Article 281 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines, committed as follows, to wit:
That on or about 10 th day of December, 1973, in the Municipality of Rizal, Province of Cagayan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without justifiable cause and has not
secured the permission of the owner entered the enclosed estate of one VENTURA B. BALORAN of plowing and
planted corn versus the latter's will.
Contrary to law.
Rizal, Cagayan, May 6, 1974.
DAVID G. DURUIN
Actg. Chief of Police
12

It is to be noted that although the crime is designated as qualified trespass, the allegations describe the offense as other forms of trespass
defined by Article 281 of the Revised Penal Code with the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00. The act of entering a
fenced estate is a light felony in view of the penalty imposed.
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Light offenses prescribe in two months.
14

It is alleged in the criminal complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police that the crime was committed on December 10, 1973. The
criminal complaint was filed only on June 18, 1974. The respondent judge should have known immediately by simply reading the
criminal complaint that the crime charged had prescribed. The respondent judge displayed gross ignorance of the law in giving due
course to the criminal complaint as a result of which the persons accused were detained for three days.
Although the preliminary examination was conducted on August 29, 1974, the warrant of arrest was issued only on August 3, 1976. The
failure of the respondent judge to issue the warrant of arrest within a reasonable time is suspicious. The respondent judge was either
ignorant of his duty or he was impelled by an ulterior motive.
And finally, the respondent judge admitted that he did not explain the affidavit to the affiants before he administered the oath. His excuse
that he could not read without his eyeglasses asinine to say the least.
Although the complainants have asked for the withdrawal of this complaint, the Court cannot overlook the anomalous acts of the
respondent judge. The actuations of the respondent judge seriously affected the public interest inasmuch as they involve the
administration of justice. It is for this reason that the motion to withdraw the complaint filed by the complainants will not justify the
dismissal of this administrative case against the respondent. As stated by the Supreme Court in Vasquez versus Malvar,
15
" ...
Furthermore, to condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."
Under the established facts and circumstances, the respondent judge should be imposed a penalty of suspension from office without pay
for three months.
WHEREFORE, the respondent judge, Henry C. Taguba, is found guilty of serious irregularities in the performance of his duties as a
municipal judge and is hereby suspended from office for a period of three (3) months without pay effective from the finality of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.