Introduction

There is no standard definition for exactly

what police do (Monjardet 2003). Their
activities vary depending on context and
institutional arrangement. Despite these dif-
ferences, they face the same difficulties when
the subject is use of force, since they wield
the power of the state within their respec-
tive territories. Arrangements where preven-
tion dominates normally indicate a certain
advance in a civilizing process (Elias 1994)
whereas repression is a sign that something
has gone awry in society, in the police insti-
tution, or both. However, the challenge for
police in a democratic state is to strike the
right balance between legitimate coercion
and prevention. Given effective manage-
ment, under a modern conception of police,
legitimacy is the most precious attribute.
The more legitimate the police are perceived
to be, the lower the need for physical force,
their primary resource.
This is legitimacy in the political sense,
based on persuasion through consensus
building and consideration of all stakehold-
ers (Hanah Arendt 2007; Aguiar 2008).
In this sense, the police that we want to
legitimize must remain close to the parties
affected, seeking consensus even when there
are differences. For the purpose of this paper,
approximation refers to state actions which
aim at this legitimacy and which include
society as a participant in the development
of public policies. Segregation on the
other hand refers not only to actions which
exclude, but to inaction due to the absence
of any public policies. Approximation does
not necessarily mean physical proximity, but
a convergence of interests especially in a civi-
lized context in which the main aim is non-
violence, that is, peace.
Previous research provides numerous
examples of this horizontal and respectful
approximation to which I refer to in the pre-
sent article. As for public security, Skolnick
& Bailey (2002) have analysed community
policing and other varieties such as proxim-
ity and problem solving policing in many
Rodrigues, R 2014 The Dilemmas of Pacifcation: News of War and Peace
in the Marvelous City. Stability: International Journal of Security &
Development, 3(1): 22, pp.1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.dt
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Dilemmas of Pacifcation: News of War
and Peace in the Marvelous City
Robson Rodrigues
*
stability
* Senior Researcher, Igarap Institute, Brazil
robson@igarape.org.br
This article is a refection on police work carried out in Rio de Janeiro favelas,
1
from
the viewpoint of someone who works in the feld as a police manager in an efort
to present the risks, opportunities, mistakes and achievements of the Pacifying
Police Units (UPPs), within the process of pacifcation currently underway in
Rio de Janeiro. The empirical data, based on observations recorded by the author
during his time as coordinator of the UPPs,
2
serves as a counterpoint to academic
research produced on the subject.
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page2 of 16
countries. Examples of this stance can be
found in other political settings too. For
instance, Santos (2005) shows good prac-
tices of participatory democracy as an alter-
native to representative democracy, which
is still dominant and practiced in many
countries, especially in the peripheral ones.
With regard to Brazil, the author mentions
the Participatory Budget
3
in Belo Horizonte
and Porto Alegre (Santos 2005: 561592).
On the other hand, vertical public policies
are examples of a deliberate segregation of
communities by the state. For example, one
can cite policies addressed at silent com-
munity residents, where there is no room for
dialogue or a possibility of effective partici-
pation and resolution of conflicts, and these
policies unfortunately are the reality in most
Brazilian favelas. A sociological study car-
ried out already in the 1970s in the favela of
Jacarezinho in Rio de Janeiro (Santos 1977)
shows that these old problems are repro-
duced even today. Santos shows how peo-
ple in these deliberately segregated spaces
resorted to solving their conflicts informally,
either because they did not believe in formal
state institutions or because these institu-
tions were indeed not capable of dealing
with their conflicts. Therefore, instead of a
naturalization of a belief in modern equal-
ity, what happened was a naturalization of
structural inequality which was exacerbated
by this historical segregation.
By considering what actually happens in
the field we can see to what extent this ideal
is actually achieved by institutions. Whether
legitimacy is pursued through segregation
or approximation, policy choices depend on
context. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, sociopo-
litical, historical and economic complexities,
which would be a challenge for any police
force in the world, provide clues to the his-
torical approach of segregation. The natural
wonders of a Marvelous City contrast with
the structural inequalities, wavering democ-
racy and a patchwork social geography of a
Segregated City (Leite 2000).
4
For example,
Gvea, an upper-middle-class neighborhood
in the southern zone of the city, with the states
highest Human Development Index (HDI)
score (and one of the highest in the country),
is located adjacent to Rocinha, Brazils largest
favela, which has one of the lowest.
These contrasts also represent a potential
for conflict which become evident when they
are intensified by discourses based on hate
and fear. To better understand policy choices,
not only must the practices that bring them
about be investigated, but also the collective
representations
5
that direct them. Up until
now a myth of fear, based on interactions
in contexts where risk is strongly perceived,
predominate, even if there is no real signifi-
cant risk (Borges 2012). The myths about
the favela, which primarily after consolida-
tion,
6
were based on fear of a different and
unknown other, transformed the favela into
a natural place for violence and criminal activ-
ity, consequently setting off violent reactions
from society and the state, in their different
dimensions: physical, symbolic and structural
(Souza e Silva 2010). This criminalization of
poverty, as Wacquant (2001) has put it has
lead to Brazil having the fourth largest prison
population in the world, made up largely
from black and brown favela residents with-
out regular employment, who tend to be
drug users or members of the drug trade.
This has also led to segregation, particularly
in relation to favelas, which are seen as zones
of danger. This resulted in the segregation of
Rio de Janeiro, and the widespread notion of
the favela as a dangerous place.
This trend appears now to be reversing
itself with the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs)
and the benefits have already been perceived
and measured (IBPS 2009; Cano 2012; CESec
2012, 2013; Rodrigues and Siqueira). They
are accompanied by great expectations.
However, there is still concern over violence,
political corruption and armed conflict.
When combined with the absence or lack
of social policies and the slow process of
urbanization, this raises uncertainty about
the sustainability of public policy (IBPS
2009; Machado da Silva 2010; Cano 2012).
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page3 of 16
The question that one must ask here is: Is
this change permanent or just another tem-
porary solution to segregation?
War and peace: Representations and
practices in public security policies
To be able to talk about peace in Rio de
Janeiro, one must understand a little about
the war over the last three decades. It is not
a war, in the conventional political sense of
the word, but an imagined one; socially con-
structed ideas that operate practices that, in
turn, reinforce this very image, producing a
spiral of meanings that take hold according
to the interests at play (Bourdieu 2005).
During this period a specific conflict
emerged in Rio de Janeiro between the police
and the favelas under the pretext that there
was organized crime operating in these
spaces, notably drug trafficking. The results,
we all know: poverty foretold by the neglect
of the state, growing violence and, instead of
the end of drug trafficking, a strengthened
drug economy and increased consumption. In
its wake came higher murder rates, as well as
an increase in police violence and extortion.
In the 1980s, with the political transition
and greater availability of official statistics,
Brazilian society began to take note of its
many problems. Expressions like lost dec-
ade, sky-high prices, runaway inflation
and escalation in violence, were often used,
indicating this widespread perception. It is
from that time onward that public security
became important, not only because of the
heightened perception of violence, but also
due to the real increases in crime rates.
The end of the Cold War did not alleviate
tensions between the state and society in Rio
de Janeiro, on the contrary, they increased.
Against the backdrop of the war on drugs
and globalization of crime, repression became
focused, allowing the media to identify a new
threat to society emanating from the favela:
the new dangerous classes (Coimbra 2001).
Even with re-democratization, the concept
of public safety was still vague and confused
with national security. Often generals would
assume responsibility for public security in
the states, viewing the problem of crime
from an ideological perspective of national
security. In this sense, the work of General
Nilton Cerqueira
7
as Secretary of Public
Safety for the state was emblematic. The
perception was that crime spread due to
the lenience of leftist policies, in this case
those of former Governor Leonel Brizola.
8

Cerqueira responded by creating a financial
reward for acts of bravery for policemen
who risked their lives while fighting crime,
soon thereafter known as the Wild West
bonus because it encouraged the death
of the enemy
9
(Cano 2003). The result was
one of the harshest and bloodiest repres-
sions the state had ever experienced, and an
increase in murder rates and controversial
justifications over resisting arrest.
10
It is no
coincidence that Cerqueiras time as head
of Public Security (19951998) resulted in
the highest murder rates in the history of
the state. In 1995, the murder rate within
Rio state peaked, with 61.8 homicides per
100,000 inhabitants, whereas in 1997 the
capitals murder rate reached a record of
53.7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
11

It is likely that the media exaggerated in its
coverage, displaying a scenario riddled with
stray bullets and military weapons, but the
fact is that this was one of the countrys most
violent episodes. The image of drug traffick-
ers wielding military-style weapons from
atop their territories, usurped from the state,
caused society to recoil and showed the inef-
fectiveness of the police against increasingly
powerful organized crime. The solution
was then to arm the police for war, which
resulted in the greatest arms race in the his-
tory of the state.
12
War metaphors were used
in the construction of discourses that gave
the impression of a real war, which Michel
Foucault would characterize as discursive
practices (Foucault 2007). While drug traf-
fickers used the favela as their military
HQs, officials transformed it into a theater
of operations, establishing their own war
based on a war on drugs, which at that time
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page4 of 16
had already been transformed into a moral
crusade of global proportions.
13
It is likely that many of the acts of bravery
recognized through the Wild West bonus
were used to officially record deaths that
were in fact extrajudicial killings, like those
that occurred in 1993 in the Massacre at
Vigrio Geral. Vigrio Geral is a favela in the
northern zone of the city, where 21 residents
were cruelly executed. Investigations suggest
the motive was the breach of a pact of corrup-
tion between police and local drug traffickers,
who on the previous evening had ambushed
a police car and killed all of its occupants,
including the leader of a rival group. Despite
the inability of the criminal justice system to
try and convict all those involved, some clues
emerged that allow us to understand how the
criminal underworld works, primarily when
war fuels a criminal market for extortion. The
key witness, who had been an informant for
both of the sides of the dispute, clearly identi-
fied the spoils of war as a natural incentive to
run his own business.
Often the deliberate segregation of the
favela produces a vacuum where alterna-
tive types of survival and social organiza-
tion emerge whose frontiers, separating the
moral fields of formality/informality and
legality/illegality, are tenuous and flexible.
They contain a mix of activities of an under-
ground economy that include motorcycle
taxis, vans, clandestine cable TV providers
or gatonet, clandestine electrical connec-
tions or gatos, street cleaning, street par-
ties or bailes funk, but also markets for
drugs, weapons and the fencing of goods
or robauto. As activities that are invisible
and untaxed by the state, they are ripe for
criminal activity that generally goes beyond
the original creators, generating networks of
corruption and violence used both by crimi-
nals and the clandestine police.
Given this situation and an archaic police
model, created within a hierarchical and segre-
gationist context where it is difficult to deter-
mine who should be controlled or repressed,
many favelas have been violently fought over,
occupied and transformed into fortifications
to protect the illegal businesses), much to the
despair of favela residents. As the volume of
transactions and working capital grow, the
corruption and violence needed to maintain
the businesses also grow.
In this context, where drug traffickers
and clandestine police or militias find com-
mon objectives, reproducing practically the
same factional logic for economic purposes,
the war ends up maintaining the ideal invis-
ibility for the proliferation of violent illegal
markets, far from the control of the state and
the fearful eyes of society. The police model,
therefore, adapted itself well to the histori-
cal segregation promoted by the state and
its policies for verticalized social control,
where the affected communities had been
the victims.
Despite this tendency towards segregation,
there have been isolated attempts at approx-
imation. However, these were not system-
atic and hardly changed anything, especially
in the face of a global criminality that was
affecting the reality of Rio de Janeiro ever
more, particularly in favelas.
14
One of the first
initiatives was the CIPOC (Centro Integrado
de Policiamento Comunitrio or Centre for
Community Policing) in the favela Cidade de
Deus, which was based on American mod-
els of community policing, and which com-
bined social policies with public security. The
CIPOC was the beginning of what was later
to become the UPPs. In the meantime, how-
ever, there has been no progress regarding
a systematic approximation strategy to pre-
vent violence and crime. Nor has there been
support from the political community to fol-
low up these initiatives, which simply did not
extend beyond the involvement of the police.
Attempts at approximation were therefore
subverted by a lack of understanding of the
new global crime scenario, and a lack of polit-
ical support and critical assessment of poli-
cies which had been copied from contexts
different from our own. Approximation was
seen as nave and ineffective against the fire
power of the drug traffickers, whichwith
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page5 of 16
the help of the mediawas expanding visibly
within favelas.
Building peace
When the first UPP emerged, no one believed
there was an alternative to policing by wag-
ing war. As the program progressed, people
began to believe more in its potential.
15
This
freed up a symbolic space where repressive
ideologies were being fomented. It is possi-
ble that the UPPs have helped to deconstruct
the myths about the favela, establishing
approximation where before there was just
a theater of operations. This is why pacifica-
tion, which is still incipient, precarious, and
provisional in some aspects, represents a
dramatic improvement on the path to public
security; an audacious movement of approxi-
mation in the exact place where the war was
naturalized. The question is whether it can
be sustained for the long term as an approxi-
mation policy.
The process of pacification currently under-
way in Rio de Janeiro is being conducted by
the State Secretary of Public Safety (SESEG),
16

through the installation of the UPPs in areas
under the control of violent armed groups.
17

It began in 2008 with the occupation by the
Military Police of the favela Santa Marta, in
Botafogo, in the southern zone of Rio. The
following year it would become the states
first UPP.
Although it was not initially christened a
UPP, because the idea had not yet become a
programme as it is today, the idea was that
the police would remain and integrate with
the local community: a completely unprec-
edented approach.
The experience gained from previous
approximation efforts by the Military Police
and some alignment around the idea of pub-
lic safety with citizenship on different levels
of government were fundamental to the pro-
gress of the occupations. After the citys third
UPP was inaugurated
18
and the initiative was
received positively by society, a bolder plan
was developed. Today there are 37 UPPs,
with 9,073 Military Police in 252 favelas;
eight in the southern zone, 23 in the north-
ern zone, two in the western zone, three in
the center of the city and one outside the
state capital, inaugurated recently in the
favela Mangueirinha, in the city of Duque de
Caxias.
19
SESEGs goal is to have least 40 UPPs
and 12,500 military policemen in place by
the end of 2014. No other community polic-
ing programme
20
in the world can compare.
Although institutionally still precarious,
the UPP is equivalent to, within the organiza-
tional structure of the Military Police of the
State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ), a military
company displaced from its original head-
quarters, which is the battalion. It receives
administrative support from the battalion of
the area where it is located, while responsi-
bility for operations falls to the Pacification
Police Coordinator, created in the same exec-
utive order that provided the first institu-
tional outline for the UPP.
21
Local operational
command is exercised by a captain, who is
assisted by other officials but, depending on
the size, staff and strategic importance, the
unit could be commanded by a major. The
services are normally carried out by young
soldiers, who after training are sent directly
to the UPP where they are supervised by
corporals, sergeants and occasionally lieu-
tenants. Their practices distinguish them, in
theory, from the conventional policing units
and controversial police operations, which in
recent decades have focused on these areas
of great social vulnerability. The proposal is
or should beto enter and remain there prac-
ticing so-called proximity policing which, in
broad terms, uses the existing local solidarity
networks to jointly build a safe environment.
The programme uses an occupation plan
that is divided into four distinct phases, start-
ing with an initial eminently military inter-
vention, until the installation of the UPP
itself. After the tactical intervention (phase
I), there is a period of stabilization (phase
II), while awaiting the right moment for the
arrival of the UPP (phase III), at which time
monitoring and evaluation (phase IV) should
be carried out simultaneously. Despite all of
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page6 of 16
these specifications about the preparations
of the environment for the arrival of the UPP,
nowhere in the plan are there any details
on how proximity should be achieved. The
plan, therefore, is basically a military occupa-
tion, since it is clear that its greatest concern
is with the initial phases (I and II), to the det-
riment of the latter phases. This gap should
have been filled by the Public Security
Institute (ISP) through the creation of a
Pacification Police Programme, as provided
for in the executive order that structured the
UPP. However, it has yet to be addressed.
22

On the one hand the UPP maintains a
sophisticated media strategy (see Mello 2010)
in order to deconstruct war and consequently
construct peace, which distinguishes it from
other previous proximity policing initiatives.
However, the same effort is not replicated in
other aspects of the project, such as its insti-
tutional structure, training of its members,
investment in digital security and information
technology. This reveals negligence precisely
where the proposal was to be different: the
ability to promote proximity.
The programme has also been criticized
because of the fact that occupations hap-
pened mainly in favelas that were dominated
by drug dealers and not by militias. In prac-
tice, the tactics for pacification are still based
on a logic of fighting drug trafficking, though
now at least with greater regulatory focus. In
other words, the de facto war requires a war
to retake the fortified territories.
In this way, pacification is presented as an
open-ended approximation process, whose
construction also depends on the daily prac-
tices of its participants. We can find many
references that inspire them, in both official
and unofficial discourse, and representations
that populate the collective imagination of
police, as we will see further ahead.
Established peace
Despite local specificities, research suggests
that the favelas that have been occupied by
the UPPs have certain features in common
(Cano 2012; Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012;
CESeC 2010, 2012 & 2013) among them:
the disappearance of visible drug trafficking,
weapons of war and traumatic police incur-
sions, and a drastic reduction in gunfights,
stray bullets, intentional homicides (primarily
those that resulted from police activity) and
also greater social control over the police,
local criminal activity and greater freedom of
movement for residents. On the other hand,
there are more reports of non-lethal violence,
such as bodily harm, threats, fights and rapes,
as well as defiance of authority and conflict in
families and between neighbors.
23

A reasonable explanation for the rise in the
number of reports of defiance of authority is
the perception by those who work in a UPP
of greater social control over their activities
(CESeC 2010, 2012). The police, because they
feel more controlled, policemen begin to reg-
ister the conflicts they have with residents as
defiance of authority in order to protect them-
selves from future disciplinary action. This
can also occur out of a lack of knowing how
to deal with issues that emerge from the new
model, such as, for example, disturbing the
peace and the conflicting use of public spaces
(CESeC 2013; Cano 2012). The police abuses
and/or the reaction of some residents to the
authority of the state shows a crisis of legiti-
macy. This is why these reports are being mon-
itored by the CPP, for lack of a better indicator.
Another interesting fact is that arrests for
drug trafficking have increased, even though
drug trafficking is less visible. Seizures of
weapons have also increased, primarily fear-
some large-caliber weapons used previously
in violent territorial disputes. With regard to
drug seizures, if before they were sporadic,
but in large amounts, with the UPPs they have
become more frequent, in smaller amounts
being seized. This has led to a less visible and
less violent level of drug trafficking, which the
police have characterized as ant-like.
The increase in non-lethal crime has been
generally attributed to a combination of fac-
tors, such as a burgeoning demand which
was previously repressed by criminal control
now replaced by informal mechanisms of
conflict resolution, the presence of police
and greater credibility of state agencies. The
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page7 of 16
fact is that, although homicides have fallen,
levels of violent sociability persist (Machado
da Silva 2009). Changing this requires appro-
priate conflict mediation approaches.
One fact is worth mentioning: the profile
of those involved in these non-lethal vio-
lent incidents, which are now more widely
reported, appears to coincide with that of
the victims and perpetrators of homicides
that predominated earlier. Generally, they
are young black males, ranging in age from
18 to 29. Similarly, those responsible for inci-
dents of resistance, defiance of authority and
disobedience, also fit this same profile. Given
that most of the police at the UPP are also
in this age range, it can be thought of as a
specific male generational conflict between
young policeman and young local residents.
Alba Zaluar suggests that an ethos of hyper-
masculinity can lead some young people of
the male sex to risk their lives in drug traf-
ficking in search of recognition through the
use of fear (Zaluar 2009). Something similar
appears to occur in the eminently military
education of PMERJ cadets, which is more
focused on the logic of war (Silva 2011).
Both groups experience a virile and violent
socialization during the social construction
of their respective identities, and are at odds
with each other from that time onward. On
one side are those who, in theory, assimilate
what Max Weber defined as the legitimate
violence of the state, and on the other, those
that, a contrario sensu, internalize the ille-
gitimate violence, rejecting Webers rational-
legal authority (Weber 1999).
Although these clues point to important
aspects of pacification to be considered in
carrying out the project, they lack detailed
comprehensive research. In practice, approx-
imation, in its many paths and contexts, gen-
erates not only conflict, but also important
lessons which deserve to be systematized.
Presumed peace
In the absence of a systematic pacification
programme in the true sense of the word,
with concrete goals, concepts, strategies
and above all adequate tools for monitoring
and assessment, pacification can instead be
said to be based on often ambiguous official
discourses, some academic research, a timid
standardization and on a day-by-day learning
process through the intuition and improvisa-
tion of the people who are directly involved
in the programme.
There has been a radical shift in the pub-
lic security rhetoric of the state regarding the
fight against organized crime in favelas. This
can be perceived in the official discourses of
the officials and managers of the Pacification
programme, notably the governemnet, SESEG
and police agencies, as well as in media out-
put. Instead of harsh repression, a hallmark of
the 1990s, the police have now begun, with
the UPPs, to prioritize the prevention of vio-
lence and crime; to establishor reestablish
relations based on trust with the community
and to jointly build effective community net-
works capable of producing local safety.
However, increasingly frequent prob-
lems appear to reveal a certain distance
between the model proposed in these dis-
courses and what is actually practiced in
the UPPs. It should be noted that, although
the UPP does not have a set public policy in
the formal sense, it is under construction,
with each unit presenting different circum-
stances, some more, and others less like the
model proclaimed in the official discourses.
Nevertheless, this does not invalidate it as a
successful policy. Its results are more promis-
ing than those of the war on drugs.
Pacification and approximation can also
be presumed based on these daily practices
and the representations that direct them.
But, whatever the case, approximation or
segregation, the favela has invariably been
the stage for police operations, despite the
conceptual controversies that it has stirred
up (Ramos & Paiva 2007). The official justi-
fication, in the case of the UPPs, appears to
point to more than one of the representa-
tions of the favela: the need to re-integrate it
with the rest of the city to interrupt the cycle
of violence that appears to be generated
from its territorial dynamics. It is evident
that, despite these expectations, the UPP
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page8 of 16
will not resolve the problems of public secu-
rity of the state by operating in the favelas,
as some might imagine. To believe in this is
to insist on a simplistic view of public safety
that reduces it to an eminently police prob-
lem based on the myths about the favela,
ignoring fundamental participants outside
the focus of its problems, including those
of the criminal justice system. Weapons and
drugs, for example, require specific investi-
gations that are not limited to state territory
and that go beyond the mandate of the mili-
tary police.
Peace practiced
The gap in the UPP programme gives it a
certain practical plasticity, leaving it open to
be built day-by-day, which in the beginning
benefited from the contribution of partici-
pants that normally would not have done so
in the case of a formal construction, such as
local leaders and police. But today, with the
expansion of the programme, this is more
of a threat than an opportunity for strategic
management.
This gap is perceived as having been filled
by a broad framework of know-how ranging
from shoot-beat-and-bomb, an expression
used to refer to police operations based on
the logic of war, to superficial and unwork-
able nice guy policing, which sees the UPP
as an opportunity to improve the image of
the police. It is likely that the problems that
currently face the UPPs, primarily the cases
of deviations and arbitrary use of force, have
to do with this poor managerial control.
Regardless of the meaning that the term
community may evoke, each favela presents
a different set of circumstances. Even a single
favela is a mosaic of internal stratifications,
physical and symbolic borders, histories and
specific needs. The process of pacification
depends on many factors, but, primarily,
on the participation of local leaders, police
and residents, and an understanding of this
dynamic to build consensus.
Pacification unveils novelties for a police
force that in recent decades has focused
almost exclusively on drug trafficking. Bias
and stigmatizing prejudice often make it
impossible for the police to see the range of
relations and participants that make up local
structures. Because of biased perceptions,
very often, the presence of drug trafficking is
morally contaminating for those who have to
live with it on a daily basis. This is a mistake
that needs to be corrected so that efforts at
approximation are not compromised. What
we see is that the police still concentrate
primarily on drug trafficking, despite the
changes that have occurred in the criminal
dynamic as a result of the UPP. Most of the
time they report incidents related to drug
trafficking to the Coordinators Office for
the Pacification Police.
24
However, incidents
recorded by the police stations, entered into
the database of the Institute of Public Safety
(ISP), show a considerable increase in other
types of conflict that could be key to under-
standing this process. Most of them fall out-
side the focus produced by structures of an
old paradigm.
There is a clear need for proper training
so that the police can better understand this
field of disputes in which it has become a
participant (Grynzspan 2004). The risk is
when, inadvertently, they produce conflicts
that are not conducive to the objectives
of pacification. There are new participants
like NGOs, companies, social programmes,
homeowner associations, the administrative
region and more recently, militias. But, some-
how drug trafficking ends up receiving more
attention than the others.
Drug trafcking
It must be understood that each of these
participants represents complex institutions.
Drug trafficking, for example, has various spe-
cialties and divisions of social work which are
poorly understood. Without this understand-
ing, it is likely that the UPP police will still
view the favela through their understanding
about favelas, where this illegal and violent
market may be over or underestimated. For
a more realistic view, one must understand
the dynamics, structures of loyalty and hierar-
chies in a more systematic manner.
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page9 of 16
For example, not all who take part in
drug trafficking receive an equal share of
the spoils, like the public might imagine
based on reports from the media. When the
media discusses drug trafficking, increasing
the criminal prestige of the owners of the
favela, it also indirectly curtails their free
movement in the formal city. With the UPPs,
their mobility is even further restricted and
some are arrested or flee to other hiding
placesthat are quickly disappearing due to
the pacification. A proper understanding of
the dynamics and more effective cooperation
with other participants would make the UPP
more effective and, consequently, improve
public security.
There have been cases of drug dealers
who were forced to leave their territorial
domains after occupation, but who still tried
to maintain control of their criminal opera-
tions through intimidation from a distance.
At times there have been more extreme acts
of violence, such as shootings and attempted
murder between opponents. Therefore even
despite effective police work in an area, vio-
lent acts orchestrated by those who fear los-
ing their local hegemonic control, are likely
to occur. Such seemingly impulsive behav-
iour in reality indicates some calculation,
especially when they occur in UPPs where
approximation is well underway and where
the loss of control could lead to considerable
financial losses for the drug dealers.
The risk of not understanding these
dynamics in a more realistic way is that apart
from an insensitivity towards the community,
the older structures of the former policing
model will be reproduced in these contexts.
Very often the reaction of the police, because
it cannot resist the tempation to resort to old
methods, is too impulsive, thereby undoing
the success that has already been achieved
through pacification. However, when the
police form networks of trust with other par-
ticipants, this brings tranquility to their work
environment and reduces the risk of them
returning to old habits. To get to this stage
a mutual humanizing learning process must
take place between favela residents and the
police. This enables a deconstruction of the
myths about the favela in practice. However,
patience is necessary. In contrast, pure and
simple repression, appears quickly and tends
to destroy these local networks to the disad-
vantage of the police, generating segregation
and a host of related problems.
Even without an institutional pedagogical
plan, it is important to encourage co-opera-
tion and practical understanding between
the police and community residents, aim-
ing in this way at gradually destabilising the
criminal structure of the area. Although a
democratic way of negotiation and mitiga-
tion of differences might still be unfamiliar
to professionals who are never used to even
hearing about these methods, it is crucial to
maintain this strategy in order to reach the
goals of pacification. It is also important to
build an institutional body of knowledge
about these relationships and the different
interests at play in order to be able act stra-
tegically in the complex battlefield of the
favelas. In the absence of this institutional
knowledge building, there is a greater risk
that obtained information will be spread by
policemen in a clandestine fashion.
Some of the violent conflicts between
police officers and criminals suggest that,
even with the presence of a UPP, some police
officers, for whom war is a particularised
means instead of an end in itself may still
resort to old criminal practices. In such cases,
the process of approximation is jeopardised
not by a lack of proper training of police offic-
ers or an appropriate understanding of the
local structures. On the contrary, the process
is damaged by a mere localised understand-
ing of these structures that maintain illegal
businesses which thrive in the absence of
formal mechanisms of control. In the UPPs
where these diversions were detected, it
was clear that the project stagnated or even
receded due to the distrust of the local popu-
lation, and this happened even when the
criminals had been arrested.
Both the emotional war, the product of a
moralist state authoritarianism that pits good
against evil, and the rational war, designed
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page10 of 16
to provide clandestine profits through the
sale of political merchandise, (Misse 1999)
are predatory and fritter away the capital
of approximation, which is its legitimacy. It
is important that this threat be continually
monitored. To do so, it is necessary to invest
in proactive and reactive correction so that
the objectives of pacification are quickly
achieved. Although greater informal control
is perceived over police activity, the lack of
appropriate technology and, many times,
the authoritarian and arrogant culture that
infests many of our institutions (including
the police) has stymied a quick institutional
response. There is no systemized control of
police activities; there are not enough cam-
eras, data or information systems to moni-
tor predatory activity and aid in legitimate
approximation.
Relations with other actors
The favela has many different meanings and
uses, depending on the perspectives and the
interests of the actors who have a stake in
this battlefield (Grynszpan 2004). In gen-
eral, the structures of this field are different
depending on the favela, but some points
in common enable us to observe important
trends for the planning of approximation.
In this sense, interaction with participants,
aimed at convergence of interests, has been
fundamental. However, the situation often
changes depending on individual capac-
ity and whether leaders understand their
roles. Participants, such as the Residents
Associations, NGOs, social programmes, pri-
vate companies, the administrative region and
young people, are either in favor or against
the new participant: the UPP. Depending on
the UPPs approach and the capacity for coor-
dination, these interactions with participants
can result in cooperation or conflict. The
greatest risk is that the police will eventually
replace drug traffickers as the new owners of
the favela (Cano 2012).
In a field as complex and dynamic as the
favela, synergy has to be developed on a daily
basis in order to reach consensus between
the different and divergent parties at play.
The question is knowing up to what point
these parties are capable of working within
this idea. Since the training of the military
police is still based on eminently military
models rather than more modern training
methods (Silva 2011), the development of
individual leadership in a dialogic scenario
that would be necessary for peace is not
prioritized. Skills such as hearing, listening,
and being perceptive are almost annihi-
lated in the formation of military discipline
and obedience. However, these are abso-
lutely necessary and should be encouraged
through this dialogic paradigm which aims
at the construction of peace. Unfortunately,
this is not happening. Therefore the pro-
gramme will be dependent mostly on the
talent and intuition of individual officers
and on those who are innate leaders, when
it could also be guided by other, adequately
trained and improved, types of leadership. In
some UPPs, there is room for dialogue and
legitimate police actions, whereas in others
there is only a physical police presence with-
out any concern for legitimisation (CESeC
2013; Cano 2012). Generally, what happens
and when it happens is an intuitive approxi-
mation with those other actors who have
managed to maintain the programme with
a certain coherence. However, because of a
lack of proper understanding, this often ends
up being more chaotic than effective, lead-
ing to conflicts and unnecessary damage to
the programme.
This is the case, for example, with regard
to the open-air dances or bailes funk and
other cultural projects created by young par-
ticipants. Often, due to negative perceptions,
these events are seen as drug trafficking pro-
jects and are not used as possible channels for
approximation with a group that, as we have
seen, is key to the prevention of violence and,
consequently, to the process of peace.
Therefore, the main factors that still
contribute to strategic errors are: a lack of
understanding and proactivity needed for
approximation due to the lack of appropriate
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page11 of 16
specific training; the old police structures
still producing the war mentality; the resist-
ance to pacification from young policemen
who, with their ethos of hyper-masculinity,
are more receptive to the adrenalin provided
by the reactive model of policing than the
model of peace; and the individual interest
in the benefits that predatory war can offer.
For each of these problems there should be
an institutional solution. Solutions, however,
are not forthcoming. Perhaps it is necessary
to rethink the SESEGs prioritization of recent
graduates for the UPPs, in favor of those truly
committed and trained for pacification.
A special pedagogical training project
for UPP policemen was requested by CPP
to SESEG, which so far has not been imple-
mented in the same way as the Pacifying
Police Programme. At that time, the project
had been designed as an urgent and provi-
sional solution for the problem of the pro-
fessional profile of the UPP, which must be
governed by the concept of proximity polic-
ing and which is entirely different from
conventional policing methods. In practi-
cal terms, this training course would offer a
solution for the UPP problem, but not for the
military police as a whole. Therefore the UPP
should be seen as a pilot project, in which
all the necessary changes for the police as a
whole should be first implemented, so that
the pacification programme can move for-
ward. Unfortunately, this strategy to reform
the police has been discarded by SESEG.
Nevertheless, since 2013 the PMERJ has been
developing a more comprehensive strategic
reconfiguration project for the UPPs as well
as the entire police force with the aim of
implementing proximity policing through-
out Rio state by 2016. The project also has
a specific strategic action plan to change
the entire educational system, also by 2016.
However, this seems too long for a process
which was begun in 2009 and is already out-
dated and in urgent need of adaptation.
Today, basic police education in the Center
for Education and Improvement of Garrisons
(CFAP) continues in practically the same way
since before the start of pacification. The only
difference is there is a provisional internship
of the pacification police, which was impro-
vised by the CPP to reduce the impact of a
war-like education and prepare policemen
for the situations they would encounter in
the favelas.
Final Considerations
UPPs represents a transition from the tra-
ditional highly reactive model of policing
to a modern proactive model based on the
prevention of violence and crime. It is not
a ready-made project, but one under con-
struction, and which still depends much
on individual skill and local leadership
both from policemen and other key partici-
pants. This makes it variable and inconstant.
Nevertheless, UPPs have produced many pos-
itive outcomes. The main one is the cease-
fire (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012) resulting
regaining territorial control of the most dan-
gerous favelas.
Change always brings crisis and rupture
where the old paradigm clashes with the
new; this forms a normal part of the tran-
sition process. However, the lack of clearly
defined objectives leads to uncertainties,
not only for society as a whole but also for
the police force involved in the process. The
biggest problem is when due to a lack of sys-
tematic measures, crises are interpreted as
a failure of the whole pacification project,
especially when the temptation to resort to
old practices is not resisted. These practices
result in the opposite of approximation,
leading to segregation and all its preda-
tory effects. Due to this segregation, acts
of violence emerge; not only state violence,
which appeals to authoritarians and police
warriors, but above all a secret and instru-
mental violence, which creates an ideal envi-
ronment for a wide range of underground
criminal activities.
There is still much to be done to secure a
sustainable peace. There is also an immense
social divide due to the historical segrega-
tion that needs to be quickly reversed so that
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page12 of 16
these informal spaces can finally be mini-
mized. These are not just priorities for the
police, but for an entire society that longs for
pacification.
The facts established in quantitative
and qualitative research are helpful, but it
is important to create indicators suitably
adjusted to the program to ensure good
management through constant and effective
monitoring. Approximation and prevention
indicators are not easy to create, primarily
when there is no systemized collection of
data or even appropriate digital systems. For
this reason SESEG hired a specialized consul-
tancy, but its product needs to be made avail-
able to managers as quickly as possible.
It is important to invest in digital and
social technology that provides support
for pacification. If this does not happen, it
will be just another project based on a vast
amount of human resources, but not neces-
sarily on the quality and training of these
resources. Technologies are urgently needed
for social prevention and public security that
enable rationalization of these resources;
for the gathering of information, systema-
tization and analysis of data on prevention
activities that enable effective planning,
with analyses of correlations between what
is done, the intended outcome and what is
actually achieved.
Today these non-criminal data are still
invisible to the institution for various rea-
sons, but primarily due to inadequate police
structure. An urgent reform of police institu-
tions is therefore necessary. Otherwise, the
risk of replicating previous models remains
high. To reduce this risk, ambiguities must be
removed from official discourses, and what
is institutionally desired from the process of
pacification must be decided. To do this, it is
necessary to first state and understand what
a UPP actually is. The executive order that
provided the minimum structure is still pro-
visory, addressing specifically the initial war,
which although necessary, cannot be seen as
an end in itself, but rather as a beginning of
a peace to be consolidated in the medium to
long term.
If this is not the objective, a wider reform
of police forces might not even be needed,
since the issue can be solved with more of
the same. In this case, our concern is no
longer quality, but quantity; the number of
police officers needed to reach the goals
of the programme, and not the quality of
these resources. These goals have been
reached to a reasonable degree through an
accelerated production of police officers,
which however causes institutional, opera-
tional and mostly emotional issues to the
ones who try to carry out pacification in a
coherent manner. Therefore, the objective
should be quality.
It is important to understand that the UPP
alone will not resolve the complex problems
of public safety, despite the expectation cre-
ated in the media that it can. The exclusive
focus on the favela may be a signal that the
old representations are being reproduced,
which probably obfuscates the perception of
a large part of public security problems. It is
necessary to consider that, with the demo-
cratic invasion of the 1990s not only the
forces of the criminal economy of drug traf-
ficking were freed (Napoleoni 2010), but also
the forces of silent crime, less visible and vio-
lent, which probably impacts other environ-
ments of Rio de Janeiro (not just the favela),
without attracting so much attention.
The medias focus on the UPP is an example
of the paradox of nonviolent crime, despite
being equally predatory, and enabling the
well-known and feared players of the favela
to continue. Other important participants,
including the criminal justice system itself,
also end up overshadowed, which in the end
requires even more from the UPPs.
If war was socially constructed even
before it actually existed, nowadays peace
is constructed through a sophisticated strat-
egy of media communication. However, it is
about time this so-called peace became an
effective and efficient peace. Otherwise, this
will only be an isolated, if more far-ranging,
measure, with more sophisticated media
appeal and with more political involvement,
but still only yet another story of segregation
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page13 of 16
among the many we have seen so far. Public
policies cannot survive on goodwill alone.
Author Information
Robson Rodrigues da Silva is a Senior
Researcher at the Instituto Igarap, a Colonel
in the Military Police, the former General
Co-ordinator of the Unidades de Polcia
Pacificadora (UPPs) and the former Chief of
Staff of the Military Police of the State of Rio
de Janeiro (PMERJ). He holds a BA in Law from
the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
(UERJ) and an MA in Anthropology from the
Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF).
Notes

1
Self-built communities of mostly low-
income people.

2
Other data can be collected and confirmed
with the CPP, by e-mail comandoupp.
pmerj@gmail.com or through its website
at: www.coordenadoriaupp.com.br.

3
The Participatory Budget, as analysed by
Santos, is an important example of par-
ticipatory democracy, which was begun
in Porto Alegre and then replicated in
other cities in Brazil and abroad. It means
that civil society itself decides or at least
influences the distribution of resources
in the legislative budgetary process.

4
The construction of these different and
antagonistic representations regarding
the city of Rio de Janeiro.

5
As Durkheim (1964) has put it, [T]he
kingdom of ends and impersonal truths
can realize itself only by the co-operation
of particular wills, and the reasons for
which these participate in it are the same
as those for which they co-operate. In a
word, there is something impersonal in
us because there is something social in
all of us, and since social life embraces at
once both representations and practices,
this impersonality naturally extends to
ideas as well as to acts, (p. 446).

6
The phenomenon of consolidation of the
favela is described by Mariana Cavalcanti
(2009), as a result of two social processes:
the change from removal policies to
urbanization policies and the appropria-
tion of its space by drug trafficking.

7
General in the Brazilian Army who in
1981, during the military dictatorship,
had already commanded the PMERJ (Mili-
tary Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
and who from 19951998 was Secretary
of Public Security during the Marcelo
Alencar administration.

8
In his return to Brazil, Brizola, who had
gone into exile after the military coup of
1964, was the first governor of the state
elected by direct vote after the dictator-
ship. His discourse emphasized respect
for human rights, especially those in the
favelas, which was his political base.

9
It was symptomatic that the Wild West
bonus was created during the General
Cerqueiras term in office. The General had
become notorious in the military dictator-
ship for having, while still a major in the
Army, planned and commanded Operation
Pajussara in 1971 in Bahia which killed the
former captain and army deserter, Carlos
Lamarca, an active member of the armed
guerrillas and main leader of the Revo-
lutionary Popular Vanguard (VPR). See
Miranda & Silva Filho (1989).

10
Administrative method for registering
murders carried out by agents of the state
in the performance of their duties.

11
According to data from Instituto Bra-
sileiro de Geografia e Estatstica (IBGE),
available at http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.
gov.br/series.aspx?vcodigo=MS4 [Last
accessed 10 April 2014].

12
In 1994, when the Army came to support
the states fight against organized crime
and the so-called Operation Rio (Coim-
bra 2001), the military police received
on loan for this mission their first Light
Automatic Rifle (FAL), which would soon
become its standard weapon.

13
For a historic analysis of this event, see
Anatomia de um erro [Anatomy of an
error], in part I by Buergiman (2011).

14
To understand the insensitivity with
regard to these impacts, including from
the Academy, see Zaluar (2000).
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page14 of 16

15
Some research has confirmed an increase
in these expectations with regard to the
UPPs, despite the problems (IBPS 2009;
Mapear 2010; FGV 2009). A recent study
by the Instituto Data Favela, published in
the media, showed that despite the prob-
lems, 75 per cent of the residents of the
favelas approve of the UPPs. Available at
http://memoria.ebc.com.br/agenciabra-
sil/noticia/2013-11-04/quase-30-dos-
moradores-de-favelas-ja-se-sentiram-dis-
criminados-diz-pesquisa [Last accessed
12 April 2014].

16
SESEG is the state executive branch
agency responsible for planning and
developing policy for public security.
Under its auspices are two police forces
that, according to Brazilian legislation,
share the function of preserving pub-
lic order in the state. The Military Police
of the State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) is
responsible for patrolling and preventing
crimes, while the Civil Police of the State
of Rio de Janeiro (PCERJ), is responsible
for investigating crimes.

17
State Executive Order no. 42787, from
January 6, 2011, established the UPPs.

18
This is the Jardim Batam UPP, inaugu-
rated in the western zone on 18 February
2009.

19
Data available at www.upprj.com/index.
php/historico.

20
Community Policing, Proximity Policing
and Problem-Oriented Policing are very
similar strategies, philosophies or prin-
ciples that, in general, bring the police
closer to the community to solve prob-
lems concerning local safety (Skolnick
and Bailey 2002).

21
The regulation that legally established
the UPP is made up of two executive
orders, the first is no. 41.650, from 21
January 2009, that created it in broad
terms shortly after the occupation of
the favela Santa Marta. The second is
no. 42.787, from 6 January 2011, which
is more detailed, establishing a plan for
occupation of the territories where the
UPPs will be installed.

22
Article 10, State Executive Order 42.787
charged ISP with the monitoring of activi-
ties at the UPPs on a biannual basis, with
regard to their quantitative and qualita-
tive aspects, as well as the development
of a Pacification Police Program (PPP),
which should contain, among other top-
ics, its objectives, concepts, strategies,
indicators and evaluation methodology.

23
The criminal data recorded by UPPs can
be found on the ISP web site.

24
The Pacification Police Coordinators
Office (CPP) at the time created a data-
base for the analysis of operational activi-
ties of the UPPs. It was called the Perma-
nence Database, because it contained
police reports from each unit for collec-
tion online and in real time 24 hours a
day. Preliminary data about police reports
and most striking information is included
in this database.
References
Aguiar, O A 2008 Juzo de gosto e legitimi-
dade em Hannah Arendt. Philsophos -
Revista de Filosofia, [S.l.], 8(2). ISSN 1982
2928. Available at http://www.revistas.
ufg.br/index.php/philosophos/article/
view/3215 [Last accessed 26 January
2014]. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5216/
phi.v8i2.3215
Arendt, H 2007 Entre o passado e o futuro.
6th ed. So Paulo: Perspectiva, pp. 127
187.
Borges, D 2012 O medo do crime na cidade do
Rio de Janeiro. Uma anlise sob a perspec-
tiva das Crenas de Perigo. Curitiba: Appris
Bourdieu, P 2005 A economia das trocas
simblicas. 6th ed. So Paulo: Perspectiva.
Burgierman, D R 2011 O fm da guerra. A
maconha e a criao de um novo sistema
para lidar com as drogas. So Paulo: Leya.
Cano, I 2003 Execues sumrias no Bra-
sil. In: Execues sumrias no Brasil
1997/2003. Rio de Janeiro: Justia
Global/Ncleo de Estudos Negros.
Cano, I 2012 Os Donos do Morro: Uma
avaliao exploratria do impacto das
Unidades de Polcia Pacificadora (UPPs)
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page15 of 16
no Rio de Janeiro. Relatrio de Pesquisa.
Rio de Janeiro, LAV/UERJ E Frum Bra-
sileiro de Segurana Pblica. Available at
http://www.lav.uerj.br/docs/rel/2012/
relatuppp.pdf [Last accessed 14 January
2014].
Cavalcanti, M 2009 Do barraco casa:
tempo, espao e valor(es) em uma favela
consolidada. Revista Brasileira de Cin-
cias Sociais, 24. Available at http://www.
redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=10713664005
[Last accessed 9 January 2014]. DOI:
http: //dx. doi . org/10.1590/S0102-
69092009000100005
CESeC 2012 Projeto Unidades de Polcia
Pacifcadora: O que pensam os policiais.
Resultados de 2010 e 2012.
CESeC 2013 Ser policial de UPP: aproxi-
maes e resitncias. Boletim segurana
e cidadania, 14.
Coimbra, C 2001 Operao Rio: mito das
classes perigosas: um estudo sobre a
violncia urbana, a mdia impressa e os
discursos de segurana pblica. Niteri:
Intertexto.
Durkheim, E 1964 The elementary forms
of the religious life. 5th impression. Los
Angeles: University of California Library.
Elias, N 1994 The Civilizing Process. Socio-
genetic and Psychogenetic Investigations.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
FGV 2009 Avaliao do Impacto do Policia-
mento Comunitrio na Cidade de Deus e
no Dona Marta. Relatrio de Pesquisa.
Foucault, M 2007 Histria da Sexualidade. A
vontade de saber. 19th ed. Rio de Janeiro:
Editora Graal.
Grynszpan, M 2004 As favelas cariocas
como espao de disputas: poder pblico,
terceiro setor, associao de moradores e
trfico de drogas. Latin American Studies
Association LASA Congress Paper Archive.
IBSP 2009 O impacto das Unidades de Polcia
Pacifcadora nas cidades do Rio de Janeiro.
Relatrio de Pesquisa.
Leite, M P 2000 Entre o individualismo e a
solidariedade: dilemas da poltica e da
cidadania no Rio de Janeiro. Revista Bra-
sileira de Cincias Sociais, 15(44): 4390.
Available at http://www.scielo.br/sci-
elo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-
69092000000300004&lng=en&tlng=pt.
10.1590/S0102-69092000000300004
[Last accessed 29 January 2014]. DOI:
http: //dx. doi . org/10.1590/S0102-
69092000000300004
Machado da Silva, L A 2009 Polcia e segu-
rana pblica no Rio de Janeiro de hoje.
In: Oliveira K B, Oliveira G Olhares sobre
a preveno criminalidade. Belo Hori-
zonte, MG: Instituto Elo.
Machado da Silva, L A Afnal, qual a das
UPPs? 2010. Available at http://www.
observatoriodasmetropoles. ufrj. br/
artigo_machado_UPPs.pdf
Mapear 2010 Avalio das UPPs. Pesquisa
Quantitativa. Relatrio de Pesquisa.
Mello, M F P 2010 O fenmeno miditico
das UPPs: anlise do discurso do Jornal O
Globo sobre a poltica pblica de pacifi-
cao das favelas cariocas. Monografia
(Graduao em Comunicao Social
Jornalismo) Universidade Federal do
Rio de Janeiro UFRJ, Escola de Comuni-
cao ECORio de Janeiro.
Miranda, O e Silva Filho, E J 1989 Lamarca.
O capito da guerrilha. 12th ed. So
Paulo: Global.
Misse, M 1999 MALANDROS, MARGINAIS E
VAGABUNDOS & a acumulao social da
violncia no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro:
IUPERJ, Tese de Doutorado em Sociologia.
Monjardet, D 2003 O que faz a Polcia:
Sociologia da Fora Pblica. So Paulo:
EDUSP.
Napoleoni, L 2010 Economia bandida. A
nova realidade do capitalismo. Rio de
Janeiro: DIFEL.
Ramos, S and Paiva, A 2007 Mdia e Violn-
cia: novas tendncias na cobertura de
criminalidade e segurana no Brasil. Rio
de Janeiro: IUPERJ.
Rodrigues, A and Siqueira, R 2012 As Uni-
dades de polcia pacificadora e a segurana
pblica no Rio e Janeiro. In: Rodrigues, A,
Siqueira, R and Lissovsky, M Unidades de
Polcia Pacifcadora: Debates e Refexes.
Comunicaes do ISER, 31(67): 952.
Rodrigues: The Dilemmas of Pacifcation Art.22, page16 of 16
Santos, B de S 1977 The law of the oppressed:
The construction and reproduction of the
legality in Parsagada. Law & Society Review,
12(1). Available at http://www.boaven-
turadesousasantos.pt/media/The%20
law%20of%20the%20oppressed_1978.
pdf [Last accessed 27 April 2014].
Santos, B de S 2005 Democratizar a democ-
racia. Os caminhos da democracia par-
ticipativa. 3 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizao
Brasileira.
Silva, R R da 2011 Entre a caserna e a
rua: o dilema do pato. Uma anlise
antropolgica da instituio policial mili-
tar, a paretir da Academia de Policia Mili-
tar D. Joo VI. Niteri: EDUFF.
Skolnick, J and Bailey, D 2002 Policiamento
Comunitrio. So Paulo: EDUSP.
Souza e Silva, J 2010 As Unidades de Pol-
cia Pacifcadora e os novos desafos para
as favelas cariocas. Seminrio Aspec-
tos Humanos da Favela Carioca. Rio
de Janeiro, Laboratrios de Etnografia
Metropolitana w(Le Metro)-IFCS-UFRJ,
maio de 2010. Available at http://obser-
vatoriodefavelas.org.br/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/Aspectos-humanos-
das-favelas-cariocas.pdf [Last accessed 2
February 2014].
Wacquant, L 2001 Prises da misria. Rio de
Janeiro: Zahar.
Weber, M 1999 Economia e sociedade. Fun-
damentos da sociologia compreensiva.
2. Braslia, DF: Editora Universidade de
Braslia.
Zaluar, A 2000 A globalizao do crime e os
limites da exlicao local. In: Cidadania e
violncia. VELHO, Gilberto; ALVITO, mar-
cos (orgs), Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ,
Editora FGV, 2: 4969.
Zaluar, A 2009 Agresso fsica e gnero na
cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Rev. bras. Ci. Soc,
24(71): 924. ISSN 01026909. Available
at http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbcsoc/
v24n71/v24n71a02.pdf [Last accessed 2
February 2014].
How to cite this article: Rodrigues, R 2014 The Dilemmas of Pacifcation: News of War and Peace
in the Marvelous City. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 22, pp.1-16,
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.dt
Published: 22 May 2014
Copyright: 2014 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY 3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.


Stability: International Journal of Security & Development is a
peer-reviewed open access journal published by Ubiquity Press
OPEN ACCESS